

zung von Vorstandpositionen durch Migranten. Für den Alltag hingegen sind interkulturelle Schulungen für Mitarbeitende, Hauptamtliche wie Freiwillige, hilfreich.

Ausblick

Damit sind die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse des Projekts umrissen. Auf einzelne Aspekte gehen die Beiträge dieses Sonderschwerpunkts

vertiefend ein. Die identifizierten Projekte werden ebenso wie der Überblick über die Fachdebatte dokumentiert und Thema einer Tagung sein, die im Dezember 2014 im Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus stattfindet. Damit ist aber der Prozess selbstverständlich nicht beendet. Vielmehr handelt es sich um einen Auftakt, der dazu dient die Debatte weiterzuführen und von verschiedenen Projekten zu lernen.

Political Participation and Naturalisation: A Common Agenda

Thomas Huddleston

Naturalisation improves the socio-economic outcomes of immigrants, according to recent Migration Policy Group research (ACIT) and a growing scientific literature on the topic. Studies are finding that national citizenship improves immigrants' employment rate, income, housing situation, and participation in elections and other political actions. Naturalisation improves their perception in wider society. Naturalised immigrants are less likely to experience discrimination from employers, better legally protected against it, and more likely to report it. Naturalisation also advances immigrants' rights and social inclusion. Firstly, national citizenship is arguably immigrants' best guarantee of secure residence and equal rights. Restrictionists can take away rights from foreigners, but they cannot easily take away citizenship from naturalised immigrants. What's more, the mobilisation of naturalised voters and their descendants is one effective response against the mobilisation of the far-right electorate. The more immigrants become citizens and can vote in elections, the more likely are politicians to listen to them and support inclusive policies that benefit all types of people.

Currently in most European countries, immigrants simply do not count in national, regional or European elections. Lower levels of voter registration and turnout are certainly issues. While studies often find that citizens with an immigrant background are on average less likely to register or turn out to vote, their participation generally relates to their age and education level, increases over time, and varies over election cycles depending on their mobilisation around key election issues. Instead, the major unaddressed issue is that most first generation immigrants are not even eligible to vote at most levels. Only naturalised citizens can vote in regional elections in most countries or in national elections in nearly all countries. Low levels of naturalisation and electoral participation among immigrants emerge as major contributors to the democratic deficit in Europe's countries of immigration. The disenfranchisement of immigrants is perhaps the major issue undermining democratic legitimacy in Western Europe. Current voting initiatives around election time do not address this structural democratic deficit. Unlike in traditional countries of immigration, most immigrants in European countries do not naturalise

and thus do not count in national elections. ACIT found that in 2008 only one in three first-generation immigrants had naturalised in the EU-27 or EU-15 countries. Even when countries facilitate political rights and naturalisation procedures, more immigrants could seize these opportunities to have their voices heard if they knew about these procedures and the benefits of political participation and naturalisation.

1 | State of play

Most immigrants have few opportunities to inform and improve the policies that affect them daily. Opening political and civil rights is the sign of a confident country of immigration. Established and new countries of immigration diverge significantly. On the one end of the scale, a third-country national has full political liberties, voting rights, elected consultative bodies, and access to funding at local, regional, and national level. On the other end, a third-country national cannot form a political association or join a political party, vote in local elections like EU citizens, or have access to funding or consultative bodies at any level of governance. Immigrants enjoy nearly none of these rights in Central Europe, the Baltics, Cyprus and Malta. Only Ireland and Portugal have opened as many political opportunities as leading countries in the Nordics and North-west Europe. Established countries of immigration with less favourable frameworks, especially on voting rights, need either constitutional changes (Austria, Germany, Italy, and Spain) or greater political will (France, United Kingdom, specific Canadian provinces and American states). Immigrants' political opportunities are not getting much better over recent years. New countries of immigration have renewed interest in both consultative bodies (e.g. Greece, Spain and Portugal) and some voting rights (i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). While consultative bodies are easily created and easily removed (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, and now

Norway) when governments are willing to listen, voting rights are here to stay: hard to obtain, but even harder to revoke.

Access to nationality remains a weakness in most countries' integration strategies. According to the MIPEX data, most parts of the procedure still discourage or exclude many from trying. Half of the countries make citizenship conditional upon income and high fees. Applicants are normally required to know the language, often at high or unclear levels. Tests rarely come with the support to pass them. Even if an applicant meets all the legal requirements, they can still be rejected on vague grounds in rather discretionary procedures. Nationality policies are more unfavourable for societal integration in many new immigration countries as Austria, Denmark, and the EU12 (Baltics, Central Europe, Cyprus, and Malta).

Nevertheless, reform trends are spreading across many EU Member States as they recognise themselves as countries of immigration and open clearer paths to citizenship. Dual nationality and *jus soli* are becoming the norms for countries of immigration. 15 MIPEX countries have created some form of birthright citizenship for immigrants' children or grandchildren born in the country. 18 in MIPEX now allow all citizens to hold dual nationality. Over the past decade, these reforms have significantly improved the legal conditions for integration in Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, and most recently Luxembourg. According to MIPEX, these recently reformed countries in the EU15 are now giving their foreign residents a slightly favourable path to citizenship, just like the traditional birthright citizenship countries like Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The highest-scoring countries tend to limit the first generation residence requirement to five years or less, grant automatic *jus soli* to at least the third-generation, avoid economic resource requirements, protect against statelessness, and embrace dual nationality. On the other end of the MIPEX scale, the sixteen

countries whose policies receive a 'slightly unfavourable' score include the Eastern Mediterranean countries, the Baltic States, as well as Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Hungary. To the less favourable aspects mentioned for the EU average are added employment-related criteria, integration conditions, and few procedural safeguards taking into account a migrant's personal circumstances.

2 | The overall link between naturalisation and political participation policies

Since its beginnings in the twentieth century, immigration studies have turned to naturalisation as the key area of integration (e.g. Walzer 1983, Hammar 1985, Brubaker 1992, Castles 1995, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002, Bloemraad 2006). Full citizenship rights are conditional upon an individual process of application for formal membership, whereby the state determines who is a national citizen. By extension, national citizenship is seen as the best guarantor of immigrants' citizenship rights, equal treatment, and recognition in society. These theorists pay particular attention to naturalisation as full political membership, political rights, and greater access to political power. The democratic inclusion of immigrants is emphasised as one of the guiding principles behind both integration and naturalisation policies (Bauböck 2005). In that sense, naturalisation is presented as a means – but not necessarily the end – of the immigrant integration process.

Several theorists nevertheless downplay the symbolic and practical importance of national citizenship. These theorists observe that European liberal democracies, or at least their educated elites, are in the process of constructing a civic culture based on residence and not on nationality. Most social and economic rights have been decoupled from nationality through European integration and the global human rights framework (Soysal 1995 and Joppke 2010). These theorists point to these free-moving citizens as evidence of the insig-

nificance of national citizenship for most people, including immigrants. Their work associates naturalisation with the history of nationalism (Kostakopoulou 2003) and the potentially 'illiberal' powers of the state (Guild et al. 2009). These theorists want to devalue national citizenship by disconnecting rights from nationality status and deriving them from legal residence. In lieu of naturalisation, they advocate for the extension of all national citizenship rights, including national voting rights, to all legal residents, under the banner of residence-based citizenship or a rights-based approach.

While there are theoretical and normative arguments supporting either perspective, there is surprisingly little theory or empirical study of the relationship between naturalisation and integration policies for immigrants. The alternative view sees granting economic, social and political rights, independent of national citizenship, as an alternative to granting access to formal membership through naturalisation. Whereas the complementary view sees access to membership through naturalisation as a complementary strategy to extending rights to foreigners. Both naturalisation and residence-based rights for foreigners enhance the equal treatment, rights, and participation of immigrants. Moreover, equal rights for foreigners means that naturalisation will not be an instrumental choice for immigrants simply seeking equal rights. Instead, equal rights for foreigners strengthen the voluntary commitment that immigrants make to their country of residence through naturalisation (Bauböck 1994).

Most notably, facilitating naturalisation and political rights for foreigners are sometimes seen as 'complementary' strategies for the political empowerment of immigrants, reflecting the principles of 'territorial inclusion' (Bauböck 2005). In contrast, the restriction of these rights would reflect an 'ethnic nationalist' or 'exclusionist' approach (Bauböck 2005). However, politicians in states granting immigrant voting rights may use them as a justification for rest-

riptive naturalisation laws (e.g. Baltic and Central European states), while those in states facilitating naturalisation may oppose voting rights with the same argument (e.g. Canada, France, and the US). Advocates may be forced to make a pragmatic ‚false choice‘ to promote one over the other, as in political debates previously in Belgium (Jacobs 1999) and currently in France and Italy.

The strongest bivariate correlation emerges between ordinary naturalisation policies and most integration policies measured in MIPEX, especially with political participation policies for non-EU citizens: In the ‚exclusionist‘ states, such as Austria, Cyprus, Malta and the EU Member States in Central Europe, few political rights are also accompanied by restricted ordinary naturalisation channels. Whereas in the ‚territorially inclusive‘ countries, the more states facilitate the naturalisation policy, the more they also tend to grant political rights (i.e. a majority of EU-15 states, such as Benelux states, Sweden, Portugal, and the UK).

Notwithstanding the significance of this European-wide trend, a few states do not fit within this spectrum of ‚territorially inclusive‘ and ‚exclusionist‘ states. In between the two lies the ‚republican‘ model, which privileges naturalisation over political rights for foreigners in order to guarantee equal and full membership for members of the electorate (Baubock 2005). Policies ascribed to this model preserve the value and incentives for naturalisation through a facilitated naturalisation policy and a significant ‚rights gap‘ between foreigners and national citizens. Democratic inclusion comes solely through naturalisation and multiple nationality. For example, our data show that France and Germany have facilitated naturalisation policies without extending electoral rights to non-EU citizens. In contrast to the ‚republican‘ model, a ‚denizenship‘ model is ascribed to states with political rights for foreigners but without citizenship reform. Among European countries, for example, electoral rights are facilitated over naturalisation

in Denmark and Switzerland, and, to a certain extent, Finland, Norway, and The Netherlands. These countries preserve a greater link between national citizenship and national belonging defined in ethno-national terms through a reduction in the rights gap between foreigners and national citizens.

3 | Conclusions

Naturalisation and the use of voting rights are the two major ways for immigrants to count in the political life of their country of residence. Voting is how most citizens participate in national politics. Far more citizens vote in elections than join associations or political parties, or participate in demonstrations, public meetings, sign petitions or contact public officials. All types of citizens, including the low-educated, low-income, and youth, are more likely to vote than to undertake other forms of political participation. Naturalisation is useful for promoting political participation among immigrants, as several studies find that naturalised citizens are more likely to vote and participate politically than non-naturalised citizens with a similar profile (e.g. Bevelander and Pendakur 2010).

Naturalisation and political participation are most effective when promoted together. Promoting only naturalisation may not have the desired effects on political participation if new citizens do not register and turn out to vote in equal numbers. Naturalisation and voting not only affect the overall level of political participation among immigrants, but also the responsiveness of politicians to immigrants‘ concerns. Integration policies and social policies are usually more inclusive in the cities and countries where immigrants and their descendants punch their weight in elections (see Vernby 2013 for evidence in Sweden and Koopmans et al. 2012 for some European-wide evidence). This ‚democratic deficit‘ argument fits within a broader argument about democratic participation for all legal residents, especially in cities/neighbourhoods

with large shares of foreigners within the population.

Given this democratic deficit and the research suggesting how to fix it, it is surprising that so few integration actors in Europe are promoting naturalisation and electoral participation. Our ACIT research found that naturalisation is promoted by very few national governments or NGOs (see Huddleston 2013). There are several reasons why advocates may not have adopted a strategy on promoting naturalization and political participation. Active citizenship may be dismissed as a 'luxury' issue that is less important than humanitarian causes like fighting for a legal status and decent life for vulnerable groups. Advocating naturalisation may also be denounced as 'assimilation.' Progressive actors in Europe often prefer to talk about long-term goals of EU citizenship and national voting rights for all foreigners – but usually settle for local voting rights. As a result, immigrants are rarely encouraged to naturalise or defend immigrants' interests in elections. Instead, integration actors work 'on their behalf' on issues such as their employment, language, and education and ignore underlying power issues. This approach is short-sighted. The far right in Europe is paying close attention to power issues and has successfully restricted many countries' naturalisation and integration policies. Integration actors cannot have inclusive integration and social policies without promoting immigrant naturalisation and electoral participation at regional and national level, where most integration and social policies are decided. Where the legislation is favourable, governments and NGOs should seize the opportunity to inform, encourage, and support immigrants to become citizens and voters. Full citizenship is within reach for many immigrants in Europe if 'citizenship campaigns' can stimulate the political participation of immigrants as citizens.

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Politische Parteien und Einwanderer – eine kritische Reflexion förderlicher und hinderlicher Faktoren der Inkorporation

Daniel Volkert

Das Thema der parteipolitischen Inkorporation von Menschen mit eigener oder familiärer Einwanderungsgeschichte tauchte in der Diskussion um die Nachfolge des sozialdemokratischen Oberbürgermeisters Berlins, Klaus Wowereit, im September 2014 auf. So bewarb sich mit Raed Saleh erstmals ein Einwanderer für das höchste Regierungsamt in der Bundeshauptstadt.¹ In diesem Zusammenhang lässt sich fragen, welche förderlichen Faktoren angeführt werden können, die den Aufstieg Salehs bis zur Kandidatur innerhalb der Berliner Sozialdemokraten ermöglichten. Wodurch kann eine derartige Öffnung der Partei erklärt werden? Derartige Fragen können angesichts der einwanderungsbedingten Vielfalt in demokratischen Gesellschaften (Faist 2009: 172; Vertovec 1998: 188) auch für andere Parteien gestellt werden. Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, erste Hypothesen im Hinblick auf förderliche und hinderliche Faktoren der parteipolitischen Inkorporation von Einwanderern herauszuarbeiten.

Unter Bezugnahme parteiorganisationstheoretischer Annahmen sollen Forschungsergebnisse aus einzelnen europäischen Ländern sowie erste eigene Forschungserkenntnisse² eingeordnet und kritisch reflektiert werden, um mögliche Faktoren zu identifizieren und für die weitere wissenschaftliche Diskussion fruchtbar zu machen. Hauptargument ist, das nicht allein das migrantische Wählerpotenzial, son-

dern vielmehr die politische Ausrichtung der Parteien in Kombination mit einer politischen Mobilisierung von Einwanderern im Ankunftsland entscheidende Voraussetzungen für eine Öffnung bilden. Ferner beeinflussen gesellschaftliche Normen im Hinblick auf den Umgang mit MigrantInnen sowie der politische Wettbewerb das Verhalten der Parteien.

1 | Das Wahlstimmenpotenzial von Einwanderern

Ausgehend von der Prämisse, dass Parteien rationale Akteure darstellen, deren Ziel die Stimmenmaximierung bei Wahlen ist (Downs 1968), könnte vermutet werden, dass die Bereitschaft zur parteipolitischen Inkorporation von Einwanderern vom Ausmaß des migrantischen Stimmengewichts abhängt. Auf den ersten Blick lassen sich Hinweise finden, die für dieses Argument sprechen. So öffnen sich Parteien gegenüber Einwanderern insbesondere in jenen Ländern, die durch ein liberales Staatsbürgerschafts- und/oder Wahlrecht geprägt sind und somit über ein größeres migrantisches Wahlstimmenpotenzial verfügen. Demnach führen Richard Alba und Nancy Foner in ihrer Analyse die niedrige Repräsentation von MigrantInnen in den deutschen Parlamenten, und somit auch die geringe Bereitschaft der Parteien, KandidatInnen mit Migrationshintergrund auf aussichtsreiche Plätze zu nominieren, indirekt auf