Dewalque, A. (2018). Natural Classes in Brentano's Psychology. Brentano‐Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 16, 111-142.
This article argues that Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena is best understood against the background of the theories of natural classification held by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Section 1 ...
Dewalque, A. (2017). Brentano's Mind: Unity Without Simplicity. Rivista di Filosofia, 3/2017, 349-364.
This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In ...
Dewalque, A. (2017). L'expérience de la valeur: Brentano, Ehrenfels, Meinong. Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 115(3), 455-479.
This article is intended to be a contribution to the history of « Austrian philosophy ». It provides a succinct historical reconstruction of the debate in which Brentano, Ehrenfels and Meinong opposed one ...
Dewalque, A. (2017). Külpe on Cognitive Attitudes. Discipline Filosofiche, 27(2), 157-176.
This paper offers a reconstruction of Külpe’s theory of cognitive attitudes from the perspective of contemporary debates about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that Külpe’s view constrasts with analytic ...
Dewalque, A. (2017). Emotional Phenomenology: Toward a Nonreductive Analysis. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 41, 27-40.
In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually ...
Dewalque, A. (2016). L'intentionnalité cognitive et ses modes. Reinach critique de Brentano. Philosophie, 128, 20-33.
Dans cet article, je suggère que la théorie reinachienne du jugement peut être vue comme une contribution à une théorie générale de l’intentionnalité cognitive et de ses modes. À cette fin, je focaliserai mon ...
Dewalque, A., & Seron, D. (2015). Existe-t-il des phénomènes mentaux? Philosophie, 124, 105-126.
This paper offers a critical discussion of the so-called argument from the transparency of experience. We recall of the argument against the historical background of phenomenal anti-dualism (Natorp, Wundt ...