Seron D., « The ideality of logic: Reassessing Husserl's anti-psychologism in the *Logical Investigations* », dans T. Grohmann (éd.), *The 'Essence' of Phenomenology*, New York, Routledge, à paraître (Routledge Series in Phenomenology).

Prepublication draft. Please cite the published version.

The ideality of logic: Reassessing Husserl's anti-psychologism in the *Logical Investigations*

Denis Seron (Univ. of Liège, FNRS)

Abstract: Husserl's philosophy of logic in his *Logical Investigations* is based on two central claims. The first one is epistemological: Husserl advocates an uncompromising logical anti-empiricism, of which his logical anti-psychologism is only a special kind. The second thesis is ontological and corresponds to what Husserl terms "idealism." Husserl, in the *Prolegomena*, presents several arguments in favor of these two claims. The aim of the present chapter is to discuss and evaluate three of them. It is argued that these three arguments are not by themselves sufficient to prove Husserl's two claims about logic.

---

1. Introduction

Husserl's philosophy of logic in his *Logical Investigations* is based on two central theses. The first one is epistemological: Husserl advocates an uncompromising logical anti-empiricism to

the effect that logical knowledge cannot be derived from experience. The second thesis is ontological and corresponds to what Husserl terms "idealism."[1]

As is known, these two claims are supported by a thoroughgoing critique of logical psychologism. On the one hand, the psychologist's mistake is to hold it is possible to infer logical from psychological laws. This is a mistake, because the only knowledge available to empirical psychology is inexact and, as such, incapable to ground exact knowledge of the kind found in logic. On the other hand, logical psychologists are guilty of a "confusion of fields" (*Gebietsvermengung*) (Hua 18: 22, Engl. trans. 13).[2] They treat the objects of logic as psychological entities, while they must be objects of their own kind. As opposed to the individual, real, and temporal objects of empirical psychology, those of logic are ideal, that is, "not determined as to time" (Hua 18: 87, Engl. trans. 55; Hua 19/1: 128–31, Engl. trans. 249–50). And insofar as logic is a theory, that is, a system of truths, the latter must exist. "Ideal objects," Husserl claims, "exist genuinely" (*die idealen Gegenstände existieren wahrhaft*) (Hua 19/1: 130, Engl. trans. 250). This view corresponds to what contemporary philosophers call a realism about universals. For Husserl, however, being "real" (*real*, *reell*) involves being individual and temporal (Hua 19/1: 129, Engl. trans. 249). For this reason, he uses instead the terms "idealism" and "conceptualism rightly understood" (Hua 19/1: 112 and 147, Engl. trans. 238 and 262, modified). Idealism thus conceived is opposed to both nominalism and "concept realism" (*Begriffsrealismus*) (Hua 19/1: 115, Engl. trans. 240). It is important to note that it is not a logical Platonism as many commentators suggest. Husserl explicitly states in the *Logical Investigations* that logical objects are not *separable* — which makes his view more akin to the view today called Aristotelian or "moderate" realism (Smith 1989: 62; Seron 2019: 53–5).

Husserl's critique of logical psychologism in the *Prolegomena* can be (roughly) summarized as follows:

First, Husserl admits that logic is a practical discipline or "technology" (*Kunstlehre*, *Technologie*), insofar as logical rules somehow guide the practice of science (Hua 18: 40–2,

---

[1] Oddly enough, Husserl seems to consider the two claims as broadly equivalent. It is though not difficult to find philosophers — for example neo-Kantians — who have strongly rejected both logical empiricism and Husserl's idealism.

[2] See also (Hua 18: 87, Engl. trans. 55). All references to Husserl's works are to Husserliana editions — abridged as "Hua" followed by Husserliana volume, page number, and page number in the English translation.

Engl. trans. 25–6). But on the other hand, he claims that every normative — and a fortiori practical[3] — discipline must be grounded in a set of theoretical truths. Therefore:

[1] Normative logic must be grounded in a purely theoretical discipline.

As a second step, Husserl asks what kind of truths the normative rules of logic must derive from. Husserl considers only two possible options (Hua 18: 22–3, Engl. trans. 13): logic is either apriorical and independent of any other science, or empirical and dependent. In other words, logic is grounded either in itself, that is, in theoretical truths that are of a logical nature, or in an empirical science. In the former case, logic contains a purely theoretical part that grounds its normative rules — a "pure logic" in Kant's sense of the term. In the latter case, it is entirely normative and its theoretical fundament is an empirical science. The question is not whether logic is theoretical or normative, but whether it is *only* normative or both normative and theoretical.

For reasons that will be discussed later, Husserl sees the second option as untenable:

[2] The purely theoretical discipline that grounds logic cannot be empirical.

The theoretical fundament of logic is not an empirical science. Therefore, logical empiricism as well as empiricism in general are false (if logic provides knowledge and logical knowledge does not derive from experience, then not all knowledge derives from experience and thus empiricism in general is false). Instead, logic must be grounded in "pure logic," that is, in some logical laws that are purely theoretical. That is why Husserl firmly condemns both logical psychologism — that is, the view that the theoretical discipline that grounds logic must be empirical psychology — and the traditional (Aristotelian) view that logic is basically

[3] In Husserl's terminology, a discipline is normative if, and only if, it says not (as theoretical disciplines do) how its objects are, but how they ought to be. A practical discipline or "technology" is a normative discipline "whose fundamental valuation is transformed into a corresponding teleological prescription" (Hua 18: 59, Engl. trans. 38).

a normative or practical discipline. After Kant and Bolzano, he holds that logic is a theory or science and provides genuine knowledge — which importantly does not mean that logic is *integrally* theoretical.

I what follows I will discuss three central arguments given by Husserl against logical psychologism. Confining myself to the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*, I will argue that all are fraught with difficulties and that none of them is really conclusive.[4]

2. The warrior argument

Husserl's only argument for thesis [1] above runs like this:

First, every normative discipline rests on "basic norms" (*Grundnormen*). More precisely, it is such that every proposition contained in it is either a basic norm or a proposition derived from a basic norm. For example, the practical judgment "a warrior ought to be brave" is based on the norm of a *good* warrior. Likewise (this example is mine, not Husserl's), "one ought to write 'umbrella' with two *l*" is based on the norm of a *correct* spelling. A warrior ought to be brave just because only brave warriors are good warriors. The reason why you ought to write "umbrella" with two *l* is that this is the only correct spelling of "umbrella." Being brave is a necessary condition for being a good warrior; writing "umbrella" with two *l* is a necessary condition for writing "umbrella" correctly. In other words, basic norms should be conceived of as values of which normative attributes such as "brave" are definitional features.

Second, Husserl holds that basic norms thus conceived are not normative strictly speaking, but purely theoretical:

> The basic norm is the correlate of the definition of "good" and "better" in the sense in question. It tells us on what basic standards (basic values) all normativization must be conducted, and does not therefore represent a normative proposition in the proper sense (Hua 18: 58, Engl. trans. 36–7, modified).

[4] A previous version of my counterarguments in sections 3 and 4 was published in (Seron 2022).

Therefore, since every normative discipline must be grounded in basic norms and actually basic norms are theoretical truths, every normative discipline must be grounded in theoretical truths. “Every normative discipline and likewise every practical discipline, Husserl says, rests on one or more theoretical disciplines, inasmuch as its rules must have a theoretical content separable from the notion of normativity (of the ‘shall’ or ‘should’)” (Hua 18: 53, Engl. trans. 33). This applies to logic as well: logic as a technology of science needs a purely theoretical foundation.

This means that the duty to be brave derives from the definition of “good warrior” — it is only because a warrior should be a good warrior that he should be brave — and that this definition is truly knowledge. Assertions of the form “*p* and non-*p*” are forbidden because the principle of non-contradiction is *true*. Being consistent has to do basically not with how judgments should be, but rather with how truths really *are*. Ethics as well as logic are theoretical insofar as the definitions of “good” and “true” are purely theoretical.

To summarize, Husserl’s aim is to eliminate at least some deontic phrasings, namely to replace sentences of the form:

[3] For any *x*, if *x* is a warrior, then *x* ought to be brave,

by equivalent non-deontic sentences of the form:

[4] For any *x*, if *x* is a good warrior, then *x* is brave,

where being brave is a definitional feature of “a good warrior.”

This approach, however, suffers from some difficulties.

First, it is obviously not sufficient in order to demonstrate [1] just to point out an equivalence relation between normative judgments and (supposedly theoretical) judgments of value. The fact that a proposition *p* is necessarily equivalent to another proposition *q* does not entail that *p* should be replaced by *q* rather than the converse. Brentano, for example, also recognized

such an equivalence, but defined "good" as what should be loved and "true" as what should be asserted or believed. By contrast, Husserl's argument works only if value judgments of the form "… is good" are not normative judgments, that is, if "good" is not defined in normative terms. For example, "it is good for a warrior to be brave" should not be construed as "all warriors ought to be brave."

A second difficulty concerns Husserl's claim that "*x* is a good warrior" is not a normative judgment. In the *Prolegomena*, Husserl criticizes Herbart and Lotze for confusing "specific" with "normative ideality" (Hua 18: 220–1, Engl. trans. 138). To a certain extent, however, it may seem that he falls prey to the same confusion. Consider proposition [4]. Husserl's suggestion is that this proposition should be construed as a conceptual truth, namely as asserting that, in virtue of the definition of "good warrior," every good warrior must be brave: a person who is not brave should not be called a "good warrior." Thus, if "*x* is a good warrior" is not normative — it tells how *x* is and not how he or she should be — the duty of being brave is analyzable in purely theoretical terms. But is it obvious that "*x* is a good warrior" is purely theoretical?

Let us examine Husserl's reasoning more carefully. His claim is this: "Every normative proposition of, e.g., the form 'An *A* should be *B*' implies (*schliesst ein*) the theoretical proposition 'Only an *A* which is *B* has the properties *C*', in which '*C*' serves to indicate the constitutive content of the standard-setting predicate 'good'" (Hua 18: 60, Engl. trans. 38). How are we to understand the verb "implies" here? The text clearly shows that Husserl takes the two propositions to be logically equivalent. "An *A* should be *B*," he holds, is just another phrasing for "only an *A* which is *B* is a good *A*." Thus, it seems that Husserl's claim can be expressed as follows:

[5] For any *x*, all *x* that is A ought to be B if, and only if, all *x* that is a good A is B.

For example, any warrior should be brave if, and only if, any good warrior is brave. The issue here is that it is hard to believe that the word "good" is devoid of any normative connotation or "separable from the notion of normativity." For this reason, some commentators have suggested that Husserl's argument would be more compelling if "*x* is a good warrior" were replaced by "*x* is a *true* warrior" (Cotta 1987; Di Lucia 2008). Still, this may not be enough.

Indeed, "*x* is a true warrior" means that *x* really is a warrior. Saying "*x* is not a true warrior" amounts to saying *x* is not a warrior at all. Therefore, if "good warrior" is equivalent to "true warrior" and "all good warriors are brave" is, as Husserl claims, a conceptual truth, then "all warriors are brave" must be a conceptual truth as well and the existence of some shrinking warrior must be self-contradictory. To put it otherwise, [5] is false if there is some shrinking warrior that should be brave. But if all warriors are necessarily brave, then it does not seem to make much sense to say all warriors should be brave. It is somewhat like saying that all bachelors ought to be unmarried.

So let us assume that "good warrior" is not equivalent to "true warrior" and is "separable from the notion of normativity." Norms are either basic norms or grounded in basic norms, Husserl argues. Basic norms are definitions (Hua 18: 58, Engl. trans. 36–7) and hence purely theoretical propositions. A normative proposition "states a necessary, or a sufficient, or a necessary and sufficient condition for having a value-predicate" (Hua 18: 56, Engl. trans. 36). Even in that case, however, Husserl's line of argument remains somewhat unsatisfying, since it does not prove that the required definitions themselves — which he says do not fit with the "ordinary logical concept of definition" (Hua 18: 58, Engl. trans. 37) — are not normative. Some might be tempted to object that "it is in the essence of an equilateral triangle to have three sides" just means that only figures with three sides should be called "equilateral triangles." Why couldn't "only brave warriors are good warriors" be construed in the same way, for example as "only brave warriors should be called 'good warriors'"? As a matter of fact, Husserl's thesis [1] presupposes a robust value realism according to which normative judgments are basically not about how individual objects should be, but about how their essences are.[5]

3. The derivation argument

Logical psychologism is the view that logical laws like the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of the excluded middle, etc., are derived from psychological laws. Against this view, Husserl objects that such a derivation is in principle impossible due to the very nature of

[5] This realism raises other issues that will be discussed in section 4.

psychological knowledge. This objection I will call the "derivation argument" (see Hua 18: 72–76, Engl. trans. 46–48). It can be schematized as follows:

[6] All logical laws are "exact," that is, exceptionless or apriorical.

[7] No psychological law is exact.

[8] No law that is derived from an inexact law can be exact.

[9] Therefore, it is false that logical laws are derived from psychological laws.

The point is an old one, having been already raised against empiricism by Kant and post-Kantians. Husserl distinguishes "real" from "ideal" laws. The latter are exact or a priori, while the former express mere inductive generalizations. Logical laws are ideal; psychological laws are empirical and hence inductive. Since it is impossible to derive an exact from an inexact law, it is therefore impossible to derive a logical from a psychological law. In other words, deriving a logical from a psychological law entails deriving an exact from an inexact law — which contradicts proposition [8].

Does Husserl's objection hold water? There might well be a leak in the hull, actually. The most conspicuous difficulty is about premise [7]. It is true that some early empiricists, notably John Stuart Mill, have held the principle of non-contradiction to be an inductive psychological law (Hua 18: 89–91, Engl. trans. 56–8), but the question is whether Mill's frail raft is the only option. Numerous empiricists have strongly rejected [7]. Brentano as well as many of his followers, for example, defended the view that empirical psychology is not entirely inductive and that some of its laws must be apriorical (Brentano 1982: 1; Engl. trans. 3). It is a conceptual truth, they claimed, that a feeling with no presentation is impossible, or that a presentation cannot be accepted and rejected at the same time.

A couple of years after the publication of the *Logical Investigations*, Moritz Schlick objected to Husserl's anti-psychologism on the ground that it relies on a *petitio principii*.[6] The logical

[6] "By merely insisting on the vagueness of all psychological laws, the supporter of 'absolute' logic can contribute nothing to the defense of his position, for he cannot demonstrate it without committing a *petitio principii*. […] Anyone who holds logical principles to be exact natural laws of thinking, naturally denies at the

psychologist, he argues, can reply to the derivation argument as follows: all logical laws are exact and exact laws cannot be derived from inexact laws; logical laws are obviously grounded in psychological laws; therefore some psychological laws must be exact. In other words, the derivation argument is objectionable because it assumes part of what it needs to prove, namely that all psychological laws are inexact.

Husserl considers this kind of objection in § 24 of his *Prolegomena*:

> Many would perhaps try to evade our conclusion by objecting: Not every law for facts has an empirico-inductive origin. […] The laws of logic are, in particular, empirical, but not inductive laws. The basic notions of logic are abstracted from psychological experience together with the purely conceptual relations given with them. […] And since we have no need of induction, our conclusion is likewise free from inductive imperfection: it has no mere character of probability, but one of apodeictic certainty. It is not vague, but exact in sense, it in no way includes assertions having existential content (Hua 18: 85, Engl. trans. 54, slightly modified).

Certain empirical laws — for example "bronze is composed of copper and tin" and "no egg-laying animal is a mammal" — undoubtedly are not inductive, but exact or apriorical. Such laws are not about facts (*Tatsachen*), but purely conceptual. The question now is, why couldn't it be the same for empirical psychology? If so, logical rules could be grounded, without any fallacy, in *exact* psychological laws. Consider the law of the excluded middle: every judgment is either affirmative or negative. On the one hand, the concept of judgment is an empirical concept, abstracted from inner experience. On the other hand, it can be analyzed so as to obtain apriorical laws that — just as the definition of bronze pertains to chemistry —

---

same time that *all* laws of nature have a merely probable validity" (Schlick 1986: 50; Engl. trans. 57, modified). See (Kusch 1995: 66–7).

pertain to empirical psychology. And logical rules can be derived validly from such laws. For example, the law of the excluded middle is derived from the psychological law to the effect that every act of judging is either affirmative or negative. This, broadly speaking, is the view advocated by Brentano and most of his followers.[7]

Why didn't Husserl embrace this view? For this he had at least two reasons, both of which are problematic. The first one is that he did not believe in psychological a priori. In his view, psychology cannot be both empirical and apriorical; its being empirical implies that it is inductive. Thus, the laws of psychology or phenomenology are not called "ideal laws" a single time in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*.[8] The only ideal laws Husserl mentions are those of logic and mathematics. The second reason why Husserl did not follow the Brentanian path is that, in contrast with Brentano (1970; Seron 2021), he viewed analytic judgments as tautologies. In § 25 of the *Prolegomena*, Husserl thus considers Spencer's construal of the principle of non-contradiction: "The appearance of any positive mode of consciousness cannot occur without excluding a correlative negative mode; and […] the negative mode cannot occur without excluding the correlative positive mode" (Spencer 1891: 192; Mill 1973: 279; Hua 18: 90, Engl. trans. 57). This psychological law, Husserl argues, is not an inductive generalization as Spencer and J.S. Mill assume, but obviously a tautology, since the concept of mutual exclusion is contained in the definition of "positive" and "negative mode of consciousness." However, "the law of contradiction […] is by no means tautologous" (Hua 18: 90, Engl. trans. 57). In Husserl's view, logic, like mathematics, must be a genuine theory and the principle of non-contradiction must expand knowledge. Therefore, neither Spencer's psychological rephrasing nor any other analytic judgment can serve as a proper foundation for logical laws.[9]

---

[7] In this sense, Husserl's critique really applies only to genetic psychology and not to descriptive psychology. See (Fisette 2021: 202–3).

[8] In the first edition of the *Investigations*, Husserl assumes that "phenomenology is descriptive psychology" (Hua 19/1: 24, Engl. trans. 176; Münch 2002: 205–13). He admitted the idea of a phenomenological a priori only in the second edition and this constitutes a major difference between the two editions.

[9] Accordingly, it is only in a derivative sense that basic norms could be called "definitions." "This," Husserl insists, "would mean departing from the ordinary logical concept of definition." (Hua 18: 58, Engl. trans. 37).

This latter conclusion, however, suggests that matters are more complex. As a matter of fact, Husserl agrees with Brentano that pure logic must be grounded in phenomenology, i.e., in descriptive psychology. "In the case [of pure logic] too," he argues, "we accept as obvious the fact that logical concepts have a psychological origin, but we deny the psychologistic conclusion to which this seems to lead" (Hua 18: 176, Engl. trans. 110–1). How can this claim be made compatible with the derivation argument, namely with the view that logical knowledge cannot be validly inferred from psychological knowledge? Husserl's answer to this question, I think, would be that the phenomenology pure logic needs to be grounded in provides no knowledge at all: the "grounding" in question does not consist in deriving logical from psychological truths. To put it more plainly, the derivation argument is against *knowledge empiricism* with respect to logic (all logical knowledge derives from experience), not against all forms of logical empiricism. It leaves untouched *concept empiricism* (all logical concepts derive from experience), which actually is the position advocated in the *Investigations*.[10] The phenomenologist's task in the *Investigations* is not to derive the judgments of logic from those of psychology, but to clarify logical *concepts* through psychological analyses that are analytic in Kant's sense of the word, that is, non-informative. Thus, the only difference from the Brentanian approach is that Husserl, unlike Brentano, views the phenomenologist's analyses as tautological — which fits in quite well with the fact that, as we saw, he never talks of phenomenological laws in the *Investigations*.

Phenomenology — descriptive psychology — is neither an exact nor an inductive theory, but no theory at all. It offers no truths from which other truths could be inferred, and is no more informative than the judgment "no egg-laying animal is a mammal." "On our view," Husserl says, "theory of knowledge, properly described, is no theory. It is not science in the pointed sense of an explanatorily unified theoretical whole" (Hua 19/1: 26, Engl. trans. 178). Phenomenology and logic are fundamentally different in this respect. For the latter is a genuine theory, namely the "theory of theories." That is why Husserl, in the *Investigations*,

---

[10] "Our great task is now to bring the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological clarity and definiteness. Here phenomenological analysis must begin. Logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition: they must arise out of an ideational intuition founded on certain experiences" (Hua 19/1: 9–10, Engl. trans. 168).

reproaches Kant for regarding logical laws as analytic judgements (Hua 19/2: 732, Engl. trans. 319).

However, the view just outlined is not free from difficulties. Indeed, it seems hardly compatible with Husserl's claim — which is a key component of his case against relativism — that the principle of non-contradiction "follows from the mere sense of 'true' and 'false'" (Hua 18: 124–5, Engl. trans. 79). At the very least, one may ask where the difference lies between saying that the principle of non-contradiction "follows from the mere sense of 'true' and 'false'" and saying that "no egg-laying animal is a mammal" is an analytical truth, that is, true in virtue of the meaning of "egg-laying animal" and "mammal." The point is that, if logical laws are analytical, then at least one of Husserl's following two central claims must be abandoned: pure logic is a genuine theory and not, for instance, a mere *art de penser*; analytic judgments are tautological. Rejecting the former claim and not the latter is plausibly — Husserl's own assertion to the contrary notwithstanding — the option chosen by Kant. Abandoning both claims amounts to embracing the Brentanian approach: logic is not a science; descriptive psychology is both analytic and informative.

4. The ontological argument

As we have seen, Husserl's critique of logical psychologism goes hand in hand with a robust realism with respect to both values and logical objects. In his view, logical psychologism stems from a "confusion of fields," namely from a confusion between individual and ideal entities. Husserl's argument for this view draws on what can be seen as a radicalized form of truthmaker maximalism. It involves two distinct steps, the first of which is clearly expressed in the following quote from the first *Investigation*:

> If one has accustomed oneself to understand by "being" only real being, and by "objects" only real objects, then talk of universal objects and of their being, may well seem basically wrong; no offence will, however, be given to one who has first used such talk merely to assert the validity of certain judgements, such in fact as concern numbers, propositions, geometrical forms etc.,

> and who now asks whether he is not evidently obliged, here as elsewhere, to affix the label "genuinely existent object" to the correlate of his judgement's validity, to what it judges about (Hua 19/1: 106, Engl. trans. 230–1).

In other words, there must be some sort of equivalence relation between the truth of a proposition and the existence of the objects it is true of. Saying that there exists an *a* that is P somehow boils down to saying that "*a* is P" is true. As Husserl emphasizes, "it exists or subsists, i.e. it is valid (*Es existiert, oder besteht, das heisst: es gilt*)" (Hua 19/1: 99, Engl. trans. 226). This view minimally implies the following:

[10] For any proposition *p*, if *p* is true, then there exists an *x* such that *x* makes *p* true.

The second step of the argument is to apply [10] to necessary truths such as those found in logic and mathematics, the idea being that the necessary truth of a given proposition entails the necessary existence of one or more objects that make it true. For example, Husserl contends, the truth of "4 is an even number" entails the existence of the number 4 (Hua 19/1: 130, Engl. trans. 250). The claim can be put as follows:

[11] For any proposition *p*, if *p* is necessarily true, then there necessarily exists an *x* such that *x* makes *p* true.

There is nothing to object to Husserl's reasoning thus far, provided that we accept the idea that proposition [10] applies to all truths whatsoever. But unfortunately, Husserl goes a step further and draws a slightly different conclusion. His version of [11] looks rather like this:

[12] For any proposition *p*, if *p* is necessarily true, then there exists an *x* such that *x* necessarily makes *p* true.

It is clear, however, that propositions [11] and [12] are not equivalent, and that [12] cannot be validly inferred from [10] even though we agree that the latter applies to all truths whatsoever. Proposition [11] says that in every possible world there exists something that makes *p* true; proposition [12] says that there exists something that makes *p* true in every possible world. The two propositions are obviously not equivalent. The former proposition does not rule out the possibility that the truthmaker of *p* varies from one possible world to another. The latter proposition, by contrast, asserts that one and the same truthmaker of *p* must exist in all possible worlds. For example, the fact that in all possible worlds there must exist at least one object that makes true the principle of non-contradiction does not entail that there must exist at least one object that makes true the principle of non-contradiction in all possible worlds. The fallacy here derives from conflating *de dicto* necessity with *de re* necessity. For example, "something necessarily exists" may mean that there necessarily exists something, or that something has existence as an essential property (Fitting & Mendelsohn 1998: 85–8). Obviously, the former claim is consistent with the negation of the latter.

The issue is that proposition [12] is crucial to Husserl's argument against logical psychologism. His overall idea is that, since the truthmaker of a necessary truth must exist in all possible worlds, it cannot be an individual object: therefore, the objects of logical laws are not, as psychologists contend, individual mental states, but meanings conceived of as "ideal," that is, supratemporal entities. Logical psychologism suffers from a fundamental "confusion of fields."

5. Conclusion

My purpose in this chapter was to reassess Husserl's line of argument against logical psychologism in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*. I discussed three crucial objections raised by Husserl and found that all three suffer from significant weaknesses. It seems that the warrior argument does not allow one to prove that sentences of the form "… is a good…" are ultimately not of a normative kind. The derivation argument hinges on a hidden assumption to the effect that empirical psychology is restricted to inductive generalizations — an assumption which already includes the conclusion to be proved. The ontological argument is unsound, as it rests on a confusion between *de re* and *de dicto* necessity.

References

Brentano, F. (1970). *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*. Hamburg: Meiner.

Brentano, F. (1982). *Deskriptive Psychologie* (R. Chisholm & W. Baumgartner, Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner. Engl. trans. by B. Müller (1995). *Descriptive Psychology*. London New York: Routledge.

Cotta, S. (1987). Il concetto di natura nel diritto. *Iustitia*, 40, 2, pp. 67–79.

Di Lucia, P. (2008). Founding norms on truth versus founding truth on norms. In: *Norm and Truth* (M. Piechowiak, Ed.). Poznań: School of Humanities and Journalism in Poznań, pp. 84–93.

Fisette, D. (2021). Overcoming psychologism: Twardowski on actions and products. In: A. Dewalque, C. Gauvry, S. Richard (Eds.), *Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School: Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 189–205.

Fitting, M., & Mendelsohn, R.L. (1998). *First-Order Modal Logic*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Husserl, E. (1984). *Logische Untersuchungen*. In: *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 18–20. Engl. trans. by J.N. Findlay (2001): *Logical Investigations*. New York London: Routledge.

Kusch, M. (1995). *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge*. New York: Routledge.

Mill, J. S. (1973). *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, Vol. 1 (Books I–III). Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Münch, D. (2002). The relation of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* to descriptive psychology and cognitive science. In: D. Zahavi and F. Stjernfelt (Eds.), *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl's* Logical Investigations *Revisited*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 199–215.

Schlick, M. (1986). Das Wesen der Wahrheit nach der modernen Logik. In: *Philosophische Logik*. Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, p. 31–109. English trans. by P. Health (1979): The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic. In: *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 1 (1909–1922). Dordrecht Boston London: Reidel, p. 41–103.

Seron, D. (2019). Fondation phénoménologique et analyse conceptuelle. In : J. Farges and D. Pradelle (Eds.), *Husserl: Phénoménologie et fondements des sciences*. Paris: Hermann, pp. 45–62.

Seron, D. (2021). Experiencing the a priori. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 1–9.

Seron, D. (2022). Les *Prolégomènes à la logique pure*. In: J.-B. Fournier and D. Pradelle (Eds.), *Les* Recherches logiques *de Husserl*. Paris: Vrin.

Smith, B. (1989). Logic and formal ontology. In: J.N. Mohanty and W. McKenna (Eds.), *Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook*. Lanham: University Press of America, pp. 29–67

Spencer, H. (1891). *Essays : Scientific, Political, & Speculative*, Vol. 2. London: Williams and Norgate.