

## IDENTICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND HERITAGE AUTHENTICITY

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### Abstract

In 1994 the document of Nara had concluded that authenticity was a relative concept that was to be understood within a certain cultural context. But in opposition with the Japanese tradition, Western criteria of authenticity seemed not to agree with the concept of « true to original » reconstruction. Nevertheless, since then, a large number of reconstruction projects have been conceived or carried out in Europe that question the conservationist and the art historian, for they seem not to be supported by any coherent philosophy, and border on relativism. The reconstruction of important monuments or city centres has often been understandably chosen in the immediate post-war context, in Munich, Ypres or Mostar. But more recent concrete projects (rebuilding the Berlin royal Palace, the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow or the Dresden Cathedral) or imaginary ones (reconstruction of the Saint-Cloud and Tuileries Palaces) are much more problematic regarding their political and philosophical justifications. This attitude questions us especially since it seems to be more and more accepted in the current conservation practice, even on the local scale (project of rebuilding the façade of the Hotel Aubecq for example). This departure from the principles and spirit of the main twentieth century conservation charters seems to encounter the mainstream of cultural capitalism and one of its major economical sectors: tourism. In many cases, this very concrete reason is obviously more important than any identity consideration and reduces the distance between heritage and theme parks. Our contribution tries to find ways to go beyond the often fruitless debate between the pros and the cons using concepts developed by analytical philosophy and sociology.

Keywords: reconstruction, authenticity, identity, tourism, kitsch.

### 1. Confusion after Nara

*...one realises that knowledge, conventions such as the Charter of Venice or the declaration of Nara, are constantly questioned by reality, by appeals from the public and that eventually they are often helpless to prevent abuses (François Chaslin) [1].*

In 1994 the document of Nara had attempted to rethink the criteria of authenticity assessment in the light of the problems raised by the periodical reconstruction of the Ise temples, which seemed in complete opposition with the Western concept of material authenticity [2]. Even if certain scholars emphasised right at the start that we were dealing with a religious rite, on the fringe of conservation practices, which could by no means be generalised to reconstruction practices in Japan as a whole [3], the discussions raised by this key issue were very soon simplified and the idea of a radically different vision of authenticity between the East and the West imposed itself in numerous future debates. Yet although identical reconstruction of heritage buildings is not representative of Japanese attitude as a whole, the last decade has shown it is increasingly favoured by the West, who found it offending only twenty years ago and often justifies it by less coherent arguments than the religious discourse underlying the ritual reconstruction in Ise, based on a still vivid thousand-year-old tradition and on the renewal of buildings by definition not quite perennial in their materiality. In this regard, the 2000 Charter of Riga somehow softened the criteria of the Charter of Venice, claiming that reconstruction could be acceptable in exceptional circumstances, such as a human or natural disaster. Yet one must admit that recent projects such as those carried out in Versailles, or reconstruction fantasies for the Tuileries palace or the castle of Saint-Cloud in France [4] can hardly be justified from a sound conservation viewpoint.

The topicality of the issue is shown by the French scientific journal *Monumental*, published by the Centre of National Monuments, which devotes a whole recent issue to “completion, restoration, and reconstruction” [5]. After considering in its final section the well-known current projects with a political dimension, i.e. the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow, the Dresden Cathedral, the Hohenzollern Castle in Berlin, and the Royal Palace of Vilnius in Lithuania, the issue closes with a debate led by François Chaslin and in which art historians and architects take part [6]. As we read this otherwise fascinating debate, we were quite surprised that it bore mainly on “how to reconstruct”, leaving aside, as requested by Pierre-André Lablaude, the more basic issue of the relevance of reconstruction. On the contrary, we are convinced that this debate must be held and that if the reconstruction of disappeared monuments seems to meet a fundamental need in our society, we must also question this phenomenon, which can by no means lead to trivializing this practice or tarnishing our heritage, where authenticity would be assessed according to more political and mercantile criteria rather than historical and artistic ones.

Although some philosophers of art, after over a century of avant-garde, are now willing to concede, together with Hume [7], that aesthetic judgment is not passed by an a-historical, universal subject, but is refined with age and education, if the same philosophers, trained in the analytical tradition, are even inclined to integrate a certain degree of relativism by shifting the issue of essentialism to wonder more empirically *when there is art* [8], this definitely does not mean that a certain post-modern thinking, which flimsily claims that anything is worth anything, is a philosophically sound stance – it would boil down to claiming that nothing is worth anything. However, for historical and therefore socio-economical reasons, it seems to us that this kind of concession to scepticism is mainly aimed at legitimizing at little cost interests that are socially understandable but still harmful to the credibility of conservation as an institution. Indeed, it is now generally accepted that mankind goes through various “regimes of historicity” [9], which necessarily influence how we perceive heritage. Every society and every period has its own way of articulating the present, the past and the future, the representation crisis Western civilisation is going through has got us stuck in the last thirty years in what François Hartog calls a “presentism”, characterized by an obsession with memory (at the expense of history), an obsession which seems to lead us to what many condemn as conservational inflation.

This inflation is even reinforced, it seems to us, by other more prosaic motivations linked to the current, particularly the European context, notably the search for identity and the economic interests of tourism. France and Belgium, to mention neighbouring countries familiar to us, seem to be going through a difficult identity crisis. In Belgium the inhabitants of Binche fought for the recognition of their carnival as UNESCO’s intangible world heritage, and Belgians, fortified by this victory, not knowing how to reconcile speech communities with each other and desperately trying to find an identity for lack of a government, have just submitted the chip (ironically aka in English as “French fried”), or more precisely the know-how of chip-shop owners, to the same committee of experts. If this example may be more cranky than convincing, can the same be said of the willingness of French people to rebuild the Tuileries? Even if matters are different in those two cases -- the latter seems at first sight more serious – they nevertheless show a yearning for symbols of identity (which the heads of those states will publicly admit) and are ready for any strategies, including in the field of conservation, that would allow the history of their nation to make sense again. And this not only points to a question of identity, but also to a willingness to attract the vast international tourism market. This phenomenon is all the deeper since the tourism industry now represents the first worldwide economic sector of late capitalism, still described as cultural, before oil and the automobile. This economic constraint is now responsible for unprecedented pressure on the players of conservation, and sometimes members of commissions of monuments and sites must make decisions with a gun at their head in matters whose declared aim is primarily to revitalise a region. It can therefore be easily understood that such a political and economic context should go hand in hand with *weak conservation thought* [10] and strong relativism.

## **2. Tourism and Authenticity**

However, these motives seriously threatening the integrity and credibility of conservation as an institution are not, according to us, the most dangerous ones, because they are quite explicit. On the contrary, a related phenomenon – one could talk of collateral damage – and a more deceitful one too, seems to be able to undermine more insidiously and not less deeply the foundations of the edifice we are all patiently trying to build on the basis of criteria as objective as possible, as well as on rational and rigorous regulations or charters. Valérie Arrault has identified this phenomenon recently described as “The Empire of Kitsch” [11] and Yves Michaud, always a clear-sighted scholar, has deconstructed the mechanism particularly well in “Art in the State of Gas” [12] ! What is meant by this? Nothing less

than an important change of regime, the one which sociologist Daniel Bell had already condemned in 1976 in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, speaking of an aestheticization of daily life, to refer to the fact that, under pressure from consumerist society and artistic circles, aesthetic and hedonistic values had spread throughout society and gradually imposed themselves as generalised ethics. Yves Michaud (the philosopher of art and former – 1989-1996 – head of *Beaux Arts* school) shows particularly well in his most pessimistic book that “the tourist’s experience is ‘aesthetic’ in its very nature, the term being understood in its etymological sense of sensitiveness and receptiveness (the Greek *aesthesis*)...” With the advent of the tourist as a representative avatar of today’s human condition (we are all potential tourists), we have been for at least three decades in a new regime of *aesthesis*, a paradoxical regime, as Michaud claims that “the tourist wants to be more than a tourist, or at least not like the others, the tourist would like to feel better, differently, more authentically” (our emphasis). There lies the paradox: the tourist aims at authentic experience, but this authenticity has nothing to do with the ideal that inspired the historians who wrote the charters of Venice and Nara, as it is only a semblance of authenticity, what Michaud calls “corrupt authenticity, which the very structure of the tourist’s experience forces him to find.” Anyone having doubts about this might refer to tourist internet sites, where the argument of authenticity is used to justify building a truly consecrated Indonesian temple and a Chinese temple turned into a restaurant in the Pari Daiza theme park in Belgium, or an equally authentic Japanese garden (the largest in Europe) in Hasselt [13].

### 3. A Few Lessons in Analytical Philosophy

In such a context it seems necessary to re-open the debate on the problematic concept of authenticity (for which we give credit to Françoise Choay [14]), which cannot evaporate into the gas produced these days by a certain kind of contemporary art and even more by tourism. Otherwise the whole mechanism of conservation would come to a halt. When he was less pessimistic, Yves Michaud would claim that “there is no reason why the pluralism we need to take into account to be true to the facts [remember the Nara debate] should yield a relativism where ‘all things are equal’.” To avoid this pitfall he suggested adopting Gaston Bachelard’s method regarding the “new scientific mind” and “pluralizing our concepts [15].” This is precisely what we are trying to do through multidisciplinary work involving the knowledge of the architect, the conservation historian and that, apparently more remote, of the logician and the analytical philosopher.

The diversity of the examples mentioned in the debate closing the issue of *Monumental*, ranging from the Hermione in Rochefort to the Stoa of Attalos in Athens, from Gaudi’s building sites to Le Corbusier’s *Pavillon de l’Esprit Nouveau*, and the ensuing difficulty to take up a coherent stance, obviously point to a lack of clarity in the concepts that yet should allow us to cast a critical glance at reconstruction operations carried out for extremely different purposes. This confusion among specialists can only be reproduced in the minds of the public, notably via internet sites of associations such as “Reconstruisons St Cloud (let’s re-build St Cloud)” in France or “Berliner Schloss (Berlin castle)” in Germany. Those inventories include reconstructions which have nothing in common with each other, either chronologically or regarding the context, with Pierrefonds alongside Guédelon and the Ise temples next to Chateau Zhang Laffitte, as if they were equally defensible examples from a scientific point of view, as if feasibility was the only criterion to take into account.

Like it or not, identical reconstruction obviously calls upon the notion of *identity*, which philosophers have perceived as most difficult ever since the sophists were discussing that of the ship of Theseus on the agora in the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C. What is being identical to oneself? According to what criteria? These questions remain as fascinating as difficult. Yet they cannot be ignored. How can the architect justify his/her choices when s/he claims to re-build in an identical way? For the Dublin workshop in 2009 [16], we had already considered the usefulness of starting from the writings of philosophers and logicians [17] to justify interventions based on three types of identity: (i) numerical identity, which defines the relation of an individual to him/herself along their whole career (A=A or Viollet-le-Duc equals Viollet-le-Duc from birth to death); (ii) qualitative identity, which refers to a likeness (with various degrees of resemblance) between one or more individuals (A=B or a bearded man equals another bearded man if a beard is the required feature for being a 19<sup>th</sup> century restorer) and finally (iii) sortal identity, which brings together under a same category of sort or gender numerically different individuals (A=B or Viollet-le-Duc equals you who are reading this article, as you are both heritage experts). If natural language defines those realities as “the same” (sameness), confusions can be avoided thanks to distinctions used by logicians to refer to an object’s authenticity (which must necessarily be the same, but according to which type?).

Similarly, as early as 1994, David Lowenthal made a distinction between three kinds of faithfulness: faithfulness to original form and substance, faithfulness to context and faithfulness to aims [18]. Of

course, the idea is by no means to choose one (arbitrarily?) at the expense of the others, but rather, as in Riegl's system of values, to search for the best possible balance between the various kinds of faithfulness. Of course, one must always make a choice in the order of priority, and some scholars clearly – if not quickly – took sides. To take a recent – and interesting – example, in his essay *Romantic Modernism* Wim Denslagen wishes “to reserve the notion of authenticity for the materiality of the artwork itself”, otherwise “it would mean that a copy of the original state of the work would have the same historical value as the original substance itself [19].”

The form-matter discussion is well illustrated by the above-mentioned puzzle of the ship of Theseus, on which many a logician have pondered, such as Frédéric Nef and Pascal Engel, who looked for the tipping point where the ship's identity changes according to the proportion of original material [20]. In this precise case, identity of material is important as we are dealing with the ship of Theseus, whose sacred feature is obvious. Therefore it can be easily understood that we are dealing with an anthropological process of fetishization necessary to the development of a cult: Engel and Nef make a distinction between two kinds of intentionality – seen from the point of view of reception – that of a priest or of a ship-owner [21]. If the ship of Theseus is a relic, her material authenticity prevails. This conditional formulation shows that a Goodmanian approach – “when is there authenticity?” rather than “what is authenticity?” – allows, as we will see further, to avoid the pitfalls of essentialism to the benefit of a more operational pragmatism.

If Denslagen particularly insists on material authenticity, Raymond Lemaire had taken up a nearly opposite stance in the discussions preceding Nara, considering that “the authenticity of the formal message, carrying the beauty of the work of art, should prevail [22],” whereby he is close to a metaphysical stance such as Aristotle's in his hylomorphic theory stating that “matter desires form the way the female desires the male.” This is also in agreement with semiologist Umberto Eco, for whom a copy is enough to carry a message across [23]. Yet as Denslagen anticipated [24], the primacy of form ultimately justifies identical reconstruction; this is what happens in the *Monumental* debate, centred on the question of *how* rather than *why*, hence the key role given to skills by the participants when it comes to reproducing the setting. This question of the skill is of course a fundamental one, as even logician Scaltsas accepts that such an external factor should intervene in his demonstration, making a distinction in the destruction of an object between terminal and non-terminal catastrophe, according to whether or not it can be recovered thanks to the technical skills of a contractor [25]. An antique vase which may not have been stuck back together at the time when it was made could easily be today in a specialized workshop, just like only a few decades ago restoring the sprayed paintings of the basilica of St. Francis of Assisi would have been impossible without the help of computers.

Yet Scaltsas does not restrict himself to the matter of the skill only, as he feeds the debate on authenticity by introducing, beyond matter and form considered as necessary conditions, the notions of space-time continuity and of intentionality, thereby leaving the field of logic to enter that of “anthropo-logic”. It may come as some surprise that such an eminent semiotician as Umberto Eco might leave aside this notion of intentionality in his judgment of authenticity: the copy, which according to him is enough to carry the message across, rarely derives from the same intention as the original work. Indeed, rhetorics and pragmatics have taught us that a statement by all means identical as far as form is concerned can have very different meanings in different contexts, in other words that the same sentence can be uttered with very different intentions. This is what Scaltsas rightly underlines when he distinguishes different intentions in the reconstruction. The reasons why a building is re-built explain why it can be considered as the same or not at all the same: in the case of the identical reconstruction of the *Pavillon de l'Esprit Nouveau* or of Mies Van der Rohe's pavilion, one may consider that there is little difference between the intention of the original construction and that of the reconstruction, given the autotelic character of the buildings. However, current examples of reconstructions of buildings emblematic of past political regimes sometimes seem to be only justified by a willingness to tear off a page in history in a logic not unlike revisionism. If qualitative (formal) identity has prevailed in both cases, the criterion of intentionality would bring us to back the reconstruction of the two pavilions only. In the second case, still in analogy with language theory, we get the same sign, but not the same symbol. This matter of intentionality can even take us quite far, as we will see, regarding very specific cases where the copy, in this respect, could be considered as more authentic than the original.

The notion of space-time continuity is also most enlightening for authenticity assessment, as Scaltsas rightly shows in his already-mentioned article “Identity, Origin and Spatio-temporal Continuity.” This viewpoint is particularly well illustrated in practices of gradual replacement of the material, and even of anastylis, which generally seems more acceptable than reconstruction provided the material has

remained on the spot. Gradual replacement brings us back to the issue of the ship of Theseus, illustrated in the *Monumental* debate by the example of *Notre-Dame de Paris*, a work which, although only 20% of its original material is left, “is handed over to future generations through the renewal of its material [26].” In the case of anastylosis, things are more complex and perfect cases where the whole material would have remained *in situ*, waiting to be “restored into shape”, only exist in the fantasies of archaeologists. In reality space-time discontinuity has irreversible implications on the quantity of material preserved and on the context, and therefore on the result of the reconstruction. Without jumping to the conclusion that such a process is impossible, we need to avoid generalizations between cases as remote as the Mostar bridge, re-built almost immediately after it was destroyed with part of the stones recovered from the Neretva river, and the *Frauenkirche* in Dresden, where over a half century eroded the material lying on the spot and whose informal aspect (ruins) had become symbolic in itself [27]. In Belgium the possibility of re-assembling the façade of Victor Horta’s *Hôtel Aubecq*, a victim of real estate promotion in the 1950s, after its stones had travelled across the country for decades, on a site yet to be found, also shows a desperate willingness to bring a masterpiece back to life starting from remains torn away from their spatio-temporal context [28]. Yet the size of the gap in the history of a destroyed monument also has more subtle effects on the perceived authenticity of its reconstruction, since space-time continuity is thereby superimposed on the question of intentionality: in the above-mentioned article, Scaltsas gives the example of a mother who, after she unintentionally destroyed a pile of cubes built by her son, immediately builds it again because speed contributes to denying the act. Her intention is to re-build the same *so it can continue to be* and not *so it can be* again.

Even if it would be dangerous to consider them as a true assessment grid, the concepts of form, matter, intentionality and space-time continuity can still be considered as beacons for authenticity assessment. The interaction between the concepts and the inevitable influence of psychological factors on assessment certainly show that any generalization is impossible and that each case must be carefully assessed.

#### 4. Nelson Goodman’s Contribution to Conservation Issues

Alongside the tools provided by analytical philosophy, the theses of Nelson Goodman, one of the most interesting philosophers of art in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, also deserve close examination if one wishes to clarify certain misunderstandings regarding authenticity, even if François Chaslin, despite being a great architecture critic and a first-rate intellectual, considers as “pedantic” any reference to the term allographic in the *Monumental* debate [29]. On the contrary, it seems to us that the writings of this American philosopher have considerably fed the discussions on art and architecture for three or four decades. First when he shifted the issue of art to avoid the illusions of essentialism, then in *Languages of Art* by distinguishing particularly operational regimes of authenticity. By distinguishing autographic arts from allographic ones, Goodman emphasizes the fact that material authenticity is not relevant to the same extent in all cases. For an autographic sculpture or painting, only the original from the hand of the artist is authentic, whereas nobody considers listening to a piece by Bach in a concert or reading Proust in a modern edition as inauthentic: it is the same work if the score or the text is faithful. If the distinction seems clearer, certainly to Nelson Goodman, as far as music, literature or plastic arts are concerned, the same does not apply to architecture [30]. As said earlier, it is caught between two wheels of Goodman’s system of authenticity, which again forces us to consider degrees of authenticity linked to degrees of allography or autography. In line with what we stated regarding intentions, based on the works of logicians, we would argue that the *Pavillon de l’Esprit Nouveau* is allographic due to its programmatic character – in language theory one would talk of metalinguistic function and Nelson Goodman of literal exemplification [31] – and that its reconstruction can therefore be considered as authentic, notwithstanding it being the work of a close disciple of Le Corbusier’s, for in this case it is not the hand but the conception that matters, as advocated by Alberti in the first book of *De Re Aedificatoria*. The *Pavillon de l’Esprit Nouveau* is mainly a conceptual and intellectual work and every updating brings it back to life, just as every new interpretation brings a musical work back to life. The *Pavillon de l’Esprit Nouveau* presented at the 1925 exhibition was, for practical reasons, made of wood, but we would go so far as to argue, in a provocative way, that mass-produced pavilions today might be more authentic than the original, because they would perfectly match the intention of the conceiver, who compared architectural production and assembly-line production of automobiles. On the contrary, if a large part of the modernists’ production can be classified among allographic works, the same can certainly not be said of the ancient works whose reconstruction is being presently considered, where craftsmanship, i.e. the hand, matters and for which no “score” is available. This means that their autographic character also emerged from the building process which was not, as for the modernists,

completely separated from conception. Building site accidents participated in the advent of the architectural work and gave it a unique character. We then understand that some confusions in the debate led in the *Monumental* journal are caused by ignoring this distinction. Indeed, one may not similarly consider the reconstruction of works by Le Corbusier and by Gaudi, the latter being well-known for his involvement on building sites. This is illustrated by the fact that the *Sagrada Familia*'s posthumous sides, even if they are in line with the overall spirit, are built in a completely different manner from those dating from Gaudi's lifetime. One may therefore wonder about the results of the current posthumous construction of a chapel as planned by the architect in Chile, a project in which Pierre-André Lablaude took part as an advisor.

In a first conclusion of this paper now drawing to a close, we would again like to insist that, if the numerous parameters which logic and art ontology have enabled us to identify seem to make any decision regarding identical reconstruction an eminently complex one – but the conservationist's work is a complex one too – they deserve credit for delineating true critical thinking which does not refrain from calling some operations unjustifiable or shaky, having more to do with kitsch than with heritage conservation.

## **5. The Rule of Kitsch and the Crisis of Heritage Conservation**

As already mentioned, it does not take long to find well-documented web sites advocating completely eccentric reconstruction proposals. The least we can say is that confusion prevails between legitimate restoration and strange projects meant for tourists, between real or at least justifiable authenticity and corrupt authenticity, to quote the words of Michaud. Unfortunately, among the players of this truly dangerous game, we find renowned experts who seem to give their support to anything and everything and to refuse any dialogue from the start, thereby reinforcing current relativism. Let it be reminded that according to Plato this attitude of refusal is precisely that of the worst sophist, probably invented to illustrate the issue, the famous Calicles, living incarnation of the very failure of philosophy, since one cannot convince the one who will not hear.

Yet the stakes are high, first of all, for the credibility of conservation as an institution. By flirting too much with political and economic interests, by supporting reconstruction projects which can hardly be distinguished from the "wonderful" achievements found in numerous theme parks all over the global planet, the conservation mechanism seems to be creating the conditions of its own implosion. How can you expect rigour in all the files treated by experts, when otherwise sickening nostalgia, an unsatisfied need for identity or pressing economic constraints suffice to depart from rationality?

And there is worse, but this would probably take us too far. What does this yearning for fake authenticity mean? Thanks to Clement Greenberg and Abraham Moles, we now know how kitsch works. We learnt with Milan Kundera that it could even be used by totalitarian power as a strategy to standardize the masses. And regarding kitsch as nourished by late capitalism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, who will tell us who profits by the crime? Who would deny that, parallel to the gradual globalization of markets and traded goods, kitsch has indeed become through consumer goods one of the most widespread styles worldwide?

It can indeed be stated that aesthetic trends beyond post-modernism have greatly revalued the notion of *kitsch*, as a middle-of-the-road aesthetic value offering powerful resources in a world which has lost its bearings, which wishes to satisfy its taste for compulsive consumption and quench its hedonistic thirst, with tourism as its most spectacular form, to the great satisfaction of those who become richer in the process. We are then left to ponder whether instead of spreading confusion, we scientists should not tidy up the chaos and at least try to resist cynicism.

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- [3] LARSEN, Knut Einar. Authenticity in the Context of World Heritage: Japan and the True Universal. In LARSEN, Knut Einar, MARSTEIN, Nils. *Conference on Authenticity in Relation to the World Heritage Convention. Preparatory Workshop, Bergen, Norway, 31 January – 2 February 1994*. Trondheim: Tapir Publishers, 1994, p.65-75.
- [4] See the websites <http://www.tuileries.fr/> and <http://www.reconstruisonsaintcloud.fr/>.
- [5] See note 1.
- [6] Jacques Moulin and Pierre-André Lablaude, chief architects for historical monuments, are among the participants: if they take part as experts, their stance is far from neutral, as the former drew up the plans for the construction of the medieval castle of Guédelon, and the latter is meeting fierce opposition after his peremptory declarations in favour of reconstruction practices (see a.o. RYKNER, Didier. Les curieuses théories d'un inspecteur des monuments historiques. In *La tribune de l'art* (<http://www.latribunedelart.com/les-curieuses-theories-daeur-tm-un-inspecteur-des-monuments-historiques-article001730.html>)).
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- [9] HARTOG, François. *Régimes d'historicité. Présentisme et expériences du temps*. Paris : Seuil, 2003, applied to the specific case of authenticity in MORISSET, Lucie-K. *Des régimes d'authenticité. Essai sur la mémoire patrimoniale*. Rennes : Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2009.
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[19] DENSLAGEN, Wim. *Romantic Modernism. Nostalgia in the World of Conservation*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009, p.107.

[20] ENGEL, Pascal & NEF, Frédéric. Identité, vague et essences. In *Les études philosophiques* 4, 1988, pp. 475-494. Similarly, in the *Monumental* debate, François Loyer argues that a restoration becomes abusive « when there is more in the restored object than in the original object.” (*Monumental*, op. cit., p.101).

[21] ENGEL, Pascal & NEF, Frédéric. *Op. cit.*, p.476.

[22] LEMAIRE, Raymond. Authenticité et patrimoine monumental. In LARSEN, Knut Einar, MARSTEIN, Nils. *Conference on Authenticity in Relation to the World Heritage Convention. Preparatory Workshop*, op. cit., p.95.

[23] “The taste for authenticity at all costs is the ideological product of a mercantile society, and when the reproduction of a sculpture is absolutely perfect, the privilege granted to the original is similar to the privilege granted to the first numbered edition of a book rather than to its second edition: it matters to the antique dealer, not to the literary critic” (ECO, Umberto. *La production des signes*. Paris : Librairie générale française, 1992, p.16). As will be seen further in the article, this radicalizes the stance according to which architecture is allographic, which we think only rarely seems true.

[24] DENSLAGEN, Wim. *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

[25] SCALTSAS, Theodore. *Identity, Origin and Spatio-temporal Continuity*. In *Philosophy* 56, 1981, pp.396. The following quotations by Scaltsas are all from the same article.

[26] *Monumental*. *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

[27] We can also mention in Belgium the so-called anastylosis of the castle of Boussu, an awkward testimony of Renaissance architecture by Jacques Du Broeucq, based on a few stones found during excavations.

[28] An exhibition is planned for this year in Brussels to present the dismantled façade to the public and encourage reflections on its future. See the site <http://charlespicque.info/web/?p=760> where the question of authenticity is raised by the Prime Minister of the Brussels regional government.

[29] *Monumental*. *Op. cit.*, p.104.

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