I. Salem and A. Gautier. "The effect of prices and pricing systems on the quantities of residential waste: Evidence from Wallonia, Belgium." (eprint/working paper , 2020). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/249356.
M. Manuel de Villena Millan, A. Gautier, D. Ernst, M. Glavic, and R. Fonteneau. "Modelling and Assessing the Impact of the DSO’s Remuneration Strategy on its Interaction with Electricity Users." (eprint/working paper , 2020). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/229747.
This paper presents a simulation-based methodology for assessing the impact of employing different distribution system operator’s remuneration strategies on the economic sustainability of electrical distribution systems. The proposed methodology accounts for the uncertainties posed by the integration of distributed electricity generation resources, and the roll out of smart-meters. The different remuneration strategies analysed in this paper include notably new distribution tariffs based on individual peak power consumption and time-dependent rates that are contingent on the time of energy consumption, both requiring smart-meters to work. The distributed electricity generation resources are modelled through an optimisation framework and an investment decision process that gradually deploys household photovoltaic installations depending on their profitability and the electricity charges, including the distribution rates. The impact of the distribution system operator’s remuneration strategy is measured by an accurate modelling of the remuneration mechanism of this entity, which can adapt to various distribution tariff designs. We analyse this impact over a discrete time horizon. Our methodology is illustrated with several examples of distribution tariffs including old –based on energy consumption or on per-connection fees– as well as new –based on power consumption or time-of use fees– designs. Finally, we provide a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of the proposed simulation environment to the main parameters of the methodology.
A. Gautier and J. Lamesch. "Mergers in the Digital Economy." (eprint/working paper , 2020). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/241664.
Over the period 2015-2017, the five giant technologically leading firms, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft (GAFAM) acquired 175 companies, from small startups to billion dollar deals. In this paper, we provide detailed information and statistics on the merger activity of the GAFAM and on the characteristics of the firms they acquire. One of the most intriguing features of these acquisitions is that, in the majority of cases, the product of the target is discontinued under its original brand name post acquisition and this is especially true for the youngest firms. There are three reasons to discontinue a product post acquisition: the product is not as successful as expected, the acquisition was not motivated by the product itself but by the target's assets or R\&D effort, or by the elimination of a potential competitive threat. While our data does not enable us to screen between these explanations, the present analysis shows that most of the startups are killed in their infancy. This important phenomenon calls for tighter intervention by competition authorities in merger cases involving big techs.
P. Bougette, A. Gautier, and F. Marty. "Which access to which assets for an effective liberalization of the rail sector." (eprint/working paper , 2019). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/241417.
In the European rail industry, the market liberalization limited to the opening of the essential facilities (the train path) to new entrants is not enough to enable competition. For an efficient and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is also required. Like in all network industries, the deregulation process faces anticompetitive practices undertaken by the incumbents or may be thwarted by their market power. Several observed anticompetitive practices involve distorted access to these quasi-essential facilities. Therefore, competition agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante regulation.
D. Auer and M. Julian. "Governing the Patent Commons." (eprint/working paper , 2019). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3432225.
N. Boccard and A. Gautier. "Solar Rebound The unintended consequences of subsidies." (eprint/working paper , 2019). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/232427.
Many jurisdictions use net metering to record the power exchange between solar photovoltaic panels and the grid, thus valuing home production at the electricity retail rate. However, if over the billing period, production exceeds consumption, the surplus remains freely available for consumption. In Wallonia (Belgium), this system was combined with generous subsidies for solar panels that encouraged households to set-up large installations, possibly exceeding their consumption needs. In this context, we test for a possible rebound effect. Based on a large sample of residential PV installations, we observe that a large proportion of households oversized their installation to benefit from the subsidies and, later ended-up consuming most of their excess production. The effect is econometrically highly significant. There are thus evidence of a strong increase in energy consumption by residential PV owners, that runs counter the original policy design.
L. Artige and A. Reginster. "On the Stylized Fact of the Firm Size Distribution." (eprint/working paper , 2018). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3219439.
A. Gautier and R. Somogyi. "Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet." (eprint/working paper , 2018). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/226763.
This paper analyzes two business practices on the mobile internet market, paid prioritization and zero-rating. Both violate the principle of net neutrality by allowing the internet service provider to discriminate different content types. In recent years these practices have attracted considerable media attention and regulatory interest. The EU, and until recently the US have banned paid prioritization but tolerated zero-rating under conditions. With prioritization, the ISP delivers content at different speeds and it is equivalent to a discrimination in terms of quality. With zero-rating, the ISP charges different prices for content and it is equivalent to a discrimination in terms of prices. We first show that neither of these practices lead to the exclusion of a content provider, a serious concern of net neutrality advocates. The ISP chooses prioritization when traffic is highly valuable for content providers and congestion is severe, and zero-rating in all other cases. Furthermore, investment in network capacity is suboptimal in the case of prioritization and socially optimal under zero-rating.
M. Manuel de Villena Millan, A. Gautier, R. Fonteneau, and D. Ernst. "Simulation-based Assessment of the Impact of Regulatory Frameworks on the Interactions between Electricity Users and Distribution System Operator." (eprint/working paper , 2017). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/215196.
W. M. W. Lam, P. Belleflamme, and W. Vergote. "Price Discrimination and Dispersion under Asymmetric Profiling of Consumers." (eprint/working paper , 2017). https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/publications/price-discrimination-and-dispersion-under-asymmetric-profiling-consumers.
W. M. W. Lam. "Investment in Flexible Resources with Demand Correlation: an application to cloud computing." (eprint/working paper , 2017). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/206850.
S. Broos. "Targeted advertising and consumer information." (eprint/working paper , 2017). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/213434.
W. M. W. Lam. "Status and Coordination in Organizations." (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/206849.
J. Teusch. "Merger incentives under yardstick competition: A theoretical model." CORE Discussion Paper - 2016/37. (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/177531.
L. Van Neuss. "The Economic Forces Behind Deindustrialization: An Empirical Investigation." (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/200764.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an in-depth study of deindustrialization and to systematically analyze the reasons why the world’s most economically successful countries have experienced a sharp decline in relative manufacturing employment over the last decades. A large strand of empirical literature on deindustrialization aims at quantifying the relative importance of the economic forces behind deindustrialization, especially of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors. While this study does not contradict the widespread belief that internal factors are quantitatively more important in explaining deindustrialization in advanced countries taken as a whole, our results, based on both static and dynamic techniques and panel data on 18 OECD countries from 1977 to 2007, however suggest that the role of globalization may be revised upwards when resorting to appropriate and well-defined indicators of trade in manufactures.
D. Auer. "Appropriability and the European Commission’s Android Investigation." (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/195789.
This paper seeks to ascertain whether Google’s Android licensing terms, which are currently under scrutiny from the European Commission, could be excused under an innovation defense framework. The paper starts by analyzing Google’s business model with regard to its Android OS. It then identifies the Commission’s main concerns. It argues that Google is simply pursuing a sensible appropriation strategy. Finally, it puts forward a framework which hinges on the concept of “appropriability”, and tentatively applies it to Google’s behavior.
L. Artige and L. Cavenaile. "Public Education Expenditures, Growth and Income Inequality." (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2759093.
N. Petit. "The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit ('SSPPU') Experiment, General Purpose Technologies and the Coase Theorem." (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2734245.
In the last years, some Standard-Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) active in wireless communications have experimented new pricing principles for standard essential patents (“SEPs”). One of those experiments is the “SSPPU” rule. Under SSPPU, the licensing rates paid to owners of SEPs for the use of their technology shall reflect the “value that the functionality of the claimed invention or inventive feature…contributes to the value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that practices the Essential Patent Claim”. This paper reviews the SSPPU experiment through the lenses of the Coase theorem. It finds that SSPPU interferes with the efficient operation of the price system, and is likely to reduce investment in socially beneficial activities, including in General Purpose Technologies (“GPTs”) which are key drivers of economic growth.
S. Broos. "Targeted Advertising and Consumer Information." (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/207170.
N. Petit. "Chinese State Capitalism and Western Antitrust Policy." (eprint/working paper , 2016). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798162.
Enthused by China’s conversion to the free market system in 1978 and its adoption of Western-style market institutions, the world has spent the last few decades turning a blind eye to China’s real “governance” problem: that a shadow Party-State system permeates all branches of the economy. Whatever Washington-consensus style institutions are put in place, whatever State Owned Enterprise (“SOE”) reform is introduced, corporate and market governance occur under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). And the CCP’s guidebook is the Leninist command that the whole of society shall be run as “single country-wide State syndicate”. This paper contends that China’s syndicated economic organization is akin to a “supertrust”, and that this creates conditions that are conducive to antitrust problems to which the Western world must awaken. In this context, this paper advances that the antitrust regulators of North America, Europe and elsewhere should take two simple, pragmatic steps under merger control and antitrust rules. In merger review, antitrust agencies should treat all SOEs and Privately Owned Enterprises (POEs) with a CCP cell as one unitary group and undertake a thorough competitive assessment of transactions on this basis. In addition, antitrust cases involving Chinese firms should be investigated on the default assumption that there is an underlying coordination scheme among them.
L. Van Neuss. "Why Did the Industrial Revolution Start in Britain?" (eprint/working paper , 2015). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/188592.
The main goal of this paper is to provide an integrated overview of the literature devoted to identifying the causes of the British industrial revolution. Why did the industrial revolution, a fascinating and multifaceted event which brought about modern economic growth, occur in eighteenth-century Britain? This question has animated a lot of discussions among scholars and is still nowadays heatedly debated in the literature. This debate is reflected in the large spectrum of theories which aim at explaining the true origins of the British industrialization. The paper first sheds light on a rising debate concerning the evolution of British incomes per capita before the British industrial revolution and the “Great Divergence”. The paper then investigates the proposed causes of the British industrialization, aggregating them into seven broad categories, i.e. (1) geography and natural resources, (2) demography, (3) agricultural progress, (4) demand-side factors, (5) trade and empire, (6) institutional and political factors, (7) science, technology, and human capital.
N. Petit. "Rebates and Article 102 TFEU: The European Commission's Duty to Apply the Guidance Paper." (eprint/working paper , 2015). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2695732.
This paper shows that the European Union (EU) courts' case-law and general principles of EU law place the European Commission (“Commission”) under a duty to apply the Guidance Communication on Enforcement Priorities (“Guidance Paper”) in abuse of dominance cases started after its adoption. This duty includes the obligation to test Article 102 TFEU cases under the As Efficient Competitor (“AEC”) framework, as set out in the 2009 Guidance Paper. The judgments handed down by the Union courts in Intel v Commission and Post Danmark II do not alter in any way the Commission’s “self binding” duty to apply the Guidance Paper. If the Commission wishes to depart from the AEC framework, it must officially withdraw its Guidance Paper.
N. Petit. "Re-Pricing Through Disruption in Oligopolies with Tacit Collusion: A Framework for Abuse of Collective Dominance." (eprint/working paper , 2015). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2622083.
L. Artige. "Will Big Data Deliver its Promised Productivity Growth?" (eprint/working paper , 2015). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2656042.
N. Petit. "Implications of Competitive Neutrality for Competition Agencies: A Process Perspective." (eprint/working paper , 2015). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620735.
N. Petit. "Theories of Self-Preferencing Under Article 102 TFEU: A Reply to Bo Vesterdorf." (eprint/working paper , 2015). Theories of Self-Preferencing Under Article 102 TFEU: A Reply to Bo Vesterdorf.
N. Petit. ""Financial Fair Play" or "Oligopoleague" of Football Clubs?: A Preliminary Review under European Union Competition Law." (eprint/working paper , 2015). https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=708020093087023088086073079093109109059004061032064017118121012005089095031087103089101045036122006102119119114113029123001090060018059064034121113010086002064090062048016111077087019016002101116127022121118122067027067065076015090001079089089110098&EXT=pdf.
This short paper offers a first analysis of the UEFA's "break even requirement" under the EU competition rules. It shows that there are good reasons to believe that the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulation violates Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, in particular because it limits investments in the sense of Article 101(1) b) TFEU and in turn risks ossifying the market structure to the benefit of a tight oligopoly of football clubs.
N. Petit and D. Auer. "Two-Sided Markets and the Challenge of Turning Economic Theory into Antitrust Policy." (eprint/working paper , 2015). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2552337.
The award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Professor Jean Tirole in 2014 has generated intense interest about his brainchild theory of two-sided markets. Against this background, this paper explores whether there is such a thing as a unified theory of two-sided markets and whether the two-sided markets literature can readily be applied by antitrust agencies, regulatory authorities and courts. This paper vindicates caution. The buzz surrounding two-sided markets could mask the fact that, in many cases, the policy implications of the theory are not yet clear, and that divergences among its proponents are often underplayed. In that regard, the paper notably stresses that one of the key conditions of market two-sidedness identified by Rochet and Tirole in their seminal paper of 2003 – the unavailability of Coasian bargaining between both sides of a platform – has often disappeared from subsequent scholarship. This omission threatens the coherent implementation of the theory of two-sided markets. Without this qualification, markets are often mischaracterized as two-sided, as soon as they display prima facie signs of indirect network externalities.
D. Muheme, N. Neyrinck, and N. Petit. "Procedural rights in antitrust proceedings." (eprint/working paper , 2014). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/182509.
L. Artige, L. Cavenaile, and P. Pestieau. "The Macroeconomics of PAYG Pension Schemes in an Aging Society." (eprint/working paper C.R.E.P.P, Liège, Belgium, 2014). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/169328.
N. Petit. "Financial Fair Play ou "Oligopoleague" de clubs rentiers: Elements d'analyse en droit de la concurrence." (eprint/working paper , 2014). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2438399.
This short paper offers a first analysis of the UEFA's "break even requirement" under the EU competition rules. It shows that there are good reasons to believe that the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulation violates Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, in particular because it limits investments in the sense of Article 101(1) b) TFEU and in turn risks ossifying the market structure to the benefit of a tight oligopoly of football clubs.
L. Artige, A. Dedry, and P. Pestieau. "Social Security and Economic Integration." (eprint/working paper CREPP, Liège, Belgique, 2013). http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/143765.
N. Petit. "NEW CHALLENGES FOR 21ST CENTURY COMPETITION AUTHORITIES." (eprint/working paper , 2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207886.
This paper discusses challenges for competition authorities in the 21st century. Those challenges were identified on the basis of a statistical review of the articles published since January 2011 in five major antitrust law journals. The assumption underlying this literature review is that the topics that statistically attract the most the attention from contemporary antitrust scholars are those that will likely constitute the main challenges for 21st century competition authorities.
L. Artige, A. Dedry, and P. Pestieau. "Social Security, Ageing and Economic Integration." (eprint/working paper , 2012). http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp201206.pdf.
L. Artige and L. Van Neuss. "A New Shift-Share Method." (eprint/working paper , 2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2123557.
L. Artige. "Evidence on the Determinants of Innovation in a Sample of Spanish firms." (eprint/working paper CREPP, Liège, Belgique, 2011). http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp201114.pdf.
L. Artige and L. Cavenaile. "A Calibrated Growth Model of Global Imbalances." (eprint/working paper CREPP, Liège, Belgique, 2011). http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp201106.pdf.
N. Petit and N. Neyrinck. "Tying Law in Microsoft I and II: The Secret Art of Magic?" (eprint/working paper , 2010). https://ssrn.com/abstract=1747181.
N. Petit and D. geradin. "Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment." (eprint/working paper Tilburg Law School Legal Studies, Tilburg, Netherlands, 2010). Tilburg Law School Legal Studies.
Ever since the creation of the General Court (“GC”), the effectiveness of judicial review in European Union (“EU”) competition cases has sparked intense scholarly debates. This paper seeks to further contribute to this discussion in three ways. First, it devotes some space to fundamental, yet often overlooked questions, such as the goals or functions of judicial review and why judicial review of administrative decisions is important; particularly so in competition law matters. Second, this paper attempts to throw some empirical light on the GC’s judicial review of European Commission (“Commission”) decisions in the field of competition law. Third, it places a specific emphasis on the particular situation of abuse of dominance law, where the GC has exercised its judicial review power with more restraint than in other areas of competition law (such as restrictive agreements and mergers). With these goals in mind, this paper follows a five-stage progression. First, on the basis of a survey of the relevant legal, economic and political science literature, it defines the functions of judicial review and identifies a set of indicators which can be used to assess the performance of the GC’s judicial scrutiny (Part I). Second, it explains why judicial review in EU competition law cases is of critical importance notably given the institutional and procedural deficiencies of the EU enforcement structure (Part II). Third, it discusses the nature and standard of review currently applied by the GC with a particular focus on the degree to which the GC is willing to review “complex economic matters” (Part III). Fourth, it provides some quantitative data on the case-law of the GC to assess whether several goals or functions attributed to judicial review by the scientific literature are met (Part IV). Finally, this paper takes a closer look at the (controversial) case-law of the GC in the field of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (Part V).
N. Petit. "The Economics of Parallel Trade – Iconoclast Views on a Dogma of EU Competition Law." (eprint/working paper , 2010). https://ssrn.com/abstract=1661884.
This paper attempts to demonstrate that whilst parallel trade (also referred to as “grey market trade” in the United States, or as “arbitrage” in economic theory) in the European Union is subject to a remarkably favourable legal regime, the economic case supporting this approach remains to be made. To this end, it shows that the position of the EU Courts, and more generally of the EU institutions, is far from unquestionable in light of the relevant economic literature.
L. Artige. "Endogenous Growth and Parental Funding of Education in an OLG Model with a Fixed Factor." (eprint/working paper , 2010). http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp201003.pdf.
L. Artige. "Endogenous Growth in an OLG Model with a Fixed Factor." (eprint/working paper , 2010). http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp201002.pdf.
L. Artige and L. Cavenaile. "A Growth Model of Global Imbalances." (eprint/working paper , 2010). http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp201005.pdf.
N. Petit. "The guidelines on the application of article 81(3) EC: A critical review." (eprint/working paper , 2009). https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=447071097117026117010119115123091122033040063036031057022083090090121127018081127029045114020060007100109064001101010087071112122078037060059113026097091020030075053048077072005124092080123023114100086023117097084090064083013067115094094068001008125&EXT=pdf.
To date, the European Commission has not yet made use of the novel guidance instruments established under Regulation 1/2003 (Article 10 inapplicability decisions, guidance letters, etc.), or taken any exemption decision pursuant to Article 81(3). The "brave new world" of Regulation 1/2003 is thus a competition enforcement system devoid of individual guidance and positive decisions. That is not to say, however, that firms have been left without formal guidance. In early 2004, the Commission issued Guidelines on Article 81(3), which set out the methodological and substantive framework for the self-assessment of agreements under Article 81(3). The present paper paper offers a critical review of those Guidelines and explains why, in practice, firms and their counsels have repeatedly argued that this text is unpractical and thus of little use.
N. Petit. "L’EXEMPTION DES ENGAGEMENTS D’EXCLUSIVITE AU « SEUIL » DE LA REFORME DES ACCORDS VERTICAUX : QUELLE(S) PART(S) DE MARCHE ?" (eprint/working paper , 2009). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1428560.
N. Petit and E. Fegatilli. "Économétrie du droit de la concurrence – Un essai de conceptualisation." The Global Competition Law Centre Working Paper Series. (eprint/working paper College of Europe, belgique, 2008). https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=680074082121113024001089018124087113005035046078090017099116013064087085108115024077114007007115059023062066027088119069019095121012037073045075097075079117112067073007064096023093005111070090085117025001064023077120028104112010119123069126013088083&EXT=pdf.
The present paper reviews in a plain language and with only limited statistical formalization, the virtues of econometrics in the field of competition law. Following a brief introduction to the origins of econometrics, we explain first that econometrics provides assistance to decision-making in a variety of fields (merger control, abuse of dominance, etc.). Second, we show that econometrics also constitute a decision-reading instrument, which may assist competition agencies, courts, firms and their counsels in understanding the content of the law. The econometric models discussed in the paper are illustrated by examples coming from well-known legal cases. Our conclusion is that in light of the novel sophisticated issues arising in antitrust enforcement (damages estimation, etc.), the nascent "econometrics of competition law" exhibit promising features.
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "Labor productivity in Europe: Evidence from a sample of regions." (eprint/working paper , 2006). http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp200608.pdf.
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "Evidence on the determinants of foreign direct investment: the case of three European regions." (eprint/working paper , 2005). https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45043.
N. Petit. "Petit, Nicolas, The Proliferation of National Regulatory Authorities Alongdside Competition Authorities in the EC: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion." (eprint/working paper , 2004). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=527403.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the risks that result from the mushrooming of regulatory authorities at the national level alongside the increased reliance on national competition authorities in the EC. Both sets of institutions have, to a certain extent, overlapping duties and competences. Therefore, they become increasingly procedural subsitutes for complainants. To avoid the risks of multiple proceedings and regulatory inconsistencies between the two sets of bodies, a variety of mechanisms have been adopted at the EC and national levels. The paper seeks to provide a brief account of these mechanisms and to show that they do not eradicate the risks of multiple proceedings.