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THE FORMATION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE BURGUNDIAN STATE (FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES)¹

IN the Europe of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the state created in the Netherlands by the four dukes of Burgundy who succeeded one another from Philip the Bold (1384-1404) to Charles the Bold (1467-1477), and perfected later by Charles V., occupied a unique position, and presented special characteristics which differentiated it so completely from the other political organisms of the time, that it merits more attention from the historian than it has heretofore been accorded. The study both of its formation and of its governing institutions is, in fact, of a nature to throw new light upon the policy of princes at the beginning of modern times: upon the obstacles which this policy had to combat, the circumstances which favored it, and in short, its connection with the social and economic life of that epoch.

But, to begin with, what is meant by the expression, Burgundian state? It is a modern term, and did not make its appearance before the end of the nineteenth century. It was invented to provide an exact designation for the political union in which, between the end of the fourteenth century and the middle of the sixteenth, the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands were joined under the authority of a single princely house. Although for a long time this house possessed the duchy and county of Burgundy as well, these two territories formed no part of the state which it built up, the state we are undertaking to describe. The union between them was simply a personal one, and indeed, the Burgundian state of the North never had anything in common with the two Burgundies; it possessed its own life, entirely independent of theirs, and the institutions by which it was governed did not extend their action beyond its frontiers.

Although the name Burgundian state is modern, it is not arbitrary, but is based on historic fact and on tradition. The chroniclers and historians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries

¹ This article reproduces, with certain alterations, a paper read before the International Congress of Historical Sciences at Berlin, August 10, 1908, by Professor Henri Pirenne of the University of Ghent.

regularly give the name Burgundians to the inhabitants of Belgo-Netherland provinces. The briquet of Burgundy² was at the same epoch the national emblem of these lands, where it is still to be seen carved on the fronts of their town halls and on the keystones of their churches. Circle of Burgundy is the name given under Maximilian and under Charles the Fifth to the circle of the Empire which embraced these lands. In the early part of the sixteenth century, it is true, the humanists gave up the old appellation and substituted that of *Belgica* or Belgium, which was supplied to them by antiquity, and which, reappearing after centuries, designates the kingdom of Belgium to-day. Nevertheless, even in the seventeenth century, curious traces of the early state of affairs are to be found. It will be sufficient to call to mind here that at the end of the Spanish régime the vessels of the Catholic Netherlands (the Belgium of to-day) still bore on their flags the arms of the house of Burgundy.

The name, indeed, is merely a detail. The essential thing is to prove the long duration of this Burgundian state, established at the dawn of modern times between France and Germany, and represented on the map of Europe to-day by the kingdoms of Belgium and Holland. From the fifteenth century until the great upheaval produced by the French conquest at the end of the eighteenth, Burgundian institutions remained at the basis of the institutions of these two countries whose political destinies were so different, and it can be said with absolute truth that both of them, the Republic of the United Provinces and the Catholic Netherlands, retained to the end the clearly defined marks of their common Burgundian origin.

In spite of appearances, then, and notwithstanding the great transformations which it underwent, first at the end of the sixteenth century, through the separation of the Calvinist provinces of the north from the Catholic provinces of the south, and later in the course of the seventeenth century through the conquests of Louis XIV. in Artois, Flanders and Hainaut, the Burgundian state had a very long existence. This length of life may at first sight appear remarkable, for it would seem that the characteristics which made it a thing unique in Europe, denied to it all the conditions indispensable to the maintenance of a political organism.

It must first be made clear, that although it belonged to the group of territorial states (*Territorialstaaten*) formed at the end of the Middle Ages, it differed from them in a very noteworthy

² The name *briquet de Bourgogne* is used to designate the links of the collar of the Order of the Golden Fleece.

manner. Like those states, it was the work of a princely house, and not of a monarchy, and, again like them, it consisted of an agglomeration of lands originally independent of one another. But while the other territorial states were built up of districts subject to the same suzerainty, it united regions dependent on Germany (Brabant, Hainaut, Holland, Zeeland, Luxemburg, etc.) with regions dependent on France (Artois, Flanders). It included within its frontiers a fragment of each of the two great states between which it lay. Its princes, until the reign of Charles V., were at the same time vassals of the emperors and vassals of the Valois. In short, the Burgundian state appears to us as essentially a frontier state, or, to speak more exactly, as a state made up of the frontier provinces of two kingdoms. The Scheldt, the most important of its commercial routes, separated *Francia Occidentalis* from *Francia Orientalis*, from the time of the Treaty of Verdun (843).

Of a hybrid nature even from this first point of view, the Burgundian state was still more so if we consider the peoples who dwelt in it. It was crossed not only by a political, but also by a linguistic frontier. Lacking unity of feudal dependence, it lacked, in a manner still more striking, national unity. It united a group of Romanic with a group of Germanic population. Walloons occupied all the southern portions—Namur, Hainaut, Artois, Gallic Flanders and southern Brabant; while people of Netherland speech, of Frankish or Frisian origin, dwelt in the northern provinces. A frontier state between two kingdoms, it was still more a frontier state between two tongues. By a singular coincidence, it constituted at the same time the point of contact between the two great states of Western Europe, France and Germany, and the two great peoples that have formed European civilization, the Germanic and the Romanic.

Finally, in addition to these two peculiarities we must mention a third. For the Burgundian state had no more geographic than it had political or linguistic unity. Except in the southeast, where it was protected by the hills of the Ardennes, it was open on all sides. Outlined on the great plain of northern Europe, it presented no natural obstacles, either on the side of Germany or on that of France. Of the three rivers which crossed it, the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt, not one has its source on Burgundian soil.

Thus, from whatever side it is regarded, this state at first sight appears to have been the work of arbitrary will, and of chance.

It seems nothing more than a confused assemblage of heterogeneous territories and of people still more heterogeneous; a sort of defiance that grasping and ambitious princes, favored by circumstances, hurled in the face of nature and of history. And in fact, in the fifteenth century, Charles VII. and Louis XI. in France, and the Emperor Sigismund in Germany, regarded it as something illegal and monstrous, the hateful result of an abominable usurpation. In our days a large number of historians have passed a similar judgment upon it. The French are unanimous in considering it a work of usurpation and violence accomplished by traitorous princes who endeavored to ruin the house of Valois from which they sprang by raising against it a rival power. In the Netherlands themselves, there is no lack of writers who, taking into account solely the resistance raised by provincial particularism against the dukes of Burgundy, see in the latter nothing more than grasping and brutal tyrants, trampling underfoot the national liberties, and owing their success to violence alone.

It is not difficult to demonstrate that these opinions, inspired by national considerations or by an abstract liberalism which fails to take into account the conditions of existence in the society of the end of the Middle Ages, have no correspondence to historical fact. Far from having suddenly interrupted the course of destiny in the Netherlands, and from owing its birth merely to the caprice of bold adventurers, the Burgundian state appeared as the climax of a long historical evolution. It was the result of the co-operation of a number of political, social and economic forces, the action of which begins to be perceptible in the early Middle Ages, in those frontier territories which it brought together. In spite of appearances, its constitution, though at first sight strange, is perfectly natural. The special characteristics which it exhibits have their sources, in fact, in all the earlier history of the Netherlands. Undoubtedly a combination of favorable circumstances, or the chance, if such it may be called, which at a given moment extinguished dynasties, threw open successions, and caused the outbreak of military and diplomatic conflicts, contributed largely to the success of the work achieved by the dukes of Burgundy. But is it not the same with all human events, and is not the important thing in this case to distinguish, beneath the chance multiplicity of changing circumstances, the profound and permanent tendency, of which these circumstances have done no more than to hasten the final result?

After the end of the Carolingian period, the diplomacy which in modern times was so frequently to alter the map of Belgium had forced the lands destined to form at a later period the Burgundian state, to undergo a division which took absolutely no account of the nationality of their inhabitants. By the treaty of Verdun, later confirmed by other treaties which we need not consider here, the region lying on the left bank of the Scheldt had been assigned to *Francia Occidentalis*, that is, to France, while the region on the right bank, after having constituted for some time the kingdom of Lotharingia, was at the beginning of the tenth century again joined with *Francia Orientalis*, or Germany. Instead of following from east to west the boundary of language, the frontier thus established from north to south cut it through the centre and assigned alike to France and to Germany a group of Flemish and a group of Walloon population. The future bilingualism of the Burgundian state is thus to be found from the beginning in the countries where that state was to establish itself five hundred years later.

And it is exceedingly interesting to show that the state of things created by Carolingian diplomacy prevailed without bringing about the least attempt at revolt on the part of the population. In the course of the history of the Netherlands, in fact, no event is to be found which presents the appearance of a race-struggle. The Flemings made no attempt to separate from the Walloons, nor the Walloons to form a group apart from their compatriots of Germanic speech. Nor did the one people attempt to dominate the other and reduce it to a subordinate position. The linguistic frontier which in the ninth century might have become a political frontier, and in that case would undoubtedly have modified for all time the course of history in these lands, never became such a frontier. On the contrary, when, beginning from the tenth century, the territorial principalities were being formed, many of them presented this same bilingual character shown by the whole country. The county of Flanders, the duchy of Brabant, the duchy of Limburg, the duchy of Luxemburg, the principality of Liège, all included within their frontiers a group of Germanic and a group of Romanic people; they were at the same time Flemish^{*} and Walloon. The two regions of the Netherlands, given, under the above conditions, the one to France and the other to Germany, began immediately to detach themselves little by little from their suzerains. As long as the

^{*}I use this expression for convenience, although it cannot be strictly applied to Luxemburg, whose Germanic-speaking inhabitants are not properly called Flemings.

power of the emperors remained vigorous, Lotharingia, under the government of the dukes and bishops appointed by the Saxon and Franconian monarchs, was one of the important provinces of the Empire. But after the upheaval caused by the War of Investitures, the power of Germany grew rapidly weaker in the regions between the Meuse and the Scheldt. Henry V. was the last emperor to appear there in person. After him, his successors—except during a period including the reign of Frederick Barbarossa—became less and less interested in the fate of this far-off land, situated at the extremity of the Empire. They abandoned it to itself, contenting themselves with preserving a supremacy which from day to day became more purely nominal. Thenceforth the Lotharingian princes became accustomed to no longer troubling their minds about their suzerain. There is no evidence of any hostility toward him, but, neglected by him, they insensibly formed the habit of having no more recourse to his authority. They assisted no longer at the elections of the kings of the Romans; they regulated their affairs according to their own good pleasure. Even under Frederick Barbarossa, Count Baldwin of Hainaut (1171–1195), though the most faithful of the emperor's vassals, regarded himself in reality as neutral between France and Germany.

The increasing power of the kings of France after the first half of the twelfth century contributed largely in its turn to cut off the Lotharingian provinces from the Empire. Not only did the Capetians, from Philip Augustus on, renew the ancient claims of the French Carolingians to that country, but the feudal princes, in their quarrels with one another, soon formed the habit of having recourse to the support of the king, who naturally asked nothing better than to mix more and more in their affairs and thus extend his influence over them. In the thirteenth century, the long war which set at odds the houses of Avesnes and of Dampierre presented a characteristic example of the constant growth of the French hegemony in the imperial portion of the Netherlands to the detriment of the German suzerainty. John of Avesnes appealed to Rudolph of Hapsburg, warning him, in the most pressing terms, that the absorption of Lotharingia by France was imminent, but his exhortations were vain. Rudolph went no further than to forbid it in useless decrees, while Louis IX. intervened actively on the side of the Dampierres and did not hesitate to send a French army into Hainaut, which was imperial soil. A little later, while the King of the Romans abstained from intervening in the conflict

which ended after the battle of Worringen in the annexation of the duchy of Limburg to the duchy of Brabant (1288), it was again France which offered arbitration to the belligerents and took a hand in their affairs as if it were a question of her own vassals.

But although the Lotharingian princes eagerly sought the aid of France, they did not mean to pass under its rule. They conveniently recalled that they owed allegiance to the Empire when they felt themselves too closely pressed by the Capetian, and in the fourteenth century a goodly number of them profited by the Hundred Years' War to attack his influence by a timely espousal of the cause of England. Louis of Bavaria did not know how to take advantage of this situation to win back to the Empire on its western frontier the prestige that it had lost. After him, Charles IV. of Luxemburg paid more active attention to the Netherlands. He succeeded in marrying his brother Wenzel to Joanna, the heiress of Brabant (1347). But his policy in this affair was purely dynastic. It had in view only the interests of the house of Luxemburg, not those of the Empire. Instead of assuming toward Joanna the attitude of a sovereign, he treated with her as equal with equal. He did so little toward restoring the German influence that the Duchess, to demonstrate her independence of the Empire, did not fear to declare that Brabant constituted an allod, which she held of God alone. How, moreover, could the imperial prestige have been re-established in the Netherlands, at the time when the intestine quarrel which in Germany was setting at odds the houses of Bavaria and Luxemburg, had extended to these countries? For about the same time that Wenzel of Luxemburg married Joanna of Brabant, Margaret of Bavaria inherited Hainaut and Holland (1345). This introduction of two German houses into the basins of the Scheldt and the Meuse might, it is true, have re-established between that region and Germany a certain community of political life and renewed between them the bonds which had so long been loosened. But nothing of the sort occurred, for, instead of depending on Germany, Wenzel as well as the Bavarian princes imitated the conduct of the Belgian princes whom they had succeeded, and it was toward France and England that they turned their attention. As a matter of fact, the introduction into Lotharingia of two dynasties of German origin in no wise retarded the evolution that we have briefly sketched above. Never before had the authority of the Empire over the Netherlands been so disregarded as it was at the end of the fourteenth century.

While Lotharingia was thus completing the centrifugal movement that detached it from the Empire, Flanders, on its side, was escaping from French suzerainty. It was escaping, it is true, under conditions and through vicissitudes very different from those just considered. And this is not at all strange. As a consequence of their intermediate position between the two great states of western Europe, to both of which the Netherlands owed allegiance for half their territory, they of necessity felt the rebound of their political fluctuations. Now at the same moment that the German power decreased the French power increased, and as a necessary result. Lotharingia, vassal of the former, naturally attained a practical independence which Flanders, vassal of the latter, could win only through the most painful efforts.

It had begun by enjoying an almost complete autonomy, from the end of the ninth century until the beginning of the twelfth. For in the early Middle Ages the kings of France, again in contrast to Germany, were as weak as the Saxon and Franconian monarchs were formidable. So at the period when Lotharingia obeyed its dukes and bishops, the counts of Flanders, regardless of their impotent suzerain, were establishing from the Scheldt to the Canche a compact principality where they exercised a quasi-royal power. But the scene changed when, beginning with the reign of Louis VI., the monarchy, having slowly augmented its strength, undertook to bring all the great vassals under the power of the crown. From that time until the end of the fourteenth century, the struggle between the Capetians and the county was almost uninterrupted. In this struggle, the Flemish princes would undoubtedly have succumbed, as did almost all the princes of the kingdom, if most of them had not been able to depend upon two powerful auxiliaries. For England, ancient rival of France, did not refuse its support, and thus just as territorial policy in Lotharingia is associated with the conflict of France and Germany, so in Flanders it is bound up with the conflict of Capetian and Plantagenet. Moreover, from the beginning of the fourteenth century, the great Flemish communes openly took sides against France, both because they saw in her the stay of the patrician régime which they had overthrown, and because the needs of their cloth industry necessarily ranged them on the side of England; for by suspending the exportation of her wool to the Continent—and in fact she did this several times—she could have ruined them. Nevertheless, in its heroic conflict with France, Flanders lost a considerable portion of its territory.

Under Philip Augustus, it was obliged to sacrifice the district which thenceforth formed the county of Artois. Under Philip the Fair, it saw itself robbed of the territory of Lille, Douay and Béthune. For one brief moment it was even annexed to the crown. But the glorious day of Courtrai (July 11, 1302) when the artisans of Bruges and the Flemings of the coast triumphed over the royal forces, restored to it an independence which its participation in the Hundred Years' War enabled it to maintain effectually in the midst of the social agitations of which it was almost constantly the scene in the fourteenth century. Moreover, the losses which it had undergone, and which had robbed it of all its Romanic region in the south, had made of it a purely Germanic land, and it thenceforth brought to its resistance to France an energy so much the greater in that it now rested on a national contrast. In the second half of the fourteenth century Count Louis de Male (1346-1384) dared openly to brave the King of France; he refused to do him homage for his fief, and united his policy closely to that of England. Thus at the same epoch and in spite of the difference in the causes that produced this result, both of the constituent parts of the Netherlands, Flanders and Lotharingia, won, if not a legal, at least an actual separation from the two states of which they formed, in the one case the extreme western point, in the other the extreme northern. In reality, thanks to the fluctuation of European politics, whose changing currents dashed themselves against this frontier land, they became, so to speak, *res nullius*.

But at the same time that the ties which bound Lotharingia to Germany and Flanders to France were thus giving way, other ties were slowly forming between these two fragments of states, and were tending to make of them a political community, in which we discover the distant origin of that new state which the dukes of Burgundy were to create in the fifteenth century. Flanders and Lotharingia, each bilingual, and in this way each, if the expression is permissible, a prolongation of the other, found no obstacle to the impulse toward concentration which was moving them to union, either in the linguistic frontier which crossed their territory without dividing it, or in the political frontier marked by the Scheldt, which was for both the principal highway of commerce. This impulse began to show itself in the eleventh century, in the history of the local dynasties. After 1051 the counts of Flanders became at the same time counts of Hainaut; then they lost this territory, whose princes became in their turn counts of Flanders in 1191, and re-

tained the title until in 1280 French policy succeeded in separating these two countries. In 1288, Brabant was joined to Limburg; in 1299 the counts of Hainaut obtained the succession in Holland and in Zeeland; in 1361 the county of Loos united with the principality of Liège; in 1357 Louis de Male added to Flanders the cities of Mechlin and Antwerp.

But without attempting to deny their importance, it is possible to hold that these relations established by princely dynasties between Flanders and Lotharingia would not have sufficed to unite these two countries had not their action been re-enforced by a motive much more powerful, since it answered a primordial need of these countries. For the work of unification was undertaken, not alone by the princes, but especially and much more energetically by the people of the towns.

It is well known that in no country of western Europe did cities spring up more thickly or develop more rapidly than in the basins of the Scheldt and the Meuse. The geographical situation which made of this country the point of junction of the two great commercial highways which, the one along the Rhine and the other through France, brought the shores of the North Sea into touch with Italy, encouraged at a very early period the commerce of the *portus*, which, in the course of the tenth century, appeared along the Belgian rivers. At the end of the following century, these *portus* became cities, and these cities, founded under the influence of commerce, were all essentially merchant towns. Far from constituting merely local markets patronized by the dwellers in the surrounding country, they all devoted themselves to foreign commerce. Their merchants, grouped in guilds or hanses, traversed with their caravans the neighboring countries: Northern France and Champagne, Rhenish Germany, above all, England. The cloth industry which developed with incredible vitality in Flanders, Brabant and Western Hainaut, the copper industry which rivalled it in activity in the valley of the Meuse, furnished these merchants with products of exchange in constantly increasing number, and clearly presented the character of export industries.

Equipped thus in very early times with a commerce and an industry greatly surpassing their local needs, it was indispensable that the towns should seek to come to an understanding and unite for the defense and protection of their merchants abroad. In spite of the scarcity of our information, we know enough to establish the fact that, in the course of the twelfth century, they were acting

in common accord; were uniting their guilds and were issuing from their municipal isolation to watch in common over their most powerful interests. It is in Flanders, the most advanced of the territories from the economic point of view, that we see most clearly, in the famous London Hansa, this curious movement of urban association, but there is no lack of indications of similar manifestations in Brabant and in the territory of Liège.

However, though the towns of the same principality were allying themselves more and more closely, we do not observe, before the thirteenth century, that the principalities themselves sought to conclude with one another any economic agreements. Indeed, as long as the commerce was carried on essentially overland, it is observable that the economic activity of the country tended in two different directions. Flanders carried on active relations especially with England and with France, where its merchants appeared by hundreds at the celebrated fairs of Champagne. On the contrary, it is rather toward Germany, and especially toward Cologne, that the commerce of Brabant and the Liège towns directed itself.

But the development of navigation was to put an end to this situation. The extraordinary development of the port of Bruges during the thirteenth century soon exercised such an attraction that the economic activity of Belgium, until then divided between two opposite tendencies, began to show a westward trend. The coast, where, besides Bruges, Antwerp soon formed another outlet on the sea, drew toward it the merchants of the whole country, and the whole economic life flowed henceforth in a single stream. The regions of the interior formed henceforth merely the *Hinterland* of the ports of the Zwyn or the Scheldt. A single example will suffice to indicate the change. Until the end of the twelfth century the "*batteurs*" of Dinant exported their copper products and provided themselves with raw material by way of Cologne. From the following century they abandoned the metropolis on the Rhine to frequent, almost exclusively, the market-places of Bruges or Antwerp. The fact that all the commerce of the southern Netherlands flowed toward the sea evidently helped greatly to favor that consolidating of the various districts already begun by the policy of the princes. It was thenceforth a fundamental necessity for all the cities of the region to be able to count on the freedom of the routes leading toward the ports, to see the number of market tolls thereon diminished, and especially to remove the excuses for the armed conflicts which interrupted transit. Also, after the

beginning of the fourteenth century, treaties of alliance, of arbitration, of monetary agreement, multiplied between the principalities. Of all these the most celebrated is that which, in 1339, in the days of James van Artevelde, established a commercial agreement between Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut, Holland and Zeeland. But alongside this celebrated document, a quantity of similar conventions witness also to the constant increase in the economic solidarity of the country. In 1356 the Brabanters caused to be inscribed in the *Joyeuse Entrée* the principle of perpetual peace both with Flanders and with the territory of Liège.

It is useless to press the point further. We have said enough to prove that, whether it is considered in its political manifestations or in its economic activity, history presents us with the spectacle of a more and more manifest amalgamation of the different territories of the Netherlands, during the Middle Ages. When a propitious occasion appeared, the movement thus begun was completed by the union in a single state of these principalities, which, in spite of their different suzerains and their differing tongues, had been so long urged toward one another.

Now this occasion presented itself during the second half of the fourteenth century. The extinction, within a period of a few years, of the male descendants of the dynasties of Brabant, Hainaut, Holland and Flanders, brought into the country, in accordance with the regular operation of the right of succession, three foreign houses. Two of these houses were German: that of Bavaria (Hainaut-Holland) and that of Luxemburg (Brabant-Limburg); the third, that of Burgundy (Flanders and Artois), was French.

It was inevitable that among these three houses, all of royal or imperial origin, and all consequently implicated in the international politics of their time, a conflict should arise for the possession of the Netherlands. But it was also inevitable that the outcome of the conflict should be favorable to the house of Burgundy. We have already said that the Empire, grown weak, and fallen a prey to internal struggles, did nothing to aid Bavaria and Luxemburg, whose family rivalry in any case prevented their arriving at a mutual understanding. The Burgundians, on the contrary, were able from the beginning to depend on France, which during the reign of Charles VI. put its armies and treasury generously at their disposal. How could this have been otherwise? The marriage (1369) of Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, with the heiress of Flanders

and Artois,⁴ Margaret, daughter of Count Louis de Male, had been the work of French policy. Charles V., who had brought it about, had seen in it the means of finally solving the Flemish question by gaining the country for a prince of the royal family.⁵ He could flatter himself, on dying, that he had at last assured the annexation to his kingdom of this rich and warlike territory.

In reality, he was entirely at fault in his calculations. Transplanted to the Netherlands, the Burgundian dynasty made use of France only to aid its own undertakings, and far from conducting itself as an instrument of French policy, it was the house of Burgundy for which was reserved the task of definitely breaking the bonds which still attached Flanders to the kingdom, and of founding in the Netherlands a state which was soon to become a dangerous enemy to France. The dukes of Burgundy made use of their close relationship with the Valois only to augment their prestige and influence in the North. This was already apparent in the reign of Philip the Bold, who, to win the good will of the Duchess of Brabant and persuade her to break the treaty by which she had promised the succession to the house of Luxemburg, led a French army against the Duke of Guelders, an enemy of the elderly princess, and caused the royal treasury enormous expenditures by which he was the only one to profit. At the end of the expedition, Joanna of Brabant did in fact recognize as her heir Philip's second 'son, Anthony, and, taking no account of the protests of the Emperor, thus afforded the house of Burgundy a footing on the right bank of the Scheldt.

Contemporaries, it is true, did not at once comprehend the import of the events which had just occurred. To them, the advance of the house of Burgundy at first appeared—as had formerly the gain of the Dampierres upon the Avesnes—a step towards the absorption of Belgium by France. Sigismund expressed this thought very clearly when he exclaimed to the Brabantine ambassadors sent by Anthony: "You wish, then, to become French!"

He was to be undeceived in the near future. For the successor of Philip the Bold, his son John the Fearless (1404-1419), prepared at once for a definite break with the Valois. In the fierce struggle between France and England it is clearly toward the latter power that he shaped his policy. Undoubtedly his personal ambition, his rivalry with the Duke of Orleans and the Armagnacs, partly ex-

⁴ Artois, separated from Flanders under Philip Augustus, came back into the power of Louis de Male by the succession of his mother.

⁵ Philip the Bold was his own brother.

plained this attitude, but it was explained still more clearly by the interests of his county of Flanders. Plainly, the Burgundian dynasty began, with his reign, to be acclimated in the Netherlands. It rapidly lost the marks of its French origin, in precisely the way that the houses of Bavaria and Luxemburg, as we have shown above, had lost the marks of their German origin. For the territories of the Netherlands were so rich, and therefore formed a possession so valuable, that they could not fail at once to take the first place in the minds of the foreign princes who became established there. They absorbed, so to speak, their new sovereigns, and soon made of the dukes of Burgundy who came to them as agents of French policy, the founders of their political unity.

It is during the reign of Philip the Good (1419-1467), son of John the Fearless, that this great work was accomplished, with astonishing ease and rapidity. Thanks to the renewal of the Hundred Years' War, during which Philip fought for sixteen years on the English side, the Valois could make no opposition to his progress, and the Emperor, too, was entirely helpless. It must moreover be recognized that chance constantly favored the designs of the Duke. In 1430, at the death of Duke Philip of Brabant, the estates of the duchy unanimously received him as the successor of their prince. Then he forced Jacqueline of Bavaria to recognize him as her heir, and obtained thus, at the death of that unfortunate princess (1428), the counties of Hainaut, Holland and Zeeland, together with the lordship of West Friesland. He bought in 1421 the county of Namur, and purchased of Elizabeth of Görlitz her claims to the duchy of Luxemburg. If we add that he succeeded in establishing his protectorate over the bishoprics of Liège, Utrecht and Tournay, by having his relatives appointed there, it will be seen that it took this skilful man little more than twenty years to accomplish the unification of the Netherlands. For although the Burgundian state was destined to conquer still other provinces, it was in its essential portions established in the reign of Philip the Good. The territories which he brought under his sceptre always remained the essential part; what was to be added later formed merely appendages, and it is with reason that Justus Lipsius gave the great duke the name of *Conditor Belgii*.

The facility with which the results just enumerated were attained proves to what extent they were prepared by history. If it can truly be said that the territorial principalities did not of themselves seek the Burgundian rule, at least it is clear that they accepted it

without serious resistance. The struggle of Philip the Good with Jacqueline of Bavaria, supported by her husband the Duke of Gloucester and the feudal party of the Hoeks, in no wise bore the character of a national war.⁶ On the contrary the cities of Holland espoused against their hereditary princess the cause of her rival, and it may be said that the Burgundian rule was established in the North by the will of the people of the cities. It is only in the territory of Liège that this régime was the object of a lively antipathy. The episcopal principality, which had become under its later bishops a genuine republic dominated by its capital, did not intend, in accepting the protectorate of the duke, to lose the liberties which it had acquired, and its population, both Walloon and Flemish, united against him in the same spirit of resistance.

Charles the Bold (1467-1477) completed and at the same time endangered the work of his father. He completed it in seeking to extend his power over Guelders and Friesland, the annexation of which was to make of the Zuyder Zee a Burgundian lake. He endangered it on the other hand by the violence of his ambition, which, after having rendered all his subjects discontented, led him finally to the catastrophe of Nancy. There is nothing astonishing in the speedy outbreak of an almost unanimous reaction against the ducal rule. To be sure, the Burgundian provinces did not seek to separate from one another. The Great Privilege which they forced the heir of Charles the Bold to grant them in 1477 left their union unbroken. But by substituting for the power of the prince the power of the States General as the central authority of the state, they actually transformed the state into a confederation of autonomous territories. It was too evident that such a confederation would have been incapable of defending itself against such an adversary as Louis XI., whose policy immediately after Nancy aimed at the complete ruin of the house of Burgundy. And so, scarcely had Maximilian of Austria married Mary of Burgundy, when he is found devoting himself energetically to the restoration of the monarchical régime set up by his predecessors. From 1477 to 1493, he unceasingly resisted the territorial particularism openly sustained by France, which used against him the suspicions bred

⁶ The opinion of Löher, (*Jakobäa von Bayern und ihre Zeit*), who sees in the struggle between Philip and Jacqueline a struggle between the Romanic and the Germanic elements, is historically untenable. See on this point Colenbrander, *De Belgische Omwenteling* (1906), p. 43. It is safe to say that the question of race is nowhere met with in the history of the formation of the Burgundian state.

by the fact that he was a foreigner. But when with Philip the Fair (1493–1506) a national prince again mounted the throne, the lost ground was at once regained. The princely prerogatives were again in force, the great central institutions of the state were restored, and the States General, instead of persisting in their role of systematic opposition, henceforth co-operated with the sovereign. It is from this time forward that the Burgundian rule became popular in the Netherlands, and sent down, so to speak, far-reaching roots. The great nobles, part of whom, under Maximilian, had taken sides against the prince, henceforth grouped themselves in a body about him, entered his councils and shared the highest offices of the state, the maintenance of which became the indispensable condition of the prestige which they enjoyed.

Philip the Fair had neither the time nor the disposition to pursue the projects of Charles the Bold and of Maximilian with regard to Guelders and Friesland. His reign, essentially pacific, went no further than the strengthening of the union between the old provinces, and saw the accomplishment of no conquests. But Charles V. was to complete the annexations which constituted, after 1543, the union of the seventeen provinces. He won Tournay from France in 1521, acquired Friesland in 1523, Overijssel and Utrecht in 1528, Groningen in 1536, and finally Guelders in 1543. Henceforth the Burgundian state was complete, and would receive no further aggrandizement.

The annexations of Charles V., quite unlike those brought about by Philip the Good, were all accomplished through war. The very energetic resistance which he had to overcome, and which was directed almost continually by the famous Duke Charles of Guelders, is not fully explained by the energetic intervention of Francis I. in the affairs of the Netherlands; to understand it, it is necessary to observe that the territories subjugated by the emperor had had, until the end of the fifteenth century, relations much less close with the old Burgundian provinces than those which had existed between the latter since the early Middle Ages. Guelders was more German than Netherlandish. As for Friesland and its dependencies, where dwelt a population as different in its speech as in its state of society from that of the county of Holland, it had struggled energetically from the twelfth century on against Holland's attempts at annexation. These attempts, which were finally successful under Charles V., proved that his conquests on the right bank

of the Zuyder Zee and the Yssel were something more than the results of his ambition. To complete the building of the Netherlands and assure their security it was indispensable that they should surround on all sides the inland sea which indented them on the North and that they should absorb the duchy of Guelders, the point of which, advancing between the Meuse and the Waal, menaced at the same time Utrecht, Holland and Brabant. Charles V., in uniting them to the territories of the west, did no more, as we have seen above, than take his inspiration from a plan already completely outlined in the days of Charles the Bold.

This assemblage of seventeen provinces, then, half Romanic and half Germanic, which constituted the Burgundian state at its completion, was composed of two clearly distinct groups of territories. The first, lying in the basins of the Meuse and the Scheldt, and extending along the North Sea west of the Zuyder Zee, was formed during the reign of Philip the Good, by virtue of a long historic evolution and without encountering serious opposition, except in the territory of Liège, which reassumed its autonomy in 1477, and retained it until the end of the eighteenth century. The second, on the contrary, a necessary aggrandizement of the Burgundian possessions, was the result of a war of conquest, and was built up only by means of violent annexations. Still, once accomplished, these annexations were permanent. The advantages which they found in their union with the Burgundian state soon reconciled the populations which had struggled with the greatest energy against it. Thenceforth they no longer sought a separation. It is true that they always played a less active part than the old provinces in the political life of the state, and it was only toward the end of the sixteenth century that the constitution of the Republic of the United Provinces attached them indivisibly to the territories of the west.

At the same time that the Burgundian state was forming by the union of the territories of the Netherlands under the authority of a single dynasty, it finally severed the ties, already loosened, which still bound it to France and Germany. Already in 1435, by the peace of Arras, Philip the Good had secured from Charles VII. release from his position as vassal of the crown. On the other hand, he neglected to pay homage to the emperor for his Lotharingian lands, so that he appeared in reality as an independent monarch. The memory of the ancient kingdom of Lothaire

certainly haunted his mind and the mind of his principal counsellors,⁷ and inspired him with the ambition to obtain in his turn a royal title. His son Charles was for an instant on the point of realizing this project, which would have set the final seal on the sovereignty of his house, and if after him there was no longer any serious question of raising the Netherlands to the rank of a kingdom, the political autonomy of the country none the less continued to gain strength. Under Charles V., the treaties of Madrid and Cambrai rendered perpetual the concession granted by Charles VII. to Philip the Good; the dependence on France was forever abolished in Artois and in Flanders; the Scheldt finally ceased to mark on the map a political frontier. It might seem, at first sight, that this advantage wrung by the Emperor from his adversary would be of profit to the Empire. This was not the case. Charles V. acted in the Netherlands as the successor of the dukes of Burgundy, and his power only served to make definitive their separation from Germany. The convention of Augsburg (1548) established them, under the name of Circle of Burgundy, as an independent state. If, in appearance, it recognized them still as an integral part of the Empire, in reality it detached them from it, for it accorded them, in all its essential features, the attributes of sovereignty. Thus ended, under the great-grandson of Charles the Bold, the long historic process whose principal phases we have endeavored to sketch. The double movement begun in the tenth century had come to an end; the provinces of the Netherlands were united, and between France and Germany a new political organism, the Burgundian state, had come forth into the light of day. The cord that bound together the seventeen provinces was securely tied; it broke at the end of the sixteenth century only, beneath the double pressure of the revolution against Spain and the religious revolution.

An agglomeration of principalities long independent of one another, the Burgundian state in the first place rested on the principle of personal union. Heir or conqueror of the different territories grouped under his authority, the duke did not reign over them by virtue of a power of superior sovereignty. Instead of bearing a

⁷ At the Congress of Berlin a discussion arose as to how far the remembrance of the kingdom of Lothaire contributed toward the formation of the Burgundian state. It is incontestable, to my mind, that although this should not be given an exaggerated importance, the former existence of a kingdom between France and Germany aided to a certain extent the projects of the dukes of Burgundy. See O. Cartellieri, "Eine Burgundische Gesandtschaft", in *Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 1907, pp. 459-460.

single title, like a king, he was clothed with a multitude of special titles. He was at the same time duke of Brabant, count of Flanders, count of Hainaut, count of Holland, etc., etc. In passing beneath his sceptre each province had preserved its autonomy, its own constitution, its special institutions. Nothing is more heterogeneous, nothing more motley, at first sight, than this state made up of an amalgamation of small states, in each one of which the common prince ruled only as the successor of the former local prince. But this is only one aspect of the matter. From the personal union came necessarily a certain unity of government. The ideal of the dukes, like that of all the princes of the fifteenth century, was an ideal of monarchical centralization. They sought in a double manner to augment their influence at the expense of the local government and of the privileges which their various lands had obtained from their princes: first, by strengthening in each of them their own authority, and, second, by establishing, with a view to the general administration, and above the greater number of local governments, a certain number of central institutions. As it appeared at the time of Philip the Good, and as it remained under Charles V., at the time of its fullest development, the Burgundian state may be defined as a plurality of autonomous territories forming a monarchical unity. A certain equilibrium was established by the force of things between the local liberties and the princely power. Had it been free to develop itself at will, the latter would have arrived at absolutism, but it had to take into account, from the very first, an opposition that it was unable to overcome. In each province it was obliged to respect the old constitution that it found in force, and its role was limited to making a place for the political centralization of the modern state, while treating medieval particularism with respect.

This political centralization was, moreover, favored by the social and economic changes which characterized the fifteenth century. It would be quite unjust to consider it as exclusively the work of the dynasty and inspired by its interests alone. In point of fact the princely interest was in many respects intimately allied with the general interest. The nascent capitalism and the economic individualism which was developing along with it, suffered from the privileges bequeathed by the Middle Ages to modern times, which hindered their free development. The municipal exclusiveness which opposed the power of the princes opposed also the development of commerce and the prosperity of the new ports. The state

of subjection which the "good towns" imposed upon the open country hindered the introduction there of that capitalistic industry which was excluded from the urban communes by the rigid and superannuated rules of the trades.⁸ It is also plain that not only the country districts, but above all those new centres of economic activity such as Antwerp and the Holland cities, which were adapting themselves to the necessities imposed by the transformation of commerce and of navigation, were on the side of the princes and favored their policy. The monarchical innovations of the Burgundian period were opposed only by the privileged cities, resolved, like Bruges and Ghent, to preserve the monopolies and prerogatives that had had their day. Nothing is more characteristic on this point than the contrast between their attitude toward the prince and that of Antwerp. In the one case, economic exclusiveness went hand in hand with resistance to the progress of political centralization; in the other, the liberal and innovating spirit which inspired the townspeople of Antwerp made it the faithful ally of the ducal government. In short, the more a city had been privileged in the Middle Ages, the more it resisted the new régime, and therefore there is nothing astonishing in the fact that it is especially in Flanders, where the cities, during earlier centuries, had surpassed those of all other territories in freedom and influence, that the Burgundian policy found its most resolute adversaries. But the resistance of Flanders was inspired by the past and not by the present. Its great communes wore themselves out in heroic efforts to maintain a supremacy which was escaping them, and the loss of which they attributed to the government. They did not see—and it was not in their power to see—that along with the establishment of the Burgundian state and independent of it, there was going on in the Netherlands a displacement of the economic equilibrium, and that the commercial leadership was on the point of passing over to Antwerp.

The "innovations" introduced by the house of Burgundy into the provincial administration responded so well to the needs of the times, that before its arrival in the Netherlands their dawn is apparent. Already Count Louis de Male had established in Flanders, about 1369, a supreme tribunal, the *Audience*, which must be considered as the precursor of the *Council Chamber* instituted at Lille in 1386 by Philip the Bold. This council chamber, which was soon

⁸ H. Pirenne, "Une Crise Industrielle au XVI^e Siècle", in *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*, classe des lettres, 1905, p. 489 f.

subdivided into a court of justice (the *Council of Flanders*) and a chamber of accounts, was the first modern administrative institution which the Netherlands had known. Similar institutions (the councils of Brabant, Holland, Guelders, Hainaut, Luxemburg; the chambers of accounts of Brussels and the Hague) were introduced into the other provinces as they passed under Burgundian sway. Everywhere they had as results the substitution of educated magistrates for the communal aldermen (*échevins*), the restriction of superannuated privileges to the advantage of the "common good", the disappearance from the law of a multitude of archaic usages, the habituation of lawyers to the practice of appeal, the organization of the pursuit of criminals, etc. The chambers of accounts brought the administration of the finances to a regular accountability, exercised a permanent control over the receipts and expenses of all officials, and allowed alterations in the distribution of the taxes, rendering them more equitable. It is incontestable that the Burgundian administration merited the reputation for excellence that it enjoyed, and of this there is no need of other proof than the fact that it served as a model to Maximilian for the reforms he introduced into Austria.

As was natural, it is from France, where monarchical government was from the thirteenth century on so thoroughly developed, that the dukes borrowed a large part of their administrative system. But they were far from simply copying the institutions of that kingdom. On the contrary, they altered them considerably to adapt them to the special conditions of their country. During the early period, and this was one of the principal complaints uttered against them, they called in a goodly number of foreigners, Burgundians or Picards, to initiate into their new tasks the officials of the Netherlands. These assistants became less and less necessary in proportion as the new régime became established, and they had almost completely disappeared in the second half of the fifteenth century.

We have said above that the establishment of monarchical institutions did not go on without arousing protest and, at least in Flanders, even violent conflicts. In all the provinces, the cities had acquired a dominant influence, and the policy of centralization found itself consequently more or less openly at odds with the urban policy. But, favored by the economic manifestations which were undermining the latter, it triumphed everywhere without great exertions. The cities, though they retained a large measure of

autonomy, were obliged to recognize the superior authority of the state, submit to its control, and contribute to the public expenses. If the rank and file of the townspeople long remained faithful to the old principle of municipal exclusiveness upon which rested the convenient industrial monopoly of the trades, the great merchants and the capitalists, on the contrary, rallied very soon to a system of government in which the "common good" took the place of privilege and in which municipal freedom was restrained only for the securing of a larger freedom. Moreover the bureaucracy now furnished a crowd of young patricians with a new and lucrative career and, in the Burgundian state as in all modern states, contributed powerfully to rally the well-to-do classes to the monarchical régime which was the condition of its maintenance.

Much less powerful than the cities, the clergy and the nobility showed also less opposition to the "Burgundian innovations". The excellent relations which the dukes maintained with the papacy, moreover, prevented the former from struggling against them with any chance of success. It resigned itself to the restriction of its jurisdiction and to the intervention of the prince in the grant of ecclesiastical dignities, and rapidly accustomed itself to a situation where devotion to the dynasty was the best path to success. As for the nobility, although it too had lost a considerable number of privileges and prerogatives, it was compensated by lucrative and honorary offices which were thrown open to it at the court, in the administration and in the army, and the entire body was soon gathered about the prince.

Although so far-reaching, the reforms accomplished in the provinces left untouched in all of them the ancient traditional constitutions. Everywhere the privileges accorded to their lands by the former princes remained; everywhere the Estates retained the right of voting the taxes and nowhere was there any modification in the organization of these assemblies, which were the essential organs of territorial autonomy. The monarchical organization took possession of all the vast administrative and judicial domain left vacant by the rudimentary organization of the Middle Ages; it put an end to abuses, it modified and perfected existing institutions, but it did not destroy them.

Besides the monarchical reforms accomplished in each province, the Burgundian period also saw the rise of a system of central institutions extending their action throughout the Netherlands, and thereby transforming them into that collective state which we have

endeavored to characterize above. It is an entirely new political phenomenon. For where, before the end of the fourteenth century, different lands had already been united under the rule of a single prince, it is not observable that this dynastic union brought about the slightest community of government. The princes, it is true, even when they reigned over several countries, had but a single council; but this council, made up of trusted advisers and limited to a purely consultative part, did not, properly speaking, constitute a governmental institution, and it seems scarcely ever to have intervened except in questions of foreign policy. Naturally the dukes of Burgundy possessed a council of this sort when they came to the Netherlands. This council, made up of nobles, clerks and lawyers from their different domains, and even of foreigners, was attached to the prince's person and moved about with him, having no fixed residence. But from the reign of Philip the Good a decisive change took place. Out of the original council developed two councils with special attributes: one, the privy council, retained the consideration of political affairs; the other, the Great Council, formed a high court of justice with jurisdiction over the entire Burgundian state. The latter, under Charles the Bold, was definitely settled at Mechlin under the name of *Parlement*; a name which it lost under Philip the Fair, to reassume and retain until the end of the eighteenth century that of Great Council. As for the political council, a new specialization of its functions divided it, under Charles V., into three separate councils residing at Brussels: the council of state (political affairs), the privy council (controversial and administrative affairs), and the council of finance. These were called collateral councils because they acted in conjunction with the prince, or his representative, the lieutenant-governor.⁹ Henceforth, above the local governments of the provinces, there existed a general government which, acting in the same manner upon each of them, united them in a common action, and made them participate, in some fashion, in the same political life. And as we have shown above for the provinces, the central government at the end of the fifteenth century took on a national character, and excluded the foreigners that were numerous at the outset. Brussels, which was its seat, and in which after 1531 the sovereign's representative resided, became the capital of the Netherlands.

⁹ It is sufficient for our purpose to characterize here in its general outlines the central organization of the state. It is useless to enter into details and to speak of the other agents of the prince, such as the chancellor of Burgundy or the lieutenant-governor.

But, and this is one of the most interesting of its peculiarities, the central government included not merely institutions charged with developing and applying the authority of the prince. The creation of the States General by Philip the Good in 1463 gave the representatives of the country a part in it. This great assembly, made up of delegates from all the provincial Estates, not only gave the prince an opportunity to deliberate with his subjects as a whole; but it also provided the most potent of the means of unification which had brought together the seventeen Burgundian provinces. Finally, just as the monarchical institutions did not suppress the territorial institutions which were anterior to them, so the States General did not absorb the individual Estates. On the contrary, it was with the latter that the final decision rested. Without their assent, the deputies of the States General could conclude nothing. Thus particularism remained as powerful beside the central organ of national representation as beside the institutions of monarchical power, and from whatever side it is examined, the Burgundian state always presented the same spectacle of modern unification above and medieval diversity below.

But while diversity did not increase, unification realized constant progress in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The creation of the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1430 attached to the person of the prince all the great nobility of the Netherlands, and thus put at his disposition, in the different territories, the enormous ascendancy which it enjoyed. On the other hand, the formation of a standing army (*bandes d'ordonnance*) under Charles the Bold enabled the dukes to take into their pay almost all of the lesser nobility, who, in fighting under their standard, were soon imbued with a lively sentiment of Burgundian loyalty. In conclusion, political measures, such as the Convention of Augsburg (1548) and the Pragmatic Sanction (1549), the former by placing all the provinces in the same position with regard to the Empire, the latter by unifying the right of succession in such a manner as to secure in each province the perpetual maintenance of the dynasty, constituted new reasons for cohesion among all parts of the Netherlands.

But while the state was thus strengthening itself within, its position with regard to the dynasty suddenly changed. Philip the Fair, who, after the troubled regency of Maximilian of Austria, had been hailed with enthusiasm as the successor of the earlier dukes and the restorer of the house of Burgundy, became in 1504, at the death of his mother-in-law Isabella of Spain, the heir of the kingdom of

Castile. It became straightway evident that in the near future the sovereign of the Netherlands was to have other interests than theirs to guard, and that it was to be expected that he would subordinate the peace and possibly the prosperity of the Belgian provinces to the world-politics into which he would be drawn. The premature death of Philip (1506) postponed the realization of these fears. But the young Charles V. succeeded to his father's rights, and therefore, to prepare as far as possible for what the future held in store, the endeavor was made, in spite of his grandfather Maximilian and his aunt Margaret of Austria, so to direct his education as to make of him a purely Burgundian prince. But the inevitable had to come to pass. Of how little weight were the Netherlands in the political combinations of a prince who reigned at the same time in the Empire and in Spain, and whose ambition had all Europe for its field! Although he accomplished, as we have seen, the territorial unification and the system of government of the seventeen provinces, in return he laid upon them expenses and wars entirely foreign to their interests. At the end of his reign Artois, Hainaut, Namur, Luxemburg, had been laid waste by French armies, and the unimpeachable credit of the Antwerp market, weakened by loans, was tottering. Nevertheless, the services rendered the country by Charles, the renown which dazzled the nobility fighting for him, the sympathy, at least apparent, that he showed his Burgundian subjects, together with the prudent conduct of the two regents, his aunt Margaret and later his sister Mary, to whom he had entrusted the government, neutralized until the end of his reign the sentiments of opposition which were gathering in the public mind. These sentiments broke out suddenly at the accession of Philip II., as soon as it was recognized that this prince was a thorough foreigner, antipathetic to the character of the country and hostile to its liberties, and that he clearly aimed at making the provinces Spanish. Ten years had not elapsed after the final departure of the king (1559) before the Netherlands were in open revolt. And this result, far from recalling the particularist uprising of 1477, proves the strength that the cohesion of the provinces had gained since that time. Directed by the principal lords of the council of state, unanimously sustained by the lesser nobility belonging to the bands of ordonnance and by the popular masses of each territory, it appears as a collective effort *viribus unitis*; as an insurrection of the Burgundian state, desiring to maintain its independence against the Spanish state. Indeed, it is more than this. During its progress, the Burgundian

state became the nation, and it was in this period of heroic struggles that its people for the first time gave it the name "*communis patria*".

Unfortunately the unanimity of the resistance was not to last. With the complication of the political by the religious question, the national party divided itself into Protestants and Catholics. William of Orange did not succeed in preventing a scission that had become more and more inevitable. It finally came about during the last years of the sixteenth century. Of the two fragments of the Burgundian state, one, the republic of the United Provinces, was in the following century to attain to that unheard-of degree of prosperity which remains in the history of Europe an unparalleled phenomenon; the other, the Catholic Netherlands, drawn into the decadence of Spain, was to vegetate in obscurity under its foreign governments and serve as a battle-ground for the armies of Europe. Its sovereigns left it its old Burgundian institutions and respected its internal autonomy. But, deprived thenceforth of the direction of its destinies, tossed about at the mercy of all the political fluctuations in the midst of which Spain went under, it lost its own self-consciousness, and long lay benumbed in provincialism and routine, after having, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, given forth one final gleam.

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