[en] The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the efficiency of different types of contracts between the industrial partners of a supply chain. Such an evaluation is made on the basis of the relationship between a producer facing a random demand and a supplier with a random lead time. The model combines queuing theory for evaluation aspects and game theory for decisional purposes.
Disciplines :
Production, distribution & supply chain management
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