Publications of Nicolas Petit
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See detailJacques Steenbergen: A Counsel at the head of the Belgian NCA
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Concurrences (2008), 3-2008

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See detailFrom Hard to Soft Enforcement of EC Competition Law - A Bestiary of Sunshine Enforcement Instruments
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Rato, Miguel

in Alternative Enforcement Techniques in EC Competition Law (2008)

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See detailThe Belgian Competition Council finds a non-profit association guilty of price fixing but does not impose any fine (AIAB)
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Digneffe, Kelly

in e-Competitions (2008), (22333),

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See detailL’effet des arrêts de la Cour de Justice et du Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Defossez, Alexandre

in de Leval, Georges; Georges, Frédéric (Eds.) L'effet de la décision de justice. Contentieux européens, constitutionnel, civil et pénal (2008)

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See detailOligopoles, collusion tacite et droit communautaire de la concurrence
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Book published by Bruylant (2008)

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See detailTPICE British Aggregates Association contre Commission
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Revue d'Etudes Juridiques Aménagement, Environnement, Urbanisme et Droit Foncier (2008)

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See detailThe Belgian Competition Council bans a price-coordination mechanism in the retail bakery markets (VEBIC)
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Verbeke, Robbe

in e-Competitions (2008), (21559),

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See detailL'actualité du droit des ententes en 2007
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Les Petites Affiches (2008)

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See detailTraité de Lisbonne et politique de concurrence – Rupture ?
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège (2008), (1), 265-279

L'auteur envisage les différentes modifications que l'adoption du Traité de Lisbonne pourra apporter à la définition de la politique de concurrence en Europe

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See detailAnnotation sous TPICE, T-210/02, 23 décembre 2006, affaire des granulats
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Aménagement - Environnement (2008), (2), 119

Les éxonérations de l'écotaxe sur l'extraction des granulats instaurée en 2001 constituaient-elles des aides d'état incompatibles avec le Traité CE?

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See detailTPI, 9 septembre 2008, MyTravel Group plc/Commission
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Lousberg, Charlotte ULiege

in Revue des Affaires Européennes (2008), (4), 785-792

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See detailL'ordonnance Actua TV contre Belgacom TV, ou l'art de la définition stratégique du marché pertinent
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Revue du Droit des Technologies de l'Information (2007)

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See detailLe français devrait-il servir de référence juridique?
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

Diverse speeche and writing (2007)

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See detailThe Commission's Non Contractual Liability in the Field of Merger Control - Don't Use a Hammer When You Need a Screwdriver
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Rato, Miguel

in Global Competition Policy (2007)

It has become conventional wisdom to view the rulings handed down by the CFI in Airtours, Schneider, Tetra Laval and Impala as unprecedented setbacks for the European Commission ("the Commission") that ... [more ▼]

It has become conventional wisdom to view the rulings handed down by the CFI in Airtours, Schneider, Tetra Laval and Impala as unprecedented setbacks for the European Commission ("the Commission") that would usher in a new era of administrative accountability in the field of merger control. However, several commentators still consider that the Commission regretfully enjoys a de facto power of "life or death" over notified mergers, and that judgments striking down its decisions are unlikely to change much in practice. Parties to a blocked merger generally abandon their projects following the Commission's decision, irrespective of the outcome of the actions they may subsequently bring before the EC Courts (e.g. the Airtours/First Choice or Schneider/Legrand mergers). Third parties - competitors or consumers - to an illegally approved merger have little prospect of inducing the Commission to unscramble a consummated transaction (e.g. the Sony/BMG merger). This unsatisfactory state of affairs has led practitioners to explore other legal avenues to hold the Commission accountable for its mistakes. One such possible means of redress is to resort to Article 288 EC which provides that the EC shall "make good any damage caused by its institutions". Where an EC institution such as the Commission is found liable for such damage, Article 235 EC grants the Community Courts jurisdiction to award compensation In light of the virulence of some of criticism directed at the Commission by the CFI in the Airtours and Schneider/Legrand judgments, the parties to those mergers initiated proceedings against the Commission, seeking compensation for the unlawful prohibition of their proposed mergers. These actions drew enthusiastic reactions from certain EC competition law experts which, upon close examination, appear unjustified. The legal avenue provided for by Article 288 EC is most likely a procedural dead-end. First, from the applicants' perspective, the conditions under which the Commission's liability can give rise to a right to compensation in the field of merger control are set so high by existing case-law that most Article 288 EC claims are likely to be dismissed as unfounded. Second, from a public policy standpoint, Article 288 EC does not constitute an adequate instrument to improve the Commission's accountability for its unlawful decisions. [less ▲]

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See detailLa politique industrielle sous les tirs croisés de la mondialisation et du droit communautaire de la concurrence
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Mondialisation politique industrielle et droit comm de la concurrence (2006)

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See detailPrice Discrimination Under Ec Competition Law: Another Antitrust Theory in Search of Limiting Principles
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Geradin, Damien

in GCLC (2005)

Price discrimination is one of the most complex areas of EC competition law. There are several reasons for this. First, the concept of price discrimination covers many different practices (discounts and ... [more ▼]

Price discrimination is one of the most complex areas of EC competition law. There are several reasons for this. First, the concept of price discrimination covers many different practices (discounts and rebates, tying, selective price cuts, discriminatory input prices set by vertically-integrated operators, etc.) whose objectives and effects on competition significantly differ. From the point of view of competition law analysis, it is thus not easy to classify these practices under a coherent analytical framework. Second, there is a consensus among economists that the welfare effects of the (various categories of) price discrimination are ambiguous. It is hard to say a priori whether a given form of price discrimination increases or decreases welfare. The response to this question may indeed depend on which type of welfare standard (total or consumer) is actually pursued. Moreover, even if one agrees on a given standard, the welfare effects of discriminatory prices generally depend on factual issues, such as whether it increases or decreases total output. Third, the exact scope of Article 82(c), the only Treaty provision dealing with discrimination, is not entirely clear. While the European Commission (hereafter, the Commission) and the Community courts have applied Article 82(c) to many different practices, there are good reasons to believe that this provision should be applied to a limited set of circumstances, most forms of discrimination being adequately covered by Article 82(b) or other provisions of the Treaty. Against this background, the main objective of this paper is to throw some light on the compatibility of price discrimination with EC competition law. In order to do so, this paper does not seek to propose a grand unifying theory that would provide a single test offering a way to distinguish between practices compatible and incompatible with the EC Treaty. Instead, we offer an analytical framework which distinguishes between different categories of price discrimination depending on their effects on competition. Different tests may thus be needed to assess the compatibility of the practices belonging to these categories with EC competition law. Another objective of the paper is to show that Article 82(c) should only be applied to the limited circumstances where a non-vertically integrated dominant firm price discriminates between customers with the effect of placing one or several of them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other customers (secondary line price discrimination). In contrast, Article 82(c) should not be applied to pricing measures designed to harm the dominant firm's competitors (first line price discrimination) or to fragment the single market across national lines. As will be seen, relying on Article 82(c) to condemn such practices goes against the letter and the spirit of this provision and may also apply a wrong test to such practices. It is also not necessary since other Treaty provisions can be used to achieve this objective. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Geradin, Damien; Hofer, Paul et al

in Global Competition Law Center (2005)

The first prong of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abuses of a dominant position, requires, prior to the identification of abusive behaviour, evidence that the firm under scrutiny enjoys a ... [more ▼]

The first prong of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abuses of a dominant position, requires, prior to the identification of abusive behaviour, evidence that the firm under scrutiny enjoys a dominant position. Surprisingly, this issue seems to be sometimes overlooked. Enforcers, practitioners and scholars have recently paid greater attention to the concept of abuse than to the question of dominance when discussing Article 82 EC. This should not, however, be interpreted as a sign that the law of dominance is clear. Quite to the contrary, the concept of dominance raises a wide array of questions which are discussed in the sections that follow [less ▲]

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See detailGCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC: The concept of dominance
Petit, Nicolas ULiege; Geradin, Damien; Hofer, Paul et al

in GCLC College d'Europe (2005)

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See detailDroit de la concurrence et recours en annulation à l'ere post-modernisation
Petit, Nicolas ULiege

in Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (2005)

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