Reference : Algorithms for testing the collective consumption model
Scientific congresses and symposiums : Unpublished conference/Abstract
Business & economic sciences : Quantitative methods in economics & management
Algorithms for testing the collective consumption model
Talla Nobibon, Fabrice [Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - KUL > > > >]
Cherchye, Laurens [Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - KUL > > > >]
Crama, Yves mailto [Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Recherche opérationnelle et gestion de la production >]
Demuynck, Thomas [Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - KUL > > > >]
De Rock, Bram [Université Libre de Bruxelles - ULB > > > >]
Spieksma, Frits [Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - KUL > > > >]
Ordered Structures in Games and Decision
9 novembre 2012
Université Paris I — Panthéon-Sorbonne
[en] revealed preferences ; rationality axioms ; algorithms
[en] In this talk, we discuss an extension of the strong axiom of revealed preferences to
collective households. The question that we address is whether a set of observed
consumption baskets can be decomposed in such a way that each of the derived data
sets reflects the choices of a “rational” (i.e., utility-maximizing) individual member
of the household.
Although testing revealed preference axioms on data generated by a single decisionmaker
can be done in polynomial time, the extension to two-member households is
We propose two algorithms for testing the collective consumption model on large
data sets. The first one is an exact algorithm based on a new mixed-integer programming
formulation, whereas the second one is a heuristic based on a simulated
annealing procedure that solves a global optimization formulation of the problem.
Computational experiments are performed on real-life data.

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