

Chapter 2

ASEAN's Quiet Authority: A Strong Convening Power in the Indo-Pacific

Marie Kwon

Introduction: Competing Multilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific

Over the past two decades, the Indo-Pacific has taken the center stage in geopolitical analyses of Asia (López Nadal, 2025). What has come to be known as the Indo-Pacific era has ushered in an increasingly fragmented and competitive landscape of multilateralism across the Pacific and Indian Oceans, marked by intensifying great power rivalries and the proliferation of overlapping institutional architectures. For ASEAN, this evolving context presents not just a challenge of adaptation but a deeper risk: the potential erosion of its role as the cornerstone of Asian regionalism. Building from a distinction between multilateralism, often externally driven and strategic, and regionalism, as a normatively grounded internal project, this chapter contends that ASEAN's continued legitimacy in the Indo-Pacific hinges on its ability to reaffirm its centrality through convening power. Far from being a passive or default position, ASEAN's convening power constitutes a deliberate and performative form of quiet authority.

Theoretically, this chapter draws from the field of International Political Sociology, examining power as expressed through norms, narratives, and diplomatic rituals performed by the region's political elites. In doing so, it explores convening power not as material influence but as the capacity to shape discursive space, modulate diplomatic tempo, and maintain inclusive regional order. Empirically, the chapter draws from multi-sited interviews conducted in South Korea, Indonesia, and Singapore in 2024, offering insights into the continuities of ASEAN's evolving diplomatic identity.

The analysis unfolds in four parts: it begins by outlining the current strategic challenges ASEAN faces in the Indo-Pacific; it then reflects on how ASEAN Centrality has long constituted the institutional DNA of Southeast Asian regionalism and served as a blueprint for broader Asian regionalism; it proceeds with an assessment of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and its implications for ASEAN's positioning in relation to its principle of centrality; and finally, it introduces an IPS-informed reading of ASEAN's underappreciated symbolic power. The chapter concludes by making the case that ASEAN's future relevance rests not in emulating great power logic but in embracing its role as a strategic convener within a competitive regional order.

ASEAN's Challenges in the Indo-Pacific

The emergence of the Indo-Pacific is notable because it has “allowed for an appreciation of the strong economic expansion of the region as well as a recognition of significant changes to Asia's security architecture” (Kwon, 2023). Nonetheless, the Indo-Pacific era, presents significant challenges to ASEAN's cohesion and strategic agency, as commentators have framed it (McInain Gill, 2024). Central among these is the perception that ASEAN's institutional architecture lacks the coherence, coordination, and bureaucratic capacity required to sustain a genuinely multilateral Indo-Pacific order (Ha, 2022). The rise of minilateral groupings such

as the QUADrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and AUKUS further compounds this challenge by sidelining ASEAN-centric frameworks and diluting the centrality it once commanded in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, internal divisions within ASEAN, exemplified by contrasting positions between member states, underscore the difficulty of articulating a unified regional response to shifting geopolitical dynamics. The organization's struggles over the implementation of the Five-Point consensus in light of the Myanmar crisis is one of the latest examples of international rifts among ASEAN members (Jones, 2025; Tobing, 2018).

To fully grasp these contemporary pressures, it is crucial to situate ASEAN's role within its longer institutional and diplomatic trajectory. ASEAN's institutional capacity has long been debated and contested (Acharya, 2009a; Jetschke & Theiner, 2020; Stubbs, 2019; Sukma, 2015), however, its strong emphasis on ASEAN centrality has historically functioned as both a strategic tool and unifying normative belief that the "international order should not be guided by the raw struggle for power" (Al Banna Choiruzzad, 2025), and it continues to do so. In the Indo-Pacific context, the challenge for ASEAN is not simply external alignment, but the delicate act of resisting incorporation into US-led narratives while maintaining long-standing economic and political ties with China (Trần et al., 2025). Navigating this polarized context requires of the organization to reaffirm its centrality, not as rhetorical inertia, but as a principled strategic stance amid systemic flux. Since its creation, ASEAN has been "living with giants" in the words of Beeson (2013), and has always been shaped by the activities of more powerful actors (Emmerson, 2017; Yates, 2017). Therefore, the challenges tied to the Indo-Pacific are far from new to the region's political and strategic leaders.

In what follows, the chapter turns to unpack how this principle of centrality has been translated into the Indo-Pacific discourse, particularly through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), and how it continues to shape ASEAN's diplomatic posture in the region.

Reframing ASEAN Centrality as Strategic Continuity in the Indo-Pacific

The publication of the AOIP in 2019 marked a pivotal moment in regional diplomacy, symbolically reaffirming ASEAN's relevance in a geopolitical context increasingly dominated by great power rivalry. ASEAN's Indo-Pacific positioning has consistently centered on reaffirming its principle of centrality as the normative anchor of regional diplomacy. One of the most common misconceptions is that ASEAN centrality is either a recent innovation or merely about ASEAN itself. As Amitav Acharya (2009a) reminds us, centrality is deeply rooted in earlier conceptualizations of ASEAN as the "leader," "driver," "institutional hub," or "nucleus" of regionalism. It is not only about ASEAN per se but about enabling and organizing regional processes in a manner that reflects Southeast Asian priorities. Moreover, centrality has always been co-constructed: ASEAN's very existence and function have evolved in dialogue with, and in response to, great power rivalry. Scholars such as Davies (Davies, 2018) have further emphasized how Southeast Asian states leverage institutional design and diplomatic narrative to exert quiet influence in a contested regional order. As one official interviewed for this study remarked, "great power rivalry has always been a part of the regional order," a view echoed across multiple conversations. In this light, ASEAN's adoption of the AOIP is not belated; rather, it is a continuation of ASEAN's longstanding strategy of cautious but deliberate engagement, reaffirming its role as a stabilizing regional convener.

The notion of *hedging* has experienced a resurgence in recent Indo-Pacific scholarship, often invoked to describe the strategic ambiguity and simultaneous engagement with competing great powers that characterizes the behavior of smaller and middle powers in the region. This strategic balancing act has frequently been interpreted through the lens of “hedging”, a term typically used to describe the simultaneous pursuit of contradictory alignment behaviors to offset risks (Goh, 2005), and more formally defined by Haacke (2019) as an effort to manage strategic uncertainty without committing fully to any one bloc.

Yet this framing flattens the complexity of ASEAN’s approach. Rather than a reactive or indecisive stance, ASEAN’s strategy is better understood as grounded in a coherent diplomatic culture, defined by principles of non-alignment, consensus, and narrative control. This gradually emerged from what Amitav Acharya coined ‘Asia’s cognitive prior,’ taking shape through the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference, which collectively contributed to the region-wide acceptance of ‘non-intervention’ as a core diplomatic principle (Acharya, 2009b). This is not a pitfall but rather a modality of agency, grounded in non-alignment and calibrated to preserve unity across political and developmental asymmetries through the ASEAN Way¹. As highlighted in interviews with regional diplomats, ASEAN’s diplomatic culture privileges continuity and predictability, qualities that serve as strategic assets amid the volatility of great power competition. Today this translates into a doctrine of practical multi-alignment in order to mitigate the risks (Fitriani, 2025).

In this light, ASEAN centrality is not an aspirational claim but a mode of practice—one that reaffirms ASEAN’s role as the core of Asian regionalism. This commitment is evident in the AOIP, which “has been criticized for being yet another ineffectual ASEAN document. These criticisms, however, misunderstand the basis on which ASEAN operates” (Tsjeng & Bhuhindar, 2020). The next section explores how AOIP operates not as a grand strategy, but as an expression of ASEAN’s convening identity within the broader Indo-Pacific imaginary.

Hedging and Theories of Southeast Asian Regionalism

The evolution of regional cooperation in Asia has long been shaped by a persistent duality: the quest for a shared regional identity, and the pragmatic imperative of managing asymmetrical inter-state relations. Within this enduring tension, two prominent strands of scholarship offer valuable insight into ASEAN’s institutional resilience: Amitav Acharya’s notion of constitutive regionalism and Jürgen Rüländ’s conceptualization of hedging utility.

Acharya’s framework of constitutive regionalism advances a view of ASEAN not merely as a functional response to systemic pressures, but as an active constructor of regional order. For Acharya, ASEAN’s endurance lies in its capacity to generate and diffuse norms, practices, and shared diplomatic culture—what has become known as the “ASEAN Way” “a code of conduct for inter-state behaviour as well as a decision-making process based on consultation and consensus. Rather than emulating Western institutional models, Southeast Asian regionalism, as Acharya argues, is embedded in the region’s own post-colonial experiences and socio-political heterogeneity (Acharya, 2009b). ASEAN’s centrality, in this light, derives from its normative agency: the ability to shape regional interaction not through enforcement, but through the socialization of expectations and the performative reproduction of diplomatic order.

¹ For more on the ASEAN Way, see, amongst others, Amitav Acharya (2014). *Constructing a Security Community in South-east Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (3rd ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315796673>

Rüland, by contrast, approached ASEAN's institutional architecture through the lens of hedging utility—a framework that foregrounds the strategic calculus behind regional cooperation. From this perspective, multilateral mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the East Asia Summit (EAS) function less as expressions of normative convergence and more as pragmatic tools for policy coordination, soft balancing, and collective bargaining *vis-à-vis* external powers. While Rüland acknowledges ASEAN's value in setting agendas and convening actors, he remains cautious about its depth of institutionalization, pointing to its limited coherence and uneven performance in crisis response (Rüland, 2010).

Taken together, these two perspectives offer complementary insights into ASEAN's political durability. ASEAN may be understood both as a constitutive force, shaping regional norms and identity, and as a strategic platform, providing member states with an instrument to navigate shifting power dynamics. Its capacity to oscillate between these roles, to adapt symbolically while operating instrumentally, has underpinned its relevance over time.

This institutional hybridity is especially salient in the context of the Indo-Pacific, where the emergence of competitive unilateral frameworks and renewed great power rivalry threatens to sideline inclusive regionalism. Yet ASEAN's persistence, as much of the scholarship suggests, is far from coincidental. It is a product of both historical embeddedness in the region's diplomatic culture (Ba, 2009) that enables it to remain central to, even if not dominant in, evolving regional architectures. Whether assessed through the lens of normative production or utilitarian flexibility, ASEAN's role in the Indo-Pacific continues to be defined not by its limitations, but by its capacity to endure and convene amid systemic flux.

International Political Sociology and the Study of ASEAN

International Political Sociology (IPS) emerged as a critical response to the limitations of mainstream International Relations, offering a lens attuned to the complexities of how the “international,” the “political,” and the “social” are co-constituted and continuously reshaped (Basaran et al., 2016; Guillaume & Bilgin, 2020). In contrast to International Relations (IR) theory, thanks to its sociological foundations, IPS emphasizes the relational and socially constructed nature of power: a shift from material capabilities to the shaping of norms, identities, and meaning.

In this context, convening power can be understood as a modality of agency that lies in the ability to organize discursive arenas, set the diplomatic tempo, and legitimate narratives over others. It foregrounds processes through which actors are positioned within broader regional frameworks, often not through coercion or hierarchy, but through the ritualization of roles and the diffusion of norms. This framework is especially generative for ASEAN studies, as it moves beyond classical geopolitical readings of the Indo-Pacific as a monolithic strategic space. Instead, it draws attention to the performative dimensions of regional diplomacy, where regional actors like ASEAN enact influence through symbolic practices and normative framing (Guzzini, 2016)

Through an IPS lens, ASEAN appears not as a reactive institutional actor but as a producer of regional diplomatic grammar, operating through a distinct mode of power that is quiet, performative, and ritualized. This approach sheds light on how ASEAN continuously constructs its centrality, not through directives, but through iterative acts of convening that produce a sense of regional rhythm and order. The following section develops this perspective by

turning to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), interpreting it not as a conventional strategic blueprint, but as a symbolic articulation of ASEAN’s performative centrality within a competitive regional architecture.

The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific as Symbolic Strategy

A key milestone for ASEAN in 2019 was the introduction of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), a non-binding document articulating the region’s strategic vision. Initiated by Indonesia (Anwar, 2020), this outlook was officially presented by all ten ASEAN member states during the 34th ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok on June 23, 2019. “The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, while preserving their formats.” (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, 2019)

The adoption of the AOIP was widely perceived as a delayed and diluted response to the region’s shifting geopolitical environment or “old wine in a new bottle” (Ha, 2019) and significantly lacking “actionable policy” (Jaknanihan, 2022). Yet such assessments often overlook the symbolic weight the document. As interviewees noted “the AOIP is in fact] not a strategy” and should be understood as such. The AOIP serves not as a blueprint for grand strategy, but as a discursive recentring of ASEAN within Indo-Pacific imaginaries through the principle of centrality. By advancing an alternative to more militarized, security-driven regional frameworks, such as those promoted, amongst others, by the United States, the QUAD countries, and AUKUS, the AOIP reasserts ASEAN’s normative voice. It offers a counter-narrative to the assumption that ASEAN is merely a passive bystander or an institutional relic. The organization remains *de facto* central not simply because it has survived as an organization, but because it continues to provide an inclusive platform where regional order is debated, reframed, and cautiously steered.

Historically, the AOIP was crafted as a deliberate counterbalance to great power-driven visions of the Indo-Pacific. Rather than endorsing binary strategic alignments, it reflects ASEAN’s long-standing commitment to multilateral dialogue, non-alignment, and sovereignty. In this sense, centrality must not be reduced to diplomatic fence-sitting or to the hedging posture often attributed to ASEAN. It is, instead, a strategic act of continuity, a commitment to maintaining an open, rules-based architecture in the face of growing polarization. While the AOIP may lack binding mechanisms or enforcement tools, its significance lies in its symbolic and normative function: it asserts ASEAN’s authorship in shaping regional discourse.

Looking ahead, the Indo-Pacific era presents both substantial risks of having to face its sempiternal challenge and affirm its centrality (Kwon, 2024), and meaningful opportunities for ASEAN. The AOIP agenda offers a chance to not only reaffirm ASEAN’s principles, but also to actively shape the future contours of Indo-Pacific cooperation. To this end, three key policy avenues should be prioritized. First, ASEAN members must work toward greater institutional coherence by ensuring deeper alignment among member states around the principles articulated in the AOIP and developing mechanisms for implementation and follow-through. Second, the organization should deepen and diversify its strategic partnerships with middle powers such as South Korea, Australia, and the European Union—actors whose visions of the Indo-Pacific often align with ASEAN’s inclusive and rules-based approach. Third, ASEAN

should further institutionalize its convening role, using its position as a diplomatic hub to mediate tensions and promote confidence-building among rival powers. In embracing these paths, ASEAN can continue to exercise its quiet authority, not by replicating the logic of great powers, but by doubling down on its role as a regional steward and convener.

ASEAN's Convening Power: Quiet Authority in Practice

This approach is particularly fruitful for ASEAN studies, where power is often expressed not through material dominance but through symbolic authority, procedural norms, and narrative control. By foregrounding ASEAN's symbolic power, not as a tool of enforcement but as a mechanism for shaping regional diplomatic grammar, an IPS lens enables a deeper understanding of how ASEAN exerts agency in the Indo-Pacific. As Evelyn Goh (2011) has argued, ASEAN helps establish a "normative bargain" grounded in sovereignty, non-intervention, consensus, and informality—principles that collectively legitimize the voice of smaller states in regional security management (p. 373). It helps illuminate how ASEAN's identity and influence are constructed through ritualized summitry, the ASEAN Way or its consensus-driven processes, and its capacity to frame the terms of multilateral engagement in a way that is acceptable to great powers (Yates, 2017). As such, IPS offers a valuable methodological toolkit for analyzing ASEAN not only as an institutional actor but as a producer of the region's diplomatic language and norms amid the imperatives of geopolitical competition.

Building on the symbolic assertion of centrality in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), it is essential to foreground the deeper logic that sustains ASEAN's regional role: its capacity for convening. In an era marked by the growing polarization of Asia's geopolitical landscape, fueled by China's expanding military and economic ambitions and the United States' increasingly adversarial rhetoric, ASEAN's convening power with normative leadership constitutes one of its most enduring power assets (Acharya, 2018). In this context of heightened rivalry and fractured trust, ASEAN provides a rare platform capable of hosting inclusive dialogue.

ASEAN operationalizes this symbolic power through key diplomatic mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus groupings, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+) (Ba, 2017). These forums, while often overlooked for their lack of binding enforcement, enable ASEAN to embed major powers, many of them strategic competitors, into processes of dialogue and norm articulation. ASEAN rarely acts as a directive force; instead, it assumes the roles of venue provider, process owner, and agenda-shaper. This facilitative posture is not a sign of weakness but a strategic asset: it anchors competing actors within a normative framework and sustains a diplomatic rhythm distinct from that of great power posturing.

The regularity of summits and diplomatic gatherings provides what Davies describes as "the rituals and symbols which serve as a representation of a region at peace to citizens, other member-states and the wider international community" (2018). Far from being mere ceremonial formalities, these diplomatic performances operate as constitutive practices that actively reproduce ASEAN's symbolic power and normative authority. As Davies further observes, the rituals of ASEAN diplomacy are "endowed with performative value precisely because of their regularity and formalism". They enact, rather than simply reflect, regional order by staging consensus, continuity, and institutional coherence. Through this lens,

ASEAN's calendar of summits and ministerial meetings functions as a visual and procedural grammar of regionalism—where the act of convening itself becomes a strategic expression of unity, irrespective of tangible outcomes. These practices do not only project an image of regional cohesion outward; they also internalize shared norms by socializing member states into a distinct diplomatic culture. Central to this process is what Davies terms a “collective sense of temporality”, wherein ASEAN-led events punctuate regional time and position the organization as the central rhythm-setter of Asian diplomacy. Thus, rather than symbolic in a superficial sense, ASEAN's diplomatic rituals are deeply strategic. They render centrality visible and legitimate through repetition, format, and affect—constituting a mode of quiet authority that is performatively sustained within the evolving architecture of Indo-Pacific multilateralism.

Within the Indo-Pacific discourse, this form of symbolic power remains central to ASEAN's relevance. Unlike coercive strategies that seek compliance, ASEAN's strength lies in its ability to mediate meaning, to shape how regional narratives are framed, how priorities are set, and how diplomacy is performed. This power to convene and frame, while subtle, is vital in a regional order increasingly defined by fragmentation and contestation. ASEAN offers a space in which states can interact without the pressure of alignment, preserving room for ambiguity, flexibility, and negotiation. In other words, it provides the normative architecture of the region (Acharya, 2014).

Rather than being marginal or secondary, ASEAN's centrality derives precisely from this underappreciated diplomatic capacity. Its relevance in the Indo-Pacific era does not depend on adopting the logics of containment or alliance-building, but on embracing its identity as a symbolic convener, an actor that mediates between competing visions and institutionalizes dialogue as a strategic tool. In this light, ASEAN's quiet authority becomes not only a defensive stance but a generative form of regional leadership.

While soft power, as articulated by Nye (2023), denotes a state's capacity to shape the preferences of others through the attractiveness of its values, norms, or culture, convening power operates according to a distinct logic. It is less concerned with attraction per se than with the orchestration of collective processes, namely, the ability to initiate and sustain platforms for dialogue, regulate diplomatic tempo, and enable inclusive decision-making absent coercive instruments. In this regard, convening power can be understood as an extension of Barnett and Duvall's conception of productive power, insofar as it configures the normative structures and institutional modalities through which actors comprehend and participate in regional order (2005). Within the ASEAN context, convening power should thus be seen not as a secondary or procedural asset, but as a core strategic modality of quiet authority, a form of agency that derives legitimacy from symbolic centrality rather than directive capacity.

Policy Recommendations for Strategic Continuity

ASEAN must reinforce its role as a regional bridge-builder (Lin, 2024), and reassert its capacity to shape the Indo-Pacific discourse on its own normative terms. The present context—marked by escalating trade tensions, exemplified by the ongoing US-led tariff war—demonstrates the strategic wisdom behind ASEAN's refusal to be drawn into the polarizing logics of major power competition. This non-alignment is not an act of evasion, but a deliberate affirmation of the organization's longstanding commitment to multilateral dialogue, sovereignty, and regional autonomy.

To preserve and enhance its centrality, ASEAN must work to strengthen institutional coherence within the framework of the AOIP. While the AOIP has been criticized for its lack of operational clarity, its core value lies in articulating a vision that centers ASEAN-led mechanisms as the backbone of regional cooperation. As the AOIP itself states, “This Outlook is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing ones; rather, it is an Outlook intended to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process and to strengthen and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms to better face challenges and seize opportunities arising from the current and future regional and global environments” (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, 2019). In this light, ASEAN’s primary objective moving forward should not be the construction of new institutional frameworks, but rather the revitalization of existing ASEAN-led mechanisms (Laksmana, 2020).

Finally, ASEAN must continue to cultivate strategic partnerships with middle powers whose Indo-Pacific visions reflect a shared commitment to multilateralism and regional stability. South Korea and ASEAN, for instance, have already demonstrated this by advancing practical cooperation in the four priority areas of the AOIP, as outlined in the Joint Statement on Cooperation on the AOIP adopted at the 24th ASEAN–ROK Summit in 2023. Beyond South Korea, countries such as Australia, the European Union, and Canada also offer valuable opportunities for institutional collaboration and norm-building without the pressure of binary alignments. Strengthening these relationships would not only amplify ASEAN’s collective diplomatic voice but also anchor it more firmly within the Indo-Pacific’s evolving architecture.

In sum, ASEAN’s policy posture should move beyond a reactive defense of centrality and toward a proactive affirmation of its convening identity. It is quiet authority, far from being a sign of decline, offers a model of regional stewardship that privileges inclusion, dialogue, and normative continuity. In a fragmented Indo-Pacific, such a model is not merely desirable, it is indispensable.

Conclusion: ASEAN Centrality as Quiet Authority in the Indo-Pacific

Interviews with regional policymakers and analysts consistently underscore a key insight: ASEAN is not losing relevance in the Indo-Pacific, rather it is transforming the meaning of relevance itself. Far from becoming obsolete, ASEAN remains a vital site for consensus-building, agenda-setting, and normative framing. In an increasingly polarized regional environment, its quiet authority continues to serve as a stabilizing force. Rather than retreat from its leadership role, ASEAN must double down on its strengths: its symbolic convening capacity, agenda-setting capabilities and its ability to shape regional narratives. These are not passive attributes but active forms of agency—expressed through diplomacy, institutional continuity, and the production of strategic ambiguity. By reasserting this unique role, ASEAN can resist being instrumentalized as a conduit for the Indo-Pacific strategies of external powers. Instead, it can reaffirm its identity as a normative convener—one that crafts inclusive frameworks, frames multilateral discourse, and anchors the region to a logic of dialogue rather than division. In doing so, ASEAN demonstrates that power in the Indo-Pacific need not be measured in force projection or bloc-building, but in the ability to convene, mediate, and narrate the region’s future. Overall, the Indo-Pacific era does not render ASEAN obsolete; rather, it demands a renewed focus on ASEAN Centrality—not as an outdated doctrine, but as a renewed practice of regional order-making.

References

- Acharya, A. (2009a). Arguing about ASEAN: What do we disagree about? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22(3), 493–499. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570903138444>
- Acharya, A. (2009b). *Whose Ideas Matter?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (1st edn). Cornell University Press; JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7zf8x>
- Acharya, A. (2014). *Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order* (Third edition). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
- Acharya, A. (2018). Doomed by Dialogue: Will ASEAN Survive Great Power Rivalry in Asia? In G. Rozman & J. C. Liow (Eds), *International Relations and Asia's Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, and India* (pp. 77–91). Springer Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3171-7_6
- Al Banna Choiruzzad, S. (2025). Understanding Indonesia's Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse. In T. L. Trân, Suthiphand Chirathivat, & P. De (Eds), *Indo-Pacific and ASEAN: new balances and new challenges for Asian integration and stability*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003559245>
- Anwar, D. F. (2020). Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific. *International Affairs*, 96(1), 111–129. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz223>
- ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific*. (2019). ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf
- Ba, A. (2017). ASEAN and the Changing Regional Order: The ARF, ADMM, and ADMM-Plus. *Economic Research Institute for ASEAN & East Asia*, 146–157.
- Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. *International Organization*, 59(1), 39–75. JSTOR.
- Basaran, T., Bigo, D., Guittet, E.-P., & Walker, R. B. J. (Eds). (2016). *International Political Sociology: Transversal Lines*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315693293>
- Beeson, M. (2013). Living with Giants: ASEAN and the Evolution of Asian Regionalism. *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia*, 1(2), 303–322. <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2013.8>
- Davies, M. (2018). *Ritual and region: The invention of ASEAN*. Cambridge University Press.
- Emmerson, D. K. (2017). ASEAN between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow? *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia*, 5(1), 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2016.31>
- Fitriani. (2025, January 16). Joining BRICS, Indonesia sticks with multi-alignment strategy. *The Strategist*. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/joining-brics-indonesia-sticks-with-multi-alignment-strategy/>
- Goh, E. (2005). *Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies*.

- Goh, E. (2011). Institutions and the great power bargain in East Asia: ASEAN's limited 'brokerage' role. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11(3), 373–401. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcr014>
- Guillaume, X., & Bilgin, P. (Eds). (2020). *Routledge handbook of international political sociology* (First issued in paperback). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Guzzini, S. (2016). *International political sociology, or: Danish Institute for International Studies*; JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13383>
- Ha, H. T. (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine in New Bottle? *Yusof Ishak Institute*, 2019.
- Ha, H. T. (2022). Understanding the Institutional Challenge of Indo-Pacific Minilaterals to ASEAN. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 44(1), 1–30. <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs44-1a>
- Haacke, J. (2019). The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: A critique and a proposal for a modified conceptual and methodological framework. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 19(3), 375–417. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz010>
- Jaknanihan, A. (2022, January 26). *What critics miss on ASEAN's Indo-Pacific Outlook | East Asia Forum*. <https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/01/26/what-critics-miss-on-aseans-indo-pacific-outlook/>
- Jetschke, A., & Theiner, P. (2020). Time to move on! Why the discussion about ASEAN's relevance is outdated. *The Pacific Review*, 33(3–4), 593–603. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1673803>
- Jones, W. J. (2025, March 14). *Myanmar shows ASEAN centrality is weakening | East Asia Forum*. <https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/03/14/myanmar-shows-asean-centrality-is-weakening/>
- Kwon, M. (2023, April 11). The Emergence of the Indo-Pacific: Geopolitical Turn or Continuity? *E-International Relations*. <https://www.e-ir.info/2023/04/11/the-emergence-of-the-indo-pacific-geopolitical-turn-or-continuity/>
- Kwon, M. (2024). *ASEAN's Sempiternal Challenge: Maintaining Centrality in the Indo-Pacific*. <https://www.e-ir.info/2024/11/21/aseans-sempiternal-challenge-maintaining-centrality-in-the-indo-pacific/>
- Laksmana, E. A. (2020). Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific. *The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, 3(5), 106–117.
- Lin, J. (2024). *Advancing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Beyond Indonesia's Chairmanship. 2024*.
- López Nadal, J. M. (2025). *Indopacífico: Eje de la geopolítica global*. Catarata. https://www.catarata.org/libro/indopacifico_159457/
- Mclain Gill, D. (2024, February 22). *ASEAN's evolving dilemma in the Indo-Pacific*. <https://www>.

- Nye, J. S. (2023). Soft Power and Great-Power Competition: Shifting Sands in the Balance of Power Between the United States and China. *Soft Power and Great-Power Competition*.
- Rüland, J. (2010). Balancers, Multilateral Utilities or Regional Identity Builders? International Relations and the Study of Interregionalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(8), 1271–1283. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2010.513586>
- Stubbs, R. (2019). ASEAN sceptics versus ASEAN proponents: Evaluating regional institutions. *The Pacific Review*, 32(6), 923–950. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1611627>
- Sukma, R. (2015). ASEAN Beyond 2015: The Imperatives for Further Institutional Changes. *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, 413–417. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814620628-092>
- Tobing, D. H. (2018). The Limits and Possibilities of the ASEAN Way: The Case of Rohingya as Humanitarian Issue in Southeast Asia. *KnE Social Sciences*, 3(5), 148. <https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v3i5.2331>
- Trần, C. T. L., Suthiphand Chirathivat, & De, P. (Eds). (2025). *Indo-Pacific and ASEAN: New balances and new challenges for Asian integration and stability*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Tsjeng, Z. H., & Bhubhindar, S. (2020). *ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific: Seizing the Narrative? - RSIS*. <https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CO20016.pdf>
- Yates, R. (2017). ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: Understanding ASEAN’s role in Asia-Pacific order. *The Pacific Review*, 30(4), 443–461. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1264458>