ESDC AUTUMN
UNIVERSITY BOOK 2021

The Common Security and Defence Policy

New developments
and Challenges

Edited by Foteini Asderaki,
Georgică Panfil, Anna Molnár
and Sylvain Paile-Calvo

DOCTORAL
SCHOOL
ON CSDP

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Introduction

The Autumn University of the European Doctoral School on CSDP was organised in residential format in Brussels from September 27 till October 1, 2021. It was the first in situ activity of the Doctoral School after the lockdowns due to Covid-19. The course's objective was to develop a critical mass of scientific and academic expertise that brings together supervisors and mentors and promotes the exchange of knowledge, skills and competences on European Security and Defence with a view to providing support for PhD level research reflecting on the CSDP.

This volume consists of twelve chapters by both Professors and PhD Fellows, on current developments on CSDP. In the first chapter Foteini Asderaki and Minas Stravopodis explore how the Common Security and Defence Policy is affected by the multilateralism crisis that the EU faced during the last decade. The study argues that unexpected developments like BREXIT and the alteration of US foreign policy pivot to Asia led to the strengthening of the CSDP, a credible option for the EU's future. Furthermore, the analysis states that a stronger CSDP can strengthen the NATO alliance and not undercut it. All in all, the analysis ends up by arguing that, paradoxically, it is the multilateralism crisis itself that leads to the strengthening of multilateralism.

Anna Molnar, in the second chapter explains the reasons and the process of the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) by 2025 instead of implementing the concept of the EU Battlegroups adopted by the so called 'Headline Goal 2010', endorsed by the European Council in June 2004. Following a SWOT analysis the study attempts to estimate the strengths and weaknesses of this new initiative and to explore in which way this new crisis management tool will enhance the EU's strategic autonomy. The study concludes that the successful implementation of this venture within the strict time frame is a *sine qua non* for the EU's credibility as a global actor.

Savvas Chrysoulidis' study explores the human security dimension and links it with the enhancement of European security. It proposes a personalised 'bottom-up' human security approach targeting individuals' resilience and active involvement in tackling security threats through the use of new technologies. The chapter is based on reviews of the most critical and reproducible scientific papers, reports, and officially published policy documents on the matter. Finally, the study indicates how new technologies, especially geospatial technologies, could contribute to individuals' empowerment and resilience.

The next chapter written by Ioannis Pateras examines the operational cooperation between EULEX and KFOR in Kosovo and its double mission of peace-building and state-building. In particular, the study argues that due to its complexity, the EU-NATO relationship should be viewed as a multi-level phenomenon. The analysis in each level, based on a combination of theoretical and conceptual approaches of inter-organisational relations in world politics, attempts to provide a holistic picture of the cooperation and to address the interplay between various state and non-state actors activated in each level. The study also focuses on operational interactions, employing concepts such as epistemic communities and communities of practice, in order to explain how and under what conditions military and civilian personnel in common areas of operations and staff at inter-organisational level, overcome the cooperation

problems imposed by political blockages. It concludes that after the July 2016 EU-NATO joint declaration, a new type of institutionalised Strategic Partnership is being developed outside the Berlin Plus arrangements

Andreas Theofilis explores the EU's international role. Taking into consideration that strategic culture is one of the essential elements of an actor's position vis-a-vis international evolutions and security concerns, this article investigates if and how the existing EU institutional framework facilitates the emergence of a comprehensive EU strategic culture. Following a neurofunctional approach, the study examines the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the spillover effect that they might have created towards the emergence of a European strategic culture. It concludes that the establishment of a comprehensive strategic culture is in progress and it is related with the rise of the supranational figures and the effectiveness of the EDA and the PESCO.

Neli Kirilova examines the conflict prevention in the EU foreign and security policy regarding the Black Sea region and the Western Balkan and how this concept is related with youth and regionalism. The study claims that there is an inconsistency between words, as outlined in the HR/VP/EEAS documents and declarations and the implemented strategy, since the EU seems to prioritise crisis management instead of conflict prevention. The research explores how regionalism and youth could become important elements of the EU's foreign and security policy in order to prevent the escalation of regional conflicts and security crises. Thus, the article argues, the EU could bridge the gap between theory and practice through using regionalism and the engagement of youth to guarantee stability in its neighbouring regions.

The 7th article by Valentin-Gabriel Georgescu deals with the potential use of 5G technologies in the defence sector, especially by the EU and NATO which have shown interest in applying these new technologies in the military. The article's main question is whether 5G could be used to accommodate defence needs and in what way they could contribute to missions and operations. In doing so, the study differentiates itself from most parts of recent research which has mainly focused on the use of 5G on civil sectors of activity, such as agriculture and transportation, and not the defence sector, which presents certain complexities to which the equipment must be adapted. The research methods used include bibliographic research, the descriptive method and the comparative analysis method, based on documents by EU and NATO agencies and institutions. The article advocates that both the EU and NATO have been increasingly interested in finding ways to incorporate 5G technologies in the defence sector, as shown by different 5G use cases during missions and operations. Finally, the conclusion reached is that 5G security related aspects present both European and Euro Atlantic common interests.

Petros Petrikkos, in the following article, presents a critical assessment on the impact of hybrid threats on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Framework. Special focus is given to small states and societies, and the timeframe after the Treaty of Lisbon until 2021. The article argues that smaller states and societies have security gaps that the CSDP may fail to deal with, because of the small states' limited resources and their dependence on the EU apparatus. If these security gaps are not dealt with, small states may become a source of security challenges that could affect the security of the rest of the EU. Exploring these gaps, as well as critically and constructively assessing the CSDP, is deemed necessary.

The next study, by Veronika Hornyak, explores gender mainstreaming in the framework of the CSDP. It argues that the EU has been increasingly viewing gender and security as a strategically important part of its external action, as showcased by the increasing presence of gender expertise on EU missions and operations. Gender mainstreaming is achieved through two means, these are training and advising through EU training missions. Using the Normative Power Europe (NPE) approach, this article studies how the EU, as a unique actor in global politics, can project its norms on gender equality through its mainstreaming efforts in its missions such as EUTM Somalia, Mali and

Central African Republic. The article, finally, explores how the EU could use its training missions to strengthen its distinctive power identity, by using peace operations to promote its values on gender and equality.

Eleni Kapsokoli studies the cybersecurity framework in the Western Balkans, developed in response to rising threats of cyberattacks, and explores to which extent the so-called 'Brussels Effect' is actually in play. The article, therefore, firstly presents the cybersecurity framework as is developed in the EU, and then goes on to study the strategies that both the EU and the Western Balkans have developed in order to deal with cybersecurity challenges. The final goal of the article is to study how policy on cybersecurity has developed in the Western Balkans, and whether the EU has been successful in promoting its cybersecurity norms in the region.

The next chapter, by Alexandru-Cosmin Dumitru, explores if a crash of the virtual currencies market could cause the next global financial crisis and the possible effects that this crisis could have on the future of the CSDP. In order to meet the research objectives, the article uses various methods, such as gathering sources, data collection, analysis method, descriptive method and the deductive, inductive, and comparative methods. The article argues that a financial crisis could be both an opportunity and a risk. On the one side, a financial crisis would limit the member states' defence budgets, thus pressuring them to further their cooperation and restructure the defence market as a response. But, at the same time, there is the risk of the member states cutting their budgets in an uncoordinated manner, leading to further gaps in their cooperation and the implementation of the CSDP.

In the last chapter, Juan C. Castilla uses a public policy perspective to analyse the CSDP's defence planning. The article presents an original 'public policy integrated analytical model' and argues that it could be used to explain the EU's capability-based defence planning as well as the CSDP's defence planning initiatives. Furthermore, the author explains that the same type of analysis could also be applied to national or NATO defence planning processes. Finally, the article concludes with certain expectations on a more coherent defence planning between the member states in the aftermath of the Strategic Compass.

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The multilateralism crisis paradox and its effect on the CSDP

THE MULTILATERALISM CRISIS PARADOX AND ITS EFFECT ON THE CSDP
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Abstract— The power politics return, the unregulated globalization, and the complexity of the contemporary international system have caused a severe crisis in multilateral organizations and in the multilateral decision-making processes by sparking the rise of populism and nationalism in the EU and the world. Within this context, the EU encounters a two-faceted multilateralism crisis, the international and the intra-EU one, that threatens the EU's unity. This analysis, after identifying the connection between the two facets of the multilateralism crisis, focuses on the window of opportunity that emerges by making the EU proceed to further steps on the CSDP. The study argues that unexpected developments like the BREXIT and the alteration of US foreign policy pivot to Asia led to the strengthening of the CSDP, a credible option for the EU's future. Furthermore, the analysis states that a stronger CSDP can strengthen the NATO alliance and not undercut it. All in all, the analysis ends up by arguing that, paradoxically, it is the multilateralism crisis itself that leads to the strengthening of multilateralism.

KEYWORDS

1. Introduction

The past two decades the EU confronted internal and external crises, concerning the Eurozone, the asylum/Schengen crisis, BREXIT, the rule of law crisis in Poland and Hungary, the Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the Arab Spring uprisings. The sequence of crises, which the EU faced in the emerging age of a multipolar world and that of unregulated globalisation, challenges the Jean Monnet dictum "the EU will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions in those crises". Even if EU scholars "are accustomed to the narrative of the EU surviving and even thriving through crises" (Rhinard, 2019, 1), recent crises are turning points which threaten the EU's existence and its resilience or transformation. Nevertheless, there is an increasing volume of work and several indications that both CFSP and CSDP are moving forward in response to polycrises overcoming diverging Member States' (MS) preferences (Riddervold *et al.,* 2021; Mac Ginty *et al.,* 2021). In several cases, crises functioned as what historical institutionalism calls 'critical junctures', generating a window of opportunity for policy change and development (Juncos and Pomorska, 2021). As crises destabilized the wider geopolitical environment, they placed CFSP and CSDP on the top of the EU agenda.

One of the most serious but less highlighted is the crisis of multilateralism that threatens the EU's founding principles and its ambition to have a key-role in a rules-based global order, as proclaimed in the Treaties and the EU Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016). The three factors that nourished the European project after the end of the Cold War, the multilateral rules-based global order, the transatlantic relations, and free trade arrangements are under revision while an era of fiercer geopolitical competition arises (Leonard and Shapiro, 2019, 7-8).

This study aims to underscore the importance the multilateralism crisis can play as a driving force that leads the EU to further integration, including CSDP. The analysis attempts to connect two types of multilateralism crisis, the external and the internal. Hence, it claims that the multilateralism crisis is two-faceted for the EU. The former examines the multilateralism crisis occurring on international level, for instance the US undermining of the decision-making in international fora like the UN, WTO, WHO and the role of NATO in Europe. The latter regards the multilateralism crisis occurring on a European level, as there are political powers within the EU that subvert the EU's multilateralism process -as the decision-making regarding the refugee/migration crisis. Both types of crises have the same causes and similar outcomes (see chap. 3). Additionally, following Ikenberry's definition of crisis as "an extraordinary moment when the existence and viability of the political order are called into question" (Ikenberry, 2008, 3) the study explores how the two-faceted multilateralism crisis constitutes a window of opportunity for the EU to proceed to further integration especially on CSDP.

2. EU: A Multilateral Entity

In a globalised and interdependent world multilateralism constitutes the solution for handling cross-border problems such as climate change, terrorism, or pandemics that cannot be effectively treated by unitary states or other actors. Multilateralism, which is often correlated with international cooperation and regional or global governance arrangements, is employed through the establishment of International Organizations, various regimes and agreements formed and implemented by states, transnational networks and private actors. Based on an optimistic neoliberal institutionalist approach (Keohane, 1989) these arrangements would not only eliminate power-politics games and state controversies but also would create a fruitful environment where new norms and value systems would emerge to determine states' behavior (Finnemore and K. Sikkink, 1998).

How is multilateralism perceived by the EU? Keukeleire and Delreux (2014, 301) pointed out that "the EU's commitment to a multilateral approach can be seen as part of its DNA". Indeed, according to the Treaties the EU promotes "the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter" (Article 3 para 5 TEU), "multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the UN" (Article 21 point 1 para 2 TEU) and "an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance" (Article 21 point 2h, TEU). The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) (EEAS, 2016) prioritizes a rules-based global order with multilateralism as 'key principle' and supports a multilateral international system through "cooperation among and within regions" also encouraging regional orders. Furthermore, it promotes "reformed global governance" based on "globally coordinated responses with international and regional organizations, regional cooperation (i.e. African Union, ASEAN), states and non-state actors" (EEAS, 2016, 4, 8, 10). The EU pursues a leading role in various significant sectors such as climate change, disarmament, nonproliferation as well as peace and security (Odermatt and Wessel, 2019, 661).

However, the achievement of 'effective multilateralism'- "the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order" as outlined in the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003, 36-38), especially in a dense multi-actored institutional environment is linked to several factors including the EU's capacity to act autonomously. The EU participates in

multilateral processes to handle crises along with NATO (Libya, Kosovo etc.) and the OSCE (Ukraine and Kosovo) (Debuysere and Blockmans 2021, 97-98). Yet, the EU lacks competencies and capabilities, as well as coherence due to its institutional fragmentation, dysfunctionalities, and its failure to speak with one voice (Smith, 2018). The latter is related to the nature of the EU, since it is not a federation but rather a 'post-modern' international actor, based on post-sovereign values (ibid). Internal disputes and differentiation occur as the individual entities (MS and non-state actors) face asymmetrical pressures from the crises creating winners and losers, increasing the politicization of the EU (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019). Nevertheless, the politicization in EU foreign policy under the shadow of BREXIT (Barbé and Morillas 2019), the securitisation of the migration crisis (Asderaki and Markozani, 2021) and Crimea's annexation in 2014 had a positive effect on the development of both CFSP and CSDP structures, tools and decision making. The EU, following a more realistic approach, intends to apply an 'open strategic autonomy' in various policies citing Commission, "cooperating multilaterally wherever we can, acting autonomously wherever we must" (European Commission, 2021).

3. Crisis in multilateral decisions

During the last years, a significant alteration in states' behavior in the contemporary international system has been observed. Firstly, the Great Powers -and especially the US- have shifted their policy from liberal practices to power politics. The significant economic growth China has indicated, has jeopardised the US dominance. Before Russia's invasion in Ukraine, February 2022, several scholars claimed that the international system has returned to an idiosyncratic 'Cold War' between two rival blocks, the US and Europeans vs China and Russia, though this is no longer the case (Biscop et al., 2022). In a turbulent system, where Great Powers have chosen either to cooperate or to dominate, as Sven Biscop (2018, 39) stated, "multilateralism can remain vibrant", in spite of the inevitable adaptation to the new balance of power in the first case, while in the second, "multilateralism is perhaps even more important, as a way of stabilising relations and preventing conflicts among the Great Powers".

Secondly, the international community has been witnessing since the 1990s the so-called 'unregulated globalization' which led to conflicts and economic, social and cultural divisions among societies (Gabrisch, 2020). Responding to this phenomenon, several states became more introverted by following protectionist policies, especially in economic and security sectors. This fact was combined with the rise of nationalism and populism, since some governments exploited this situation for brinkmanship purposes. Populist leaders claimed that multilateral and regional arrangements weakened the state's sovereignty and burdened nations' supremacy (Westcott, 2020).

Finally, complexity, fragmentation and multi-actorness have become the main characteristics of the international system, since the states are not the only significant actors; the rise of several non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and militias jeopardise the world order (Widiatmaja and Rizqi, 2019).

All three elements led to the multilateralism crisis. This crisis has affected the EU significantly, in a two-fold way. On the one hand, the EU multilateral decisions became tougher than before, especially in high-politics issues. On the other hand, the EU has seen its role constrained in IOs and multilateral arrangements; the crisis of multilateralism has made effective decision-making towards contemporary challenges more difficult within multilateral institutions, such as the UN or the WTO. In addition to that, states with populist governments withdrew from decisions already taken, decisions that intended to confront current threats like the climate crisis (Lazarou, 2020).

Consequently, the EU multilateralism crisis is two-faceted, one related to the populist or the authoritarian governments of third countries, and the other interweaved with populism that grows within the EU. The former causes a major external threat for the Union's very survival, while the latter threatens to divide the Union itself.

3.1. Crisis in multilateral decisions taken by international organizations

The first aspect of the multilateral crisis for the EU, is reflected on the crisis in decisions taken by international organizations. Since the WWII multilateralism raison d'etre has been the maintenance of peace and democracy in the 'Western World', as well as the expansion of the rules-based international order in other regions - following this rationale the EU has determined its goals too (McKean and Szewczyk, 2021).

After the collapse of the USSR indicating the Cold War's end, the US dominance era emerged. From the 1990s to 2001 the US has been the undoubted dominant power in the world when the liberal order reached its peak. However, after the 9/11 attacks, the US power started being contested since a non-state actor had caused a significant strike against it. Simultaneously, along with the US first doubt of its predominance, immense economic growth was indicated in the so-called emerging powers, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China (Layne, 2012).

During the 2010s, China started behaving as a Great Powe[1] and was perceived as a threat for the US dominance (Jungbluth, 2021). The same applied, to a lesser extent, to Russia. Thus, a gradual alteration in world politics was indicated in the early 2010s, as the new emerging powers started bringing back the power politics rationale -the international system was under transition as it started being from unipolar to multipolar.

The shift from liberal policies to power politics was completed in 2016, when Trump won the elections. Trump's administration was oriented to power politics too, as its major goal was to prevent China from becoming the dominant power, undermining important multilateral decisions (Dimock and Gramlich, 2021). The looming withdrawal of the US from multilateral and regional agreements during Trump's administration and the weakening of the transatlantic relations has questioned the liberal international order (Riddervold & Newsome, 2018; Ikenberry, 2018). The US withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for the Iranian nuclear program, the UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It also undermined the WTO, as the US violated several international trade rules since it started trade war with China by imposing harsher sanctions receiving counter sanctions as a response (Sperling and Webber, 2019). Within this context, the US imposed sanctions on EU products by initiating another trade antagonism between the US and the EU (Moens, 2021).

Besides the failure of the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Trump's administration also contested the core of the EU-US partnership, the NATO alliance. NATO has been the security guarantor in Europe since its establishment in 1949. Trump argued that there was not a fair burden-sharing in the Alliance since the US was the one spending the most. Additionally, Trump accentuated that the US strategic interests were re-oriented from Europe and the Middle East to Southeast Asia and China. Therefore, for the first time, there was a serious discussion about NATO's importance for the US interests along with a European reflection on the bonds between the US and Europe under the NATO umbrella (Sperling and Webber, 2019). Even if Trump is not currently the US president, the 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA) phenomenon (Trumpism) is still a threat for the liberal world, and therefore for multilateralism too (Dimock and Gramlich, 2021). President Macron has shed light on NATO's dysfunctionality and appealed to the EU to redefine "itself strategically as a geopolitical power" otherwise it will no longer be able to form its fate (The Economist, 2019). However, the Ukrainian war in 2022 functioned as a catalyst since NATO remains the only operational means of collective defence in Europe.

The crisis in multilateralism was deepened, even more, when Trump decided to quit from the WHO amidst the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a turning point for multilateralism as for the first time since WWII the US did not take the leading

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[1] The most significant example of this behavior being the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). characteristic examples of power politics return are: China's behavior towards the Philippines regarding the dispute in South China Sea and the Russian behavior towards Ukraine, Syria, Libya etc.

role in a global crisis (American Progress, 2020). Subsequently, a power vacuum was created, which China tried to fill ineffectively, although in the short-run it achieved to divide the EU temporarily (Haenle, 2020). The pandemic and Russia's invasion in Ukraine on February 24th, made crystal clear that the EU is not an autonomous security provider.

3.1. Crisis in intra-EU multilateral decisions

Due to power politics' return, unregulated globalization, and the complexity of the contemporary international system, the rise of nationalism and populism was spread even within the EU MS, which are considered the most solidified democracies; populist parties emerged or enhanced/won the elections (Sandrin, 2020). The rise of populism came as a response to the EU's efforts for further integration, especially on sensitive policy areas, namely, fiscal policies, home affairs and security issues, which along with the CFSP and the CSDP, touch upon state sovereignty.

The adoption of a populist and Eurosceptic rhetoric by certain governments has exacerbated the EU's decision making, since consensus -on several cases, like the migration/refugee crisis- became 'mission impossible' (Rayes, 2020). Multilateralism and the integration process were systematically contested by populist governments both actively -by blocking the integration process and undermining multilateralism- and passively -by avoiding discussing issues that they were not willing to agree on. Additionally, the EU could not adopt a common stance on addressing external challenges in international fora. Instead, the EU stance was characterized by polyphony or cacophony (Maurer and Wright, 2021). External powers like China, Russia and Turkey, tried to exploit this intra-EU multilateral crisis by interfering within the EU affairs, aiming at dividing the EU and promoting their own interests (Asderaki 2021). In some cases, authoritarian regimes approached MS populist governments aiming to convert vast economic investments into political influence (Cadier and Lequesne, 2020). As a result, the EU faced standstills, since its decision-making process -especially in matters related to China, Russia, or Turkey- became complicated and difficult (ibid).

As far as the British case is concerned, BREXIT challenged European integration as fears were raised that a spillover effect for exit would be supported by Eurosceptic political parties and governments (i.e FREXIT). However, the EU has shown that it acquires reflexes in handling this internal crisis and has started strengthening its position both towards the UK and towards other external powers. Nevertheless, scholars claim that it was the BREXIT decision which accelerated the populist trend in both the US and EU the following years (Langlois, 2021).

4. The crisis of multilateralism as an opportunity for further integration in CSDP

The multilateral crisis has changed the EU's stance. EU institutions and MS leaders realized that nothing should be taken for granted, neither the US support in security and defence, nor the EU's unity. As a response, the terms European sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and common strategic culture have become the new buzzwords in the European agenda. The terms were introduced in previous papers (St Malo Declaration, 1998; European Council, 2013); however, they have been revived in the EUGS (2016) and re-interpreted by political and institutional leaders, though in an uneven way.

Thus, during this two-faceted multilateral crisis, the EU identified the need for multilateralism reforming. As Eckhart Tolle said: "The world can only change from within", therefore the EU, "being in danger" (Borell, 2022), appears to be determined to change itself in order to change the world. It realized that it should become a strategic autonomous player, and not leave its future to be constrained by others. Accordingly, the EU accelerated its efforts toward its strategic autonomy by focusing mainly on

a) technological autonomy, b) digital sovereignty, c) euro strengthening, d) energy independence, e) EU Defence Union, and f) trade (Lazarou, 2020). The recent outbreak of the war in Ukraine has confirmed that the EU's decision for strengthening the CSDP and deepening the integration process has been a necessary step for the EU's strengthening.

Consequently, the multilateral crisis functioned as a critical juncture for the EU to reconsider and revise its role and its position within the international system. Obviously, this process is multi-dimensional, however, the authors are focusing their analysis only on the EU's security and defence, because the other dimensions of the EU's strategic autonomy building are beyond the purposes of this paper.

5. Why the multilateralism crisis should be considered as an opportunity for a stronger and more integrated CSDP

The crisis of multilateralism became the EU's driving force to proceed to further integration -one dimension of which is a stronger CSDP. The EU has run 37 CSDP missions and operations (military or civilian) on three continents since 2003 (EEAS, 2021). However, BREXIT unlocked the potential for further EU defence cooperation. It is not accidental that in 2016 EUGS security and defence were one of the EU's top priorities. Approximately, one year later, in 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched and currently 25 out of the 27 EU MS participate in sixty (60) CSDP projects of capability development. The EU had also launched an annual coordinated defence review of the national defence budgets (CARD). Most importantly, the EU proceeded to the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF), run by the European Commission, aiming at strengthening the EU's defence industrial base (European Parliament, 2021) and an off-budget funding mechanism, the European Peace Facility (EPF). The 'Strategic Compass', the latest initiative by the HR/VP, encloses as one of its four overarching pillars multilateral (NATO, AU, ASEAN) and tailor-made bilateral strategic partnerships (US, Canada, Norway). Apparently, the EU has intensified its efforts in deepening security and defence cooperation "beyond crisis management and capacity building" (Fiott and Lindstrom, 2021).

The alteration of the US foreign policy towards the new geopolitical centre in Asia and the Indo-Pacific since Obama's Administration, accentuated by Trump's rhetoric, constituted a wake-up call for Europe to realize that NATO will not continue being the security and defence guarantor under the post WWII terms. As the scarce voices (i.e. France) on the EU's capacity and most importantly, on its operational autonomy have been enhanced, the EU's strategic autonomy building became a visible option for the EU. However, there is a discrepancy between words and decisions; the proclaimed establishment of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity till 2025 of up to 5000 troops is far away from the vision for a 'European army'.

6. Does a stronger CSDP mean the NATO's debilitation?

There has been an ongoing debate regarding European security since the post WWII period. The rival schools of thought are based on Eurocentrism and Atlanticism. The former believes that European security should become solely a European matter without the US engagement, while the latter believes that the US presence is the only sustainable solution for Europe to be able to address and confront security and defence challenges (EUISS, 2020). However, both rationales can be combined, since CSDP and NATO cannot be compared as they are different in nature. Therefore, CSDP is not an alternative option to NATO, rather it will strengthen NATO in the long run.

Current developments, like the unexpected withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan or the AUKUS security pact, showed that some NATO members act -if needed-independently, for instance the US and the UK. However, it is questionable if the EU could act independently as a security actor, as Libya's and Syria's crisis revealed. A stronger EU as a security actor would subsequently mean a stronger NATO. There are, though, voices, and especially within the US that oppose a stronger CSDP, particularly its operational aspect (Brustlein, 2019). As it is stressed in the EU's Strategic Compass, released while this paper is about to conclude "A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members" (Council, 2022). Hence, the EU-NATO relations should be grounded on a new transatlantic culture of cooperation, not only on a Euroatlantic basis but also on a global security perspective. Nevertheless, more effort is needed for the re-establishment of the transatlantic strategic alignment with a global and multilateral prospect, with the participation of regional institutions (AU, ASEAN, OSCE) and other like-minded partners in Africa or the Indo-Pacific area to face revisionism, aggressiveness and new complex security challenges. So, one can conclude that it is the crisis of multilateralism that leads to a stronger CSDP, and this subsequently leads to the strengthening of multilateralism itself -at least in the security and defence domain.

7. Concluding remarks

In conclusion, concerning the EU, the multilateralism crisis is two-faceted, internal and external. The external multilateralism crisis puts at stake the very survival of the EU, while the internal one has the role of the 'Trojan Horse', by dividing the EU from within. This multilateral crisis effect determined the EU need for proceeding to a stronger CSDP, as the two-faceted multilateralism crisis witnessed provided a window of opportunity for further integration. After Brexit and the outburst of the crisis of multilateralism, the EU established a framework of security and defence cooperation, that issues strategic priorities, upgrades its capabilities, the industrial sector included -EUGS, PESCO, CARD, EDF, EPF, Strategic Compass. Significant causes that sparked the EU's response for a stronger CSDP may be considered Great Powers' politics return, BREXIT, the US foreign policy shift towards Asia, third countries' interference in EU matters and crises affecting external borders due to deterioration of the EU's neighborhood. Within this context, the recent Ukrainian war and the Russian aggression indicated the dire need for the EU to be coherent and united concerning security and defense issues.

The EU-NATO relations should set the fundamentals for a new transatlantic culture of cooperation, on the basis of a global security perspective to tackle traditional and new asymmetric/hybrid security threats. In parallel, the EU and the US should lead the way for a re-establishment of the transatlantic strategic alignment with a global prospect, within multilateral frameworks including regional institutions (AU, ASEAN, OSCE) and other like-minded partners in Africa or the Indo-Pacific area (i.e. Japan, India) to face revisionism, aggressiveness and new complex security challenges. So, one can conclude that it is the crisis of multilateralism that leads to a stronger EU's CSDP, and this subsequently leads to the strengthening of multilateralism itself -at least in the security and defence domain.

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Anna Molnár

From EU battlegroups
to rapid deployment
capacity: strengths,
weaknesses,
opportunities and threats

FROM EU BATTLEGROUPS TO RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPACITY: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

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Abstract— The aim of this paper is to analyse the potential implementation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC). In March 2022, the EU's Strategic Compass (SC) requested the establishment of the RDC by 2025 which is planned to be a modular force of up to 5,000 troops, including land, air and maritime components, as well as the required strategic enablers. The main added value of this new crisis management tool is overcoming the weaknesses and shortfalls of the previous solutions, such as the EU Battlegroups, promoting the EU's strategic autonomy, and effectively using the EU's integrated approach. In this paper, firstly, the reasons for creating this new instrument so far are explained, secondly, the process leading to its establishment is analysed, and, last but not least, the debates and questions concerning the future of the RDC are presented. In order to achieve these goals SWOT analysis is used to highlight the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats regarding the implementation of the RDC. On the basis of available scientific works I plan to prepare a structured literature review in the framework of SWOT analysis, which facilitates the examination of the future development of this new tool at an early stage. It helps to identify threats that can pose an obstacle to the deployment of the RDC and future development opportunities that help the successful transformation of EU Battlegroups into this new crisis management tool.

KEYWORDS

- **Rapid Deployment Capacity**
- **Strategic Compass**
- **SWOT**
- **EU Battlegroups**

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyse the potential implementation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC). In March 2022, the EU's Strategic Compass (SC) requested by 2025 the establishment of the RDC, which is planned to be a modular force of up to 5,000 troops, including land, air and maritime components, as well as the required strategic enablers. The main added value of this new crisis management tool is overcoming the weaknesses and shortfalls of the previous solutions, such as the EU Battlegroups, and promoting the EU's strategic autonomy, and effectively using the EU's integrated approach.

In this paper, firstly, I explain the reasons for creating this new instrument so far, secondly, I analyse the process leading to its establishment, and, last but not least, I present the debates and questions concerning the future of the RDC. In order to achieve my goals, I use SWOT analysis to highlight the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities

and Threats regarding the implementation of the RDC. On the basis of available scientific works, I plan to prepare a structured literature review in the framework of SWOT analysis, which allows the examination of the future development of this new tool at an early stage. It helps to identify threats that can hinder the deployment of the RDC and future development opportunities that facilitate the successful transformation of EU Battlegroups into this new crisis management tool.

It is not the first time that European leaders are discussing the creation of military forces at European level. The idea of creating a European Defence Community (EDC) first arose from the French Pleven plan in 1950. The Pleven plan, i.e., the federalist vision of the EDC, failed in 1954, and then it was not discussed again in the framework of the European Communities for decades. As a consequence, the European integration process started in the economic field, not in defence. From the late forties, the collective defence of Europe was provided by NATO and through it, by the United States of America.

Although the Western European Union was created in 1954, after the fall of the EDC, it gradually faded out in the shadow of NATO. During the 1980s, the organisation was again filled with substance and then revived slowly. The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union, contained references not only to the common foreign and security policy, but also to defence and security, and aimed to strengthen European defence cooperation. The process eventually led to the integration of the WEU's tasks into the EU in the 1990s. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which started to take shape in the late 1990s, is still among the youngest and least integrated but most dramatically developing policies of the European Union. The CSDP is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it encompasses defence cooperation between Member States within the EU framework, including EU military and civilian operations and missions, and the joint development of defence capabilities. In the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, a process initiated in this policy area may lead to common defence if the Council decides unanimously.

The creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) established in the early 2000s led to the development of the concept of the European Union Battlegroup (EUBG). The origins of the EUBG concept can be traced back to several bilateral summits and declarations (Franco–German, Franco–British. UK–Italy), but especially to a Franco–British proposal inspired by the successful implementation of the first autonomous EU crisis management operation, the Artemis military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Missiroli, 2003, 36-39). On 17 May 2004, the Council of the European Union adopted the so called 'Headline Goal 2010' which was endorsed by the European Council in June 2004. This document set the target of establishing the EU BGs and achieving full operational capabilities by 2007 (Council of the EU, 2004). The final Battlegroup concept was completed in 2006. Within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, EUBGs can be used for conflict prevention, initial stabilisation, humanitarian intervention and rescue operation, crisis management and peacekeeping tasks. An EUBG is a multinational integrated force of at least 1,500 personnel, deployable within 10 days and up to 6,000 km for a minimum of 30 days and a maximum of 120 days. In 2004, Member States offered to establish 13 EUBGs in total.

As EU BGs have never been deployed, there have been serious doubts about their applicability. A large amount of literature highlighted the reasons behind the problems of Battlegroups (Balossi-Restelli, 2011; Reykers, 2017; Ringsmose and Rynning 2017; Tsitsikostas, 2021; Meyer, 2022). The main obstacles to their deployment have been the lack of political will of the Member States and the lack of substantial funding opportunities. It is no coincidence that the idea of extending the Athena mechanism to this area has been discussed as well. This process also meant the rethinking of the whole financial system. As a consequence, in 2021, the European Peace Facility succeeded the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility. The European Peace Facility (EPF) budget is available for Common Costs of CSDP military missions and also for Assistance Measures in support of third countries or international organisations. This new off-budget fund is planned to facilitate rapid deployment outside the EU and to support flexibility (Soler, 2021). The European Peace Facility made it easier to finance CSDP military missions, most than quadrupling the earlier stated ceiling of EU contributions.

2. Methodology

SWOT analysis is a strategic planning method mainly used by business management and by development policy which identifies the internal strengths and weaknesses of an organisation or new project and the external opportunities and threats influencing its implementation (Karppi et al. 2001, 15). It is an ideal tool to know how to proceed.

SWOT analysis

A strength = a resource or capacity the organisation can use effectively to achieve its objectives	A weakness = a limitation, fault or defect in the organisation that will keep it from achieving its objectives
An opportunity = any favourable situation in the organisation's environment	A threat = any unfavourable situation in the organisation's environment that is potentially damaging to its strategy

Source: Karppi et al. 2001, 16.

The SWOT analysis helps to "Build on strengths; eliminate weaknesses; exploit opportunities and mitigate the effect of threats" (Karppi et al. 2001, 16.; Dealtry, 1992: 2) According to the official website of the European Union, strengths are positive internal factors that are controlled by the organisation, in this case the European Union, which provide foundations for the future. "The weaknesses are negative internal factors which are controlled by the organisation, and for which key improvements can be made." "The opportunities are the external positive possibilities which can be taken advantage of in the context of contemporary strengths and weaknesses. They are often beyond the influence of the EU, or at the margins" (for example, the evolution of international public opinion concerning one of the EUs decisions). "The threats are difficulties, impediments, or external limitations which can prevent or impede the development of a tool (for example, the industry). Threats are often beyond the influence of the EU, or at its margin" (for example, the development of the war in Ukraine) (Europa.eu, 2017).

3. EU Rapid Deployment Capacity

In 2021, 14 EU Defence Ministers (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) asked Josep Borrell, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU to establish a new rapid military response capacity (called First Entry Force) for crisis management outside the EU (Finabel 2021; Meyer et al, 2022, 4). In March 2022, the Council of the EU adopted the Strategic Compass and agreed on the creation of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. According to this first ever military strategy of the EU, an RDC will be fully operational and swiftly deployable in 2025. EU Member States have decided to agree on operational scenarios in 2022 and organise the first live exercises in 2023. The Compass declares that the RDC "will consist of substantially modified EU Battlegroups and of pre-identified Member States' military forces and capabilities" (Strategic Compass, 2022). The successful realisation of this new intervention force requires a highly ambitious timetable (Meyer et al, 2022).

Even though the EU Battlegroups are considered as building blocks for RDC, there are major differences between the two. In opposition to the EU Battlegroups, the RDC will be a modular force of maximum 5,000 troops including land, air and maritime elements, and strategic enablers (such as cyber defence, satellite communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities) (Zandee and Stoetman 2022, 2). Another difference between them is the length of the rotating period. Now it is planned to extend the six months to one year.

According to Meyer, Van Osch and Reykers, the EU RDC cannot be considered as a "single force of 5,000 troops, but rather a toolbox of force packages with land, air and

maritime components, plus strategic enablers (such as strategic airlift and intelligence for target acquisition)". This means that the EU Battlegroups should be substantially modified 'in line with the single set of forces principle'. It is worth mentioning that either national headquarters or the EU's Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) could be used as command and control (C2) structure (Meyer et al, 2022, 4). Although these two options can be taken into consideration, it is planned that the MPCC will provide C2 capacities to the live exercise and to the first RDC. Regarding the transformation of the BGs, Biscop highlighted that "The Battlegroups were not killed off because many Member States insisted on retaining them." He also proposed to "let those who advocated for them continue to tinker with them, while others, if they want a real Rapid Deployment Capacity, focus on pre-identified national forces" (Biscop, 2022, 2013).

4. SWOT analysis of the RDC

4.1. Strengths and weaknesses

During the planning phase it is very difficult to estimate the strengths and weaknesses of this new initiative. One of the main strengths of the RDC is its modular composition which should be tailor-made according to the nature of a crisis. The two operational scenarios of the RDC, the initial entry of a stabilisation operation and a rescue and evacuation operation are reasonable options for successful deployment. According to Zandee and Stoetman, the organisation of live exercises is a very important novelty of this initiative. Until now, this has never happened under strategic level EU command and control in the case of the EU Battlegroups. Following the decision of MSs, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) will plan and lead the RDC exercises first in 2023, and it should be ready to provide strategic command and control structures to RDC operations in 2025. The modularity of RDC and the integration of strategic enablers can allow preparation for different crisis situations (Zandee and Stoetman, 2022, 2-3).

The transformation of EUBGs should be based on the experience of existing PESCO projects. In this regard, one of the most promising PESCO projects seems to be the establishment of a EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC). The main goal of this project is to contribute to the creation of a coherent full spectrum force package, accelerating the provision of forces (PESCO, w.y.). However, it is important to note that this is not the case of setting up a new and permanent force, but of creating a list of force elements to help the force generation needed to launch EU military operations and speed up the process (Biscop, 2017). This would also mean the implementation of differentiated integration (DI) not only in the field of PESCO but also the EU RDC. As the Treaty created the PESCO as a new, flexible instrument for enhanced cooperation, with the aim of promoting interoperability, reducing capability shortfalls and strengthening cooperation in the field of defence, it easily can support the efficient development of RDC.

The differences between the EUBGs and the EU RDC can lead to difficulties in transforming successfully the Battlegroups into a new intervention force. Lack of political will and absence of flexibility during the planning phase can obstacle the adequate decision and preparation for all kinds of crisis situations and for choosing the right scenario. The unanimity vote in decision making processes can also hinder the successful deployment of this new crisis management tool.

Another weakness arises from the fact that the MPCC lacks adequate numbers of personnel (as it is not a full-fledged EU Military Operation Headquarters) and a secure communications network for conducting such exercises. The absence of a certification system of readiness should be addressed before conducting such exercises (Zandee and Stoetman, 2022, 2-3).

It is well known that EU MSs have significant capability shortfalls in the field of enablers: especially in the field of intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR); air-to- air refuelling

(AAR) and strategic transport, precision munitions and adequate medical support (Zandee and Stoetman, 2022, 6). The existing fragmentation in the field of planning, procurement and manoeuvres also can be considered as a weakness (Biscop, 2022).

4.2. Opportunities and threats

After the unprovoked aggression of Russia against Ukraine, the clear division of labour between the EU and NATO is more important than ever. It also would provide great opportunity for closer integration in the field of European defence between the two organisations.

In recent years, there has been a request for substantial modification of the EU's decision-making processes in order to make the deployment of EU BGs possible in the future (Azzoni, 2022, 4). The use of Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union can solve the problem of decision-making procedures without bypassing the principle of unanimity (Meyer et al., 2022, 11-12). This article permits a group of EU member states to execute CSDP tasks, thus act as a coalition of the willing. "However, in order to activate Article 44, the Council has to take a decision by unanimity" (Zandee and Stoetman, 2022, 2-3). This may be the reason why Article 44 has not yet been used by the EU and its Member States. Despite the negotiations so far, no agreement has been reached on using Article 44. It increasingly seems that there are more questions than answers, and positions of the Member States are still diverging. The advocation of constructive abstention can also support the flexible decision-making process of this new asset.

Considering the present international security environment, one of the biggest threats for the deployability of this new crisis management tool is the necessity of a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate for the establishment of an EU military operation with executive mandate (Zandee and Stoetman, 2022, 2-3). In our days Russia or China would hardly support strengthening the European strategic autonomy in this way.

Without clear cooperation between NATO and the EU it might be difficult to prepare forces at high readiness available for both the EU and NATO at the same time, especially for smaller nations (Zandee and Stoetman, 2022, 5). It is very important that smaller or medium sized MSs will be able to contribute to the modular concept of RDC.

Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that further financial and economic crisis can hamper finding solutions not only to the financial problem of preparation and deployment of RDC, but also to investing more in European defence.

5. Conclusions

Although the creation of BGs can be considered a significant achievement promoting interoperability and multilateral international military cooperation in the framework of the EU and mutual trust between EU member states, this asset has never been used. This fact has created a politically embarrassing situation for the EU. For the success of the EU RDC it is very important to prevent being the 'old wine in new bottles' (Meyer et al, 2022, 4).

The EU RDC is a key factor of the Union's ambitions for strategic autonomy. The modular system and the availability of enablers can facilitate acting rapidly when a crisis requires so. The very strict time frame is an additional ambitious target for the successful implementation (Zandee and Stoetman 2022, 9). There is no question about the fact that time limits must be respected to prove the credibility of the EU.

As Germany is expected to lead the first RDC in 2025 (Ministry of Defence 2022), the experience of the German-led PESCO CROC project will be reflected not only in the realisation of the first concept, but it will be probably used in the development of the full RDC as well.

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An assessment of the
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF PERSONAL HUMAN SECURITY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

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Abstract— Contemporary humans have to survive in complex environments, and they are vulnerable to widespread and often severe threats. The United Nations (UN) has responded to such threats and challenges via the introduction and promotion of the notion of "Human Security" (HS). This concept is recognised by all the European Union (EU) states. The EU's approach to external security within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the vehicle of the EU's efforts to enhance security within the EU by external actions. This article examines how promoting human security is critical to succeeding in stronger European security through the CSDP in external conflicts and crises and all aspects of the European security role in the world. The article presents a proposal of a personalised 'bottom-up' human security approach targeting individuals' resilience and empowerment with their active role as a vital part of the human security stakeholders. The achievement of a personalised approach succeeds via the use of new technologies. Individuals become aware of their risk profile as the first step of their empowerment and resilience. The article's research methodology reviews the most critical and reproducible scientific papers, reports, and officially published policy documents of several entities (UN, EU, Countries, etc.) of the available publications. By performing detailed and broad literature research, the article indicates the connection between promoting the concept of human security and stronger European security. Finally, the paper proposed how new technologies, especially geospatial technologies, could contribute to individuals' empowerment and resilience.

1. Introduction

The global security environment is characterised as continuously changing, multidimensional, and complex, where humans are vulnerable and exposed to widespread and often severe natural and man-made threats. In the last decades, global security entities and states, led by United Nations and followed by European Union, International Organizations, and non-state actors (NGOs, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions) have realised the importance of adopting a human-centric security approach (UN HS Handbook, 2016). The European Union is a global player (if not a potential superpower) in this context, as stated in the European Security Strategy (Council of the EU, 2003): it recognises that the primary victims of conflicts are not the states but the civilians. The above document dramatically placed the EU on the path toward human security, putting "freedom for individuals" at the

core of its policy. The milestone document in establishing the EU's approach to human security is *The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, 2004*, where the report proposes a 'Human Security Doctrine for Europe'.

This article aims to assess the role of Personal Human Security in promoting and achieving European Security and investigate how one may enhance the promotion of human security through CSDP will cause the strengthening of European security. Moreover, it will suggest how the CSDP concept may achieve the desired "effective and comprehensive response" to external conflicts and crises in all aspects of the EU's leading security role globally through promoting human security. The EU could profitably readjust its approach and consider the human security context as the lens through which the EU views the various types of security and not as yet another manifestation of security. The paper proposes a different, more powerful 'bottom-up' human security approach methodology by making use of new technologies: to achieve better results at less cost, targeting in a tailored way the enabled flexibility of the individual line of response.

The paper will briefly present the evolution of the concept of human security, focusing on the core values and the importance of the term. The next section analyses how states and organisations approach and promote the HS concept, mostly focusing on the EU's attitude. The following section presents the connection of the HS with EU security, how the EU, via the CSDP missions and operations, promotes HS, and why it is important to enhance individuals' security in a personalised approach using the new technologies. The last section presents conclusions and proposals on how the new technologies can offer additional tools for HS promotion in an effective, efficient, and low-cost way, galvanising an active role for individuals.

2. Evolution of the Human Security Concept

The notion of HS is an old idea that has only obtained an important position in international politics in the last decades. The "Human Security" milestone, as a term (re)introduced on a global scene, was the United Nations Human Development Report in 1994. In fact, the very first attempt where individual security forms a context and the basis for developing human rights was the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Gros, 1948). The main aftermath was the appearance of the traditional concept of security (based on the security of states). States were, however, considered the only actors in the sphere of international politics; individuals were seen as only a part (an asset) of them. Later, human rights (a fundamental pillar of human security) became the core of *The United States Constitution* (1787). The declaration recognised humans as equals and subjects of welfare. In addition, States are assigned the responsibility of the security and the happiness of the individuals (U.S. Department of State, 2019; Parkinson, 2012). Apparently, the United States Constitution contributed to the formation of the current broad definition of human security as freedom from fear, want and indignity. Two of these three freedoms have become the basic principles of human security: Freedom from Fear and from Want (Rothschild, 1995; Tadjbakhsh, 2014). Several other declarations and documents followed that enhanced and established the stable roots of today's human rights and the broader concept of human securit[1].

The twentieth century found the world confronted by disastrous wars with millions of casualties, mainly civilians who did not actively participate in the conflicts. After the end of the Second World War, nations realised that security was required, safeguarding and preventing other catastrophic wars in the future. As a result, the Organization of the United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945. The extent of civilian casualties forced the global community, via the UN, to change the focus of security from states to individuals.

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[1] The most important is the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and the Bill of rights (1791) as predecessors of HS can also be considered the documents of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva 1863), the Geneva Conventions, The Hague Conventions as well as in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc

After the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union, international security has taken a new form. The "old" security concept of global security, considering security as promoted among states, belongs to the twentieth century. The new security concept actually had its beginnings even earlier and was mainly brought to bear by the two World Wars, in particular the latter one.

A consequence of the "new" security concept was the introduction of a new threats agenda. Here, threats no longer primarily stem from states (one state against another). The new threats diagram shows the prime sources of danger – crime, criminal gangs, misgovernance, epidemics, terrorism, dangerous food, poverty, economic mismanagement, over-population, failed/fragile states, irregular/mass flows of refugees, natural hazards, and nature's destruction, pollution, and climate change in general. The victims of the new threats are primarily individuals.

The new security concerns came from the UN, and the first Human Development Report of the UNDP in 1990 stipulated that people constitute the true wealth of a state (UNDP, 1990). The resolution of the Security Council (688) in 1991 was a significant milestone in adopting principles of human security compared to the traditional security core. Since then, the human security framework has been systematically implemented in all subsequent UN reports and actions. A report fundamental to the adoption and enhancement of the notion of human security was the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report. Following the UN, the EU has been adopting many principles of the HS concept, as have other states and entities, of which the leading examples are Canada, Japan, and NGOs, among others.

The next section analyses how these states and entities approach the HS concept, with a focus on the EU. It is important to understand how different entities approach human security concurrently with the EU. This analysis will allow us to know why the concept of human security is of paramount importance in so many diverse entities around the globe and examine if the EU should re-approach human security to achieve stronger European security.

3. Human Security Concept Approaches

3.1. United Nations

The UN approach stresses that the term "security" should involve a broader and people-centric orientation and not be limited only to the territorial security of a sovereign state. It recommends a different approach than the traditional one: here, security is defined not just as the absence of conflicts but rather encompasses the security of the individuals against disease, hunger, and oppression in people's daily lives (UNDP, 1994). The Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 introduced seven main types/dimensions of security under which threats can be categorised: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. In 2004, the UN published the report *A More Secure World (2004),* which showcased the development of the notion of human security. The report recognised that a wide range of threats exists, threatening both the states and individuals, indicating both the need for more comprehensive cooperation so as to eliminate these threats and a greater demand for a new approach to cover both human and national security issues (United Nations, 2004).

One year later, the UN published the report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (2005)*, where the Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Deprivation, and Freedom to Live in Dignity are indicated as the essential elements of human security. That year, the UN General Assembly published *The Outcome Document of the 2005* where it is mentioned that "all individuals, in particularly vulnerable people, are entitled to Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy their rights and fully develop their human potential" (United Nations, 2005). The newest document about HS, namely, *the General Assembly UN resolution 66/290,*

was published in 2021, where Human security was described as "an approach" that the Member States "can adopt to identify and address widespread and cross-cutting challenges to promote the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people" (United Nations, 2012).

3.2. National Governments

3.2.1. Canada

Canada chose to follow the aspect of "freedom from fear" early on. Even during the Cold War, the Canadian approach to foreign policy stressed peace, safety, development, disarmament, international collaboration, and more practically active operations to eliminate anti-personnel landmines. This approach culminated in signing the Agreement on the ban of the anti-personnel mines at the Convention of Ottawa in 1997.

At the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, Canadians announced the creation of the International Commission for Interventions and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to create a global consent on humanitarian intervention. In 2001 the Commission issued its report under the title *Responsibility to Protect (R2P)*, where it is written that the states hold the principal responsibility for protecting their citizens. The vital point in that approach was that if a country is unable to do so, or when states and authorities are putting their citizens in jeopardy, "the principle of non-interference will be withdrawn before the international responsibility to protect" (Evans, 2016). The most important application of the R2P Canadian approach was the UN General Assembly in 2005, where for the first time, contrary to the logic of the Westphalian state's sovereignty, it was decided that under specific emergencies (genocide, mass killings, and ethnic cleansing) individual security has priority over the security of the state and the global community has an obligation to intervene. Here, the concept of human security was legitimised for the first time. After the military intervention in Libya (in 2011), the R2P concept lost its credibility, so the Canadian Center for R2P led a new campaign under the title "R2P at Crossroads," which hoped to reformulate the approach.

3.2.2. Japan

Japan's approach to HS focused on "the freedom from want". Japan chose to contribute to HS via UN organisations, especially UNTFHS (The UN Trust Fund for HS). Japan financed activities that led to practical actions at a country level. In addition, Japan was the initiator for establishing the CHS (Commission on Human Security) and, in general, promoting national and international engagement involving the concept of HS. The Japanese government declares that it is essential to go beyond defending human life in conflict situations. Moreover, Japan focuses on increasing cooperation between individuals, especially vulnerable people and groups, and provides them with the opportunity for collaboration to achieve more effective protection and empowerment to establish the desired level of human security. This is the mainstream concept in the international community.

3.2.3. NGOs and Think Tanks

Civilian society has been involved in promoting the notion of human security from the very beginning. Many think tanks, forums, and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) operating worldwide deal with human rights. They grant support and contribute to the formation of the HS concept more indirectly.

3.2.4. European Union

The first document of the EU where the principles of the HS concept were adopted is the European Security Strategy published in 2003. The document recognises that none of the current new threats is any more purely military. The most vital introduction is

recognising the primary role security plays in development. In addition, it highlights the responsibility of the EU for global security, underlines that the new threats are against civilians and not states as traditionally considered, and finally connects diseases and poverty with increases in security challenges.

In the following year, *The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, 2004* was published, which is considered the fundamental document in establishing the EU's approach to human security, resulting in a human security doctrine for Europe. The document explicitly represents Europe's responsibility for the ability to operate autonomously and, if necessary, to act outside the European borders to promote Human Security for the benefit of European security. The "Barcelona Report" centres on the capabilities needed for dealing with situations of severe physical insecurity and the concept of the 'freedom from fear' without involving the whole range of possibilities and tools of European foreign and security policy. It focuses on the 'bottom-up approach' and includes three elements (Albrecht et al., 2004). The first element is seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity. The second element relates to a 'Human Security Response Force' consisting of 15000 personnel. Lastly, the third element urges for a new legislative framework on the decision to intervene, along with the conduct of operations.

When it comes to the first element the seven principles: are the importance of human rights, legitimate political authority, effective multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus,clear and transparent strategic direction and the use of legal instruments. The 'Human Security Response Force' advocated by the second element comprises men and women, of whom at least one-third will be civilians. The third element, namely the new legal framework, will more specifically concern: the management of decisions for intervention and operations on the ground, to be installed in the internal law of host states, international criminal law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law.

The next important step was the Madrid Report published in 2007, introducing a further development of the human security approach as championed by the EU (Albrecht et al. 2007); it anticipated its institutionalisation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Madrid Report highlights that Human Security concerns the fundamental needs of individuals and communities in times of danger. It is about being safe when travelling, about material survival and the act of free will. It realises that 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' are vital to people's sensation of well-being and their willingness to live in peace (Albrecht et al., 2007). The latest action of the EU to promote an institutionalised development of Human Security is presented in the Global Security Strategy. In 2016 the EU published *the Global Security Strategy*, which confirmed human security as the goal of EU external action. In that document, the EU adopts a conflict prevention-oriented human security approach, prioritising the prevention of general hostilities above individual empowerment. Of particular importance is an integrated approach to the promotion of HS, but within a militarised perspective: this is perceived as essential to support action with hard rather than soft power in the present global fragile security environment (EEAS, 2016). The question remains; Why does human security have an essential role in European security?

4. Human Security is pivotal to EU Security

The European Union (EU) is more than just an economic and political union between 27 European countries. It is about common values and interests that are shared and help unite the EU countries. These values are a fundamental part of the European identity and express the uniqueness of the EU. These values are Human Dignity, Freedom, Democracy, Equality, the Rule of Law and Human Rights. The modern world has to deal with new threats that have never been recorded or an old one with a new, more threatening form. These threats are directed against individuals independent of the state security situation and the values of the EU. The EU realised early on that the security

of the Union and its citizens goes beyond regional and international security matters (Kaldor et al., 2007). Moreover, taking the role of a global player, the EU recognised that it should share the European values and promote a better world, as referred to in the Treaty of the European Union (article 2 & 3) (TEU, 2012), as that is the only way for humanity to thrive.

By promoting human security, the EU promotes its fundamental values embedded in the EU's interests. At the same time, this approach gratifies the EU's strategic goals, as presented in the last Global Security Strategy (European Union, 2016) and other EU policy documents with the most important the Barcelona (ibid, 8-12) and Madrid reports (ibid, 2-5). Why has security become a core issue for the EU? The answer is that security is the precondition to promoting European values and interests and, indeed, prosperity for any human society. The successful promotion of Human Security encompasses the fundamental values and interests that the EU needs to promote and succeed in order to achieve a stronger and secure Europe for its citizens (ibid, 13-14).

The most common criticism of Human Security is that it is too idealistic and does not promote a state's national interest (Schütte and Talita, 2006). That is partially true, as living in the world involves reality first and foremost. However, human security can become the lens through which the EU can approach all the other security aspects, an approach indeed closer to today's efforts of the UN and many other global security actors and states.

There are three main reasons, as presented in the Barcelona Report (Albrecht et al., 2004) and elaborated more in the article "Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European Union" (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005), for which the European Union promotes and invests in developing the HS approach around the globe.

Morality: Based on the declaration that "Human beings have a right to live with dignity and security, and a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened".

Legal reasons: The EU is obliged to promote human rights as all the EU member states have ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the EU constitution itself recognises this obligation.

EU interest: Europe cannot be safe if the rest of the World is not safe, and the world cannot be safe if individuals around the globe experience insecurities.

These three reasons indicate why human security has a central role in promoting and establishing a secure Europe. The path to success is through the CSDP missions and operations.

5. EU promotes Human Security

The EU's first strategy came about only in 2003 because of the widely different standpoints on autonomy existing among the EU Member States. The failure of the EU to address the war in the Balkans between 1990-1999 was the driving force for the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In this way, the EU was able to satisfy the need for unity and develop a strategy based on its interests, and now it can deal with threats and challenges in its way.

The principal guidelines of the Treaty of Lisbon indicate a more comprehensive approach to security. That new attitude moves away from the traditional one and redirects the EU to focus on the security of people. Even if the Treaty does not refer to HS directly, the importance of this idea is identified in the documents about the strategic objects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and within the respective general

guidelines. The EU promotes human security, international security, and peace around the globe via the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and through several political and military components (embracing many military and civilian missions and operations). The CSDP is other than an internal policy and allows the EU to act externally.

Moreover, it enables the EU to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention, and strengthening global security. It is an essential part of the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management, which relies on civilian and military assets. The EU has conducted many overseas operations, using civilian and military means and personnel in several target countries in the three continents (Europe, Africa, and Asia) as part of its CSDP concept.

People around the globe face different threats and challenges. For this reason, the promotion of the human security concept must be based on local and individual realities, separate from those seen at the state level. The victims of the new threats are primarily individuals and societies or states (Caballero-Anthony M. et al., 2016). In failed and fragile States, individuals, especially the poorest and most vulnerable social groups, experience the greatest miseries due to the absence of state protection (Mcloughlin, 2012). Each individual has different socio-economic characteristics and confronts various threats and challenges differently, depending on the geographical area they reside or activate. A major role concerns the country's status where a person lives. The CSDP missions and operations must be organised to increase the resilience and empowerment of the individuals in a tailored way. The article introduces a new concept to significantly enhance the "bottom-up" approach to human security in the CSDP missions and operations. The new concept is personalised human security, whereby the use of the new technologies' capabilities will enforce the efforts of the human empowerment and promotion of human security.

5. Personalised Human Security

Individuals remain critical stakeholders in security, as they are the components of human security and the most numerous to be affected. Individuals need to become aware of their security situation, the threats around them and their own weak or strong characteristics. Moreover, they have to rethink their role and responsibilities regarding their security. Indeed, individuals who ignore the threats around them and are not aware of their level of capacity to confront these threats act passively by assuming the role of victims and take no responsibility for the outcome of the surrounding dangers (physical or man-made), even when this affects their own lives. Furthermore, when persons underestimate their abilities and are convinced that they cannot confront threats/crises, the automatic outcome is that they assume the victim's role. From a social perspective, human security is a collective responsibility shared by everyone in a society. The level of individual resilience, civil preparedness and empowerment reflect any society's resilience. Thus, targeting the empowerment of individuals will result in the empowerment and the resilience of the community and the country (bottom-up approach). The empowerment of human security can succeed only by the stronger participation of the individual. The EEAS/CSDP missions and operations have to adopt a more powerful bottom-up approach and target personalised human security.

Personalised HS refers to a concept of safety that assesses each person's spatiotemporal characteristics (social background, behaviour, activities) and environmental surroundings/ conditions and reacts accordingly to these.

7. Towards a geospatial assessment of personalised HS

Each person has a unique geospatial profile (identity) that is spatiotemporal and formed both by the natural environment in which a person lives and interacts and by the cultural background and socio-economic characteristics: these are of a continuously changing nature. In addition, the place where a person lives (country – region) is of paramount importance, as a country's negative or positive factors reflect a person's geospatial profile (personal risk level), respectively. The necessity of defining the individual elements that compose the geospatial profile arises from the above. Lastly, the people tasked with safeguarding security are redefined, they now embrace individuals empowered to contribute to their own security by foregoing the passive stance now prevailing and adopting an active one in cooperation with the EU personnel in the field and other security providers/actors. New technologies for personalised human security include geospatial technologies, such as Geoinformatics, Location-based Services, Spatial Analysis and Geocomputation, Geographic Information Systems, Data Science, and Analytics. These are uniquely positioned to play an essential role in this effort, as they offer the means to achieve the new 'bottom-up' personalised approach. Modern geospatial technologies provide the required tools to identify and analyse/model those essential physical and human characteristics that shape an individual's security status, hence their related exposure to threats and risks in space and time. Such technologies can critically contribute to achieving personalised human security, including most if not all of its facets.

More specifically, the innovative proposal set forth in this paper envisages the development of assessment tools and their application to personalised HS. With such tools, users will be able to compile a record of their activities in space and time in conjunction with possible threats, allowing them to assess their risk level, personal vulnerabilities, and coping capacity at any specific time and place. The proposed tools would act as the first step (for individuals where the EU operates under the CSDP context) to achieve self-awareness and progress towards individual empowerment and resilience by utilising modern geospatial technologies. The application/tool will operate through a set of geo-"snapshots" that capture an individual's unique and dynamic personal data. Data are unique – not only for a specific user but also for that user at a specific moment. The application will naturally incorporate the concept of "privacy by design", which provides a framework for designing systems, databases, and processes whilst respecting the fundamental rights of data subjects (GDPR, 2016).

The process will present the user's estimated personal risk as a number or level and give results even offline. For instance, a mobile phone will be used to provide a user's position, which, combined with other layers (e.g., Corine land cover, elevation, water streams), will be used to estimate a user's potential level of risk in a flood inundation scenario. Users will provide their data by filling out a form under conditions of anonymity. The overall risk level will be reported in the form of vulnerability indicators which will be visible on the user's screen in a dashboard format.

The proposed tool will also be able to collect and store data from users. However, the only mandatory data will be their postal code (or other community-level code based on the country), considered as non-personal, as defined in the EU's data policy under GDPR (GDPR, 2016). When the tool is fully operational, server access and data management can be centrally managed by an EEAS body. The resultant information can contribute to the CSDP missions and field personnel. The essential point is that the application can be shared and used in the pre-deployment phases or even when there is no possibility (political, financial, or other reasons) for deployment in an area. Today, the number of smartphone users worldwide is estimated at around 6,378 billion, or 80.69 per cent of the entire earth's population, and is increasing (Statista, 2021). EEAS/CSDP missions and operations routinely have access to these low-cost and commonplace tools, i.e., smartphones, and can promote human security via customised applications, like the one proposed in this paper.

8. Conclusions

A huge portion of the global population experiences direct or indirect threats and insecurities, as the world tends to be an ever increasingly insecure place. Nowadays, old threats and new challenges appear to be more complex and severe, negatively influencing all aspects of people's lives and costing billions annually in economic losses.

The EU aims to provide the proper conditions for EU citizens to obtain freedom from fear and want with dignity. The main precondition is a secure environment that promotes human security, mainly regionally and secondary worldwide. The EU strategic documents and hypotheses over security are referred to as a global security player that acts externally worldwide. Moreover, policy documents indicate that the EU's internal security is linked to the security status of other countries and/or regions and demands external actions mainly in neighbouring countries. As a result, the EU recognises a special responsibility to promote security in neighbouring countries as security is necessary for development. State security does not automatically imply the individuals' security, so external action should be applied if required.

Human Security needs an effective multilateral approach which can succeed with the protection and the empowerment of individuals by adopting a "bottom-up" approach as the most effective and efficient way to promote human security. This paper advocated that the EU should increase CSDP missions and operations in the countries at its borders and even in other countries further away that present a concern for its security. The promotion of HS is the vehicle that will allow Europe to share its values and contribute to global peace and prosperity and enable EU citizens to prosper and enjoy unprecedented security, democracy, and prosperity (Jochen, 2021). At the same time, promoting empowerment and resilience in fragile and failed states direct to the individuals should be a priority. That will prevent/diminish future or ongoing threats and challenges that directly threaten the EU Member States and citizens. In addition, CSDP missions and operations have to support its neighbouring states, especially those societies which face poverty, inequalities or/and authoritarian governments.

Lastly, this paper proposed methods/tools through which CSDP missions and operations might approach and promote personalised human security, using capabilities offered by new geospatial technologies, at a low cost and legal, based on the international law approach. The article proposed a more targeted 'bottom-up' approach by introducing the concept of personalised human security and promoting the individuals' geo-spatiotemporal profile. Until now, all the provided tools for measuring a risk profile are at the State level. In this "new" approach, the human security concept may be engendered at the lowest level of participation by stimulating individuals to seize an active role in their security status. This goal can be succeeded by developing a tool available to the individuals in the CSDP target areas. Increasing their awareness of their weaknesses and capabilities will allow them to become resilient against threats and challenges (nature hazards, man-made catastrophes etc.), which in the end will reflect the EU's stronger security.

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EULEX and KFOR
cooperation: from
peace-building to
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EULEX AND KFOR COOPERATION: FROM PEACE-BUILDING TO STATE-BUILDING IN KOSOVO

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Abstract— **Kosovo is a typical paradigm of international cooperation, after the end of the NATO-led 'Operation Allied Forces' in June 1999. Pursuant to UN SC Resolution 1244, UNMIK cooperated with KFOR to coordinate their endeavours for peace and state building. After 2008, UNMIK allocated most of its initial responsibilities to Kosovar authorities and to EULEX, which along with KFOR, became the main international players in Kosovo, albeit, no official arrangement was established between the EU and NATO. Despite the two organisations' long strategic partnership, after 2004 political and strategic institutional cooperation was almost non-existent, leaving space only for informal, non-institutionalised cooperation. That situation started to change after the July 2016 joint declaration, placing their relationship within a new framework. The aim of this study is to investigate what kind of cooperation, outside the Berlin Plus arrangements, has been developed in Kosovo between the EULEX and KFOR, within this new EU-NATO partnership framework. My argument is that due to its complexity, the EU-NATO relationship should be viewed as a multi-level phenomenon, where, by drawing on insights from concepts and theories from Inter-Organisational Relations (IOR) in International Relations (IR) in each level, when put together, can provide a more nuanced and holistic picture of the cooperation. Finally, the article advocates that, after the July 2016 joint declaration, a new type of institutionalised Strategic Partnership is being developed, outside the Berlin Plus arrangements. However, in order to avoid political blockages, some fields of this co-operation, in the international staffs and the operational/tactical levels, are kept away from the Member States' approval mechanisms and influences, where practical approaches of cooperation have been developed.**

KEYWORDS

- **European Union**
- **NATO**
- **inter-organisational relations**
- **Common Security and Defence Policy**
- **Kosovo**
- **peace-building**
- **state-building**

1. Introduction

On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 officially terminated the NATO-Led 'Operation Allied Force' (OAF), and established in Kosovo, under UN auspices, an international civilian administration, the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), under a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), and a NATO-led international security presence, the Kosovo Force (KFOR). UNMIK, pursuant to Resolution 1244, had full legislative and executive authority as well as control over the judiciary. In order to perform its duties UNMIK adopted a four-pillar structure. Each pillar was responsible for a specific set of duties and was managed by a different international organisation. The EU was leading Pillar IV, on (economic) Reconstruction (United Nations, 1999b, 2). In 2007, Martti Achisaari, a Special Envoy appointed by the UN Secretary General with the task to prepare a report on Kosovo's future status,

advocated that UNMIK had fulfilled its purpose and recommended independence with international supervision as the only option for Kosovo to develop a viable economy and political stability. Therefore, he suggested that UNMIK should be replaced by a European Security and Defence Policy Mission which in cooperation with KFOR, would support Kosovo's institutions until they would become capable to assume the full range of their responsibilities (United Nations, 2007; Weller, 2008). On 17 February 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, and in December 2008 UNMIK handed most of its duties and authorities to the Kosovo government and to a newly deployed European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).

This article examines the operational cooperation between EULEX and KFOR. In the article I advocate that in order to understand the complexity of relations between international institutions, in this case the EU and NATO, cooperation should be broken down into multiple levels, then analysed at each level so as to attain a more nuanced, comprehensive and holistic view when assembled. Additionally, a comprehensive approach, which can draw insights from different theories, concepts and approaches of inter-organisational relations (IOR), in the discipline of international relations (IR), should be taken at every level. Accordingly, no state-centric IR theory (i.e., realis[1], liberalis[2], social constructivism[3] etc.), will be used. Furthermore, the term 'world politics'[4] will be used as this article addresses the interplay between a great variety of state and non-state actors and deals with relations between international organisations. We consider the EU to be a *sui generis* organisation which, in addition to its international and intergovernmental characteristics, also has supranational and federal features. Its legal personality is also affirmed in Article 47 of the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty), making it an independent entity in its own right[5] Finally, in this article the term 'international organisations' refers to intergovernmental organisations only and not to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or regimes[6]

In this vein this article comprises five sections: the first section will review the literature on the subject. The second section presents the methodology and tools used for the analysis and set out the theoretical framework of the EULEX-KFOR relationship. The third section will present some background information on the operations of both organisations, while the fourth section will proceed with an in-depth analysis of the operational cooperation with respect to the IOR theoretical framework for each level of interaction. Finally, the article epitomises the results of the research.

2. Literature review

Scholarship research on international cooperation for the peace and state building in Kosovo, have mostly focused on the coordination problem between the organisations managing UNMIK's pillars, and the unresolved issue of the final status of the former Serbian autonomous province, albeit researchers have not treated the cooperation between EULEX and KFOR in Kosovo in much detail. Furthermore, the EU-NATO cooperation was not placed into the theoretical framework of inter-organisational relations in world politics. Christer Jönsson (1987), applied insights from organisation theory, sociology and administration and management science to develop inter-organisational approaches into International Relations. Ojanen (2004), investigated the EU's identity as a security actor when interacted with other international organisations using theoretical approaches in relations between international organisations, while Biermann and Harsch (2017), investigated the significance of RDT to understanding

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[1] On realism, see Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer, (2014).
[2] On liberalism, see Moravcsik (1977), Keohane and Nye (1977). On democratic peace theory, see Doyle (1997).
[3] On constructivism, see Wendt (1999).
[4] On the prevalence of the term 'world politics' in the interaction between state and non-state actors, see Bayles et al. (2020).
[5] The summary of the EU's legal personality explicitly defines the EU's international abilities (EU 2021).
[6] The concept of 'regime' was defined by Krasner (1982, 186), as *"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations"* (authors italics).

why the need for scarce resources can motivate cooperation between organisations and their reservations that this need might lead to over-dependence on others. Koops (2008), outlining the lack of effective cooperation and coordination between the various IOs, advocated the use of insights from related disciplines for IOR and identified the role of individuals in an implicit reference to the various levels (of analysis) of cooperation. In 2009 Varwick and Koops identified three internal and external 'factors' (levels of analysis) affecting EU-NATO institutionalised cooperation. Koops (2011; 2012), a pioneer in analysing the EU-NATO relationship by combining a multi-level analysis with insights from various organisational and sociological theories, included in his following studies two additional levels in his analysis of EU-NATO relations.

Similarly, Hofmann (2009, 2011), investigated how the institutional overlap between the EU and NATO impacted ESDP/CSDP. Egger (2013), employed a four-level analysis model in her communication on EU-NATO competition and built a theoretical framework using principal-agent theories. Smith (2014), analysed the deadlock in EU-NATO cooperation by means of a three-level analysis and historical institutionalism, while Schleich (2014), combined institutionalist, organisational and principal-agent theoretical insights to investigate EU-NATO interaction as an inter-institutional relationship in conflict regulation, in three time-phases, from 1998 to 2014. Lachmann (2010) and Græger (2014; 2016; 2017), investigated the informal cooperation between personnel from the EU and NATO to bypass the political obstacles, and the 'communities of practice' and 'epistemic communities' that facilitated such interaction. Finally, Costa (2017, 389-405), explored the influence international organisations can exert on each other, separating influence from power and the influence of other actors on IOs.

Regarding the Kosovo crisis, Yannis (2001, 32-34; 2004, 69-78), identified the challenges the international administration was facing in Kosovo, in terms of the dual authority at the head of the administration, UNMIK and KFOR, as well as the multi-institutional/multinational internal structure of both, combined with the antagonism between the organisations and their differences in terms of working practices and priorities. He also acknowledged the ambiguities in UN Resolution 1244 and the uncertainty about the final status of Kosovo. Weller (2008a; 2008b), analysed the future status of Kosovo based on the supervised independence, recommended by Ahtisaari's report and the subsequent declaration of independence by Kosovo Albanians. Papadimitriou (2009) investigated the limits of state and peace building of the EU in Kosovo, from the beginning of the international presence until the declaration of independence and the nascent of EULEX in 2008. He argued that, despite the significant amount of aid towards Kosovo, the EU's presence, and effectiveness, was constrained by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. Choedon (2010), argued that factors, such as competition and overlapping, the frequent change of personnel and differences in structure and recruitment methods along with different approaches to peace building, hindered coordination among organisations. Parish (2010, 1), by comparing the state-building paradigms of Kosovo and Bosnia, asserted that EULEX and KFOR cannot afford to leave Kosovo because of the ethnic violence that would erupt and the possibility of partition upon their departure. Greiçevci (2011), investigated the deployment of EULEX in Kosovo, built on the EU's international role and particularly on the EU actorness as an international player. Finally, Silander and Janzekovitz (2012), underlined the state-building challenges Kosovo was facing, in terms of providing core functions, after the declaration of independence, especially due to ethnic tensions.

3. Methodology and conceptual and theoretical framework

3.1. Methodology: Analytical method

The article will involve a deductive collection of qualitative data from primary and secondary sources to track the gradual development of the EU-NATO strategic partnership (NATO, 2021). Then, using a level-of-analysis approach and employing

the process-tracing method, these data will be used at each level against the theories and concepts of IOR in world politics in order to explore the EULEX-KFOR operational cooperation, within the new framework set by the joint declarations of 8 July 2016 and 10 July 2018.

3.1.1. Levels of analysis

The 'level of analysis' or 'multi-level analysis' approach is an analytical tool able to unpack and examine in depth complex and multi-level phenomena, such as the EU-NATO relationship. Thus, we can understand the different dynamics and influences of all stakeholders and acquire a more holistic view at each level without loss of substance. With the seminal works, Waltz (1959), and Singer (1961), paved the way for scholars in international relations to apply this tool in studying wider complex issues and relations concerning IOs, global governance and regionalism.

Hence, we will apply a multi-level analysis approach at four different levels:

▶ the international level or the 'external environment' of organisations will examine how international organisations respond to structural changes in the international system, to international crises or to influences from external actors;

▶ the national/member-state level examines the strategic decisions and preferences of EU and NATO members, as well as how influential and powerful states and national actors shape or hinder relations;

▶ the inter-institutional/inter-secretariat/inter-bureaucratic or headquarters (international staff) level focuses on the role of bureaucracies, staffs and key personalities and examines how organisations interact with other organisations of the same population;

▶ the military/civilian (field) operational level, which deals with the problems faced by military and civilian leaders and personnel, from both the EU and NATO, in joint areas of operations and how these problems can be overcome, or not, in the field, especially when there are few formal agreements or little institutionalised cooperation.

3.1.2. Process-tracing method

In addition to the level of analysis, process tracing will allow us to investigate and decode the processes and causes at each level that led to the specific method of interaction. Beach (2017, 1), defines process tracing as 'a research method for tracing causal mechanisms using detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case', and identifies three distinct forms within social science: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 3). According to Glennan, causal mechanisms are *'complex systems which produce an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts'* (1996, 5, author's italics), therefore process tracing connects causes with their hypothesised outcomes. In particular, in theory-testing process tracing we investigate in a case-study whether a theory is present and works as anticipated.

3.2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

3.2.1. State-building and Peace-building

State-building, in political science, is a term used to describe the creation of a functioning state. Therefore, a state has to establish institutions able to perform some core functions, in order to provide a number of services to its citizens (World Bank, 1997, 27). Weber (1919, 9-10), defines state as a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Depending on the level of

services they provide these functions can be categorized in one of three main categories (from basic to medium and active functions).

Fukuyama (2004, 28-53), argues that a state can be strong or weak not according to its power but to its ability to perform those functions. A state can be powerful but, at the same time, can be institutionally weak. Based on the strength of their institutions we can identify three major types of states, the "Strong States", the "weak" or "fragile" states and the "failed" states. Paris emphasizes that peace-building and state-building in war-torn societies demands the cooperation of different international organisations each with their own priorities, working ethos and practices which can result in duplication of effort, and/or competition. Additionally, peace-building actors usually pursue quick results instead of focusing towards long-term solutions (2009, 2).

Kosovo today is a fragile state. It is a post-conflict environment where state-building and peace-building had to be enforced in tandem. Is lacking state legitimacy[7] and does not have total control over the Northern Serb-dominated territory where parallel institutions exist. Additionally, it is one of the poorest countries in Europe (World Bank, 2017, 9), and is ranked very low in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2020, 3)[8] Above all, it still requires an international civil and security presence.

3.3. Population ecology and overlap

Population ecology deals with the interaction of organisations with their external environment, the international system, and focuses on competition and selection in populations of organisations. Hannan and Freeman (1977), argue that since there are limitations on the ability of organisations to learn and adapt to environmental changes, natural selection plays a dominant role. According to Dijkstra (2013), there are multiple international crisis management organisations, with some unique capabilities, whose activities overlap, thus creating competition as they struggle for the same resources and significance. In addition to this 'functional overlap', Euro-Atlantic security institutions overlap in terms of membership. Peters (2003), identifies a total of four fields where Europe's security institutions overlap: policy areas, general functions, problem areas and membership.

3.3.1. Principal-agent theory

In intergovernmental organisations such as the EU and NATO, which are composed of sovereign states and established by treaties, the principal decision-making and strategic-guidance bodies are the heads of state or government of the members. This very important feature puts member states in a position to control to a varying degree, or affect the behaviour of, the organisations in which they participate. Principal-agent theory provides an insight into why states (the principal) delegate certain tasks to international organisations in general, and to the EU and NATO in particular (the agent) in order to achieve specific tasks which otherwise would have been politically, economically and/or militarily unattainable, or unbearably costly.

A theory of agency was created almost in parallel, but independently, by Barry Mitnick (1975), as an institutional theory in political and social science, and by Stephen Ross, (1973), as an economic theory to describe, for example, contractual arrangements. In international relations the theory was introduced by Darren Hawkins et al. (2006), who examined the motives and incentives states have to delegate certain tasks and authority to international organisations, and furthermore how states can control them afterwards. One important issue regarding this delegation is to what extent the agent, at the expense of the principal, will seek autonomy or will have incentives to promote its own agenda contrary to the preferences of the principal (Jönsson, 2017, 49-66). Additionally, there is the issue of why states prefer one IO over others to achieve their

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[7] Kosovo is not recognised as a sovereign state by the United Nations, 5 out of 27 EU Member States and 4 out of 30 NATO Allies.
[8] Kosovo is ranked 108 over 180 countries with a score of 36/100

goals (institutional choice), which is of great importance in crisis management where the respective capabilities of each organisation in the field should be balanced with the political preferences and strategic interests of the member states (Dijkstra, 2013, 3-4).

In the case of EU-NATO cooperation, where there is membership overlap, principal-agent theory can explain why member states delegate some of their defence, security and crisis management tasks to either the EU or NATO, or both, according to the institutions' specialisation in a certain field or for reasons of national interest (Varwick and Koops, 2009, pp.101-130), as well as their agreements and disagreements in relation to the EU's and NATO's distinct roles, division of labour and interaction, either cooperation or rivalry (Schleich, 2014, 182-205).

3.3.2. Resource dependence theory

Resource dependence theory (RDT), which has its roots in management studies and political science, has become in recent years one of the most preferred explanations for cooperation between organisations. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik (1978), in their path breaking work, 'The External Control of Organisations', combined the power-dependency approach and the interdependence perspective, arguing that organisations cooperate in order to have access to resources they lack but other organisations possess. This resource-dependence interaction creates power differentials between them that lead to 'control' of one organisation over the other, especially when resources are scarce and the number of potential providers is limited. On the other hand, organisations have the tendency to preserve their autonomy, which, in resource-dependence cooperation can create inter-organisation rivalry. Biermann (2008, 151-177), was one of the first scholars who built on RDT to explain the EU-NATO relationship, while Koops (2012), and Schleich (2014), applied RDT to the EU efforts to achieve autonomy from NATO.

3.3.3. Practice approach

The stagnation in EU-NATO cooperation since 2004 has forced staff from both organisations to explore unofficial avenues of interaction. At the operational level, in the common areas of responsibility (AOR), but also at the inter-institutional level, civilian and military personnel were engaged, under the watchful eye of member states and allies, in day-to-day informal cooperation. A type of a non-institutionalised practical cooperation had been conceptualised by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1998), who consider 'communities of practice' as social systems of human learning through participation. Haas (1992, 2), developed a similar approach by defining 'epistemic communities' as networks of knowledge-based experts. Adler (2008, 196), defined 'communities of practice' as 'like-minded groups of practitioners who are bound, both informally and contextually, by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice', and applied that concept to explain the proliferation of security communities and NATO's transformation from a purely collective defence organisation to a defence and cooperative-security organisation by incorporating crisis management and conflict prevention into the alliance's new strategic concept (NATO, 1991), after the end of the Cold War.

Lachmann (2010), was the first to explore the emergence of communities of practice in the EU-NATO relationship, also distinguishing the role of the 'epistemic communities', especially among military personnel. Græger (2016, 478–501; 2017, 340–358), studied EU and NATO communities of practice, based on their common background, focused on the day-after-day informal interaction between individuals who develop informal ties through shared interests, values and habits. The community of practice approach focuses on the individual, inter-bureaucratic/inter-institutional and field personnel levels. High-ranking officials from both organisations and member states contributed to the onset and the institutionalisation of the EU-NATO relationship, while bureaucrats and secretariat staff from both organisations kept unofficial channels open in order to bypass political blockages. Additionally, personnel on the ground, both civilian and military, try to overcome the lack of institutional relations in operations.

4. European Union mission and NATO operation

4.1. European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo - EULEX

EULEX was proposed in the 2007 Martti Achisaari's report to the UN Security Council on Kosovo's future status, in order to support relevant rule of law institutions in Kosovo. EULEX, the largest civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union, was launched in 2008 for a 28-month period, pursuant to Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, and entered into force on 14 July 2009. Political control and strategic direction are exercised by the PSC, under the responsibility of the Council.

Under the mission's initial, 2008, mandate, EULEX was vested with monitor, mentor and advisory roles vis-a-vis Kosovo institution, as well as certain executive responsibilities, while under the 2018 mandate, it retained only certain limited executive responsibilities through Monitor and Operational Pillars. The Mission works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and has a strength of approximately 420 staff and a mandate until 14 June 2023 (EULEX, 2021).

4.2. NATO Kosovo Force - KFOR

KFOR, an approximately 50,000 strong international peacekeeping-force, entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999. Its mandate, derived from the UNSC Resolution 1244(1999) and the Military Technical Agreement that was signed on 9 June 1999 between the International Security Forces-KFOR and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (NATO, 1999b), was to provide a safe and secure environment for all the people of Kosovo.

Over time, KFOR underwent a series of structure reforms and personnel reductions in response to the improvement of the security environment and gradually transferred a number of its responsibilities to the local authorities. Today, KFOR maintains approximately 3,500 troops in order to perform its mission. HQ KFOR is located at Camp Film City, Pristina and COMKFOR reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN), Italy (NATO, 2021b).

4.3. EULEX-KFOR interaction

4.3.1. International level

Population ecology theory advocates that there is an interactive relationship between populations and their external environment (Reis, 2017), therefore, any structural change, crisis, or influence from external actors in the international system triggers some kind of response by the international organisations, either cooperation, rivalry, or burden sharing. In the case of Kosovo, both the EU and NATO responded to the same structural change, the civil wars resulting in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent shocks of the rule of law chaos and the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.

Initially, NATO conducted a 78-days air campaign, "Operation Allied Force", against Serbia proper and the Serbian security forces in Kosovo, aiming to protect the Kosovo Albanians. It was the first war NATO conducted and the first ever called a 'Humanitarian Intervention' (NATO, 1999). Subsequently, and in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 1244, NATO deployed the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which until today pursue to maintain a safe and secure environment and to provide freedom of movement in Kosovo.

The EU originally participated in UNMIK leading Pillar IV, on reconstruction. In due course it extended its footprint on the ground by establishing an additional number of institutions and policy instruments. In 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was deployed which took over most of UNKIK's tasks. After 2018, EULEX's mandate was amended to include only limited executive responsibilities. Today,

based on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement there are two EU institutions in Kosovo, EULEX and the European Union Office / EU Special Representative (EUSR), in Kosovo.

The increase in the number of international organisations accordingly increases their interaction and also their overlap (Jönsson, 2017, 49). Peters (2004, 382), identified that the EU and NATO overlap in four fields (membership overlap, general functions and, policy and problem areas). These overlaps can lead to some type of interaction, either cooperation or rivalry or division of labour. In the case of Kosovo, the EU and NATO have distinct roles. However, when there is an overlap of members, the question arises as to which IO the member states will choose for each role. This means that, according to population ecology theory, the increase in the number of conflicts, due to structural changes, increases the number of international organisations dealing with security issues as well, therefore, member states have to make an institutional choice, which is based on the fundamental niches of the IO (Dijkstra, 2013, 5). Hence, a continuous natural selection process in an environment determines which organisations fit the environmental niche[9] and survive or otherwise become obsolete and extinct (Van de Ven, 1979, 320).

4.3.2. National/member-state level

An 'agency relationship' occurs when one part, the principal, can delegate certain tasks in a predetermined domain to be performed by another part, the agent (Ross, 1973, 134). Applied to the EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo, this can shed light on many member states' / allies' decisions to delegate specific security and crisis management tasks to the EU and/or NATO. Dijkstra (2013, 3-4), advocates that states show preference to one IO over others to achieve their goals (institutional choice), according to the respective capabilities of each organisation in the field and the effort to balance the political preferences and strategic interests of the member states. Schleich argues that powerful member states in the EU and NATO influence institutions according to their strategic interests 'navigating' them towards cooperation, rivalry or division of labour, or to certain actions in specific conflict regions instead of others. Additionally, she acknowledged the potential, and effort, of organisations themselves to pursue a more autonomous role, slightly diverting from states' preferences (2014, 182-205).

From the early 1990's, with the beginning of the break-down of Yugoslavia, the United States and Russia along with the four biggest European powers, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, formed an unofficial group called the 'Contact Group', to deal with the crisis. The active involvement of the EU and NATO in Kosovo can be attributed to the five Euro-Atlantic members of the group, with special interests in the Western Balkans, which established the 'Quint' (excluding Russia), another informal decision-making group. These states chose and delegated specific tasks to EU and NATO according to their nieces, and navigated them to perform specific actions in accordance to their political goals.

France, which had historical ties with Yugoslavia even before WWI, played a leading role in the negotiations preceding the 1999 NATO bombing campaign. In March 1998 the French foreign minister, along with his German counterpart, visited Belgrade in order to deescalate the upcoming crisis. Also, France hosted in Château de Rambouillet the negotiations for a proposed peace agreement between Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanians. When the negotiations failed France sided with NATO and participated in operation Allied Force, being the second force contributor behind the US (Couture and Morina, 2014). With the end of the air campaign, France participated in KFOR leading a multinational Brigade, the MNB North in Mitrovica. Additionally, France was engaged in a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives in order to assist Kosovo.

Germany was the protagonist of the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when on 23 December 1991 unilaterally recognised Croatia and Slovenia (Zipfel, 1996, 140). Additionally, Kosovo marked a fundamental turn in its foreign policy, allowing for the first time after WWII, German Armed Forces to participate in combat operations (Hoffman

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[9] For more information on niche theory, see Hannan and Freeman (1977, 946-956).

et al. 2013, 22). The German Air Force took part in the NATO air campaign (Werkhauser, 2004, 2). With the end of the air campaign, Germany became a major troop contributor to the KFOR (in 2009 was the biggest troop contributor), and was leading a multinational Brigade, the MNB South in Prizren. Today, Germany is one of the main investors and trading partner in Kosovo and a very significant donor (Federal Foreign Office, 2021).

Since the creation of contemporary Italy, the access to the north of the Adriatic Sea was of paramount value, hence, Italian endeavour to put the east Adriatic coast under its influence and away from that of a potential opponent. In order to achieve such an objective, Italy supported the establishment of a sovereign Albanian state in 1912, and thereafter Italy steadfastly supported Albanian irredentist efforts, until 1943 (Michelatta, 2013, 522-542). Post-Cold War Italian diplomacy regarded the western Balkans a 'strategic priority of the Italian foreign policy' (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 2021) and during operation Allied Force Italy provided the strategic and logistic base for the military operations, and participated with its own means. After the end of the air campaign Italy became a major troop contributor and leads the western sector of the KFOR around Peć/Peja (NATO, 2000). Additionally, it has developed a strong economic relationship with Kosovo, along with Albania and the other Western Balkan states (Belloni and Morozzo, 2008, 179-183).

The UK was one of the states that from the beginning of the Kosovo crisis advocated an armed intervention, because it was convinced that, as had already been proved twice in 20th century, appeasement would not work, and memories from Bosnia were very recent (Daddow, 2009, 551-552). The UK participated in Operation Allied Force and the subsequent Kosovo Force where it was a very significant contributor of forces, it provided the first KFOR Commander, and it was leading MNB Centre, in Pristina. Additionally, it was one of the main players in humanitarian assistance, including mine clearance (Doyle, 2013, 6-8). The UK also played a pivotal role in institution-building in Kosovo and strongly supported its declaration of independence providing contributions to the International Court of Justice advisory opinion for the matter (ibid, 11-13).

Regarding NATO, the intervention in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) was mainly a US initiative which, witnessing the Europeans' political hesitation and division along with their lack of military capability to intervene, took the initiative (Clark, 2001, 114, 123, 133). Paradoxical as it may sound, it was the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, and not the Secretary of Defence, William Cohen amongst the US administration who promoted the US and NATO active involvement in Kosovo (Clark, 2001, 77-161). The US is the largest troop contributor to KFOR and was leading MNB East, now Regional Command-East (RC-E), at Camp Bondsteel near Uroševac/Ferizaj and is very popular among Kosovo Albanians due to its protagonist role to Operation Allied Force, to Kosovo's independence, and the continuous political and diplomatic support. Furthermore, the US is providing significant financial assistance (Congressional Research Service, 2021, 12-13).

It should be noted that in the case of Kosovo, NATO indeed pursued a more autonomous role. NATO's top political and military figures, Secretary General Solana and General Clark, were eager to promote the organisation's role in the region. Gen. Clark (Clark, 2001, 133-171), continuously stressed that NATO's credibility was at stake if it would not have been engaged, or have no role (Schleich, 2014).

4.3.3. Inter-institutional (inter-secretariat/inter-bureaucratic) level

Organisations tend to depend on their environment, that is other organisations of the same population, for access to scarce resources because many of their tasks and goals are not achievable without them. Biermann (2008, 158-171), argues that the need for access to external resources can motivate cooperation, although organisations fear that too much dependence on external resources threatens their autonomy. Koops (2012, 155-185) and Schleich (2014, 186-187) acknowledged the EU efforts to pursue a more autonomous role, diverting from NATO's preferences. The Berlin Plus arrangements in general provide the European Union with access to NATO resources, but, even if political blockage was non-existent, it actually applies to military operations albeit EULEX is a civilian mission, and KFOR a military operation.

The lack of a formal and institutionalised cooperation between the two organisations have forced their personnel to seek for more unofficial and practical ways to overcome the pressing issues they face at staff-to-staff, and operational at the field, levels when they work to put in practice the new framework of cooperation after the 2016 EU and NATO Joint Declaration. Notwithstanding the continuous rhetoric from both organisations for common interests and values that, in combination with the common threats and challenges, have enhanced and reinforced their strategic partnership, meetings between staffs, even at the highest level, remain unofficial. In the case of Kosovo, the EULEX and KFOR 'reinforce each other through the separate work on the rule of law and in maintaining security' (Lindstrom and Tardy, 2019, 8).

Even before EULEX was launched, during a NAC-PSC meeting on 26 November 2007, EU and NATO had an 'informal exchange of views on Kosovo' (NATO Speech, 2007, 1). In 2008, the year EULEX was deployed, there were a number of joint meetings and statements by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (EU HR for CFSP), and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO's Secretary General. On 25 February Solana, in a joint statement with Scheffer, announced that they had discussed the situation and the cooperation of the two organisations in Kosovo (NATO, 2008a). In July Solana, before the meeting of international organisations active in Kosovo, stated that while KFOR would remain responsible for the security the EU would reinforce the Rule of Law in Kosovo (Council of the EU, 2008b), and a few months later, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), at the level of Foreign Ministers on 2-3 December 2008, characterised the prompt deployment of EULEX 'an urgent priority' (NATO, 2008b, 3).

On 25 May 2010, EU HR for CFSP Ashton and NATO's Sec. Gen. Rasmussen during a bilateral NAC-PSC meeting in NATO HQ in Brussels, stressed the need to 'step-up' their cooperation in Kosovo (NATO, 2010). The crisis in Ukraine triggered a bilateral NAC-PSC meeting on 5 March 2014, and provoked a sequence of events that led to the Joint EU-NATO declaration in Warsaw on 8 July 2016, to foster their strategic partnership. In December the same year the councils of the two organisations endorsed, in parallel documents, a list of 42 measures in 7 areas to enhance, among others, their operational cooperation. In December 2017 an additional list of 32 measures were endorsed, including 3 new areas. On 10 July 2018, during the Brussels NATO Summit the EU and NATO issued a new Joint Declaration, to renew their willingness for enhanced cooperation. Additionally, there are regular progress reports on the implementation of the proposals, to EU member states and NATO Allies (to date six such progress reports have been issued).

4.3.4. Operational-tactical level

Regarding the EU-NATO relationship for Kosovo the most pressing problems lie at the operational-tactical level where, the lack of a formal and institutionalised framework between the two organisations in missions and/or operations in common areas of operation has hampered effective cooperation. Additional problems stem from the different type of presences and mandates, where EULEX is a Rule of Law mission and KFOR is a security operation. These differences affect the unity of effort and limit cooperation. However, due to coronavirus, KFOR is providing assistance for the protection of personnel of the institutions in Kosovo and to EULEX (NATO, 2021). In order to overcome these problems, EU and NATO military and civilian personnel, at operational and tactical level in the field, have started to gradually employ more unofficial ways of cooperating. According to Græger (2016; 2017), this 'practice approach' is applied to EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo, where practitioners 'formulate' what Lachmann (2010) calls 'communities of practice'.

EULEX-KFOR cooperation is based on a Joint Operational Procedure document, signed in 2013 by the EULEX Head of Mission (HoM) Bernd Borchardt and COM KFOR Maj. Gen Volker Halbauer, which provided for the exchange of full-time Liaison Officers in each HQ (EULEX, 2013). From then on, a series of informal meetings took place between HoMs and COMs KFOR. HoM Ms. Alexandra Papadopoulou, on 15 September 2016, met COM KFOR Giovanni Fungo, at the KFOR Headquarters, to discuss developments in

the region and on 17 December 2018 Ms Papadopoulou met with the incoming COM KFOR Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D' Addario were they both reaffirm the roles of their respective organisations as the second (EULEX) and the third (KFOR) security responder after Kosovo Police (EULEX, 2018). On 3 October 2019, the Acting HoM Bernd Thran, met with the departing Deputy COM KFOR Brig. Gen. Reinhard Ruckenstuhl and welcomed the new Deputy COM KFOR Brig. Gen. Laurent Michaud expressing his conviction that the excellent cooperation between the Mission and KFOR will continue.

On 28 January 2020, the Head of Operations and Missions at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Michel Soula, met with the new HoM Lars Gunnar Wigemark, and the Deputy HoM Cezary Luba. They discussed the security and rule of law situation in Kosovo and reaffirmed the well-established cooperation between EULEX and KFOR, including the three-layer security responder system (EULEX, 2020a). Two days later HoM Wigemark met with COM KFOR, Maj. Gen. Michele Risi, to discuss the security situation in Kosovo, and committed to strengthen their cooperation as Kosovo's second and third security responder respectively (EULEX, 2020b). Additionally, the EU and NATO, focusing on different aspects and remits of the aviation normalization process in the Western Balkans, after a series of bilateral discussions with Belgrade and Pristina managed to set the conditions for the imminent opening of new South-West air routes in the lower airspace over Kosovo, when the political circumstances allow.

5. Conclusions

Kosovo is a post-conflict society, therefore, peace-building and state-building must procced hand in hand for there can be no fruitful state-building without security. Hence, UNMIK, in the beginning and EULEX afterwards need, not only the presence of, but even more a good relationship and a well-established cooperation with, the security organisation, KFOR. However, regardless of how good that relationship might be at a personal level, there is very limited formal institutionalised cooperation between the two.

The converging strategic interests of the two organisations is the dominant driving force behind the newly re-institutionalised EU-NATO cooperation. Moreover, owing to the intergovernmental character of the principal political decision-making bodies of both organisations (the European Council and the North Atlantic Council), most of the obstacles in the EU-NATO relationship in general and operational cooperation in Kosovo in particular, stem from the political blockages and caveats imposed by member states at national level and consequently at institutional level.

The main argument of this article is that, in order to understand interaction between international organisations, we need to consider EU-NATO cooperation as a complex phenomenon which should be broken down into multiple levels, analysed at each level and then all the parts put together to provide a more nuanced, accurate and holistic picture. Additionally, a combination of theoretical and conceptual approaches of inter-organisational relations in world politics, at each level, can help us gain a deeper understanding of the evolution and current state of the EU–NATO relationship and facilitate hypotheses about the future trends of their interaction.

The levels-of-analysis approach is a powerful tool to examine complex inter-organisational relations due to the various actors and dynamics at all levels. As we have seen, the levels are not independent but interact with each other. All exogenous shocks that reshape the external environment of international organisations also affect their member states, and thus their strategic decisions and influences over the organisations themselves. Key officials in member states, in organisations' staff and in the field play a vital role in promoting or hampering inter-organisational relations according to their national, personal, political or professional interests. Also, communities of practice can be found at both inter-institutional as well as practical-operational levels.

It is not easy to assess which level has more significant impact relative to the others and in what conditions, however, it can be assumed that the different levels have different impacts during the inter-organisational life-cycle, that is, the whole-time framework of an inter-organisational relationship, but this is outside the scope of this article. Population ecology theory, which refers to the external environment of organisations, can assess the impact of exogenous shocks on organisations and their effort to remain relevant or risk extinction, and can thus help explain the onset and the re-institutionalisation of the relationship, while overlap theory can explain how organisations with common members, similar norms and familiar functions can interact.

As already stated, the political blockages member states and allies impose at both headquarters, highlight the great influence the national level and power politics have over the whole spectrum of inter-organisational relations in general and EU-NATO interaction in particular. The preferences of influential member states facilitate or hinder cooperation at headquarters/inter-institutional level and also at operational/tactical level in the field. Principal-agent theory can explain how powerful and influential member states' strategic interests can favour one institution over another or how member states (principal) can delegate certain tasks to international organisations (agent) in order to achieve certain goals, reduce transaction cost and enhance cooperation.

Furthermore, resource dependence theory can shed light on inter-bureaucratic/inter-secretariat cooperation due to organisations' need to access the recourses of others and explain how they can become similar in organisational, normative and functional terms. Key officials in organisations' staff, in member states and in the field can play a vital role in promoting or hampering inter-organisational relations according to their personal, political or professional interests.

Finally, the application of the 'practice' approach and concepts such as epistemic communities and communities of practice can explain how and under what conditions military and civilian personnel in common areas of operations and staff at inter-organisational level, can create avenues of practical communication and interaction to overcome the cooperation problems imposed by political blockages.

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The emergence of a comprehensive EU's strategic culture: a neofunctional approach

THE EMERGENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE EU'S STRATEGIC CULTURE: A NEOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH

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Abstract— **A much-debated question is about the EU's international role. However, this question can lead to misconceived answers since it ignores the conditions that shape the EU's appearance in the international environment. Assuming that strategic culture is one of the essential elements of an actor's stance vis-a-vis international evolutions and security concerns, this article attempts to examine whether the existing institutional arrangements at the EU level compose a fertile ground for facilitating the emergence of a comprehensive EU strategic culture. As the argument goes, such a strategic culture can reveal the future role of the EU in the international environment. Thereby, the article suggests that the relevant question shall be transposed from the outcome, meaning the EU's international presence, to its roots, meaning the strategic culture. For this purpose, the article adopts a neofunctional approach to track the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). In particular, these institutional arrangements are examined through conceptual analysis, supported by quantitative methods where appropriate, to identify critical elements for a spillover effect that could pave the way for a comprehensive strategic culture. In doing so, the article tests the central hypothesis that if supranational aspects prevail in the arrangements under consideration, then an emerging strategic culture has already been on the rail. Ultimately, it is argued that significant prerequisites exist and make the emergence of a comprehensive strategic culture -bolstered with supranational aspects- likely, although not certain.**

1. Introduction

Most scholars argue that the modern international system is changing. The US strategic orientation seems to shift from Europe and the Middle East to the so-called Indo-Pacific area (Simón et al., 2021). The AUKU[1] agreement underlines this shift. Simultaneously, many claim the very nature of the international order will change (Kupchan, 2012; Flockhart, 2016; Renshon and Suedfeld, 2021) due to the diminishing role of the USA, which leaves space for the emergence of powers questioning several international institutions and agreements established to serve norms such as open global economy or rule-bound multilateralism. However, there are arguments that ongoing changes will probably not fundamentally affect the nature of the existing international order (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann, 2020), even though the international system is becoming rather multipolar. Against this background, the role of the EU in the future international system is debated. Nevertheless, these questions seem very narrow in the

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[1] A security pact for the Indo-pacific area concluded by Australia, the UK and the US.

sense that they focus on the evolutions outside the EU whilst slightly neglecting internal parameters. Although external dynamics shall be considered, internal elements are equally important.

Strategic culture contributes to shaping an actor's internal structure. Concerning the EU, many ask whether a comprehensive strategic culture can emerge. The present article aims to answer this question by subscribing to neofunctionalism and examining current institutional arrangements to identify the potential presence of essential prerequisites adequate to trigger the core concept of neo-functionalism, meaning the spillover effect. On the occasion of a positive answer, it is argued that a *comprehensive* strategic culture has been emerging. The term *comprehensive* is intensively adopted to describe the elements that drive an actor's answers on "why" to do (or not to do) something, "what", and "how", in other words, the fundamental elements of a strategic culture.

Even if inquiries on the EU's strategic cultures may abound, neofunctionalism as the theoretical approach is somewhat limited to date contrary to state-oriented perspectives, such as intergovernmentalism. This article aspires to contribute to adopting neofunctionalism in the analysis of the broader security and defence sector at the EU's level, given the extensive use of neofunctionalism in other policy areas and the cross-sectoral nature of the security and defence policy area (Bergmann and Niemann, 2018; Faleg, 2018).

The arrangements under consideration are three: the EU's Global Strategy (EUGS), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). These arrangements compose the spearhead of the recent EU's initiatives on the sector directly related to strategic culture, namely the security and defence. Moreover, they provide insights into the "why", "what", and "how" elements of the comprehensive perspective.

The starting point of this article is the clarification of the concept of strategic culture. In parallel, space is given to the subject of the EU's strategic culture coupled with a review of recent works. These steps aim at shaping concrete theoretical foundations for analyzing the subject under consideration. Upon these foundations, critical points of the EUGS, PESCO and EDF are analyzed using conceptual analysis (Olsthoorn, 2017) coupled with quantitative findings to reveal factors that will ultimately answer whether a comprehensive EU's strategic culture has been put on the rail.

2. The EU strategic culture

The concept of strategic culture was introduced by Snyder (1977) to describe general beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of a given actor vis-à-vis security threats. Moreover, he mentioned that strategic culture is not immutable in time and space but can be amenable to technological evolution or international system changes. Similarly, Booth (1990, 121) took the concept of strategic culture as "a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force". Moreover, Booth (2005) mentioned that the strategic culture could influence but without totally determining an actor's international interaction.

As far as strategic culture grounds on perceptions and beliefs, its nature is ontologically relativist (Moon and Blackman, 2014). This nature limits to a great degree a precise definition, as scholars have noticed (Poore, 2003). Be it as it may, strategic culture can be seen as how an actor perceives security threats and the response that he considers appropriate against them in a given context. This way, perceptions can be linked to existing circumstances, thus leading to a better understanding of the strategic culture concept, according to Hadfield's (2005) assertion.

Thereby, the concept of strategic culture lies in two discrete dimensions. One refers to strategy and the other to culture. As for the first, a commonly accepted definition

pertains to undertaking actions and using means for achieving a specific goal (Miller et al. 1996; Wright et al., 1998). Concerning culture, the Cambridge Dictionary defines it as "the way of life, especially the general customs and beliefs, of a particular group of people at a particular time" (Cambridge University, 2021). Hence, strategic culture implies, more or less, *ways for achieving a set goal under specific perceptions of reality.*

In this framework, the EU's strategic culture refers to how it conceives security threats and what it aims to do vis-à-vis them. Several authors, drawing on different approaches, have considered the emergence of the EU's strategic culture. Cornish and Edwards (2001, 587) followed an institutional perspective and argued that a strategic culture facilitated by the Helsinki process was developing. However, they noticed that the long term outcomes would depend on whether the EU could enhance its capabilities.

Similarly, Meyer (2005) pointed out a significant convergence of norms on security issues within the EU. Nevertheless, he mentioned that this convergence was uncertain on issues such as undertaking missions with probable casualties or the attachment to NATO. The lack of political willingness for using "hard" capabilities in traditional military missions has been mentioned by Matlary (2006), too, arguing that the development of an EU strategic culture grounded on the concept of human security was more likely. The latter seems to be validated in Pentland's (2011) assessment of two EU operations, namely Concordia in North Macedonia and Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, insofar as conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions and operations promote human security.

Other scholars have mentioned the difficulties that the development of the EU strategic culture faces. For instance, Rynning (2011), subscribing to realism, argues that shared views on security and defence can hardly arise due to the predominant role of discrete national interests. However, from a functional point of view, he accepts the argument that socialization at elite levels, meaning national representatives at Brussels, could facilitate shaping common understandings on security matters. Norheim-Martinsen (2011) has mentioned that the integrated approach of the EU at the international level generates shared norms that can pierce limitations set by different national views.

What is important to realize is that most EU citizens support developing common security and defence policy, as illustrated in the figure below. Thereby, the rudiments of the EU strategic culture does not seem likely to collide with public opinion. In that respect, there exists a *permissive consensus,* in the jargon of Hooghe and Marks (2009), that makes the use of postfunctionalism rather improper in researching the area of security and defence, even if strong conceptual relation between identity, stressed in postfunctionalism, and culture exists in the matter of strategic culture.

Diagram 1. EU. Public opinion on common security and defence policy (Based on Kantar Public. (2021). Standard Eurobarometer 95 Spring 2021 (Wave EB95.3). Available from https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2532 [accessed 08 October 2021].

Equally important is the predominant role of specific approaches in researching the subject matter of the EU strategic culture. These approaches mainly focus on either the cultural aspects of the concept or try to analyze it through state-oriented perspectives. In that respect, they partially fail to adequately connect the twofold essence of the strategic culture's concept, meaning strategy and culture, with their context, meaning the cross-sectoral nature of the EU security and defence policy (Bergmann, 2019). In other words, they do not pay adequate attention to the "why", "what", and "how" questions that an EU comprehensive strategic culture shall answer.

In this connection, this article subscribes to neofunctionalism to answer whether the existing institutional dynamics push for a *comprehensive EU strategic culture*. The article is in line with other, yet limited, in number efforts adopting neofunctional perspectives to analyze issues relevant to the broader area of CSDP. For example, Bergmann (2019) has researched the reform of the Stability and Peace (IcSP) mechanism through the lens of neofunctionalism. Haroche (2020), drawing on neofunctionalism too, argues that the involvement of the Commission in the EDF illustrates a "paradigm shift" that allows the Commission to undertake action in areas previously perceived as absolutely intergovernmental. This shift aligns with a turn to a strategic approach concerning the defence industry, as noticed by Fiott (2015). On his part, Håkansson (2021) included exogenous spillover effects on analyzing the EDF's establishment.

Bergmann and Niemann (2018) have shown how neofunctional perspectives can enhance our understanding of the integration dynamics on issues related to the EU external action. As far as the strategic culture concept directly relates to such actions, neofunctionalism fits well. Against this background, this article traces the most recent institutional developments in the area of the CSDP, namely the EUGS, the PESCO and the EDF, through conceptual analysis (Olsthoorn, 2017) supported by quantitative findings to discuss how relevant documents situate in the overall concept of a *comprehensive strategic culture*. In addition, the article draws on risk perspectives to identify the stakeholders involved in the above arrangements, which encompass "formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 938). Once the stakeholders are identified, assessing their nature in the axis of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism is feasible. For this purpose, stakeholders are defined as "person or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by a decision or activity" (IEC, 2019, 1). Overall, the article assesses how institutional arrangements under consideration contribute to the two components of the strategic culture concept, meaning strategy and culture, aiming to answer whether this contribution indicates a probable spillover effect that pushes for a *comprehensive strategic culture* with supranational aspects.

It shall not be neglected that theories are not doctrines. Different theories and approaches can shed light on different aspects of a subject matter. In this connection, this article does not inquire about the relevant social or state developments, though they seem to be equally important to those that occurred within the formal institutional framework, insofar as a strategic culture reflects the general stance of a polity vis-à-vis security concerns.

3. The existing institutional arrangements: EUGS, PESCO and EDF

Kasperson and his colleagues (1988) described the social amplification of risk in their seminal article. They pointed out how amplified risks can lead to behavioural responses. Also, they mention that the nature of the amplification station, meaning anyone able to generate and disseminate information, plays a crucial role in determining the appropriate response against the perceived risks.

As far as a threat is an escalated risk, it can lead to profound changes in behavioural patterns, generating secondary effects. The latter triggers "demands for additional institutional responses and protective actions, or, conversely (in the case of risk attenuation), impedes needed protective actions" (ibid, 179). Besides, if the threat becomes a central issue in the political agenda, it gains significant attention. Barbé and Morillas (2019) argued that the EUGS reflects an emerging politicization in EU external activity pushing for more integrated policies.

The EUGS decisively clarifies why the EU shall become stronger since the "Union is under threat" (EEAS, 2016, 7). The word "threat" carries significant emotional implications as far as it is related to fear. As a matter of fact, a lexigram analysis reveals that the word "threat" (or its derivatives) is found 19 times in the EUGS document and the word "terror" (or its derivatives) 16 times. Terrorism, violation of the established security order, climate change, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are named among the sources of the threat. What these sources have in common is their transnational nature. Due to this nature, a single member state (MS) can hardly protect itself and its citizens. On the contrary, larger communities, meaning the EU, can better deal with complex international issues.

The EUGS provides the rudiments for common understanding on what threatens the EU, its MS and citizens, and, in doing so, it answers why the EU as a whole shall intensify its efforts to guarantee the "security of its citizens and territory" (EEAS, 2016, 14). As the argument goes, anyone being in threat will reasonably seek protection. At this point, the Union appears to "guarantee the security of its citizens and territory" (ibid, 7), sowing the seeds of an *ideational spillover* (Risse, 2005). In other words, the pursuit of guaranteed security can lead to increased support for the entity as such that provides it.

Following Kasperson's conceptual framework, the EUGS amplifies the named threats and determines the appropriate responses. A lexigram analysis in the document of the EUGS (EEAS, 2016) reveals that the words "threat" and "terror" (or their derivatives) occupy a prominent place, as they are respectively in the 78th and 219th among 1358 examined terms. Interestingly, the most prominent place is occupied by the entity that determines the response, that is to say, the European Union.

In this connection, the EU as a whole is the main stakeholder of the EUGS coupled with the EU's citizens, including any kind's elite, and MS, insofar as the EUGS is addressed to all of them. This way, supranational aspects are placed in its stakeholding. These aspects pave the way for common responses by addressing political guidance and practical instructions in the sheer defence sector through the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (Council of the European Union, 2016).

The political guidance is condensed in adopting *principled pragmatism*. The latter represents a transition to *Realpolitik*. This term does not mean "a rejection of liberal ideals themselves but the rejection of liberal utopianism" (Biscop, 2016, 1). In other words, the EUGS reflects the EU's understanding, even implicit, that hard capabilities in the form of defence capacity supported by military means are indispensable for guaranteeing its citizen's security. Hence, threat invocation generates preconditions for shared, supranational in its nature, perception of security concerns due to the external spillover concept (Bergmann and Niemann, 2018).

At a practical level, the Implementation Plan opened the door for establishing the PESCO, almost ten years after the Treaty of Lisbon had provided the relevant legislative base. Fiott and his colleagues (2017) have shed light on the historical evolution of PESCO and mentioned the differences between its initial planning and its final implementation by analyzing its content. Mauro and Santopinto (2017) offer valuable insights on the national postures over implementing the PESCO. Nováky (2018) argued that PESCO might evolve as a "game-changer" for the European defence edifice on the occasion that specific prerequisites will be fulfilled.

Be that as it may, PESCO's contribution to developing the EU strategic culture could be twofold. Since it aims to enhance the EU's capacity on defence issues, it could be said that PESCO can answer the "what" element of a comprehensive strategic culture. PESCO suggests cooperation among MS to enhance the available means to strengthen the EU's position in a challenging international environment. Thereby, it can be seen as a crucial parameter of the strategic culture concept primarily to its first component, meaning strategy, since it can provide the means for a goal. In this connection, PESCO initially raised high expectations, making scholars, as Biscop (2018), urge for giving PESCO a chance.

However, the reality reveals that the effects of the PESCO projects on enhancing the available means is limited so far. To illustrate the point, the Council mentioned in its 2020's recommendations that "more than two-thirds (30) of the projects [out of 47] remain at their ideation phase, including some which were already established in March and November 2018" (Council of the European Union, 2020, para 11). In this connection, the Council left space for clustering, merging, or even closing some projects prematurely. Thereby, the progress of the PESCO projects is cumbersome, if not problematic hitherto.

The nature of the PESCO comes to the fore and offers a meaningful reason for the slow development of most of its projects. The governance of these projects demands unanimity. However, reasonable as it sounds, different internal bureaucratic procedures, divergent views even in minor issues, different prioritization in each MS's national defence planning, and budgetary constraints at the national level can make the pursuit for unanimity cumbersome. Moreover, even if unanimous decisions can finally occur, this does not automatically lead to warm implementations since the undertaken commitments are not really binding (Biscop, 2020).

Following Schmitter's (1970) view of the elaborated spillover effect, MS looks *retrenching*, meaning that they agree to increase the common concept about the issue at stake, though without accepting supranational institutions to get directly involved in this issue. They have accepted the commitments under PESCO, but they seem reluctant to make them really binding, let alone bestow competencies to another EU body to monitor the PESCO projects' progress. These projects are not subject to any external assessment, meaning assessed by a body not governed by MS. This way, the functionality of the PESCO is being hampered. Through the lens of neofunctionalism, this retardation can create a push for *supranationalising* some aspects of the PESCO to be more functional and serve EUGS' aims, thus overwhelming MS' retrenching.

Concerning the second component of the strategic culture concept, its contribution is doubtful. On the one hand, it can be seen as a framework familiarising the MS to collaborate on defence matters within the EU. In this vein, it shapes a collaborative culture. On the other hand, it does not exclude "dormant" participants, in other words, free riders in the EU defence train due to a *culture of non-compliance* (Biscop, 2020). This seems to reveal the structural problem of PESCO projects which underlines most MS' view of not perceiving themselves as the real stakeholders of PESCO. However, if they are not the main stakeholders, should the EU be?

There is also another difficulty at the level of individuals running the projects daily, such as the points of contact (PoCs). They are, regularly, military officers subject to often repositions. This, in principle, can give rise to deficient interaction patterns, which in turn can lead to a decreased likelihood of socialization amongst them (Lindberg, 1963, as cited in Niemann et al., 2018), thus making a spillover effect unlikely. Regardless of the latter, loose bonds amongst the PoCs ultimately begets lingering projects with insufficient short to medium-term effects on enhancing the EU capabilities.

Overall, the contribution of PESCO in the strategic culture concept seems inadequate so far. But again, PESCO projects can gain financial support from the EDF. This financial "carrot" can boost PESCO effectiveness, given that the EDF can finance 100% of research programs costs and 20% of development programs, increased by 10% for

PESCO projects. This way, the EDF bridges the economic and strategic approaches to the defence industry, similar to its predecessor, the EDID[2] (Fiott, 2015).

Generally, financed projects can forge the European defence industry and, in doing so, generate positive effects in economic terms. Simultaneously, these projects are more likely to produce tangible results and, in doing so, enhance EU capabilities. To illustrate the point, a budget of 8 billion € approximately for 2021-27 is dedicated to the EDF; an average of 1.15 billion € per year when the average investment of the 26 MS of the European Defence Agency (EDA) during 2016-19 in research and development defence efforts (R&D) was 5.8 billion per year. Hence, if MS continue allocating the same amount of money in R&D during the next years, EDF can increase relevant investments by up to 20%, thus hypothetically covering 16% of the increased R&D investments (Diagram 2). Thereby, the EDF can profoundly affect the EU's strategy positively by enhancing the available, technologically innovative means.

Diagram 2. EDF contribution in R&D, Data source European Defence Agency, Available from https://eda.europa.eu/publications-and-data/defence-data [accessed 08 October 2021].

- Average R&D investments (EDA 26, 2016-19) - EDF (Average budget per year, 2021-27)

In addition, the defence industry will be favoured since the EDF calls interested parties to find projects to be financed by a given budget instead of looking for money to finance a project, as Haroche has put it (2020, 10). In this vein, the defence industry is identified amongst the stakeholders of the EDF. Moreover, Haroche's observation clarifies the "how" question of a comprehensive strategic culture.

Also, for a project to be financed by the EDF, it should be developed by a consortium composed of entities established in at least three different MS or associated countries. The consortium must have ensured that at least two MS intend to buy the project's outcome. It is evident that EDF pushes for joint procurements and, in doing so, contributes to building a culture of collaboration in defence that overcomes narrow national priorities.

What is impressive in the case of the EDF is its sheer supranational nature as the Commission runs it. This is crucial concerning how the EDF can affect the strategic culture since it promotes supranational driven responses in defence issues. Haroche (2020) and Håkansson (2021) offer insightful views on how the Commission made it get involved due to spillover effect from the economic to the strategic field and the defence sector, previously concerned as the impregnable fortress of intergovernmental structures within the EU. As Haroche (2020, 11) has mentioned, "in the first meetings of the Council Friends of the Presidency Group on the EDIDP, some member state representatives asked when Commission officials would leave the room".

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[2] European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

Thereby, officials unfamiliar or reluctant to collaborate with supranational bodies for defence matters are becoming familiar with a new reality. The Commission's leading role in the EDF reveals that it constitutes the primary stakeholder. In this vein, and given the PESCO projects' dependence on the EDF for financing, it would not be strange if the Commission demands a more active role in assessing these projects' progress shortly. Therefore, the EDF constitutes an illustration of cross-sectoral dynamics pushing for integration in previously intergovernmental domains.

Taking stock of the above, Table 1 aggregates how the institutional arrangements situate in developing the EU's comprehensive strategic culture. First, the EUGS offered fundamental strategic guidelines and clarified the ends of the EU in the international system, which led to significant contributions at the cultural level by identifying why the EU as a whole shall intensify its efforts on security and defence. Afterwards, the Implementation Plan paved the way for the PESCO, which aims at providing the appropriate means for the defined ends. However, the contribution of PESCO projects in enhancing the EU's capabilities and their implications on building a comprehensive, collaborative culture is somewhat limited so far. The EDF can treat some of the PESCO project's inadequacies by offering significant money in research and development defence projects. Besides, under the neofunctional perspective, it might open the door for more active and direct involvement of the Commission in assessing the progress of financed PESCO projects.

Table 1. EUGS, PESCO and EDF contribution in developing a comprehensive strategic culture

Institutional arrangements	Probable implication on Strategic Culture		Elements of a comprehensive approach			Effectiveness	Stakeholders' nature
	Strategy	Culture	"Why"	"What"	"How"		
EUGS	Fundamental	Significant	The EU and its citizens are threatened in ways almost impossibly dealt with by single-MS	Enhance capabilities to support *principle pragmatism*	--	Significant	Supranational
PESCO	Significant	Doubtful	--	Collaborate within PESCO to develop capabilities	--	Inadequate	Intergovernmental
EDF	Significant	Significant	--	--	By taking advantage of funding opportunities and developing projects to be financed	Significant	Supranational

4. Conclusions

This article sheds light on how the most recent institutional arrangements on security and defence, EUGS, PESCO, and EDF, situate in the concept of a *comprehensive strategic culture*, where the term comprehensive denotes something that includes all the necessary elements. In the case of the strategic culture, these elements are the "why", "what", and "how". It has been shown that the EUGS answers "why" the EU shall intensify its security and defence efforts. Moreover, it offered guidelines to the "what" element by paving the way for PESCO. The latter aims at answering this "what" element. In turn, EDF financially supports PESCO projects, which answers the "how" element.

Looking at the nexus created by the EUGS, PESCO and the EDF, it seems that EUGS and EDF have been more functional than PESCO so far. What these two arrangements have in common is that they carry supranational implications. In this vein, it seems that

sooner or later, demands for a different approach to PESCO may arise, which can make it more supranational to boost its functionality and, ultimately, its effectiveness. In this connection, supranational aspects make developing a comprehensive strategic culture more likely. As long as the EUGS and the EDF perform better in this development, it would not be strange if demands for *supranatiolising* the PESCO intensify.

All in all, a *comprehensive strategic culture* has already been put on the rail. However, it can be derailed if the PESCO projects will not strengthen their effectiveness. But again, the whole development of the EU security and defence structures is a work in progress. As people change over time, the same applies in the case of the PESCO projects. The fact is that the EU strategic culture has been born. When it comes of age, its very essence will fundamentally affect the EU's role in a challenging international system.

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Conflict prevention in the EU's foreign and security policy: youth & regionalism

CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE EU'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: YOUTH & REGIONALISM

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Abstract— Security crises repeatedly happen in two EU neighbouring regions – the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. Although the EU aims to preserve regional stability, the continuity of conflict prevention in its foreign and security policy is disrupted. Crisis management is among the priorities of the EU's Strategic Compass (2022), initiated by the HR/VP J. Borrell. Conflict prevention is currently missing, despite being part of the previous HR/VP F. Mogherini 's initiative *Youth, Peace and Security* in 2017/2018, supporting the UNSCR 2250. In this context, I address the questions – *What is the role of conflict prevention for the EU? How do the concepts of youth and regionalism relate to EU conflict prevention?*

This research discusses conflict prevention in the current EU foreign and security policy. A gap exists between theory and the actual strategy. While theory suggests efficient intervention to prevent a conflict before crisis escalation, the current EU strategy proposes intervention during the peak of a crisis. The theoretical part of the research explains the intervention during the *conflict prevention* phase. A conceptual analysis proposes *youth* and *regionalism* as approaches of efficient early intervention in conflictual regions before a crisis escalates. The empirical part of the research discusses whether and how the *EU* could use *regionalism* and *youth* for *conflict prevention* in its foreign and security policy. The research results suggest that the EU could prevent the escalation of regional conflicts in its near neighbouring regions and their extrapolation on its territory. Particularly, through a regionalist approach the EU could ensure stability in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. Furthermore, through actively engaging young people in regions of high potential for conflict, the EU could timely prevent the escalation of security crises.

KEYWORDS

- **conflict prevention**
- **youth**
- **regionalism**
- **EU foreign policy**
- **Black Sea region**
- **Western Balkans**

1. Introduction

This research identifies the importance of conflict prevention in the EU foreign and security policy. It defines the role of youth and regionalism as tools for conflict prevention. Then, it discusses their possible application by the EU. The findings suggest that the EU could improve its current foreign and security policy by prioritising youth and regionalism, aiming for conflict prevention.

This research is significant, because it shows that the EU's foreign and security policy currently focuses on crisis management, omitting the importance of early warning and conflict prevention, thus allowing undesired escalation of crises. The EU barely addresses youth and regionalism as possible tools for conflict prevention in its external regions.

Nevertheless, the potential of the EU to address youth in its neighbouring regions as a tool for conflict prevention is high and such action is urgently needed. Therefore, the research is suitable for improving the EU's foreign and security policy. The empirical novelty of the research identifies EU potential to prevent regional security crises through involving youth in conflictual regions.

2. Research problem

Security crises and regional conflicts constantly happen throughout the world, including in the European Union's neighbouring regions. In light of the ongoing war, the EU needs to establish lasting peace in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. Both regions in close proximity to the EU have high conflict potential in the post-Cold War period. Instead of crisis management when a conflict is beyond control already, the EU's foreign and security policy strategy needs to efficiently prevent latent conflicts. The EU, aiming to be a regional power, can act in two main directions: conflict prevention and tools to apply it.

The latest developments in the EU's foreign and security policy do not particularly focus on conflict prevention. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP, is part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP. The CSDP addresses security crises close to their peak through civilian and military missions. The Strategic Compass, as a politico-military response to security crises, focuses as well on crisis management and the post-conflict situation. However, the efficacy of measures to prevent conflicts prior to the escalation of a security crisis and their application within the CFSP need further exploration. While crisis management is among the priorities of the EU's Strategic Compass (2022), initiated by HR/VP J. Borrell, conflict prevention is currently missing. However, conflict prevention was one of the four aspects of the *Youth, Peace and Security* initiative of the previous HR/VP F. Mogherini in 2017/2018, supporting the UNSCR 2250 (2015). The United Nations' Security Council Resolution – UNSCR 2250 (2015) suggests that young people are among the main guarantees of stability and security in conflict-intense regions.

3. Research questions and aims

What is the role of conflict prevention for the EU? How do the concepts of youth and regionalism relate to EU conflict prevention? Addressing these questions, the research aims to show how the concept of conflict prevention is related to the latest developments of the EU's foreign and security policy. After the significance of conflict prevention for the EU is clarified, it addresses the theoretical conceptualisation of two factors: youth and geopolitical regionalism as conflict prevention instruments. Then, I assess the potential role of *youth* and *regionalism* as EU's strategic instruments to prevent the escalation of external conflicts and security crises. I suggest its application towards two EU's neighbouring regions – the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans.

4. Methodology and Methods

The methodology is abductive. The research problem is based on the case study of the EU. Then, it is discussed within the IR theory on conflict. Finally, it applies the discussed theoretical concepts, regionalism and youth, as possible conflict prevention instruments of the EU foreign and security policy.

In the theoretical part, based on the *curve of conflict theory,* I discuss the significance of the conflict prevention phase, before a crisis escalates. The literature review explores conflict types, stages, and timing. It shows the conflict prevention stage within the theoretical construction of the *cycle of conflict* (Lund, 2009). I discuss why prevention of security crises is significant to provide long-term stability of fragile regions.

Through the qualitative method of conceptual analysis, I locate concepts among theory, and construct reasoning. The method of conceptual analysis relates to definitions, classification, explanation, measurement, categorisation of concepts (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008). Through conceptual analysis, theories explain politics and policies (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008). The conceptual analysis can later be amended by empirical findings (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008). By this method, I relate the types of conflict to basic concepts – time, actors, location, root causes, phases. I identify different intervention types through structural and operational measures. Based on conceptualising conflict analysis, I select two variables – the concepts of youth and regionalism as tools of efficient conflict prevention, shown in *Fig.1*.

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework (Source: the author)

The first concept, regionalism, shows the connection between the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans as core areas of geopolitical competition, leading to conflicts and crises. These regions are placed within the wider context of theory - the Clash of Civilizations (Huntington, 1996) and the Great Chessboard (Brzezinski, 1997). Regionalism in IR theory shows geopolitics and cultural differences as a reason for conflict. In regionalist views, I examine the conflicts in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans, typical for the post-Cold War period. Based on the classical theories of geopolitical competition – the *clash of civilizations* and the *grand chessboard,* I discuss the suitability of a regionalist approach for external EU regions. The second concept, youth, draws the relation between *Youth, Peace and Security* UNSCR 2250 and conflict prevention, stepping on the Independent Progress Research (UNFPA, 2018). It shows the relation between young people, local values and the potential change of beliefs in a region, which decreases the likelihood of conflict. Youth and conflict prevention are discussed in the example of the *Youth, Peace and Security UNSCR 2250 (2015).* Based on the *Youth, Peace and Security* UNSCR 2250 (2015), I justify why the concept of youth could be externally applied by the EU as a structural conflict prevention measure.

The empirical application of regionalism and youth as conflict prevention measures in international relations is discussed. In the case study of the EU, I suggest how youth and regionalism can contribute to conflict prevention. The relation between regionalism and youth in constructing regional beliefs and dividing lines of conflict is drawn. It is outlined how the EU relates to both concepts, youth and regionalism, in its foreign and security policy. Finally, I conclude with suggestions, based on the relation between youth, regionalism, EU conflict prevention and long term stability in external EU regions.

5. Research structure

The paper is structured in the following way: literature review on the case study of the EU's foreign and security policy, theoretical literature on conflict, conceptual analysis of regionalism and youth in conflict prevention, discussion of the EU's potential for conflict prevention through youth and regionalism, conclusion. First, it outlines conflict prevention and crisis management for the EU, internally and externally in the CSDP, CFSP, Global Strategy and Strategic Compass. It addresses the importance of the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans as external for the EU regions, and youth in EU internal programmes. It identifies a lack of consistent conflict prevention theme in the EU's foreign and security policy, and a lack of strategic application of regionalism and youth. Second, in the theory of conflict, the *curve of conflict* shows how the conflict prevention phase is conceptually related to youth and regionalism. Third, it shows the relation of conflict prevention with regionalism in the *Grand Chessboard* and the *Clash of Civilizations*, and with youth in *the Youth, Peace and Security* UNSCR 2250 and its progress report. The findings are discussed, showing the EU's potential to apply youth and regionalism as conflict prevention instruments in its near neighbourhood. Finally, a conclusion summarises the research process, the results, expected impact and applicability.

6. The case study of EU conflict prevention: internal vs. external process

EU conflict prevention can be examined internally, between its member states since its establishment, or externally, where the EU is an intervening actor in external conflicts. The current research is focused on the external role of the EU as an intervening actor. Nevertheless, it recognises the achieved internal unity and lasting peace. Within this context, the research shows the possible role of youth and regionalism in EU conflict prevention. Regionalism in external for the EU regions is the subject of the current paper, which excludes internal EU regions. Youth, as a universal concept, can be transferred from internal EU policies towards the external process of conflict intervention.

6.1. Internal process: youth programmes and common EU identity

During WWI and WWII Europe was in constant conflicts and crises. The antagonism transformed through the next generations by first constructing cooperation on military resources – steel and coal, and later convincing the future Europeans that cooperation and common identity are more prosperous than conflict.

Since the core of its creation, the EU is a project aimed at preventing war in Europe, thus further enlargement towards the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe is envisaged (Gross and Juncos, 2011, 3). For the EU, conflict prevention is understood as an attempt to solve the root causes of conflict, initially through economic and political instruments (Gross and Juncos, 2011, 3), evolving to partnerships, information gathering from civil society, conflict analysis and early warning, and others (Council of the EU, 2011). Conflict prevention, being central for the EU foreign policy, is bound with development, military, economy and political components (Gross and Juncos, 2011, 1). For the EU, conflict prevention means uniting values, goals and tools for its international presence (Hill, 2001, 315). Despite the EU's attempt to prevent conflicts and sustain peace abroad, further efforts are needed in early warning, cooperation with partners, civil-military action and active local participation (Juncos and Blockmans, 2018, 131).

If different cultural and regional aspects create tensions between nations, then people belonging to the same identity might be less likely to initiate security crises. The combination of several factors contributes to constructing a common regional and

European identity. It is easier to be achieved among young people, rather than adults whose beliefs are already established. Studies show that the EU's education abroad and mobility programmes had a positive effect on: acquiring transferable skills, cultural awareness, fitting job market needs, potential for employment of highly qualified youth, and brain gain (Asderaki and Maragos, 2014). The tools through which the EU addresses youth cross-countries include: education and training programmes for internal and external mobility; youth organisations and networks; improved mobility and employability; encouragement of young entrepreneurs (Asderaki and Maragos, 2014). The results from youth participation and mobility include: linguistic skills, 'team working, problem solving, critical thinking and adaptation to a new international environment', and employability (Asderaki and Maragos, 2014). Creating a common identity within the EU is a precondition for further cooperation between the next generations of Europeans.

The EU institutions and high-level officials working with the topics of youth include: European Commissioner on Youth, Education, Culture and Innovation Mariya Gabriel, European Youth Coordinator Bilyana Sirakova, European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), European Commission's Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC). Among the successful EU initiatives for constructing a next generation of peace within the EU are short-term and long-term EU programmes for international education and youth work: Erasmus Mundus, Erasmus+, Youth in Action, and others. The result is a constructed will for lasting cooperation, mutual trust and friendship between a generation of people originating from different countries, with different cultures and beliefs.

The EU has addressed youth to successfully construct lasting internal peace. But youth is not completely developed as a conflict prevention tool towards external conflicts. The practice of constructing common understanding of the world, accomplished through youth programmes, could be redirected towards external regions. Involving youth from countries in conflict, based on the internal EU model, could contribute to lasting peace and stability in external regions.

6.2. External process: regionalism, CFSP, CSDP, Global Strategy, Strategic Compass

The current EU's foreign and security policy mainly addresses security crises in their peak, while not specifically focusing on conflict prevention. The Treaty of the European Union regulates the EU policies related to crises and conflicts abroad. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, initiated with the Maastricht Treaty 1991, marked the end of the previous security order, bounded around the idea of conflict prevention (Hill, 2001, 315; Gross and Juncos, 2011, 3; Stewart, 2006, 40). It has been reaffirmed with the Lisbon Treaty 2009 (Council of the EU, 2011). The CFSP developed a CSDP (Howorth, 2007 in Gross and Juncos, 2011, 3), parts of which evolved to Global Strategy 2016 and Strategic Compass 2022.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU is a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It allocates abroad missions of civilian and military character, for the purpose of 'peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security' (TEU, 2008, Art.42). It is implemented through cooperation and coordination between the EU Member States (European Parliament, 2021).

The EU Global Strategy from 2016, annually reviewed by the Council, Parliament and Commission, prioritises five areas – security, state and society in South and East, integrated approach towards conflicts, regional cooperation, global governance (European Parliament, 2021). In addition, in 2016 HR/VP F.Mogherini also initiated CARD, PESCO, EDAP, EDF (European Parliament, 2021). Under the next HR/VP J. Borrell, a new development of the CSDP was initiated in three steps – analysis of threats, discussion for common understanding between Member States, enabling European security and defence culture (European Parliament, 2021). The idea of the derived Strategic Compass comprises *four baskets – crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships* (Fiott, 2021). They do not particularly involve conflict prevention. The finalised Strategic

Compass has four pillars – 'Act' for crisis management, 'Secure' for intelligence and resilience, 'Invest' for developing capabilities and technology, and 'Partner' for setting common aims (EEAS, 2022, 6). Conflict prevention is indirectly concerned by 'ability to anticipate threats', which is addressed through 'intelligence capacities', 'situational awareness and strategic foresight' (EEAS, 2022, 12). It is focused on the hybrid field, externally manipulated information and attempts to interfere, as well as fields of cyber, maritime and space domains. However, specific regional dimensions, showing the characteristics of different regions, are missing. Regions are mentioned only as part of potential partnerships – multilateral or bilateral, and a tailored approach towards the Western Balkans, the East, the South, Africa, Asia, Latin America (EEAS, 2022, 13). Regionalism is mentioned over two pages only, and broadly includes Western Balkans, Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia, Arctic, Southern Neighbourhood and Libya, Syria, Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey, Africa, Sahel, Central Africa, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa, Mozambique, Middle East, Gulf Region, Indo-Pacific and China, Asia, Latin America (EEAS, 2022, 19-20), Central Asia is missing. Conflict prevention is addressed through the EU definition of crises and integrated approach – diplomatic, economic, sanctions, military (EEAS, 2022, 24). *Women, peace and security* (EEAS, 2022, 28) is mentioned, while *Youth, peace and security* is missing.

The structural division of the EU's foreign policy bodies, namely the EEAS and the European Commission, prioritise the Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership, Russia and Turkey. The institutional organisation is divided between the European External Action Service, the Council of the EU, European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi, the DG NEAR, DG INTRA/DEVCO, FPI, and the international relations divisions of the remaining European Commission´s services. However, while the EU focuses on harmonising rules of governance, some regional characteristics need attention.

6.3. Gap: EU's potential for external conflict prevention through youth and regionalism

Conflict prevention is a missed opportunity in the EU's foreign and security policy. The EU does not address external security crises and conflicts early enough. This research explains why the prevention phase is key for intervention before a crisis escalates. It addresses the concepts of regionalism and youth in the conflict prevention theory. It also shows whether and how youth and regionalism could serve the EU's external conflict prevention. As a result, the research relates the EU's potential to use the concepts of regionalism and youth for external conflict prevention in regions of close geographic proximity. Consequently, the concepts of youth and regionalism could be incorporated as conflict prevention tools in the EU's strategy for foreign and security policy.

7. Theoretical framework: conflict prevention

This research refers to *international conflicts* as situations in which more than one nation is involved on opposing conflict sides. A conflict can happen within a country, between countries, between regional clusters of countries, or between world blocs. As *conflict prevention*, this research refers to a timely intervention in a conflict situation, before violence escalates. As *a conflict*, the meaning of increased tension and violence which escalates over several phases is understood.

7.1. Prevention among conflict phases

A major study on the Cycle of Conflict (Lund, 2009) suggests that the phases in a potential violence escalation are surrounded by preceding and following periods, which could repeat. The *Curve of Conflic*[1] (Lund, 2009), in *Fig.2*, shows three basic stages of

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[1] The Curve of Conflict shows the stages of a conflict and possible intervention per stage. It is used by the US Institute of Peace.

external intervention in violent conflicts and wars – prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. To each of the phases of a conflict, a corresponding type of intervention is suggested. While prevention and peacebuilding relate to the phases of relatively low tensions, crisis management relates to the phase of escalation of violence. The more preventive diplomacy in the initial stage of the conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding after the highest intensity of the conflict are done, the less need for crisis diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping (Lund, 2009). Crisis management is a central aspect of the EU CSDP, while the low-tension phases are not the current focus. This research suggests that the EU's CSDP and CFSP could benefit if the focus is redirected to the conflict prevention phase.

Figure 2. Curve of Conflict. (Source: US Institute of Peace, adapted from M.Lund, 2012)

7.2. Concept of conflict prevention

The UN developed international intervention ideas during the Cold War (Stewart, 2006. 23). The concept of 'preventive diplomacy' was introduced by the UN Secretary General Hammerskjold in the 1960s (Lund, 2009, 288; Ackermann, 2003, 340). Conflict prevention is a derivative concept in IR, developed significantly during the 1990s (Ackermann, 2003, 339). This concept is important for regional and international organisations interested in global governance and security (Ackermann, 2003, 339). Diplomatic action prior to conflict intensification is preferable than involvement during its peak (Mial, 1992, 126; Berkovitch, 1986; 1991; 1993; in Lund, 2009, 287). Conflict prevention is considered the most important stage in settling and preserving peaceful regional relations.

7.3. Participants in conflict prevention

Conflict prevention is aimed through different countries and organisations, including the EU, UN, G-8 (Molak, 2005; G8; in Lund, 2009, 287). Beyond the UN, practitioners of conflict prevention include non-governmental organisation and development donor projects (Hampson and Malone, 2002, 5). The number of involved external actors and the effects from their intervention has been widely debated. Some authors suggest that all involved actors should contribute - 'national, regional and local governments, the UN, regional and civil society organisations, research institutions, and the private sector' (Cordell and Wolff, 2011). Others express doubts on the effect of intervention by third parties – whether it is provoking, deterring, indifferent or with multiple effects to the conflict (Kydd, 2010, 101). The European Union, as an organisation with potential for regional and global leadership, embedded between several regions with high potential

of crisis escalation, needs to better prioritise conflict prevention. For this reason, the way of analysing a conflict is further clarified.

The knowledge of conflict prevention, providing a basis for interaction by the UN or other organisations, should identify how and why conflicts are initiated, continued, and which measures could prevent happening, escalation or repetition (Hampson and Malone, 2002, 2). This is further developed by outlining some basic factors of a conflict.

7.4. Factors of a conflict

Among the factors, associated with conflict, are: historical time, location and actors, participant type, reaction type, root causes, areas of involvement.

Table 1. Factors to consider in defining a conflict. (Source: the author)

Historical time	Location and actors	Participant type	Reaction type	Reasons (root causes)	Areas of involvement
Cold War/ post-1990s/ pre-1945	Between: blocs/ countries/ regions/ groups	Involved directly / Intervening externally	War/ Peace/ Neutral	Material resources / People's beliefs	Resources / People

7.4.1. Historical time, location and actors: Post-Cold War regionalism

The intensity of geopolitical crises depends on the world order in a certain historical time. It is directly related to the most powerful geopolitical actors during the observed time period. This research refers to the development of new types of international conflicts in the Cold War period and the years afterwards. Since that time, the contemporary understanding of regionalism has been created.

'*Geostrategic balancing exercises were the hallmark of the Cold War era. Crises arose primarily between the great powers or their surrogates and were usually the culmination of strategic ventures prepared in secret and executed with stealth*' (Hampson and Malone, 2002,1).

Conflict prevention during the Cold War was related to mutual deterrence of the superpowers US and USSR, helped by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in nuclear and military terms (Stewart, 2006, 23). With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the global conflicts decreased their escalation risk (Hampson and Malone, 2002, 2). The scope changes from between world blocks, to smaller regions. Differently from conflicts between competing blocs during the Cold War, in the period after 1990 conflicts concerned smaller entities. Some claim a transformation from inter- to intra-state level, escalating tension between and within communities (Mearsheimer, 1990; Huntington, 1991 in Stewart, 2006, 27). Others see mutual existence of three conflict types - interstate, intrastate or related to formation of a state (Wallensteen, 2002). Despite some differences, a common understanding on the approaches to the post-Cold War conflicts is that they are embedded in 'regional security complexes' (Buzan 1991, 190 in Stewart, 2006, 27; Hampson and Malone, 2002, 3).

Due to the regional context, these conflicts impact the neighbouring countries. Such are the examples in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Yugoslavia (Stewart, 2006, 26), with low intensity status. These countries belong to two regions of the contemporary EU's South-Eastern neighbourhood - the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region. Conflict prevention has been tried after the Cold War by involvement of third parties in places with high risk for conflict, including the Republic of North Macedonia, Baltics, Crimea (Lund, 2009, 288). Its implementation is not always successful (Molak, 2005; G8; in Lund, 2009, 287). It has been temporarily successful for some of the cases only. Therefore, a punctual analysis on the specific reasons of a conflict is necessary.

7.4.2. Participant type, reaction type

The type of participants, respectively, is divided between directly involved in a conflict situation and externally intervening. The directly involved participants bear the consequences of the conflict in a direct form, independent of whether they are a side of a conflict against another participant or the conflict is entirely internal. The indirectly intervening participants interfere in the conflict situation through external ways. Three basic reactions are possible - to intensify the conflict situation aiming for war, to try to interrupt it aiming for peace, or to stay neutral. Cooperation results in peace, while competition results in war. Their reaction depends on their perception and interests at a certain time.

7.4.3. Reasons for conflict: material resources or people's beliefs

To prevent a conflict, the reasons for it should be identified and addressed prior to the escalation of violence (Stewart, 2006, 14). Defining the root causes requires thorough understanding and a consensus if multiple actors are present (Stewart, 2006, 28). The general reasons for conflict can be split in two categories – material resources and people's beliefs. Material resources, resulting in conflict escalation, are lack of food, water, overpopulation, insufficient resources or territorial disputes, or abundance of natural wealth – minerals, oil, diamonds (Hampson and Malone, 2002, 3). People's beliefs, as a reason for conflict escalation, are driven by: 'insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and perceptions', historical background, change in political and economic structures, or external and regional dynamics (Gardner, 2002 in Hampson and Malone, 2002, 5). Conflicts can originate from a combination of structural inequality and decreased power of some groups in economic, political or social terms (Stewart, 2002). The '*belligerent groups (…) many of which are elites acting concertedly with government forces or on behalf of the state itself (…) to foment and perpetuate violence. Their ability to manipulate populations through the instrumental use of ethnicity, religion, history, and myths in support of the goals they seek is one of the key factors that determines how a conflict will unfold, and hence what can be done to arrest it.*' (Hampson and Malone, 2002, 3). Growing violence is a main concern both on material state level, related to resources, and cultural ideological level, where nationalism and religion justify a conflict (Galtung, 1990 in Stewart, 2006, 22). In addition, among the main contemporary world challenges became terrorism, confrontation between West and Muslim, resource competition, nuclear confrontation of Iran and North Korea, arms control, internal state conflicts, wars, unstable democracies, climate change, overpopulation, poverty, inequality (Lund, 2009, 287). A conflict can be addressed correctly only if the exact reasons for it are clarified. Based on the root causes - resources or beliefs, external actors could try to prevent international conflicts by either material means or information (Kydd, 2010, 101). After identifying the basic reasons for violent conflict of either material or human nature, I further regroup these conflict drivers. Corresponding measures are needed on each level of conflict and each category of drivers.

7.4.4. Areas of involvement

The areas of involvement suggest multiple options. Some authors claim that 'effective prevention requires integrated strategy across different sectors (diplomatic, military, political, economic, social) and periods of engagement' (Hampson and Malone, 2002, 6). The peace and security research has been widened to health, along with social, economic, and developmental problems (Hampson and Malone, 2002, 8). Methods of prevention, selected by Boutros-Ghali, include 'early warning, mediation, confidence-building measures, fact-finding, preventive deployment, and peace zones' without military support (Lund, 2009, 289; Ackermann, 2003, 340). Mediation is considered an efficient tool of conflict prevention, as the mediator provides diverse information, but some characteristics remain unclear (Kydd, 2010, 101). The UN in the 1990s suggested prevention through 'institutional, socio-economic, and global (…), humanitarian aid, arms control, social welfare, military deployment, and media' (Lund, 2009, 289). Some of these methods are currently applied by the EU.

7.5. Intervention: moment and type

The intervention by external actors might differ in its type, time scope, moment of intervention and expected effect. The moment of intervention depends on the phase of conflict which is selected for action.

7.5.1. Moment of intervention: The Curve of Conflict

The conflict prevention scholar M.Lund (2009) has drawn the cycle of conflict in several stages – prior to a crisis, during a crisis, and after a crisis. Each phase corresponds to a different type of intervention, shown in detail in *Fig.3*.

Figure 3. Curve of Conflict. (Source: Lund, 2009, p.290)

Different levels of prevention are needed in the following types of conflict: latent, limited manifest, escalating violence (Lund, 2009, 291).

7.5.2. Type of intervention: structural or operational

The scope, timing and depth of the preventive action need to be specified (Ackermann, 2003. 341). As a result of them, different types of intervention exist. The type of intervention depends on several factors, including the moment for which intervention is planned. As corresponding tools, two main sets are found: structural and operational.

Table 2. Intervention in conflict/crisis – structural and operational tools. (Source: the author.)

Type of intervention	Time scope	Moment of intervention	Effect
Operational	Immediate	Escalation, Early Warning	Short-term
Structural	Planned	Prevention, Reconciliation	Long-term

Prevention is concentrated on the time of preliminary intervention, aiming to keep peace in a potentially hostile environment. The process of preventing escalation and resolving imminent crises ranges 'from long-term or structural policy, to short-term operational policy (preventive diplomacy and civilian or military crisis management)' (Stewart, 2006, 14). The type of intervention differs, based on the specific reasons for conflict, their depth, and the time of action. The prevention stages refer to three main groups: 'structural or long-term; early warning and analysis; and operational' for short term results (Stewart,

2006, 14). The tools for prevention are classified as either structural, such as 'societal conditions', institutions and governance, or direct, both types implemented through either a priori or ad-hoc reaction (Lund, 2009, 291).

Operational or direct prevention refers to imminent interaction, early warning refers to analysing the potential of escalation, structural prevention refers to advance planning. The tools to prevent (ethnic) conflicts can be operational or structural, aiming respectively short-term or long-term results (Cordell and Wolff, 2011; Ackermann, 2003, 341). The type of measures depends on the type of conflict. For the post-Cold War conflict types, structural prevention is preferred over operational (Wallensteen, 2002). Among the structural tools to address people's beliefs is educating young people in a selected value system. However, the participants in the preventive action and the areas of involvement depend on the root causes of a conflict.

Three suggested steps of efficient prevention are: 1) Structured knowledge on the situation, dependent variables and suitable framework; 2) Specific local knowledge on emerging conflicts by local stakeholders and dissemination of roles; 3) Additional basic prevention research (Lund, 2009, 307). These steps might be applied through different tools. The structured knowledge on the situation in a specific region requires a regionalist approach. The local knowledge can be best accumulated through local participants, who provide truthful information. As a source of local information for specific regions, young people might be considered. Recently, the UN developed consecutive strategies to involve children, women, and youth in the process of providing peace and security. Through youth, local information on the conflict situation in a certain time can be obtained, while potential local youth leaders are prepared to construct lasting peace.

8. Conceptualising regionalism, youth and the EU in conflict prevention

This conceptual framework shows the concepts of youth, regionalism and the EU within conflict prevention theory. *Table 3* shows schematically the concept of conflict prevention through youth and regionalism, implemented by the EU. The purpose of this conceptualisation is to address repetitive conflicts in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans.

Table 3. Youth, regionalism and the EU in conflict prevention theory. (Source: the author)

	Youth	Regionalism	EU
Factors of a conflict (theory: tool, action, phase, effect)	Structural tool; Planned action; All phases; Long-term effect	Operational/ Structural; Immediate/ Planned; Prevention/ Escalation phase; Short-term/Long-term effect	Actor: external intervention/ internal stability; cooperation
Examples	UN Youth, Peace and Security, EU Youth, Peace and Security; Erasmus+	Grand ChessBoard; Clash of civilizations	Internal structure: EEAS, Commission, Agencies.

9. Addressing local values, shaping cognitive processes

Young people, unlike adults, are still in the process of forming their beliefs and behaviour. This makes them flexible to different ideas, beliefs, norms and cultural trends. But it also puts them at risk of behaviour with negative consequences for a society. Among the risks for youth are extremism and radicalisation. A recent study shows the links between 'interethnic violence and extremism in fragile contexts' of 'young Bosniaks,

Serbs, and Croats' in one of the Western Balkans countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina (Savage and Fearon, 2021). Among the reasons for conflict are 'low cognitive complexity, characterised by categorical thinking' not recognising 'the validity of other viewpoints' as a violence predictor (Suedfeld et al., 2013 in Savage and Fearon, 2021). The study shows that a successful conflict prevention tool is intervention in conflict-intense regions through 'structured group activities' and 'facilitator-led reflections' raising the 'awareness of thoughts and feelings' (Savage and Fearon, 2021). Young people are open-minded and ready to overcome lasting over generations hostility by new cooperation – aiming for a common peaceful future. And regional knowledge is needed to efficiently address the local culture.

10. Regionalism

In the regionalist views, conflict is a result of the geopolitical competition for resources and for beliefs. Some scholars highlight that prevention should correspond to the specific country and context of the emerging conflict (Cockell, 2002, 190; Ackermann, 2003, 343). 'A country-specific approach tailored to the conditions in a particular country rather than a' unified approach is necessary (Lund, 2002a, b; Cockell, 2002 in Ackermann, 2003, 243), which might be applied to regions with similar characteristics. Among the key literature on regional divisions worldwide are the *Grand Chessboard* and the *Clash of Civilizations.*

The first aspect of competition is control over the resources. The *Grand Chessboard* for the USA means maintaining supremacy, blocking any rival superpower from emerging over Eurasia (Brzezinski, 1997). Allowing any other country to control the resources of Eurasia would devalue the monopolist position of the USA. Eurasia consists of Europe, Russia, Central Asia and East Asia, including the Balkans and the Caucasus (Brzezinski, 1997). The term rival powers, according to Brzezinski (1997), refers to Russia, Turkey, Japan, China, the UK, Germany, France or any other potential competitors in the region. The competition between potentially interested powers is concentrated in a geographic area, which possesses significant resources.

The second aspect of competition is control over the beliefs. According to Huntington (1996), conflicts happen either between major states of different civilizations, or between borderline states or even within a state consisting of different civilizations. Looking through the prism of the *Clash of Civilizations,* the West could rethink its democratic rules of the international system and the UN, considering the differences of nine competing civilizations of different world regions after the Cold War - Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Latin American, Sinic, African, Buddhist, Hindu, Japanese (Huntington, 1996). The differences between civilizations range from language, culture, religion, history and tradition (Huntington, 1996). The main reason for conflicts is based on differing beliefs, therefore the competition would be over controlling the source of beliefs. Beliefs could be formed by the educational system in schools and universities, history, religion, ideology, language, but also media and information access.

Resources, as a reason for conflict, relate to physical substance in a geopolitical location. Perceptions, as a reason for conflict, are fluid, constantly changing and reshaped in new generations, even in the same location. Change of the way of thinking can either solve or intensify a conflict. Both concepts, resources and perceptions, can be addressed in conflict prevention. Furthermore, regionalism refers to a way of thinking in a certain geographic area. Youth refers to an emerging reformulation of the way of thinking. Both approaches, regionalism and youth, address local values understandably to the local audience. Therefore, through regionalism and youth, regional conflicts can be prevented early enough.

11. EU and regionalism

Comparison between two EU neighbouring regions – the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region, composed of the Eastern Partnership countries, Russia and Turkey, is relevant. In both regions, security crises and conflicts continue for centuries. Two main conflict drivers are present – the nationalism of the local population and the geopolitical competition between regional hegemons.

EU conflict prevention can be studied in regions of strategic importance, such as the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa (Juncos and Blockmans, 2018, 131), by analysing the particular local situation. Recently, scholars compared the EU integration of the 'Balkan and Eastern European' countries (Emerson et al., 2021). The framework of Emerson et al. (2021) comprises political and legal factors, macroeconomic, trade, economic cooperation, and urge from status quo to new momentum, including policies and programmes, participation in the EU institutions, conditionality. The compared countries in the WB are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – all with Strategic Association Agreements, while in the EaP – Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine with Association Agreements (AA), and Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia – with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) (Emerson et al., 2021). The methodology of Emerson et al (2021) is based on their annual reports on implementation of agreed chapters. Their findings (Emerson et al., 2021) show similarity of the countries in implementing economic and political criteria, some advantage of the Balkans on legal criteria, little advance of the EaP AA on economic policies. Another comparison is drawn with the three latest accessed EU members – Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, located between the two regions, showing similar results with the rest of the Balkans and EaP on gender equality and education, and less advance on corruption than Georgia (Emerson et al., 2021). While the major focus falls on economy, political development, and law, little attention is brought to the social factor – education, employment, gender and civil society are briefly mentioned in the final remarks. A major priority towards both regions is the economic, political and legal integration. But the society, in particular youth, remains unseen and their potential to contribute to the development of their own countries is neglected.

12. Youth Leadership

Young people have the potential for leadership of local communities. The UN created its *Youth, Peace and Security* agenda after more than a decade lasting advocacy by NGOs, youth-led and civil society organisations, as well as 'governments and intergovernmental organisations' influenced by them (Altiok at al., 2020). The UNSCR 2250 relates to youth organisations, but also to research of rights and commitments of children and youth, including child soldiers, ethnography, reintegration, social psychology (Altiok at al., 2020). Nevertheless, the active role of youth in 'post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding' is limited by economic restrictions, seen in neoliberalism (Altiok at al., 2020), and most of their work is voluntary. Apart from youth employment and voluntary engagement in conflict prevention, action is needed towards purposeful involvement of youth to prevent international conflicts. This could be achieved through global investment in youth for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security (UNFPA, 2018) shows that Youth Peace Work: 1) *'Engages in all phases of peace and conflict – prevention, humanitarian, on-going and post-conflict'*; 2) *'Operates at every level – peer to peer, family, community, national, regional international'*; 3) *'Collaborates with diverse partners – local and national governments, community leaders, media, cultural organisations, justice, police, other peacebuilding organisations'*; 4) *'Responds to different types of violence – extremism, political conflict, organised criminal violence, sexual and gender-based violence'*; 5) *'Bridges development, human rights, humanitarian, and peace and security'* (UNFPA, 2018).

Therefore, youth-led organisations and youth NGOs could contribute significantly for resolving conflicts, maintaining peace and stability, as well as preventing further latent conflicts.

13. Evolution of the UN's Youth, Peace and Security

The Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325, 2000) relates international security to gender equality, and specifically the role of women and children for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It assumes that women can contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. It is regularly present in the foreign and security policy of the EU, UN and NATO. The newer *Youth, Peace and Security* (UNSCR 2250, 2015) refers to young people as major actors in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, whose education and economic growth is a catalyst of durable peace and a necessary condition for security worldwide. The UNSCR 2250 (2015) recognizes contemporary youth as the largest generation so far, a majority of the population in countries of armed conflict. The UNSCR 2250 (2015, 2) underlines the role of youth for peace and security, '*building and maintaining peace'*, is a key to conflict prevention and long-term stability. The role of youth is significant against violence and radicalization leading to terrorism, and addresses exclusion of '*social, economic, political, cultural and religious*' character as conflict drivers (UNSCR 2250, 2015, 2). The UNSCR 2250 (2015) recommends worldwide empowerment of youth through inclusion in decision-making, consultations and leadership at local, national, regional and international levels. The UNSCR 2250 (2015, 3-5) recommends inclusion of young people, particularly important for '*post-conflict resolution*', '*local youth peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution*', '*empowerment of youth in peacebuilding and conflict resolution*', '*violence prevention activities and support social cohesion*', '*social and economic development*', '*youth employment opportunities and vocational training*', '*quality education for peace*', to '*promote a culture of peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue*', '*to counter the violent extremism narrative*', '*preventing the marginalisation of youth*'. The subtopics within which this action is divided are: participation, protection, prevention, partnerships, disengagement and reintegration.

An *Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security: The Missing Peace* (UNFPA, 2018) assessed the necessity of further development of the UNSCR 2250 (2015). The study has proven the importance of youth in conflict prevention and sustaining peace, which has led to a second UNSCR 2419 (2018) on *Youth, Peace and Security*. The UNSCR 2419 (2018) recognizes the positive role of youth and the need for '*prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes at all stages of conflict'*, as youth is a significant actor in '*conflict prevention and resolution*'. The UNSCR 2419 (2018) insists on measures of '*protection of civilians, including youth*', but also '*free of violence*' educational institutions and equality for young women, youth employment, as well as '*constructive political engagement*'. The UNSCR 2419 (2018) reaffirms '*youth and youth-led civil society*' as significant for '*peacebuilding and sustaining peace*'.

14. The EU and Youth, Peace and Security

Despite its development through the UN, its application in NATO and the EU remains limited. The latest inclusion of *Youth, Peace and Security* in the EU foreign policy agenda was during HR/VP F.Mogherini's two initiatives – an European Consultation in 2017 and an EU Conference in 2018. The Conference involved four panels – 'Youth inclusion for conflict prevention and sustaining peace', 'Young people innovating for peace', 'Empowering young people to prevent/counter violent extremism', 'Protecting the human rights of young people' (EEAS, 2018). Its regional focus groups included Africa and the Mediterranean, omitting significant for the EU neighbouring regions – the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. The High Level Conference concluded with a

Summary Report, discontinued in the following years. This lack of consistent EU action sends mixed signals. It is not clear whether the EU plans to include youth in conflict prevention, or it only tested this opportunity.

15. Discussion: EU conflict prevention through youth and regionalism

This paper shows why the EU needs conflict prevention and how to achieve it through youth and regionalism. Conflict prevention for the EU has been significant since its creation. Youth is among the tools to transform the previous internal conflicts, constructing a common European identity of cooperation. But external insecurity increases the internal risks. Conflict prevention is important in EU external regions of close proximity, with high conflict intensity. Geopolitical security in the EU's neighbouring regions -the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region, is an EU priority leading to internal peace and security. I suggest that transmitting internal EU practices of youth conflict prevention towards external regions is possible.

The EU's foreign and security policy needs to prioritise conflict prevention, increasing the stability in conflict-intense regions. Advanced action, prior to crisis intensification, is necessary in countries and regions with high potential of conflict. The action could best correspond to the needs of a region if its characteristics are addressed. Efficient prevention can be achieved through engaging a majority of trusted people among the local population. Long-term prevention requires the engagement of potential future leaders, unbiased and open for cooperation, possibly among local youth.

16 The EU, regionalism and conflict prevention

Regionalism brings understanding of the dividing lines between different cultures, as the Clash of Civilizations explains. The Grand Chessboard shows the dividing lines between East and West over the Balkans and the Caucasus, increasing their potential of repetitive conflict. The Balkans and the Black Sea consist of a variety of nations, religions, population, languages, territories, geographic conditions, which are a precondition for the changing behaviour of differing population groups. Several regional leaders, belonging to divergent civilizational groups such as the EU, Russia, Turkey and even China and Iran, have been intensifying the differences in both regions for centuries. After the end of the Cold War, the two regions became zones of competition for influence. Attempts to group together the countries in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership as EU's partnerships concern economy, law and governance (Emerson et al., 2021), while a cultural approach would add value. The EU's efficiency in the countries of the Black Sea and the Balkans could increase by a unique approach towards each country. Otherwise, if it groups the countries under unified conditions, their immense cultural differences would barely allow progress.

A regionalist approach leads to the achievement of targeted results. Recognising the diversity of countries in the EU neighbourhood results in appropriate action towards them. The two regions intense in security crises – the Balkans and the Black Sea, are composed of diverse nations. These people partially succeed to live in peace. Misunderstandings often arise due to their differing attitudes, resulting in conflicts, undesired by either side. Awareness of the local cultural identity could bring mutual understanding. Alternatively, through the young generation new thinking models could be constructed, as their mindset is still open to various explanations of *truth* and *reality*. Reshaping attitudes towards cooperation instead of competing identities among youth is an important asset of conflict prevention.

17. The EU, youth and conflict prevention

The new initiatives of the EU, including PESCO, CARD and European Defence Fund, are directed towards security crises already in their peak. The stage before a crisis escalates, conflict prevention, is not in focus. This decreases the efficiency of long-term strategic goals. The role of young people in conflict prevention, as an efficient agent to change the structural problems of security crises abroad, is partially prioritised.

Engaging young people is a prospective conflict prevention instrument in conflict intense regions. Due to a combination of factors, listed further, young people are highly motivated and efficient in long-term conflict prevention (Kirilova-YPS Summary report, EEAS, 2018, 18). First, their open-mindedness allows erasing the past legacy of collective memory of conflict. The desire for peace can motivate youth from different sides of a conflict to cooperate. Second, the trust in young people within their own communities, including opposing sides of a conflict, makes them an efficient agent of change to reconstruct the thinking models. The trust by family and circle of acquaintances justifies the internal influence over the local population. Third, they have time - they could invest the coming years of their life in long-term peacebuilding efforts. Fourth, they need to live in peace – territorial and social, if possible in the community of their originate.

The empowerment of young people in political and governing structures in their countries or conflict sides enhances peace construction. Purposeful education of how youth from different sides of a conflict to cooperate is necessary. The international community could support the process of educating youth in cooperation rather than in competition. The EU could construct lasting cooperation between youth, and empower young people in their own societies. Young people share local information throughout different world regions, playing a similar role in the structure-agency dynamics – open-minded, vulnerable, wishing to achieve peace, ready to act and to lead. The beliefs and perceptions differ across regions, leading to conflict, and youth is an efficient agent of change.

18. Efficiency of youth and regionalism for EU conflict prevention

The results show that youth and regionalism can serve in the conflict prevention stage of EU interaction into a crisis. First, through regionalism the specific characteristics of each involved state can be addressed. Conflict prevention can address the geopolitical location, historical behaviour and values in the specific context of an actor. Addressing local perceptions, the EU could attract local audiences towards the idea of lasting cooperation instead of conflict. Regional beliefs and perceptions are constructed through generations. Local people can be reached either through already existing local beliefs in a cultural region, or through the youth in which beliefs are in process of forming. Second, youth is examined as a flexible lifetime period, during which the mentality of a whole society could be transformed. Engaging young people who possess leadership potential in conflict prevention can contribute to further peaceful relations between their countries. Through youth, a conflict can be horizontally approached by involving participants on different conflict sides. Stimulating early age cooperation can contribute to constructing regional stability.

These findings show that the concepts of youth and regionalism are significant for EU conflict prevention. While addressing youth is a long-term prevention strategy, addressing regionalism allows immediate interference. Therefore, through engaging youth from the Black Sea region and the Western Balkan countries, the EU could ensure long term stability in its neighbouring states. By incorporating in the EU foreign and security policy youth and regionalism as conflict prevention instruments, the EU can preliminarily prevent crisis escalation. Including youth and regionalism in a long-term

strategy contributes to constructing peaceful relations and stability in conflictual regions. This could be efficient by bringing together young people with leadership potential, who originate from different sides of international conflicts, educating them to cooperate for peace, and empowering the same people in their countries of origin. Guarantees for constant continuity of such action are necessary, such as mutual cooperation projects.

19. Conclusion

This research followed the listed steps. *First*, in the case study, the application of conflict prevention, regionalism and youth in the EU's foreign and security policy were discussed. It was found that the EU applies regionalism and youth on both internal and external basis. The EU's regionalist approach in external conflict prevention was questioned. Extrapolation of the EU's practice of internal youth inclusion was suggested, as an instrument of external conflict prevention. *Second,* in the literature on conflict, the concepts of regionalism and youth were related to the prevention phase. A regionalist approach was found suitable for the post-Cold War conflicts in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. A youth approach was suggested to address conflicts based on operational and structural intervention. *Third*, in the empirical part, conceptual testing of youth and regionalism as EU conflict prevention tools followed. The development of including youth in conflict prevention was examined through the UN strategic documents. It was found that both youth and regionalism relate to forming beliefs in a society. Based on the results, a discussion on the potential EU application of youth and regionalism was developed.

The main research problem is that the EU's foreign and security policy has been recently prioritising crisis management, while omitting the more significant phase of conflict prevention. This study has shown the potential for EU conflict prevention through two tools – youth and regionalism. The literature review outlined the emergence of a conflict prevention concept in the UN, the geopolitical fragmentation in regions after the Cold War, and the importance of involvement in conflict prevention (Curve of Conflict, Lund, 2009) before a regional crisis escalates. The conceptual analysis assessed addressing youth and regionalism in the conflict prevention phase.

The concept of regionalism relates the characteristics of different regions to conflict prevention. The Grand ChessBoard (Brzezinski, 1997) and the Clash of Civilizations (Huntington, 1996) shows the relation between high risk of crises due to cultural differences and conflict prevention. The EU's interest in conflict-intense neighbouring regions, the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans, is assessed in the post-Cold War period. Similarities are found in the EU's approach to these regions in economy, governance and law, while the role of youth and culture is mostly neglected.

The concept of youth in conflict prevention is developed in the context of the latest UN strategic priorities. The application of *Youth, Peace and Security* UNSCR 2250 (2015) is suggested as a contemporary tool to address international conflicts and security crises. Existing EU instruments address youth internally and construct a common identity, which contributes to preserving peace and cooperation. But the current EU foreign policy has limited application of youth in conflict prevention. It is found that youth as a concept of EU conflict prevention needs development, especially towards regions outside of the EU.

This research suggests a combined approach in EU conflict prevention - through regionalism and youth. Regionalism supposes that the dividing lines of perception between different cultures could provoke undesired conflict. Local beliefs are embedded in societies through culture, language, religion, history, identity. Paradoxically, young people in the process of learning beliefs are flexible to trust different perceptions. The research concludes that young people from different cultures, if educated in cooperation early enough, can learn to overcome the differences and to prevent the escalation of conflicts. Conflicts, based on regional differences, can be prevented by preliminary inclusion of youth from opposing sides of a conflict.

20. Research impact and applicability

The impact of these research results is to support policies and strategies of the European External Action Service. The research findings showed the importance of youth and regionalism within the theory of conflict prevention. As a result, the research proposed a potentially new role of youth and regionalism in the EU's foreign and security policy. I suggest that these findings could serve for EU conflict prevention, proposing an innovative EU approach towards the Black Sea region (Eastern Partnership, Russia, Turkey) and the Western Balkans.

These results are applicable to other regions and by other actors. In theory, youth and regionalism could be addressed as conflict prevention measures by an intervening external actor in a regional conflict. The UN can impose it globally, under the condition that the specific characteristics of a region are researched.

21. Limitations and recommendation

A limitation is that this research only examines the period 2017-2021, prior to the war in Ukraine. The conflict prevention in the main political and strategic documents of the EU during that period is examined. Two measures for structural prevention of conflicts are proposed - regionalism and youth. The research does not propose any other tools of conflict prevention, which might be suitable. Furthermore, it does not explore the complete EU administrative structure or all recent EU action.

Recommended for further research is to examine the latest EU activities related to *Youth, Peace and Security* towards the Black Sea region and the Western Balkan. The internal structure of regional divisions at the EEAS, the Commission, the Council, and the EU bodies dealing with youth policy and their latest initiatives might be compared. After identifying all existing initiatives, their continuity and consecutive action can be examined. Suggestions could be derived on how to apply already existing initiatives into policy, particularly in the foreign and security policy of the EU.

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The use of 5G technologies in support of missions and operations

THE USE OF 5G TECHNOLOGIES IN SUPPORT OF MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

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Abstract— The purpose of this research is to determine the potential use of 5G technologies in the defence sector by analysing and presenting both EU and NATO initiatives towards the implementation of these new technologies in the military. Since 5G looks like a box of new standards and technologies, the main question is if the new generation of mobile communications technologies could match the defence needs and in what manner they could contribute and add value to missions and operations. In addition, main security concerns have to be assessed and explained. Most studies that have been conducted so far have been mainly focused on the contribution of 5G to civil sectors of activity, such as industry, agriculture, transportation, energy, utilities, education, etc. This may be more profitable from an economic perspective compared with the creation of military capabilities based on the same generation of technologies, since the defence sector is a more sensitive and complex area, with its own standards and particularities the equipment must comply with. The research methods in writing the paper consist of the bibliographic research method, the descriptive method and comparative analysis method, based on the documents issued by the European Defence Agency (EDA) for the EU and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) and NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study Group on behalf of NATO. It also includes an analysis of documents issued by the European Commission and EU agencies and bodies. It is clear from the findings that both EU and NATO have shown recent clear interest and efforts in initiating studies on the new technologies and their potential contribution to the defence sector, identifying different use cases for engaging 5G during missions and operations. As studies are still open to continue and be improved, this should be considered an initial evaluation on the current information available. On top of that 5G security related aspects are both European and Euro Atlantic common interests.

KEYWORDS

- **5G technology**
- **mobile communications**
- **EU**
- **NATO**
- **missions**
- **operations**

1. Introduction

The phenomenon of automation and digitalization in recent decades can be compared with the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, which changed the world from the ground up. The COVID-19 pandemic that swept the world, further accelerating all processes, so that a significant number of activities began to move from physical to virtual, with technology playing a significant role in supporting them.

The invasion of technology in recent years has rapidly spread to almost all sectors and areas of activity, starting with industry, banking and finance, energy, transport, education and not least defence. The evolution of mobile technology generations is usually based on the improvement of the previous one. If the first four generations made the mobile

technologies advance with large steps, the leap from 4G to 5G can be considered giant. It can be said that 5G combined with the emerging disruptive technologies would be a 5th Industrial Revolution (5IR), since 5G will fuse with other new technologies leading to the so-called 'intelligent connectivity'.

It is almost impossible to imagine today's world without smartphones, without easy access to high-speed internet, accessible anywhere and anytime, or interconnected smart systems or, in general, without all those electronic equipment and devices that contribute to personal comfort and allow access to any information of interest in real time. Anyone can now get in touch with family and friends located at the other side of the world, at any time of the day or night, both by voice and video, download movies, send photos at low or even no cost by getting access to a Wi-Fi connection to the Internet.

This era is dominated by new concepts and terms such as Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), Virtual Reality (VR), Augmented Reality (AR) and others, which tends towards a quasi-total automation of industrial processes. Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly present on the market, in a diverse range and at affordable prices. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is becoming a reality and is starting to be integrated into a wide range of devices and equipment, including in the military. Virtual Reality (VR) is now within everyone's reach, from mundane children's games to the most advanced and complex military exercises. We have satellites receiving and transmitting various information in real time, from any corner of the world. Intelligent robots are in full development and have already begun to replace humans in activities considered dangerous for them or in high-precision actions, including in the medical field.

In a generic term, all these technologies, along with others such as blockchain, quantum or edge computing, cloud, etc. fall under the concept of emerging disruptive technologies. The defence sector is studying in detail the specific areas where these technologies can be implemented. The fifth generation of mobile communications known as 5G can be seen as joining all these new technologies and is considered an enabler for most of them, that is why both EU and NATO are currently intensively studying the potential of the latest generation of technologies for military applications, in support of missions and operations based on peacetime, humanitarian and conflict scenarios.

2. The concept of (emerging) disruptive technologies

According to Oxford Reference, a disruptive technology is defined as 'a specific technology that can fundamentally change not only established technologies but also the rules and business models of a given market, and often business and society overall.' Another definition of the term is given by the Collins Dictionary, which presents it as 'a new technology, such as computers and the internet, which has a rapid and major effect on technologies that existed before.' The concept originates from professor Clayton M. Christensen, who popularised it in 'The Innovator's Dilemma' book, which was published in 1997 (Christensen, 1997). He stated there can be two types of technologies: sustaining, based on an existing technology which have been improved, and disruptive, as a brand-new technology, without being tested before, and able to significantly influence the future.

There are several examples of such innovative technologies to be considered nowadays: artificial intelligence, cloud computing, mobile connectivity, 5G, mobile internet, blockchain, the internet of things, virtual/augmented reality, 3D printing, quantum and edge computing, etc. Each of them open doors to new various applications and solutions, which are going to dramatically change life, businesses, in general all the way of doing things. Artificial intelligence (AI) and blockchain are probably the most discussed disruptive technologies at present, while 5G can be considered a disruptive innovation as well both from technical and non-technical perspectives due to the different technical characteristics and attributes from previous generations (3G and 4G), and to the fact that the 5G market will exceed the services for regular user by focusing on mass connectivity of 'things' (e.g. the Internet of Things or M2M Communications).

3. The 5G technology – an enabler for the EDT

5G technology represents the latest generation of mobile communications technologies, which by its characteristics, exceed the domain of the average user, having a great potential for large-scale connectivity, providing high data transfer speeds, low latency and high energy efficiency. Younger generations who have grown up with technology 'at home' and benefited from it to the fullest, and future generations, definitely want to benefit from user-level and professional experiences once they start a career, whatever it may be. That is why the professional environment should consider the transposition and adaptation of technological innovations also within specific sectors of activity, and the defence sector should be no exception. Moreover, in the defence sector, the professional soldier must benefit in the modern battlefield from all the facilities with which he is trained in the training camps, during exercises or military actions.

In very brief, a mobile communications network is composed of the following main elements: the user equipment (UE), the radio access network (RAN) and the core network (CN). The radio access network connects the mobile users (UE) to the main core network; it consists of physical infrastructure elements, such as pillars / towers / masts, small network cells, connection devices and dedicated systems installed inside the buildings (indoor equipment). The core network, or the brain of the entire network, must support devices and applications having different traffic profiles. It manages the mobile connections such as voice transfers, data, internet, and the network functions such as network slicing and virtualization. Software applications and software-defined networking play a key role to ensure the flexibility of the 5G network for efficient use of it.

One of the 5G characteristics is that 5G Radio Access Network can connect both to 5G and 4G (LTE) Core Networks, thus defining the type of network architecture. These drive towards two kinds of 5G network architectures. The case of 5G RAN connected to 4G (LTE) CN is known as 'non-standalone architecture'. It allows mobile network operators to provide 5G services without replacing the existing network, but limited to high-speed connectivity and lower latency to those users having 5G-enabled devices. The integration of 5G with existing 4G networks is what the majority of mobile network operators offering '5G' today have done or will do as a first phase of 5G deployment, since the option minimises costs on infrastructure.

The case of 5G RAN connected to 5G CN is known as 'standalone architecture' and requires a new fully virtualized network. It is a cloud-based solution, separated from any existing 4G network, and suitable for those mobile operators who plan to deliver new enterprise services (e.g. smart cities) and vertical market solutions. This type of architecture is suitable for supporting self-driving cars, remote imagery/surgery, real-time monitoring and control, etc. It is considered that 5G can play a significant role in extending the reach of present military communications systems by combining traditional tactical systems and conventional cellular communications networks (EDA, 2021).

Communications in missions and operations are essential for command and control and also for sharing information between all participants (military, civilian, security, NGOs, media, etc.). One of the main challenges is the deployment and setup of the HQ and its elements. 5G in a standalone architecture/configuration could largely contribute to it through a quick setup. Going deeper with analyses into missions and operations, we can think about using capabilities. It is clear that military needs should be satisfied by military 5G.

4. The EU vs. NATO initiatives on 5G use for defence

Since EU and NATO are sharing the same strategic interests and confronting the same threats and challenges in the matter of defence, cooperation between those two organisations is normal and should converge towards the same goal. Moreover,

the EU and NATO are sharing the majority of member states, and work together towards convergent development of military capabilities for sorting out various crisis management situations.

The identification of potential use cases of 5G technologies for the defence sector is also a common interest of the two organisations. Studies on the use of 5G for defence are conducted on specific structures platforms.

In January 2021, the EDA CapTech INFORMATION issued a first version of a white paper titled '5G Technologies for Defence', with the aim 'to raise awareness of the importance and possibilities of the concepts and technologies covered by the 5G standard for broadband cellular networks and its potential application to Defence.' (Conan et al., 2021). It's a first initiative and common effort of the EDA CapTech Information and the industry group, trying to answer to several questions related to military communications applications that could benefit from 5G, identification of gaps that need to be solved so that 5G could meet the expectations and needs for the military, or overall how could the defence sector benefit from 5G. The study is based on a security-oriented approach, based on the fact that military applications require a higher level of security compared to the civil ones. Another standing point is that equipment needs to meet specific military standards, to include the customization and hardening. And last but not least, the equipment must be defendable against attacks, given that the specific attacks in this area are present not only in wartime, but also in peacetime and crises.

The technological progress in the field of communications is very rapid, and unlike other categories of military technology the life cycle of equipment and systems is very short.

According to the EDA report, there have been identified five areas of potential use of 5G, although further studies could lead to more.

A first use identified is pointing out the increase of soldier's experience. That means the broadband capacity introduced by the additional radio frequency spectrum used by 5G technologies could support and bring disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality and augmented reality to the battlefield. In combination with the integration of various types of networks (mobile and fixed networks, terrestrial and SATCOM networks, public and private networks), 5G could facilitate the digital services in order to have access to them at any time and location in support of military operations.

Another use identified is related to the improvement of shared governmental use. The consideration is based on the fact that generally operations require cooperation and permanent communication between military and civilian. Moreover, with the 5G network slicing feature, the military and civilian authorities could make use of the system by sharing the same physical infrastructure, configured separately based on each specific requirement.

The area of deployed facilities is a third use identified. It is known that missions and operations involve the engagement and presence of multiple nations on the ground. Large deployed HQ elements require quite a long time to install and turn on all systems, while a standalone deployable 5G system designed for military use could solve the issue. In addition, a communication system based on mobile/transportable user equipment, new 5G base stations and relying nodes using millimetric waves and beamforming could be used, to reduce the probability of jamming or signal interception of communications. Moreover, the other main characteristics of 5G such as low latency and high data rates could make possible the use of robots, autonomous vehicles or remote surgery.

A fourth use case identified by the EDA CapTech is the area of support. It refers to the fact that the requirements of stationary support posts are the same as the ones of a deployable HQ scenario. While mobile connectivity of all personnel and assets engaged in a mission or operation is crucial, it is limited by the area of coverage provided by the traditional cellular networks; this could be extended by making use of 5G systems and their specific features.

The battle zone represents the area where actions are conducted, requiring the highest level of mobility, agility and connectivity. It consists of a lot of personnel and equipment that need to be connected – sensors, actuators, effectors, and also easy to respond to any quick change of the operational situation. The use of 5G low latency characteristics and higher speed rates could ensure a real time exchange and provision of mission-critical information within the battle zone.

These are only few of the potential uses identified at the EDA CapTech level, however there could be more, since 5G technologies are complex and are different from the previous generations of mobile communications, focusing on connectivity of IoTs, and EDTs rather than personal use.

While EDA is working on the identification of 5G uses for defence purposes through the EDA CapTech INFORMATION Communication Information Systems and Networks, NATO pursues these studies through a multinational programme under the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) direct coordination (MN5G). The programme was initiated by the Latvian Ministry of Defence at the end of 2020, aiming to bring NATO Allies and Partners around the table to discuss, share information and combine efforts to make use of the potential of new 5G technologies for the military by avoiding duplications.

In the implementation of 5G for defence, several gaps have been identified and need to be solved through further specific research and development activities and solutions, so that the military could fully benefit from the 5G technologies. The technology gaps are presented in the table below.

No	5G technology gap	Details
1.	Cloud support	5G cloud support permits a fast configuration of the military applications, and multi-cloud infrastructure should exploit and improve the 5G support to ensure the required mobility and nomadicity. That means there should be implemented customised networks having a higher level of security and resiliency for the mission-critical applications.
2.	Security	There must be provided a balance between active and passive measures related to the systems' security, according to the involved risks.
3.	Centralisation	There should be considered a decentralised use of 5G networks in the battlefield, with deployable and mobile tactical cells. That means 5G military deployment and services that are provided to the users can be seen as a combination of independent subsystems or cells.
4.	Resilience	The Core Network architecture should have a high level of resilience due to mobile characteristic of military networks supporting a mission. In order to avoid any potential single point of failure, there should be provided network and services redundancy, and distributed deployment, as parts of resilience. The network control and mobile network traffic should be locally kept, while transmitting to the backhaul only secured data.
5.	Network integration and interoperability	The technological gap is related to the key functions of the CN that need to be incorporated into the tactical network routing solution, and the need of integrating the legacy communications that are not based on IP, connection to proprietary IoT solutions and interworking with the public networks.
6.	Identity management	While the 5G standard relies on centralised identity and access management, the military use of nomadic services requires decentralised access control and identity management. The identity information must be stored locally and be available to remote segments. In that sense, an independent identity domain and management is required.

7.	Massive MIMO	mMIMO systems need accurate real-time estimation of the radio propagation channel. This requirement could be a difficult task in high speed scenarios. Civilian requirements consider user equipment speeds of up to 500 km/h, which means that higher values, which may be specific to military use cases, may require improvements. In addition, the integration of UAVs, high altitude platforms and LEO satellites in the 5G radio access network impose a deeper knowledge and understanding of the propagation conditions of radio waves.
8.	mmWaves	mmWave communications in combination with mMIMO/beamforming represent ideal means of establishing communication 'bubbles' within military units deployed on the ground. A main challenge could refer to such situations when connectivity among multiple 'bubbles' that are changing locations continuously needs to be ensured and preserved, while providing full coverage and connectivity in all directions around the base station.
9.	Doppler effect	The Doppler effect is the effect of apparent variation in the frequency of a signal due to relative motion between source and receiver. This challenge could be valid for airplanes, UAVs, helicopters or hypersonic objects that are equipped with 5G communications systems, especially those that are using the mmWaves.
10.	Integrated access and backhaul (IAB)	It refers to aspects like effects of (self) interference when both access and backhaul use the same frequencies (in-band deployment) or the need for beyond line-of-sight (BLoS) communication (lower RF, higher antennas and SatCom). Further studies are required for evaluating the system performance in dynamic scenarios in which network topology changes - e.g., mobile new base stations for military use, appearance of obstacles between the nodes, seasonal changes (foliage) or local congestions due to traffic load variations.
11.	Device to Device communications in the battlefield	It is about using the D2D functionality in order to enable nearby mobile devices to establish direct communications bypassing the network infrastructure/base station. The challenges come from the fact that there are not so many available chipsets providing D2D, and the chipset vendors might not be too interested in implementing the feature for the military use cases due to a limited economic scale. However, V2X (vehicle-to-everything) might become the application domain which could determine some interest to make the D2D feature available in the future.
12.	Integration of satellite technology	Considering satellite communications as integral part of 5G ecosystems, facilitating on one side 5G non-terrestrial networks and connectivity in rural and isolated locations and on the other side a strong backup infrastructure, the challenges related to mobile sectoral or massive MIMO antennas might be required on terrestrial nodes with transceivers covering the complete half-sphere around them (i.e. also upward direction). On the other side, it is very possible that the military sector wants to use aerial base stations providing large mobility, which require establishment of appropriate receiver algorithms to face with Doppler spread.

Source: Conan et al, 2021

In February 2021, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study Group 254 presented a final report on 5th Generation International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) for NATO Operations. The purpose of the study was 'to gather industry perspectives on the potential opportunities presented by fifth generation mobile telecommunications (5G) technologies for NATO.' (NATO, 2021) It is a very detailed report describing the 5G technology capabilities, interoperability, system evolution and how NATO might introduce 5G technologies into the NATO communications-information infrastructure. It also takes into consideration the challenges associated with 5G and identifies gaps that need to be addressed through additional science and technology efforts.

The 5G use cases identified by the study group are summarised in the table below.

Use cases identified by NIAG

No	Domain & Use	Purpose/details
1.	Providing Secure and Enhanced Mobile Communication for Enterprise Users	Looks at how NATO staff would communicate in a secure manner whilst in the HQ and transiting from their place of work, whilst mobile to an off-site location.
2.	Military Force Sustainment and Logistics – Connected (And Co-Operative) Autonomous Vehicles (CAV)	Supports the development of connected and cooperative autonomous vehicles for delivering of materials to operational and tactical locations in peacetime, humanitarian aid and conflict scenarios
3.	Military Force Sustainment and Logistics – Integrated Logistics & Fleet Management	Looks at how Smart Warehouses, Smart Containers and Fleet Management enabling technologies could be integrated into a single platform solution by using 4G and 5G.
4.	AR/VR Training	Uses the potential of 5G connectivity in support of VR/AR training of personnel, as a cost-effective method of virtually training teams of military personnel participating remotely from different physical locations.
5.	Medical – Teleconsultation/ Tele Mentoring	Supports the development of connected and cooperative medical devices and how these might be used to support NATO healthcare infrastructures deployed in operations.
6.	Deployable Communication Information Systems (DCIS)	Looks at how 4G/5G technologies can be used for Deployable Communications Information System (DCIS), in order to allow communications between deployed C2 entities, NATO and national networks, based on peacetime, humanitarian (e.g., peace keeping) and conflict scenarios.
7.	Beyond Line-Of-Sight Autonomous Vehicle Control	Looks at the means by which a commander can collect intelligence on a specific area of operations before deploying into that, considering an automotive ecosystem augmented by UAVs and Swarms could enable a real-time picture of a specific urban neighbourhood during peacetime, humanitarian or conflict scenarios.
8.	Intelligence – Contribute to a Continuous And Coordinated Understanding of the Operating Environment- Intelligent Offload/ Onload and Processing Of Intelligence Data	Looks at how the 5G New Radio (NR) features (e.g. base stations) could extend the capabilities of the platforms to optimal offloading/onloading and processing of intelligence data when conducting their respective operations. The use case analysis looks specifically at situations in which the vehicle could be an airborne, ground base or littoral craft that could opportunistically use 5G civilian and private 5G networks in peacetime, humanitarian aid and conflict scenarios.
9.	Friendly Force Tracking	The use of 5G to support FFT by sharing FFT tracks between different nations or domains that are equipped with 5G infrastructures, get FFT tracks from organisations (e.g. NGOs) that are not equipped with tactical radios but can have access to 5G hardware, and send FFT tracks even if the use of GPS is unavailable or denied.
10.	Civil Military Interaction - Provide Civil Military Interaction	Looks at how 5G could provide an added-value to the ability of the military in collaboratively working with civilian public safety, international and NGO during operations, by using 5G civilian and private 5G networks in peacetime, humanitarian aid and conflict scenarios.
11.	Tactical Bubble for Naval Operations	Looks at the technologies, specifications and regulations that are used to support the development of relayed or meshed 5G network and how these might be used to support NATO naval operations.

Source: NATO, 2021

5. Security considerations on 5G networks

The network architecture of previous generations of mobile communications technologies have not presented significant issues of concern from a security perspective, therefore the question "why things look different in the case of 5G?" might be justified.

The security of 5G networks has multiple dimensions. Three main types of risk that make 5G security complex might be considered. A first type of risk is represented by the larger attack surface and attack opportunities. Considering the new architecture of 5G networks (mainly the stand-alone networks) is different from the previous ones, new risks would target a larger physical surface, especially on the RAN (Radio Access Networks), as shown in the figure below.

Threats in the 5G networks

Source: Ahmad et al., 2017

This happens due to the large number of (poorly secured) IoT devices connected to the 5G network, new endpoints, frequent software patching, therefore more opportunities for the hackers and various ways to penetrate the networks. The less secure IoT devices, especially the cheapest ones, could introduce weak points into home networks, thus making possible ransomware attacks, sabotage, theft of data, etc. Or they could be introduced in botnets and distribute malware across the networks, launch DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks to shut down websites, or get fraudulent data and information (credit cards, passwords, etc.) by tricking people through phishing attacks. The widespread use of network configuration software will be able to open up opportunities to attack networks and take control of them by malicious state or non-state actors.

Another sensitive aspect is related to the 5G antenna. In the high frequency spectrum, the propagation of microwaves is on short distances, allowing a higher data capacity. That means that compared to 4G, in the same geographic area there will be a larger number of 5G antennae. Through radio jamming, the mobile user access to network services in a specific area could be easily blocked. Spoofing and sniffing are other potential threats that should worry us.

In March 2020, the US Administration issued the "National Strategy to Secure 5G of the United States of America", as President Trump's vision for America "to lead the

development, deployment, and management of secure and reliable 5G communications infrastructure worldwide" together with US allied and partner nations. According to the strategy, "5G infrastructure will be an attractive target for criminals and foreign adversaries due to the large volume of data it transmits and processes as well as the support that 5G will provide to critical infrastructure." (US Department of Commerce, 2020).

The analysis of the US strategy reveals two major types of threats to 5G infrastructure:

1. theft of data transited through 5G networks, for the purpose of obtaining financial gains, gathering information and monitoring;

2. the interruption of public and private services based on or causing malfunctions in communications infrastructures.

Therefore, 5G infrastructures will need to ensure an adequate level of information security and address the risks to critical infrastructure, public safety and health, and economic and national security.

The concerns with respect to 5G security are not related to the White House only. The European Commission pays utmost attention to the security aspects of the future 5G networks, recognizing this new generation of technologies will play a key role to the development of the Digital Single Market within the EU.

As a result of the preliminary study on 5G security, in November 2019 the European Union Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) published a first edition of the "ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks" Report, as an overview of the security challenges in 5G networks. This was reviewed by ENISA, NIS Cooperation Group and European Commission, and updated in December 2020. The document presents an overview on 5G threats as a result of the comprehensive studies based on public information available, coming from the 5G standardisation groups (3GPP, ETSI, etc.) and 5G stakeholders (mobile network operators, vendors, national and international bodies, institutes, etc.). According to the Commission Recommendation on Cybersecurity of 5G networks, "the dependence of many critical services on 5G networks would make the consequences of systemic and widespread disruption particularly serious. As a result, ensuring the cybersecurity of 5G networks is an issue of strategic importance for the Union, at a time when cyber-attacks are on the rise and more sophisticated than ever." (European Commission, 2019, 1).

The supply chain and its complexity are a second type of risk. On one hand, it refers to the location of subcontractors - they may be located in several countries, so that the identification of the country of origin of a component is quite difficult (if not impossible) to achieve. In addition, the number of entry points in the 5G supply chain could allow malicious threat actors to access the supply chain directly, or by compromising vendors. For example, the EU coordinated risk assessment report on cybersecurity states that "While a threat actor's direct access to or influence on the telecom supply chain may significantly facilitate its exploitation for malicious actions and make the impact of such actions significantly more severe, it should also be noted that actors with a high level of intent and capabilities, such as State actor, would seek to exploit vulnerabilities at any stage of the product life cycle provided by any supplier." (European Commission, 2019,.22).

On the second hand, the supply chain refers to the component quality control – at the beginning of a component's lifecycle, the quality control is low, while the impact of possible sabotage actions in the supply chain is high. In order to mitigate the risk, it is crucial the primary vendor and its companies have an effective quality control process able to identify any vulnerability on security (mainly in software products). The trustful on employees and common security measures to protect any illegal access to the vendor's production activity are also essential.

The software used in 5G networks contains millions of lines of code written in different locations, many errors in turn generating vulnerabilities. The EU coordinated risk assessment report concluded that unidentified vulnerabilities are "a leading cause of

potentially undetected, long-lasting intrusions into networks." (European Commission, 2019, 25). Regular software updates or patches are good occasions for insertion of backdoors or new vulnerabilities in the source code, since 5G networks will heavily rely on it.

Even though most of the nations banned Huawei as a 5G vendor, this will not prevent the Chinese companies from influencing the future supply chains. For example, Cisco, Nokia and Ericsson have factories in China; in addition, Nokia and Ericsson operate their Chinese subsidiaries mainly through joint ventures with local firms, although Nokia has moved part of its production out of China due to a possible ban, but also to demonstrate alignment with the security measures, especially the US ones.   The third type of risk refers to a limited diversity of 5G vendors. Nowadays, the 5G vendors worldwide able to provide 5G networks are not too many. The "traditional" providers of RAN equipment are Nokia and Ericsson in Europe and Huawei and ZTE in China, so the choices are not too diverse; this is another challenge for 5G due to the risk of systemic failures or hostile exploitation of the networks. On the other hand, apart from a limited vendor competition, banning the Chinese companies and reliance on just one or two vendors (e.g. Nokia and Ericsson, in case the Chinese vendors are banned) would reduce competition and open new risks in case of problems. It is the same situation with the Chinese operators relying exclusively on Huawei and ZTE in case of banning the European manufacturers in return for international sanctions.

The controversial technological war between the US and China on 5G has also repercussions at European level, its dimensions being both political and economic. Politically, it is worth mentioning the signing, on August 13, 2018, by US President Donald Trump of the National Defense Authorization Act by which one of the provisions on telecommunications equipment and services refers to the ban on the US government and their contractors to use equipment and technology produced by Huawei and ZTE or its subsidiaries or affiliates (United States Congress, 2018). The intention to exclude the two major Chinese telecommunications equipment and services companies was extended by the US and its allies worldwide aiming to remove Huawei from any critical infrastructure tender, based on the argument that this company presents high security risks.

6. Conclusions

From the studies and documents analysed and presented at EU and NATO level, it appears that 5G technologies have a great potential of use in the military domain, bringing a considerable contribution to support missions and operations, whether they are under EU or NATO command (technologies do not consider the organisations they serve). At the same time, both organisations are showing real concern and are allocating resources to understanding new 5G technologies and identifying the possibilities for implementation and use in the military domain, to improve the defence capabilities.

On the other hand, the documents studied show a close link between emerging disruptive technologies and 5G technology, which can also be classified as a disruptive technology.

Given that most EU member states are also NATO member states (21 EU member states out of 27 are also members of NATO), and that European security and defence basically rely on the contribution of the armed forces of the member states and their military capabilities, a closer collaboration and synergy between the efforts of the EU and NATO, as organisations, is required in order to adopt joint measures to support the implementation of 5G technologies in the military field, to be prepared to engage their use in missions and operations.

It has to be admitted that 2020 and even 2021 were very challenging years, with unforeseen changes and with the most serious unexpected effects on health, economic and social sectors due to COVID 19 pandemics. Thus, overcoming those kinds of challenges became the priority of the Member States. On top of that, Brexit has somehow affected the EU's

defence, although the UK remains committed to NATO, and regarding Europe's defence the role of main guarantor of security still remains with NATO.

A major issue in 5G technology relates to network security. Analysing the US and EU statements, it can be noticed that potential vulnerabilities of the new 5G networks are common worries. 5G networks can offer great flexibility through multiple configuration possibilities, satisfying both civil and military requirements. At the same time, the network configuration may be accompanied by errors, opening the door to new vulnerabilities.

Considering the threat landscape and large variety of potential risks of 5G networks, it seems the goal of getting full security of 5G networks is unreachable, however continuous assessments and measures for 5G mitigation of risks will have to be carried on.

Substantial funding must be allocated to the research and development sector in the field of emerging disruptive technologies (including 5G technologies), especially as great powers such as China and Russia have taken a considerable lead in this field, and there is every reason to believe that in a few decades they will be able to takeover control on the key emerging technologies.

The development of 5G networks for use in operations and missions should be a joint effort at both NATO and EU level by jointly establishing and harmonising the minimum operational requirements to be met by 5G networks, services and applications and achieving the required level of technical and procedural interoperability.

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Context matters. An assessment on the impact of hybrid threats on the CSDP framework for small states and societies in 2009-2021

CONTEXT MATTERS. AN ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPACT OF HYBRID THREATS ON THE CSDP FRAMEWORK FOR SMALL STATES AND SOCIETIES IN 2009-2021

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Abstract— **This paper focuses on an assessment of how hybrid threats have impacted the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Framework, mainly in small states and societies, for the period of 2009-2021. The selected timeline explores the changes on the CSDP implemented following the Treaty of Lisbon. At the same time, it provides insights on how this specifically affects small states and societies: for the first time, literature critically assesses the impact hybrid threats may have had on CSDP. While 'smallness' is an essentially contested concept, the paper argues that states and societies as such have vulnerabilities and security gaps that the CSDP may fail to address, often due to resource-based limitations of small states themselves and an over-reliance on the EU apparatus. Consequently, leaving these gaps unaddressed, small states as political actors within the EU may reproduce insecurity. As a result, such gaps may jeopardise the rest of the EU bloc. Understanding these gaps and assessing CSDP in a critical and constructive manner becomes, therefore, a necessary objective to pursue.**

KEYWORDS

- CSDP
- European Union
- Hybrid Threats
- Small States

1. Context Matters: An Introduction

Following revisions on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009 brought clearer objectives to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Framework over enhanced cooperation and mutual assistance among member-states on crises such as terrorist attacks and natural or human-made disasters. Such cooperation or assistance from one member-state to the other also implies the use of joint military action, where allowed, and where objections and other concerns are already raised by member-states in Article 31 of the consolidated Treaty of the European Union. Therefore, CSDP is, effectively, an integral part of the European security architecture (Hofmann, 2011, 102).

In terms of military and defensive prospects, the CSDP, following its predecessor (ESDP), also allows for an integrated approach over defence and security. This equally allows the formation of a Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (also known as PESCO) for those member-states "whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another", as mentioned in Articles 42(6) 43(1),

and Article 46, Protocol 10 of the amended Treaty on European Union (European Council – Council of the European Union, 2020; European Union External Action Service: n.d.; European Parliament, 2021; Petrikkos, 2021b, 142-143).

Nonetheless, where conditions within PESCO dictate that member-states must fulfil such military criteria in order to achieve armed force integration, PESCO and the CSDP do not adequately address nor conceptualise hybrid threats. Not only that, but CSDP itself has not provided a comprehensive framework over hybrid attacks and warfare. Although hybrid threats are taken into consideration more recently within the CSDP framework (Biscop et al, 2015), they are often looked at from a more traditional standpoint, with added emphasis on the military dimension, and with discussion often limited to event-like strata or reports instead of deeper, more critical analysis on the level of comprehensive policies or scientific articles, with little to no exception. This contradicts the very fabric of CSDP, which undeniably includes civilian missions as well. The Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats in the 2016 Communication (Giumelli et al., 2018, 145) led both the Council and Parliament in 2017 to also launch a Common Proposal on Countering Hybrid Threats (Rehlr, 2021, 56), yet more serious attention to such threats at EU level has only recently started gaining momentum. Certainly, the missions and the framework of CSDP can be customised, in an attempt to account for new crises and security issues, yielding greater positive results with added flexibility capabilities for the EU to combat new forms of threats, a principle which has been enforced since the CSDP's predecessor (Rehrl, 2021; Toro, 2005). However, the actual operational capacity in handling security issues directly is limited from member-state to member-state. For instance, it is noteworthy that Denmark has actually opted out from the CSDP, showing no interest in collective security either (Urbelis, 2015, 62).

At the same time, the CSDP as a tool largely accounts for the EU more widely, or for a more generic state-model that is capable of defending itself militarily, thus often overlooking individual members' concerns or opt-outs as such, leading to a generalised approach over matters of security and defence. The problem with this generalisation is that it does not account for context. In the case of small states and societies, especially those within the EU, the security and defence structures vary considerably. Despite a rather meticulous level of analysis and increased awareness in policymaking circles, efforts in addressing the topic on hybrid threats in the EU as part of a comprehensive policy have been largely inadequate. This is perhaps linked to the fact that the CSDP framework has not been revised to reflect the growing presence of hybrid threats at EU level, let alone what happens in small states within the bloc. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to note that context matters.

Furthermore, hybrid threats are more difficult to identify, quantify, or separate and distinguish, particularly because they are often "mixed with other security issues" and essentially "stop being separate phenomena and are thought of as one single entity" (Petrikkos, 2021a, 203). While hybrid threats remain by definition an essentially contested concept, they are often widely discussed across EU policymaking and security-related circles. The challenge, nonetheless, is to understand and assess the effectiveness of CSDP addressing hybrid threats in small states and societies. Most importantly, unaddressed threats as such and gaps in the overarching security and defence architecture of the bloc might even be a by-product of CSDP simply not being a comprehensive framework for small states in the EU (Adamides and Petrikkos, 2023).

This paper critically assesses the CSDP Framework vis-à-vis hybrid threats in small states and societies for the period of 2009-2021. The overarching argument presented here is that while the EU has developed a variety of capabilities that address the highly contested topic of hybrid threats, it does little to address the agency of individual small member-states, with different priorities and different concerns over hybrid threats. In order to be an effective security provider, the EU could benefit by addressing issues of agency across small member-states, the latter often seen as more vulnerable and easier targets by adversaries that can be exploited, thus jeopardising bloc security in kind. The paper, then, first incorporates a conceptual framework that utilises ontological security as a model theory for understanding the behaviour of small states vis-à-vis security-seeking. The

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paper also employs a critical methodology derived from discourse analysis, participant-observation, and archival methods, in formulating and compiling relevant data. Thereafter, it addresses the dangers of generalising when it comes to CSDP practices in small states and societies with underdeveloped security and defence infrastructure. In its fourth section, the paper looks at examples of hybrid threats manifesting in small states and societies in the EU. In the fifth and final section, the challenges in addressing such threats via a CSDP lens are highlighted. The final section includes a conclusion, with some reflections on what we can learn from these challenges and limitations, in a bid to introduce a renewed discussion on hybrid threats in the European Union.

2. Conceptualising Smallness and Hybrid Threats for Security-Seeking

The enlargement of the European Union post-2004 welcomed additional member-states, who had successfully acceded into the bloc, following years of negotiations. Characteristically, the following member-states who joined in 2004 are often described as small in different literature: Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, and Slovakia (Pedi, 2021; Haugevik and Rieker, 2017; Thorhallsson, 2006; Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2003). Prior to this enlargement, other member-states that have been previously described as 'small' included Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland, Belgium, and Denmark, bringing the total number of small EU member-states following enlargement to 12. While the majority of EU member-states are not small, small states and societies make up the majority of states in the international community (Berg and Vits, 2020, 390). The Union itself does not have an official definition or mechanism in how it classifies its member-states with regards to smallness. Nonetheless, this also means that across the EU and at an individual member-state level, which includes larger states, political entities view small states as equal partners across the policymaking spectrum. This means small states have a role to play, and such a role encompasses a serious approach to security and defence too.

What attributes do such states have in common that make them small in the eyes of the authors in literature and across policymaking instruments? What role does 'smallness' play in their EU ascension? Do small states join for specific reasons? What differences are there in terms of security and defence? These initial questions bring forth some initial conceptual issues that deal with smallness specifically. 'Smallness' is an essentially contested concept, suffering from definitional debates (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020). While it is not the intention of this paper to engage directly in the debate, a balanced paradigm must be presented in conceptualising smallness, given how this study largely assesses CSDP practices in small EU member-states. For that, it is important to consider both quantifiable variables as well as qualitative, and finally relational criteria equally.

In the first case, population and surface sizes, both GNP and GDP, and military capability. In the second case, we pay closer attention to their general characteristics, how vulnerable they are in terms of external influences, how they are perceived by others, and how insular they are. In the third case, small states and societies may exhibit particular characteristics that constitute them as both powerful and weak, depending on the relations and context we are looking at (Kurecic et al., 2017, 129, 134). Where small states lack in conventional, quantifiable characteristics such as military strength and arsenal, they might make up for it by exhibiting soft power and influencing the international community through their participation in international organisations and institutions, including the EU, thereby exercising strong agency, as in the case of small states like Belgium (Steele, 2008, 14). It is reaffirmed that context, therefore, matters again. Moreover, small states have an obligation to protect the self-image they form and present in the international community, given their limited resources. This makes them prone to threats, particularly when their image and their own constructed identity are under threat. This means that the selected narrative they routinely use to justify their daily functions in the international realm of politics is also put into jeopardy, feeding into their own insecurity (Steele, 2008, 2-3, 12-13).

One of the chief objectives as highlighted in the CSDP is to engage in security and defence practices that shape resilient and capable societies via enhanced security capabilities. Therefore, corresponding frameworks Ontological security actively engages with the concept of resilience by examining routine processes and the daily pursuit of security at state and societal levels. As a theoretical tool, it is useful in conceptualising and understanding the role of the 'small IR state' within the international political realm. The process itself might refer to a simple "sense of continuity and order" (Giddens, 1991, 37) that helps provide reassurance and working mechanisms that may help a state become more adaptive and flexible in times of crisis. Therefore, becoming resilient and adaptive against security vulnerabilities that potential adversaries might be willing to exploit in order to cause harm and to disturb routinised processes the state and society might depend upon alike is something that ontological security theorists have engaged with in explaining why states may often choose to pursue 'softer' or 'non-traditional' options for security-seeking (Croft, 2012; Subotić, 2016; Gustaffson and Krickel-Choi, 2020). Being able to understand what a state's priorities are in combating security threats means a deep understanding of one's ontological status (Mälksoo, 2018). Applying this to the issue of 'smallness' is a demonstration of how small states may actively pursue security-seeking by focusing on their image and identity: crafting and exporting their self-image to their peers, for instance within the EU bloc, allows small states to portray themselves as reliable and trusted partners that abide by EU values and prioritise security and defence alike (Hom and Steele, 2020, 328; Vaicekauskaitė, 2017, 9).

In the face of hybrid threats, however, these threats can exploit smallness by attaching on small states' insecurities (Petrikkos, 2021a). Nonetheless, 'Hybrid threats' as a concept also suffers from definitional debates. Perhaps a key takeaway point, however, is to understand that small states view hybrid threats as a collection of both conventional and unconventional forms of security issues that disturb continuity in both states and societies. Simply put, hybrid threats are employed by political actors in a bid to catalyse existing issues by exploiting pre-existing vulnerabilities, to (a) further disturb and disrupt routinised processes in states and societies, and (b) to fulfil a political agenda that might endanger and threaten both human security, while challenging the legitimacy of normalised state and societal structures (Giumelli et al., 2018, 146, 147-148; Mälksoo, 2018, 377; Petrikkos, 2021a, 200). Hybrid threats do not necessarily have to be seen as completely separate from more traditional security issues. Instead, they incorporate both traditional and new security challenges that can, in principle, attack underdeveloped infrastructure or policy gaps, making small states clearly vulnerable targets (Vaicekauskaitė, 2017, 9). Interestingly, literature interest in connecting the dots between hybrid threats and small states has only recently started picking up, whereas the more narrow and precise literature on hybrid threats in small states in the EU is almost non-existent. This demonstrates an added need for addressing these issues when implementing the CSDP.

Last but not least, of the implementation of CSDP has heavily relied upon conventional approaches that have traditionally focused on adapting to national security policies and strategies of member-states as a response to shaping CSDP as a whole to operate on a macro-level. More importantly, there has been exceeding emphasis on what is deemed as 'new'. Surely, we talk about 'new' types of threats, 'new' transnational security challenges, and events that shape EU decision-making. The changes taking place in the "political rationalities and problematisations" that end up informing both decision-making and policymaking entities are overlooked, because there is not enough dialogue on the ontology of things (Merlinger, 2011, 156). This means that while the EU pursues an agenda in the grand scheme of things to examine and assess the macro-level impact, it may fail to account for the agency at the micro-level on individual member-states. What if, for instance, a member-state does not have a published national security strategy, as in the example of the Republic of Cyprus (Adamides 2018, 72; Petrikkos , 2021b, 144)? This means that key important decisions might sometimes be limited by the absence of such strategic decisions and published documents from the very source: the member-states themselves. Conversely, the threats such states might face are not always reflected centrally at EU level, something we have to be honest about and acknowledge, for the sake of implementing more effective strategies.

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3. Methodology and Results

As mentioned in the introductory section, this paper aims at showcasing the need to exercise additional agency safeguards to consider the perspective of small member-states within the EU, assuming that this would further benefit and protect the bloc overall by adequately expanding the CSDP to include individual practices vis-à-vis hybrid threats. In assessing the impact of hybrid threats on the CSDP in small states and societies, the study first took into consideration the way small states interact with CSDP. Mixed qualitative methods were employed. Firstly, through discourse analysis, it has been possible to lively engage with both primary and secondary literature to look at official documents, handbooks, strategic documents at EU and member-state level, press releases and articles related to foreign policy, security, and defence. At the same time, utilising participant-observer methods, which includes private, informal consultations and exchanges with different officials while attending training seminars, public events, as well as in utilising European Security and Defence College (ESDC) resources, it has been possible for this research to incorporate high-level insights in formulating a better understanding of current practices over hybrid threats across the EU.

A desk review of archives from both primary and secondary sources has been conducted, including scientific and policy-related publications on the CSDP, hybrid threats, and literature on small states (thus addressing directly the key concepts this paper is puzzling with), as well as primary sources, such as treaties and policies at individual state- and EU-level. Such a comprehensive review also enables the critical examination of archives through a discourse analysis lens – in other words, reading between the lines. Both approaches are then cross-referenced in order to ensure reliability in the findings. Building upon this framework, future work may also incorporate semi-structured elite interviews to capture additional remarks by officials, yet as this particular work focuses on introducing the gap and engaging with the topic through a desk analysis and review, it has not been primarily concerned with compiling interviews at this stage, which is an issue that can be easily addressed by continuing the conversation on the future approaches to hybrid threats from a small EU member-state perspective.

The findings show that there is, in general, a satisfactory attempt from CSDP-linked tools and mechanisms to address hybrid threat issues at EU level. Examples of these include the Hybrid Toolbox, the Hybrid Fusion Cell employed at intelligence level, among others. The persisting problem, nonetheless, is that within CSDP, small member-states have not developed specialised tools due to underdeveloped security and defence infrastructure. Cases vary from member-state to member-state. In Estonia, for example, a pioneer in defence and security (also hosting NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) or in Finland (hosting the Hybrid Centre of Excellence), and in Belgium (which hosts civilian and military defence and security headquarters), security and defence priorities, as well as infrastructural capabilities will arguably differ vastly from cases like Cyprus (an island-state who suffers from protracted conflict against an overarching existential threat and has a poorly developed modern security infrastructure). In the meantime, Malta, also a small-state island, has opted out from PESCO due to constitutional incompatibility, yet on the other hand, Lithuania is increasingly reliant on other EU institutions and is left exposed to crises such as the Belarussian irregular migration.

4. There is no 'I' in 'We': Generalisation and Collectiveness as EU Problems

The year 2009 marks profound revisions on security and defence in the EU. Characteristically, this is the year the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. Not only that, but this also confirmed the transition from the European Security and Defence Policy to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Fast-forwarding to 2016, the EU's Global Strategy

for foreign and security policy gave the CSDP an even more pivotal role in addressing crises and multidimensional security threats. This also marked the beginning of serious dialogue across EU decision-making circles with regards to hybrid threats, by first addressing the issue of crafting resilient communities and states, while eliminating new transnational challenges (Mälksoo, 2018, 382, 384; Thiele, 2016). Later on, 2017 saw more refined and structured military and civilian mission planning, as part of the CSDP. These missions are coordinated via the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) respectively. Meanwhile, within the same year and through the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) was established in Helsinki, Finland (Hybrid CoE, n.d.). This provided an ideal opportunity for enhanced collaboration over matters of hybrid threats between the EU and NATO, making this accessible to small states such as the Republic of Cyprus, who does not hold NATO membership. Where it was originally planned to revise and enhance the functions of key CSDP attributes such as the MPCC in the year of 2020, however, the COVID-19 pandemic led this to a painstakingly slow path. Thereafter, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a revised Strategic Compass with highly ambitious targets set out to redefine the EU as a comprehensive security provider for its member-states and the wider region by 2023, while also placing emphasis on added threats that are unconventional in nature, including the role of security mechanisms the EU utilises, such as security and intelligence networks, to effectively combat such threats (Council of the European Union, 2022). Despite the united stance in condemning the invasion at EU-level, no clear policy has been developed that accounts for security management and the spill-over effect of crises of this magnitude impacting individual member-states.

Therefore, this begs the question of how effective the CSDP is in addressing crises that affect the EU both as a bloc, but also as a community of individual states that have different needs and priorities, as well as responsibilities to their own citizens. For instance, both COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of neighbouring Ukraine can be seen as security concerns that have a hybrid security spill-over, evident in how both have influenced directly and indirectly human security and critical infrastructure, while also shaping society. The triggering of added spill-over effects unfortunately shows that the EU has not been operationally ready to deal with such unprecedented level of crises, let alone CSDP itself. This is exported to small states who are even more harshly impacted due to the lack of material resources, thus further impacting the EU bloc, as additional counter-measures would have to be taken into consideration for distributing resources accordingly within the bloc in order to uphold security issues, in line with the suggestions highlighted by the Strategic Compass. With critical infrastructure in mind, however, EU institutions have not adequately addressed the need to protect vulnerable objects like hospitals and other basic services and amenities, thereby leaving such infrastructure exposed and prone to threats (Aradau 2010: 491, 501; Christou 2019, 284; Collier and Lackoff, 2020; Van Kolfschooten and de Ruijter, 2020, 481). The over-reliance on the military aspect of the CSDP across the EU is also a problem on its own, particularly at the face of 'invisible' threats that cannot be addressed by exercising military power alone. In effect, this prevents the flourishing of other civilian-led initiatives that can effectively address certain aspects of hybrid threats that military-led initiatives may be unable to identify (Merlinger, 2011, 156, 164).

Another major problem that persists when accounting for security issues in small states and societies is the issue of generalisation that echoes in the chambers of EU institutions. In expanding further to this notion, it is worth emphasising that the critique here is posed in an attempt to engage with the problem more constructively, rather than merely launching an assault against the institutions, which would be naïve, somewhat ludicrous, and mostly unnecessary. The problem is that EU institutions and organs advocating for and accommodating CSDP practices often tackle security and defence problems holistically. The EU is, by definition, a collection of state subsidiaries, thus it should be understood as a single entity that attempts to solidify its singularity through additional integration that is fluid in nature. One such tool that is equally fluid is seen in the adjustability and adaptability of the CSDP. Nonetheless, at the face of hybrid threats, approaching multidimensional and 'entangled' threats targeting one single,

individual member-state as a Union might be ineffective when such member-states do not possess the appropriate structure to tackle such threats (Adamides and Petrikkos, 2023). Therefore, the danger to the Union is even more evident when threats infiltrate one member-state or its society, for it is now easier to reproduce and spread elsewhere to other member-states. Like exposed flesh during a pandemic, small states with underdeveloped security and defence infrastructure might fall prey to hybrid threats seeking to exploit vulnerabilities and gaps at the state and societal level.

What has been observed from various proceedings, private exchanges with officials affiliated with EU organs and national governments, as well as training seminars and workshops is the emphasis on the concept of resilience across the EU. It is now widely accepted that developing strong, resilient societies is among the chief priorities of CSDP. Not only that, but resilient societies lead to resilient states. The connection here is rather clear and EU actors have thoroughly emphasised this in events, publications, as well as in private exchanges. This is perhaps one of the major successes of CSDP in educating and raising awareness over mutual security and defence priorities. In theory, this can help individual small states to also incorporate such teachings into their own mechanisms so that their operational infrastructure and security architecture is revised and refined to an optimum level. As highlighted in "The Future of European Security and Defence" in-person conference in Cyprus in November 2021, resilience contributes to a common strategic culture that can be then passed on to individual member-states through education and training, as well as by engaging directly with civil society actors in a top-bottom fashion. Despite this, there are challenges in achieving this, as observed in the next sections.

5. Manifestation of Hybrid Threats in Small States

This section is dedicated to understanding and accounting for some of the more recent examples of hybrid threats in small states and societies. It is particularly important to note that those initiating hybrid attacks target both society and the state in order to fulfil their political agenda. The table below lists in greater detail how CSDP relates to different types of threats. The type and origin of such threats is expanded on, while also providing additional details and useful examples that are specific to small states in the EU. Responding effectively to such threats requires strong security architecture in place, which is how CSDP fits in this narrative (Petrikkos, 2021b, 142).

Table 1. CSDP's Response to Hybrid Threats in Small States in the EU

Type of threat	Origin	Details and examples	CSDP Response
Cyber-threats (attacks, espionage, data breaches)	'Hostile states[1], non-state actors (internally and externally)	All state-actors are subject to a plethora of cyber-attacks on a day-to-day basis. Some more concrete examples are the Russian cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 and the phishing of Cypriot diplomats' credentials by Chinese hackers reported in late 2018 (Sanger and Erlanger: 2018). Also, increased cyber-attacks during the COVID-19 pandemic	Special amended provisions to combat hybrid threats related to the cyber realm.

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[1] This is a rather subjective characterization. A state might perceive another state-entity as hostile due to pre-existing conflict history or conflicting interests. For instance, the Republic of Cyprus has a long-standing conflict with the Republic of Turkey due to the latter illegally occupying the former's territory, yet other EU member-states like Germany may not necessarily perceive Turkey as a direct hostile entity.

Type of threat	Origin	Details and examples	CSDP Response
Disinformatio[2]	Online (social media, forums, texting apps, blogs, unverified media outlets), wider media, perceived threats from Russia and Chin[3]	Targeted disinformation campaigns against small states in the Baltics and elsewhere. In the case of Estonia, such campaigns are more frequent against Russian speakers; Latvia also is sceptical over EU being a reliable and capable security provider (Andžāns, 2017: 255-257)	Global Strategy; EEAS online toolkit to fight disinformatio[4]; European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP)
Public diplomacy	Perceived threats from non-EU countries; diplomatic tactics	External relations with third countries	Global Strategy and CSDP; Neighbourhood policies; EEAS; mediation
Threats to critical infrastructure	Electronic warfare, healthcare vulnerabilities, telecommunications	Increase of such threats and attacks during COVID-19; climate change and extreme weather events	Technical support; geospatial intelligence, network support, protection of vulnerable facilities; a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) strategy
Irregular/ 'Weaponised' Migration	Border control and security; unregulated refugee crises	Refugee crisis and civil war in Syria (2011-ongoing at the time of writing); Cyprus (forced and illegal trafficking from Turkey from the occupied nort[5], Lithuania and Latvia (Belarus's targeted flows of migrants[6]	Frontex and CSDP relief missions
Corruption and lack of accountability	This can be both endemic and external breaches that damage faith in the democratic system & institutions	Cyprus' widespread scandal on the mismanagement of the Citizenship by Investment Programme and	Rule of law & democratisation practices; at the moment, CSDP missions are designed to tackle corruption in third countries
Crises and disasters	The COVID-19 pandemic; large-scale disruptions in the economy; natural disasters and human-induced crises (e.g. human-ignited wildfires and environmental destruction)	Serious crises in small island-states (Cyprus and Malta) can be difficult to address due to them not being connected to the mainland, thus such crises leave island-states even more exposed	Early warning and emergency response units, training, member-state collaboration & CPCC

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[2] This refers to the intentional and targeted dissemination of false and doctored information knowingly, targeting specific political actors across states and societies, in an attempt to cause harm and to upset routinised processes (Bennet and Livingston, 2018: 124).

[3] The EU and certain small states (including Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics) often identify certain states like Russia as a perceived threat (Emmot: 2020)

[4] East StratCom Task Force is responsible for raising awareness over disinformation campaigns since 2015. The need for such a toolkit was particularly evident throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, contributing effectively to the EUvsDisinfo campaign (EEAS: 2021).

[5] Given the northern occupied part of the island has formed an unrecognized breakaway 'state' with Turkish influence, political, and military control, Turkey sends settlers in the northern part of the island to (a) increase the population of ethnic Turks in a bid to destabilise and change demographics, and (b) to accumulate migration from the north and force it to the south. This tactic is unregulated and not enough data on the numbers nor the frequency can be retrieved at the moment due to the ongoing conflict.

[6] This is the result of imposed EU sanctions against the Lukashenko government due to their poor human rights record and limited transparency in elections and the overall political process domestically. In response, Belarus has tried to undermine border controls and security, including programmes like Frontex, whose securitised status calls for increased cooperation over border regulation (Asderaki and Markozani 2021; Vock 2021).

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Type of threat	Origin	Details and examples	CSDP Response
Military conflict & threat of confrontation	Pre-existing conflict; historical relationships during former occupation	Former Soviet republics feeling under threat, including small Baltic states and societies; states and societies in conventional conflict settings, e.g., Cyprus VS Turkey (Petrikkos: 2021a)	CSDP missions; PESCO; collective measures
Terrorism and criminal activity	Non-state actors; criminal organisations; transnational connections transcending state boundaries	The Islamic State; violent jihadist groups; violent fascist and supremacist organisations; e.g. the National Popular Front (ELAM) in Cyprus, Denmark's National Front, the Finnish Resistance Movemen[7]	Integrated response via inter- and intra-security agency cooperation
Territorial threats (land, sea)	Disputes over territory, FIR and EEZ	Island-states (Malta, Cyprus); Baltic Sea states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark),	Global Strategy

Sources: This table consists of original work that has compiled data using previous research the author has conducted (Petrikkos 2021a; 2021b)

6. Challenges in Channelling the CSDP Response

Looking at the table in the first section, at first glance, it seems the CSDP is capable of presenting various tools in addressing hybrid threats. When it comes to cyber-linked threats and hybrid warfare, the CSDP itself, through joint training initiatives and platforms such as the ESDC, military personnel and civilian experts can receive high level training in order to become more resilient to such threats. Similarly, the disinformation challenges are combated via a European External Action Service (EEAS)-approved toolkit. Not only that, but there are also comprehensive mechanisms in place like PESCO that allow for collective action against conventional threats. It is also worth examining the affected sites within each member state. For instance, is it mostly a state-related or society-related threat? Is it infrastructural or all of the above? Similarly, how is governance affected and to what extent can the CSDP fully capture individual small member-state needs?

Unfortunately, despite the mechanisms in place, certain challenges still persist. This prevents from channelling the CSDP response to hybrid threats in small states effectively. Whereas small states seek a safe and secure environment to ensure their own survival and enhanced cooperation, the actual CSDP response can be delayed at the face of large-scale and unanticipated crises, such as COVID-19. At the same time, infrastructure is unevenly developed across small states within the EU. This means that some small states might not even have the appropriate infrastructure to combat such crises. Critical infrastructure, for instance, is one thing that has traditionally been overlooked. Developing strong e-governance tools to cope with social distancing has also been a real challenge.

An additional and serious limitation falls under the conceptualisation of hybrid threats within CSDP circles. There is a tendency of directly associating hybrid threats to cyber threats, as observed in the CSDP Handbook (Rehlr, 2021). Cyber-threats can exist in parallel to hybrid threats. There are cyber threats that specifically target individuals with the objective of extracting money, for instance. Such threats, while they do trigger discomfort and general insecurity, should not be labelled as 'hybrid', simply because the majority of cyber-attacks do not have a political objective. While it is often convenient to

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[7] The Danish and Finnish organisations have launched violent assaults against vulnerable and marginalized groups (Ravndal, 2018, 776-777). ELAM as a political party in Cyprus has not been branded a terrorist entity, yet ELAM has often identified as a 'sister' party to Greece's Golden Dawn, an entity that has been branded an illegal criminal organisation, formerly operating "under the cover" of a political party (Banteka, 2019; Malkopoulou, 2021, 178).

throw terms and concepts under an overarching umbrella, this can be very problematic when implementing and executing policy at a later stage. Clear distinctions must be drawn in order to first raise awareness of the overarching malevolent nature of cyber-attacks, then subsequently, to provide enough resources to society as a way of mitigating exposure and risk, and thirdly, to understand what type of threats as such are political and which ones are not.

Moreover, it is worth noting that disinformation targets both societies and states. Despite the solid attempt in devising a useful toolkit to combat disinformation, this process is not visible enough to the average citizen. Not only that, but additional training in utilising such tools and raising awareness over CSDP practices is needed. This is something that needs to be further clarified and emphasised from a CSDP perspective. At the moment, training is widely available for high-profile and national experts, academics, diplomatic and military personnel, and state-affiliated actors, but not for the rest of society. It is also particularly difficult to train each and every EU citizen in order to become more aware of the perils of fake and distorted information. This is certainly not the CSDP's fault, yet a clearer parameter must be drawn in order to highlight what the CSDP can and cannot do when it comes to disinformation that deliberately targets the wider society.

In terms of traditional challenges like military confrontation, some small states like Ireland do not even have the operational capacity to address certain PESCO activities like procurement (Flynn, 2018, 73, 76). At the same time, the fact that other small states like Cyprus simply take part in EU mechanisms places a burden on border security and an uncomfortable relationship between the EU and Turkey, given the ongoing conflict and tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Not only that, but while some CSDP practices are applicable and have an effect in third countries, the same situation is not really observed within the EU bloc. In the case of corruption, for example, the CSDP has not developed internal mechanisms to tackle corruption as a hybrid security threat, assuming that member-states abide by the transparency criteria set in the Union's organs. Even internal instruments such as Justice and Home Affairs are looking outwards and not inwards in this context (Rehrl, 2021, 97).

In working towards a comprehensive CSDP that is both capable in addressing hybrid threats, as well as channelling appropriate responses to individual member-states, both risks and opportunities must be stressed. This paper is but a preliminary base for launching a conversation that can help identify how the CSDP as an integral security and defence instrument can fill in its existing gaps. The risks, evidently, include the potentially dangerous impact this might have on the EU bloc itself. Leaving small states' problems unaddressed can open up gateways for hybrid attacks targeting the Union directly. Therefore, in terms of governance, there is a need for both centralised and decentralised approaches prior to enhanced security integration. This implies working towards improving security and defence architecture across the more vulnerable targets that small states pose, in order to uplift the overall CSDP's security architecture, making it a far more powerful instrument than before. This, therefore, guides the discussion towards the added value and opportunities such change brings. Increased security and defence integration cannot be achieved without filling in the gaps across the bloc. Similarly, the CSDP cannot have an effective response when the gaps found in small states' and societies' infrastructure are not filled, reinforced, and protected against novel hybrid security issues. As such, context matters.

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Context matters. An assessment on the impact of hybrid threats on the CSDP framework for small states and societies in 2009-2021

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Veronika Hornyak

**Gender mainstreaming
in training missions –
the strongholds of the
European normative
power?**

GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN TRAINING MISSIONS – THE STRONGHOLDS OF THE EUROPEAN NORMATIVE POWER?

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Abstract— Gender mainstreaming in the framework of the EU CSDP has come a long way since the Lisbon Treaty both in terms of policies, as well as implementation through the strategic and operational levels. Planning and working with gender expertise in EU missions and operations as well have become a common and living practice as an important part of how the EU views gender and security as a cross-cutting issue strategically important in its external action. Gender equality and women's empowerment is mainstreamed through the two components, training and advising, of the EU training missions as well. Deriving from the EU's unique, normative power identity gender equality being one of the fundamental pillars of the EU's constitutional values, the EU's gender mainstreaming activity is now implemented in EUTMs in Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic, in countries between the most dangerous places to be a woman in the world. Building on the Normative Power Europe (NPE) approach, this research explores how the EU as a unique actor in global politics transfers and projects the norm of gender equality through its mainstreaming efforts in EUTM Somalia, Mali and CAR, and how training missions could be an extraordinary example for the EU to strengthen its distinctive power identity using military power in peace operations for promoting equality between sexes.

KEYWORDS

- **EU training missions**
- **EU CSDP**
- **gender and security**
- **gender mainstreaming**
- **Women**
- **Peace and Security**
- **missions and operations**

1. Introduction

Since the launch of the first EU training mission in Somalia in 2010, member states have used this tool of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) more and more to address crisis and conflict directly or indirectly threatening the security of the European Union. Fragile states, prolonged intra and interstate conflicts have been affecting European security in a growing number in the last decade, while the launch of the full-scale war against the Ukraine in February 2022 by Russia further enhanced and urged the discussions on European security.

Since the 2010's, EU military missions have become the stable pillar of the EU CSDP with five running missions in Africa: in Mali (EUTM Mali), in Central African Republic (EUTM RCA), in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) and most recently in Niger (EUMPM Niger). Additionally, in October 2021, working documents shed light on discussions about the possible establishment of the first EU military mission in Europe upon the request of Ukraine, where the EU has already been present with a civilian mission, which

was eventually launched in late 2022. Current missions in Africa demonstrate a clear tendency in the EU not only to increase its military visibility as a part of its external action, but also its strengthened trust in military missions for countering instability and conflict in its neighbourhood. This trend is in line with the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) from 2016 focusing the Union's attention to *'military capabilities and anti-terrorism as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It deals with peace-building and the resilience of States and societies, in and around Europe'* (EUGS, 2016, 4). Moreover, the EU's first *de facto* defence strategy, the EU Strategic Compass published in 2022 also reinforced the role of CSDP missions and operations, while the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) allowed the Union to allocate financial support for military purposes for the first time in its history.

In this challenging era, this paper focuses on the EU as an international security actor mainstreaming gender equality in all activities involved in its external action, including military training missions functioning in the CSDP framework. The paper argues that with its unique normative power identity, the European Union creates values and norms on gender equality and women's empowerment through the use of military power via EU training missions. The argument builds on previous research conceptualizing the power of the Union from a normative standpoint, most specifically on scholarship using the *Normative Power Europe* (hereinafter: NPE) idea by Ian Manners (Manners, 2002). The NPE or *'puissance normative'* concept – as Orbie puts it – has *'shifted the attention to cross-cutting objectives of the EU'*, which adjective is widely and commonly used to characterize gender and security related topics both in EU communication as well as in academia (Orbie, 2011, 160). Researchers developing further Manner's NPE concept by the early 2010's established a strong body of literature on the topic leading to the creation of the *Normative Power Approach* (NPA) also extending the discussion to non-EU actors and cases (Manners, 2013). One of the highlights of the discussions on the EU normative power is whether using military force jeopardizes this unique identity of the Union, on which issue this paper follows Björkdahl's argument highlighting that *'EU can be both normative and powerful but it needs to couple its traditional normative powers with its newly developed military capacity in order to meet the security challenges and expectations from conflict-ridden societies around the world'* (Björkdahl, 2011, 103). The argument that peace support operations carried out by the EU in the framework of CSDP can be the linkage between the normative identity and military power is maybe more worth to consider than ever in the light of the changing security environment in region alongside with the strategic directions laid down in the EU Strategic Compass in 2022. Hence, I further argue that this approach still leaves us with questions regarding the use of military power, and the *real* and unique normative identity of the EU reflected the most in its non-executive military missions. Military missions explicitly focusing on developing the security sector and defence capabilities of partner countries by advising and training are the embodiment of the normative power Europe.

In 2019, a study by Trineke Palm and Ben Crum seeks to further develop Manners' theory by outlining four possible forms of EU identity explaining the changes regarding CSDP missions and operations, and capability development in the last two decades (Palm and Crum, 2019). Palm and Crum examined the issue through the political/strategic embeddedness of military missions and operations, as well as the reasons that ensure their legitimacy and concluded: on the one hand, the political/strategic embeddedness of EU military missions and operations has significantly strengthened since the beginning in 2003, on the other hand, on the interest-based/ value-based axes, interest-based reasons for peace operations have been on the rise pushing the EU's identity to a more realist direction. However, the authors emphasized that despite the strengthening interest-led external actions, the EU has never had a military intervention without value-based legitimacy or justification. The latter strengthens the argument of this paper that the EU external action is inherently linked to the normative power identity of the EU and the use of military means in CSDP is based on strong normative considerations.

Additionally, a growing number of literature has examined peace operations led by the EU with different focuses such as the mandate, country-specific context or institutional framework, but scholarship exclusively on EU military missions is still rather limited

due to its continuously evolving, relatively young nature. Vecsey (2015; 2017) and Minard (2014; 2017) noted papers on EUTMs in the context of EU action in the African continent, while case studies are already available on EUTM Somalia (Williams and Ali, 2020) and EUTM Mali. Raineri and Baldaro (2019) wrote on EUTM Mali in the framework of EU external action in the Sahel region, while Skeppström et al., (2015) highlighted the possible negative effects of EU training missions on security sector reform (SSR) and state security in case of fragile states such as Mali and Somalia. Skeppström et al. also argued that '*additional steps are needed to make the EUTM missions fully consistent with EU policy on SSR*' (Skeppström et al., 2014, 365). The possible negative effects of defence sector reform (DSR) or capacity building, is argued by Nilsson and Zetterlund, debating whether these processes de facto resulting in '*arming peace*', with training and equipping personnel who might use the new capabilities against their own society (Nilsson and Zetterlund, 2011). In contrast with this idea, other researchers explicitly refer to training missions, such as EUTM Somalia, as SSR missions (Oksamytna, 2011). Lackenbauer and Jonsson (2014) addressed the gender perspective in training missions in their work, focusing also on EUTM Somalia and Mali alongside other peace operations. Research on EUTM RCA started to be available most recently, including the work of Hickendorff and Acko (2021). Using the EPON framework[1], the latter is another rare example of the few available studies touching upon the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS) and its principles in EUTM RCA. EUTM Mozambique due to its very young nature has not been analysed thoroughly yet, only a couple of scientific sources and EU policy documents and factsheets make it possible to study the newest EU CSDP mission (Bidaguren, 2022; Zajączkowski, 2021; EEAS, 2021).

In terms of exclusively gender-focused literature on EU CSDP, Olsson et al. (2014), Haffner (2019), Grekula (2020) and, most recently, Järvinen (2021) have worked on the topic either in a policy context studying the implementation of the WPS agenda in CSDP or focusing on the gender balance in EU security and defence. With regards to important strategic and policy documents on gender and security in CSDP, one of the most relevant is the EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security from 2018 highlighting gender mainstreaming and participation as the two key issues leading to the successful implementation (Council of the European Union, 2018). This new strategic document replaced the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on WPS (EEAS policy officer, interview, 2021). This paper works with the same definition of gender as it is indicated in the Strategic Approach, which follows as: '*Gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys (…)*' (Council of the European Union, 2018, 71).

Most of the listed studies are based on mixed-method research, using available documentations complemented with in-depth interviews. Similar methodology is applied in this paper, where discourse analysis of relevant policy documents were used alongside with semi-structured interviews allowing to work with primary sources, as well as identifying how the normative framework of gender mainstreaming is present in the strategic-political, and operational levels. Moreover, several expert presentations given by experts and EEAS personnel during the summer universities of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) under Chatham House rules in 2021 and 2022 in Brussels complemented the previously mentioned data. The presenters and interviewees, similarly to the two interviewees, are either seconded international staff working in European External Action Service (EEAS), or other relevant EU bodies.

This paper neither aims noting all mandate related activities of EUTMs, nor analysing the country-specific context of the respective missions in detail. However, it seeks to identify commonalities and similar challenges on gender-mainstreaming specifically in EU military training missions, as well as pointing out common patterns and processes derived from the strategic-political focus on gender and security in the EU external action to link the normative power identity to the implementation on strategic and operational levels. Hence, key research questions of this paper are how the EU establishes norms and transfer values through gender mainstreaming in three of the ongoing EU military training missions in Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic between 2010 and 2022. Additionally, future perspectives will be discussed aiming to contribute to the

implementation possibilities of gender mainstreaming in EUTMs, including the training mission in Mozambique. The latter is not studied in detail in this paper, as at the time of the writing a very limited amount of data was available from the mission's first year, not allowing comprehensive study of the case. However, some reflections are added to the paper, which is structured as the following: Chapter 2. highlights the most important milestones and policies vis-à-vis gender and security as the foundation of the strategic-political level in the EU, and describes the evolution of training on gender issues regarding EU military missions. Subsequently, in two different chapters, the country-specific gender mainstreaming activities carried out by the EEAS and the three EUTMs in question are studied: in Chapter 3. comparing similarities and differences between the areas of operation, and the institutional aspects in more general terms, while Chapter 4. concentrates more on certain specific activities and country-specific characteristics on the ground. Before concluding the paper a chapter is dedicated to discussing findings difficulties and perspectives of the EU's action on gender-mainstreaming in the framework of the Normative Power Europe approach.

2. Gender mainstreaming in policy and in EU military training

EU training missions are unique tools of the EU CSDP in terms of operational and institutional perspectives. They are managed by the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) – inside the structure of the EEAS –, the only permanent military command and control (C2) structure in the EU on the strategic level. MPCC was established in 2017 as a result of the implementation of the EUGS to enhance EU security and defence (EEAS, 2016). Since its creation the military-strategic level of the existing four training missions are centred in Brussels in the MPCC with having one mission commander, the *'director of the MPCC, and de facto 'commander of all non-executive missions'* (Tardy, 2017, 3).

In terms of policies on gender mainstreaming, the EU has multiplied its effort since 2010 ensuring the implementation of the gender perspective in the CSDP as the part of the integrated approach (EEAS policy officer, 2021). Several key documents have been adopted, reported on, and have been revised. Following the first holistic, milestone EU document adopted by the Council in 2008, the *'Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security'* more and more documents ensured that the EU focuses on gender mainstreaming in its external action, including training missions. *'Package of three draft concepts containing minimum standard training elements on Human Rights, Gender and Child Protection in the context of CSDP'* (2010), the *'Implementation of UNSCR on Women, Peace and Security in the context of CSDP missions and operations'* (2012), the *'EU Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on WPS'* (2014) and the *'EUMC Strategic Guidance on CSDP Military Training. CSDP Military Training Conditions and Priorities'* (2016) are just a few of the policy documents supporting the development of gender perspective in the context of EUTMs.

In the framework of the EU's *'integrated approach on external conflicts and crisis'* through CSDP, the two main strategic guiding documents are the EU Strategic Approach to WPS (2018), the EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 2019-2024, and the EU's 3rd Gender Action Plan (GAP III, 2020) which provides a broader context for EU gender mainstreaming beyond security and defence. The Strategic Approach notes several highlights regarding mission-related training and advising components both in terms of internal and external gender mainstreaming. It indicates that *'implementing specific measures, including training of military and police forces'* ensure the successful gender mainstreaming inside the EEAS as well as in external action in partner countries (EU Strategic Approach to WPS, 2018, 4). In terms of training, the Strategic Approach argues that targeted training is a must, and it highlights the work of the European Security and Defence College on developing relevant training courses besides emphasizing the need

for intensive, continuous knowledge and experience sharing on overall, EU-level. ESDC cooperating with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) provides impetus, expert advice as well as operational support for training the next generation of EU experts, including civilians and uniformed personnel (EEAS, 2021a). In terms of gender mainstreaming ESDC organizes specific trainings, such as '*Integration of a Gender Perspective in CSDP*' in partnership with the Cyprus Security and Defence Academy (Goalkeeper, 2022).

The concept of training is at the heart of the EU's work on gender mainstreaming, focusing on internal processes in case of pre-deployment training for EU troops or external ones, such as training host country nationals in EUTMs. Best practices of gender mainstreaming in CSDP frequently come from civilian missions (Strategic Approach, 2018) mainly due to civilian staff being better trained in gender issues in general than their military counterparts (EUMS Training Requirement Analysis on Gender, 2020). Although civilian missions with SSR focus have several elements in common with DSR-focused military training missions, the effective usage of best practices gathered in civilian missions are still difficult as a result of the significant differences in the operational environment (OE) and mandates. Crucial guiding document, the Civilian Operations Commander Operational Guidelines for Mission Management and Staff on Gender Mainstreaming has been created for civilian missions in 2018 by the EEAS's Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which, in spite of its civilian nature contributes to successful gender mainstreaming in EUTMs as well (EEAS-CPCC, 2018). Commonalities in principles and directions given by strategic EU documents, besides the similar mission components, such as advising, operational guidance by CPCC document might be a best practice to be followed for MPCC.

In the case of the continuously evolving military component of the EU, the last couple of years resulted in significant development, including military training guidance as well. The EU Military Training Group (EUMTG) was established in order to manage the processes and requirements on CSDP military training (EUMS, 2020). The EUMTG was responsible for defining training disciplines, some of them addressing cross-cutting issues, such as gender, which has become one on the list of more than 20 different topics such as cyber defence or logistics. (Lucero, interview, 2022). For each training discipline '*Member States, EU bodies and Multinational Formations, Centres of Excellence, National, Multinational or EU Training Providers or Supranational Institutions*' could apply to take up the role of discipline leader to elaborate the training requirement analysis (TRA) for the respective topic (EUMS, 2020, 6). In 2016 after submitting its candidacy, Spanish Ministry of Defence (MoD) was appointed as discipline leader to carry out the Training Requirement Analysis on Gender between 2017-2019 later approved by EU Military Staff (EUMS, 2020). As a result, the first comprehensive analysis as well as military training document explicitly addressing gender training of military personnel in EU missions and operations was created in accordance with overall policy documents and relevant existing military training manuals (EUMS, 2020). The TRA indicated that EU member states train their military personnel in gender issues during '*generic basic*' training, and additionally, directly before deploying staff to international peacekeeping missions, including EU-led military missions and operations (EUMS, 2020, 5). This highlights the individual responsibility of EU members on sending troops to missions with adequate training on gender, which can vary between member states. Military personnel joining EU missions and operations from Nordic countries, such as Finland and Sweden, are usually already fully trained on gender perspective by their national curricula (EEAS policy officer, interview, 2021). However, for troops sent by other MSs where gender perspective is a less deliberately or involuntarily not yet integrated or not integral part of the foreign policy and/security and defence, training on gender is mostly available before being deployed through pre-deployment or in the field via induction trainings (EEAS policy officer, interview, 2021). Most interviewed EU experts expressed that training through the EU institutional framework aims at filling the gap in the knowledge of troops not trained on gender perspective at all, as well as creating a common understanding of concepts, definitions, and the vital role of gender perspective in military missions and operations.

The responsibility and importance of single EU member states' commitments were highlighted during the adoption of Training Requirement Analysis on gender as well, which also intended to study the practice of MSs on including gender perspective in their basic military training. Besides identifying shortfalls in training on gender in CSDP, the TRA contributed to the comparison of different training levels between civilian and military personnel deployed in EU missions and operations (EUMS, 2020). The main outcome of the landmark document by the Spanish Military Office for Gender Mainstreaming in MoD was the elaboration of three curricula for EU military training in gender for personnel deployed to EU military missions and operations, which is indicated in Figure 1. below:

Figure 1. Curricula for EU Military Training in Gender, edited by the author 2020

Sources: EUMS (2020) *Training Requirements Analysis Report on Gender EU Military Training Discipline*

The first curriculum is for gender experts, advisors, and gender focal points, the second is for senior leaders, such as force commanders, while the third was created for enlisted officers up to platoon leaders. The latter was elaborated for troops on the field who's daily work is affected by gender issues during patrolling or other tasks, but who do not have planning tasks, such as a corporal or a sergeant (Lucero, interview, 2022). The three curriculum differs from each other in terms of length –1 day for the basic up until 5 days for the extended one – but also in terms of topics addressed, as the extended training includes more than 10 different thematic elements, while for the key leaders training and the basic curriculum touch upon 5-6 topics (Lucero, interview, 2022). '*Introduction to Key Gender Concepts. Code of Conducts*, '*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*', as well as '*The prevention of conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)*' are integral parts of all three curriculums (EUMS, 2020).

The latest developments on military training for EU troops and staff in missions and operations demonstrated the EU's will to provide more coherent training for multinational troops working together in CSDP on the ground. Integrating such a cross-cutting issue such as gender and security as one of the disciplines for EU military training is the integral, constitutive part of the normative framework of the EU's external action. Gender training as a separate discipline derived from gender equality being the essential pillar of the EU's normative identity reiterated recently by President Ursula von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the EU Gender Equality Strategy for 2020-2025 stating that '*Gender equality is a core value of the EU, a fundamental right and key principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights. It is a reflection of who we are*.' (EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, 2020). Addressing shortfalls and gaps in military training on gender perspective strengthens the EU's normative identity from within the institutions and the member states, supporting common understanding and strong value-based approach for training uniformed personnel deployed to military missions, including training missions.

3. EU Training missions: the operational environment for gender-mainstreaming

EUTMs are *de facto* military capability development missions having training and advising components as the core tasks deriving from the mandates complemented with country specific needs shaped by the operational environment. An important note on military capabilities of the EU – technically owned by member states –is that despite the growing focus on CSDP and training missions strengthening the EU's military presence globally, overall military capabilities available, including the human resources, are still very limited. Capacity issues and struggles regarding the recruitment and secondment processes have been highlighted while setting up MPCC in 2017 (Tardy, 2017) up until recently by MPCC personnel (Presentation by EU staff during ESDC Doctoral School Summer University, 2021). Currently, the EU Military Staff works with approximately 200 people in total, while MPCC, responsible for four EU training missions, has 50 colleagues (Presentation by EU staff during ESDC Doctoral School Summer University, 2021) in Brussels' headquarters. Nevertheless, progress has been made as MPCC personnel has doubled in five years, as it started its work with only 25 colleagues (EEAS, 2016).

There are several similarities in the operational environment of the ongoing EUTMs influencing the gender mainstreaming activity of the EU on the field. The currently studied three training missions in Mali, CAR and Somalia are functioning in states severely affected by conflict and violence, all of them falling under the definition of fragile states based on the Fragile State Index (FSI). In 2021, Somalia was 2nd, Central African Republic was 8th and Mali was 19th in the ranking of FSI (2021). All three countries are burdened by the presence of terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab and/or the Islamic State directly affecting the areas of operation. As an example, during the selection process for the trainees in case of EUTM Somalia, the identification of al-Shabaab affiliated candidates was a crucial issue avoiding the imminent threat to the security of the mission's personnel (Minard, 2017). The recruitment process for trainees is also challenging from another perspective. The representation of different ethnic groups in Mali and Somalia are of utmost importance, also influencing the training of trainees (Skeppström et al. 2014). Similar problems, ethnic tensions and ethnicization of the armed forces is a sensitive issue in the Central African Republic as well (Hickendorff and Acko, 2021). Moreover, from a gender equality perspective, all three countries are considered to be one of the most dangerous places for women, especially in terms of lacking physical security. Looking at two major datasets, while in the Women, Peace and Security Index – focusing more three main aspects, inclusion, justice and security, in the latter including intimate partner violence, organized violence and perceptions on community safety – Somalia ranked 159th, CAR 157th and Mali 143rd out of the 170 countries indexed (GIWPS and PRIO, 2021). Another comprehensive dataset, the Womenstats, providing crucial insights on the physical security of women based on different indicators, such as life expectancy of wome[1], the the rate of the murder of women between the age of 15 and 4[2], the maternal mortality scal[3] or the women's physical security scale, where all three Somalia, CAR and Mali continuously performed poorly (Womenstats, 2018-2019).

The mandates of the first three EUTMs of the EU have been extended several times, broadening the tasks and/or the geographical area covered by the mission. Moreover, mandates are also quite similar by nature, focusing on two main components of EUTMs: training and education, and advising and assisting. In case of training of trainees of the respective armed forces, in Mali, CAR and Somalia, the missions prioritise providing the fundamentals of military training for the selected soldiers of the host country, such as firing a gun or reading a map (Moreno, interview, 2022). Furthermore, instructors are frequently facing similar challenges in the respective countries, such as low level

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[1] Womenstats (2018). Life Expectancy of Women [online]. Available from: https://www.womanstats.org/substatics/DACH-SCALE-1-2018.png

[2] Womenstats (2018). Rate of Murder of Women, 15-44 [online]. Available from https://www.womanstats.org/substatics/MURDER-SCALE-2-2019.png

[3] Womeanstats (2018). Maternal Mortality Rate [online]. Available from: https://www.womanstats.org/substatics/MMR-SCALE-2-2018.png

of basic education, lack of literacy and language barriers affecting the gender specific training as well as considering gender-specific vocabulary (Lackenbauer and Jonsson, 2014). In contrast with some civilian missions of the EU, with special focus on SSR missions, such as EULEX Kosovo, where tackling conflict related SGBV is a vital element of the mandate deriving from the country-specific context of the missions, in case of EUTMs, the priorities might vary significantly.

The advising component mostly means a very distinct set of tasks and opportunities for gender-mainstreaming through direct cooperation with the ministries of defence and armed forces of the respective country. In several cases, military advisors and/or commanders of EU Training Missions have closer and most direct connections with the highest state authorities, like the government or presidents, than EU delegations (Dinca, interview, 2022). A different, but yet another crucial implication of language and cultural barriers both in advisory and training components are in the interpretation of capability and/or capacity: while the EU considers military training as an explicit capability development task, in training mission countries, developing capabilities are frequently understood solely as the armament of the forces. In other words, the understanding of capabilities in the respective countries are much more material due to the generally lower level of infrastructure and equipment (Dinca, interview, 2022). The EU's holistic interpretation of capability development covers a much broader area – for example training officers of the host country on the fundamentals of gender equality and humanitarian law – than investing money or supplying arms (Presentation by EU staff during ESDC Doctoral School Summer University, 2021). Hence, with the creation of the European Peace Facility the EU took a significant step towards supporting capacity building of partner countries with *'funding of military training, equipment and infrastructure'* (Hagström Frisell and Sjökvist, 2021, 1).

Another vital element affecting the OE of the studied EUTMs is the intensification of international presence in the last decade. On the one hand, international organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and a great number of different NGOs are working on the field with permanent stations, missions, and personnel. In Somalia, where both EU and NATO-led missions/operations were put in place, the number of UN-affiliated personnel has become significant in the last decade (Marsai, 2015). Both EUTM missions cooperate and coordinate continuously with the UN-led missions in the respective countries, UNSO[4] in Somalia, MINUSM[5] in Mali, and MINUSC[6] in CAR. On the other hand, besides other international actors, the EU often deploys different kinds of missions and operations in one country simultaneously, as in the case of Somalia, Mali and CAR, in addition to the already working EU delegation (Presentation by EU staff during ESDC Doctoral School Summer University, 2021). With having international personnel on the field, cooperation on gender mainstreaming, such as the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, also affects the efforts of EUTMs. Interagency cooperation and coordination on the field is crucial, especially regarding human rights violations, gender-based violence and crimes like female genital mutilation (FGM), which is still a common practice both in CAR and in Somalia (Strategic Approach, 2018). To work with such issues whenever it is relevant is an expectation towards EUTM personnel on the field (EEAS policy officer interview, 2021). This expectation is another element which derives from and strongly connected to the normative framework in which the EU implements its integrated approach in external action and the use of military means. However, as highlighted above, external capacity building efforts in the host country on gender mainstreaming can be and usually are jeopardized by the lack of internal EU capacity, such as deployable seconded (gender) expertise.

Despite the internal difficulties in finding deploying gender expertise to missions, the creation of the position of the gender advisor for each military mission is a common requirement today in the EU (EEAS policy officer interview, 2021). Gender advisors are working in the office of the head of the mission or mission force commander in the

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[4] United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
[5] United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
[6] United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

respective missions on the strategic level. This new, uniformed approach could be identified clearly in case of EUTM RCA, where country-specific tasks of gender advisor is to support and advise the force commander on gender issues, as well as ensuring that 'at all levels (Staff and Pillars) have the proper knowledge and awareness of how to integrate gender perspective in their daily tasks, helping the Central African Armed Forces to be more efficient on their missions' (EUTM RCA, 2020, 113). Accordingly, gender experts are responsible for internal and external gender mainstreaming efforts as well. These positions ideally only fulfil strategic level tasks, and missions might have additional gender experts in operational roles, such as gender trainers in operational components (EEAS policy officer, interview, 2021). Additionally, EUTMs usually have other mission personnel appointed in different components and pillars of the missions as gender focal points, who were previously trained in gender issues for supporting the work of the gender advisor on the operational level. Nevertheless, the challenge of fulfilling these positions was and is acknowledged on the highest policy levels, for example in the Strategic Approach on WPS in 2018. The document noted that all EU missions as well as the MPCC and the EUMS have dedicated single or double-hatted positions – usually handled together with human rights – created explicitly for gender experts, but 'none of these positions have yet been filled, which jeopardises the EU ability to achieve effective implementation' (Council of the European Union, 2018, 61). Accordingly, ambition levels, as well as expectations on the capacities of the staff deployed are high, while the reality is much more concerning (Presentation by EU staff during ESDC Doctoral School Summer University, 2021). Gender capabilities of the training missions are also heavily influenced by the secondment procedures of international experts who are eligible to fulfil these positions. Usually only a few countries, such as Finland and Sweden, having more focus on gender expertise in domestic military training in general were and are able to fulfil these positions (EEAS, policy officer interview, 2021). While these positions have started to be held by uniformed personnel lately, it is still a common practice in EUTMs to have civilian experts, which can cause internal tensions. These experts are mostly trained and experienced in humanitarian settings, and sometimes lack the necessary understanding of security and defence implications, which would be crucial for the effective implementation of gender mainstreaming in a heavily militarized and challenging security environment such as the EUTMs (Presentation by EU staff during ESDC Doctoral School Summer University, 2021). Increasing EU efforts in military missions to deploy and use relevant gender expertise on the field and create country-specific content is highly dependent on member states, mainly on their commitment to gender equality, but also directly deriving from the number of female personnel in national armed forces. As a result, the percentage of women in EU training missions is in line with the gender ratio of national forces, varying between 5-8 % in all three missions (EUTM RCA, 2021; Williams and Ali, 2020; Raineri and Baldaro, 2019).

Finally, another common shortcoming is the lack of capacity for monitoring of trainees trained by EUTMs in general, as well as in connection with gender issues. Misconduct, sexual and gender-based violence cases for example are still widespread and often perpetrated by military personnel of the respective country regardless of the training and advice provided by EUTM previously, which can be explained in the deeply deprived situation of women culturally and historically defined clan-based and tribal societies (Hudson et. al., 2020). In case of EUTM Somalia, the EU was pushing for the integration of female trainees from the Somali National Army, which was a significant and difficult discussion between the mission and the commander of the Somali troops. It took months of negotiations and confidence building between the mission and the local authorities to send a single female soldier – a mother of seven – to the training provided by the mission, and who since then has become the first female captain of the SNA (Moreno, interview, 2022). Monitoring of tactical training outcomes, for example, the effectiveness of trained battalions against insurgents, as well as the identification of former trainees perpetrated gender-based violence is still an issue to be solved. In case of EUTM RCA, lacking the necessary capabilities for continuous monitoring and follow-up on the performance of the trained personnel of FACA, the EU mission works closely with MINUSCA (Hickendorff and Acko, 2021). It emerges clearly from the overall situation of the operational areas in Mali, CAR and Somalia which are between the most dangerous places in the world, where gender equality is deeply rooted in almost all societal practices, that besides

focusing on operational priorities to tackle the most challenging security threats, such as terrorism and civil war, the EU is still trying to push for change in line with the values defining it's normative power identity.

4. Tangible result in Somalia, CAR and Mali: small steps for the EU, huge steps for women on the ground?

While having several similarities, common patterns in the operational environment of the three EUTMs discussed above, threats, and opportunities of gender-mainstreaming might vary mainly due to country and/or conflict-specific characteristics as well as the details of the mandates of the missions.

4.1. EUTM Somalia

EUTM Somalia, established in 2010 was the first training mission of the European Union, which was also referred to as the EU's *'first SSR mission dedicated to military training'* (Minard, 2017, 83) with the aim of tackling severe security threats, including organized crime, piracy and the expansion of jihadist terrorist groups in the country. During the planning of the mission in late 2000's there was no requirement to plan with gender perspective, the mission did not have a gender advisor (Moreno, interview, 2022). Currently working under its 7th mandate, EUTM Somalia is tasked with training, advising, and mentoring of the Somali Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Army (EUTM Somalia, 2021). Between 2010-2013 the training took place in Uganda, then moved to Mogadishu in Somalia, and now the mission is functioning with approximately 200 troops from eight troop contributing countries and a gender advisor deployed to the mission (EUTM Somalia, 2019). During its first decade, EUTM Somalia trained around 7000 SNA soldiers from basic C2-related topics to the protection of civilians, human rights, and gender issues (Williams and Ali, 2020). International cooperation in the field is important in terms of gender mainstreaming as well, since lessons on the topic are also provided by the UN in Somalia (European Parliament, 2015). Upon the deployment of the first gender expert, a civilian one in EUTM Somalia, the operational utility, in terms of for example the frequency of the training provided by the gender advisor was neither always well justified nor efficient in practice (Moreno, interview, 2022).

The lack of gender expertise in Somalian training missions was and is a problem, stipulated as a *'missing capability for many years'* up until very recently (Williams and Ali, 2020, 16). Double-hatted positions, as well as appointing designated personnel to cover gender issues on the field – such as it was the case in 2015, when the Defence Sector Training Team (DSTT) personnel covered human rights and gender issues – is common practice (European Parliament, 2015). Despite the shortfalls, personnel on the field managed to achieve several vital milestones during the first decade of the mission, for example achieving SNA slowly getting agreed to send female trainees. Even if the overall implementation of the WPS agenda had been moving forward slowly, the development of gender equality policies of the Somali MoD besides providing gender training for trainees from SNA were included in the mainstreaming efforts of the mission (Williams and Ali, 2020).

4.2. EUTM Mali

EUTM Mali has become another theatre for the EU tackling violent extremism and the expansion of jihadist terrorist groups, which made counterinsurgency and counterterrorism aspects a vital part of the operational context (Raineri and Baldaro, 2019)[7] Upon the *'Official request for support from the President of the Republic of Mali to*

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[7] Gender perspective on countering violent extremisms as well as counterterrorism is the part of the extended curriculum for gender advisors and gender focal points accepted by the EUMS in 2020 (EUMS, 2020).

the European Union' the mission was established in 2013, and currently works with an approximate 1000 troops from 22 EU and three partner countries (EUTM Mali, 2021b). In the first five years of the mission, close to half of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) have participated in training provided by EUTM. The operational environment in case of Mali is also heavily influenced by the significant number of international personnel, including military presence in the field, which have decreased in the last two years due to the severe security situation in the country. Besides having another EU-led civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Mali in the country for the training of Malian police and national guards, France as an individual state actor conducted two military operations upon the request of the Malian president since 2013.

In terms of gender mainstreaming, the mission in Mali is labelled as a success story in several sources, where *'gender perspective in both internal and external tasks is systematically addressed during all phases of the mission'* (EUTM Mali, 2021a). The expertise on the field has shown more consistency than in Somalia, having three gender specialist trainers in the mission already early on in 2015 (Lackenbauer and Jonsson, 2014). Shared success of EUTM Mali and other EU and non-EU affiliated actors on the field in connection with gender mainstreaming efforts is that in 2021 a working group on promotion of gender within the FAMA was established. The working group will be assisted continuously by the EUTM personnel providing specialized expertise in the field of gender equality (EUTM Mali, 2021a). The results of international and local gender expertise are the adoption of the National Action Plan of Mali on the implementation of WPS for 2019-2024 (WPS NAP), and an additional sectoral action plan created by the Malian Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MDAC) for supporting the integration of gender perspective in the defence sector (EUTM Mali, 2021a). However, currently, there is no follow-up on how these initiatives or the implementation of the WPS NAP is proceeding. In 2020, EUTM Mali joined the EU initiative called *'Women4security'* on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the WPS agenda with a 6-day-long online campaign, in which female members of mission were pictured in online news and blogs expressing their thoughts on the mission and their contribution, including female British army officer who has been the executive officer and acting chief of the staff in EUTM Mali (EUTM Mali, 2020).

However, successes and efforts of EUTM Mali personnel on the ground have been overshadowed by qualitative/operational failures, such as in counterinsurgency operations against non-state armed groups, or human rights violations against civilians, local communities by FAMA (Raineri and Baldaro, 2019, 176). In spite of the almost decade long history and work done on the field, EU mission in Mali faces serious challenges, including the presence of Russian Wagner Group and increasing hostilities, which made the EU suspending the operational training in case of both EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali police training missions most recently in the spring of 2022. High Representative of the EU, Josep Borell main reasoning was the lack of *'security guarantees from the Malian authorities over the non-interference of the well-known Wagner Group'* as well as concerns about serious human rights abuses committed (Reuters, 2022). While EUTM Mali is still in place with narrowed functions, official communication from the EEAS as well as from the mission itself were very limited, as there was no press release or further information on the details of the suspension of such an integrative WPS focused parts of the operation training. Several questions arise from the suspension and the future of the mission as the current mandate of EUTM was extended in 2020 until 2024 (Council of the European Union, 2020).

4.3. EUTM RCA

The EU has been present in the Central African Republic since 2014, first with EU Force RCA, then between 2015-2016 with EU Military Advisory Mission RCA, which was later succeeded by the current EUTM RCA (EEAS/EUTM RCA, 2021). The mandate was extended geographically and in time frame as well, and is carried out in close cooperation with its civilian counterpart, EU advisory mission (EUAM RCA) from 2020 (EEAS/EUTM RCA, 2021). With the full statistics being unclear – mostly due to double or multiple participation by selected individuals – EUTM RCA educated approximately 7000 personnel

up until 2020, with around 2500 trained in special topics, such as human rights and SGBV (Hickendorff and Acko, 2021). Under its 3ʳᵈ mandate, EUTM RCA provided advising and training activities, with special focus on defence sector reform (EEAS/EUTM RCA, 2021). An important highlight of the strategic advising component of the mission is that the force commander worked directly with the president of CAR as a security advisor, as well as the MoD of the country – previously led by a female minister – on articulating and implementing national policy documents, such as the National Defense Strategy (Hickendorff and Acko, 2021). The training mission in CAR elaborated its own gender action plan for the effective internal and external gender mainstreaming and published a brief, but comprehensive news report on its gender-related activities and structures available at the webpage of EU Delegation to Chad (EEAS, Delegation of the EU in Chad, 2021). Additionally, EUTM contributed to the implementation of the gender perspective in FACA's recruitment plan in 2018, with which the 10% target goal of women in FACA forces has been reached. In 2018, 101 women out of 1022 soldiers recruited in 2018 attended the basic military training in the following year of which 40% joined combat units or the headquarters of FACA (EEAS, Delegation of the EU in Jordan, 2019).

As highlighted, all studied missions could set forth some tangible result regarding gender mainstreaming throughout the missions components either as advising the respective ministries or training individual soldiers and providing the opportunity to create change or food for thought. Some of these steps might seem small or insignificant, but two major issues are to be considered: the amount of efforts put into the confidence building measures and negotiations with host nation authorities to be able to transfer the value of gender equality in partner countries, and the significance of creating change with supporting the first handful female trainees, or achieve shift in the attitude of one policy-maker or local leader.

5. Findings and discussion

The increasing support for EU-led training missions since 2010 is an undoubted phenomenon. EUTMs has become an important instrument of the European Union's CSDP, but common structural and procedural difficulties, as well as country-specific issues are overshadowing the 'career path' of EUTMs. All of which are directly influencing the gender mainstreaming efforts of the military missions. Even though civilian missions, especially those focusing on SSR, and their personnel are usually better trained in gender issues and better equipped with gender mainstreaming opportunities predominantly deriving from the mission mandate, military training missions have come a long way since 2010. The evolution of generic procedures, structures and tasks related to gender mainstreaming can be clearly identified. EUTM RCA, for instance, elaborated an internal action plan (Gender Action Plan RCA) creating a country-specific document harmonizing with EU-level strategic documents on gender mainstreaming and equality, GAP III. Permanent, full-time, and in most cases explicitly gender-focused expert positions on the strategic level are opened to provide the necessary expertise in the field. Gender advisors working directly with the mission force commanders are helped by appointed colleagues in other components (gender focal points) to support the widespread implementation of the principles of gender equality. However, these vacancies are often waiting for member states to second their experts, but gender expertise, especially in the field of security and defence on its own, is a missing capability in the EU.

The two major tasks in EUTMs' mandates are training and advising, which means different challenges and opportunities for gender mainstreaming. On the one hand, advising by nature is more closely connected to the strategic/political level, working with a top-down approach including gender mainstreaming. With mentoring and advising the MoDs and the armed forces of the respective countries on gender equality, mainstreaming efforts might have a more nationwide effect via new regulations, policies or security and defence-related strategic documents. However, questions might be asked on whether MoDs in Mali, Central African Republic or in Somalia have the necessary capabilities

to successfully disseminate these new strategic decisions and directions born with the cooperation of gender experts of the EUTMs. Whether a new gender policy for example will be able to physically reach the soldiers on the ground, or will senior military leaders, commanders have the means and will to help the troops understand and internalise these. On the other hand, complementing the gender mainstreaming efforts of the respective missions with a bottom-up approach, the training component is aiming at changing the attitudes and societal gender norms on an individual level. Directly benefiting selected trainees, gender awareness training or lectures on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, provide a brief insight, but vital, different perspective for host country soldiers on gender equality. External gender mainstreaming in training missions include training on gender perspectives or awareness raising on sexual and gender-based violence (Moreno, interview, 2022). It is important to acknowledge that the overall outreach of the training component might be thousands of trainees in EUTMs, gender training for host country soldiers and officers is (only) mostly a module integrated in basic military training alongside with several other priority issues. The complementary nature of these two components and approaches of external gender mainstreaming in EUTMs are pictured in Figure 2. below.

Figure 2. Complementary nature of gender mainstreaming in EU training missions

Figure by the author, 2021

Nevertheless, gender training for trainees is facing major limitations deriving from human capacity and capability issues of trainers and trainees as well. From the training provider's side, EUTMs are frequently lacking continuous and consistent gender expertise on the field in general, especially in terms of operational roles. Besides the quantitative shortfalls on expertise, Training Requirement Analysis of EU CSDP personnel in gender clearly indicated that the goal of gender-related training before and upon deployment is to close the knowledge gap between civilian and military personnel, and troops coming from different member states with different levels of training on gender. Accordingly, as already highlighted above, the responsibility of providing training on gender issues also lies with member states and their national curriculum in military education. In case of trainees in host countries, even if the military mission has the necessary gender expertise and personnel on strategic and operational levels, EU personnel frequently face much more fundamental challenges in terms of capacities of national armed forces than the implementation of gender mainstreaming efforts. Selected trainees are often lacking or having very basic military education, as well as basic skills for carrying out tasks and orders, such as low level of literacy.

6. Conclusion

The European Union as a unique entity in contemporary global politics represents a new form of power with reaching back to its fundamental values and norms even in its external action, and even if it is seeking the interest of the union and its member states. One of the core values, gender equality in the European Union is mainstreamed in its external action and CSDP. In the case of military training missions internalizing the norms of gender equality and women's empowerment through internal gender mainstreaming via the military gender training discipline in pre-deployment, induction and/or in-mission trainings, while at the same time externalizing the same principles in host countries. This duality in the EU gender mainstreaming framework and processes are present in all different missions and operations to some extent. While in case of EU training missions in Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic, the externalization process is supported by another bifocal method: top-down approach in the advising components and bottom-up approach in the training components. This further strengthens the unique nature of EU training missions vis-à-vis gender mainstreaming as instruments of the EU's normative power that even if their mandates do not explicitly involve gender-related aspects, such as in the case of some civilian missions, the EU still 'exports' gender awareness, transfers the norms of gender equality in parts of the world where achieving success on gender equality socialization takes months and years of work due to the deeply rooted inequalities between women and men in the respective countries. Furthermore, with military training missions the EU uses military force but that of a non-executive nature, which reiterates the normative power identity of the European Union, and the strong normative considerations on which the EU external action is based.

In other words, some EU CSDP missions are (also) for gender-mainstreaming based on their mandate, while in EU training missions, gender-mainstreaming is for the mission and for the sustainable and successful implementation of the integrated approach. The normative power identity of the EU allows it to conduct military missions and operations and use military force, but does not allow doing so without the strong normative considerations and funding values of the Unions, such as gender equality. This normative power identity which characterizes the EU the most in international politics allows it to merge tools, ways and means, and provide an explanation on why the Union focuses on gender mainstreaming in EU training missions in Somalia, Mali and CAR to some extent. Quoting president von der Leyen once again: gender equality '*is a reflection of who we are*' (EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, 2020).

Nevertheless, despite the strong normative consideration, the EU shall seek ways for rationalization, and maximizing the operational utility of gender expertise on the field in training missions or gender mainstreaming in the EU. With the increasing international presence in Somalia, Mali and CAR the EU might be able to strengthen and rationalize its gender mainstreaming activity by reinforcing and exploring cooperative solutions together with the UN and other international organizations and NGOs on the field. More cooperation on training for host countries on Women, Peace and Security for instance would not be solely an opportunity to find more cost effective solutions, but beyond the functional point of view, it would allow the EU and the international community to overcome capacity challenges of human resources, or language barriers, as well as exchanging best practice solutions and lessons learned/identified by international staff working on the ground for the same goal under different flag.

The close future holds the possibility for researchers to study the fourth EU training mission in Mozambique, where '*gender advisor and trainer position has been created*' (EEAS policy officer, interview, 2021). Counting with the several commonalities in the operational environment of the ongoing missions in Mali, RCA or Somalia, Mozambique can be a theatre where the developments of the last decade in the relatively short history of training missions can give reason for optimism. Moreover, EUTM Mozambique might be the first EU training mission, where gender specific training requirement analysis adopted by EU Military Staff is already used during the setup phase and upon deployment. 2022 shall bring new impetus to EU CSDP in general as well with

the adoption of the Strategic Compass, as well as, training missions are likely to be highly affected by the new opportunities provided by the European Peace Facility. As Europe faces maybe the most challenging security environment in the region as well as in global terms, the European Union insisting on keeping its normative approach and constitutional principles, including gender equality and women's empowerment in the heart of its external action will most definitely keep researchers and policy-makers busy in elaborating the means and ways to do so.

INTERVIEWS AND PRESENTATIONS

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Eleni Kapsokoli

Cybersecurity in the Western Balkans: is the 'Brussels Effect' in play?

CYBERSECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: IS THE 'BRUSSELS EFFECT' IN PLAY?

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Abstract— **During the last two decades, societies have faced the growing threat of cyberattacks and malicious cyber activities by both state and non-state actors. It is in this context that the Western Balkans have developed cybersecurity strategies and relevant mechanisms over the last years. The purpose of the paper is to analyse the cybersecurity framework in the Western Balkans and in particular question the extent to which the so-called 'Brussels Effect' is in play. In order to achieve that, we will first examine the cybersecurity context developed by the European Union. In a latter phase, we will review the mechanisms and strategies that both the EU through its actions and the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the Western Balkans states have developed to counter the full spectrum of the cybersecurity challenges. The end goal is to reach a better understanding of how cybersecurity has been developed in the region, but also highlight whether the EU has succeeded in promoting its cybersecurity norms and regulations in the Western Balkans.**

KEYWORDS

- **cybersecurity**
- **Western Balkans**
- **European Union**
- **Brussels Effect**

1. Introduction

Modern societies have benefited from the advantages offered by the rapid evolution of information and communication technologies (ICTs), which are vital in all aspects. In the era of internet of things (IoT), there are more than 5.185 billion cyberspace users (64.6 percent of the world's total population (Internet Live Stats, 2023), which are "active" for at least 6.5 hours per day and 4.9 billion users of social media platforms (Statista Research Department, 2023). The critical infrastructure, the private and public sector and citizens are highly dependent on the global interconnectivity and the digitalization of our life, which give rise to new threats. Cybersecurity as a multifaceted field has raised numerous security threats like cybercrime, cyberespionage, cyberterrorism and violation of digital rights and freedoms. Cyberspace is a new field of malicious activities for state or non-state actors. The above security threats are addressed not only at the national level but also at the European level. In particular, over the last years, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has developed policies, capacity building and training programs in order to integrate the cybersecurity element within the CSDP missions.

Taking into account various indicators and metric[1] that have been developed to assess the level of national cybersecurity readiness, it can be argued that the Western Balkans have been rated as the less prepared countries within Europe. The European Union's

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[1] For more details see the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) by e-Governance Academy and Global Cybersecurity Index 2020 by International Telecommunication Union.

(EU) cybersecurity strategies of 2013, 2017 and 2020, and the relevant mechanisms of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), the Network & Information Security (NIS) Directive, the Digital Single Market and the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, shaped the development of the Western Balkans cybersecurity framework. The Western Balkans are in the process of harmonizing and standardizing their cybersecurity legislation and strategies with that of the EU. The latter assisted in the creation of the Multi-Annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkans (MAP) and the Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans. The above raises the question whether the 'Brussels Effect' is in play or not.

A common challenge of the Western Balkans regarding cybersecurity is that they have not developed effective institutions, operational and legislative mechanisms due to lack of political will and technical capabilities. The region is trying to tackle cybersecurity threats, but their approach compared to that of the EU is narrower. In particular, they lack Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) and public and private cooperation. They also need to develop training and awareness programs and sharing of information capabilities and practices.

Thus, the aim of this paper is dual. On the one hand to analyse how the Western Balkans respond to the wide range of cybersecurity threats and on the other hand to question whether the EU is able to externalize its regulations and practices in this region. In other words, to argue whether and to what extent the EU digital regulatory power - the 'Brussels Effect' (Bradford, 2020) - triggered a number of policy reforms and regulatory adjustments in the Western Balkans' cybersecurity. In order to demonstrate this cause-effect link, we first review how the EU constructed its cybersecurity framework and in a latter phase analyse the cybersecurity policies and strategies of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and North Macedonia. By pointing out the inefficiencies and shortcomings of the current cybersecurity strategies, we will be able to identify policy gaps that can be filled by enhancing the cooperation between the Western Balkans and the EU.

2. The Brussels Effect: the EU as a digital regulatory power

The EU is a global governing power and comprises one of the largest and wealthiest economies. Many private and public actors have close cooperation with the EU and its member-states, which has resulted in the adoption of its rules and regulations. Bradford refers to this as the 'Brussels Effect', meaning the ability of the EU to externalize its regulations and practices, outside its borders. The European principles have a broad influence on ICT's technologies and the mitigation of their threats. The digital "Europeanization" starts with adoption of common regulations and joint actions, by its member-states and third parties. The need for broader cooperation has as a main precondition the harmonization and standardization by its member-states and the other partners (Bradford, 2020). The EU, being a global power in terms of digital regulation, for example the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Bradford, 2020, 131-170) is able to shape how others - in our case, the Western Balkans - shape their cybersecurity ecosystem. The EU influences the policies and strategies of other states-partners and their markets through its regulations (Bradford, 2020, 14-15). The Union being a large consumer market with strong regulatory institutions, is in a position to shape the homogenization of legislations, standards and policies on a global level. Based on the fact that after the implementation of the GDPR, many states adopted similar regulations, it is justified to question whether the 'Brussels Effect' could have a similar impact in the area of cybersecurity.

3. An overview of the European cybersecurity framework

The European Cybersecurity framework includes the protection of online systems, information networks, data, digital programs, and critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activities. The EU Cybersecurity Strategy (EUCSS) of 2013 defines the above term as "The safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and the military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure". Cybersecurity strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained within (European Commission, 2013, 3-5). It includes six strategic priorities: 1) to achieve cyber-resilience, 2) to reduce cybercrime, 3) to develop a cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the CSDP, 4) to develop industrial and technical resources to prevent and deter cyber incidents, 5) to develop international cyberspace policy and 6) to promote the EU's core values both in the digital and the physical world. The EUCSS is highly promising and through the years of its adoption, the EU has made progress in all policies. Nevertheless, the goal of a wider cooperation between national and international actors, that involve both the private sector and the civil society, has not been achieved yet.

The revised Cybersecurity Strategy of the EU in 2017 pointed out the same goals as the previous one, but mentioned the need to establish a pan-European mechanism for dealing with crises and future large-scale cyber attacks, to develop joint actions in the field of cyber defence within the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation with the European Defence Fund and the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox. The latter is the Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities. It is a set of measures against malicious operations and threats in cyberspace (European Commission, 2017b, 18-20). Two years later, the Council imposed the first cyber sanctions regime as a response to cyberattacks.

Over the past decade, the EU has established several institutions, which aim to provide its member-states with the necessary cybersecurity and cyber defence capabilities like the European Defence Agency (EDA), the ENISA, the NIS Directive, the Digital Single Market, the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) and the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre.

In 2020, the EU presented its new revised Cybersecurity Strategy. The Strategy strengthens the EU's collective resilience against cyber threats and ensures that citizens and the private sector benefit from trustworthy and reliable services and digital tools. It stresses that Europeans need to be assured that they will be protected from cyber threats. The Commission proposes to address both cyber and physical resilience of critical entities and networks through a Directive on measures for high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (revised NIS Directive or NIS 2'). The Strategy encourages the EU to think global but act in a European way, in order to secure cyberspace (European Commission, 2020a). The EU has close relations with the Western Balkans and aims to secure, stable, prosperous and well-functioning democratic societies with its guidance. The Western Balkans formalize and adopt cybersecurity strategies and legislations to achieve harmonization and standardization with the EU's security strategies, as well as to have attractive and secure markets and economies for further investment, economic and regional development. In order to become a full member of the EU, the Western Balkans have to make certain reforms. One of the main requirements relating to the NIS Directive is to have a sufficient level of cybersecurity and common measures for network and information systems across the Union (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). In line with the above, the Budapest Convention's ratification requests the effective combat of cybercrime (OSCE, 2019).

The President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker highlighted the main goal of the Union for the Western Balkans, 'If we want more stability in our neighbourhood, then we must also maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans...Accession candidates must give the rule of law, justice and

fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations' (European Commission, 2018b). In July 2017 at the Trieste Summit, the Western Balkans agreed for digital integration as one of the key objectives of the MAP (European Commission, 2017A).

In February 2018, the EU's strategy for the Western Balkans presented six flagships initiatives. One of these six initiatives involved the Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans (DAWB) (European Commission, 2018C). In May 2018, during the EU - Western Balkans Summit in Sofia, the region publicly supported the Digital Agenda (Council of the EU and European Council, 2018). The MAP is coordinated by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) upon request of the Western Balkans and supported by the European Commission.

The European Commission announced in June 2018, the DAWB, which pointed out the need to support the region to become a digital economy and to boost digital transformation and connectivity. The agenda focused on five main priorities: the reduction of roaming cost, the deployment of broadband, the strengthening of digital economy, health and society (e-Government, e-Procurement and e-Health), the building of trust and security with the digitalization of industries and the implementation of the EU's rights and obligations. Progress has been achieved regarding the communication and cooperation between the Western Balkans due to the RCC (European Commission, 2018a).

In December 2020, the EU announced the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) was ended because it was in force from 2014 and provided a 2.98 billion, assistance of cybersecurity capacity building in the Western Balkans to build up effective institutions to strengthen cyber-resilience (European Commission, 2019). In October 2020, the EU called for the Western Balkans to focus on reform priorities, including cybersecurity capacity and the fight against cybercrime by implementing the EU toolbox regarding 5G networks risks (European Commission, 2020B). According to the 2020 EU cybersecurity strategy, the EU cyber capacity building will support the efforts of the Western Balkans in the area of digital development (European Commission, 2020A). The IPA III was adopted on 15 September 2021 and will be put into force by 2027 with a budget of 14.162 billion to further enhance their capabilities in cybersecurity. On 15 November 2021, the Foreign Affairs Council highlighted the need to enhance the cooperation with the Western Balkans on cyber security, hybrid threats and other instances such as the use of space data (Council of the EU, 2021).

The CSDP will assist the efforts of the Western Balkans' digitalization. Bearing in mind that the Western Balkans is a fragile region that experiences a wide spectrum of security challenges, like cybersecurity, hybrid threats, disinformation and radicalization, the CSDP could aid in countering the above. In particular, the CSDP missions could provide adequate training courses, awareness programs, and early warning exercises in the fields of hybrid threats and cybersecurity (European Commission, 2020a).

4. Western Balkans cybersecurity developments

Even though some important strategic steps have been taken to improve the conditions in the cybersecurity field by the Western Balkans, there is still much ground to cover. The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the need for digital services and thereby highlighted the threats deriving from cyberattacks. A summary of the cybersecurity developments (national strategies, legislation and national cybersecurity teams) is provided in Table 1.

5. Albania

Albania does not have a national strategy on cybersecurity. In 2015, it adopted the Paper on Cyber Security 2015-2017 from the Ministry of Innovation and Public Administration. The Paper refers to the need to review and coordinate the obligations for a secure

cyberspace. It also focuses on the following strategic objectives: to complete a legal framework in the cybersecurity, to raise awareness and increase know-how through the training, to create Identification and Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure (CIIP), to develop cybersecurity requirements and to enhance security in governments information systems and critical infrastructure (Republic of Albania, 2015, 9-10). The above strategy also recognizes the need for preparedness and resilience in case of cyberattacks and the raising of awareness for cybersecurity. The existing strategies and policies are the following: Strategy for Cyber Defense from the Ministry of Defense (2014), National Security Strategy 2014-2020, the Digital Agenda for Albania 2015-2020 (2015), the Action Plan for Digital Agenda 2015-2020 (2015) and Cybersecurity Strategy 2018-2020 (2018). In 2020, Albania announced its National Cybersecurity Strategy 2020-2025 and its Action Plan, which are under development (UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal Albania). Training in the cyberspace field is provided by international organizations, like the OSCE (Conway and Brady, 2018, 44-45). Also, they implemented the Law on Cybersecurity in 2017 in alignment with the NIS. The national CIRT of Albania, which was ALCIRT, now is part of the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cybersecurity (AKCESK) which was established in 2017 (DCAF, 2021, 4). The new strategy of 2020-2025 will focus on four goals: 1) the national level of cybersecurity for the protection of information infrastructure, 2) a safe cyberspace through cyber awareness in the society, 3) the development of mechanisms for cybersecurity and 4) the improvement of national and international cooperation (Republic of Albania, 2020, 1492-1497).

6. North Macedonia

Cybersecurity is one of the top national priorities and there is a strategy and an action plan, but there is no sufficient awareness to implement them. The EU in 2018 noted that North Macedonia's digitalization is moving fast, and government services are developed, but the citizens do not feel comfortable with the cybersecurity capabilities due to lack of awareness and training (Conway and Brady, 2018, 55-56). North Macedonia has adopted its National Cybersecurity Strategy 2018-2022 and its action plan (2018). Although a cybersecurity law is absent, online criminal activities are addressed by the criminal code. The Strategy highlighted five key goals: 1) to build cyber resilient ICT infrastructure, 2) to promote a cybersecurity culture to raise public awareness, 3) to strengthen national capacities for cybercrime, 4) to strengthen national capacities for cyber defence and 5) to cooperate at national and international level (Republic of Macedonia, 2018, 17-26). The Strategy was developed on the principles of the EU's Cybersecurity Strategy and the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge. The Macedonian Computer Incident Response Team (MKD-CIRT) is the national coordinating body for reporting and management of cybersecurity incidents and was set up in 2015 inside the Agency for Electronic Communications (AEC) (MKD-CIRT, 19/11/2021). The MKD-CIRTs are doing joint exercises with both the public and private sector, similar to those of ENISA and NATO (Republic of Macedonia, 2018, 57). The cybersecurity culture is under development and there is a need to establish training programs for cybersecurity awareness for the public and private, but also for the citizens.

7. Serbia

The first reference on the rising threat of cyberspace was in Serbia's National Security Strategy of 2009. This Strategy pinpointed the increased use of ICTs and the challenges of cybercrime and other malicious cyber activities against its citizens and legal entities (Republic of Serbia, 2009, 14). In Serbia, cybersecurity is regulated by the Law on Information Security (2016), the Strategy for the Development of Information Security for the period 2017-2020 (2017), the Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy for the Development of Information Security for the period 2017-2020 (2018) and the Strategy for the fight against high-tech crime for the period 2019-2023 (2018) (UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal Serbia). The vision of the strategy is to develop and enhance information security

at the national level to achieve cybersecurity for its society and secure ICT systems. This vision will succeed through the establishment of continuous cooperation between public and private sector, non-governmental organizations, and the academic community. The National Centre for Prevention of Security Risks (CSIRT) was established in 2016. The SRB CERT protects ICT systems and coordinates the cooperation with other relevant actors and is hosted by the Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services (RATEL) (Cyber Security Intelligence, 2021).

8. Montenegro

Montenegro has significant evolution in the cybersecurity field. The timeline starts from 2010 with the adoption of Law on Information Security, the National Cybersecurity Strategy 2013-2017 and its Action Plan (2013) as well as the National Cybersecurity Strategy 2018-2021 (2017) and its Action Plan (2019). The last strategy refers to modern challenges and updates the strategic objectives of the previous strategy from 7 to 8. The key goals are the reliance on European and Euro-Atlantic concepts, the strengthening of cyber defence capacities, the centralization of cyber expertise and resources, the data protection, the secure cyberspace for the state and its citizens, the cybersecurity education and training, the cooperation between public and private sectors and the regional and international cooperation (Ministry of Public Administration, 2017, 37-38). It also refers to cyberterrorism and cybercrime (creation of terrorist organizations, attacks by individuals or groups, organized crime). The strategy does not refer to a clear vision on cybersecurity, but it refers to the EU NIS Directive and the need to ensure further advancement. Also, they do not mention human rights and resilience of information systems in case of cyber threats. The government adopted a multiannual strategy based on the Digital Agenda for Europe and the EU's Digital Single Market strategy which addresses cybersecurity issues. The National Montenegrin Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT.ME) participates in joint exercises that are hosted by the National Security Agency of the Ministry of Defence, to enhance cyber capabilities (Conway and Brady, 2018, 50).

9. Kosovo

Kosovo has adopted the National Cybersecurity Strategy and its Action Plan 2016-2019 (2015), the Digital Agenda for Kosovo 2013-2020 (2013) and the Law on Critical Infrastructure (2018). The Strategy includes five objectives: to ensure a safe cyber environment which includes the protection of critical infrastructure, the institutional development and capacity building, public-private partnerships, incident response and international cooperation (Republic of Kosovo, 2015). It refers to the respect of privacy, fundamental rights, freedom and democratic values through the use of cyberspace. Based on this, they created a National Cybersecurity Council (NCSC) as a coordination platform for all stakeholders that are involved. Kosovo's strategy and action plan are based on the indicators developed by ENISA (2014). International cooperation and public-private partnerships exist, but need improvement because they are necessary priorities to enhance the field of training and education. Kosovo cooperates in the field of training with international organizations such as ICITAP, the EU and OSCE (Conway and Brady, 2018, 48-49) and has multilateral agreements to increase the capacity building initiatives and to promote best practices. Also, it has a national cyber-incident response unit, the National Cyber Security Unit of Kosovo (KOS-CERT) that was established in 2015 by Kosovo Security Forces. This Unit is hosted by the Regulatory Authority of Electronic and Postal Communications (RAEPC) and is assigned to provide technical incident response and awareness-raising. Nevertheless, there is currently no information / cybersecurity law, but only a list of regulations that are relevant to this field (DCAF, 2021, 12).

10. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia addressed the growing risk of cybercrime, the hacking of network systems and the abuse of its citizens' personal information by cyberattacks in its counterterrorism strategy in 2010 (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010). Its amended version in 2015 does not specifically refer to online radicalization but only addresses that violent extremism and radicalization lead to terrorism. It points out special preventive measures to combat misuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes, widespread hate speech, hate crimes and discrimination (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015, 8-10). The above strategies are based on the principles and vision with the relevant documents of the United Nations, NATO and the EU. The first reference on cybersecurity was in 2017, when the Ministry of Defence adopted its Cybersecurity Strategy and its Action Plan. This strategy focused solely on the ministry's network systems and noted that the legal framework to fight organized crime is only partially aligned with the EU assistance. The National Cybersecurity Strategy is still under construction due to lack of legal framework and some sectoral policies have developed relevant strategies as it has been mentioned above. The state should guarantee a strategic and legal framework to improve its procedures and techniques (CERT/CSIRT) to protect its critical infrastructure and cyberspace as highlighted by the European Commission Progress Report in 2016. This report stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a comprehensive strategic approach to address cybercrime and cybersecurity threats (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, it is the only state in Europe that does not have a national CERT/CSIRT/ CIRT to reduce cyber threats and incidents. The only entity is CERT RS in Republika Srpska and is working on developing a cybersecurity strategy through an interdepartmental working group (DCAF, 2021, 10). Although some security strategies in Bosnia are dealing with cybersecurity issues, Bosnia lacks a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. The revised Strategy for Preventing and Countering Terrorism 2021-2025 will include the issue of cybersecurity. Till now, there are only the guidelines of a cybersecurity strategy by the OSCE (2019). CSDP programs could provide support in the form of training, awareness, and education.

Table 1. Western Balkans Cybersecurity Developments

	National Cybersecurity Strategies / Policies	Legislation	National Cybersecurity Teams
Albania	Paper on Cyber Security 2015-2017 (2015) Strategy for Cyber Defense from the Ministry of Defense (November 2014) National Security Strategy 2014-2020, the Digital Agenda for Albania 2015-2020 (2015) Action Plan for Digital Agenda 2015-2020 (2015) Cybersecurity Strategy 2018-2020 (2018) National cybersecurity strategy 2020-2025 and its Action Plan (2020)	Law on Cybersecurity (2017)	AKCESK/NAECCS (2017)
North Macedonia	National Cybersecurity Strategy 2018-2022 and its action plan (2018)	No Law on Cybersecurity	MKD- CIRT (2015)
Serbia	Strategy for the Development of Information Security for the period 2017-2020 (2017) Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy for the Development of Information Security for the period 2017 -2020 (2018) Strategy for the fight against high-tech crime for the period 2019-2023 (2018)	Law on Information Security (2016)	SRB-CERT (2017)

Montenegro	National Cybersecurity Strategy 2013-2017 and its Action Plan (2013) National Cybersecurity Strategy 2018-2021 (2017) and its Action Plan (2019)	Law on Information Security (2010)	CIRT.ME (2011)
Kosovo	National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan 2016-2019 (2015) Digital Agenda for Kosova 2013- 2020 (2013)	Law on Critical Infrastructure (2018)	KOS-CERT (2013)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	No cybersecurity strategy, only guidelines by OSCE	No Law on Cybersecurity	No National CERT/ CSIRT / CIRT - CERT RS in Republika Srpska

11. Conclusions

Cybersecurity is a key concern for the Western Balkans region as it strives for economic growth, societal stability, and integration into the global digital sphere. This issue is accompanied by challenges such as limited resources and technical capabilities, fragmented legal frameworks, and lack of awareness. These challenges necessitate a multifaceted approach to address them effectively. Although the Western Balkans have progressed in the field of cybersecurity, there is still much work to be done.

As we mentioned, there are key challenges relating to the training and awareness of the relevant stakeholders, including the incident reports and attribution procedures. Additionally, the establishment of CSIRTS and CERTS, and the promotion of public-private cooperation in this field are issues that require more attention. There are different levels of awareness, preparedness and approaches to cybersecurity issues among the Western Balkans countries, which further increase the security vulnerabilities.

A review of the cybersecurity policies and strategies of the Western Balkans reveals that many have replicated the data regulations and cybersecurity standards/ policies of the EU. This replication is evident in the following initiatives and developments such as the Multi-Annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkans (MAP), the Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans, the CSIRTS / CERTS, the IPA II and the ongoing IPA III. The above proves that a process of 'digital Europeanization' of this region is at its early phase. Thus, it is safe to argue that a silent 'Brussels Effect' is in play after all.

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Could virtual currencies
cause the next financial
crisis and what would be
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COULD VIRTUAL CURRENCIES CAUSE THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE?

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Abstract— Purpose: This study set out to examine if a potential crash of the virtual currencies market could cause the next global financial crisis, given its continuous growth and popularity and the risks associated with their use, and at the same time what would be the impact on European Defence and the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), by making a parallel with the effect that the 2008 financial crisis had.

Methodology: A series of methods, techniques and tools have been adapted to the research objectives, specifically: gathering sources, data collection, analysis method, descriptive method, deductive, inductive, and comparative methods.

Findings: As the financial institutions started to invest in the new currencies seeking high returns, the market finds itself in an uncanny similar position as it was before the Great Recession. A new recession may represent an opportunity for the EU defence sector considering that lower budgets allocated for defence would put an increased pressure on the states to have better cooperation and solve the existing issues related to the capability development and at the same time would force them to restructure the defence industry and markets. Nevertheless, a financial crisis could represent a risk for the member states to be forced to cut their budgets allocated to the military in an uncoordinated manner which could lead to even bigger gaps related to capability development which could be translated into diminished opportunities to implement the Common Security and Defence Policy.

1. Introduction

▶ **Aim of the research:** This research aims to analyse if the virtual currencies market crash could affect the global economy, leading to a new financial crisis and how could this affect the European Defence.

▶ **Research question:** What are the impacts of a potential financial crisis, produced by a virtual currencies market crash, on the European Defence?

2. Argument

Virtual currencies gained huge popularity worldwide and they continue to rapidly grow as individuals are becoming wary of the monetary politics of the centralized banks. As their rapid spread is not essentially an issue, some of the effects that this phenomenon is producing are concerning (Halim, 2021). For instance, the potential high returns yield by the investments in virtual currencies are attractive also for the financial institutions, which then use these coins as collateral in exchange for funds (Infante, 2018). In this sense, virtual currencies can be seen as a gold mine for some firms that participate in the exchanges. Yet, the risks stemming from trading virtual currencies are not fully assessed and mitigated or are simply ignored. As a consequence, some financial experts believe that this kind of exposure is putting the market in a similar position as it was before the Great Recession (Mussington, 2018).

3. Structure of the paper

In this article, our objective is to analyse (i) the possible outcomes of a virtual currencies market crash and (ii) which would be the likelihood of leading to a global financial crisis; (iii) short and long term effects of a financial crisis on public budgets, especially on the military budgets (iv) problems and measures imposed on the defence sector during the recession.

4. Methodology

The objectives proposed in this study will be achieved by using a complex scientific research methodology, based on:

▶ documentary analysis, consisting of a theoretical and scientific study of how the topic researched is reflected in the literature in various online sources, in order to conceptualise, analyse and capitalise on the information obtained.

▶ a comparative analysis aimed at a study and analysis of the effect that the 2008 financial crisis had on the European defence and the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

5. Conceptual and theoretical framework

There is no applicable existing theoretical framework addressing the possibility of a market crash caused by the virtual currencies and the impact on EU defence. However, there are specific theories describing the probability of a financial crisis to be provoked by the use of virtual currencies as well as studies examining the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on EU defence. Hence, the current conceptual framework was constructed from certain theories relevant to this research. There are studies confirming the causal relationship between the huge increase in Bitcoin price and the impact on global financial stability (Renick, 2021). Additionally, the theory also aligns with the study of Sharma (2019), which addresses the implications of a Bitcoin price crash.

Taking these findings into consideration and employing the significant role of research such as that conducted by Ferreira and Pereira (2019), which shows the contagion effect in the cryptocurrency market, might provide useful insight, as such an approach highlights implications of this new technology on the global financial system, respectively the effects on the public budgets and EU defence.

6. Literature review

As existing studies have not yet exhaustively addressed the real implications of a possible financial crisis provoked by the new payment technologies, such as virtual currencies, or considered all the aspects of their potential impact on the EU's Defence, there still is a clear need to explore and study this domain. Notable among the existing studies is the risk analysis carried out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in their Global Financial Stability Report October 2021- *'Covid-19, Crypto, And Climate. Navigating Challenging Transitions.'* stating that the virtual currencies represent a challenge to the financial stability and that their market cap is comparable to the US high-yield bonds; the trading volumes of the virtual currencies are comparable to domestic stock exchanges in some countries, and the exposure of the financial institutions is constantly growing.

Additionally, a number of studies have identified that a financial crisis has short- and long-term effects on the public budget, putting them under extreme pressure, as concluded by the research done by Mölling & Brune (2011). In their seminal paper, Maulny and Liberti (2008) also showed the impact of the financial crisis on the implementation of ESDP. Whilst, Brune, Cameron, Maulny and Terlikowski (2010) researched how Europe's Armed forces are restructuring in times of Austerity.

However, the global efforts to limit the risks associated with the use of virtual currencies have remained largely unnoticed and understudied. This paper seeks to address this gap, with a view to better understanding the impact of a possible new financial crisis provoked by a virtual currencies crash and tries to include recommendations to better address the impact of a potential economic crisis whilst ensuring that the EU retains and even improves its defence capabilities.

As a starting point for our scientific research, we consider it important to analyse first what is the likelihood that the virtual currencies bubble would burst and produce a financial crisis and then examine what this would mean for the EU Defence.

7. What is the Issue?

The virtual currencies market lacks transparency and this leads to diminished confidence in the valuation of the technology, especially as the financial institutions invest in extremely volatile and unsafe coins and use them as collaterals in exchange for funds, even though they admit that the valuation is speculative (Irrera, 2019). This leads to high volatility of the coins that could plummet unexpectedly and start a domino effect that would lead to a financial crisis. In the meantime, the existing regulations fail to be effective and are not enforced consistently, thus, the transparency and stability issue of the virtual currencies is not being addressed properly (Girasa, 2018).

The general opinion about Bitcoin is that it is still a high-risk investment, its value can drop as much as 30% at any movement. This is also the reason that the gains are also so big, high risk – big reward but also great losses. Due to this reason, Bitcoin is attractive for investors as it is not similar to fiat hedges, being mostly an instrument based on emotions. When the times are bad, its price crashes, and when times are good it surges. It can be compared to a casino game in the investing world, with everyone winning at the moment (Halim, 2021).

There are many reasons that specialists believe the virtual market will crush: the chart on bitcoin price looking very risky; the US dollar getting stronger, which puts bitcoin at risk as there was a huge interest in virtual currency due to the wrong estimations about the dollar devaluation; the decreasing power of central banks to sustain the markets; the declining number of marginal bitcoin buyers. Some people see bitcoin as a virus. The

price growth is determined mostly by the adoption of those who do not trust the existing monetary systems and the authorities, and this phenomenon was noted during the latest impressive growth phase of the coin (Renick, 2021).

8. Could Bitcoin Price Crash affect the global Economy?

The opinion of the majority of experts regarding the huge increase of Bitcoin price is that it is a bubble, wondering when the price will crash, rather than if it will crash or not. Consequently, it is interesting to analyse also what will be the effect of a Bitcoin price crash (Sharma, 2019).

In the 2018 annual report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC, 2020), the virtual currencies were first listed among the challenges to financial stability. FSOC concluded that the virtual currencies did not pose a material risk and that they have a 'very limited' impact on global financial stability, but identified some factors that could change the assessment: such as the size of market cap., exposure of financial institutions, utilization of the virtual currencies for payments and settlements. In the meantime, the market cap has grown 10 times, being comparable to the US high-yield bonds; the trading volumes of the virtual currencies are comparable to domestic stock exchanges in some countries, and the exposure of the financial institutions is constantly growing (IMF, 2021).

The global financial crisis, 2007-2008, was triggered by the subprime mortgages, which were the last financial instruments that undermined the global economy. The crisis was produced by a mix of factors and actors that were actively involved in the process. It was a chain of events and actions that triggered the market crash. For instance, faulty loans were taken out by subprime creditors in the US, then the international financial institutions repackaged them into derivative instruments and further sold them to investors, so these faulty loans were propagated across all the parts of the US economy, and then further spread globally (Sharma, 2019). On the other hand, the virtual currencies market price increased mainly due to the unregulated exchanges that are circumventing the regulatory authorities. Some recent reports conclude that the main actors of these virtual currencies' exchanges are mainly individual investors and bots (Reiff, 2017). While the virtual currency-related stocks have increased their valuation considerably, the global banks and investment companies have relatively limited exposure to the virtual currencies' markets.

A better comparison to the crises that can be caused by the virtual currencies potential crash, can be represented by the 'tulip mania', dated back in the 17th century, rather than the subprime mortgage crisis. The prices of tulips surged as there was an unnecessary demand for them, creating a bubble. The main difference is that the market crush affected only the Dutch economy because the exposure of the serious financiers was limited, the ones bidding up the prices were the casual traders who did it for greed and profits, according to Nicolaas Posthumus, Dutch Historian (Posthumus, 1929). The ones who were affected the most by the market crash were exactly these people. As a parallel, a crash of the virtual currencies' prices would affect the casual traders (der Veen, 2009).

There are studies that confirm the high risk of the speculative bubbles related to the trading of virtual currencies, determined by the exuberance of the casual traders who are surging the market prices creating situations where crashes are highly probable. For example, the study done by Bianchetti, Ricci and Scaringi in 2018, identified strong bubble signals on the analysed sample periods during 2016-2018, confirming the potential of the bubbles to lead to a virtual currencies' market crash (Bianchetti, et. al, 2018).

9. How will the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem be affected?

The current surge of the prices of most of the virtual currencies comes as a domino effect from the price increase of Bitcoin and a price crash would affect the entire market. Moreover, the majority of the virtual coins with no defined business plan and having no clear utility for the society, would not survive the crash (Sharma, 2017). This type of 'contagion effect' between Bitcoin and the other virtual coins was also identified in a study performed by Ferreira and Pereira, the analysis revealing the increased integration of the coins (Ferreira and Pereira, 2019).

10. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence

The study examines the potential impact of a financial crisis that could be triggered by the crash of the virtual currencies market, on the European defence and on the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), by making a parallel with the effect that the 2008 financial crisis had. This paper seeks to address this gap, with a view to better understand the impact of a new financial crisis provoked by a virtual currencies crash and tries to include recommendations to better address the impact of a potential economic crisis whilst ensuring that the EU retains and even improves its' defence capabilities.

A new financial crisis could lead to a decrease in the budgets allocated for the defence sector, but it could also force the EU member states to have better cooperation in the defence sector and determine them to find solutions for the existing problems concerning the capability development and the restructuring of the defence industries.

The budget cuts risk to be done in an uncoordinated way by the member states since the national prerogatives still prevail, despite the efforts to have more synergies in EU defence. This could lead to higher capability gaps between the member states, and fewer chances to implement the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Mölling and Brune 2011).

11. Short- and long-term effects of a financial crisis on public budgets

There are estimations that the budgetary constraints of the EU member states will persist over the next decades, with different effects, considering that the consolidation of the national budget is done differently from country to country (Mölling and Brune 2011). However, the majority of the EU members that were affected by the 2008 financial crisis (except for Denmark, Sweden, France, Finland), undertook major consolidation measures, with drastic cuts also affecting defence spending (Valasek, 2011).

The way that the budget cuts impact the budgets allocated to the defence sector differs significantly from country to country, depending particularly on the degree of importance that is attributed to this sector. It can happen that member states with strong economies, such as Germany, plan significant cuts of the defence budget, while midsized countries like Poland and Sweden are increasing their defence budgets. On the other hand, the most drastic cuts are made by the small countries, reducing as much as 1/3 of their defence budgets (European Commission, 2011), while a number of EU-member states like Denmark and Finland are leaving their budgets steady. Hence, the different approaches are resulting from the importance that the member state is according to defence in general, as an expression of their national identity (Mölling and Brune 2011).

In order to understand what kind of problems a financial crisis caused by the crash of virtual currencies can create for the EU's defence sector, we need to look back at the effects of the 2008 crisis. Basically, it created two related problems: forcing the countries to increase their public debt in order to ensure economic recovery, and overtime seeking a fiscal consolidation to reduce the debt, this issue representing a risk for the financial security of the EU in itself; and the fact that states were forced to take measures and cut the defence-related budgets, delaying the modernization or cancelling the modernization of equipment processes and the research and technology in the defence sector. This can also impact the Level of Ambition (LoA) set by the member states, especially in the key interest of enhancing the sustainable deployability of the troops in theatres outside Europe. Also, the target of the bigger member states is to keep full-spectrum forces, whilst the smaller countries intend to cover niche capabilities and to cover specialized roles, as the full-spectrum forces are the most expensive capabilities. For example, Belgium is focusing on conventional conflict niche capabilities, such as combat aircraft and special forces; Romania is focusing on special operation sectors, cooperating with the US, Czech Republic and Hungary focus on electronic warfare and NBC protection (it covers defence and prevention measures against nuclear, biological and chemical threats and hazards) and also they are favouring the cooperation with other small countries on the topic. Besides this, other niche capabilities refer to reconnaissance and medical response, military police and engineering support (Maulny and Liberti, 2008).

When it comes to the personnel costs in the defence sector, most of the member states struggle with the excessively bureaucratic structures and high-income staffs and militaries. Cutting the defence budget could also translate into wages cuts or personnel reductions, going as far as reducing the military end-strength. Those reductions would directly affect the capabilities of the member states and their ability to contribute to EU and NATO operations. Paradoxically, this could sometimes lead to a need for additional resources to compensate for the long-term contracts.

As for the impact on the acquisition of armaments, after 2008 the cuts were lower than initially planned on average across the EU member states. Though, as mentioned earlier, the importance given to the defence sector by each member state differs and this created a bigger gap between the countries that are pro modernization and the countries that cut the armament procurement. By killing the acquisition projects, the member states are putting at risk the modernisation of their defence capabilities and is also not a feasible choice since they are bound by long-term contracts. By cancelling those contracts, the penalties imposed by the existing clauses are almost as big as the cost of the equipment.

Also, by lowering the investments with the acquisition of armaments, the defence contractors are also impacted. After 2008, the big countries decided to respect their procurement contracts, mainly due to the size of their defence industries. There were some important acquisition programmes ongoing, like Eurofighter and A400M which represented a very sensitive political topic. The decision taken by Germany and Italy was to actually re-sell some of the received tranches of the Eurofigther on the extra-European markets. However, the rest of the countries aimed to reduce their purchases or to delay the programmes of acquisitions. Also, the modernization of the key capabilities was affected, as some small states decided to postpone the modernization programmes (Mölling and Brune 2011).

In terms of maintaining and operating the existing older capabilities, most states accelerated the decommission, increasing the interest in training simulators and outsourcing the training to companies from the private sector, as a response to the financial pressures. Most of the countries tried to resell them on the international market.

On the other hand, despite the big cuts on the defence budgets, with a few exceptions, no country withdrew from any ongoing military engagements. Yet, the number of troops was reduced by almost all the member states in certain missions or shifted to fulfil their several engagements.

The defence industries across the EU were not affected immediately by the crisis, but in the long-term, the programme cancellations or delays and the market contractions could affect the EU defence sector. A drop in the demand could affect the production costs and affect the prices (Brune, et al., 2010).

12. Conclusions

The last financial crisis really challenged the budgets of the EU member states, putting them under extreme pressure. The fiscal consolidation of the governments can still be felt after the massive increases of the public debts that occurred with the recovery programmes after the crisis. It was noticed that the austerity after a global crisis could last for as long as 20 years, depending on how the member states are consolidating their public spending and their fiscal policies. It can be concluded that the impact of a crisis on the defence budget is a matter of how the member states are prioritizing the defence sector. The budget pressures determined by the crisis became a complicated situation for the small to medium countries. The budget cuts are performed at the local level in an uncoordinated way and in case of a new crisis, there is a risk of creating a bigger capability gap between the member states, impacting also the European technological and defence industry and delaying the progress (Mölling and Brune 2011).

As the financial institutions started to invest in virtual currencies seeking high returns the market finds itself in an uncanny similar position as it was before the Great Recession. A new recession may represent an opportunity for the EU defence sector considering that lower budgets allocated for defence would put an increased pressure on the states to have better cooperation and solve the existing issues related to the capability development and at the same time would force them to restructure the defence industry and markets. Nevertheless, a financial crisis could represent a risk for the member states to be forced to cut their budgets allocated to the military in an uncoordinated manner which could lead to even bigger gaps related to capability development which could be translated into diminished opportunities to implement the Common Security and Defence Policy.

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Juan C. Castilla

A public policy integrated
analysis model" applied
to CSDP defence planning

A PUBLIC POLICY INTEGRATED ANALYSIS MODEL" APPLIED TO CSDP DEFENCE PLANNING

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Abstract— The guiding question of this article is to disclose how a public policy lens is applicable to the analysis of EU defence planning. The literature on public policy or on CSDP is extensive, but scarce or non-existing when it comes to analysing CSDP from a public policy perspective. A qualitative explanatory approach sets the route for this study, which starts by setting the scene through theory on public policy, including creative individual thinking and groups influence. The author explains an original 'public policy integrated analytical model', which is later applied to a generic sequence of Capability Based planning. A hybrid analytical dimension for defence planning research is applicable to the EU. The main finding is that the EU capability based defence planning can be analysed from the view of public policy analysis. Consistently, the proposed 'public policy integrated analytical model' is also applied to the CSDP defence planning initiatives. In a broader context, this type of analysis can be applicable to other studies on defence planning research, either at national processes or at the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). The article finishes pointing out some expectations concerning the Strategic Compass aftermath, related to the military Level of Ambition and the prospect of a coherent EU defence planning process specification.

KEYWORDS

- **Public policy**
- **defence planning**
- **CSDP**
- **Capability Based planning**
- **HLGP**
- **CDP**
- **CARD**
- **PESCO**
- **EDF**
- **Strategic Compass**

1. Introduction

The 'public policy analysis (PPA)' (Deleon, 2008) as an academic discipline was born half way through the 20th century by Lerner and Lasswell (1951) (Moran et al., 2008, 5). The 'public policy creative process' (Anderson, 2011, 7–8; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984, 19–23; Olson, 1971) conceives a four stages sequence: the introduction of the problem to solve in the agenda, the policy formulation, the implementation, and the evaluation of results. Dunn's (2017) 'integrated approach' methodology for PPA includes a normative description or assessment on every stage of the policy process, where prescription, monitoring, evaluation and forecasting are developed around the 'policy problem'.

The 'defence policy' (Battaglino, 2010; Tagarev, 2006) is a state public policy, 'defence planning' (Tagarev, 2013) is one of its key processes. At a national level, the 'defence policy' is a *protective public policy* (Gómez Arias, 2012, 227–228) of a *pure public good* (Samuelson, 1954) such as security. Within the PPA, the context is one of the main factors to analyse (Lasswell, 1970, 6). A National Security Strategy (NNS) and a 'defence policy' give context to 'defence planning'(Gray, 2014). "The national issue compared to other processes or international dynamics" (Breitenbauch and Jakobsson, 2018) is a relevant analytical dimension for research on defence planning.

Figure 1. Public Policy Analysis. Dunn's 'integrated approach.'

(Dunn, 2017)

At the EU level, the 2016 EU Global Strategy frames the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and so does the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the defence planning.

Figure 2. The context of EU defence planning.

(Source: Juan C. CASTILLA)

21 EU Member States (MS) harmonise, up to a certain level, their national planning with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). 4 MS cooperate with NATO within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Planning and Review Process (PARP), and 2 MS have no formal cooperation with NATO in terms of defence planning.

Figure 3. International dynamic in terms of defence planning.

In defence planning, decisions come out from a combination of individual and collective thinking. The EU political and military authorities assume different responsibilities; while overlapping is sometimes inevitable, the leading and supporting roles require delineation. The political authorities are the decision-makers and have pre-eminence over military advisors, when it comes to 'defence policy' and 'defence planning' (Gray, 2014; Ruiz Palmer, 2016, 20).

The thesis of the article is that an analysis considering the 'public policy creative process' is applicable to 'defence planning'. Specifically, an analytical model based on a combination between the individual 'Whole-Brain Creative Model' (Herrmann, 1991) and Dunn's (2017) 'integrated approach' can be applied to the Capability Based defence planning within the CSDP.

Firstly, the article proposes an original 'public policy integrated analytical model'. A short description of main outputs and stakeholders involved in the capability initiatives will follow, and how they fit in the proposed analytical model. It will describe the Capability Based Planning activities and where the EU planning fits. The author provides further considerations related to the defence planning Level of Ambition (LoA) prior to recap the conclusions.

## 2. A 'public policy integrated analytical model'

The 'public policy creative process' starts when individuals or groups perceive and identify a problem to solve, and they insert it in the political agenda (Aguilar Villanueva, 1992a, 43). This stage is followed by the formulation of the policy including its aims, its implementation through different plans and programs limited by the budget (DeCandido, 1996), and the results review. The process (Anderson, 2011, 7–8; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984, 19–23) is subject to a limited rationality (Simon, 1997), and to "the unavoidable polemics between reason and transaction, calculation and consensus, which are inherent to the elaboration of policies in plural and competitive societies" (Aguilar Villanueva, 1992b, 10).

Birkland (2011) conceives the elaboration of a policy as an inputs-outputs process; such a process can also be graphically specified using IDEF0 engineering terminology (Feldmann, 1998; Yan-Ling et al., 2004). From this viewpoint, 'Defence Planning' is a methodical input-output process within the 'Defence Policy', which is subdued to the public policy creation process (Lasswell, 1970; Martínez Nogueira, 1995; Parsons, 2007).

Individual leaders, MS, and EU institutions face common limitations and dialectics. The individual creative thinking and the influences from groups intervene in the building of public policy, which can be analysed through an 'integrated approach' (Dunn, 2017). Following Lasswell's desire for integration, there is room for a 'creative flash' (Lasswell, 1970, 13) to 'rearrange' (Parsons, 2007, 54) relationships between the individual 'Whole-Brain Creative Model' (Herrmann, 1991, 278), and the 'public policy creative process' considering Olson's theory (1971), to create the 'public policy creative model'.

Herrmann's individual model includes four modes of knowledge. Quadrants 'A' and 'B' are structured ways of thinking and learning, objectively oriented, while 'C' and 'D' are non-linear, non-verbal, unstructured modes prone to subjectivity. 'A' lodges capacity for logical, rational and quantitative thinking prone to analysis of factors. 'B' fits the planning approach, good at organizing steps and detailed review; it is an organized, sequential, procedural thinking suitable for administrative bureaucracy and control of pre-planned execution. 'C' lodges gut reaction, sensory response and interpersonal relationships (emotional, expressive, interpersonal thinking) prone to feelings and perception of needs. 'D' helps with visualization, imagination, conceptualization and simultaneous thinking, the open minded is suitable for providing the political will, the strategic vision and the purpose of a policy. Typically, an individual mostly fitting in 'A' mode of thinking would dismiss the 'C', and vice versa. The same confrontation appears between 'B' and 'D'.

Figure 4. The 'public policy creative model'.

Source: Juan C. CASTILLA

Communication between the diagonals (DB, and AC) is often difficult, as it is the case between the ideal and the reality (Ortega y Gasset, 1930). In politics, formulation ('D') and implementation ('B') must be intrinsically linked; otherwise, it can be fatal (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). However, an automatic understanding between those who formulate and those who implement cannot be assumed.

The 'public policy creative model' (figure 4) can also be merged with Dunn's (2017) 'integrated approach' (figure 1) to form the 'public policy integrated analytical model as follows.

Figure 5. The 'public policy integrated analytical model'.

Source: Juan C. CASTILLA

The CSDP *'policy problem'* in terms of defence planning "(both at national and multi-national level) is to have the right quantity and quality of [...] capabilities at hand when these are required. [...] What do we have to develop now because it will be required in the future?" (Schadenbauer, 2021, 197-199).

'Defence planning' is a field in which the formulation and implementation of public defence policy converge and their limits blur and intermingle (Parsons, 2007, 33). The tasks of political and military spheres are not clearly delimited (Pion-Berlin, 2020, 3) and the roles overlap. The delimitation of tasks favours the interaction between the activities of quadrants 'D' and 'B', 'A' and 'C'.

3. The EU defence planning initiatives, from the lens of public policy

Capability based planning is one of the main models in the art of force planning. (Bartlett et al., 1995; Frühling, 2014; Lloyd et al., 1990). The 2003 EU Security Strategy did not identify any particular military threat; neither did the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The EU has not identified threats until the common exercise carried out within the Strategic Compass developing, and "not all threats can or should be understood from a military perspective" (Fiott, 2020, 2). The EU approach to defence planning during the XXI century mainly fits within a Capability Based Planning (CBP).

CBP basically consists of a series of activities (Tagarev, 2006, 2009, 2012), to:

▶ Define the defence objectives, establishing the LoA and other political guidelines such as the set of fundamental missions;

▶ Establish the Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) using a set of planning scenarios. For each scenario, define a list of essential mission tasks in accordance with the operational concepts;

▶ Evaluate strategic force structure options for effective force packages at an efficient cost; which allows undertaking the list of tasks with an acceptable level of risk in all scenarios;

▶ Define the Long-Term Force Goal;

▶ Plan the implementation, using roadmaps to obtain the required capabilities and the necessary reforms or adaptations of the force structure. Facilitate the implementation through support to industry, and the development of budgeted programmes.

▶ Review the results and measure the progress. An adequate review of the cycle outcomes should allow internal control, and ideally external, to comply with the principles of responsibility and transparency.

Figure 6. Capability Based Planning within the 'public policy integrated analytical model'.

Source: Juan C. CASTILLA

Defence planning in the EU is a process whose construction is recent (Lindstrom, 2021). The institutions and bodies came first; later the capability planning initiatives were generated along with the creation of structures, and eventually, efforts to give coherence.

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) were create[1] in 2001 and the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004. Currently a large number of bodies are involved in capability planning: the Council of the EU, the Policy and Security Committee (PSC), the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) II, the EUMC, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its EUMS, the EDA, the Commission, and last but not least the MS.

The convergence between top-down and bottom-up approaches (European Parliament, 2020) to capability development should result in improved coherence at the internal level.

Table I. Relevant events for defence planning in the EU.

1999 Helsinki European Council Meeting (Headline Goal 2003)
1999 Launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
2001 Creation of the EUMC and EUMS.
2003 First European Security Defence Policy (ESDC) mission.
2003 (1st) European Security Strategy adopted
2003 Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) established.
2004 Creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA)
2009 Lisbon Treaty into force (ESDC renamed as CSPD)
2007 Nov. 1st Progress Catalogue out from CDM/HLGP.
2008 8th July EDA approves the Capability Development Plan (CDP).
2010 Establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS)
2016 A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy
2016 1st Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation
2016 European Defence Action Plan (EDAP)
2017 Establishment of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)
2017 Launching of Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO)
2017 Launching of the European Defence Fund (EDF)
2018 2ndJoint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation
2020 Establishment of the DG Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS) in the EU Commission.
2020 1st CARD presented
2021 Entry into force of the EDF

In 2003, the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) was established, and later on the so- called the Headline Goal Process (HLGP), which worked with strategic and political guidance such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the ambition of the Headline Goal of 2010 (established in 2004). It first obtains the *Requirement Catalogue* (RC), followed by the *Force Catalogue* (FC), and the *Progress Catalogue* (PC), including a list of priorities for short-term capability development, the so-called *High Impact Capability Goals* (HICG) (Fiott, 2018). The HICG was later established as one of the inputs of the Capability Development Plan (CDP) led by the EDA[2]

The military authorities through CDM/HLGP follow a top-down approach playing an essential advisory role in terms of defining a "virtual force structure and profile" (Schadenbauer, 2021, 204). They focus on defining military requirements for the subsequent capability development, while interaction with political authorities throughout the process is limited. Although the nature of planning scenarios is politically decided,[3] the specific parameters for the illustrative planning scenarios are established by the military authorities.

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[1] Council of the European Union. (2001). Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union available on https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001D0079

[2] The Progress Catalogue (PC) is later adapted in the CDP to produce the Strand A (capability shortfalls). The EUMC also contributes to the CDP with the lessons learned from missions and operations (Strand D). "In reality, the EDA is at the forefront and obscures the role of the military bodies. Many of those who were interviewed for the purposes of this report were unaware that the CDM even existed, even though it is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (article 2(d) of Protocol n°10) - the only capability-related element – along with the PESCO – to be mentioned in the Treaty" (Mauro, 2019, 24)

[3] To get the PC 17-18, five Ilustrative Scenarios (IS) were established in accordance with the political Level of Ambition: Rescue/Evacuation (RE), Support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (SHADR), Support to Stabilization and Capacity Building (SSCB), Conflict Prevention (CP), Peace Enforcement (PE). (Fiott, 2018)

The EUMC is the main responsible body for the HLGP. A specific working group deals with it: the EUMC Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force (EUMCWG-HTF), supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Outputs from the CDM/HLGP are addressed to the PSC. The PSC, every two years, sends the progress report to the COREPER II, which is formed by the political authorities of the MS (ambassadors) in charge of foreign affairs, development and defence (Council of the European Union, 2018).

Outputs from the CDM/HLGP are, on one side, dealing with defining shortfalls (part of military inputs for the formulation), in the form of 'prescriptions' to work with during the implementation phase of the 'policy problem'. On the other side, they provide the military 'monitoring' (quadrant 'B') of the progress and 'forecasting' (quadrant 'A'), while the PSC assesses and provides their own political 'evaluation' (quadrant 'C') of the 'results review'.

Figure 7. Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)/ Headline Goal Process (HLGP) (IDEF0 Level 0).

Source: Juan C. CASTILLA

Figure 8. Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)/ Headline Goal Process (HLGP) (IDEF0 Level 1).


Source: Juan C. CASTILLA

The EDA leads the Capability Development Plan (CDP). The EDA leading role is prescribed in the Council Decision (CFSD) 2015/1835 Article 2: "The Agency shall identify operational requirements, promote measures to satisfy those requirements, contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities."

The main CDP outputs are the *Capability Development Priorities*, and the implementation guides or roadmaps, known as *Strategic Context Cases* (EDA, 2019). The agency shares information collected from the *National capability Implementation Plans* (NIP). CDP also produces a twofold analysis, of the framework for technology research (the *Overarching Strategic Research Agenda* (OSRA)) (European Parliament, 2019, 68), and of the main cooperative activities for the implementation of capabilities which are of strategic interest (*Key Strategic Activities* (KSA)) (Fiott, 2018). These CDP outputs facilitate other initiatives such as CARD and PESCO, or instruments like the EDF. CDP products are also intended to support MS national capability planning.

Figure 9. EU Capability Development Plan (CDP) (IDEF0 Level 0).

Source: Juan C. CASTILLA

The Agency is the main stakeholder to facilitate the implementation of capabilities; facilitation is essentially a continuous activity, not cyclical. It proposes multinational projects, ensuring coordination between the MS, and managing specific cooperation programs.

While the CDM/HLGP highest political relationship is at the ambassadors' level, Council of the EU Decision (2015/1835) stipulated that the Defence Ministers provide guidelines for the EDA work. This has helped to achieve a leading "single voice" (Barbé, 2012, 2019) in terms of capability development. In addition to Ministers, the National Armament Directors, the Capabilities Directors, the Research and Development Directors, and the Defence Policy Directors will receive the reports from the EDA. Those MS stakeholders also contribute to prepare the decisions presented to the Defence Ministers regarding the Agency. In relation to research and development, and to industry, the EDA also interacts with the Commission.

CDP outputs play a role in an intersected area between formulation ('D') and implementation ('B'). The EDA has a leading role (incorporating technical inputs from the military authorities) in 'prescribing' the priority areas to work with. EDA has a pre-eminent voice in terms of 'implementation' through roadmaps, and tangible relationship with industry and MS multinational weapons programmes. In theory, CDP plays a secondary role in terms of 'evaluating' progress, although practically, its outputs will influence the CARD reports about the 'review results' ('C').

In 2017, the Council (decision 9178/17) launched the *Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)* initiative (Council of the European Union, 2017b, 2017a) and reiterated "the need to ensure coherence between the CARD, as well as the Capability Development Plan (CDP), and respective NATO processes, such as the NDPP, where requirements overlap[4] while recognizing the different natures of both organisations and their respective responsibilities." (Decision 9178/17, § 18).

"The main aim of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is to provide a picture of the existing defence capability landscape in Europe and to identify potential cooperation areas. [...] the EDA, together with the EUMS, acts as the CARD Secretariat[5] The CARD seeks to develop a structured way of identifying capabilities to be developed through the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The first CARD report was presented to Defence Ministers in November 2020;[6] it identified six focus areas. The intent is that the MS, on a voluntary basis, adopt specific commitment[7] in concrete projects, to support the CARD as much as possible. Every two years, CARD reports will include specific recommendations in terms of defence planning, to be considered in the MS national planning. CARD reports are related to political evaluation on the state of the art of the CSDP military capabilities, an overall assessment of the achievement of the objectives set; therefore, those reports are mainly related to the 'review results' (quadrant 'C'). CARD might also influence in inserting topics or issues in the defence planning agenda (quadrant 'D').

In June 2017, the European Council launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Its legal basis is found in articles 42.6 and 46 of the EU Treaty (TEU) and Protocol 10. The PESCO must be open to all MS wishing to commit to specific projects. (Council of the European Union, 2017a). In line with Fiott's (2018) 3 Ps (priorities, plans, projects), Brattberg and Valášek (2019) recommend that in PESCO implementation the connection between what is required to meet the LoA and prioritized capabilities should be improved. It is a matter of internal coherence, "the first list of 15 capability projects [...] do not address any of the strategic shortfalls" (Biscop, 2018, 124).

In December 2016, the Commission approved the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), its fundamental contribution was to launch the *European Defence Fund* (EDF) starting in 2021. EDF includes economic incentives for research and capability development, incentives to MS to enhance defence cooperation, promoting research including prototypes, through a co-financing mechanism supported by the Union budget. The MS decide the amounts allocated to the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), and therefore to the EDF 2021-2027. Decisions on implementation funded by the EDF are oversighted by the Directorate-General 'Defence Industry and Space' (DG DEFIS) at the Commission (Schadenbauer, 2021, 207). It is necessary to ensure full coherence between the EDF and the CDP-CARD-PESCO trio, avoiding governance problems (Arteaga and Simón, 2019, 14). PESCO and EDF are clearly related to the implementation (quadrant 'B') phase within the public policy creative process.

The 'public policy integrated analytical model' applied to the CSDP military planning initiatives can be represented as follows, where the area of intersection between formulation and implementation is of special interest, that intersection is the core of the policy problem.

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[4] Mattelaer, 2019) No footnote in the original.
[5] European Defence Agency (EDA) (2020). Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), available at https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card)
[6] European Defence Agency (EDA)(2020). 2020 CARD Report Executive Summary, available at https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/reports/card-2020-executive-summary-report.pdf
[7] Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Binding Commitments, available at https://pesco.europa.eu/binding-commitments/

Figure 10. CBP & EU defence initiatives and mechanisms within the 'public policy integrated analytical model'.

a. Define the Level of Ambition (LoA) and other political guidance.
b. Establish the Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR). (CDM/ HLGP)
c. Evaluate strategic force structure options. (CDM/HLGP & CDP)
d. Define the Long-Term Force Goal. (CDM/HLGP + EU MS national goals).
e. Plan the implementation, using roadmaps, facilitate industry and develop programmes.(CDP, PESCO, EDF + EU MS programmes).
f. Review results and measure the progress (CARD, PESCO).

Source: Juan C. CASTILLA

4. Some expectations on the Strategic Compass

The formulation of a defence planning LoA should ensure a correct political hierarchy, clarity and details sufficient to enable a coherent implementation. "Protecting the Union and its citizens" might not be enough as a defence planning LoA to "provide an overarching cluster for all currently relevant capability development activities" (Schadenbauer, 2021, 197). In terms of defence planning: a "*more defence-related ambition...has not yet been fully defined*" (Schadenbauer, 2021, 203).

The defence planning LoA is a remit of the political authorities and it should be sufficiently explicit, to allow military authorities to translate it into capability requirements when dealing with the illustrative planning scenarios (Colom Piella, 2011a; Nowowiejski, 2013; Stojkovic and Dahl, 2007; Tagarev, 2006).

"The Strategic Compass will *enhance and guide the implementation of the LoA* in the area of security and defence agreed in November 2016 in the context of the EU Global Strategy"[8] The Strategic Compass, expected to be approved by the MS by March 2022, will include a Capability Development basket (Biscop, 2021b; Fiott, 2020; Mölling and Schütz, 2020), which could eventually enhance the capability development *processes specification*, providing extra strategic/political guidance to further define parameters usable by the military authorities and other stakeholders within CDM/HLGP and CDP future revisions.

The EUMC could have some expectations in relation with the Strategic Compass, since the military authorities have provided a set of questions concerning the usability of the LoA, some of them clearly related to defence planning.[9] There is a "need for a clear military LoA" (Biscop, 2018, 34), according to a new Headline Goal to decide on the right "coherent full spectrum force package" (Biscop, 2021a, 35–36).

Fiott (2018) tried to explain a consistent planning methodology, Mauro (2019, 24) demonstrates that there is no such type of a single coherent process, and Biscop advocates turning it upside down (Biscop, 2018, 116). Will the Strategic Compass include a mandate to specify a single and coherent EU defence planning process where top-down consistency governs?

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[8] Council Conclusions on Security and Defence 8396/21 from 10 May 2021, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8396-2021-INIT/en/pdf (Italics not in the original source).

[9] Sometimes Limited documents are published on the internet. Apparently, this is the case for "Plan for EUMC contribution to the Dialogue Phase of the Strategic Compass" (EEAS(2021)230 REV5), at https://www.statewatch.org/media/2355/eu-eeas-military-committee-strategic-compass-plan-2021-230-rev4.pdfconsulted on 09 Oct 2021. See Appendix to Annex C, § 12A-14D.

5. Conclusions

A hybrid (national and multinational) dimension is required to analyse defence planning in the EU. 'Defence planning' is a methodical cycling input-output process within the 'defence policy', which is subdued to the public policy creation process. It is focused on the policy problem of defining required capabilities and force structures to face future threats and risks.

The 'public policy integrated analytical model' for defence planning proposed in this article combines the individual patterns of thinking structured in four quadrants ('A' to 'D'), with the public policy creative stages (inclusion in the agenda, formulation, implementation and results review) integrated around the policy problem, through prescription ('D'), monitoring ('B'), evaluation ('C') and forecasting ('A').

Outputs from the CDM/HLGP are, on one side, dealing with defining shortfalls (part of military inputs for the formulation), in the form of 'prescriptions' to work with during the implementation phase of the policy problem. On the other side, they provide the military 'monitoring' (quadrant 'B'), of the progress and 'forecasting' (quadrant 'A'), while the PSC assesse and provide their own political 'evaluation' (quadrant 'C') of the 'results review'.

CDP outputs play a role in an intersected area between formulation ('D') and implementation ('B'). The EDA has a leading role (incorporating technical inputs from the military authorities) in 'prescribing' the priority areas to work with. EDA has a pre-eminent voice in terms of 'implementation' through roadmaps, and tangible relationships with the industry and MS multinational weapons programmes. In theory, CDP plays a secondary role in terms of 'evaluating' progress, although indirectly, its outputs will influence the CARD reports about the 'review results' ('C').

CARD reports are related to political evaluation on the state of the art of the CSDP military capabilities, an overall assessment of the achievement of the objectives set; therefore, those reports are mainly related to the 'review results' ('C'). CARD might also influence in inserting topics or issues in the defence planning agenda (quadrant 'D').

PESCO and EDF are related to the implementation ('B') phase within the public policy creative process.

The EU capability planning initiatives fit into a Capability Based Planning model. The CDM/HLGP is related to the establishment of Minimum Capability Requirements. CDM/HLGP and CDP have a role in evaluating strategic force structures options, while MS are the main stakeholders to define the Long Term Force Goals. Concerning the implementation roadmaps, and relationships with the defence industry, CDP, PESCO, EDF share their roles and influence with the MS programmes. CARD and PESCO have a part when it comes to measuring the progress and reviewing results.

The European Council and the Council of the EU are the main stakeholders at a strategic and political level, entitled to establish the LoA and other political guidelines for defence planning. The EU Global Strategy includes a certain vision for the military instrument. To facilitate defence planning, the 'CSDP defence objectives' should typically be expressed in terms of possible roles of the armed forces, missions and concurrencies in different scenarios, duration of efforts, etc. The formulation of the defence planning LoA should ensure a correct political hierarchy, clarity and details sufficient to enable a correct implementation.

Concerning the Strategic Compass aftermath, there are certain expectations over possible improvements. Would it be the time to have a clearer military LoA? Would it include a possible mandate for specifying a coherent EU defence planning process where top-down consistency governs? To be analysed in the close future.

6. Annex A. IDEF0 graphics.

**Figure 11. CPB IDEF0 input/output process (IDEF0).**

Figure 12. EU Capability initiatives and mechanisms represented by IDEF0 input/output process.

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