Publications of Nicolas Petit
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See detailWhy the EU Merger Regulation should not enjoy a Monopoly over Tacit Collusion
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Henry, David

in Krasnodebska-Tomkiel (Ed.) Changes in Competition policy over the last two Decades (2010)

Over the past two decades, the European Commission (“the Commission”) has adopted a stance whereby the implementation of ex ante, structural merger rules is deemed more appropriate when seeking to ... [more ▼]

Over the past two decades, the European Commission (“the Commission”) has adopted a stance whereby the implementation of ex ante, structural merger rules is deemed more appropriate when seeking to challenge tacit collusion than ex post, behavioural instruments (e.g. on the basis of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”). As a result, the EU merger regulation (“EUMR”) is the preferred, if not sole, legal instrument deployed by the Commission in order to avert any potential risk of tacit collusion. Since the entry into force of the EUMR, the number of Commission decisions in which the future emergence of risks of collective dominance was examined lies in the region of 130. In stark contrast, and despite pronouncements of the General Court (“GC”, or the Court) that Article 102 TFEU may apply to tacit collusion, the Commission has not yet taken a single decision enforcing Article 102 TFEU against tacitly collusive oligopolies. Similarly, the stillness of the 2009 Guidance Communication on Enforcement Priorities in applying Article 102 TFEU in this context implicitly confirms the Commission’s reluctance to use the abuse of dominance rules in order to address the phenomenon of tacit collusion. Overall, within the realm of EU competition law, the provisions of the EUMR de facto enjoy a jurisdictional monopoly over issues pertaining to collective dominance. The present article challenges the conventional view that tacit collusion should be exclusively addressed through the use of the EUMR. To this end, it examines and seeks to set straight five widespread misconceptions on which such view is based. [less ▲]

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See detailFrom formalism to effects? The Commission's Communication on enforcement priorities in applying article 82 EC
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in World Competition: Law and Economics Review (2009), 32

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See detailAbusive margin squeeze: an overview of European national case laws
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Provost, Elise ULiege

in e-Competitions (2009)

The purpose of this brief article is to introduce the reader to the national case-law on abusive margin squeezes that was commented in the e-competitions bulletin over the period 2003-2009.To this end, it ... [more ▼]

The purpose of this brief article is to introduce the reader to the national case-law on abusive margin squeezes that was commented in the e-competitions bulletin over the period 2003-2009.To this end, it seeks, to the extent possible, to analyze the 23 e-competitions case notes in relation to six items which are generally reviewed in margin squeeze cases, i.e., existence of an upstream input and a downstream product/service (1); indispensability of the upstream input (2); dominance in the upstream market and vertical integration (3); particularly aggressive downstream pricing policy (4); anticompetitive effects (5); absence of objective justifications (6). In addition, the present article reviews a seventh issue, namely sanctions and remedies (7), where national enforcement practices may again diverge/converge. [less ▲]

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See detailThe guidelines on the application of article 81(3) EC: A critical review
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

E-print/Working paper (2009)

To date, the European Commission has not yet made use of the novel guidance instruments established under Regulation 1/2003 (Article 10 inapplicability decisions, guidance letters, etc.), or taken any ... [more ▼]

To date, the European Commission has not yet made use of the novel guidance instruments established under Regulation 1/2003 (Article 10 inapplicability decisions, guidance letters, etc.), or taken any exemption decision pursuant to Article 81(3). The "brave new world" of Regulation 1/2003 is thus a competition enforcement system devoid of individual guidance and positive decisions. That is not to say, however, that firms have been left without formal guidance. In early 2004, the Commission issued Guidelines on Article 81(3), which set out the methodological and substantive framework for the self-assessment of agreements under Article 81(3). The present paper paper offers a critical review of those Guidelines and explains why, in practice, firms and their counsels have repeatedly argued that this text is unpractical and thus of little use. [less ▲]

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See detailInternational report on Competition Authorities Discretion
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Scientific conference (2009, September)

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See detailJudicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic Regulation: A Post Commission v. Tetra laval Assessment
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; RABEUX, L.

in ESSENS, O.; GERBRANDY, A.; LAVRIJSSEN, S. (Eds.) National Courts and the Standard of Review in Competition Law and Economic Regulation (2009)

The article seeks to assess the degree of judicial scrutiny performed by French courts when reviewing decisions of national competition authority and national regulatory authorities in the aftermath of ... [more ▼]

The article seeks to assess the degree of judicial scrutiny performed by French courts when reviewing decisions of national competition authority and national regulatory authorities in the aftermath of the seminal ruling handed down by the European Court of Justice in Commission v. Tetra Laval [less ▲]

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See detailL'application du droit communautaire des restrictions verticales aux accords de distribution commerciale
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Le Droit de la Distribution (2009)

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See detailThe outcome of the EC pharmaceutical sector inquiry
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Concurrences (2009), (3),

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See detailLes strategies juridiques en droit des coordinations entre entreprises Une approche scenarisee
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Masson, A. (Ed.) Les stratégies juridiques des entreprises (2009)

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See detailConcurrence difficile
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Article for general public (2009)

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See detailNe dites plus Constitution
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Article for general public (2009)

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See detailAccords d’échange d’informations et fédérations d’entreprises – Grands principes d’analyse en droit de la concurrence
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in LAMBRECHT, Philippe; GHEUR, Charles (Eds.) Les fédérations d'entreprises et les règles de concurrence (2009)

A l'heure de l'alourdissement des risques générés par le non-respect du droit de la concurrence, il est crucial que les fédérations sachent distinguer l'échange d'informations licite de l'échange illicite ... [more ▼]

A l'heure de l'alourdissement des risques générés par le non-respect du droit de la concurrence, il est crucial que les fédérations sachent distinguer l'échange d'informations licite de l'échange illicite et puissent remédier en temps utile à tout risque de violation du droit. Pour les y aider, la présente étude tente de définir une méthode permettant de trier les bons et mauvais accords d'échange d'informations. [less ▲]

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See detailL’exemption des engagements d’exclusivité au “seuil” de la réforme du droit des accords verticaux : Quelle(s) part(s) de marché ?
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Abenhaim, M.

in Concurrences (2009)

The present paper discusses whether the market share threshold enshrined in Regulation 2790/1999 allows to draw correct inferences on the foreclosure risks arising from single branding and exclusive ... [more ▼]

The present paper discusses whether the market share threshold enshrined in Regulation 2790/1999 allows to draw correct inferences on the foreclosure risks arising from single branding and exclusive purchasing obligations in the context of vertical relationships. As far as the customer foreclosure risks arising from single branding are concerned, it comes to the conclusion that Regulation 2790/1999 wrongly focuses on the market share of the seller and should concentrate on the market share of the acquirer. Symetrically, in so far as the input foreclosure risks arising from exclusive purchasing are concerned, Regulation 2790/1999 should focus on the market share of the seller. In the context of the upcoming review of the rules applicable to vertical agreements, the European Commission should seek to address this problem. [less ▲]

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See detailJudicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic Regulation: A Post Commission v. Tetra laval Assessment
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; RABEUX, L.

in ESSENS, Oda; GERBRANDY, Anna; LAVRIJSSEN, Saskia (Eds.) National courts and the Standard of Review in Competition Law and Economic Regulation (2009)

The present article seeks to assess the degree of judicial scrutinity performed by French courts when reviewing decisions of National competition Authorities and National Regulatory Authorities in the ... [more ▼]

The present article seeks to assess the degree of judicial scrutinity performed by French courts when reviewing decisions of National competition Authorities and National Regulatory Authorities in the aftermath of the seminal ruling handed down by the European Court of Justice in Commission v. Tetra Laval [less ▲]

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See detailFrom hard to soft enforcement of EC Competition Law
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Rato, Miguel

Book published by Bruylant (2009)

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See detailLa fin de la récréation pour l'opérateur historique? Annotation de la décision du Conseil de la concurrence dans l'affaire Belgacom/Scarlet, 7 novembre 2008
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Daems, Ief

in Tijdschrift voor Belgische Mededinging (2009), (3),

Le Conseil belge de la concurrence a décidé de subordonner l'autorisation de la concentration entre Belgacom et Scarlet à la mise en oeuvre de diverses mesures correctives structurelles et ... [more ▼]

Le Conseil belge de la concurrence a décidé de subordonner l'autorisation de la concentration entre Belgacom et Scarlet à la mise en oeuvre de diverses mesures correctives structurelles et comportementales. [less ▲]

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See detailÉconométrie du droit de la concurrence – Un essai de conceptualisation
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Fegatilli, Ermano

E-print/Working paper (2008)

The present paper reviews in a plain language and with only limited statistical formalization, the virtues of econometrics in the field of competition law. Following a brief introduction to the origins of ... [more ▼]

The present paper reviews in a plain language and with only limited statistical formalization, the virtues of econometrics in the field of competition law. Following a brief introduction to the origins of econometrics, we explain first that econometrics provides assistance to decision-making in a variety of fields (merger control, abuse of dominance, etc.). Second, we show that econometrics also constitute a decision-reading instrument, which may assist competition agencies, courts, firms and their counsels in understanding the content of the law. The econometric models discussed in the paper are illustrated by examples coming from well-known legal cases. Our conclusion is that in light of the novel sophisticated issues arising in antitrust enforcement (damages estimation, etc.), the nascent "econometrics of competition law" exhibit promising features. [less ▲]

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See detailTrois questions à Nicolas Petit
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Article for general public (2008)

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See detailNon-competition concerns under the ECMR - An overview
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Concurrences (2008), 4-2008

This article lists the EC merger cases where noncompetition concerns were raised (industrial policy, social concerns, personal data protection etc.). It summarizes the issues raised by non-competition ... [more ▼]

This article lists the EC merger cases where noncompetition concerns were raised (industrial policy, social concerns, personal data protection etc.). It summarizes the issues raised by non-competition concerns in the ECMR. [less ▲]

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