

**The Uneasiness of the Citizen Subject.
Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics "of the Decision of the Other"
in Étienne Balibar**

« *Ce qui veut dire, j'en conviens sans réserve, que la
politique est aussi une éthique* »¹.
(« Which means, I wholeheartedly agree, that
politics is also ethics »)

"Balibar's thinking is stamped with the seal of aporia" ². Even though it leads to resolute and consistent political commitments in favor of migrants, the Palestinian cause, social and climate justice, a democratic and cosmopolitan Europe, anti-racism, etc., Etienne Balibar's political philosophy, writes Louis Carré, "has the distinctive feature of always reframing the issues it addresses in terms of specific 'circumstances', in the mode of 'aporia' and 'inconclusiveness', without presupposing any synthesis or final resolution in advance. »³. Another of his most attentive readers, Diogo Sardinha, has remarkably shown that Balibar's "anthropology without metaphysics" is inseparable from a "method" described as "quasi-dialectical," in the sense that the tensions or points of heresy it reveals are never subsumed under any unifying or reconciling generic category⁴.

Going one step further, Sardinha adds that "more than a method (...), we are dealing here with an *ethics*, an attitude towards the practice of thought"⁵. It is this insight, both penetrating and elliptical, that I would like to develop in this article. The importance of the ethical motif in Balibar's political philosophy became obvious to me when comparing two texts separated by more than thirty years of prolific philosophical production. The first is "The Infinite Contradiction", an excerpt from the presentation he gave at the University of Paris-I in 1993 as part of his Research Director Habilitation⁶. In it, Balibar traces the path that led him from a "reconstruction" of Marxism under the guidance of Louis Althusser to a "deconstruction of the Marxist text" inspired by Jacques Derrida's approach. While Althusser long maintained the idea of a "last instance" determination of ideology by economic infrastructure, Balibar now conceives of a "combination of two bases that are both incompatible and inseparable," where each—ideological structure and economic structure—"has a history only through the other." There is therefore no longer any last-instance causality, but rather an absent cause, or more precisely a "cause *that absents itself* ("cause qui s'absente") or whose effectuality passes through its opposite"⁷. This scheme of history detoured by "the other scene" (of economics by ideology and vice versa) will be reworked by Balibar several times in later works, as we shall see in the conclusion. But it is particularly significant that he insists

¹ Étienne Balibar, « La contradiction infinie », in *Lignes* (1997/3) : 24.

² Martin Delheix, *Étienne Balibar. L'illimitation démocratique* (Paris : Michalon, 2014) : 111.

³ Louis Carré, « Violence, institutions, « politique de la civilité ». Étienne Balibar et les enjeux d'une « anthropologie politique », *Raison publique* (2014/2) : 30.

⁴ Diogo Sardinha, « La contribution d'Étienne Balibar à une anthropologie sans Métaphysique », *Raison publique* (2014/2)

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ An English translation was first published : É. Balibar, "The Infinite Contradiction," *Yale French Studies* (n°88, 1995) : 142-164; then in French : "La contradiction infinie," in *Lignes* (1997/3) : 14-25. I quote the French text.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 19–20.

on “the ethical attitude implied by such a way of philosophizing” in the element of "aporia “—an aporia that ”does not mean error,“ he specifies, ”but the double bind of a discovery, or simply of a revolutionary theoretical question, that is posed in the very terms of its denial, or of the impossibility of its solution”⁸. Balibar outlines this ethics in the conclusion to his 1993 text through three famous formulas, which are themselves aporetic: “pessimism of the intelligence and optimism of the will” (Gramsci), “ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility »(Weber) and ”whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent »(Wittgenstein), which perhaps best expresses, in Balibar's mind, the contradictory injunction that governs all ethics faced with the aporias of politics.

The second text dates from 2025 and deals with the now familiar category of "intersectionality." It questions the tension between the two modes of subjectivation that it allows: on the one hand, a *politics of collective identification*, when intersectionality is thought as the addition or intersection of discriminations and therefore also of heterogeneous struggles that we seek to unify, and on the other hand, an *ethics of singularity*, when intersectionality helps to highlight the specific vulnerability that results from the aggregation of several discriminations on a single victim (typically: the poor, racialized single mother).⁹ Balibar's argument is to outline a politics of collective mobilization that could rally a plurality of discriminated groups (based on gender, race, class, etc.), without this policy violating the singularity of each existence taken in its difference. How can the “I,” without merging into a single collective identity, be a “we” at the same time? This narrow path, explains Balibar, ultimately depends on a “decision of the other,” (“*décision de l’autre*”) in both senses of the term: the other “who interpellates me or to whom I address myself,” and the other “who decides in me,” “who is not myself but the other in me”¹⁰.

My aim here is not so much to recount the entire conceptual trajectory that led Balibar from his 1993 text to his 2025, but rather to identify the philosophical matrix of this ethics inherent in the aporia of politics. Ethics is understood here as a relationship to the self (in contrast to morals, which concern the norms of our actions), according to a meaning shared by Foucault and Derrida (two explicit references in Balibar's thinking). I would argue that this matrix relies in the “uneasiness of the citizen-subject” (“*malêtre du citoyen sujet*”), a theme developed in *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique*, but which has its origins in the Humanist Controversy that marked Balibar's formative years and continued to fuel his thinking. I will proceed in five stages: (1) I will start with two seminal texts from the same year, 1989: (1.1) “La proposition de l'égaliberté” (equaliberty) where the question of “anthropological differences” appears for the first time, opening up the question of the universals; (1.2) “Réponse à la question de Jean-Luc Nancy: qui vient après le sujet?” in which Balibar both extends and modifies the “theoretical anti-humanism” of French structuralist thought through the notion of a constitutive uneasiness of the modern subject; (2) I will then show that the motive for this uneasiness underlies the Humanist Controversy; (3) we will then be in a position to understand why Balibar's anti-humanism paradoxically leads to a philosophical anthropology; (4) and in what way this is indissociable from an “ethics of the decision of the other” that results from a close debate with Jacques Derrida. (5) I

⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁹ Étienne Balibar, « Intersectionnalité et différences anthropologiques », *Les temps Qui Restent* (24-01-2025) : 25.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

will conclude by returning to the ethical consequences of the “cause that absents itself” and which gives history its tragic dimension.

1. 1989 : Equaliberty, Citizen Subject and the universal

In 1989, Balibar published two seminal texts: "La proposition de l'égaliberté"¹¹ and "Réponse à la question de Jean-Luc Nancy : Qui vient après le sujet ?"¹². It is useful to recall the historical and intellectual context of these texts, that of a double reactive crusade. Politically, 1989 was the year of the collapse of the Soviet system, as well as the bicentenary of the French Revolution – a contemporaneity that endorsed the arguments of François Furet or Marcel Gauchet on the alleged connection between revolutionary heritage and communist totalitarianism, and on the need to break with any “illusion” of radical historical transformation.¹³ On the philosophical stage, the period was also marked by the "return of the Subject," loudly championed by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, among others, against the ideas of "suspicion" (« *souççon* »), deconstruction, and structuralist decentering, which were accused of undermining the autonomy of subjectivity and, consequently, the democratic culture.¹⁴ To restore these, they advocated a "return to Kant" that would integrate post-Hegelian critiques of the transcendental subject, while preserving its capacity to reflect its finitude and to set itself as an ideal or regulatory horizon.¹⁵

The two texts of 1989 are, in their own way, forms of resistance to these two reactive crusades, as well as problematizing the complex relationship between the two issues. On the one hand, Balibar wanted to revive what was most revolutionary and emancipatory in the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*; on the other hand, he had no intention of backing down on the criticism of the “originary” or “constituent” subject that had driven the theoretical anti-humanism of Althusser, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Michel Foucault. But weren't these two struggles in deep tension with each other? For how can one assert the radicality of human rights without renewing the humanism that is its underlying ideology? How can one criticize the “sovereignty of the subject” while advocating the universal emancipation of citizens?

1.1. Equaliberty and the Aporia of the Universals

In “La proposition de l'égaliberté», Balibar considers the unprecedented implications of equal freedom or “equaliberty”¹⁶ for all humans promised by the *Declaration* of 1789. These implications were unprecedented because, although Athenian democracy had enshrined equal political freedom for all citizens (*isonomia*), this right to citizenship was not universal, as it was based on the privileged status of a group of *homoïoi* that excluded foreigners, women, and slaves. Symmetrically, five centuries later, Paul of Tarsus delivered a message of universality and equality for all humans in the name of Christ, regardless of their membership in any community, class, or gender (“*there is neither*

¹¹ Étienne Balibar, *Proposition de l'égaliberté* (Paris : PUF, 2010).

¹² Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011).

¹³ François Furet, *Le passé d'une illusion. Essai sur l'idée communiste au XX^e siècle* (Paris : Calmann-Lévy, 1995) ; Marcel Gauchet, *La Révolution des droits de l'homme* (Paris : Gallimard, 1989).

¹⁴ Luc Ferry & Alain Renaut, *La pensée 68. Essai sur l'anti-humanisme contemporain* (Paris : Gallimard, 1985).

¹⁵ Alain Renaut, *L'ère de l'individu. Contribution à une histoire de la subjectivité* (Paris : Gallimard, 1989) ; *Kant aujourd'hui*, (Paris : Aubier, 1997).

¹⁶ Étienne Balibar, *Proposition de l'égaliberté* (Paris : PUF, 2010).

Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female; for all you are one in Christ Jesus”¹⁷); but this equality was purely spiritual, dissociated from any citizenship, since it was only effective in the mystical body of Christ. In other words, the citizenship without universality of “Athens” mirrored the universality without citizenship of “Jerusalem.” However, the *Declaration* of 1789 combines the two: it makes all humans equal citizens in terms of rights and freedom. What concerns Balibar is “the disruptive effect it has in the political sphere”¹⁸ but also the contradictions that arise from it. For it is by mobilizing the *same* text that the bourgeoisie asserts its rights against privileges and absolutism, while excluding women, workers, colonized peoples, etc., and that the latter, through the voices of Olympe de Gouges, Gracchus Babeuf, or Toussaint Louverture, claim a universal right to citizenship. The issue of inequality and discrimination is therefore not eliminated but relocated: “since man and politics are coextensive ‘de jure,’ human beings cannot be denied access to citizenship except insofar as, contradictorily, they are also divested of their humanity »¹⁹. This is why there is a specifically *modern* form of racism and sexism, which does not confer on racialized people and women an inferior *status* within a hierarchical and intangible cosmological or theological order, but which relegates them to a defective humanity that excludes them from the community of equal citizens. From this perspective, “Modernity, because of its inherent universalism, is a form of political exclusion much more violent and unstable, or even unsustainable, than others to which it might be compared”.²⁰

The universal right to citizenship, since it is at stake in the very element of anthropological differences (of gender, race, division of labor, etc.), therefore raises an aporia that the dominant constantly seek to close, and the dominated to reopen. The dominant seek to close this aporia by *naturalizing* these differences (particularly those of gender and race, as Colette Guillaumin²¹ showed), or by *objectifying* them through specific “power-knowledge” mechanisms (as M. Foucault showed, this time with regard to the normal and the pathological: hospitals, asylums, prisons, etc.²²), which then gives institutions, and power in general, the basis to exclude more or less actively or completely from citizenship the humans placed on the negative side of these divisions. But these same differences can also become the basis for claims to rights, dignity, or recognition that reopen the aporetic nature of anthropological differences, since every claim to universality on the part of victims of discrimination involves the affirmation of a difference, a singularity.

For the paradox that underpins Balibar's entire reflection on universals is that any *universal*, as soon as it is enunciated (and solely by virtue of this enunciation), necessarily becomes *particularized* in a specific discourse, situated historically and geographically; conversely, any assertion of *particularity* (social, ethnic, religious, sexual, etc.) performatively *universalizes* thought by opening it up to a singularity that was previously oppressed or invisibilized. In other words, writes Balibar, “oppositions of the universal-particular type are much less significant and violent than oppositions

¹⁷ *Epistle to the Galatians*, 3:26-28

¹⁸ Étienne Balibar, *Proposition de l'égaliberté* (Paris : PUF, 2010), 56.

¹⁹ ¹⁹ « (...) dès lors que l'homme et le politique sont coextensifs « en droit », l'être humain ne peut se voir dénier l'accès à la citoyenneté que dans la mesure où, contradictoirement, il se trouve aussi retranché de l'humanité » (Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 467).

²⁰ « La modernité, en raison de son universalisme propre, est une modalité d'exclusion politique beaucoup plus violente et instable, ou même intenable, que d'autres auxquelles on pourrait vouloir la comparer » (Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 467).

²¹ Colette Guillaumin, *Sexe, Race et Pratique du pouvoir. L'idée de Nature* (Paris : Côté-femmes, 1992).

²² Michel Foucault, *Les Anormaux. Cours au Collège de France 1974-1975* (Paris : Seuil-Gallimard, 1999).

within the universal, between its nominations, its determinations, its realizations, or quite simply its rival enunciations".²³ Thus, the statement "all men are created equal", which opens the United States *Declaration of Independence*, is impeccably universalist; But what matters is its *enunciation*: when "performed" by the Founding Fathers of the United States, so determined to keep slavery going, this statement is in fact a vehicle for unbearable violence, whereas when performed by African Americans claiming their emancipation, it reveals an undeniable potential for liberation. The debate is therefore not between the universal and the particular, but between heterogeneous forms of universalism, which Balibar categorizes into two main poles: an "*extensive*" universalism that aims to become hegemonic, to spread and impose itself institutionally and ideologically; and an '*intensive*' universalism, which is a universalism of resistance and struggle against all forms of inequality or discrimination, and which tends to be singular and particularized.²⁴

All forms of universalism are therefore, in historically variable proportions, a combination of hegemonic structure and insurrectionary principle, but their aim is always the unification and differentiation of humans, in more or less inclusive or discriminatory ways. This is why anthropological differences always arise through *relationships of power and resistance* that constantly construct them (by naturalizing them) or deconstruct them (by historicizing them), opening up space for a confrontation without end or guarantee: "We must therefore negotiate difference," writes Balibar, "both fixing it (which is the role, or rather the condition of possibility, of the institution), and turning it, subverting it, shifting it incessantly"²⁵.

1.2. The Citizen Subject and his Uneasiness

The second text (of 1989) is a response to a question posed by Jean-Luc Nancy to some fifteen philosophers from different horizons: "Who comes after the subject?"²⁶. At a time when the debate was raging in France around the concepts of "subject," "man," and "consciousness" (more or less assimilated to one another), Nancy's editorial initiative seemed to take sides with those (inspired by Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Heidegger, etc.) who considered these figures obsolete, against those who, increasingly numerous and loud at the time, intended to defend or restore them. But as Balibar pointed out, Nancy's point was more subtle, because by asking *who* comes after the subject, he still seemed to mark the place for... a subject²⁷. This is no doubt what motivated Balibar to adjust the terms of the question before answering it. He begins by challenging the Heideggerian narrative that makes Descartes the inaugurator of the "sovereignty of the subject." Nowhere does Descartes make the *cogito* a foundation, a *Subjectum*. On the contrary, the Cartesian subject remains

²³ « Les oppositions du type universel-particulier sont beaucoup moins significatives et violentes que les oppositions au sein de l'universel, entre ses nominations, ses déterminations, ses réalisations, ou tout simplement ses énonciations rivales » (Étienne Balibar, *Des universels* (Paris : Galilée, 2016), 69).

²⁴ Étienne Balibar, *Des universels* (Paris : Galilée, 2016), 74.

²⁵ « Il faut donc négocier la différence, à la fois la fixer (ce qui est le rôle, ou plutôt la condition de possibilité, de l'institution), et la tourner, la subvertir, la déplacer de façon incessante » (Étienne Balibar, *Des Universels. Essais set conférences* (Paris : Galilée, 2016), 34.

²⁶ *Cahiers Confrontation*, no. 20. J-L. Nancy's question is followed by answers from A. Badiou, É. Balibar, M. Blanchot, M. Borch-Jacobsen, J-L. Courtine, G. Deleuze, J. Derrida, V. Descombes, G. Granel, M. Henry, Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe, J-F. Lyotard, J-L. Marion, and J. Rancière.

²⁷ Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 25

ontologically subject (*subjectus*) to that “positive infinite” that is God²⁸. In fact, the true conceptor of the subject as foundation or fixpoint is Kant, who erected the transcendental subject as *Subjekt* or *Subjectum* in the very movement whereby he de-substantialized it. Balibar's entire argument rests on this “wordplay” around the double Latin etymology of the concept of “subject”: the neutral *subjectum* (subject as foundation, scholastic translation of the Greek *hypokeimenon*, translated by Kant as *Subjekt*) and the masculine *subjectus* (subject as subjection, the one who is subject, submitted to God, to the king, to the sovereign). Subject-*suppositum* on the one hand, subject-*subditus* on the other²⁹. According to Balibar, the whole question of the subject is played out in the *relationship* between these two meanings, simultaneously antinomic and complementary: originary subjectivity (*subjectum*) and subjugated subject (*subjectus*).

The answer to Nancy's question derives from this. “After the subject comes the *citizen*,” replies Balibar. The citizen (defined by his rights and duties) is that “non-subject” who comes after the subject, and whose constitution and recognition put an end (in principle) to the subject's subjugation”³⁰. A double movement unfolds from there. First movement: after the subject-*subjectus* of the Ancien Régime comes the modern citizen, emancipated, autonomous, who establishes his own law. This is the *becoming-citizen of the subject*. But this citizen is not sovereign, or at least his sovereignty is not dissociable from his subjection to the State or disciplines. This is the second movement: the *becoming-subject of the citizen*. This double movement thus turns the citizen into an unstable figure, “who is no longer the *subjectus*, and not yet the *subjectum*”³¹, who performatively asserts his sovereignty against all powers while continuing to experience his subjection to them.

Through the historical wordplay between *subjectus* and *subjectum*, Balibar dismantles the often-presumed unity between the French (political) revolution and the Kantian (philosophical) revolution. Certainly, “the moment when Kant produced the transcendental subject was the very one when politics destroyed the ‘subject’ of the prince, replacing it with the republican citizen”³². But even so, Balibar asks, “is this citizen immediately what Kant calls ‘subject’ (*Subjekt*)?”³³. No, this citizen is indeed inscribed in an uncertain space between assujettissement and subjectivation—a space that makes him a strange “empirical-transcendental doublet “ (a whole conceptuality borrowed from Foucault), both a true subject of the State and a potential actor in a revolution, both passive and active, below and above the law, “sovereign-submissive,” as Foucault writes about the “subject” of Velázquez's *Las Meninas* (in turn model, painter, king, or spectator)³⁴. Such is precisely the *uneasiness* of the modern citizen-subject: that of not being identical to himself, in a fixed place, because the “care of the self” (“*souci de soi*”) inherent in any subjective position, in any movement of subjectivation that would also be an emancipation, is doomed, not only to anxiety or to a state of unhappy consciousness, (...) but to seek its being in a much more objective structure

²⁸ In the Classical Age, the subject cannot be originary because its finitude is always related to some “positive infinite”: this idea can be found in Foucault's *Les mots et les choses* (Paris : Gallimard, 1966), which himself probably inherits it from Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris : Gallimard, 1960), 187.

²⁹ Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 67.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 43. (« « Après le sujet vient le *citoyen*. Le citoyen (défini par ses droits et devoirs) est ce « non sujet » qui vient après le sujet, et dont la constitution et la reconnaissance mettent fin (en principe) à l'assujettissement du sujet »).

³¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

³² *Ibid.*, 44.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines* (Paris : Gallimard, 1966), 323.

that both immediately inscribes it in the universal and violently forbids it from finding a recognizable place there"³⁵.

Because this “place” is essentially a “place of relationship,” “for relationship,”³⁶ citizenship is experienced in these anthropological differences, which simultaneously legitimize inequalities (of gender, origin, etc.) through which it is exercised, and make the affirmation of these very differences the driving force of any struggle for emancipation. Thus, the two texts of 1989 converge: the uneasiness of the modern citizen-subject is experienced in the aporia of universals, in this “place of subjectivation as a conflictual process of assujettissement and emancipation.”³⁷ Both converge towards the development of a philosophical anthropology that nevertheless has no foundation in any generic or transcendental humanity. Here is where the detour via the Humanist Controversy becomes necessary: for how is an anti-humanist anthropology possible?

2. Theoretical Anti-humanism and Philosophical Anthropology

Balibar himself situates his project of philosophical anthropology in the wake of two pivotal moments in the “Humanist Controversy” that tore continental philosophy in the 20th century: the German moment of the 1920s and 1930s, which climaxed with the Davos debate (1929) between Cassirer and Heidegger on Kantian criticism (does it reveal the rational frameworks of any experience and any freedom, and therefore of any humanity, or does it pave the way for an ontology of finitude whose object is not man but *Dasein* as being-in-the-world?); the French moment of the 1960s, which targeted Sartre's existentialist humanism, successively assaulted by Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, and Foucault, each of them drawing in their own way on the potential for *decentering* of the structuralist approach³⁸. I would like to show that each of these moments reveals something of the ethical dimension of uneasiness at the heart of Balibar's anthropology.

Finding Heideggerian influences in Balibar's work may be surprising, even though Balibar has allusively linked what he terms “malêtre” to Heidegger's concept of *Unwesen* (“unrest,” “trouble”³⁹). However, it would not seem excessive to detect a significant analogy between Balibar's critique of the universalist metaphysics that obscures the subject's *malêtre* and Heidegger's critique of the “forgetting of *Being*.” (*Sein/être*). In the latter, as we know, the metaphysical tradition is deemed to have hidden the enigma of the question of Being (*Sein/être*) by positing some “supreme beings” (*Seienden/étants*) whose substantiality eludes the *temporality* constituting the relationship of *Dasein* to Being: the Nature of Ancient philosophies, the God of Medieval theology, and the Subject of Cartesian modernity, each of these founding beings (*étants fondateurs*) also becoming the vehicle through which this *Dasein* reveals itself⁴⁰. Similarly, in Balibar, the subject's uneasiness was successively obscured by a “cosmological” universal and then a “theological” one, before civic-

³⁵ « Le souci de soi inhérent à toute position subjective, à tout mouvement de subjectivation qui serait aussi une émancipation, est condamné, non seulement à l'inquiétude ou à l'état d'une conscience malheureuse, (...) mais à chercher son être dans une structure beaucoup plus objective qui tout à la fois l'inscrit immédiatement dans l'universel, et lui interdit violemment d'y trouver une place reconnaissable » (Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 24).

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁸ Étienne Balibar, "Renouveau de l'anthropologie philosophique ?", *Cahiers critiques de philosophie*, 2019/2, 71-73

³⁹ Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 26.

⁴⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Être et temps* (1927), trans. F. Vezin (Paris : Gallimard, 1986).

bourgeois universality, that is, humanism, both opened and closed the irreducible *historicity* of the citizen-subject⁴¹. Without saying that Balibar is a Heideggerian in disguise, it seems to me that the experiment of the absence of foundation, of *Subjectum*, precisely because it is an experiment, a subjective experience, that of a *malêtre*, a care (*Sorge*) or an unrest, leads Balibar's "citizen-subject," like Heidegger's *Dasein*, to embrace and replay this absence, this void, in the form of an *ethics* understood as relationship to the self and transformation of the self.

But the critical divergence from Heidegger is nevertheless very clear since, as we have seen (1.2), Balibar rejects the Heideggerian narrative that makes Descartes the inventor of "consciousness" as the foundation of the sovereign subject. In his view, it was John Locke who "invented a concept of subjectivity that implanted it in the field of individual consciousness and ultimately identified it with self-consciousness"⁴² This allows the individual to perceive him as the same person over time, thanks to memory, and more precisely as the owner of his body, possessions, and thoughts: *self = own*. But this identity is immediately affected by an *uneasiness* ("malêtre" or "inquiétude", according to Coste, Locke's first translator) that the subject experiences when confronted with dreams, hallucinations, and desires that he cannot fully appropriate, since their production escapes him, and which disturb the adequacy of the *self* and the *own*. In other words, in the modern subject, in the very movement (*desire*) in which he seeks to recapture himself, there is a "residue" that eludes any appropriation and irrevocably divides him from himself⁴³. The sovereign subject is thus indeed a myth (to which Heidegger subscribes) that forbids us from identifying modernity with "humanism" understood as the adequacy of subjectivity to consciousness.

The second episode in the "Humanist Controversy" is structuralism. Here, as we shall see, it was against his mentor Althusser that Balibar made a decisive critical shift. Contrary to those who reduce the structuralist adventure to a "death of the subject" and to an objectivism or formalism destroying all ethics and political commitment, Balibar rightly argues that it was, on the contrary, as he writes, "one of the very few philosophical moments to have sought not only to *name* the subject, or to assign it a founding function, or to situate it, but to actually *think* it"⁴⁴. According to Balibar, structuralism sought to "think the subject" by operating a double movement: a shift from *constituent* subjectivity to *constituted* subjectivity, or, so to speak, from the subject as *archè* to the subject as *effect*; and a movement of *alteration* of subjectivity as excess, supplement, limit-experience, or even "*experience of the impossible*".⁴⁵ If space permitted, we could show how inappropriate it is to describe the first movement as 'structuralist' and the second as "poststructuralist," when they operate simultaneously. The key point is that the "destitution of the subject" thus performed is by no means tantamount to its cancellation, but rather to the recognition that "there is no subject without subjection"—subjection that Balibar defines as "a differential of assujettissement and subjectivation, that is to say, of passivity and activity, perhaps of life and death, or of transformation

⁴¹ This periodization is presented at least twice by Balibar: in *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 26; in "Anthropologie philosophique et anthropologie historique en débat. Étienne Balibar, Gunter Gebauer, Roberto Nigro, Diogo Sardinha" *Rue Descartes*, "L'homme après sa mort, Kant après Foucault," 2012/3, 93-94.

⁴² Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 126.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 138-143.

⁴⁴ « (...) l'un des rares moments philosophiques à avoir essayé, non seulement de *nommer* le sujet, ou de lui assigner une fonction fondatrice, ou de le situer, mais à proprement parler de le *penser* » (E. Balibar, « Le structuralisme : une destitution du sujet ? », *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, « Repenser les structures » (2005, n°1) : 16.

⁴⁵ *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, « Repenser les structures » (2005, n°1) : 18-20.

and destruction.”⁴⁶ The decentering operated by ethnology (of Lévi-Strauss) or psychoanalysis (of Lacan) leads subjectivity back to the underground layer of the structures that constitute it, but this decentering also takes it, as Foucault writes, “to the threshold of what limits it”: death, madness⁴⁷. In this way, the great metaphysical divisions are challenged, particularly two of them: the nature/culture divide, which marks the boundary between the human and the non-human, and the normal/abnormal divide, which structures all the differences inherent in the human.

This is why theoretical anti-humanism, far from dismissing philosophical anthropology, invites us instead to restore its full legitimacy. Let us refer in this regard to Lévi-Strauss, who argued (in 1979) that the tragedies of the 20th century, such as colonialism and fascism, were “not in contradiction with so-called humanism (...) but, I would say, almost a natural extension of it.” Indeed, the anthropologist continues, “it is, in a way, in a single movement that man began by drawing the boundary of his rights separating himself from other living species, and then was led to extend this boundary within the human species, separating certain categories recognized as truly human from other categories that are then subjected to degradation based on the same model used to discriminate between human and non-human living species.”⁴⁸ It must be said that this statement has lost nothing of its relevance or actuality...

It is precisely this link between anthropological *difference* (elevating humans above non-humans) and anthropological *differences* (generating violence against groups considered as sub-human) that Balibar will gradually explore through his project of philosophical anthropology. Here we have the critical shift away from Althusser, but also, it should be noted, from Foucault and Deleuze: all of three saw any philosophical anthropology as a form of secularized theology⁴⁹. Balibar disagrees with such an equation; for him, it's indeed necessary to “dissociate the notions of philosophical anthropology and theoretical humanism, which Althusser had confused.”⁵⁰ This was perhaps a way of responding to the latter's laconic statement: “*theoretical anti-humanism was the only way to authorize a real practical humanism*”⁵¹.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁷ Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines* (Paris : Gallimard, 1966), 394-5.

⁴⁸ Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Entretien," *Le Monde*, January 21-22, 1979. (« c'est, en quelque sorte, d'une seule et même foulée que l'homme a commencé par tracer la frontière de ses droits entre lui-même et les autres espèces vivantes, et s'est ensuite trouvé amené à reporter cette frontière au sein de l'espèce humaine, séparant certaines catégories reconnues seules véritablement humaines d'autres catégories qui subissent alors une dégradation conçue sur le même modèle qui servait à discriminer entre espèces vivantes humaines et non humaines »)

⁴⁹ Étienne Balibar, "Renouveau de l'anthropologie philosophique ?" (A revival of philosophical anthropology?), *Cahiers critiques de philosophie*, 2019/2 (p.75.) Let us highlight two well-known quotes: “By turning theology into anthropology, by putting Man in God's place, are we not removing the essential, that is to say, the place?” (« en faisant de la théologie une anthropologie, en mettant l'homme à la place de Dieu, supprimons-nous l'essentiel, c'est-à-dire la place ? ») (Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (Paris: PUF, 1972), 101); “And so, in this Fold, philosophy has fallen into a new sleep; no longer that of Dogmatism, but that of Anthropology.” (“Et voilà qu'en ce Pli, la philosophie s'est endormie d'un sommeil nouveau ; non plus celui du Dogmatisme, mais celui de l'Anthropologie »). (Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 352)

⁵⁰ Étienne Balibar, "Renouveau de l'anthropologie philosophique ?" (*Cahiers critiques de philosophie*, 2019/2) : 75

⁵¹ Louis Althusser, *L'avenir dure longtemps* (Paris : MEC, 1992), 209.

3. Anthropological Differences and Political Aporia

This dissociation is therefore due to the fact that the object of Balibar's philosophical anthropology is no longer, as in Kant, human *nature*, nor even, as in Arendt, the human *condition*, but the very *relationships* and *differences* through which the human is defined in a space that is irreducibly political⁵².

Balibar takes great care not to assign any boundaries or foundations to this political space where humans and their differences play out. He therefore does not propose any *a priori* classification of anthropological differences, but only "an open and indicative list"⁵³. No difference has primacy or centrality over others, but all of them constantly interfere with each other in the construction of the universal human. However, between "La Proposition de l'égaliberté" (1989) and "Le malêtre du citoyen sujet: l'universalité bourgeoise et les différences anthropologiques" (2012), which concludes *Citoyen sujet*⁵⁴, there is a significant shift in the way the question of anthropological differences is *formulated*. In the 1989 text, Balibar focuses on the two differences that motivated, at the time of the French Revolution, the exclusion of women and workers from "active citizenship": sexual difference and intellectual difference. Whereas in *Citoyen sujet*, another set, this time triadic, is privileged: the difference between the sexes (once again) and sexualities; the division of humanity into "races" or "cultures"; and finally, the difference between the normal and the pathological (of which madness and crime are the most revealing examples of the boundaries between the human and the inhuman⁵⁵).

The common feature of these three differences is *the aporia* into which they drive all politics, because they are both unavoidable and unassignable: *unavoidable*, because these differences (between masculine and feminine, normal and abnormal, between cultures, etc.) are constitutive of humanity itself, in the sense that it is not possible to conceive of humanity otherwise than through them; but *unassignable*, insofar as there are no "natural" or intangible criteria that allow them to be fixed once and for all, nor to determine *a priori* the rules that should govern relations between "different" humans.

From the 2020s onwards, faced with climate change and the health crisis on the one hand, and the digital domination of (almost) all human activities on the other, Balibar's reflection on the (« *les* ») anthropological differences between humans has gradually become overdetermined by the question of the (« *la* ») anthropological difference (in the singular) between the human species and "other" species: *animal* species on the one hand, *computer* automata on the other. This dichotomy in a sense reproduces Aristotle's idea of humanity as intermediate between animals and gods, but where the latter have been replaced by machines⁵⁶. This Aristotelian formulation indicates how

⁵² Étienne Balibar, "Renouveau de l'anthropologie philosophique ?", *Cahiers critiques de philosophie* (2019/2) : 71-91 (77).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁵⁴ « Fermeture : malêtre du sujet : universalité bourgeoise et différences anthropologiques », in Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 466-515.

⁵⁵ « Crime privé, folie publique », in Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 361-382.

⁵⁶ Étienne Balibar, "Renouveau de l'anthropologie philosophique ?", *Cahiers critiques de philosophie* (2019/2) : 71-91 (p.74). See also *Des Universels* : 156. Balibar alludes to Aristotle's famous phrase: "Man is a *zōon politikon*. And he who, by nature or circumstance, is without a city (*apolis*) is either a degraded being or above humanity" (Aristotle, *Politics*, I,2).

much Balibar's thinking, despite the shift he has made, remains focused on the specifically *anthropological* issue. While he rejects the "myth of the uniqueness of the human species and its transcendence," he equally rejects conceptions that essentialize "the living"⁵⁷ or "the terrestrial," and maintains his preference for a "cosmopolitics" rather than a "gaiapolitics"⁵⁸. As for his recent reflections on the "digital catastrophe", without resorting to technophobia, they express concern about the mutation of humans into hybrid organisms, "inforqs" configured by algorithms, and the end of historicity that this transformation augurs⁵⁹.

Something like an *anti-humanist anthropology* thus arises from the subject's experience of himself as an "empirical-transcendental doublet," that is, as a being affected by a "malêtre," or uneasiness, that of not being able to reconcile his universal essence with the anthropological differences which, in their very empiricity, affect, disturb this universality and prevent it from being fixed forever. This experience is no more than that of a "différance," a certain ethical relationship to the self ceaselessly *altered* by politics and its aporias, which condemns this "self" to alter itself, to be indefinitely affected by differences, without however renouncing either *identifying* itself as subjectivity or *deciding* as subjectivity: "politics is what incessantly alters ethics, and therefore what affects it at every moment of "différance", thus preventing it from becoming metaphysics again, not to say religion"⁶⁰

4. An Ethics of "the Decision of the Other"

In two of his most recent texts, both of which deal with anthropological differences, Balibar places his thinking under the banner of an "ethics of the decision of the other." I mentioned the first of these texts in the introduction, which deals with the concept of "intersectionality," and in which Balibar seeks to reconcile the formation of a collective resistance to discrimination with respect for the singularity of each difference⁶¹. This narrow path, he explains, necessarily results from a set of choices and decisions both *about* anthropological differences (about their very existence, the value we give them) and *within* anthropological differences (in our uneasiness in moving through and between them).

But these decisions, he adds in this text as in the second (dedicated to the question of race, sex and gender⁶²), cannot lead subjectivity from domination to liberation, from passivity to activity, through the effect of a simple "awareness," as in the "humanist" schemes of 'maturity' (Kant), of existence "for oneself" (Marx) or 'authenticity' (Sartre). Subjectivity "must take a longer route," writes E. Balibar⁶³: an "ethics of the decision of the other" understood in the double sense of the genitive: a decision that I make *about* or *with* the other (the other who interpellates me or to whom I address myself), but also the decision *of* the other in me, of that strangeness ("étrangeté") or excess force that

⁵⁷ Étienne Balibar, *Cosmopolitique. Des frontières à l'espèce humaine. Écrits III* (Paris : La Découverte, 2023), 339.

⁵⁸ Étienne Balibar & Patrice Maniglier, *La Terre ou le Monde. Divergences cosmopolitiques* (Paris : Miallet-Barraud, 2025).

⁵⁹ Étienne Balibar, « Sur la catastrophe informatique : une fin de l'historicité ? », *Les Temps Qui restent* (04-03-2025).

⁶⁰ Étienne Balibar, "Jacques Derrida. D'un Autre l'autre," *Éthique, politique, religions*, no. 12, 2018–1 : 44.

⁶¹ Étienne Balibar, « Intersectionnalité et différences anthropologiques », *Les temps Qui Restent* (24-01-2025) : 25

⁶² E. Balibar, *Rasse, Geschlecht, Gattung. Zur Frage der anthropologischen Differenzen*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Vorwort von Étienne Balibar ». I thank Étienne Balibar for sharing this text with me prior to its publication.

⁶³ Étienne Balibar, « Intersectionnalité et différences anthropologiques », *Les temps Qui Restent* (24-01-2025) : 40

inhabits me unsuspectingly⁶⁴. Any ethics is the experience of an aporia that appears as a “differential of passivity and activity,” a *conatus* (to use Spinoza's term), an effort of subjectivity to increase its agency, but an effort that paradoxically consists in a transcendental *passibility* to the other.

This passibility is at stake in “Jacques Derrida. D'un Autre l'autre" (2018), a text in which Balibar starts from the observation that Derrida (almost) always writes *other* with a lowercase *a*, whereas in Sartre, Lacan, and especially Levinas, the Other is capitalized, as if to emphasize its eminence or transcendence. This is not a typographical detail, because to decapitalize or decapitate the Other is to pluralize it, to disseminate it, in order to welcome all the others that the Other invisibilizes: women, foreigners, animals, etc. Because the other is *any* other, who can appear at any moment and who also haunts our unconscious, the decision of the other can only be a “*passive* decision, a decision that is originally affected”⁶⁵. This undoubtedly entails removing the decision from any Schmittian decisionism, which implies the authority of the voluntary, sovereign subject. In contrast, the decision in Derrida's and Balibar's ethics, “is beyond activity”⁶⁶, as conditioned to a “highly paradoxical” passivity, a transcendental “passibility” towards any other – who is neither a sovereign self nor an anonymous structure, but who places the subject “outside of himself” (“*hors de soi*”), thus revealing the “transindividual” being that characterizes him ontologically⁶⁷.

By placing his own reflection in the conceptual wake of Derrida, Balibar invites us, I believe, to take very seriously the ethical motif that emerges from his thinking. It seems to me that this motif is as follows: just as deconstruction, in Derrida, is “undeconstructible” (“*indéconstructible*”) (and therefore it is *justice* itself⁶⁸), *the experience* of the aporias of politics, in Balibar, is not itself an aporia, in the sense it is indeed a crossing, therefore a passage, a clearing, but without destination, without any traced path. For both philosophers, ethics is the subjective experience of the very ethicality of ethics⁶⁹. This experience is that of an *alteration* of politics which, I believe, must be taken in the literal sense of an experience *of the other* and *for* the other.

However, I do not believe that the other Balibarian, despite the decapitation and dissemination of the other Derridian, can be confused with the latter. For even if Derrida criticizes the radical, transcendent otherness of the Levinasian Other, it remains that his minusculed other is still the one who faces me, who *interpellates* me unconditionally, who imposes a responsibility on me, while evading me indefinitely, whereas Balibar's other always manifests himself through the contingent

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁶⁵ Balibar quotes Jacques Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié* (Paris : Galilée, 1994), p.87). (Étienne Balibar, « Jacques Derrida. D'un Autre l'autre », *Éthique, politique, religions* (n°12, 2018 – 1) : 33-44 (41).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁶⁷ On the notion of “transindividual,” which is central to Balibar's fundamentally Spinozist ontology (deriving from the definition of man as *pars naturae*, and not as *imperium in imperio*), see Etienne Balibar, *Spinoza politique. Le transindividuel* (Paris: PUF, 2018): 199-335.

⁶⁸ “Justice itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond the law, cannot be deconstructed. Nor can deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice” (« La justice en elle-même, si quelque chose de tel existe, hors ou au-delà du droit, n'est pas déconstructible. Pas plus que la déconstruction elle-même, si quelque chose de tel existe. La déconstruction est la justice ») (Jacques Derrida, *Force de loi* (Paris : Galilée, 1994), 34.

⁶⁹ Drawing on Derrida's own words (“if by ethics we mean a system of rules, of moral norms, then no, I am not proposing an ethics”), François Raffoul shows that Derrida is instead concerned with “problematizing what he calls the ethicality (“éthicalité”) of ethics, its very possibility.” François Raffoul, « Derrida et l'éthique de l'im-possible », *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* (2007/1 n° 53) : 73-88

?

political space that he opens up or claims, and which must therefore be constructed with him. To approach what separates Balibar from Derrida, it is useful to follow the hypothesis proposed in an interview with Ernesto Laclau⁷⁰, according to which the revolutionary enunciation of equaliberty or the universal “split in two within Kant's work,” between a posterity (“undoubtedly ossified and institutionalized,” according to Balibar) faithful to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and another, somehow “oblique” to Kantian transcendentalism, traced by the *Critique of Judgment*. Undeniably, Derrida sides with the “second *Critique*”⁷¹, where the universal is the Law, the telos “which we approach indefinitely, which guides the progress of humanity, but which can never be entrenched in reality, which therefore evades us, which is always still to come”⁷². While Balibar, like Jean-François Lyotard or Hannah Arendt, follows the Third Critique, where the universal is inseparable from a *sensus communis* that is “of the order of practice, of communication,” “of translation” too, that is to say, “of modes of apprehension of the same and the other, which means that fundamentally heterogeneous individuals and groups can recognize each other, or possibly exclude each other”.⁷³ Derrida apprehends the other from the perspective of *determinante* judgement (where the Law, the universal, is given, and where it is a question of finding the case that corresponds to it), while Balibar approaches the other from the perspective of *reflective* judgement, where the singular case is given, and where the universal must be found through the practice of “putting ourselves in the place of any other man” – a practice inseparable, as Arendt has shown, from the constitution of a common political space and the recognition of every other individual's “right to have rights”, but a practice which also presupposes, even more profoundly, as Lyotard has so insisted, a “faculty”, prior to any interest or representation, of being affected and altered.⁷⁴

5. Conclusion: The Tragic Ethics of Civility

If my reading is correct, we can reasonably conclude that Balibar's political philosophy is effectively guided by ethics, in the sense of a mode of subjectivation and decision of the other that reopens the space for politics while simultaneously disrupting and irrevocably altering that space. Let us repeat that the experience of political aporias is in itself a passage (*poros*: strait, path, expedient), a path, a crossing that takes the form of a “differential” that subjectivity traverses without ever being able to fix itself. The “site” where subjects experience themselves as *other subjects* is an “unstable” site, the “place of uneasiness” writes E. Balibar, that does not play out “in psychological or moral interiority” (as in Kant's second *Critique*), but “in the exteriority and immanence of the social relationship it maintains with every other subject”⁷⁵.

Future research will be needed to locate the various motifs in Balibar's philosophy that involve this mode of subjectivation and of decision of the other. By way of conclusion, I would like to highlight one of these motifs, that of *civility*, which will allow us to bridge with the theme of the “absent

⁷⁰ « Entretien avec et entre Étienne Balibar et Ernesto Laclau », *Rue Descartes* (2010/1, n°67) : 78-99 (see : 83-86)

⁷¹ "I always said to Derrida, 'deep down, you're a Kantian!' 'No, absolutely not,' he replied, but well, there is a common element!" (« « J'ai toujours dit à Derrida « au fond tu es kantien! » – « mais non, absolument pas », répondait-t-il, mais bon, il y a bien un élément commun ! ») (*ibid.*, 84).

⁷² « (...) la Loi, le *telos* dont on s'approche indéfiniment, qui oriente le progrès de l'humanité, mais qui ne peut jamais être inscrit dans la réalité, qui, par conséquent, échappe, qui est toujours encore à venir » (*ibid.*, 83).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁷⁴ J-F. Lyotard, *L'enthousiasme. La critique kantienne de l'histoire* (Paris : Galilée, 1986 ; *Leçons sur l'Analytique du sublime* (Paris : Galilée, 1991) ; *Misère de la philosophie* (Paris, Galilée, 2000).

⁷⁵ Étienne Balibar, *Citoyen sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique* (Paris : PUF, 2011), 513

cause” evoked in the introduction. As we have seen, the “cause that absents” (“la cause qui s’absente”) is the structural necessity for each modality (economic or ideological) of politics to pass through “the other scene” to become effective. In another of his most fundamental texts (« Three Concepts of Politics: Emancipation, Transformation, Civility »), Balibar reworks this theme by adding a “third scene” of politics, even deeper than that of law and ideology (where the question of emancipation is played out) and that of material conditions (where the question of the transformation of society is played out)⁷⁶. This “other of the other scene,” as he calls it, is by no means a last instance that would provide a dialectical synthesis of the other two. On the contrary, it is the open and circular surface where, as on a Möbius band, “the phenomena of ultra-subjective violence (driven by an obsession with identity) and ultra-objective violence (the result of reducing human beings to the status of useless things, and therefore superfluous) can continuously pass into one another, while remaining essentially heterogeneous”⁷⁷. At the very place where the (main, ultimate) cause of politics “absents itself,” violence tends to escalate to extremes, destroying all politics as transformation as well as emancipation.⁷⁸

The only antidote to this “unconvertible,” non-dialectizable violence is civility. Civility is, of course, institutionalized in citizenship (and more broadly, in the structures of Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*, for which it is a possible translation), but it is not limited to that. For it also draws a subjective “movement of distancing within identifications,” “a withdrawal from the very strength of the collective»⁷⁹ which is profoundly *ethical* in that subjectivity engages not only its capacity for resistance to violence, but also its ability to cultivate the alterity or transindividuality that traverses and constitutes him⁸⁰. Here lies the fundamentally tragic dimension of politics. Indeed, civility “is certainly not a politics that eliminates violence: but rather, it removes its extremes, so as to make space (public and private) for politics (emancipation, transformation)”⁸¹. It thus revives “the practical aporia of politics,” insofar as this aporia “is also the opening in which, by rejecting forms of ‘terror’ or ‘cruelty,’ politics can be reconstituted or reinvented.”⁸². “A pessimistic proposition,” Balibar concedes, which does not, however, imply that we must give up either maintaining institutions or rebelling (or even rebelling to restore them, etc.), but which requires us to always seek to “avert terror, to *differ* it more or less completely and for more or less long”⁸³. Any politics of civility is ultimately “a politics of tragedy based on an *ethical* decision that says that the risk of the revolt becoming perverted is never a sufficient reason not to revolt”⁸⁴. This ethical decision, as in the 1993 presentation, draws on Weber—but Gramsci and Wittgenstein are certainly not far behind. The uneasiness of the citizen subject makes it both uncertain and ineluctable.

Edouard Delruelle (University of Liège – Belgium)

⁷⁶ Étienne Balibar, « Trois concepts de la politique : émancipation, transformation, civilité », *La crainte des masses* (Paris : Galilée, 1997).

⁷⁷ Étienne Balibar, *Violence et civilité. Wellek Library Lectures et autres essais de philosophie politique* (Paris : Galilée, 2010), 109.

⁷⁸ Étienne Balibar, « Trois concepts de la politique : émancipation, transformation, civilité », *La crainte des masses* (Paris : Galilée, 1997), 44.

⁷⁹ Étienne Balibar, *Violence et civilité. Wellek Library Lectures et autres essais de philosophie politique* (Paris : Galilée, 2010), p.410.

⁸⁰ Étienne Balibar, « Trois concepts de la politique : émancipation, transformation, civilité », *La crainte des masses* (Paris : Galilée, 1997), 43.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁸² Étienne Balibar, *Violence et civilité. Wellek Library Lectures et autres essais de philosophie politique* (Paris : Galilée, 2010), 411.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 413.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 417.

