

# Lotze and Brentano on psychology

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# Lotze

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- (1852). *Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele*. Leipzig: Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung.
  - (1856), *Mikrokosmos. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. Versuch einer Anthropologie*. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, Vol. 1: *Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben*.
  - (1879), *System der Philosophie*. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, Part 2: *Drei Bücher der Metaphysik (Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie)*.
  - (1881), *Grundzüge der Psychologie* (R. Lotze, Ed.). Leipzig: S. Hirzel.

# Lotze & robust materialists

- (1) Non-analytical science is empirical
- (2) Non-analytical science's goal is causal explanation
- (3) The only causal relations immediately accessible to science are physical

# Robust materialists

C(a, b)

Of what nature are ultimately the object referred to by “a” and “b”?

“Keine Kraft ohne Stoff — kein Stoff ohne Kraft!” (Büchner, *Stoff und Kraft*, 1855)

**Metaphysical materialism:** Reality (substances) is ultimately physical.

**Physicalism or physical reductionism:** Mental properties are ultimately physical.

# Lotze against robust materialists

- (1) Non-analytical science is empirical
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- (4) Reality is ultimately mental (panpsychism or "spiritualism")**

# Lotze against robust materialists

**Matter becomes ever more obscure to us when we disregard its calculation value for physical mechanics and ask ourselves what it might be in itself.** Then it soon becomes apparent that an inert, passive existence, consisting in impenetrability and space-filling, inactively endowed with forces that follow some constant law, **is a completely impenetrable thought for our cognition.** (Lotze, *Medicinische Psychologie*, 1852, p. 58)

# Lotze against robust materialists

- (1) Non-analytical science is empirical
- (2) Non-analytical science's goal is causal explanation
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- (4) Reality is ultimately mental (panpsychism or "spiritualism")
- (5) **Mental properties are irreducible to physical properties (property dualism)**

# Lotze against robust materialists

While materialism allowed the mental to be absorbed by the physical in an inconceivable way, here both are conceived of as **equally original** [*gleich ursprünglich*], equally essential, but in a constant and indissoluble unity. (*Medicinische Psychologie*, 45). (Lotze, *Medicinische Psychologie*, p. 45)

The claim to transform the theory of mental life [*Seelenleben*] into a natural science is an empty fashionable way of speaking [*eine leere Modephrase*], which means either nothing significant or an attempt to hear with one's eyes and see with one's ears. (Lotze, *Medicinische Psychologie*, p. 58)



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- (4) Reality is ultimately mental (panpsychism or "spiritualism")
- (5) Mental properties are irreducible to physical properties (property dualism)

# Lotze

- (1) Non-analytical science is empirical [TRUE]
- (2) Non-analytical science's goal is causal explanation [TRUE]
- (3) The only causal relations immediately accessible to science are physical
- (4) Reality is ultimately mental (panpsychism or "spiritualism")
- (5) Mental properties are irreducible to physical properties (property dualism) [TRUE]

# Was Brentano a panpsychist?

Substance panpsychism:  $\forall x (Sx \supset Mx)$  [All substances are souls]

[6]  $\forall x \forall y (P(y, x) \supset My)$

[Only souls perceive]

[7]  $\forall x \forall y (P(y, x) \supset y = x)$

[All perceptions are inner perceptions]

[8]  $\forall x (Sx \supset \exists y P(y, x))$

[All substances are objects of perception]

# Was Brentano a panpsychist?

Die chemischen Elemente sind Stoffe, unanschaulich in sich selbst [...] (*Deskriptive Psychologie*, p. 2)

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- |   |   |            |  |
|---|---|------------|--|
| [6]   | $\forall x \forall y (P(y, x) \supset My)$                |            | [Only souls perceive]                      |
| [7]   | $\forall x \forall y (P(y, x) \supset y = x)$             |            | [All perceptions are inner perceptions]    |
| [8]   | $\forall x (Sx \supset \exists y P(y, x))$                |            | [All substances are objects of perception] |
| A (fictitious) semi-Brentanian demonstration: |   |            |  |
| [9]   | $\forall x \forall y (P(y, x) \supset (My \ \& \ y = x))$ |            | [dis. 6, 7]                                |
| [10]  | $\forall x \forall y ((My \ \& \ y = x) \supset Mx)$      |            | [Leibniz law]                              |
| [11]  | $\forall x \forall y (P(y, x) \supset Mx)$                |            | [trans. 9, 10]                             |
| [12]  | $\forall x (\exists y P(y, x) \supset Mx)$                |            | [11]                                       |
| [13]  | $\forall x (Sx \supset Mx)$                               | <u>QED</u> | [trans. 8, 12]                             |

# Lotze

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# Brentano

Genetic psychology will never be able to achieve its task fully and properly without mentioning physico-chemical processes and without reference to anatomical structures. (*Deskriptive Psychologie*, p. 2)

We disproved the claim that no laws could be established on the basis of mental experience, but we agreed with the assertion that **the discovery of the really fundamental laws [eigentlichen Grundgesetzen] of the succession of mental phenomena is possible only on the basis of physiological facts.** The highest generalizations based upon the exclusive analysis of the succession of mental phenomena can only be empirical laws subject to inadequacies and imperfections, which is ordinarily the case with underived secondary laws. (Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, p. 91–2)



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- (5) Mental properties are irreducible to physical properties (property dualism) [TRUE]