Publications of Nicolas Petit
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
See detailCredit rating agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in European Competition Journal (2011), 7(3),

Detailed reference viewed: 136 (9 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailCollective dominance: An overview of national case law
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Neyrinck, Norman ULiege

in e-Competitions (2011), N°39129

This article aims at providing an overview of the national case law on collective dominance in Europe. We observe that overall, most domestic decisions have manifestly integrated the EU case law and ... [more ▼]

This article aims at providing an overview of the national case law on collective dominance in Europe. We observe that overall, most domestic decisions have manifestly integrated the EU case law and followed the shift from a structural approach towards a more behavioral approach. We higlight several protruding cases on the definition of the notion of abuse and the most creative remedies devised by national competition authorities so far. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 302 (10 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailArrêt Tele 2 Polska: une interprétation contestable de la compétence des autorités nationales de concurrence
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Lousberg, Charlotte ULiege

in Journal de Droit Européen (2011), (182), 242-245

En se fondant sur une lecture littéralement et téléologiquement discutable du Règlement 1/2003 pour conclure que seule la Commission, à l'exclusion des autorités nationales de concurrence, est compétente ... [more ▼]

En se fondant sur une lecture littéralement et téléologiquement discutable du Règlement 1/2003 pour conclure que seule la Commission, à l'exclusion des autorités nationales de concurrence, est compétente pour constater l'absence d'une pratique abusive, la Cour omet de tenir compte des implications pratiques de la limitation qu'elle impose aux compétences des ANC. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 194 (6 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailL'UE devrait enquêter sur l'irrationalité des agences de notation
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Article for general public (2011)

Detailed reference viewed: 32 (4 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailLes vertus oubliées d'une politique de concurrence efficace
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Article for general public (2011)

La Commission européenne a remis en cause le système belge d’indexation automatique des salaires. L’inflation s’accélère et est nettement supérieure à celle de la zone euro. Il y a pourtant un remède « ... [more ▼]

La Commission européenne a remis en cause le système belge d’indexation automatique des salaires. L’inflation s’accélère et est nettement supérieure à celle de la zone euro. Il y a pourtant un remède « gagnant/gagnant » au panier percé de l’indexation automatique. Il faut revoir la politique belge de la concurrence. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 39 (5 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailThe Judgement of the European Court of Justice in VEBIC:Filling a Gap in Regulation 1/2003
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Journal of European Competition Law and Practice (2011)

In VEBIC, the Court of Justice of the EU clarifies the prerogatives of National Competition Authorities under Regulation 1/2003 and paves the way towards regulatory reform in Belgium

Detailed reference viewed: 83 (2 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailThe Judgment of the European Court of Justice in VEBIC: Filling a Gap in Regulation 1/2003
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Journal of European Competition Law and Practice (2011), 2(4), 340-344

Detailed reference viewed: 86 (4 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailThe Economics of Parallel Trade – Econ-oclast Views on a Dogma of EU Competition Law
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Govaere, Inge; Quick, R.; Bronckers, Mario (Eds.) Trade and Competition Law in The EU and Beyond, Edward Elgar Publishing (2011)

Detailed reference viewed: 93 (1 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailDroit de la concurrence et instrumentalisation parisitaire
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Neyrinck, Norman ULiege

in Roquilly, Christophe (Ed.) La contribution des juristes et du droit à la performance de l'entreprise (2011)

This paper explore whether, and to what extent, firms can instrumentalize the competition rules to free ride on others’ efforts. We come to the conclusion that attempts to free ride through Article 101 ... [more ▼]

This paper explore whether, and to what extent, firms can instrumentalize the competition rules to free ride on others’ efforts. We come to the conclusion that attempts to free ride through Article 101 TFEU allegations are likely to fail. In contrast, Article 102 TFEU offers a more promising legal avenue to wanna-be free riders. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 310 (14 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailTying Law in Microsoft I and II: The Secret Art of Magic?
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Neyrinck, Norman ULiege

E-print/Working paper (2010)

Detailed reference viewed: 26 (0 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailJudicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; geradin, Damien

E-print/Working paper (2010)

Ever since the creation of the General Court (“GC”), the effectiveness of judicial review in European Union (“EU”) competition cases has sparked intense scholarly debates. This paper seeks to further ... [more ▼]

Ever since the creation of the General Court (“GC”), the effectiveness of judicial review in European Union (“EU”) competition cases has sparked intense scholarly debates. This paper seeks to further contribute to this discussion in three ways. First, it devotes some space to fundamental, yet often overlooked questions, such as the goals or functions of judicial review and why judicial review of administrative decisions is important; particularly so in competition law matters. Second, this paper attempts to throw some empirical light on the GC’s judicial review of European Commission (“Commission”) decisions in the field of competition law. Third, it places a specific emphasis on the particular situation of abuse of dominance law, where the GC has exercised its judicial review power with more restraint than in other areas of competition law (such as restrictive agreements and mergers). With these goals in mind, this paper follows a five-stage progression. First, on the basis of a survey of the relevant legal, economic and political science literature, it defines the functions of judicial review and identifies a set of indicators which can be used to assess the performance of the GC’s judicial scrutiny (Part I). Second, it explains why judicial review in EU competition law cases is of critical importance notably given the institutional and procedural deficiencies of the EU enforcement structure (Part II). Third, it discusses the nature and standard of review currently applied by the GC with a particular focus on the degree to which the GC is willing to review “complex economic matters” (Part III). Fourth, it provides some quantitative data on the case-law of the GC to assess whether several goals or functions attributed to judicial review by the scientific literature are met (Part IV). Finally, this paper takes a closer look at the (controversial) case-law of the GC in the field of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (Part V). [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 115 (2 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailRemedies for Coordinated Effects under the EU Merger Regulation
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Competition Law International (2010), 6(2), 29-37

Detailed reference viewed: 80 (7 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailRemedies for Coordinated Effects under the EU Merger Regulation
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Competition Law International (2010), 6(2), 29-37

Detailed reference viewed: 53 (3 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailThe Economics of Parallel Trade – Iconoclast Views on a Dogma of EU Competition Law
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

E-print/Working paper (2010)

This paper attempts to demonstrate that whilst parallel trade (also referred to as “grey market trade” in the United States, or as “arbitrage” in economic theory) in the European Union is subject to a ... [more ▼]

This paper attempts to demonstrate that whilst parallel trade (also referred to as “grey market trade” in the United States, or as “arbitrage” in economic theory) in the European Union is subject to a remarkably favourable legal regime, the economic case supporting this approach remains to be made. To this end, it shows that the position of the EU Courts, and more generally of the EU institutions, is far from unquestionable in light of the relevant economic literature. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 34 (1 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailThe Past Clouds the Future of Europe’s New Antitrust Enforcer
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Article for general public (2010)

Detailed reference viewed: 35 (4 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailEditorial - Antitrust in the Energy Sector
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Oil, Gas and Energy Law (2010), 8

This Special OGEL issue on "Antitrust in the energy sector" is devoted to the challenges arising from the implementation of the antitrust laws across various energy sectors. While this Special spans a ... [more ▼]

This Special OGEL issue on "Antitrust in the energy sector" is devoted to the challenges arising from the implementation of the antitrust laws across various energy sectors. While this Special spans a range of countries, its primary focus is on the European Union ("EU") and the United States ("US"). [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 75 (7 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailLe droit européen de la concurrence au banc des accusés
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège (2010), (2),

Detailed reference viewed: 82 (14 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailHow Much Discretion do, and should, Competition Authorities enjoy in the Course of their Enforcement Activities? A Multi-Jurisdictional Assessment
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Concurrences (2010), (1), 44-62

The purpose of this study is to assess whether competition agencies (“CAs”) do, and in turn should, enjoy an unfettered discretionary power in the context of the investigation of competition law ... [more ▼]

The purpose of this study is to assess whether competition agencies (“CAs”) do, and in turn should, enjoy an unfettered discretionary power in the context of the investigation of competition law infringements or whether their margin of discretion should be subject to certain limits. To this end, it focuses on four successive areas where CAs may be entitled to make choices, i.e. detection of infringements, selection of enforcement targets, initiation of infringement proceedings and outcome of the case. Thanks to reports received from 21 national experts in response to a questionnaire covering 18 jurisdictions, the present study formulates a number of public policy proposals. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 341 (11 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailL'émancipation du Conseil de la Concurrence? Note sous la décision du Conseil de la concurrence du 26 mai 2009 dans l'affaire Base/BMB
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Provost, Elise ULiege

in Tijdschrift voor Belgische Mededinging (2010), (2), 89-101

Enième avatar de la bataille juridique opposant les opérateurs alternatifs de communications électroniques à l’ancien monopole public Belgacom1, la décision commentée constitue une première pour Conseil ... [more ▼]

Enième avatar de la bataille juridique opposant les opérateurs alternatifs de communications électroniques à l’ancien monopole public Belgacom1, la décision commentée constitue une première pour Conseil de la concurrence (« le Conseil ») à plus d’un titre : première condamnation de l’opérateur historique, première caractérisation d’un ciseau tarifaire abusif, première décision infligeant une amende aussi élevée en Belgique. Après des années de carence dans l’application des règles de concurrence au secteur des communications électroniques le Conseil parait vouloir renverser la vapeur. Sonne peut-être – comme nous l’avons écrit précédemment – la « fin de la récréation pour l’opérateur historique ». Il faut sans doute s’en féliciter, la Belgique figurant depuis longtemps parmi les mauvais élèves de l’ouverture à la concurrence des industries de réseaux. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 134 (5 ULiège)