How does it feel when people forget your name or name you incorrectly?

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Abstract

The present study investigated, using a questionnaire, how people feel (i.e., irritated, offended and sad) when their own name was misprocessed (i.e., forgotten, uttered after a hesitation, mispronounced, replaced by another person's name) during a conversation with friends and close colleagues. Participants reported relatively low negative feelings after such naming incidents. Nevertheless, they reported being more irritated and offended than sad for all the incidents. They felt comparable levels of irritation and offense, except for mispronunciations that caused more irritation. Although participants reported weak negative feelings, they reported reacting often to all incidents, either by reminding their names or by correcting the interlocutor. The contrast between weak ratings of negative feelings and high ratings of recall and correction shows that using the correction as the only indicator of bother when the own name is misprocessed can be misleading. Finally, the intensity of irritation triggered by incidents with the own name was negatively related with the participants' propensity to misprocess other peoples' names, but was not related with scores at the Rosenberg self-esteem scale nor with the level of self-symbolic value of the own name.

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Naming individuals is universal. No ethnographic study ever revealed a society in which people does not receive a personal name (Alford, 1989). Even if naming practices may strongly vary across cultures (Hanks & Parkin, 2016; Lawson, 2016), all cultures developed a personal naming system. As a corollary, there are proper names in all known languages (Farkas, 2020; Jeshion, 2009). This universality is presumably due to two joint properties of proper names: economy and unambiguity. The use of a proper name to designate a person (or another individual entity) is more economical than producing a (relatively long) description whose efficacy in designating unambiguously a target person may change across the conversational contexts (Jeshion, 2009; Searle, 1958; Stivers et al., 2007). Some authors have speculated that the use of proper names to call people (or other individual entities) could have had an adaptive advantage at some point in human evolution (Semenza, 2006, 2009). For example, it is clearly more efficient to warn a fellow human being of impending danger by calling their name rather than by shouting a description of them. Another possible adaptive advantage lies in that the use of proper names makes referring to absent people easier (Stivers et al., 2007).

One important function of proper names is thus to designate individuals, i.e. to single out an individual from all other individuals (Aldrin, 2016). On identity cards, the unicity of the person stems from the conjunction of a face and a name (Le Breton, 2003). Moreover, people interiorize this identification function of names, and consider that their name is an important attributes of their identity (Aldrin, 2016; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). The strong relationship between names and identity reveals itself through a number of cognitive effects. The own name, like other self-relevant stimuli, is privileged during information processing. For example, one's own name is more easily perceived as a target than unfamiliar or famous

names and it causes more interference as a distractor (for reviews, see Cunningham & Turk, 2017; Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Rotshstein, 2019). In regards with memory, episodic recognition is better for items presented in association with one's own name than for items associated with other familiar people's names, such as names of actors (Turk et al., 2008). Moreover, we are better at recalling, in five minutes, surnames of known (familiar or famous) people sharing our own first name than surnames of people bearing a colleague's, a romantic partner's, or a parent's name (Brédart, 2016, 2018). Another indicator of the link between one's name and identity is the *name letter effect*, i.e. the fact that people prefer the letters included in their own names to letters that are not in their names (for a review, see Hoorens, 2014).

Other studies have addressed the relationship between the own name and identity by examining people's explicit claims that one's own name is a symbol of identity. For examples, researchers asked participants to provide answers to the simple question "Who are you?" or "Who am I?". In response, the majority of participants made explicit reference to their names (e.g. Bugental & Zelen, 1950, for a review, see Dion, 1983). In Norway, a survey showed that 84.7% of respondents liked their surname, only 4.5% disliked it and the others did not know or were indifferent (Wilkstrom, 2012). The vast majority (85.7%) of respondent who liked their surnames expressed an association between their personal identity and their names (e.g. "My surname is me"). Researchers have also addressed the effect of name changes on identity. In this context, Snyder and Fromkin (1980) recalled that the motto of the Lucy Stone League, a women's rights organization established in 1921, was "A wife should no more take her husband's name than he should hers. My name is my identity and must not be lost". In other contexts, name changes may be a means to declare a new social or cultural identity. For example, Thompson (2006) reported how young Korean American women explicitly expressed their new identity as bilingual and bicultural persons by adopting

American first names while keeping their original Korean first names. In addition, the act of giving names to children may reflect a will to express ethnic or cultural identity (Aldrin, 2009; Reed, 2001).

As described above, an important function of naming is to differentiate an individual from others. Researchers have stressed that the function of naming is also to underscore or signal a person's individuality (Jeshion, 2009). Giving a name to a particular entity (person, animal, or entity of the environment) is recognizing that this particular entity is deemed important enough to possess its own individuality (Farkas, 2020; Jeshion, 2009). People reserve proper names for entities they regard as "worthy of being referred to as an individual" (Jeshion, 2009, p. 385). Not referring to people by their name may have the purpose of maintaining impersonality (Farkas, 2020) or denying their identity (Watson, 1986; Rachmani, 2016).

Given the strong link between the personal name and self-identity, one could wonder how people perceive and react to their name being misprocessed by an interlocutor. To the best of our knowledge, apart from a few anecdotal reports of people being offended by misnaming (Aksholakova, 2014; Deffler et al., 2016; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980), very few systematic investigations of this question were conducted. In a study of the implications of ostracism, King and Geise (2010) evaluated the reactions of participants to the fact that an experimenter that they met two days before had forgotten their names. Participants whose names were forgotten did not rate their mood differently than participants whose names were remembered. However, the former had lower scores at the Meaning in Life Questionnaire than the latter. Watzlawick et al. (2016) investigated to what extent Brazilian, German and Korean participants were bothered by the mispronunciation and misspelling of their first names. They showed that the percentages of people who reported correcting often or very often both mispronunciations and misspellings of their first name was higher in Korea

(respectively 58.9% and 71%) and Germany (41.4% and 61%) than in Brazil (35.5% and 49.2%). However, Watzlawick et al.'s (2016) study presents a limitation: the correction of the interlocutor's mistakes was the only indicator of the participants' bother when their names were not correctly spoken or written.

Therefore, the overall objective of the present study was to assess more comprehensively how people perceive and react when they are the target of misnaming and naming failures. More concretely, we asked participants about their feelings, and reactions when, in a conversation, an interlocutor cannot recall their first name, recalls it with hesitation, mispronounces it or calls them by a wrong name. Hereafter, we will refer to these four kinds of naming incidents as *misprocessing*. Participants were invited to rate how much they feel irritated, offended, and sad when their name is misprocessed. They also rated whether they recall their name to the interlocutor when it is either unrecalled, mispronounced or confused. The study was also aimed at assessing if there is a relation between the level of self-esteem and the strength of negative feelings experienced when a naming incident occur. High self-esteem can protect people against negative emotions triggered by incidents challenging their sense of personal value (Poggi & D'Errico, 2018). Thus, it is possible that the higher the participants' level of self-esteem, the less they feel irritated, offended or sad. Finally, we also assessed the extent to which participants themselves committed naming incidents and whether this is linked to their perception of and reactions to the misprocessing of their own name. We hypothesized that committing naming incidents could make participants more understanding and less reactive to the misprocessing of their name. We also assessed whether the strength of negative feelings was associated with the participants' perception of their name as a symbol of their identity: the higher the self-symbolic value of the name, the stronger the negative feelings experienced should be when the name is misprocessed.

Method

Participants

The minimum sample size necessary to evaluate a small size one-tailed correlation of 0.2 with a power of 0.8 at an alpha level of 0.05 was 153 (G*Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). We recruited a total of 186 participants (94 females, 90 males and 2 non-binary) on the university campus and amongst social circles. They were aged between 18 and 40 ($M = 23.9$; $SD = 4.7$). Data from nine additional persons were collected but not included in the analyses (eight participants reported a medication and/or a medical condition that could affect memory performance, one participant did not follow instructions properly). The participants' average educational level, as measured by the number of years of study completed to achieve their highest qualification, was 14.1 ($SD = 2.0$). This study was approved by the local Ethics Committee. All participants gave their written informed consent prior to participation. The study was conducted in French with native French speaking or perfect bilingual participants.

Material and procedure

The experimenter individually ran each participant and explained that the study explored the perceptions and reactions of people when, in conversations with close acquaintances, their interlocutor was unable to recall their first name, recalled it with hesitation, mispronounced it or called them by a wrong name. Close acquaintances were defined as friends, close classmates, teammates or colleagues but did not include family members or romantic partners. Five incidents (i.e. forgetting, hesitation, mispronunciation, misnaming, and mocking, respectively) were described to participants as follow:

a) the interlocutor was unable to recall the participant's first name;

b) the interlocutor hesitated before recalling the participant's first name;

c) the interlocutor mispronounced the participant's first name (for example, the interlocutor says "Clare" instead of "Claire" or "Geoffrey" instead of "Jeffrey");

d) the interlocutor called the participants by a wrong first name (for example, a friend's or a colleague's name, according to the context).

e) the interlocutor laughed at their first name[1].

For each incident, participants were asked whether it happened to them. If so, they were invited to rate on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = *not at all* and 7 = *very much so*) how much they usually felt a) irritated; b) offended; c) sad when such incident occurred. They also indicated on a 4-point scale (*Never / Sometimes / Often / Always*) whether they recalled their name to the interlocutor (for forgetting incidents) or corrected the interlocutor (for mispronunciations and misnaming incidents). For each incident, participants had the opportunity to comment on their responses on a sheet of paper. Then participants judged on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all* and 7 = *very much so*) how much they see their first name as a symbol of their identity, how much they liked their first name, how easy to pronounce their first name is to French-speakers. Then, the participants were invited to rate on 7-point Likert type scales (1 = *never* and 7 = *very often*) how often they themselves committed the same five incidents.

Finally, the participants rated whether people (all kinds of people including parents, friends, colleagues, classmates, clients, and so on) called them by their surname or their first name in daily life. The following options were presented: 1) Only my surname / 2) Mainly my

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[1] Ratings associated with this type of incident were not included in the analyses because the number of participants who experienced it was much smaller ($N = 65$) than for the other four incidents, far from the number of participants requested to carry out correlations in good conditions ($N = 153$; see above).

surname / 3) A little bit more often my surname / 4) Both equally / 5) A little bit more often my first name / 6) Mainly my first name / 7) Only my first name.

Finally, the participants filled a French translation of the 10-item Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale (Vallières & Vallerand, 1990).

Results

All the statistical analyses reported here were conducted using JASP 17.1, except the Cochran and McNemar tests which were calculated with Jamovi (Jamovi does not include a specific option for the Cochran Q test but it can be calculated via the Friedman test option, see Statkat (2023) at https://statkat.com/stat-tests/cochrans-q-test.php).

We carried out Spearman rank correlation analyses rather than parametric correlations because the assumption of pairwise normality was systematically violated (all ps associated with the Shapiro-Wilk tests were < .05)

Properties of the own first name

Before reporting results related to the naming incidents, it is interesting to note that participants judged that their first name was a relatively strong symbol of their personal identity, $M = 5.15$, $SD = 1.87$, $Median = 6$. They also liked their first name, $M = 5.84$, $SD = 1.35$, $Median = 6$. In addition, participants judged that their first name was easy to pronounce, $M = 6.49$, $SD = 1.10$, $Median = 7$. There was a significant positive correlation between the self-symbolic value of the own name and ratings of liking one's name: the higher the symbolic value of the own name, the higher the ratings of liking it, Spearman's $rho = 0.407$, $p < .0001$.

Participants reported that, during a typical day, people called them mainly by their first name, $M = 5.94$, $SD = 1.01$, $Median = 6$ corresponding to "*Mainly my first name*".

Occurrence of incidents

A Cochran's Q test showed that the proportions of occurrence of, respectively, forgetting the participants' name (0.75), hesitating before uttering the participants' name (0.86), mispronouncing the participants' name (0.63) and calling the participants with a wrong name (0.82) differed in a significant way across the type of incidents, *Chi square* = 32.7, *df* = 3, *p* <.001. *McNemar tests* (*N* = 186, *df* = 1) indicated that hesitation was more frequently reported than forgetting and mispronunciation, and mispronunciation was less often reported than misnaming and hesitating, all *p*s < .05. The other comparisons showed no significant differences.

Comparing feelings across the different types of incidents

The most informative analysis of the present data should have been a 4 (Type of incident: Forgetting, hesitation, mispronunciation, and misnaming) X 3 (Feeling: irritated, offended, and sad) repeated measures ANOVA on the intensity of feelings reported. However, only 67 out of the 186 participants (i.e. 36%) reported having experienced the four types of incidents. Consequently, we decided to run this analysis but to also examine the Incident by Feeling interaction (if it was significant) by means of separate one-way ANOVAs for each incident with the Feeling as the repeated measure factor. This strategy allowed us to include much more participants in each one-way ANOVA than in the omnibus two-way ANOVA (see Table 1). For all the performed ANOVAs, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when the assumption of sphericity was violated (Mauchly's test, *p* < .05).

The two-way ANOVA conducted on 67 participants revealed a main effect of Incident, $F(2.60,171.28) = 6.99$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2p = 0.09$: participants reported stronger negative feelings for forgetting and misnaming incidents than for hesitations, Holm's ts(66) = 3.60 and 3.07, respectively, Cohen ds = 0.41 and 0.35 respectively, both *p*s <. 01, and mispronunciations,

ts(66) = 3.35 and 2.82, respectively, ds = 0.38 and 0.32 respectively, ps <. 01 and <.05

respectively. There was no significant difference between forgetting and misnaming incidents,

t(66) = 0.53, d = 0.06, p = 1, nor between mispronunciations and hesitations, t(66) = 0.25, d =

0.03, p = 1. There was a main effect of Feeling, F(1.72,113.26) = 16.29, p < .0001, $\eta^2 p$ =

0.20: participants reported being more irritated and offended than sad, Holm's ts(66) = 5.42

and 4.25, respectively, Cohen ds = 0.37 and 0.29, respectively, both ps < .0001 with no

significant difference between irritation and offense, t(66) = 1.17, Cohen d = 0.08, p = .24.

There was also an interaction between these two factors, F(3.75,247.22) = 2.18, p = .016, $\eta^2 p$

= 0.05. We did not directly follow up this interaction and instead, we report the results of the

four separate ANOVAs conducted on larger samples. For all incidents, participants were more

irritated and offended than sad. The levels of irritation and offense were similar except for

mispronunciation where participants were also more irritated than offended. Descriptive data

are presented in Table 1, and the results of the four ANOVAs and their associated post-hoc

analyses are presented in Table 2.

<div align="center">INSERT TABLES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE</div>

Mean values presented in Table 1 may give the impression that participants had very

weak negative feelings when their name was misprocessed. However, the percentage of

participants who reacted at least moderately (i.e. giving a rating of 4 and over) to at least one

incident reached 53% (96 out of 182 participants; 4 participants having experienced none of

the four considered kinds of incidents). These percentages were respectively 36.4% (51 out of

140 participants) for forgetting incidents, 18.8% (30 out of 160 participants) for hesitations,

29.7% (35 out of 118 participants) for mispronunciations and 36.6% (56 out of 153

participants) for misnaming. These percentages suggest that participants were not always

indifferent to naming incidents involving their own name.

Behavioral reactions to incidents

A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was carried out to compare the estimated frequency with which participants recalled (for incidents where the name was forgotten) or corrected (for mispronunciations and erroneous naming) their name across the incidents. This analysis revealed no effect of Incident, $F(2,140) = 0.64$, $p = 0.53$, $\eta^2 p = 0.01$. For all the incidents the mean ratings were around 3, which corresponded to 'Often" on the 4-point scale: $M = 2.99$ ($SD = 0.93$) for forgetting incidents, $M = 3.09$ ($SD = 0.97$) for mispronunciations, and $M = 3.13$ ($SD = 0.94$) for misnaming.

Relationship between self-esteem and feeling intensity for the different types of incidents

Before starting to report the results of correlation analyses, it is important to note that the recommended sample size ($N = 153$, see the **Participants** section) was reached for two kinds of incidents: hesitation ($N = 160$) and misnaming ($N = 153$) but not for forgetting ($N = 140$) and mispronunciation ($N = 118$). Thus, for these last two incidents, we estimated the achieved power of the analyses a posteriori. The achieved power was 0.77 for forgetting incidents and 0.71 for mispronunciation (G*Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).

Since high self-esteem may protect us against negative emotions elicited by incidents that could challenge our sense of personal value (Poggi & D'Errico, 2018), we expected negative correlations between scores at the Rosenberg scale and the mean ratings of negative feelings for each kind of incidents. Non-parametric one-tailed correlations (Spearman Rho) are presented in Table 3. Contrary to our expectation, almost none of these correlations were significant. The only significant correlation indicated that the higher the participants' self-esteem score, the lower their feeling of sadness when they are misnamed.

Relationship between propensity and feeling intensity for the different types of incidents

It is also possible that participants who are more prone to incidents with other people's names are more tolerant or understanding of similar mistakes and would experience less negative feelings when their own name is misprocessed than participants who are less prone. Data seem to support this hypothesis for the feeling of irritation. Indeed, there were significant negative correlations between the participants' propensity to forget, to hesitate, to mispronounce names or to misname people, and the intensity of their irritation when an interlocutor committed the same incidents (see Table 3). There was also a significant negative relationship between the participants' propensity to misname other people and the intensity of sadness when they were themselves misnamed. No other negative relationship between feelings and incidents were significant.

Relationship between name self-symbolic level and feeling intensity for the different types of incidents

Finally, we expected a positive correlation between ratings to the question "Do you see your first name as a symbol of your personal identity?" and the intensity of feelings when naming incidents occurred. Results are presented in Table 3. Analyses only revealed a significant positive correlation between the name self-symbolic level and the intensity of irritation after mispronunciation of the own name, but not for the other naming incidents. In addition, there were significant positive correlations for ratings of self-symbolic values and both the level of sadness when the interlocutor hesitated before uttering the participant's name and the level of sadness when the interlocutor misnamed the participant. There were no other significant correlations.

Discussion

In the present study, participants were explicitly asked to judge if their first name was a symbol of their personal identity and if they liked it. The results showed that they did as they

gave relatively high ratings in response to these questions (respectively $M = 5.15$ and $M = 5.84$ on a 1 to 7 scale). This result is consistent with those of the few studies that examined people's explicit evaluation of the self-symbolic value of their first name (Dion, 1983; Wilkstrom, 2012).

The intensity of negative feelings in reaction to a misprocessing of the own name by an interlocutor varied across feelings: participants reported being more irritated and offended than sad. There was no significant difference between irritation and offense for forgetting, hesitations or misnaming incidents, but participants were more irritated than offended when their names were mispronounced.

However, in all cases, the intensity of feelings remained relatively low, with means varying between 1.37 and 2.56 (see Table 1), well below the middle of the 7-point scale. This relative weakness of negative feelings elicited by naming incidents is in line with King and Geise (2010)'s findings that people whose name had been forgotten by an experimenter did not report more negative mood than people whose name was recalled. It is nevertheless important to note than more than half of the participants (53%) rated one of their feelings as moderate or stronger (rating 4 and higher) for at least one incident. Another point to be mentioned is that ten participants spontaneously expressed, in their complementary comments, that they found that naming incidents were funny with sentences such as "I find this funny", "This makes me laugh" 'This amuses me", or "This makes me smile; it is generally the interlocutor who feels uncomfortable, not me". Therefore, some people experience positive rather than negative feelings when their own name are misprocessed. Future research should more directly assess the proportion of people experiencing positive or negative feelings in such situations.

In contrast with these relatively weak negative feelings, people reported they often react to incidents with their names, either by reminding it to the interlocutor or correcting them (i.e. on average 2.99 for the forgetting incident, 3.09 for mispronunciations, and 3.13 for misnaming on a 4-point scale). This result indicates that, even if participants do not experience strong negative feelings when their own name is misprocessed, they do not ignore these incidents and tend not to let them pass without a reaction. In the present study, participants corrected interlocutors who mispronounced their names more often than those in the Watzlawick et al. (2016)'s study. In their study, the percentage of participants who often or very often corrected their name when it was not correctly spoken varied from 35.5% to 58.9% across countries. Here, the percentage of participants who corrected their name at least often was 71.1% for mispronunciations and 77.1% for misnaming. The percentage of participants who often and always recalled their name in case of forgetting was 72.1%. However, the comparison is difficult because, the contexts in which mispronunciations occurred possibly differed between the two studies. Furthermore, Watzlawick et al. (2016) showed that the frequency varied across cultural contexts (Brazil, Germany and Korea) and none of these cultural contexts was similar to that in the present study. Importantly, the contrast between the weak ratings of negative feelings and the high ratings of recall and correction suggests that it can be misleading to use the correction as the only indicator of bother when the own names was not correctly spoken as Watzlawick et al. (2016) did. From the present results, ratings of negative feelings alone would suggest that bother was low, whereas ratings of corrections alone would suggest that bother was important. Taking the two kinds of ratings into consideration thus leads to the more refined conclusion that, globally, incidents did not trigger strong negative feelings but participants did not ignore these incidents and usually responded by correcting or recalling their names.

Because high self-esteem can protect people against negative feelings triggered by incidents that could question their sense of personal value (Poggi & D'Errico, 2018), we expected negative correlations between scores at the Rosenberg self-esteem scale and ratings of negative feelings (irritation, offense and sadness) for the different incidents. Globally, results did not support this prediction. There was only a negative correlation between scores at the Rosenberg scale and ratings of sadness when participants were misnamed.

We also hypothesized that participants, who are themselves prone to difficulties with others' names would be more tolerant and experience less negative feelings when their own name was misprocessed, than participants who do not. Results showed that, indeed, there was a negative correlation between propensity to misprocess names and the intensity of experienced irritation when the own name was misprocessed. This was the case for *every kind* of naming incident: the more participants were prone to incidents with others' names, the less they felt irritated when their own name was misprocessed. However, this negative relationship was not found for the feeling of being offended, regardless the type of incident and only for sadness when participants were misnamed.

We also explored whether the self-symbolic value of the own name (i.e., the degree to which the own name was seen as a symbol of identity) was related to the intensity of negative feelings experienced after naming incidents. We found a positive correlation between the name's symbolic level and the intensity of irritation after the own name was mispronounced. The name symbolic value also correlated positively with both the level of sadness after an interlocutor's hesitation before uttering the participant's name and the level of sadness when the interlocutor named the participant by a wrong name. As one can see in Table 2, only two systematic patterns of results come out from these correlation analyses. First, the participants' propensity to misprocess names and the intensity of experienced irritation when the own name was misprocessed were negatively related for the four types of incidents. Second, the

intensity of sadness after having been misnamed correlated with the three factors under study (Self-esteem, propensity to misprocess names and self-symbolic value of the own name).

It would be interesting to evaluate, in future research, whether emotional reactions are stronger, and whether the almost total absence of sadness holds, when naming incidents occur in the context of conversations with close relatives such as romantic partners or close family members. Future research should also include ratings of positive feelings such as amusement when misprocessing of the own name occurs.

In the present study, the names of the participants were usually easy to pronounce (with a median of 7 of the 7-point scale, see results). It would be interesting to reproduce this study in conditions that allow comparing feelings and reactions of people that have names with different degrees of ease of pronunciation to evaluate the influence of this factor on the occurrence of naming incidents and on feelings associated with the different naming incidents. It is difficult to predict how the difficulty to pronounce a name may influence feelings associated with, for example, mispronunciation. On one side, repeated mispronunciation might trigger irritation, offense, or even sadness; on the other side, it might lead the person to habituate to such incidents and experience weaker negative feelings. Likewise, a person who knows that their names is hard to pronounce may be more tolerant toward these incidents.

Finally, a limitation of the present study is that it is unsure whether participants responded based on episodic recollections of naming incidents or, rather, on the plausibility that such incidents could have happened to them. The two response strategies were possible when answering our questionnaire. Future research should include questions to clarify this point, or explicitly instruct participants to base their response only on episodic recollections of incidents.

Data availability

Aggregated data are available at https://osf.io/meydz

Ethics declarations

Ethical approval

This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology, Speech

Therapy, and Education Sciences of the University of Liège, IRB document No. 2223-110.

Informed consent

All participants gave their written informed consent prior to participation.

Conflicts of interest

The authors declare no potential conflicts of interest

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Tables

Table 1. Mean ratings of feelings as a function of type of feeling and type of incident. Ratings were provided on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all* and 7 = *very much so*). Standard deviations are in parentheses. The numbers of participants included in the one-way ANOVAs are specified for each type of incident.

		Feeling		
		Irritated	Offended	Sad
Incident	Forgetting (*N*= 140)	2.41 (1.54)	2.56 (1.66)	1.97 (1.43)
	Hesitation (*N* = 160)	1.89 (1.25)	2.01 (1.28)	1.57 (1.10)
	Mispronunciation (*N* = 118)	2.37 (1.68)	1.81 (1.28)	1.37 (0.87)
	Misnaming (*N* = 153)	2.52 (1.71)	2.51 (1.75)	1.75 (1.28)

Table 2. Parameters (*F*, *df*, *p*, η^2p) for the four one-way ANOVAs and the associated Post-hoc Holm's tests (*t*, *p*, Cohen's *d*) as a function of Incident. Significant differences are in bold.

		Forgetting N = 140	Hesitation N = 160	Mispronunciation N = 118	Misnaming N = 153
Main effect	*F*	11.78	15.16	30.95	29.75
	df	(2,278)	(1.82,288.97)	(1.74,204.08)	(1.74,263.85)
	p	**<.0001**	**<.0001**	**<.0001**	**<.0001**
	η^2p	0.08	0.09	0.21	0.16
Post-hoc Holm Irritated *vs* Offended	*t*	1.24	1.42	4.39	0.06
	p	0.22	0.16	**<.0001**	0.95
	Cohen's *d*	0.10	0.10	0.42	0.004
Post-hoc Holm Irritated *vs* Sad	*t*	3.44	3.89	7.85	6.71
	p	**= .001**	**<.001**	**<.0001**	**<.0001**
	Cohen's *d*	0.28	0.27	0.76	0.49
Post-hoc Holm Offended *vs* Sad	*t*	4.69	5.32	3.46	6.65
	p	**<.0001**	**<.0001**	**<.001**	**<.0001**
	Cohen's *d*	0.38	0.37	0.33	0.48

Table 3. Correlations between the intensity of affective responses (feeling irritated, offended or sad) and a) scores at the Rosenberg self-esteem scale, b) ratings of propensity to misprocess (forgetting, hesitating, mispronouncing or calling by a wrong name) other people's names, c) levels of self-symbolic value of the own name. All the correlations are one-tailed.

		Rosenberg	Propensity	Symbol
Incident	Feeling			
Forgetting (N =140)	Irritated	$rho = 0.077$ $p = .818$	**$rho = -0.180$ $p = .017$**	$rho = 0.121$ $p = .077$
	Offended	$rho = 0.002$ $p = .511$	$rho = -0.135$ $p = .056$	$rho = -0.033$ $p = .650$
	Sad	$rho = -0.111$ $p = .095$	$rho = -0.030$ $p = .360$	$rho = 0.109$ $p = .099$
Hesitation (N = 160)	Irritated	$rho = -0.060$ $p = .227$	**$rho = -0.182$ $p = .010$**	$rho = 0.081$ $p = .156$
	Offended	$rho = 0.055$ $p = .754$	$rho = -0.127$ $p = .055$	$rho = 0.021$ $p = .395$
	Sad	$rho = -0.069$ $p = .192$	$rho = -0.007$ $p = .535$	**$rho = 0.162$ $p = .020$**
Mispronunciation (N = 118)	Irritated	$rho = -0.012$ $p = .447$	**$rho = -0.203$ $p = .014$**	**$rho = 0.224$ $p = .007$**
	Offended	$rho = 0.021$ $p = .590$	$rho = -0.062$ $p = .252$	$rho = 0.103$ $p = .134$
	Sad	$rho = -0.103$ $p = .132$	$rho = -0.086$ $p = .176$	$rho = -0.065$ $p = .765$
Misnaming (N = 153)	Irritated	$rho = -0.078$ $p = .167$	**$rho = -0.156$ $p = .027$**	$rho = 0.014$ $p = .433$
	Offended	$rho = -0.121$ $p = .068$	$rho = -0.085$ $p = .147$	$rho = 0.030$ $p = .355$
	Sad	**$rho = -0.199$ $p = .007$**	**$rho = -0.142$ $p = .040$**	**$rho = 0.144$ $p = .037$**

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