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Abstract :
[en] Since the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid-1990s, the world trade system notes a spread of international trade agreements (ITAs) which has configured the world map of trading relationships resembling a “Spaghetti bowl”. This bewildering range of geographical configurations of ITAs at a regional and extra-regional level containing a tangle of rules of origin (RO) prompts worries about an inefficiency so-called the “Spaghetti bowl” Phenomenon (SBP). This chapter re-examines the relationship between ITAs and this inefficient situation. It discusses the evidence of SBP by surveying relevant empirical studies and ITAs and analyzing data. At first, it presents the contain of the political economy of trade agreement by reviewing the reasons of a trade agreement formation, and giving some justifications of the proliferation of ITAs. Secondly, it makes an analysis of the data on ITAs and trade, relating it to the existing studies, in order to highlight the evidence on the trade diversion of ITAs. As conclusion, the multiplication of ITAs might result in trade diversion effects because of higher transaction costs due to a mass of overlapping rules. Even if the percentage of world trade covered by ITAs has expanded sharply, the multiplication of ITAs nevertheless diverts trade including often some bilateral ITA relations no impact on trade. However, the relative size of trade creation and trade diversion depends on trade elasticities between the trading partners. In the question of the tangle of RO, recent plurilateral agreements (intra and extra regions) involving many countries, such as CETA, TPP, etc., have the potential to reduce the SBP of ITAs especially if they supersede existing bilateral agreements and develop common rules (such as for RO) to be applied by all the parties to the agreement. This chapter is intended as a tool for policymakers considering new regional trade agreements, and as a reference paper for academics interesting in SBP.
