References of "Leclercq, Bruno"
     in
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailFoundational mereology as a logical tool for descriptive psychology
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

in Fisette, Denis; Frechette, Guillaume; Janousek, Hynek (Eds.) Franz Brentano’s Philosophy After One Hundred Years. From History of Philosophy to Reism (2021)

Detailed reference viewed: 25 (2 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailEmpirical investigation of indexical externalism about “social-kind” terms
De Brabanter, Philippe; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference (2020, September 15)

Are there “social kinds” the way there are “natural kinds”? Are social sciences likely to hit upon “essences” the way natural sciences (seem to) do? Or are all social phenomena purely theoretical ... [more ▼]

Are there “social kinds” the way there are “natural kinds”? Are social sciences likely to hit upon “essences” the way natural sciences (seem to) do? Or are all social phenomena purely theoretical constructs? Questions about whether there are natural kinds, what exactly they are and which kinds of phenomena they cover have been the object of heated epistemological and metaphysical debates (e.g. Schwarz 1983). We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. This we define as speakers’ being disposed to use words in line with the norms of their linguistic community and as consenting to being corrected when it is manifest that their use and understanding of a word does not match common practice (and caused the falsity of some of their previous statements, which they are retrospectively willing to acknowledge). When those dispositions are present, speakers defer semantically to something beyond themselves. Our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not (just) to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism (à la Kripke or Putnam) provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined; the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, which shows a kinship with work by Braisby et al. (1996), Jylkkä et al. (2009), and Genone & Lombrozo (2012), we confront participants with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements, e.g. An emu is a bird; Touching a stranger’s breast without their consent is rape. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be naturalkind terms, including terms for social phenomena, exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for natural-kind terms. If so, speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical, and there’s therefore a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond its usual boundaries. Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Häggqvist, S. & Wikforss, Å. 2015. Experimental semantics: the case of natural kind terms, in J. Haukioja (ed), Experimental Philosophy of Language, London, Bloomsbury./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2009. Against arguments from reference, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, 332-356./ Marconi, D. 1997. Language, Speech, and Communication. Lexical Competence. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press./Moravcsik, J. 2016. Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI./Schroeter, L. & Schroeter, F. 2014. Normative concepts: a connectedness model. Philosophers’ Imprint 14, 1-26./Schwarz, S. 1983. Reply to Kornblith and Nelson. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 21, 475-481./Wikforss, Å. 2010. Are natural kind terms special?, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary (eds), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, New York, Routledge, 64-83. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (1 ULiège)
Peer Reviewed
See detailEmpirical investigation of indexical externalism about “social-kind” terms
De Brabanter, Philippe; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference (2020, July 18)

Are there “social kinds” the way there are “natural kinds”? Are social sciences likely to hit upon “essences” the way natural sciences (seem to) do? Or are all social phenomena purely theoretical ... [more ▼]

Are there “social kinds” the way there are “natural kinds”? Are social sciences likely to hit upon “essences” the way natural sciences (seem to) do? Or are all social phenomena purely theoretical constructs? Questions about whether there are natural kinds, what exactly they are and which kinds of phenomena they cover have been the object of heated epistemological and metaphysical debates (e.g. Schwarz 1983). We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. Our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not (just) to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism (à la Kripke or Putnam) provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined; the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, which shows a kinship with work by Braisby et al. (1996), Jylkkä et al. (2009), and Genone & Lombrozo (2012), we confront participants with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms, including terms for social phenomena, exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for natural-kind terms. If so, speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical, and there’s therefore a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond its usual boundaries. Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Schwarz, S. 1983. Reply to Kornblith and Nelson. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 21, 475-481. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 17 (1 ULiège)
Peer Reviewed
See detailUsing semantic deference to test an extension of indexical externalism beyond natural-kind terms
De Brabanter, Philippe; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference (2020, July 17)

Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly and they are rigid designators: their reference ... [more ▼]

Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly and they are rigid designators: their reference is unchanged even in worlds in which the referent lacks some or all the properties associated with it in the actual world. There have, however, been heated debates about what should be taken as a natural-kind term. These often take on a strong epistemological or metaphysical dimension. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. Our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not (just) to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism (à la Kripke or Putnam) provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined; the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, we confront participants with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for natural-kind terms. If so, speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical, and there’s therefore a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond the usual set of terms. We believe our results will enrich the conclusions from previous empirical studies (Braisby et al. 1996, Jylkkä et al. 2009, Genone & Lombrozo 2012). Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60 [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 17 (1 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailUsing semantic deference to test an extension of indexical externalism beyond natural-kind terms
De Brabanter, Philippe; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Scientific conference (2020, June 04)

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (1 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailUsing semantic deference to test an extension of indexical externalism beyond natural-kind terms
De Brabanter, Philippe; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference (2020, March 01)

We offer a new outlook on the vexed question of the reference of natural-kind terms. Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they ... [more ▼]

We offer a new outlook on the vexed question of the reference of natural-kind terms. Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly (not via the satisfaction of a descriptive condition) and they are rigid designators: their reference is unchanged even in worlds in which the referent lacks some or all the properties associated with it in the actual world, and which are useful to us in identifying that referent. There have, however, been heated debates about what should be taken as a natural-kind term. Some challenge the very existence of a separate category of natural-kind terms (Wikforss 2010); some their being directly referential (Marconi 1997; Moravcsik 2016; Häggqvist & Wikforss 2014); some raise the possibility that direct reference extends to terms beyond those usually assumed to fall under the category (Mallon et al. 2009), e.g. to ‘polemical’ terms (Schroeter & Schroeter 2014). When these debates turn on the question of what natural kinds are, they take on a strong epistemological or metaphysical dimension. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. This we define as speakers’ being disposed to use words in line with the norms of their linguistic community and as consenting to being corrected when it is manifest that their use and understanding of a word does not match common practice (and agreeing that previous statements they made that contained a word they misused were false). When those dispositions are present, speakers defer semantically to something beyond themselves. Here, our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not (just) to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism (à la Kripke or Putnam) provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined. In other words, one can say that the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, participants are confronted with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements, e.g. An emu is a bird. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension, e.g. discoveries that require excluding certain species now thought to be birds from the Aves class. The scenario is such that it is clear that the ‘discoveries’ bring us closer to the actual essence, if there is one, of birds. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms – for instance summer, contract or rape – exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for bird. If so, then there’s a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond the usual set of terms. What would be shown in this way is that speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical. We are at the pre-test stage for the survey. We cannot yet report on our results. We should, however, have initial results by March, which, we believe, will enrich the observations made by previous empirical studies (Braisby et al. 1996, Jylkkä et al. 2009, Genone & Lombrozo 2012). References: Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Häggqvist, S. & Wikforss, Å. 2015. Experimental semantics: the case of natural kind terms, in J. Haukioja (ed), Experimental Philosophy of Language, London, Bloomsbury./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2009. Against arguments from reference, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, 332-356./ Marconi, D. 1997. Language, Speech, and Communication. Lexical Competence. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press./Moravcsik, J. 2016. Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI./Schroeter, L. & Schroeter, F. 2014. Normative concepts: a connectedness model, Philosophers’ Imprint 14, 1-26./ Wikforss, Å. 2010. Are natural kind terms special?, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary (eds), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, New York, Routledge, 64-83. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (1 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailL’imagination au pouvoir. Référence singulière et exploration des mondes intuitifs possibles
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

in Beziau, Jean-Yves; Schultess, Daniel (Eds.) L’Imagination. Actes du 37e Congrès de l’ASPLF (Rio de Janeiro, 26- 31 mars 2018) (2020)

Dans la mesure où elles permettent toutes deux d’explorer des possibilités qui dépassent la réalité de ce qui est effectivement perçu, l’imagination et la faculté de conception intellectuelle (entendement ... [more ▼]

Dans la mesure où elles permettent toutes deux d’explorer des possibilités qui dépassent la réalité de ce qui est effectivement perçu, l’imagination et la faculté de conception intellectuelle (entendement) sont souvent associées l’une à l’autre dans leur opposition commune à la perception. En nous appuyant sur la théorie husserlienne des intentions de signification et de leur remplissement par l’intuition, nous insisterons pour notre part sur tout ce qui distingue l’imagination de la conception intellectuelle et qui la rapproche au contraire de la perception : - sur le terrain de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie de l’esprit, nous montrerons d’abord ce qui différencie les actes mentaux d’imagination des actes de conception, en particulier la singularisation de visée qu’implique l’apport de données sensibles concrètes ; - sur le terrain de la sémantique et de l’ontologie, nous nous intéresserons ensuite aux contenus et « objets » propres aux actes d’imagination et aux actes de conception, et nous dénoncerons à cet égard les confusions entretenues par la théorie meinongienne des objets inexistants aussi bien que par la théorie twardowskienne des objets immanents ; - sur le terrain de la philosophie du langage et de l’esprit, nous insisterons alors sur le type de référence mentale et linguistique permise par l’imagination (par opposition à la simple conception) et sur la possibilité ainsi ouverte de jugements fictionnels synthétiques (plutôt qu’analytiques) ainsi que d’une désignation fictionnelle rigide analogue à la référence de re (et non de dicto). Dans un second temps [si la durée de l’intervention le permet], nous nous interrogerons sur le rôle épistémologique spécifique que peut jouer l’imagination – par opposition à la simple analyse conceptuelle – dans l’exploration des possibles. Pour Husserl, il importe de distinguer ce qui est intellectuellement inconcevable (c’est-à-dire inconsistant, formellement contradictoire) de ce qui est inimaginable (c’est-à-dire non conforme aux contraintes de l’intuition sensible). Des lois analytiques (sphère de l’a priori formel), qu’explore l’analyse conceptuelle, se distinguent les lois de l’a priori matériel ou synthétique, que permettent de dégager les variations libres de l’imagination. A cet égard, on sait que des débats très vifs ont opposé les théoriciens de la connaissance quant aux sources du savoir mathématique. Kant tenait l’arithmétique et la géométrie pour synthétiques a priori car fondées sur l’intuition formelle et sur les schèmes (et constructions) de l’imagination. En sens inverse, Bolzano défendait le caractère purement analytique des mathématiques, dans lesquelles, selon lui, l’imagination peut au mieux jouer un rôle psychologique d’adjuvant. Et le logicisme de Frege et Russell renchérissait en montrant dans le détail que les concepts et principes arithmétiques mais aussi géométriques fondamentaux peuvent être définis en termes purement logiques de sorte que les mathématiques seraient entièrement réductibles à la logique et donc analytiques. Tout en acceptant la dimension essentiellement formelle des théories mathématiques modernes (contrairement aux intuitionnistes), certains épistémologues contemporains du projet logiciste préservent toutefois une certaine légitimité épistémologique à l’imagination. C’est le cas de Husserl lorsqu’il distingue deux versants des mathématiques selon qu’elles relèvent de la logique de la conséquence (où prévaut la non-contradiction) ou de la logique de la vérité (où prévaut la question de l’existence de modèles intuitifs). C’est aussi le cas de Peirce lorsqu’il montre l’importance sémiotique de l’imagination dans les déductions « théorématiques », qui, contrairement aux simples déductions « corollariales », ne sont pas triviales et comportent un véritable gain d’information, même si elles peuvent ensuite faire l’objet de preuves purement analytiques. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 17 (1 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailIs the content-object distinction universally valid ? Meaning and reference in Twardowski and Meinong
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

in Dewalque, Arnaud; Gauvry, Charlotte; Richard, Sébastien (Eds.) Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School (2020)

By claiming, against Bolzano, that all presentations have an object on top of their content, even when this object does not actually exist, Twardowski notoriously paved the way for Meinong's ... [more ▼]

By claiming, against Bolzano, that all presentations have an object on top of their content, even when this object does not actually exist, Twardowski notoriously paved the way for Meinong's "Gegenstandstheorie", which will make place for inexistent objects and their properties. And this provides a very interesting counter-model to the standard account of meaning and reference which is linked to extensional semantics. However, by equating inexistent objects with the sets of their descriptive features, Meinongian formal systems tend to jeopardise the content-object distinction. The universal validity of such a distinction will here be assessed by having a closer look at different kinds of “inexistent objects”. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (1 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailConstruction logique et constitution transcendantale du monde. Les principes catégoriels de la constitution du monde sont-ils analytiques ou synthétiques a priori ? Relecture carnapienne du projet phénoménologique
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

in Farges, Julien; Fournier, Jean-Baptiste; Pradelle, Dominique (Eds.) Edifier un monde. La notion d’Aufbau entre construction logique et constitution phénoménologique (2020)

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (5 ULiège)
Peer Reviewed
See detailAsserted contents, contexts of assertion and circumstances of evaluation. Formal semantics and pragmatics
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference (2019, December 05)

La sémantique formelle s’efforce de déterminer aussi précisément que possible les contributions des différents termes d’un énoncé aux conditions de vérité de cet énoncé. Il est toutefois notoire que le ... [more ▼]

La sémantique formelle s’efforce de déterminer aussi précisément que possible les contributions des différents termes d’un énoncé aux conditions de vérité de cet énoncé. Il est toutefois notoire que le sens d’un énoncé dépend partiellement du contexte d’énonciation. Cela constitue un défi pour la sémantique formelle, qui tente de le relever en montrant que le contexte d’énonciation détermine moins le contenu énoncé (et ses conditions de vérité) que les circonstances dans lesquelles ce contenu doit être évalué. C’est notamment dans ce cadre que peut être traitée la pragmatique propre aux déictiques (indexicaux, démonstratifs, …). Nous montrerons que, moyennant certaines modifications du cadre formel (envisagées au sein d’un Projet De Recherches interuniversitaire du FNRS), ce cadre peut également traiter la pragmatique propre aux noms propres mais aussi à certains termes généraux. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 30 (3 ULiège)
Peer Reviewed
See detailAre self-consciousness and introspective knowledge one and the same thing ?
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference (2019, April 26)

Detailed reference viewed: 29 (2 ULiège)
Full Text
See detailLa PMA pour tous, signe d'un nouvel ordre sexuel mondial ? Analyse d'arguments
Glorie, Caroline ULiege; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference given outside the academic context (2019)

Detailed reference viewed: 39 (5 ULiège)
See detailRobots et personnages virtuels : objets et sujets d’émotions ?
Delbouille, Julie ULiege; Leclercq, Anne-Lise ULiege; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

Conference given outside the academic context (2019)

Detailed reference viewed: 35 (2 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailFondements logiques et phénoménologiques de la rationalité scientifique. Penser avec Jean Ladrière
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

in Leclercq, Jean; Scaillet, Thierry (Eds.) Lire Jean Ladrière (2019)

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (2 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailProposition d’une enquête empirique sur les intuitions « externalistes » des locuteurs à travers le mode de déférence sémantique
De Brabanter, Philippe; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

in Travaux du Cercle Belge de Linguistique (2019), 13

Nous distinguons plusieurs formes d’externalisme sémantique puis montrons leurs rapports à différents modes de la déférence sémantique. Dans la mesure où la question de savoir quel type d’externalisme ... [more ▼]

Nous distinguons plusieurs formes d’externalisme sémantique puis montrons leurs rapports à différents modes de la déférence sémantique. Dans la mesure où la question de savoir quel type d’externalisme sémantique caractérise quel type de termes du langage fait aujourd’hui l’objet d’âpres débats théoriques, nous suggérons un dispositif expérimental qui interroge les intuitions des locuteurs à cet égard en testant le mode de déférence sémantique qui régit leur usage de divers types de termes. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 28 (3 ULiège)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailLa phénoménologie doit-elle fonder ou seulement élucider les mathématiques ?
Leclercq, Bruno ULiege

in Pradelle, Dominique; Farges, Julien (Eds.) Husserl. La phénoménologie et les fondements des sciences (2019)

Detailed reference viewed: 19 (1 ULiège)