Producing Objectivity Under Assumption of Values

My intention is to put the problem of objectivity under examination from a very specific viewpoint, namely by focusing on the theory of judgement, which has been defended in the so-called South-Western School of neo-Kantianism. As one knows, the main representatives of this School are Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask and Bruno Bauch. Those authors are known, first and foremost, for having supported the view that valuation and assumption of values play a basic role in almost all the domains of our life, including our scientific life. This view forms the basis of their theory of knowledge or epistemology, which is prior to any methodological distinction between natural and cultural sciences (so it would be misleading to say that they confine that view to their foundation of cultural sciences and humanities). What, then, does such an ‘axiological’ theory of knowledge exactly mean? What does it imply for the construction of a theory of objectivity? And how is it related to Kant’s foundational program?