



Argument for emergentism:

1. The attribute of mentality is either (i) differentiating or (ii) delusive or (iii) reductive or (iv) emergent.
2. It is not (i) differentiating.
3. It is not (ii) delusive.
4. It is not (iii) reductive.
5. Therefore, the attribute of mentality is emergent.

Support for P2: “Any theory which regards mentality as a ‘differentiating attribute’ (...), *ipso facto*, renounces all hope of ‘explaining’ its occurrence. For, by definition, it holds that none of the higher factors of mentality are reducible or emergent from the lower factors of mentality alone or in combination with mentality. Hence it is not of the least advantage to a Dualistic Theory to ascribe some of the factors of mentality to all matter in the hope that it will thereby explain the occurrence of the complete characteristic of mentality in certain material objects” (Broad 1925, 645-646).

Support for P3: “It is easy to see that any theory which makes mentality a delusive characteristic is self-contradictory. For to say that mentality is a delusive characteristic is to say that it in fact belongs to nothing, but that it is misperceived or misjudged to belong to something. But, if there be misperception or misjudgments, there are perceptions or judgments; and, if there be perceptions or judgments, there *are* events to which the characteristic of mentality applies” (Broad 1925, 611).

Support for P4, against reductive materialism/behaviourism: “However completely the behaviour of an external body answers to the behaviouristic tests for intelligence, it always remains a perfectly sensible question to ask: ‘Has it really got a mind, or is it merely an automaton?’ (...) Now, on the behaviouristic theory, to have a mind just means to behave in certain ways; and to ask whether a thing which admittedly does behave in these ways has a mind would be like asking whether Jones, who is admittedly a rich man, has much wealth” (Broad 1925, 614-615).