References of "Bloch, Francis"
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See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULiege

in Journal of Regulatory Economics (2017), 52

In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses between access and bypass. Second, we extend the baseline model studied in the literature by allowing for fixed costs of network installation. By analogy to the literature on strategic entry deterrence, we distinguish three regimes of blockaded bypass, deterred bypass and accommodated bypass depending on the entrant's unit cost. We show that the make-or-buy decision of the entrant is not necessarily technologically efficient: when bypass is chosen, it is always the cheapest option but access may be chosen when it is not cost effective. [less ▲]

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Peer Reviewed
See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference (2012, September)

Detailed reference viewed: 10 (0 ULiège)
Peer Reviewed
See detailStrategic Bypass Deterrence
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference (2012, March 17)

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 9 (0 ULiège)
Peer Reviewed
See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Gautier, Axel ULiege; Bloch, Francis

Conference (2011, October 17)

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. [less ▲]

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See detailAccess Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULiege

in Review of Network Economics (2008), 7(2), 207-230

In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final ... [more ▼]

In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous. [less ▲]

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See detailAccess, Bypass and Productivity Gains in Competitive Postal Markets
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULiege

in Crew, Michael; Kleindorfer, Paul (Eds.) Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector (2008)

Detailed reference viewed: 61 (8 ULiège)