Scoring-rule and the choice of a contractor by a financially constrained government

Reference : Scoring-rule and the choice of a contractor by a financially constrained government


	Document type :	Scientific congresses and symposiums : Unpublished conference/Abstract
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/82741

Title :	Scoring-rule and the choice of a contractor by a financially constrained government
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Gautier, Axel [Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Economie industrielle >]
Publication date :	15-Jun-2010
Peer reviewed :	Yes
On invitation :	No
Audience :	International
Event name :	International conference on "contracts, procurement and public-private agreements'
Event date :	June 14, 15
Event organizer :	Chaire EPPP, IAE
Event place (city) :	Paris
Event country :	France
Keywords :	[en] PPP ; Budget constraint ; Scoring-rule
Abstract :	[en] Governments and public authorities are increasingly relying on Public-Private Partnerships for the provision of public goods and services. It is often argued that the use of a public private partnership can relieve the government from a strained budget constraint and, in this paper, we analyze the choice of a contractual solution for designing, constructing and managing a project, with observable externalities, by a budget-constrained government. We show that the quality of the project and the designed contractor are affected by the extent of the budget constraint and we show that the use of a PPP may partially overcome the resulting inefficiencies.
Target :	Researchers ; Professionals
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/82741

There is no file associated with this reference.

All documents in ORBi are protected by a user license.