References of "Pestieau, Pierre"
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See detailHarsh occupations, life expectancy and social security
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Racionero, M.

in Economic Modelling (2016), 58

Should pension provisions differ by occupation? We study the optimality of allowing the pension policies to differ by occupation when individuals differ in longevity and occupation, longevity is private ... [more ▼]

Should pension provisions differ by occupation? We study the optimality of allowing the pension policies to differ by occupation when individuals differ in longevity and occupation, longevity is private information but occupation is observable. There is a case for differentiating the pension policy by occupation when longevity is (imperfectly) correlated with occupation. The short-lived workers in the safe occupation are however made worse-off, more so when the social objective includes a higher social weight on short-lived individuals to redress the implicit bias towards long-lived that the unweighted utilitarian objective entails. The maximin criterion ensures equal utility for short-lived workers regardless of occupation but those in the safe occupation consume the most when young, the least when old and retire the earliest. This is achieved by taxing - often quite heavily - their savings and their earnings from prolonged activity. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. [less ▲]

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See detailFair retirement under risky lifetime
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Fleurbaey, M.; Leroux, M.-L. et al

in International Economic Review (2016), 57

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See detailLong-term care and capital accumulation: the impact of the State, the market and the family
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Canta, Chiara; Thibault, Emmanuel

in Economic Theory (2016), 61

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See detailLong-term care and births timing
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Ponthiere, Grégory

in Journal of Health Economics (2016), 50

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See detailThe design of long term care insurance contracts
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Cremer, Helmuth; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie

in Journal of Health Economics (2016), 50

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See detailArrow’s theorem of the deductible and long-term care insurance
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Dreze, Jacques H.; Schokkaert, Erik

in Economics Letters (2016), 148

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See detailLongevity variations and the welfare state
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Ponthiere, Grégory

in Journal of Demographic Economics (2016), 82

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See detailEfficient taxation with differential risks of dependence and mortality
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Nishimura, Yukihiro

in Economics Bulletin (2016), 36

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See detailAging and the Inherited Wealth of Nations
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Onder, Harun

in CESifo DICE Report (2016), 14 (1)

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See detailLTC social insurance with two-sided altruism
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Cremer, H.; Roeder, K.

in Research in Economics (2016), 70

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See detailLong-term care social insurance. How to avoid big losses?
Klimaviciute, Justina ULiege; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

E-print/Working paper (2016)

Long-term care (LTC) needs are expected to rapidly increase in the next decades and at the same time the main provider of LTC, namely the family is stalling. This calls for more involvement of the state ... [more ▼]

Long-term care (LTC) needs are expected to rapidly increase in the next decades and at the same time the main provider of LTC, namely the family is stalling. This calls for more involvement of the state that today covers less than 20% of these needs and most often in an inconsistent way. Besides the need to help the poor dependent, there is a mounting concern in the middlec lass that a number of dependent people are incurring costs that could force them to sell all their assets. In this paper we study the design of a social insurance that meets this concern. Following Arrow (1963), we suggest a policy that is characterized by complete insurance above a deductible amount. [less ▲]

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See detailPublic education, PAYG pension and economic growth in an a geing s ociety
Artige, Lionel ULiege; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Conference (2015, June 05)

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See detailOptimal life-cycle fertility in a Barro-Becker economy.
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Ponthiere, Grégory ULiege

in Journal of Population Economics (2015), 28

Parenthood postponement is a key demographic trend of the last three decades. In order to rationalize that stylized fact, we extend the canonical model by Barro and Becker (Econometrica 57:481–501, 1989 ... [more ▼]

Parenthood postponement is a key demographic trend of the last three decades. In order to rationalize that stylized fact, we extend the canonical model by Barro and Becker (Econometrica 57:481–501, 1989) to include two—instead of one—reproduction periods.We examine how the cost structure of early and late children in terms of time and goods affects the optimal fertility timing. Then, we identify conditions that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium with a stationary cohort size. Finally, we examine how the model can rationalize the observed postponement of births, and we highlight two plausible causes: (1) a general rise in the cost of children in terms of goods and (2) a decline in the degree of family altruism. [less ▲]

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See detailLobbying, family concerns and the lack of political support for estate taxation
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; De Donder, Philippe

in Economics and Politics (2015), 27

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See detailTax Evasion and Social Information: an Experiment in Belgium, France and The Netherlands
Lefebvre, Mathieu ULiege; Villeval, Marie Claire; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege et al

in International Tax and Public Finance (2015)

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See detailLong-term care social insurance. How to avoid big losses?
Klimaviciute, Justina ULiege; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Scientific conference (2015)

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See detailUnited but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce, and the marriage contract
Cremer, Helmuh; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Roeder, Kerstin

in Journal of Population Economics (2015), 28

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization is optimal with no divorce risk. Couples can self ... [more ▼]

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization is optimal with no divorce risk. Couples can self-insure through savings which offers some protection to the uneducated spouse, but at the expense of a distortion. Alternatively, for large divorce probabilities, symmetry in education, where both spouses receive an equal amount of education, may be optimal. This eliminates the risk associated with the lack of education, but reduces the efficiency of education choices. We show that the symmetric allocation will become more attractive as the probability of divorce increases, if risk aversion is high and/or labor supply elasticity is low. However, it is only a “second-best” solution as insurance protection is achieved at the expense of an efficiency loss. Finally, we study how the (economic) use of marriage is affected by the possibility of divorce. [less ▲]

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See detailTagging with leisure needs
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Racionero, Maria

in Social Choice and Welfare (2015)

We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private information about ... [more ▼]

We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private information about their abilities but needs are observable. With different levels of observable needs the population can be separated into groups and needs may be used as a tag.We first assume that the social planner considers individuals should be compensated for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging.We also consider an alternative social objective where individuals are deemed responsible for their needs. [less ▲]

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See detailTax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

in International Tax and Public Finance (2015), 22

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive ... [more ▼]

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries [less ▲]

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