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The Belgian Juge d'instruction and the EPPO Regulation: (Ir)reconcilable?

Claes, Ana Laura; Werding, Anne; Franssen, Vanessa

2021 • In European Papers, 6 (1), p. 357-389

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Keywords :

criminal procedure; European Public Prosecutor's Office; judicial review; judicial authorisation; European criminal law; investigating judge

Abstract :

[en] The European Public Prosecutor's Office (hereafter EPPO) was established by way of enhanced cooperation, with the adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (hereafter EPPO Regulation). It has the power to conduct criminal investigations and to directly act as the prosecuting authority before national criminal courts, which is revolutionary. Interestingly, the EPPO Regulation does not explicitly regulate the relation between the EPPO and national judges at the pre-trial stage, who may intervene punctually or, in some cases, even conduct the investigation. Indeed, some civil law systems have a system of shared investigative competences between the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, meaning that the latter conducts a judicial inquiry, while the former is responsible for the prosecution. This raises the delicate question whether a judicial inquiry is compatible with the EPPO Regulation. This article analyses this question, which hugely impacts the implementation of the EPPO, with respect to the Belgian legal system, based on a close reading of the EPPO Regulation and taking into account its drafting history. It will argue that the EPPO Regulation is not per se irreconcilable with a judicial inquiry as the Member States did not wish the EPPO Regulation to alter the way in which criminal investigations are organised at national level. Subsequently, it will examine how an EPPO investigation conducted by an investigating judge can practically function. While the analysis concentrates on Belgium, the underlying reasoning may also be useful for other Member States with a similar legal system.

Research center :

Cité - CITE

Disciplines :

Criminal law & procedure
Metalaw, Roman law, history of law & comparative law
European & international law
Criminal law & procedure
Metalaw, Roman law, history of law & comparative law
European & international law

Author, co-author :

Claes, Ana Laura

Werding, Anne ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de droit > Droit pénal et procédure pénale

Franssen, Vanessa ; Université de Liège - ULiège > Département de droit > Droit pénal et procédure pénale

Language :

English

Title :

The Belgian Juge d'instruction and the EPPO Regulation: (Ir)reconcilable?

Publication date :

July 2021

Journal title :

European Papers

eISSN :

2499-8249

Publisher :

European Centre for European Law, Rome, Italy

Volume :

6

Issue :

1

Pages :

357-389

Peer reviewed :

Peer reviewed

Available on ORBi :

since 02 October 2020

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Bibliography

1 Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of the Council of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (“the EPPO”).
2 So far, 22 Member States have joined the enhanced cooperation: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. OLAF, European Public Prosecutor's Office ec.europa.eu.
3 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins' in S Dewulf (ed), La [CVDW]. Liber Amicorum Chris Van den Wyngaert (Maklu 2017) 238.
4 Proposals to create the EPPO date back to the nineties with the Corpus Juris. The idea was eventually introduced in art. 86 TFEU. In 2013, the Commission launched the Commission Proposal COM(2013) 534 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. For a full history of the debate on the creation of a European public prosecutor's office: L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Introduction: the EPPO and the Challenges Ahead' in L Bachmaier Winter (ed), The European Public Prosecutor's Office: Challenges Ahead (Springer 2018) V; M Delmas-Marty (ed), Corpus Juris: Introducing Penal Provisions for the Purpose of the Financial Interests of the European Union (Economica 1997); D Flore, Droit pénal européen: Les enjeux d'une justice penale européenne (Larcier 2009); W Geelhoud, LH Erkelens and AWH Meij (eds), Shifting Perspectives on the European Prosecutor's Office (Springer 2018); V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Oxford Hart 2009); JAE Vervaele, ‘The European Community and Harmonisation of the Criminal Law Enforcement of Community Policy: Ignoti nulla cupido?' in C Bassiouni, V Militello and H Satzger (eds), European Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Issues and Perspective (Cedam 2008) 31 ff.
5 These long negotiations are reflected in the number of recitals.
6 L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Introduction: the EPPO and the Challenges Ahead' cit. VI; JAE Vervaele, ‘The European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO): Introductory Remarks' in W Geelhoud, LH Erkelens and AWH Meij (eds), Shifting Perspectives on the European Prosecutor's Office cit. 12 ff.
7 For one of the first analyses of the Commission's proposal, see V Franssen, ‘Proposed Regulation on the European Public Prosecutor - Thinking Federal?' (8 August 2013) European Law Blog europeanlawblog.eu.
8 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins' cit. 230. Or, to quote A Weyembergh and C Brière, the Member States' “willingness to renationalise the EPPO as much as possible, and to keep the strongest control possible over its activities”. A Weyembergh and C Brière, ‘Towards a European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), Study for the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament' (2016) European Parliament www.europarl.europa.eu 51.
9 Art. 288 TFEU.
10 This follows from the principle of precedence of EU law; art. 5(3) EPPO Regulation cit.
11 L Seiler, ‘Le parquet européen: une révolution sans bouleversements' (2019) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 1188.
12 V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du parquet européen en Belgique: quelques enjeux et propositions de solution' in C Chevallier-Govers and A Weyembergh (eds), La création du Parquet européen. Simple évolution ou revolution au sein de l'espace judiciaire européen (Bruylant 2021) 135, 144 ff.; F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding, ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?' (18 November 2019) European Law Blog europeanlawblog.eu.
13 In Spain, e.g., this is still one of the main stumbling blocks for the implementation of the EPPO. See e.g., Europa Press, El CGPJ advierte de las dificultades de adaptar la Fiscalía Europea en España con la actual LECrim www.europapress.es.
14 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions' in DK Brown, J Iontcheva Turner and B Weisser (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Process (Oxford University Press 2019) 139, 146.
15 Arts 30(2) and 30(5) EPPO Regulation cit.: “The procedures and the modalities for taking the measures shall be governed by the applicable national law”. This also follows from art. 31 on cross-border investigations. To note that the original proposal of the Commission included an EU-wide requirement of a prior judicial authorisation for the EPPO's most intrusive investigation measures (art. 26(4)). In the final text of the EPPO Regulation, there is no trace left of this partial approximation of national rules.
16 For a presentation of the powers of the Luxembourgish juge d'instruction, see J Nies, ‘A Special Toolkit of Investigation Techniques in Luxembourg' in K Ligeti and V Franssen (eds), Challenges in the field of economic and financial crime in Europe (Hart 2017) 86-88.
17 For a presentation of the powers of the Spanish juez de instrucción, see L Bachmaier Winter and A del Moral García, ‘Spain' in F Verbruggen and V Franssen (eds), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Criminal Law (Wolters Kluwer 2020) 34-35 and 215-217.
18 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions' cit. 146 and 147.
19 I.e., the legal system the authors are most familiar with. Nonetheless, the analysis will also encompass some punctual comparison with other legal systems, in particular France, Luxembourg and Spain.
20 Z Durdevic, ‘Judicial Control in Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure Conducted by the European Public Prosecutor's Office' in K Ligeti (ed), Towards a prosecutor for the European union (Hart 2013), 986, 987.
21 According to the most recent information, the EPPO would start its operational activities on 1 June 2021. See EPPO, Start date of EPPO operations: European Chief Prosecutor proposes 1 June 2021 to the European Commission (7 April 2021) www.eppo.europa.eu.
22 Act of 17 February 2021 holding several provisions in criminal justice matters (Loi du 17 février 2021 portant des dispositions diverses en matière de justice), Moniteur belge 24 February 2021 (hereafter Belgian EPPO Act).
23 MA Beernaert, ‘Le nouveau Code de procédure pénale en projet: quelques lignes de force' in V Franssen and A Masset (ed), Actualités de Droit Pénal et de Procédure Pénale (Anthemis 2019) 133; R Ver-straeten and A Bailleux, ‘Het voorstel van een nieuw wetboek van strafvordering: algemene beginselen en fase van het onderzoek' in A Bailleux, B Spriet, R Van Herpe, J Vanheule, F Verbruggen and R Verstraeten, Themis: Straf- en strafprocesrecht (die Keure 2019) 143.
24 Art. 325 TFEU.
25 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law.
26 Art. 22(1) EPPO Regulation cit.
27 Ibid. art. 22(3).
28 F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?' cit.
29 The European Prosecutors, forming together with the European Chief Prosecutor the EPPO College, were appointed on 27 July 2020. Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1117 of the Council of 27 July 2020 appointing the European Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor's Office.
30 Art. 8(3) EPPO Regulation cit.
31 Ibid. art. 8(4) and recital 21; AM Santos, ‘The Status of Independence of the European Public Prosecutor's Office and Its Guarantees' in L Bachmaier Winter (ed), The European Public Prosecutor's Office: Challenges Ahead (Springer 2018) 8.
32 Art. 9 EPPO Regulation cit. and recital 24.
33 Ibid. arts 10 and 12; AM Santos, ‘The Status of Independence of the European Public Prosecutor's Office and Its Guarantees' cit. 10-11 and 13-14.
34 Ibid. art. 17(2).
35 Ibid. art. 6(1).
36 Ibid. art. 17(2).
37 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins' cit. 232-233.
38 Art. 13(1) EPPO Regulation cit. Emphasis added.
39 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions' cit. 146.
40 Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure (Code d'instruction criminelle, hereafter CIC), art. 28bis.
41 The prosecutor (procureur du Roi) is competent to investigate and prosecute in his own judicial district. If he wants to accomplish an investigation measure in another district, he has to inform the prosecutor of that district. Arts 137 and 150 Belgian Judicial Code of 10 October 1967 (Code judiciaire), Moniteur Belge 31 October 1967; art. 23 CIC cit. The Belgian Federal Public Prosecutor's Office is a distinct prosecution service that can act throughout the whole Belgian territory. It is, for instance, competent to prosecute cases that have an international dimension or concern several districts, or cases regarding terrorist offences or criminal organisations. Arts 143, 144ter and 144quater Belgian Judicial Code cit; MA Beernaert, HD Bosly and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale (la Charte 2017) 340.
42 Art. 55 CIC cit.
43 O Michiels and G Falque, Principes de procédure pénale (Larcier 2019) 227.
44 Art. 61 CIC cit.
45 Ibid. art. 63(1).
46 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the prosecutor has more powers when and as long as there is a situation of flagrant délit (i.e., when an offence is being committed or has recently been committed, see arts 41 and 46 CIC cit.).
47 Art. 88bis CIC cit.
48 Ibid. art. 90undecies.
49 Ibid. 28septies. MA Beernaert, HD Bosly and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale cit. 624628.
50 Act on pre-trial custody (Loi du 20 juillet 1990 relative à la détention préventive), Moniteur belge 14 August 1990 art. 16.
51 Art. 89bis CIC cit.
52 Ibid. art. 90ter. It is worth pointing out that this investigation measure also encompasses secret searches in information systems and extends to all content of private communications, even if the communication is no longer in transmission. For a more detailed analysis of this legal provision, see V Franssen and O Leroux, ‘Recherche policière et judiciaire sur internet: analyse critique du nouveau cadre législatif belge' in V Franssen and D Flore (eds), Société numérique et droit pénal. Système, Système, Europe (Lar-cier/Bruylant 2019) 161-165.
53 This double hat, giving rise to an “ambivalent role”, has been criticised and is one of the reasons why the authors of the reform of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure propose to replace the investigating judge by a pre-trial judge (see infra). See e.g., MA Beernaert, ‘Le nouveau Code de procédure pénale en projet: quelques lignes de force' cit. 136-137.
54 MA Beernaert, HD Bosly and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale cit. 826-827.
55 According to Belgian criminal procedure, the public prosecutor has a general right of action on the basis of art. 1 Loi contenant le titre préliminaire du code de procédure pénale and art. 22 CIC cit. R Declercq, Beginselen van strafrechtspleging (6th ed Kluwer 2014) 316; R Verstraeten and F Verbruggen, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht voor bachelors (12th ed Intersentia 2019) 159.
56 This right of appeal is a consequence of the prosecutor's general right of action. Belgian Court of Cassation judgment of 22 March 1994 n. P.94.202 N; Declercq, Beginselen van strafrechtspleging cit. 316-317.
57 Art. 136bis CIC cit.
58 Ibid. art. 136bis(1).
59 Ibid. art. 228.
60 Ibid. art. 235.
61 We opted for this term and not “indictment” as this document is not a formal charging decision that brings the case to the trial court. It is the pre-trial tribunal (or, upon appeal, the pre-trial court) that refers the case for trial; this (court) decision determines which suspects are referred, for which facts and under which charges. This terminological distinction is important for the analysis made in Part V.
62 Art. 127 CIC cit.
63 Ibid. art. 128. Other decisions like e.g., grant the suspension of the ruling are also possible.
64 Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights [1950] and art. 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012].
65 Art. 135 CIC cit.
66 Interestingly, the same reflection is ongoing in Spain where a major reform of the Spanish criminal procedure would encompass the abolition of the investigating judge and the creation of a pre-trial judge (juez de garantías). The draft bill entailing this reform (Anteproyecto de Ley de Enjuiciamento Criminal) was published in the course of 2020 and can be consulted at: www.mjusticia.gob.es, in particular 59-60. An impact analysis was published in January 2021: ‘Anteproyecto de Ley Orgánica de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, Memoria del Análisis de Impacto Normativo', Ministerio de Justicia www.mjusticia.gob.es.
67 Ministerial Decree setting up the commissions for the reform of criminal law and criminal procedure (Arrêté ministériel de 30 octobre portant création des Commissions de réforme du droit pénal et de la procédure
75 JB Jacquin, ‘Les pouvoirs hors normes du futur parquet européen' (19 August 2019) Le Monde www.lemonde.fr; J Nies, ‘La répartition des rôles entre le Parquet européen et les parquets nationaux' (2019) Journal des tribunaux 11, 13; J Bigot and S Joissains, ‘Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes sur la coopération judiciaire en matière pénale et la mise en œuvre du parquet européen' (16 May 2019) Sénat www.senat.fr; L Seiler, ‘Le parquet européen: une révolution sans bouleversements' cit. 1212; HH Herrnfeld, D Brodowski and C Burchard, European Public Prosecutor's Office: Article-by-Article Commentary (Hart Publishing 2020) 249 and 252.
76 Emphasis added. Cfr other language versions of the EPPO Regulation: e.g., French: “Le procureur européen délégué chargé d'une affaire peut, conformément au présent règlement et au droit national, soit prendre des mesures d'enquête et d'autres mesures de sa propre initiative, soit en charger les autorités compétentes de son État membre. Lesdites autorités veillent, conformément au droit national, à ce que toutes les instructions soient suivies et prennent les mesures qu'elles ont été chargées de prendre. Le procureur européen délégué chargé de l'affaire utilise le système de gestion des dossiers pour signaler au procureur européen compétent et à la chambre permanente tout événement important concernant l'affaire, conformément aux règles établies dans le règlement intérieur du Parquet européen” (emphasis added). E.g., German: “Der mit einem Verfahren betraute Delegierte Europäische Staatsanwalt kann im Einklang mit dieser Verordnung und dem nationalen Recht die Ermittlungsmaßnahmen und andere Maßnahmen entweder selbst treffen oder die zuständigen Behörden seines Mitgliedstaats dazu anweisen. Diese Behörden stellen im Einklang mit dem nationalen Recht sicher, dass alle Weisungen befolgt werden, und treffen die ihnen zugewiesenen Maßnahmen. Der betraute Delegierte Europäische Staatsanwalt unterrichtet gemäß den in der Geschäftsordnung der EUStA festgelegten Vorschriften den zuständigen Europäischen Staatsanwalt und die Ständige Kammer durch das Fallmanagementsystem von allen wesentlichen Entwicklungen des Falles” (emphasis added).
77 “Conduite de l'enquête” in French and “Führung der Ermittlungen” in German.
78 MA Beernaert, ‘Le Nouveau Code de Procédure Pénale en Projet: Quelques Lignes de Force' cit. 139.
79 For a concise analysis of the role of the pre-trial judge (taking the form of a juge des libertés) and the option of creating a European pre-trial court in the Corpus juris, see K Ligeti and V Franssen, ‘Le contrôle juridictionnel dans les projets de Parquet européen' in G Giudicelli-Delage, S Manacorda and J Tricot (eds), Le contrôle judiciaire du Parquet européen: Nécessité, modèles, enjeux (Société de législation comparée 2014) 127, 134-139.
80 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions' cit. 160.
81 The same interpretation counts for other language versions of the EPPO Regulation. E.g., in German: “Diese Verordnung lässt die nationalen Systeme der Mitgliedstaaten in Bezug auf die art. und Weise, wie strafrechtliche Ermittlungen organisiert werden, unberührt, or in French: “Le présent règlement s'applique sans préjudice des systèmes nationaux des États membres concernant la manière dont les enquêtes pénales sont organisées” (emphasis added).
82 Emphasis added.
83 See e.g., Belgian Constitutional Court judgment of 25 January 2017 n. 6/2017 (2017) Nullum Crimen 351, case comment by S Raats; Belgian Constitutional Court judgment of 21 December 2017 n. 148/2017, para. B.22.4; R Verstraeten and A Bailleux, ‘Het voorstel van een nieuw wetboek van strafvordering: alge-mene beginselen en fase van het onderzoek' cit. 149-150.
84 In French “charger” and in German “anweisen”.
85 For instance, the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the importance of a judicial warrant with respect to the search of private premises (ECtHR Sociétés Colas Est and Others v France App n. 37971/97 [16 April 2002] para. 49) and personal searches (ECtHR Kobiashvili v Georgia App n. 36416/06 [14 March 2019] paras 39-41 and 61-71). At the EU level, the need for a court order is explicitly required for the production of “transactional” and content data by service providers in the Commission's proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European production and preservation orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters (art. 4(2) COM(2018) 225 final). If adopted this way, this will be a new step in the approximation of national law, as the EU legislator has so far only required the intervention of a “judicial authority”, which can be a judge or a public prosecutor. See e.g., art. 6 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of the Council of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. That said, the Court of Justice has emphasised, with respect to the European arrest warrant, the need for the intervention of an independent (issuing and executing) judicial authority, a standard that is, for instance, not met by German nor by Dutch public prosecutors as they can receive instructions from the executive. Joined cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU Ministry for Justice and Equality v OG and PI ECLI:EU:C:2019:456 para. 88; Case C-510/19 AZ ECLI:EU:C:2020:953 paras 56 and 70. Moreover, in the field of data retention, the Court has recently ruled that a measure authorising the realtime collection of traffic and location data must “be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding”. Joined cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18 La Quadrature du Net and Others ECLI:EU:C:2020:791 para. 189.
86 Emphasis added.
87 Emphasis added.
88 Art. 26(4) Proposal for a Regulation COM(2013) 534 cit.
89 Emphasis added.
90 It should also be noted that, contrary to the Commission's initial proposal, the EPPO Regulation does not set minimum requirements regarding the need of a judicial authorisation for intrusive investigation measures. F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?' cit.
91 Ibid.
92 Pradel comes to the same conclusion: J Pradel, ‘Le parquet européen est-il compatible avec les juges nationaux de la mise en état en affaires pénales?' (2019) Recueil Dalloz 650.
93 Recital 70 EPPO Regulation cit.
94 Recital 69 and art. 5(6) EPPO Regulation cit.; F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?' cit.
95 J Pradel, ‘Le parquet européen est-il compatible avec les juges nationaux de la mise en état en affaires pénales?' cit.
96 This is also expressed by the terms used in certain language versions of the Regulation: e.g., in Dutch “openbare aanklager”, a term that stresses the accusatory function of a public prosecution service. This choice is somewhat surprising because, in practice, this is just one of the many tasks performed by modern prosecutors. F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?' cit.
97 European Commission, ‘Draft Minutes VTC Meeting of the EPPO Expert Group' (30 June 2020) 3, emphasis added.
98 Proposal for a Regulation COM(2013) 534 cit.
99 Emphasis added. Cfr other language versions of the EPPO Regulation: e.g., in German: “Der benannte Abgeordnete Europäische Staatsanwalt leitet das Ermittlungsverfahren im Namen und nach den Weisungen des Europäischen Staatsanwalts. Der benannte Abgeordnete Europäische Staatsanwalt kann die Ermittlungsmaßnahmen entweder selbst durchführen oder die zuständigen Strafverfolgungsbehörden in dem Mitgliedstaat, in dem er seinen Standort hat, dazu anweisen. Diese Behörden befolgen die Weisungen des Abgeordneten Europäischen Staatsanwalts und führen die ihnen übertragenen Ermittlungsmaßnahmen durch”; in French: “Le procureur européen délégué désigné mène l'enquête au nom et sur instructions du procureur européen. Le procureur européen délégué désigné peut soit procéder aux mesures d'enquête de sa propre initiative, soit donner instruction en ce sens aux autorités répressives compétentes de l'État membre où il est affecté. Ces autorités se conforment aux instructions du procureur européen délégué et exécutent les mesures d'enquête dont elles sont charges” (emphasis added).
100 Even before the Commission presented its proposal, France and Germany published a common memo in which they advocated in favour of a less European-centred EPPO. See D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins' cit. 234 and the references made there. Shortly after the publication of the Commission's proposal, several national parliaments objected too, raising a so-called yellow card: V Franssen, ‘National Parliaments Issue Yellow Card against the European Public Prosecutor's Office' (4 November 2013) European Law Blog europeanlawblog.eu.
101 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins' cit. 234-235.
102 Draft regulation Council doc. n. 5766/17 Interinstitutional File 2013/0255 (APP) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Council of 31 January 2017 on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office.
103 Emphasis added.
104 With the only minor and irrelevant exception that the final version reads “those” authorities and not “these”.
105 This thesis is supported by J Pradel, ‘Le parquet européen est-il compatible avec les juges nationaux de la mise en état en affaires pénales?' cit. 650.
106 Y De Vries and SJ Lopik, ‘Het Europees openbaar ministerie komt eraan: waakhond of papieren tijger?' (2019) Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht 7.
107 Art. 25(1) EPPO Regulation cit. See also arts 41-42 of the Internal Rules of Procedure of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, College Decision 003/2020 of 12 October 2020 (hereafter IRP).
108 Art. 26(1) EPPO Regulation cit.
109 Ibid. arts 24(2) and 27.
110 Ibid. art. 25(1) and recital 58.
111 Ibid. art. 27(7).
112 Ibid. art. 27(1).
113 Recital 58 seems to be broader than art. 27(2) as it states that “the authorities of Member States should refrain from acting, unless urgent measures are required, until the EPPO has decided whether to conduct an investigation”, whereas art. 27(2) only mentions “any decision under national law that may have the effect of precluding the EPPO from exercising its right of evocation”.
114 Art. 27(2) EPPO Regulation cit.
115 Ibid. art. 27(5).
116 Ibid. art. 25(6).
117 Ibid. art. 24(2).
118 Ibid. art. 27(7).
119 Art. 128 CIC cit.
120 Roughly summarized, the investigating judge's competence ends when the pre-trial tribunal or court refers the case to the trial court or dismisses the case. For more details, see M Franchimont, A Jacobs and A Masset, Manuel de procédure pénale (Larcier 2012) 600 paras 68 and 608-618.
121 To note that the pre-trial tribunal cannot order the prosecutor (nor the investigating judge) to undertake such measures.
122 As explained in Part III, the public prosecutor can never oblige the investigating judge to undertake certain measures. The same holds true for the pre-trial tribunal, as it situated to the same organisational level as the investigating judge - both belong to the court of first instance. Only the pre-trial court (upon appeal) can order the investigating judge to do so (art. 228 CIC cit.).
123 M Franchimont, A Jacobs and A Masset, Manuel de procédure pénale cit. 616.
124 To note that the meaning of the term “indictment” is not entirely clear in the EPPO Regulation, especially for systems with a pre-trial hearing (infra, V.4). For one, art. 27(7) refers to the submission of the indictment “to a court”. This “court” could be a pre-trial or a trial court, which makes a significant difference (supra, footnote 61). For another, the translation of the term “indictment” in other language versions of the Regulation creates confusion: e.g., “acte d'accusation” (in French), “Anklage” (in German) and “tenlasteleg-ging” (in Dutch). For further analysis, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution' cit. 148-149.
125 In the case there is an appeal against the decision of the pre-trial tribunal. See supra, III.
126 Emphasis added.
127 The compatibility of a judicial inquiry with a cross-border EPPO investigation will not be analysed in this Article.
128 As explained above (supra, IV.1), there is no obligation under art. 30(1) and (4) of the EPPO Regulation to give the EPPO the right to give orders to the investigating judge.
129 Art. 88ter CIC cit.
130 Ibid. art. 28septies.
131 Art. 47(1) IRP cit.
132 Ibid. art. 47(2).
133 For the second one, see infra, V.5.
134 See also arts 49-51 IRP cit.
135 It should be noted that this possibility, which was created in 2011, was strongly criticised by legal scholars exactly because it derogates from the fundamental principle that a public prosecutor cannot remove a case pending before a judge and override the latter's decision, all the more since there was no meaningful judicial review. In 2016, the law was amended to meet the concerns expressed by the Constitutional Court and further punctual amendments were made in 2018. For an analysis of the current legal framework, see H Van Bavel and D Delwaide, ‘Enième réforme de la transaction pénale: la fin des controverses?' (2018) Journal des Tribunaux 765.
136 Art. 216bis(2) CIC cit.
137 Ibid. art. 216bis(8).
138 For an extensive analysis, see C Marr, ‘La médiation pénale à la suite de la loi du 18 mars 2018: de la médiation à la “procédure médiation et mesures”' in V Franssen and A Masset (eds), Actualités de droit pénal et de procédure pénale (Anthemis 2019) 293.
139 Art. 235 CIC cit.
140 Ibid. art. 525 ff.
141 MA Beernaert, HD Bosly and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale cit. 873-878, para. 1135: there is no text that explicitly provides for this possibility, but there is well established case law.
142 After the withdrawal, prosecution in Belgium is no longer possible, unless the international tribunal has decided not to deliver an indictment or that the procedure is inadmissible. Arts 47-49 Loi concernant la coopération avec la Cour pénale internationale et les tribunaux pénaux internationaux. See, for example, Belgian Court of Cassation judgment of 9 July 1996 n. P.96.0869.F. C Van den Wyngaert, P Traest and S Van-dromme, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht in hoofdlijnen (Maklu 2017) 1257-1258.
143 Art. 35 EPPO Regulation cit.
144 Ibid. art. 36.
145 Ibid. art. 40.
146 Because the EPPO is not competent, because the conditions of arts 25(2) and (3) are not fulfilled anymore, or on the basis of the principle of prosecutorial discretion. Art. 34 EPPO Regulation; M Caianiello, ‘The Decision to Drop the Case in the New EPPO's Regulation: Res Iudicata or Transfer of Competence?' (2019) New Journal of European Criminal Law 186, 191.
147 Art. 39 EPPO Regulation cit.
148 Ibid. art. 35.
149 Unless the Permanent Chamber has delegated its decision-making power to conclude the case before. Art. 55(1) IRP cit.
150 T Huisjes, ‘Een Europees Openbaar Ministerie: kansen en risico's' (2019) Proces 150.
151 Arts 23 and 26 EPPO Regulation cit.
152 Ibid. art. 36(3).
153 Ibid.
154 Art. 36(5) EPPO Regulation cit. Emphasis added.
155 In France, the investigating judge also intervenes as a pre-trial tribunal at the end of the investigation, by adopting ordonnances de règlement. Arts 177-184 French Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de procédure pénale).
156 For instance, in Italy, where the investigating judge was abolished in 1989 and the investigation is conducted by the public prosecutor, there is a preliminary hearing that very much resembles the role of the pre-trial tribunal in Belgium. See e.g., A Di Amato and F Fucito, ‘Italy' in F Verbruggen and V Franssen (eds), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Criminal Law (Wolters Kluwer 2016) 175-178.
157 Art. 36(5) EPPO Regulation cit.
158 See also art. 57 IRP cit.
159 For further analysis, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution' cit. 147.
160 Under Belgian criminal procedure, the dissolution of the legal person does not necessarily put an end to the prosecution. Art. 20(2) Act holding the preliminary title of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Loi contenant le titre préliminaire du code de procédure pénale); S Van Dyck and V Franssen, ‘De strafrechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid van vennootschappen: wie, wanneer en hoe?' in Orde van advocaten Kortrijk (ed), De vennootschap in de verschillende takken van het recht (Larcier 2013) 36-39.
161 Pursuant to art. 36(3) or art. 36(4) of the EPPO Regulation cit.
162 In French: “Le présent règlement fait obligation au Parquet européen”.
163 Recital 78 EPPO Regulation cit. Emphasis added. Moreover, recital 79 states that: “[t]he Member State whose courts will be competent to hear the prosecution should be chosen by the competent Permanent Chamber on the basis of a set of criteria laid down in this Regulation”.
164 Art. 39(2) EPPO Regulation cit. and art. 59 IRP cit.; M Caianiello, ‘The Decision to Drop the Case in the New EPPO's Regulation: Res Iudicata or Transfer of Competence?' cit. 194.
165 Arts 246-248 CIC cit.; M Franchimont, A Jacobs and A Masset, Manuel de procédure pénale cit. 607-608.
166 This overview does not include the legislative changes regarding the relation between the EDPs and the customs administration, which enjoys far-reaching autonomous investigation and prosecutorial powers under Belgian law. For an analysis of the concerns in that respect, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution' cit. 162-172.
167 The EP is included as well, even though he is formally speaking part of the central office of the EPPO, presumably to ensure that he can conduct the EPPO investigation personally, in accordance with art. 28(4) of the EPPO Regulation. Nevertheless, this reference could, in our view, have been omitted as the EPPO Regulation defines the role and powers of the EP.
168 V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution' cit. 151-154.
169 Art. 156/1(1) Belgian Judicial Code cit., inserted by art. 3 Belgian EPPO Act cit.
170 Art. 47quaterdecies CIC cit., inserted by art. 7 Belgian EPPO Act cit.
171 Art. 156/1(2) Belgian Judicial Code cit.
172 Ibid. art. 156/1(3).
173 Ibid. art. 156/1(4), para. 1.
174 Ibid. art. 156/1(4), para. 2.
175 Ibid. art. 144ter(3).
176 Explanatory Memorandum to the EPPO Bill, Doc. Parl., Ch. représ., sess. ord., 2020-2021, n. 551696/001, 11-12.
177 Art. 79 Belgian Judicial Code cit., amended by art. 2 Belgian EPPO Act cit. The designation of these judges is the responsibility of the First President of the respective courts of appeal.
178 Art. 62bis CIC cit., as amended by art. 9 Belgian EPPO Act cit.
179 Art. (5)6 and recital 69 EPPO Regulation cit.
180 Case C-2/88 Zwartfeld and Others ECLI:EU:C:1990:440.
181 Cfr art. 30(5) EPPO Regulation.
182 Arts 696-115(2), 696-116 and 696-117 French Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by Act n. 2020-1672 of 24 December 2020 on the EPPO, on environmental criminal law and on special criminal law (Loi n. 2020-1672 du 24 décembre 2020 relative au Parquet européen, à la justice environmentale et à la justice pénale spécialisée), Journal officiel de la République française 26 December 2020 (hereafter French EPPO Act).
183 Bill of 1 February 2021 on the implementation of the EPPO Regulation and amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Projet de loi relative à la mise en application du règlement (UE) 2017/1939 du Conseil du 2 octobre 2017 mettant en oeuvre une cooperation renforcée concernant la creation du Parquet européen et modifiant le Code de procedure pénale), Ch. sess. ord. 2020-2021 n. 7759 (hereafter Luxembourgish EPPO Bill). See in particular the newly inserted art. 136-6(1) of the Luxembourgish Code of Criminal Procedure.
184 Council of State, Opinion on the Luxembourgish EPPO Bill, 27 April 2021, Ch. sess. ord. 2020-2021 n. 7759/05, 6-8.
185 The full text of the Spanish EPPO Draft Bill is available at: leyprocesal.com.
186 Iustel, El Consejo de Ministros aprueba el Anteproyecto de Ley de la Fiscalía Europea (28 April 2021) www.iustel.com.
187 See footnote 66.
188 See e.g., L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Jueces de instrucción o fiscales' (28 April 2020) ABC www.abc.es.
189 It is worthwhile pointing out that the Luxembourgish Council of State severely criticises the approach of the government following the French example, arguing that national law should not repeat the provisions of the Regulation and only provide for further rules if the Regulation refers to national law or requires further implementation. Council of State, Opinion on the Luxembourgish EPPO Bill, 27 April 2021, Ch., sess. ord., 2020-2021, n. 7759/05, 2-3.
190 Art. 156/1(3) Belgian Judicial Code cit.
191 Explanatory Memorandum to the EPPO Bill, Doc. Parl., Ch. représ. sess. ord. 2020-2021 n. 551696/001, 15.
192 Art. 39(2) EPPO Regulation cit. and art. 59 IRP cit.; M Caianiello, ‘The Decision to Drop the Case in the New EPPO's Regulation: Res Iudicata or Transfer of Competence?' cit. 194.
193 V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution' cit. 149-154.
194 If a new set of procedural rules had been created merely for offences falling within the EPPO's competence, while maintaining the existing rules for all other offences, the question would have arisen whether the difference in treatment (different procedures and levels of protection of defence rights) between suspects in EPPO investigations (without the possibility of a judicial inquiry), and suspects in ordinary national investigations (with a judicial inquiry) would not constitute an unlawful discrimination and hence create serious constitutional problems. As explained in Part III, in recent years, the Belgian Constitutional Court has increasingly criticised the discrepancies in applicable safeguards - between pre-trial and judicial inquiries (see the references in footnote 83). Therefore, if the Belgian legislator had opted for such a set of separate procedural rules for EPPO offences, discarding the judicial inquiry, it would not have been unlikely for the Constitutional Court to annul these rules, especially because there is no explicit EU prohibition to maintain the judicial inquiry in EPPO cases. This could, consequently, have undermined a large number of pending EPPO cases. For a further analysis, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution' cit. 159-160.
195 Free translation: “Being in the minority does not mean being wrong”. L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Jueces de instrucción o fiscales' cit.
196 For a more detailed analysis, see F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?‘ cit.; V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution’ cit. 159-160.

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