On the Future of Husserlian Phenomenology

http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/hasserl/Future/Future_Main.html

Introduction 4
James Dodd

On the Future of Husserlian Phenomenology 5
Sebastian Luft

The Living Future of Phenomenology 12
Nicola Zippel

Husserl's Total Theory of Intentionality: An Outline 15
Jitendranath N. Mohanty

¿Tiene un futuro la lectura de Husserl hoy? 18
Rosemary R.P. de Lerner

Radical Phenomenology 23
Stefano Gonnella

El futuro de la fenomenología pasa por poner unas nuevas bases para reorientar la actividad humana causante de la actual crisis ecológica 27
María-Luz Pintos

The time of the self and the other 31
Anna-Lena Renqvist

The Future of Husserlian Phenomenology: Time and Epoché 35
Louis Sandowsky

Phenomenology in the Present-Day Philosophy 42
Denis Seron

Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World 50
Andrina Tonkli-Komel

Phenomenology and Ethics 53
Francesco Saverio Trincia

On the Radical and Erotic Reductions 57
Roberto J. Walton

Phenomenology, Psychopathology and the Philosophy of Mind 59
Michael Blamauer
Phenomenology as a Transcendental Theory of Consciousness 62
Wolfgang Fasching

Phenomenology for the 21st Century 66
Joanna Hodge

Reeling Phenomenology Away from Theology 69
Rajiv Kaushik

The Development of Research in Intersubjectivity and the Lebenswelt in Contemporary Sociology 72
Kenneth Liberman

The Future of Phenomenology: Issues in Practical Philosophy (Persons, Values, Motives) 76
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl

On Neo-Husserlianism 80
Michael K. Shim

On the Future of Phenomenology 84
Ferrarello Susi

Naturalizing Intentionality? A Husserlian Contribution to the Internalism/Externalism Debate 88
Thomas Szanto

The Body of Phenomenology; Unforeseen Phenomenological Outcomes of Biotechnologies 92
Martin G. Weiss

Does (Husserlian) Phenomenology have a Future? 96
Dan Zahavi

The Possibility of Husserlian Phenomenological Practice 101
Elizabeth A. Behnke

The Future of Phenomenology. Naturalization and Phenomenology of Perception 105
Carmelo Calì

The Future of Husserlian Phenomenology 109
David Carr

Practice as the Epistemology of Phenomenology 111
Natalie Depraz

Continuing Husserlian Phenomenology 114
Lester Embree
Globalization: The Phenomenological Consequences 119
Lennart Heerwagen

The Future of Phenomenology. Towards a Philosophy of Translation Inspired by a
Phenomenological Hermeneutics 122
Domenico Jervolino

The Well-Founded World: On a Possible Rapprochement of Phenomenology and Logical
Analysis 125
Jonathan Kim-Reuter

Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Constitution of the Intercultural Sense 129
Dean Komel

On the Future of Phenomenological Sociology 134
Nam-In Lee

Working With Husserl 138
Sophie Loidolt

Prospects of Husserlian Phenomenology 141
Algis Mickunas

Husserl and the Being of Time 145
Anna-Lena Renqvist

The Future of Phenomenology: Applications 149
Lanei Rodemeyer

The Future of Husserlian Phenomenology 152
Biagio Tassone

Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World 156
Andrina Tonkli-Komel

Phenomenology and Ethics 159
Francesco Saverio Trincia

On the Radical and Erotic Reductions 163
Roberto J. Walton

Die Phänomenologie der Zukunft: Eidetisch,transzendent oder naturalisiert? 165
Dieter Lohmar
Introduction
James Dodd

Phenomenology, in all of its forms, has constituted one of the fundamental trends of intellectual life for almost a century. Any account of the philosophical legacy of the 20th century must weigh the contributions of phenomenology, and any attempt to look forward in philosophy assess its claim to the future. In fact, it is the promise of a renewed future for philosophy that remains a central legacy of the “breakthrough” of phenomenology in the work of Edmund Husserl. What is the status of this legacy today? Does phenomenology—above all in its Husserlian form—remain a viable, living philosophical promise? Or has phenomenology become merely “classical” phenomenology, having matured into a legacy of influence, a chapter in the history of thought interesting only for the purposes of a historical narrative of ideas?

The truth may be something in between. The influence of phenomenology, and the different forms it has taken, is so varied and complex that the horizon of phenomenology can no longer be taken in at a single glance, as it were. If the promise of a renewed idea of and commitment to philosophy remains alive, it is surely mediated by a remarkably diverse intellectual embodiment, one that is not without its tensions. Phenomenological philosophy is a living philosophy that finds its home in territories far beyond the institutional field of philosophy, which even within academia is not always the center of activity. On the other hand, if the promise for a renewal remains salient to the meaning of the breakthrough of phenomenology, then it is doubtful that the ongoing development of ever more sophisticated “phenomenological perspectives” in more and more areas of intellectual and cultural activity is in and of itself the fulfillment of this promise. Phenomenology must, to be both a tradition and a philosophy, reflect on its breakthrough, precisely in order to be able to look ahead. It needs to ask the fundamental question of its sense, for it is only in this way that a tradition can look ahead of itself.

This third and last installment of the internet project On the Future of Husserlian Phenomenology features an introductory essay by Professor Dr. Dieter Lohmar of the Husserl Archives at the Universität Köln. We would like to thank Professor Lohmar, as well as all of the contributors who have shared their diverse and engaging perspectives on the prospects and promises of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy.
On the Future of Husserlian Phenomenology
Sebastian Luft

Introduction

For many reasons, ours is an exciting time for Husserl research! To be sure, this excitement is not fueled by the same motives some one hundred years ago, when the first phenomenological societies were formed in Göttingen and Munich, driven by a truly pioneering spirit and an initial zeal of getting back “to the things themselves.” At the beginning of the 21st century, it is rather a sense of endurance, of what remains at the end of the day, now that the movements of post-modernism, post-structuralism — and whatever other “post”-phases might have been declared in the latter half of the 20th century — have swept over us and as the “cold war” between Analytic and Continental philosophers is thawing. Now is the time to see what has been swept asunder in the tides of times, and what remains.

Indeed, taking stock of the last century and taking a look at the current scene in philosophy, it is fair to say that phenomenology, especially Husserlian phenomenology, emerges as a tendency in modern philosophy that is clearly here to stay, and is even becoming stronger in recent years. Surely it is no longer the case that one speaks of a “Phenomenological Movement,” which demands a commitment to this “School” and its “doctrines” and a disavowal of other philosophical doctrines. In this sense, Husserl and his pupils and followers stood in the midst of opposing philosophical tendencies in their time; an opposition whose mutual hostility seem almost incomprehensible today. Today, the “Phenomenological Movement” in its original shape and its organized form is dead. Nevertheless, phenomenology is alive and well in a different sense. Husserl's phenomenology stands for a type of philosophy, of philosophizing, that has remained intact since its inception a century ago. I believe it is not trivial to point out that this is largely due to the honest nature of Husserl's philosophical quest, the manner in which he was willing to question the foundations of his thought as well as their consequences and his very approach, always testing new avenues of thought — and not due to fixed results that one could identify as particularly “Husserlian.” What distinguishes Husserl's philosophy from most other schools is not a commitment to any factual premises or doctrines, but to the very style in which philosophy is carried out. What remains of Husserl's phenomenology is precisely its sense as a method.

At the same time, Husserl had the philosophical genius that provided us with insights that spawned whole philosophical schools in his aftermath, and be it only that they radically opposed him, developing their own thought motives as anathemata to Husserl. It is this history of effects of Husserl's phenomenology, which propels him far into the 21st century, not as the dated founding father of a school that has allegedly long moved beyond its inceptor, but instead as watchful guardian, whose warning gaze anybody should feel upon him/herself who believes s/he has found fixed results and reached firm ground. More than anything, Husserl has infused future philosophers with an ethos, a working morale and professional attitude that is, to be sure, not new in the history of Western thought, but is carried out with an unprecedented rigor and all too often forgotten and neglected — and mocked by less serious scholars.

So why is the present time a particularly exciting moment for Husserlian phenomenology? It is so because we are witnessing radical changes in our current philosophical landscape. These changes concern, most importantly, the new openness on the part of Analytic philosophy on the one hand, and the fading away of postmodernism that dominated much of Continental philosophy, on the other. In this tectonic shift continents begin to converge, and a philosophy with its intrinsic character of methodological openness, of searching, of probing and describing — rather than declaring, bold announcing and groundless speculating — is exactly what is called for. This is precisely the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology, and it is this sense in which, I believe, the time is rife for this ageless philosophy to reassert its role in the present; a present, which is once again ready for inspirations and more than ever open for dialogue.

In what follows, I will briefly lay out the areas, in which I think Husserl can assume a dominant voice
in the orchestra of contemporary philosophy. But first I shall give a short assessment of Husserlian phenomenology in the context of 20th century philosophy. This narrative will provide the backdrop before which one can understand its timeless — or timely, depending on how one chooses to see it! — contribution to philosophy; it also helps explain why some aspects of Husserl have faded into the background. In some cases, it is, ironically, precisely those aspects that Husserl considered some of the most important, which, I believe, ought to better be forgotten in order for phenomenology to be "free." I will conclude with a list of topics that are to be found in more recent volumes of the Husserliana that either complement and expand the known scope of Husserl's oeuvre, or point to interesting new themes, where phenomenology has traditionally played little to no role. As our knowledge of Husserl's oeuvre expands and deepens, his genius becomes ever more awe-inspiring and recognized.

Locating Husserlian Phenomenology in the History of 20th Century Philosophy: After Postmodernism

The history of 20th century philosophy is largely a history of "supersedings." This is to say, many of the great philosophers of the last century defined themselves precisely through their "departure" or "overcoming" of the philosophical "establishment" of their time. Certainly the main target, at least on the European continent, were, besides Husserl, the neo-Kantians, though Husserl was, ironically, oftentimes regarded as one of them as well. Husserl was revered as the founder of a new movement, a new style of thinking, but was dismissed in the same instant as having laid foundations that were, well, just this: foundations, some of which were faulty or misconceived at that. This is the way Husserl was treated most famously by Heidegger, his erstwhile closest pupil, as well as some philosophers in other countries, where phenomenology took hold. Heidegger's project of a "destruction of Western metaphysics" is probably the most important source for postmodernism and its critique of traditional Western philosophy (e.g., in Derrida, as "metaphysics of presence"). Heidegger's philosophy inaugurated the many attempts to "overcome" the establishment in philosophy. The result of this move was that Husserl, among others, was mainly seen as a philosopher who, though on to the right thing, was still caught up in "Western" paradigms that were seen as obsolete or (at the very least) in need of redefinition. It was mainly the simplifying label of "Husserl the Cartesian" that accounted for him fading into the background. (1) The result was that Husserl was usually passed over, despite the ongoing publication of the Collected Works (the Husserliana), which betrayed this label with nearly every volume. Husserl's rather sluggish reception after the War was, furthermore, due to the fact that most books published by him were out of print and the Husserliana did not get under way until the mid-1950s. The shadows of National Socialism, during which Husserl as a Jew was considered non-existent, still lingered after 1945.

Meanwhile, as Continental philosophy developed in the decades after the war, postmodernism — and with this I mean very generally the numerous tendencies of "overcoming" inaugurated by Heidegger — got caught up increasingly in its idiosyncrasies and detached itself from classical discussions in the traditional philosophical canon. Consequently, less and less attention was being paid to it in the philosophical mainstream, especially in North America. While it would be premature to speak of a "collapse of postmodernism" in the way in which one has spoken of a "collapse of Idealism" around the middle of the 19th century, it is safe to say that the heyday of this movement, to which also some analytic philosophers contributed (e.g., Rorty), is history, just as, on the other side, traditional Analytic philosophy in the tradition inaugurated by Wittgenstein is dead. So what has remained?

Both Analytic as well as Continental philosophers have since attempted to reassess their origins and understand their respective roots, some of which before the "parting of the ways" turn out to be identical. This is not especially astonishing but noteworthy nevertheless, especially for Analytic philosophy, which has traditionally been indifferent to history. Here one can mention the Anglo-Saxon philosophers of the Enlightenment (Locke, Hume, etc.) and, on the Continent, the towering figure of Kant. A look at more recent common origins has, furthermore, unearthed thinkers at the end of the 19th century, such as Frege and Brentano, who have shaped the scene upon which Analytic philosophy
took a stand in the 20th century. This period now brings us into the vicinity of Husserl. The latter stands squarely in the midst of discussions and topics, which were discussed by Frege, Lotze, and the Brentano School, the latter essentially comprised of philosophers in Austria. In many respects, Husserl synthesized some of their key issues and paved the way for new developments. Here one could mention Husserl’s famous rebuttal of psychologism, his anti-metaphysical stance opposed to traditional speculative theories (the call “to the things themselves” was mainly a battle cry calling philosophers away from transcendental-subjective questions), and finally his sketch of a science of subjectivity informed by the Brentanian (Scholastic) paradigm of intentionality. In many ways, Husserl stood at the end point of developments at the end of the 19th century and at the helm of new ideas that were to become dominant at the beginning of the 20th. This peculiar stance is what made it possible for him to be recognized as the “father” of a new philosophical school. This position has been recognized all along by historians of European philosophy of the 20th century and has been newly discovered by philosophers writing the history of Analytic philosophy (e.g., Dummett). It is as if, as both tendencies retraced their steps in order to understand their respective roots, they arrived at common figures, one of them being — Husserl! To occupy this seminal role cannot be said of other philosophers who might seem more known or “important,” such as Heidegger or Wittgenstein, since they not so much inaugurated novel schools, but instead synthesized existing tendencies into original philosophical approaches or methods. Heidegger and Wittgenstein were, of course, highly influential, but they had no following like Husserl did. It is, I think, in this “inaugural” stance that Husserl stands out, next to Hume, Kant, and Brentano, in modern philosophy.

Now, what are the philosophical issues themselves that render Husserl so foundational for modern philosophy and where Husserlian phenomenology can play a significant role in contemporary thought? Let us first consider Husserl’s vision of phenomenology as a foundational discipline itself.

Philosophy and Science I: Phenomenology as Foundational Discipline or “First Philosophy”

One problem in the reception of Husserl’s thought has been to take Husserl at face value in the way in which he himself conceived of phenomenology as foundational discipline or “first philosophy.” Of course this is only natural in applying the principle of charity to an author at first read. The problem is the position in which, Husserl thought, phenomenology should stand vis-à-vis other (scientific) disciplines. In most of his publications, which are introductions and only touch the surface of his thought, Husserl insists on the fact that phenomenology is “first philosophy” and is “foundational” for all knowledge. Indeed, it is Husserl himself who probably took the neo-Kantians more seriously than they themselves did in posing the problem of “ultimate foundationalism” (Letztbegründung) and insisting that phenomenology be that very foundational discipline upon which all cognition could be grounded. Presenting phenomenology in this manner is, from Husserl’s standpoint, understandable—and yet regrettable. Hardly any philosopher or scientist would go along with this proposal nowadays, and yet this is where Husserl is most adamant about promoting the achievements of his phenomenology. (2) So let us be uncharitable for a moment and consider another sense of “foundationalism,” which is to be found in Husserl as well, though somewhat hidden.

Indeed, the sense in which phenomenology can be “foundational” in a plausible manner is much less emphatic. In many respects, Husserlian phenomenology lends itself as a philosophy of science and provides a plethora of conceptual tools for the internal workings of positive sciences, mainly natural sciences. This type of foundationalism has also been ridiculed — in the context of a critique of the neo-Kantian paradigm — in the phrase of philosophy being demoted to the “handmaiden of the sciences.” This critique, issued by Scheler and Heidegger (and since repeated like a mantra), goes against the neo-Kantian interpretation of transcendental philosophy and targets Husserl as well. In this light, there is a clear alliance between the neo-Kantians and Husserl, but the critique is most unfair and incorrect. What is at stake is not an ultimate foundation of knowledge in some remote, abstract Ego, but a sense in which philosophy can be an ally and partner in scientific progress. It is never about “reducing” philosophy to the role of the handmaiden. Instead, it is one purpose of philosophy to
scrutinize and police the sciences for their activities; be it on the level of their conceptual work, drawing the correct inferences and conclusions from their findings; or be it on the meta-level, where scientists’ work is assessed as to its efficacy and moral permissibility. Nobody, especially not Husserl, would have said that this is the only or even main purpose of philosophy; but it is one task of philosophy next to others, and no unimportant one at that. It also conveys a sense of cooperation, solidarity and collaboration standing behind this ideal. Philosophy and science are not and should not be opposites, having no relation to one another — as, e.g., Heidegger and many philosophers in his following have claimed, without ever providing good reasons, as far as I can tell. Instead, philosophy needs to remain informed about the sciences’ progress and current level of research in order to have any meaningful and relevant role in contemporary debates. This is more important today than ever, if one thinks of debates, e.g., about the moral status of stem cell research and other “hot button topics” in the sciences that pervade politics. And the sciences need to be checked, scrutinized and criticized by the “experts for generalities,” which the philosophers are by definition since Western philosophy’s inception. Husserl is committed to this type of collaboration with the “applied” sciences.

Phenomenology’s specific focus of foundationalist reflection is, to be sure, on the conceptual work, but more specifically on intuition and evidence as prime “methods” of scientific progress. Phenomenology can help scrutinize scientific insights and evidences as to their veracity, intuitability and intersubjective plausibility. And, it provides the ontological groundwork that supports and informs specific “regional ontologies” in addressing their conceptual issues, such as concept-formation and grounding foundational concepts (Grundbegriffe). Lastly, if one recalls Husserl’s analyses in the Crisis, genetic phenomenology gives an account of how science arises out of the pre-scientific life-world; moreover — given this history — it clarifies how ordinary (pre-scientific) agents and researchers belong together and even need each other in a democratic discourse that respects human nature and retains a sense of origin and destiny that is rationally “authenticatable” (ausweisbar). This is the connection between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the notorious topic of the life-world.

Philosophy and Science II: Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

A scientific field that has amassed fascinating results over the last decade and has, consequently, attracted lots of attention lately is cognitive science. While this discipline has arisen out of a positive science — neuroscience — it has become clear that this new and exciting field poses many challenges for traditional philosophy, that attempts to explain the workings of the mind. Several crucial questions arise out of this approach: Is the mind reducible to the brain and its neural structure? Is, hence, freedom an illusion? What do these new findings mean for a “science of the subject” Can we as philosophers seriously continue with the ideal of transcendental philosophy with the claim to a priori findings? Or will our thoughts on these matters forever be reduced to contingent claims about the human brain at a certain state of the evolutionary process? In short, what kinds of challenges does cognitive science pose for what has traditionally been called “psychology”? It is here that phenomenology, by definition a science of subjective lived-experience, has the potential to be of vital importance and can potentially be a partner in this ongoing research. This is witnessed by a whole new field of research that has vowed to “naturalize phenomenology” and has recently founded a journal dedicated to “Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.”

I do not want to comment on the prospect of “naturalizing” phenomenology, but I do think that it is in this scientific discipline that phenomenology must invest and watch closely what new findings are brought to bear on matters of the mind. It seems to me that it is here, more than in any other scientific discipline, that phenomenology’s results, methods and insights can be of methodological help for the science itself on the one hand, and where phenomenological themes and topics culled from reflection and introspection can be cashed out in scientific results, on the other. One must not forget that Husserl studied closely the experimental psychology of his day (through his teachers Wundt and others), and that many of his theorems are direct consequences of these experimental scientists. It is especially in Husserl's early phenomenology, where he deals with topics such as perception, attention, where his
analyses are oftentimes undistinguishable from scientific discussions. It is here that Husserl's eye for
detail and his keen insight into the workings of the mind — be it construed physically as brain or
subjectivity on an eidetic level — are exemplary cases of "scientific" analysis. If there is one prime
discipline that can aid the development of cognitive science and prevent it from falling into the pitfalls
of reductionism, it is Husserl's phenomenology. It remains to be seen how cognitive science will
develop. Yet there is no doubt that the systematic progress it can achieve, both methodologically and in
terms of factual results, and the extent to which it will be able to communicate with traditional
philosophy will be at least in part owed to phenomenology.

Philosophy of Mind: Towards a Science of the 1st Person Perspective

It was Thomas Nagel's influential *The View from Nowhere* that proposed a novel philosophical or, for
that matter, scientific discipline, which should stand in opposition to the paradigm of modern science.
This was not the first attempt at such a discipline; however, it was an original approach that surprised,
especially coming from the tradition in which Nagel stood, namely Analytic philosophy. Modern
science, he argued, stood under the assumption, or the ideal, of a truly objective science, a science, in
other words, that increasingly eliminate the subjective, human standpoint in order to strive towards a
"view from nowhere." While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an approach, it leaves
something missing. Hence, opposed to this ideal he proposed a science of the first person perspective.
Only in this manner of consideration will one be able to ascertain "what it is like" to be a subject with a
certain viewpoint on the world. This "novel" science of the subjective was greeted by
phenomenologists and in general Continental philosophers almost with a sigh of relief, in the sense
that traditional Analytic philosophy was finally making steps into the right direction. Indeed, such a
science is, especially to Husserl scholars, nothing novel at all. It was precisely what Husserl had in mind
all along: Husserlian phenomenology is a rigorous (eidetic) science of the first person perspective; it is
decidedly a discipline that takes its starting point from this first person perspective and, while it strives
for general results, never abandons this perspective.

It is in this sense that there has been a mutual approach between phenomenology and Analytic
Philosophy of Mind. Indeed, the parallels and common themes are astonishing: be they intentionality,
perception, or self-awareness, (3) topics, which were part of the traditional canon of Analytic
Philosophy of Mind, but that had been dealt with by Husserl and his school at all times, if perhaps
under different terms and methodological assumptions. As the editors of a recent volume on
Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind assert, one can demonstrate “how work in phenomenology
may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical
philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. … [T]hese different approaches to
the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but are mutually illuminating.” (4) It is, once
more, this sense of collaboration which captures the true spirit of phenomenological philosophizing in
the Husserlian heritage. Contrary to Husserl's view, transcendental phenomenology ought not to have a
primacy or play a foundational role in a quasi-Cartesian schema; instead, phenomenology (Husserlian
or otherwise) and other methods are called upon to work together on the perpetual issues of the mind
and enter the “rich bathos” of problems that can be accessed from different perspectives and with
different methods. Phenomenology can offer, with confidence of its abilities and knowledge of its
limits, one more voice in a field, which is devoted to what Husserl himself called the “enigma of all
enigmas,” the mind and its manifold content. What is nowadays called “Philosophy of Mind” in the
Analytic tradition is a continuation of transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, before some
Continental philosophers decided to “overcome” the latter. If phenomenology in its original sense of
“method of the mind” manages to reassert and reinsert itself into these discussions — which it is
destined to do if it adheres to the spirit of its founding father — and if contemporary Analytic
philosophy continues to open itself to other traditions and other discourses, the way is paved for a
most fruitful discussion and collaboration between philosophy of mind and the Husserlian tradition in
the decades to come.
The Complete Husserl: Challenges for Scholarship in the Next Decades

Last not least, one should point to the unpublished and only recently published texts of Husserl, which pose a tremendous challenge for future scholars. It has been a tired trope in phenomenological circles to assert that since the important Husserlian volumes which appeared in the 50s and 60s — tomes that did indeed change scholars’ view significantly — nothing fundamentally new has emerged from the unpublished material. Nothing could be further from the truth. While it is true that some of the texts that appeared in the last two decades “merely” filled in anticipated gaps in rather detailed aspects of Husserl’s work, there have appeared new volumes and texts in the past decade that open up whole new horizons and spheres of phenomenology in the Husserlian style. While some long-lived prejudices about Husserl can easily be shunned at this point—Husserl the cognitivist, the detached theoretician — there are others that can be at least relativized and put in perspective; and, there arise some new images and faces of Husserlian philosophy, which have not been seen at all. Let me, in conclusion, mention some topics where I believe scholars are bound to find a great deal of novel inspiration for the future of phenomenology:

Ethics: Husserl’s ethics has been nearly ignored in scholarship. Just recently Husserl’s ethics lectures of the 1920s have appeared (Hua. 37). These later reflections on ethics are significantly different from those of the pre-war years (Hua. 28). These later thoughts stand in conjunction with questions concerning the state of culture and society in the interim period between both World Wars. While some of these reflections are known through Husserl’s articles written for the Japanese journal “The Kaizo” (published in Hua. 27), these lectures are yet much more detailed and also let us see how Husserl interpreted and criticized other ethical theories in the history of Western thought. Given that common opinion has it that phenomenology, as a purely “descriptive” discipline, has no relation to, or bearing on, moral issues possibly involving normativity, it is to be seen how Husserl imagined phenomenology contributing to moral philosophy. The entirety of Husserl’s thoughts on ethics needs to be assessed and has been studied in detail by only few scholars.

The Nature of the Mental: The first shape of a full-fledged phenomenology that Husserl envisioned was a full account of consciousness on all of its cognitive, volitional, affective etc. levels. Only a fraction of these analyses have appeared thus far. Husserl’s studies on perception, attention, passivity, mood (Gemüt) and willing still await publication and will provide us with a phenomenological account of consciousness as a whole in a breadth that has not nearly been achieved by other phenomenologists. Not only do they fill in many details on the nature of the mental in the Husserlian perspective; they will also yield many insights in areas where other philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists are currently working.

Transcendental Phenomenology and Idealism: It is still an open question in which sense exactly one can speak of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism and how one has to construe this type of idealism vis-à-vis that of Descartes, Kant and other idealists (Fichte, Hegel). What kind of subject are we talking about that “constitutes” the world? Is it just a mental phenomenon or is it part of this subject to be necessarily embodied? And in what sense is the positing of a transcendental subject that is not part of the world a possibility (conceivability) or a factual necessity? It is these questions that Husserl ponders in his “proofs” for transcendental idealism in recently published texts in Hua. 20/1 and Hua. 36. Anybody interested in the specifically phenomenological sense of transcendental idealism and its similarities and differences to those of Kant and German Idealism will find a wide array of interesting texts dealing with these issues. As the question of philosophy as transcendental idealism is still an ongoing topic of discussion, e.g., in Kant scholarship, one can find fascinating convergences and overlaps concerning this “metaphysical” topic. And, the relation between “critical” and “phenomenological” philosophy is still a topic of interest for scholars on both sides of the spectrum.

The Character of the Life-World: Though Husserl has provided a sketch of an “ontology of the life-world” in the Crisis and other texts of his late philosophy, there has been much speculation of how this life-world phenomenology would actually be carried out in detail. Indeed, many of the texts that
Husserl wrote on the issue of the life-world have thus far not been published and will be published shortly. These detailed texts, rather large in quantity, will fill in what is arguably one of the most famous aspects and themes of Husserl's late thought.

Teleology and Theology: Phenomenology at the Limits. It is another trope that Husserl was so caught up in his own parameters and paradigms that he never questioned the very foundations and limits of his thought. This, too, is an unfortunate mistake, but again an understandable one, judging from the writings published during Husserl's lifetime. Indeed, already as of the first decade of the 20th century, Husserl penned manuscripts that he himself considered "metaphysical" or "unphenomenological" in the common understanding of the word. These texts were later collected in a section of his Nachlass, entitled "Teleology, Theology and Phenomenological Metaphysics." In these texts Husserl ponders questions at the limits of his phenomenology, probing these very limits. Here we see Husserl engaged in the kind of speculation that is known from, e.g., mysticism, neo-Platonism or German Idealism — no doubt with the intention of shoring up the impression that he only considered the "dry" issues in the context of his other analyses concerning intentional consciousness. Many of the issues that are being discussed, e.g., today in French phenomenology, as to the question and status of givenness itself and questions regarding other (spiritual) accesses to transcendental life, find their "Husserlian equivalent" here. Speculation was not introduced to phenomenology by, e.g., Fink, but already much earlier by Husserl himself. These texts, also still mostly unpublished, will show Husserl working beyond the limits of what he himself, as he once says to Cairns, found acceptable for public consumption.

Notes

(1) In this context, Landgrebe’s famous article on “Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism” is an interesting piece, as an article that attempts to show how Husserl, just like Heidegger, said farewell to Cartesianism in his late phenomenology in the Crisis manuscript. This was an almost desperate attempt to relocate Husserl in the philosophical landscape after World War II and is to this day an important piece concerning the history of the effect of Husserl’s philosophy. It also did a lot of damage to the image of Husserl’s phenomenology, which remains to this day. For, Husserl was not a Cartesian in the way that Landgrebe portrayed him, nor did Husserl overcome his own paradigms in his late phase. That Husserl would move close to Heidegger in this last phase is a fatal misunderstanding.

(2) I leave aside highly interesting attempts at transcendental philosophies or theories of science, which have used Husserl’s model of foundationalism for their efforts. One philosopher-scientist who has attempted this was Hermann Weyl, and there was a significant amount of attention paid to these attempts in the early 20th century on the part of contemporary philosophers of science. Here I would like to mention the work of Michael Friedman and Thomas Ryckman.


(4) Ibid., quoted from the back cover.
The Living Future of Phenomenology
Nicola Zippel

The future of phenomenology is inscribed within phenomenology itself. Indeed, phenomenology is a philosophy of time, because it moves within a temporal shape.

The continual development of Husserl's reflections on the meaning of phenomenology involves an ontological and theoretical growth of thickness of phenomenological consciousness, which correlates with the concept of time. The study of the phenomenological subjectivity, that becomes increasingly more accurate, deep and critical, shows not only that the subject as consciousness is temporal by essence, but also that this temporality transcends the subject in a transcendental meaning, to be precise, in a constituent meaning. Because it gives itself originally as temporal, consciousness becomes part of a genetic process. The relationship between subject and time seems to assume the form of an original asymmetry: Time founds in original and permanent way the subject, namely, it constitutes the subject because it confers sense to the consciousness-being of the subject. It must be considered what is meant for the subject as consciousness to obtain sense from its own temporal-being, in accordance with the authentic meaning that Husserl gives to the concept of transcendental.

In the whole process of its self-reflection, of its Selbstbesinnung, the Ego remains ever included in the permanent – and transcendental – shape of temporality. As Husserl explains in an important passage of Cartesian Meditations, this process develops in "levels, all of which fit the universal persisting form, temporality, because the latter itself is built up in a continual, passive and completely universal genesis, which, as a matter of essential necessity, embraces everything new" (Hua I, tr. by D. Cairns, 1960, p. 80, first emphasis mine). Through the way of the phenomenological reduction, the subject reaches the heart (Kern) of its being, i.e. its existence by the form of a temporal being, from whom, with an historical-genetic route, it develops itself through the concrete forms of intentionality and constitutes itself as Monade-Ich with its objective-wordly system. In the 1920s, i.e. at the beginning of the genetic turn of his thought, Husserl writes about the transcendentality of time and its connection with the life of subject: “Ich, das transzendentale Ich, lebe ein transzendentales Leben, das sich in kontinuierlicher transzendentaler Erfahrung in einer eigenen transzendentalen Zeitform darstellt» (Hua VIII, 1959, p. 86, emphasis mine).

Husserl calls the urtümlicher Kern by the name of lebendige Gegenwart, whose originality is such, only if it is possible to consider the living present as the structure of consciousness-stream, and, for this reason, as anterior to the Ego's intentionality itself, as its condition. Nevertheless, I do not intend to say that there is in Husserlian philosophy any dimension without the Ego; and yet, if there is a temporal permanent form for which the Ego has to be suitable, regarding its self-constitution as original temporality, it is possible to see an asymmetry between time and subject; this asymmetry does not mean the disappearance of Ego, but makes it difficult to understand in which sense the subject is still original. The Ego, in the original movement of self-constitution as lebendige Gegenwart, assumes the temporal form and in it, only in it and by it, achieves its own irreducible transcendental unity. So, the intentionality of the subject derives from the original gesture of Selbst-Zeitigung, which is an Ur-Faktum that precedes any constitutions and, for this reason, is the Ur-Quelle for each sense and meaning.

The enigma of lebendige Gegenwart, as Klaus Held correctly called it (see Held, 1966, pp. 94-122), has its origin in the ambiguous relationship that develops between time and subject within the phenomenological horizon; an enigmatic situation, where, nevertheless, it seems clear that the subject, when revealing itself originally as temporal, becomes part of a genetic process, that is dominated by a diachrony; the subject is not able to determine this diachrony, but, on the contrary, it has to be suitable for it. The consequences of this diachronic asymmetry could be serious for phenomenology, because they concern its theoretical and methodological premise, that has an eidetic perspective, which is the origin of the subjective apriori. The premise of phenomenology is the un-historical ideality of constituent sense; nevertheless, the subject is temporal by essence and, in its original development, it moves within temporality. This temporality transcends the subject in a transcendental meaning, to be precise, in a constituent meaning. The temporal being of the subject means its innate historicity.
(Geschichtlichkeit), which contradicts the essentialist request of phenomenology. Instead of the irreell motionless eidos, subjectivity seems to move ab initio within the strömend-werdend shape of time and history, that are an apriori that the reduction reveals, but does not determine.

Time, as the original form of passive genesis, is the transcendental history where subjectivity always, immer schon, finds itself. As a transcendental history, time is the ultimate genesis; nothing else lies beyond this dimension. Within time, every reality constitutes itself and finds its sense, because first of all the subject, chief reality, constitutes itself and derives its sense of being within the temporal historical-genetic shape. What does it mean that time is anterior to subjectivity? Does it bring into question the intentionality of the Ego? The subject’s passivity, namely its being suitable to a genetic process, means first of all that you have to recognize the existence of a non-intentional shape, or, as Husserl says, a nicht-ichlich, Ich-fremde shape. Does this outcome represent the subject’s overcoming along with its eidos itself? It seems a paradox, an insuperable aporia. Or, on the contrary, could the phenomenological method, just as a method, in the strict sense of meta+hodos, of “through the way”, allow to cross this blind alley? I believe the answer belongs to this paradoxical essence of consciousness, i.e. to its temporal being.

Under the way of the reduction, temporality constitutes the transcendental ground on which the subject’s life moves and this time resists the act’s reductive power. Once the reduction revealed (in the sense of a-letheia) the inner structure of subjectivity, then time allowed the Ego to keep a lively memory of what is revealed. The will of the subject cannot intervene in time’s ultimate articulations, rather, it has to suit them; nevertheless, by the help of these articulations it can take possession of what always belongs to the subject itself. This appropriation occurs within an infinite and constant retention. According to this point of view, reducing means remembering, in the peculiar sense of German word Er-innern, i.e. an interiorizing movement (see Derrida, 1984, tr. by A. Bass, pp. 207-271). The flowing life of the Ego exists by the original shape of living present; this life goes before the awareness that the subject has about it once the reduction is carried out. In this sense, the Lebensstrom is vor-ichlich. And nevertheless, in an other sense, the I, as it returns on itself, through a methodological and transcendental self-reflection, gives a specific sense to the being of the original flow, and, in this way, the subject carries out the inmost and fundamental Sinngebung. As Husserl writes: „Das Leben geht immer vorher des auslegende Methode, und die Methode ist selbst Leben usw. Aber die denkende Auslegung stellt dies erst fest, dass es so ist, das ist ihr Ergebnis, und so geht sie dem Sein im Sinn der Wahrheit voraus“ (Hua XXXIV, 2002, p. 175, emphasis mine). That is the originality of the Ego. The asymmetry and diachrony of time and subject mean therefore a relationship which is based on an original alterity; the same structure of the Ego is relational, because of the feature of essence, in accordance with which the I is fundamentally consciousness-of, Bewusst-von, namely it is articulated by the intentional manners of relationship. This structure emerges in awareness only on the level of the phenomenological attitude and reveals the Ur-Form of the subject’s life: the relationship between temporality and consciousness. Because of the subjective root of this relationship, its two poles are determined in their actual reality only a subiecti, through that Sinngebung, which allows the possibility to recognize the relation itself. The phase displacement between time and subject is therefore functional to the phenomenological method, which works in the wake of this original alterity.

Uncovering the relational being of subjectivity allows to understand its relationship with the world. Indeed, through the reduction to its authentic being, the I sheds light on its own original articulation and, from that, it returns to the world, which is grasped in its essential correlation to the subject. Only phenomenology, through the method of reduction, sees the inner connection between world and subject and grasps its hearth in the temporal structures of the consciousness field, whose study becomes necessary as the true way (hodos) to the genuine understanding of reality. The concept of “constitution” that refers to the activity of the subject’s intentional-temporal Sinngebung, is the link on which the relationship I-world takes roots. The phenomenological descriptions, which retrace the Ego’s structures to the original sphere (Kernsphäre) of living present, culminates in the recognition of the correlation between subjectivity and world; this correlation is based on the unique apodictic premise
of phenomenology: the thinkable-being of the world – in accordance with the consciousness structures. This premise is what presses the philosopher to go all over the ways of self-reflecting method and it proves its validity by the discovery of constitutive subject’s relational-being, i.e. intentionality, which means the Ego’s theoretical opening to the alterity of transcendence. At this point, the subjective structures become the filter through which it is possible to read the sense of the world. So, the concept of time, though it corrodes the proposition of supremacy of the subject, develops the authentic possibility of phenomenology, because temporality is finally the origin and the structure of subject, which is the being that makes the transcendental - phenomenological turning as its theoretical and ontological fulcrum.

Hence, the future of phenomenology is inscribed within the phenomenology itself, since the subject is structured so as to develop the phenomenological method and, once the reduction is started, the subject cannot have forgotten what appeared to its look, namely its origin, which is at the same time an infinite history. As a method, phenomenology means going back up the various ways of this history, through a continual reflection, a constant return on itself, which assumes the form of specific anamnesis in order to try to cure the Krisis of our being-in-the-world. The phenomenological attitude seems to be moved by a philosophical nostalgia, which presses to undertake a recherche du temps perdu. But this nostalgia does not become poetry, rather it aims to gain the features of a rigorous science, which has the endless consciousness field as object and, in a fertile paradox, as also subject of research. Studying the inner life of subject, its living present, entails a philosophy in touch with a living present that shows the topicality of phenomenology as a method of research, also with regard to the new sciences which study the questions of mind, consciousness and brain (see, e.g., Marbach, 1993).

Husserl taught us that understanding the subject means understand its temporal being and understanding its temporal being helps to understand its being-in-the-world.
Husserl’s Total Theory of Intentionality: An Outline
Jitendranath N. Mohanty

Now that most of Husserl’s writings are accessible in print, it is incumbent on us Husserl scholars to take a complete look at his thinking about intentionality. This is even more needed because most writers on Husserl, including this author, have restricted themselves to some phase or phases of his thinking about intentionality. It is only after we have gained a total picture of the theory that we can evaluate it. It is this writer’s conviction that the theory, in its principal components, is pretty well sustainable, and defensible against his critics.

The Formal Theory of Intentional Acts

In this part of the theory, the acts, per definition, are considered as satisfying the Brentano thesis, and the sentences containing the main verb, which stand for such acts, as satisfying the Chisholm criteria. Such analytic philosophers as Chisholm, who accept the Brentano thesis, make one major mistake, and we must here warn against it: they misread the Brentano thesis as giving a way of distinguishing the mental from the physical (including the bodily). It is worth emphasizing that Brentano’s “physical phenomena” are neither bodily states, nor material objects nor events of nature. Brentano’s own examples are colors, sounds, warmth, etc., also landscapes, which in his view, exist only phenomenally and intentionally. They are primary objects or intentional contents of mental acts. This was certainly his view in the Psychologie, but later on, he seems to have interpreted his position differently by considering his intentional objects as being “things” in the ordinary sense. An interpretation that is more plausible is of Aristotelian heritage: what is an immanent content, and so “inexists” in the mind, is only the “form” (of the horse I am thinking of) and not its matter. This, however, is not the place to discuss the question how best to interpret Brentano. With this in mind, let us turn to Husserl.

Husserl discovered intentionality via Brentano and Twardowski after distinguishing between representations in which the object is not intuited, and an intuitive presentation of the same object. This distinction brings out a Spannung between the given and the not given, a “striving” towards a transcendent object, accompanied by a feeling of “lack.” In knowledge, there is a resolution of this tension. Husserl’s thinking about intentionality begins with a perception of this complex phenomenon, and at the end of his life he returns to it in the lectures on “Passive Synthesis.” Thus, the theory begins with a psychology of cognition, then — after the rejection of psychologism — moves to a theory of meaning (Investigations I & II), which is taken up into a phenomenology of knowledge (Investigation VI). With the discovery of the “epoché” (1905), the same intentionality (Ideas I) becomes constitutive of the object that is intended, and eventually of the “world.” This complex theory may be articulated in the following propositions, in that order:

P1: An intentional act refers to its object through an ideal content.

P2: As meaning-intending, it constitutes an ideal meaning.

P3: The meaning-intention is fulfilled when the object intended is itself presented precisely as it was intended, and therewith known.

P4: With the bracketing of the object intended, the intentional act is discovered to have a structure of correlation between noesis and noema, the former being a real, temporally individuated act, the latter an ideal, non-temporal meaning.

P5: “Noema” is the product of the noesis giving meaning to sensory stuff or hyletic data.

P6: Identity of an object is constituted by overlapping noemata which enter into a synthesis of
“coincidence” (Deckung).

P7: “Existence,” “non-existence,” “possibility,” “fictional,” etc., are properties of the noema, which correspond to the appropriate thetic qualities of acts.

P8: The thing itself, or true being, is the correlate of the idea of perfect and final fulfillment. “Being” and “Truth” coincide.

P9: Intentionality is a temporal process of striving after truth but exhibits at its core a logical structure, as described in P1- P7.

Intentionality and Time

This core theory must now be inserted into a phenomenology of time and, without disturbing the central structure, allowed to undergo necessary expansion and modification. The elements which are most susceptible to “temporalization” are: the ego (so long not mentioned above), the hylé and the act. The temporality we are talking about is obviously not the objective time in which transcendent things and processes of the world take place but the immanent, phenomenological time of immanent acts and contents, this latter time having been disclosed by an appropriate epoché. It is in this immanent time that we shall find, through reflection, the genesis of the hyletic data, the acts, and the ego — in fine, of active intentionality. Let us recall the thesis, advanced in the 1905 lectures on time-consciousness, that the immanent flow of consciousness is constituted by the retentions and protentions, and by the double intentionality, the so-called longitudinal and transversal intentionalities.

Now we can formulate the following structures, which Husserl gradually came to discover in the Bernau and the C-manuscripts:

P10: In the “original” process of time-consciousness, every presentation as a now is a fulfillment of an expectation-intention.

P11: There is a continuous distancing from the source point of the now as a new now emerges — one is the primary retention, the other is a presentification of it as a presenting of the past.

P12: Protention is a tendency, a passive expectation. Retention also has its protentional element. Retention and Protention — penetrate each other.

P13: There is no absolute beginning, no Ur-datum which is not a fulfillment of a prior protention. We are always in the middle of an endless process. Any arbitrary point can be treated as a null-point.

P14: In every phase of it, consciousness is both intention towards something, and also intention away from something (which appear as positive and negative tendencies). Intentionality has now to be studied in the sphere of passivity prior to the emergence of the active ego with its acts.

P15: To the passive sphere belong the intentional associations, tendencies, drives, and affections of feelings.

P16: Originally ego-less within the “living present,” the I first appears as the “functioning” I, not yet as the subject-pole; then as a “place” where the original stream and constitution of the world takes place; and finally an entity constituted in reflection. Sartre is partially vindicated.

P17: (Returning to the act-intentionalities, one should now say) the noema is not a-temporal, but omni-temporal.
Intentionality in Intersubjectivity

P18: Empathy, as an intentional act, presents (to the empathizing ego) a new kind of transcendence, the other (the empathized) ego.

This transcendence is very different from the transcendence of things given in sensory perception. The latter are constituted meaning-unities, the former are not, but exist in themselves. The transcendence of the other ego is a stronger transcendence. (Note that Levinas does not see this in Husserl.)

P19: My ego and the other egos do not have any real connection. Their only connection is intentional.

P20: The community of egos, through its “communalized intentionality,” constitutes one identical world as its ideal correlate.

P21: The process by which the child builds up his idea of the world corresponds to the reflective delineation of the steps of constitution of the world. Genetic phenomenology and developmental intentional psychology are correlates.

P22: Empathy with the other ego may lead in either direction: either “I take over” his position by identifying with him, or I may distance myself from him.

By the former, a common world, between him and me, is constituted. However, I cannot “take over” the practical intentions (desires and willings) of others.

P23: The world is the horizon of possible consistent coincidence with the others.

P24: A community is constituted by personal acts of “intimation” and “sharing,” through an intuitive presentification, in empathy, of the other egos. Mutual empathy is a presupposition of successful communication, whose basic form is “addressing” the other who understands me as so addressing, such that the meaning content of my communicative intention reaches into the other who understands me as so intending. A “we” in a special sense is being thereby constituted.

P25: Social acts are so constituted that a personal act takes part in the life of the co-members, actual or potential. A “many-headed” subjectivity (of a social unity) is thereby constituted, which is such that even if there is no continuity between the streams of consciousness of the egos, one ego intentionally contains the other egos.

P26: A special category of intentionality of the ego is the sexual desire, at first indeterminate, then having a determinate correlate in the other, reaching its fulfillment in a being-in-one-another of two fulfillments.

P27: The sexual drive leads to “generations” and “cultural traditions,” an important step in the “self-mundanisation” of the transcendent ego.

Husserl’s critics need to take this entire theory into consideration, just as his followers have to build on it through a process of internal, phenomenological critique.
¿Tiene un futuro la lectura de Husserl hoy?
Rosemary R.P. de Lerner

¿Por qué leer a Edmund Husserl, el iniciador del movimiento fenomenológico, precisamente hoy? ¿Tiene un futuro el desarrollo de la fenomenología husserliana? Ante el notorio curso de la tradición fenomenológica en el siglo XX, que se aleja en múltiples direcciones de la fenomenología trascendental de Husserl, queda en muchos la impresión que el “retorno” a Husserl tiene sólo un sentido “arqueológico” o, en el mejor de los casos, histórico-crítico, para fines que se hallan más allá de la obra del maestro. En este texto me arriesgo a proponer algunos motivos para leer a Husserl hoy, con el objeto de tomar conciencia de cómo la obra de este filósofo aparentemente anacrónico –o quizás provocadoramente renovador– pone en nuestras manos, a través de un método inédito, posibilidades inesperadas en muchos frentes concebibles de la interrogación filosófica. En un inicio, lo más difícil es vencer las prevenciones de nuestra época contra un proyecto filosófico de aparente corte “clásico” que, a diferencia de otros extraordinarios filósofos, poetas o escritores cuyas obras sí invitan a inspiradas travesías intelectuales y literarias, no parece ni a primera vista, ni luego de lidiar algún tiempo con sus textos, particularmente amable o atractivo.

Por ello, lo primero que se me ocurre es una miríada de razones que, al parecer, dificultan la lectura de Husserl hoy. La obra de Husserl no es particularmente amable a la lectura; pero durante décadas, desde antes de su fallecimiento en 1938, los principales textos que la interpretaban o introducían, sea globalmente, sea desde ciertos aspectos de la misma, eran aún menos amables con ella. Desde aproximaciones parciales, se solía tejer frecuentemente lecturas de conjunto –llenando arbitrariamente los aparentes vacíos con elementos extraños a ella, extraídos muchas veces de la tradición, si no de la imaginación. Estas críticas –mucho más intensas en las décadas de 1960 y 1970– que ignoran el corpus inédito de la obra de Husserl, aunque todas se apoyan en cierto privilegio del lenguaje, provienen de tradiciones muy disímiles entre sí, como la filosofía analítica, la teoría crítica social y el deconstrucccionismo. Aunque apropiándose diversa pero calificadamente de determinados elementos de la fenomenología husserliana, a la vez que desembarazándose de su teoría y su método, coinciden en interpretarla crítica e integralmente como una filosofía de la “representación” que rescata la tradición racionalista e intelectualista del cartesianismo y del neokantismo. Atribuyen el interés husserliano de fundar la filosofía fenomenológica como ciencia rigurosa universal, de fundamentos últimos, a un rezago de su cientismo enraizado, fruto de su formación matemática. Opinan igualmente que esta formación determina sus extrañas concepciones acerca de la intuición intelectual y del carácter eidético o esencial que deben exhibir las investigaciones, fundamentalmente descriptivas, de la filosofía. Se ha supuesto, así, que hablar de “intuición eidética”, de “esencias” o eide consiste en explicar todo desde una suerte de universalidad e idealidad congeladas –more geometrico–, ergo desde una exigencia de exactitud para el saber, que no se conduce con las condiciones de la vida y de la experiencia humana fáctica, histórica, temporal y perfectible. Asimismo, se le reprocha el adoptar el punto de vista del sujeto, o aun el de un idealismo subjetivo –especialmente desde que los discursos des-centrados y los múltiples relatos adquieren cierto lustre y renombre de pasarela– pues todo lo “egológico” resulta para los críticos sinónimo de “solipsista”. A los calificativos atribuidos a su obra, de “subjetivismo-relativista”, “solipsismo”, “logocentrismo” y hasta “eurocentrismo”, se ha sumado frecuentemente el reproche de que el ideal filosófico de Husserl es, en última instancia, el ideal de un proyecto fundamentalista de corte moderno, cuya inviabilidad ya ha sido ampliamente demostrada hoy, tanto por sus discípulos –que consideran ellos mismos haberlo superado– como por sus más tradicionales adversarios. Así, habiendo ya caído en la habitualidad trivial y en desuso el llamado decimonónico a “la muerte de Dios”, retumba más bien, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX, un nuevo grito de guerra: el llamado perentorio a la “muerte del sujeto”.

Estas críticas –mucho más intensas en las décadas de 1960 y 1970– que ignoran el corpus inédito de la obra de Husserl, aunque todas se apoyan en cierto privilegio del lenguaje, provienen de tradiciones muy disímiles entre sí, como la filosofía analítica, la teoría crítica social y el deconstrucccionismo. Aunque apropiándose diversa pero calificadamente de determinados elementos de la fenomenología husserliana, a la vez que desembarazándose de su teoría y su método, coinciden en interpretarla crítica e integralmente como una filosofía de la “representación” que rescata la tradición racionalista e intelectualista del cartesianismo y del neokantismo. Atribuyen el interés husserliano de fundar la filosofía fenomenológica como ciencia rigurosa universal, de fundamentos últimos, a un rezago de su cientismo enraizado, fruto de su formación matemática. Opinan igualmente que esta formación determina sus extrañas concepciones acerca de la intuición intelectual y del carácter eidético o esencial que deben exhibir las investigaciones, fundamentalmente descriptivas, de la filosofía. Se ha supuesto, así, que hablar de “intuición eidética”, de “esencias” o eide consiste en explicar todo desde una suerte de universalidad e idealidad congeladas –more geometrico–, ergo desde una exigencia de exactitud para el saber, que no se conduce con las condiciones de la vida y de la experiencia humana fáctica, histórica, temporal y perfectible. Asimismo, se le reprocha el adoptar el punto de vista del sujeto, o aun el de un idealismo subjetivo –especialmente desde que los discursos des-centrados y los múltiples relatos adquieren cierto lustre y renombre de pasarela– pues todo lo “egológico” resulta para los críticos sinónimo de “solipsista”. A los calificativos atribuidos a su obra, de “subjetivismo-relativista”, “solipsismo”, “logocentrismo” y hasta “eurocentrismo”, se ha sumado frecuentemente el reproche de que el ideal filosófico de Husserl es, en última instancia, el ideal de un proyecto fundamentalista de corte moderno, cuya inviabilidad ya ha sido ampliamente demostrada hoy, tanto por sus discípulos –que consideran ellos mismos haberlo superado– como por sus más tradicionales adversarios. Así, habiendo ya caído en la habitualidad trivial y en desuso el llamado decimonónico a “la muerte de Dios”, retumba más bien, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX, un nuevo grito de guerra: el llamado perentorio a la “muerte del sujeto”.
Pero hay otros elementos formales que podrían desanimar al lector hispanohablante a habérselas con Husserl. Además de múltiples artículos dispersos, de los ocho libros que publicó durante su vida, algo disímiles y en apariencia inconexos –meros islotes en un mar o río de pensamiento incesantemente renovado durante cuarenta años de investigación–, sólo siete fueron traducidos muy temprano al castellano, en versiones que añadieron, a la dureza del alemán de Husserl, la torpeza de un español precipitado, acaso plagado de errores –en léxico y en comprensión. Y aunque la obra inédita se viene editando y publicando desde 1950 por los Archivos Husserl de Lovaina, Bélgica, en colaboración con investigadores de Friburgo y Colonia en Alemania, sólo en los últimos 10 ó 15 años se observan serios y muy exitosos proyectos de traducción al castellano de los volúmenes antes inéditos de la Husserliana o de fragmentos de ellos, traducciones no solamente muy bien hechas, sino que ponen por primera vez al alcance del público hispanohablante elementos antes no suficientemente asequibles en su obra originalmente publicada. Éstas todavía no han dado lugar en castellano, como ya ocurre en otras partes del mundo, a obras interpretativas de la trama global y sistemática del asombroso pensamiento y descubrimientos de Husserl, aunque sí algunos elementos por donde ésta empieza a asomar.

Cabe por ello mirar al futuro con optimismo. Pero no nos refiramos enseguida a por qué leer a Husserl, sino primero a cómo leerlo.

Lo primero que hay que tomar en cuenta, entonces, para leer a Husserl, es que la obra que publicó durante su vida debe abordarse sobre el trasfondo del material inédito. Es en éste donde se desenvuelve y desarrolla, de modo vivo y crítico, el método fenomenológico, la filosofía fenomenológica y el conjunto de sus temas y problemas en asombrosa sistematicidad. Esta sistematicidad se va constituyendo, sin embargo, en el devenir de los manuscritos. En estos se hallan retomas permanentes de lo avanzado, en nuevas estratificaciones donde nuevos temas aparecen enlazados. Este trabajo en devenir es el trasfondo de los libros publicados: no está en contradicción con ellos sino que transunta en ellos si uno los lee atentamente y los interpreta desde una perspectiva ajena a los prejuicios modernos, que no permiten precisamente ver lo nuevo que ellos aportan. Por ejemplo, si uno toma Investigaciones lógicas de 1900-1901 (1), Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica de 1913 (2), y Lógica formal y lógica trascendental (3), de 1929, uno observa que, a pesar de las profundas brechas temporales que separan a estas tres distintas introducciones a la fenomenología, todas plantean el tema de lo que podría llamarse la “razón lógica”. En las tres, luego de establecer el estatuto, por así decir, “ontológico” de las objetividades ideales de las matemáticas y de la lógica, Husserl aborda retrospectiva y descriptivamente el tema de aquellas experiencias originarias en las que dichas objetividades ideales se constituyen –esto es, se dan, aparecen, o son articuladas temporalmente– en su sentido y validez. Pero los dos primeros textos, desarrollados desde una perspectiva fenomenológica “estática”, apuntan a una dimensión anterior, más explícita en el último texto: una dimensión genética, previa a la experiencia trascendental constitutiva del sujeto, a saber, una dimensión de profundidad desde la cual las propias experiencias constitutivas del sujeto (la conciencia misma y su temporalidad) emergen –o se constituyen– asociativamente. En otras palabras, la constitución de sentido y validez en la vida consciente del sujeto no es, de entrada, una capacidad o vivencia disponible desde siempre, lista para ser usada. Más bien, las mismas experiencias constitutivas de sentido y validez son constituidas –emergen asociativamente– de la vida pre-egológica, pre-consciente, del sujeto. La perspectiva complementaria de los textos inéditos, en suma, busca abordar descriptiva y genéticamente esta dimensión pasiva, pre-egológica y pre-objetivante de la vida del sujeto, una dimensión en la que la vida fluye inicialmente de modo indiferenciado. De modo tal, que el único modo de juzgar globalmente el aporte de Husserl a la historia de la filosofía de occidente, será comprendiendo cómo se articulan sus investigaciones estáticas sobre la constitución del sentido y validez (por ejemplo, de las ciencias y la cultura) con las investigaciones genéticas que echan luz a la dimensión desde la cual tal constitución se vuelve posible.

En cuanto a por qué leerlo, se pueden decir muchas trivialidades al respecto: v.gr. por la inmensa influencia que ha tenido sobre prácticamente todos los desarrollos filosóficos del siglo XX, o por la
inmensa influencia que ha tenido el método fenomenológico, a nivel mundial, en todas las lenguas, aplicado a las más variadas—e inverosímiles—disciplinas: desde las matemáticas a la estética, la antropología cultural y la etnología a la arquitectura, desde la inteligencia artificial al Budismo, desde la ciencia cognitiva a las disciplinas culturales, desde la danza a la ecología, desde el cine y el teatro y las comunicaciones a la hermenéutica, desde la geografía social y del comportamiento a la medicina, desde la tecnología a la psiquiatría y la psicología, y así en adelante. Basta una mirada a la *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (4) para tener una idea al respecto.

Es cierto también que son ciertas disposiciones personales, innatas o adquiridas, las que lo llevan a uno a sentirse motivado por uno u otro filósofo. En mi caso, esa inclinación a releer a Husserl desde distintos ángulos y obras—luego de volverse recurrente a lo largo de los años— se convirtió en vocación. He aquí un filósofo al que accedí por vez primera hace por lo menos treinta y siete años, y todavía no me atrevo a decir que lo conozco a cabalidad, ni siquiera bien. Pero en lugar de desanimarme, en mi provoca un entusiasmo y una curiosidad poderosos, e incluso, cuando lo leo, me estimula por el modo tan *sui generis* que en pleno siglo veinte se conecta con temas planteados por toda la filosofía occidental desde Platón—con el cual se siente particularmente inspirado. También me motiva porque, al abrir nuevas trochas—cual Stanley o Livingston en la “África Negra” decimonónica— nos invita a entrar a un terreno muy poco familiar, y una vez en él, a experimentar la verdadera dimensión *crítica* de la filosofía—la más auténtica y honesta *crítica*—la que se vuelca sobre sus propios pasos para desandarlos y reanudarlos. (5) Sólo desde esta dimensión es posible entender a este filósofo que hasta el final se consideró un “*efectivo principiante*”. (6) En 1913, por ello, compara su proceder “al de un viajero que explora una parte desconocida del mundo, describiendo cuidadosamente lo que se le presenta a lo largo de sus caminos no trillados y que no siempre serán los más cortos. (...) Con semejante espíritu –dice Husserl– queremos ser en adelante un fiel expositor de los hechos fenomenológicos, conservando por lo demás el *habitus* de una íntima libertad incluso frente a nuestras propias descripciones.” (7) Mirando retrospectivamente su obra, escribe Husserl en 1931: “En todo caso, quien durante decenios no especula sobre una nueva Atlántida, sino que se ha metido realmente por las selvas sin caminos de un nuevo continente y ha hecho los primeros esfuerzos para cultivarlo, no se dejará extraviar por negativa alguna de los geógrafos que juzgan de las noticias por sus propios hábitos empíricos y mentales—pero que también se ahorran el esfuerzo de hacer un viaje a las nuevas tierras.” (8)

Pero ¿qué nos ofrece el método fenomenológico, y a qué “tierra prometida” alude y nos invita Husserl a visitar? A riesgo de tocar temas poco “populares” en la escolástica husserliana, prefiero abordar el centro de la cuestión. Nos ofrece restaurar la *idea primitiva de la filosofía*, que él entiende como una ciencia universal—en el sentido platónico de *episteme*—, que parte de fundamentos últimos, “o lo que es igual, de una responsabilidad última”, como dice en 1931. Se trata, por cierto, de una “idea”, esto es, que sólo es realizable en un camino de “tareas infinitas”, infinitamente abierto, “en el estilo de verdades relativas, temporales, y a lo largo de un proceso histórico infinito—pero que así es realizable efectivamente”. (2) Se trata, pues, fundamentalmente, de una filosofía de los “comienzos”, y del “radicalismo de la responsabilidad autónoma”, puesto que el fundamento último, en efecto, no puede ser otro que la vida trascendental que *anida en todo sujeto*, y que no sólo es el presupuesto “de toda teoría”, sino que es la *fuente de todo sentido* y de toda validez concebible, de toda ciencia y de toda cultura, de todo lenguaje y de toda cosmovisión, de toda ética y de toda estética. Se trata pues, nada menos que una filosofía que—a través de una meditación radical— pretende regresar, con radical seriedad, a las “fecundas honduras de la experiencia”, en su riqueza, inmensa variedad y muy compleja estructuración—región de auténticos fundamentos últimos detrás de los cuales no cabe buscar otra causa o razón, u otra instancia “responsable”. Pero estas “fecundas honduras”, como dice Husserl, comportan también una insondabilidad que predetermina el carácter abierto e infinito de su indagación. Refiriéndose libremente en la *Crisis a la psyché* de Heráclito, sostenía Husserl que: “los límites del alma nunca los encontrarás, y ello a pesar de que recorras todos sus caminos: tan profundo es su fundamento.” (10)
El método de indagación fenomenológico requería para él de dos presupuestos: primero, que se combatiera el naturalismo imperante en las ciencias y la cultura decimonónicas, que pretendieron desconocer una dimensión cognoscitiva con derecho propio –el de las objetividades de tipo ideal, a priori, como en las ciencias matemáticas y la lógica. Esto significa ir más lejos que los neokantianos, quienes reconocen sólo una dimensión de lo ideal, el a priori formal o analítico. Ante el caso de la geometría –y otros similares– Husserl sostiene la necesidad de reconocer un ámbito de idealidades “materiales”, o de un a priori “material” y sintético. Correspondientemente, el “mundo circundante” con el cual tenemos relación, no sólo consta de “hechos” empíricos, individuales, determinados espacio-temporalmente, sino también de objetividades “ideales” así como de valores, éticos y estéticos, normas, y entidades culturales cuyo status trasciende la mera naturaleza física o psíquica. En segundo lugar, pide que se reconozca que todo este “mundo circundante”, con su infinita variedad, es precisamente el correlato intencional de múltiples y variadas experiencias humanas –actuales y posibles– de donde obtiene sus “sentidos” y “valideces”. Y que se reconozca, entre todas las modalidades de experiencias, desde las más humildes e intuitivas hasta las más sofisticadas y formales, a la experiencia intuitiva como “principio de los principios”, a aquella que “coloca”, por así decir, las objetividades “ante los ojos” –tanto los físicos como los de la mente. La intuición perceptiva y la intelección constituyen así para Husserl una fuente de derecho último, aunque reconocidamente limitada, respecto de toda otra forma de experiencia, incluso de las experiencias predicativas, argumentativas y simbólicas. Si esto es así, si el mundo circundante y todo cuanto contiene es correlato de experiencias humanas, atravesadas por una creencia originaria, básica, universal y tácita, la Ur-doxa de la “tesis general de la actitud natural” –que el mundo existe, y está allí para nosotros, independientemente de todo cuanto podamos poner en cuestión en él–, entonces se hace imperioso el indagar dicha experiencia correlativa, la vida intencional del sujeto. Pero como esta vida intencional, trascendental, en su plena concreción, no es visible desde la actitud natural, que tiende a abordar toda relación –incluso la relación cognitiva, etc.– como una relación cósica causal, se hace imperioso el “desconectar”, poner entre paréntesis, suspender metodológicamente la tesis general de la actitud natural, para examinarla precisamente en su funcionamiento. La epojé, acompañada de la reflexión fenomenológica (la reducción trascendental) descubre la vida trascendental, intencional, dadora de sentido y validez, del sujeto, que funciona anónimamente en la actitud natural, como su secreto motor. Una vez allí, Husserl procede con el primer criterio metodológico: mirando –reflexivamente– y fijando –intelectivamente– las estructuras y el funcionamiento típicos de esa vida intencional, de ese a priori universal de la correlación en el mundo de la vida.

Lo que descubre de allí en adelante es asombroso. El mismo Gadamer, recordando su paso por las aulas de Husserl entre 1921 y 1923, señala que “la intuitividad de la técnica husserliana de descripción era verdaderamente asombrosa.” (11) Para resumirlo en unas cuantas palabras, la vida del sujeto, su experiencia, tiene como estructura básica la intencionalidad, que, como decíamos, es inmensamente variada, y compleja, siempre en correlación con la inmensa variedad de objetos o correlatos de las experiencias actuales y posibles. Asimismo, la vida del sujeto entera, y cada experiencia en particular, es temporal. Todas las experiencias, desde las más primitivas, aparecen sintéticamente articuladas con las demás en la unidad de una conciencia. El método fenomenológico descubre así, en virtud de la intencionalidad y la temporalidad de las experiencias, la noción fundamental de horizonte. Por eso dice Welton, “Husserl se convierte en el primer filósofo trascendental en confrontar directamente la cuestión de los contextos”. (12) Se trata, por otro lado, de experiencias intencionales vividas por sujetos concretos, individuales, psico-físicos, esto es, encarnados, experiencias que serían impensables sin sus cuerpos orgánicos, en contacto con el mundo físico circundante, con otros seres humanos y animales. Es en estas experiencias en donde se da la relación intencional, constitutiva de sentido y validez. Debido, entre otras cosas, a esa vinculación con el cuerpo propio, es que Husserl se percata de que dichas experiencias son siempre experiencias de un yo, que vive a través de ellas. Son sus experiencias, tanto las “activas”, en las que él impera, tomando posición responsablemente desde un punto de vista teórico y práctico, cuanto las “pasivas”, en las que vive como afectado a través de ellas. Son sus dichas experiencias, tanto en el sueño como en la vigilia, en la continuidad de una vida temporal desde el
nacimiento hasta la muerte. Pero, si bien son suyas, relacionadas con el “mundo circundante” y, en él, relacionadas con las experiencias de otros sujetos como él, estas experiencias se descubren inter-intencionales, mutuamente determinantes, ni externa ni causalmente relacionadas. La vida del sujeto se descubre, en dichas experiencias, como una vida inter-subjetiva, compartida, en relaciones mutuas de inter-penetración intencional y de co-constitución de sentidos y validez. Es así como se constituyen los lenguajes y se fundan las comunidades y tradiciones históricas. Pues surge la idea de un mundo circundante intersubjetivo e intersubjetivamente constituido, de personalidades de orden superior, donde lo “intersubjetivo” no se restringe al presente, sino que se extiende a las generaciones históricamente constituidas, donde el pasado, sedimentado, se reactiva desde presentes siempre renovados. De ese modo no sólo se comprende la constitución temporal, histórica, intersubjetiva, de las comunidades culturales e históricas relativas, sino la constitución de un mundo común, y a un nivel más elevado, la constitución racional, por parte de comunidades científicas, de mundos objetivos, en un sentido más fuerte.

Quizás la lectura de Husserl hoy debe tener un futuro, porque nos invita a indagar en las profundidades de la vida del sujeto y a descubrir cómo sus experiencias intencionales –incluso las teóricas más elevadas– son una forma radical de praxis, de constitución de todo sentido y de toda validez. En ese sentido, se puede decir, vale la pena leerlo porque su obra invita a tomar conciencia radical de la vocación ética de la humanidad.

Quizás se mostrará incluso que la actitud fenomenológica total y la epojé que le pertenece están llamadas a provocar una completa mutación personal, que cabría comparar, en principio, con una conversión religiosa, pero que, por encima de ello, esconde en sí la máxima mutación existencial que se encomienda a la humanidad en tanto que humanidad. (13)

Notas

(2) Edmund Husserl, Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica, Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993 (segunda reimpresión en España), traducido por José Gaos.
(3) Edmund Husserl, Lógica formal y lógica trascendental. Ensayo de una crítica de la razón lógica, México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1962, traducido por Luis Villoro.
(7) Ibid., p. 235.
(8) Ibid., p. 388.
(9) Ibid., pp. 373-374.
Radical Phenomenology
Stefano Gonnella

To be a scholar in phenomenology does not mean to be a phenomenologist. To do phenomenology does not mean to know thoroughly the precepts of Husserlian scholarship, but rather to be able to apply the phenomenological method to precise analytical fields. This is not to say that scholarship, history of thought, or philological exegesis of manuscripts are useless; this is merely to say that they are quite different things in regard to the actual practice of phenomenological analysis. The future of phenomenology relies on the understanding of this basic difference.

The Husserlian method requires the purification of all the unexplored assumptions that underlie and support our everyday life. (1) It is the neutralization of background presuppositions, by applying a sophisticated technique of suspension known as epoché, that allows to access a field of investigation where one should apprehend the “things themselves.” This field of manifestation is the field of “pure phenomena.” According to Husserl, “to one truly without prejudice it is immaterial whether certainty comes to us from Kant or Thomas Aquinas, from Darwin or Aristotle, from Helmholtz or Paracelsus.” (2) We have to see with our own eyes and we must not change under the pressure of preconceptions what we plainly see. (3) Here we find, worded in a very precise formulation, the intuitive and descriptive nature of phenomenological method. Nevertheless, while acknowledging Husserl’s thoroughness and exactness, there is further room to raise an essential question: is the epoché really able to hit and to put out of circuit all possible presuppositions, completely purifying the field of investigation from prejudices and not yet acquired assumptions? (4) Can we proceed along the path of phenomenology, trusting its method as a well arranged and reliable theoretical tool, or must we begin instead, as impenitent sceptics, with an attentive critique of phenomenology itself?

These are not new questions, yet they acquire particular meaning for contemporary and future phenomenology. The value of an analytical method, its significance, is located in the ability to transmit the method itself from its founder to other researchers. In this way the method, being employed by quite different scholars to carry on new analyses in the field, can be directly verified and proved with regard to its function and effectiveness. (5) To test a method, one needs to practice it. This sentence, perhaps stating the obvious, may not be the truism it seems. From what other external criteria should the query into the phenomenological method be guided? Could phenomenology be submitted to a non-phenomenological inquiry? Once again, nothing new: phenomenology, as Husserl used to exhort himself, should be submitted to a phenomenological analysis. (6) So, one of the unavoidable tasks for a future phenomenology is to carry out a phenomenology of phenomenology. How could one approach and realize such a paradoxical task?

Once the epoché is performed and the thesis of natural attitude has been bracketed, the sphere of pure phenomena offers itself to the phenomenologist’s eyes. The field of the originary is open, so the analysis and the phenomenological description can finally be developed. Inside the phenomenological practice we find intuition, as the so-called “principle of all principles” teaches us. (7) Intuition is the actual core of phenomenologist’s gaze is. It is the rightly intended intuition, according to Husserlian fundamental rules, that would drive us to the exact phenomenological apprehension of essences.

In a slightly more technical way, what is phenomenologically originary persists as irreducible after the performance of epoché. Without further reference to anything else, this originary manifests itself as self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit), as something that a peculiar intuition can grasp as its adequate fulfilling (Erfüllung). One of the questions left open by this theoretic engine is just the phenomenological purity of Anschauungen, of the intuitions that would hold and corroborate phenomenologist’s work. In other words, the rigour and the authenticity of phenomenological attitude involves a correct singling out of
the horizon of the so-called originary self-givenness, the Selbstgegebenheiten which are the direct objects of intuition and the sole warranty of the validity and the consistency of analysis. To clarify the role of intuition would help us decipher the well-known motto “zurück zu den Sachen selbst!” and to finally grasp the phenomenological sense of that movement backwards (zurückgeben) towards the “things themselves”. (8)

Therefore, proceeding phenomenologically into phenomenology itself primarily implies inquiring into the intuitive ground of Husserl’s method. This is just the task undertaken by Domenico Antonino Conci, an Italian phenomenologist whose work is mainly known to a narrow range of scholars and students. Since the seventies, Conci set up a reform of the classical Husserlian method opening a research stream that could be properly named “Radical Phenomenology”. With “Radical Phenomenology” one intends a kind of analysis dealing with phenomenological residues singled out by radical epoché: this epoché, unlike the Husserlian one, does not only bracket the natural attitude, but also suspends the wider and more complex sphere of objectivation. This sphere is actually the matrix of some obstacles that turned up to vitiate Husserl’s own research.

The risk of aporetic paths inside classical phenomenology has been clearly noticed and then handled by other phenomenologists as well. But, it is precisely this “phenomenology of phenomenological method”(9) that managed to display a week point of the Husserlian analytic, showing how its intuitive ground is affected with some presuppositions of non-phenomenological nature. It has been Conci’s endeavour to bring phenomenology to its utmost consequences, radicalizing the epoché and suspending what can really be suspended in the field of presence, without paying hidden tributes to the Western philosophical tradition. This is exactly what Husserl did not avoid doing and therefore remained imprisoned within what Conci calls “categorial structure” (10). In virtue of this structure, classical phenomenology proceeds to a concealed objectivation of phenomenological data, identifying the origins of sense with immanent lived-experiences (Erlebnisse) of a transcendental ego. (11) The radical epoché extends the classical Husserlian epoché and thereby suspends what according to Husserl was in fact irreducible, i.e., the egological pole, the sphere of the transcendental I. (12)

While the distinction between consciousness and the ego has been established by Husserl himself, radical phenomenology further suggests that the irreducible residue of radical epoché is a basic impersonal lived-experience. It is a non-ego-centered consciousness that manifest itself as actual “self-givenness”, i.e. as a datum that really “gives itself by itself” (always into the phenomenological praxis, certainly not into the physics or the natural sciences): this is identified as the authentic Selbstgegebenheit. (13)

Schematically speaking, the subject appears to be constituted in virtue of the structure that remains invisible through the Husserlian method: the variation/invariance structure. (14) This categorial structure is the basic intentional structure of Western thought, our objectivating logos. It consists of a functional relationship between an invariant pole (eidos) and a plane made by an indefinite sequence of variations (to be intended as individual metamorphosis of the eidos). The variations get their lacking sense, either ontological or logical, from the invariance, meanwhile the invariance works as a principle, as a rule, and as a unity of connection for the whole range of variations.(15)

Radical epoché affects each intentional construction and thus also the I that is enclosed therein. By striking the assessment of the ego as an obvious datum, by placing into question the idea that the ego would be endowed with absolute and exclusive existence, the radical epoché comes to show how the ego is nothing more than the unity pole (eidos) of the sequence of numberless activities (variations) usually referred to consciousness. The ego-centered consciousness then does not enjoy any preferential statute, but rather is constituted like any other object.
In virtue of its radicalization, phenomenology dismantles the idea that the categorial attitude is the only possible attitude (16), the unique and absolute form of consciousness. The Western basic intentional structure, underlying our natural attitude, is an objectifying structure. Radical phenomenological analysis shows how this *logos* of objectivation, ruling both common and scientific cognitive posture, comes to effect on the basis of the variation/invariance structure. So the possibility of suspending this structure within the analytical domain discloses a further huge field of research. To deal with the impersonal consciousness implies a widening of the traditional phenomenological interests towards the domains of cultural anthropology, ethnology, archaeology, paleoethnology, etc., in other words, of every human science that under some respect deals with cultures and human communities far from the Western *logos*, in either space or time. (17)

In brief, this new phenomenological frontier marks the land of a transcultural anthropology which can be fruitfully explored only through an analytical method that suspends the absoluteness of Western logical and categorial principles. (18) This means trying to analyze sense-structures bound and embodied in the most dissimilar cultural signs. After all, the question about the method could be taken on and resolved in this way, for in phenomenology there is an unavoidable interaction between method and field of analysis. Usually one begins by employing broad models, and then along the way, tools and techniques undergo improvement through the direct comparison with evidences and signs. But to assert that phenomenological method forms itself through phenomenological analysis is also to say that the real theoretic and technical value of the method can arrive at a critical explication as the phenomenological field of observation extends and fixes itself, and vice versa. (19)

Notes

(1) “Access to phenomenology demands a radical reversal of our total existence reaching into our depths, a change of every prescientifically-immediate comportment to world and things as well as of the disposition of our life lying at the basis of all scientific and traditionally-philosophical attitudes of knowledge.” Eugen Fink, “What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish?,” Research in Phenomenology, 2 (1972), p. 6.


(3) Cf. ibid.


(7) The principle declares that “every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originary offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.” Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*, First Book (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 44f.


(11) “This search for an ultimate and final apodictic foundation, which, following the Cartesian paradigm, can only lie in the ego (*cogito, ergo sum*), is never given up by Husserl, no matter how much his actual emphasis might be directed at other ‘phenomena.’” Sebastian Luft, “Husserl’s Theory of the

(12) “On what authentically phenomenological basis is the unsuspendable residue to be identified, as Husserl would have it, with the sphere of transcendental subjectivity?” Domenico A. Conci, “Disinterested Praise of Matter: Ideas for Phenomenological Hyletics,” Analecta Husserliana LVII (1998), p. 50.

(13) Cf. ibid., p. 52.

(14) Cf. ibid., p. 53.


(16) “The logos of objectivation (...) is a sense structure polarized in an invariant moment (...) and in a moment to be understood as an orderable sequence of individual variations crossed by the invariant as the unitary principle towards which all these moments must necessarily converge. Functionally related with each other, these polarities constitute an altogether general intentional structure, a structure of connection, order and comprehension,” Domenico A. Conci, “Disinterested Praise”, p. 51.

(17) Domenico A. Conci, La conclusione della filosofia categoriale, p. 79.

(18) “Thus, it is quite evident that the phenomenological residue of a radical epoché is constituted by a true ‘cultural continent’ (...) where the elementary lived experiences reveal a morphology and a lawfulness of connection which go beyond those already visualized by classical analysis, which has confined itself to complex Western experiences.” D. A. Conci and Angela Ales Bello, “Phenomenology as the semiotics of archaic or ‘different’ life experiences. Toward an Analysis of the Sacred,” Phenomenology Inquiry, XV (1991), p. 125.

(19) Cf. ibid., pp. 110ff.
El futuro de la fenomenología pasa por poner unas nuevas bases para reorientar la actividad humana causante de la actual crisis ecológica

María-Luz Pintos

Introducción

Este asunto que aquí se nos sugiere pensar en realidad está co-implicando directamente dos asuntos: en primer lugar, la fenomenología husserliana y, en segundo lugar, el futuro de ella. Sin embargo, sólo podemos hablar del futuro de la fenomenología si tenemos claridad sobre qué es y cuál es la función de la fenomenología en el propio Husserl. Y sólo podremos pensar “en el futuro” si partimos del presente actual en el que estamos viviendo como personas y no ya como fenomenólogos. El futuro siempre es futuro de un presente, y, en nuestro caso, se trata de este presente en el que estamos en esta fecha de primavera del año 2007. El filósofo, como fenomenólogo y, antes, como persona, únicamente puede plantearse el futuro desde el presente actual en el que todos estamos inmersos. Por tanto, en mi desarrollo sobre “el futuro de la fenomenología husserliana” tomaré como inexcusable punto de partida la situación de nuestro mundo hoy. Y esta situación no es otra que la de una profunda crisis ecológica a nivel del planeta. Al día de hoy, y desde hace tan sólo unos meses, por primera vez hay consenso entre los científicos y por primera vez estos hablan abiertamente no ya de “cambio climático” –el cual ha estado siempre ligado a la historia del planeta– sino de que estamos asistiendo a una “aceleración” del cambio climático y de que éste es un factor determinante en esta crisis ecológica. Después de muchos años de debate, los científicos han llegado a la conclusión de que esta aceleración del cambio climático no tiene una causa “natural” por detrás, sino que más bien está ligada a la “actividad humana”, es decir, a cierta orientación de la actividad humana y, por tanto, a una causa enteramente “cultural”. Esta actividad humana causante del actual deterioro del planeta es la propiciada desde la cultura occidental. Como sabemos, nuestra cultura occidental está toda ella centrada en ciencia objetivista-tecnología-industria-consumo. La finalidad máxima de las sociedades occidentales es, desde hace unos dos siglos, la de vender y comprar/consumir. Todo lo que compone nuestro planeta (mundo inorgánico y mundo orgánico: vegetales, animales no humanos y animales humanos) es visto exclusivamente desde el prisma de esta finalidad. Y, lamentablemente, esta finalidad hoy está sirviendo de modelo para el resto de las sociedades y reproduciéndose a escala mundial.

Pues bien, este tipo de actividad humana occidental sólo es posible porque se apoya en una determinada noción conceptual del ser humano:

a) Por una parte, nuestra cultura siempre ha estado vinculada a una interpretación de la realidad y a una auto-interpretación de nosotros que son ambas antropocéntricas y especistas: la especie humana se tiene a sí misma por soberana y por centro del planeta y sus intereses como especie son para ella los únicos importantes y que hay que tener en cuenta frente a los de las restantes especies animales y vegetales y frente a la naturaleza. Los humanos occidentales nos consideramos a nosotros mismos los únicos “sujetos” y, por tanto, los amos de todo el planeta frente a todos los demás seres, los cuales son meros “objetos”, algo, pues, tan “otro” y tan ajeno a nosotros que no hay ningún problema moral en el hecho de que los explotemos, de que los maltratemos cruelmente infligiéndoles sufrimientos innecesarios, de que los exterminemos como especie, etc.

b) Por otra parte, nuestra cultura siempre ha estado empeñada en ahondar en las diferencias dentro de nuestra propia especie en vez de buscar puntos de conexión, es decir, algo común a todos los humanos. Por lo general, esta tendencia a buscar diferencias tiene como objetivo implícito apuntalar a nivel conceptual prácticas de desigualdad de trato. Si los humanos no somos todos iguales ontológicamente hablando, unos podemos ser más valorados que otros y, por tanto, la desigualdad de trato se deriva de esta asimetría por sí sola. Normalmente esta asimetría ha sido ejercida desde el punto de vista del individuo
varón, occidental, adulto, bien posicionado socialmente y cristiano. Nuestra tradición ha considerado a aquellos individuos no varones, no pertenecientes a la cultura occidental, no de raza blanca, no adultos, y no cristianos, de otra categoría más baja: como no “sujetos” o como no plenamente “sujetos”.

Únicamente podremos cambiar el comportamiento que los humanos occidentales tenemos hacia los animales no humanos, y hacia todos aquellos otros humanos que en nuestra actualidad están malviviendo o llevando una vida indigna ante nuestras miradas indiferentes, y únicamente podremos entrever otro futuro distinto a nuestro presente actual y a nuestro pasado, si previamente cambiamos nuestro modo de valorar a unos y a otros. En mi opinión, sólo dejando de verlos como “objetos” frente a nosotros, los “sujetos”, seremos capaces de valorarlos más. Y, sin duda, cambiar nuestra valoración hacia ellos, pasando a considerarlos como “sujetos”, con los derechos que de ello se derivan, favorecerá un cambio en nuestro modo de comportarnos hacia ellos. Y, entre otras cosas, este cambio implicará cuidar más nuestros ecosistemas para evitar situaciones ecológicas negativas para los vivientes que en ellos habitan (destrucción del manto vegetal, contaminación atmosférica, contaminación y derroche del agua, urbanizaciones salvajes por doquier, etc., etc.). Por tanto, se trataría de lograr esta sucesión de cambios: en las ideas, en los valores, en la conducta. De otro modo, la destructiva orientación de la actividad humana que está por detrás de la actual aceleración del cambio climático y, por tanto, del deterioro de todos los ecosistemas del planeta y, por consiguiente, de las vidas de una gran parte de los seres humanos y no humanos, nunca será reorientada de forma suficiente hacia una armonía con la naturaleza y con todos los demás seres vivos.

La intervención activa de la fenomenología

Ante esta situación, el futuro de la fenomenología pasa, pues, por adoptar en este momento la misma actitud que adoptó Husserl en su época y por aplicar su método a asuntos tan urgentes y tan actuales como el que hoy define nuestra situación presente. Cuando él elaboró su novedoso método lo hizo a la vista de la situación cultural, científica e histórica de su momento. La actitud husserliana que está en el origen de su fenomenología y que indica cuál es la función para la que ésta nace, fue, pues, la de encarar de frente la crisis cultural y científica y, por tanto, el mal rumbo que entonces estaba llevando la historia de nuestra civilización occidental. Continuando su actitud, a nosotros nos corresponde hoy, como fenomenólogos, encarar la crisis ecológica global en sus causas, ya que es uno de los más grandes problemas que nos acompañarán en este futuro inmediato del siglo XXI. (1) Como sabemos, Husserl comienza su andadura por lo que para él es prioritario: hacer una descripción de aquello en que consiste la vida de todo sujeto humano como existente personal que forma parte de una comunidad cultural concreta. Al hacer esta descripción, Husserl descubre como un rasgo universal de todo humano el que cada uno, desde su nacimiento, vive en lo que él técnicamente denomina “actitud natural ingenua” y que básicamente consiste en tomar como “natural” lo que es únicamente “cultural”. No hay criatura nacida de mujer que no traiga ya consigo esta especie de mecanismo biológico que le permitirá poder integrarse en su comunidad al ir adoptando como normales y naturales los hábitos culturales de pensamiento, de valoración emocional y de comportamiento que rigen en ella. Al hacer la descripción de la “actitud natural” vivida en su momento histórico Husserl descubre y desenmascara como uno de los hábitos de pensamiento-valoración-actuación más definitorios de nuestra cultura occidental el del “objetivismo”. El prejuicio del “objetivismo”, causa primera del mal rumbo de nuestra cultura, más que contemplar sujetos contempla meras entidades psico-físicas, cósmicas, algunas de ellas con movimiento animal pero que son, a fin de cuentas, meras cosas u “objetos”. Este prejuicio hace que valoremos a los animales no humanos muy asimétricamente con respecto a nosotros y que los tratemos sin ningún tipo de escrúpulos morales, fundándonos en que ellos no son “sujetos”, sino tan sólo “objetos”, y además, permite que califiquemos de “otros” a los humanos que consideramos que no son tan “sujetos” como nosotros, y que fácilmente incurramos en —o consintamos en— su instrumentalización.
El descubrimiento husserliano del prejuicio del “objetivismo” le hace ver la necesidad de iniciar una nueva actitud científica. Ésta consiste, dice él, en una nueva actitud “para con los humanos y para con los animales [no humanos]”. (2) En Husserl se halla un mensaje ecológico sorprendentemente audaz que tendría que ser todo un modelo a seguir en nuestros días: sus textos ofrecen la fundamentación, a nivel ontológico, de una actuación de respeto mutuo de humanos-con-humanos y, también, de humanos-con-no humanos. Hasta donde yo sé, Husserl no escribió ningún texto con un propósito abiertamente “ecologista”, ni ningún texto dedicado íntegramente a la necesidad de tratar con dignidad todas las vidas, incluso las vidas de los animales no humanos. Sin embargo nos ha dejado como legado textos y más textos fundamentando esta nueva actitud y siendo él muy consciente de que la nueva interpretación fenomenológica que promueve lleva a esta nueva actitud ético-política y que no puede llevar a otra. La suya es quizás la fundamentación más radical y comprometida de todas cuantas hay en el ámbito de la filosofía. Y, sin duda, ésta puede ser una de las mayores contribuciones de la fenomenología a la crisis ecológica actual y lo que permitirá que pueda tener cada vez un papel más importante, tanto hoy como en el futuro.

Hoy en día son muchos los intelectuales que, desde diferentes áreas del saber, reclaman la necesidad de una renovación ético-política que alcanzaría nuestras ideas, nuestras valoraciones y nuestra conducta. Pero, en la mayor parte de los casos, su intento carece de una fundamentación ontológico-antropológica que sea suficientemente sólida como para, desde ella, basar con toda evidencia esta necesidad de renovación; quizás porque no es su misión llegar a establecer esta fundamentación. Sin embargo, sí es ésta precisamente la tarea esencial de la filosofía y, desde luego, es la fenomenología la que tiene el método adecuado para lograrla.

Husserl centra esta fundamentación ontológica en lo que tenemos en común unos-con-otros: humanos-con-humanos y humanos-con-no humanos. Todos los que somos una corporalidad viviente animal compartimos, según él, un a priori biológico (3), el cual es el nivel básico en el que todos los animales constituimos sentido (pre-racional). Éste es, por tanto, el nivel en donde se asienta la subjetividad trascendental. Este nivel y esta constitución de sentido son los que nos vinculan y ligan a los individuos de una misma especie y, también, a los individuos de unas especies con otras. Y esto ocurre de un modo tan originario y tan profundo que podemos decir que entre todos los animales (humanos y no humanos) formamos una trascendental intersubjetividad en cuanto a que todos somos (en cada especie a su nivel, pero sin que ninguna deje de serlo) “sujetos” constituyentes de sentido (pre-racional), es decir, sujetos trascendentales. (4) Por tanto, el mensaje ecológico de Husserl que hoy debemos recuperar y seguir ahondando fenomenológicamente es éste: forma parte de la propia naturaleza de los humanos un vínculo originario y trascendental de interconexión intersubjetiva, pre-racional, con las otras especies animales y, por supuesto, de interconexión intersubjetiva con todos los integrantes de la especie humana (con independencia de su edad, sexo, época a la que pertenecen, Lebenswelt concreto, y demás características concretas que cada uno tenga). (5)

Reconocer esta ligazón entre unos y otros supone estar fundamentando ontológicamente, desde la animalidad que es nuestra esencia, una actitud ecológica de trato respetuoso para con todos los seres vivos, humanos y no humanos y, así, se pone una base sólida y evidente para un cambio de valores y de comportamientos. Y, viceversa, no reconocer esta ligazón entre unos y otros seguirá favoreciendo en nosotros una valoración asimétrica y, por tanto, un trato poco digno de los demás seres vivientes, humanos y no humanos, y la consiguiente continuidad de una actividad humana devastadora de todos los habitats del planeta. Y, en esto, la responsabilidad de la fenomenología actual y futura es evidente.

Notas
(1) Es Lester Embree quien define la etapa de la fenomenología en la que nos encontramos como la Vª etapa, caracterizada porque en ella estamos haciendo “fenomenología continuada” al adoptar como


(3) Husserl habla de este “a priori biológico”, por ejemplo, en el Beilage XXIII a La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental, en la nota a pie de página número 2.


The time of the self and the other
Anna-Lena Renqvist

What is time? The question is simple, the answer evasive. I would like to approach this very question in the phenomenology of Husserl, duly characterized as “a nest of problems, among the most important and difficult ones in all phenomenology”. A nest, as we should shortly see, yet an highly important one since, as Husserl himself has indicated: “all objectification takes place within time consciousness, and no clarification of the identity of an object can be given without a clarification of the identity of temporal position” (Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, s. 88)

The challenge is related to the old problem of the unity of identity and difference. Whatever is given to us is constantly streaming, ceaselessly changing (in einem beständige Fluss gegeben). “The original phenomenon of the World experience is the Heraclitean flow of the subjective ‘having of a world’ (Welthabe); which nevertheless stands forth (erschienen) as one and the same World. As a real (substantial) world it changes, but in its change it remain identical”. The words are taken from Husserl’s late writings, as they reach us in the so called C-manuscript (C2, nr 1). Throughout his different formulations of the intricate relation between time and consciousness, Husserl remains faithful to a conception of time in line with the Aristotelian doctrine of time such that the “basic unity of time” is the now. This is due to the fact that “whatever is Gegen-ständlich is also present” (C2, text nr 3, s.7). Time is thought of as rooted in the original object of consciousness, in terms of perception (Wharnehmung) since, as it is perceived, is always presently perceived, which is to say perceived in a now. Or as he eloquently puts it in the PIC: “perception (Wharnehmung) constitutes the now” (s.82). Being perceived is being in time, and vice versa, because being perceived is being present and presence is a temporal quality. Recalling the title of this conference, the time we’re here dealing with is the time not of the self, but of the phenomenon given to the self. In this sense it’s the time of the other.

Due to the natural significance of the phenomenon within a phenomenological project, the investigations will henceforth be circling around the nature of the “now” of this very phenomenon. Husserl keeps following the Aristotelian indications: the now is above all a limit. A limit which, as such, has a twofold function: to separate and to unify whatever it is delimiting – in this case the earlier and the later, or as we would also say, past time and future time. According to Aristotle, it is precisely the separating function of the limit that explains the nature of time: its floating character. But what about it’s unifying function? Regarding the latter question, Husserl would dedicate a good portion of his work to complete an analysis which Aristotle left half-done; or if you prefer, hereafter he will abandon the Greeks in favour of the Africans. I’m referring to Augustine of Hippo. Because, as Husserl economically recalls, in order for the now to respond to the presence of perception, the now could not be considered a knife-edge present but must be something as a “duration-block”. In order for the present to give account for the identity of the manifold, or simply, in order for an “object” to appear, the now must be something more than a mere nunc stans of an ever streaming continuity; it has to have a temporal extension, a width able to allow that “wonderful synthesis in which the individual Being is constituted in ceaseless flow (beständigem strömenden Gang)”. In as far as the now is a limit, it indicates differentiation, but as far as it is a unifying limit, it reaches beyond, or it transcends itself, implying not one but three dimensions, or the three dimensions that we commonly attribute to the phenomena of time: the past and the future by way of a present. As opposed to a distant past that has fallen into oblivion, and a future eventually to be expected, this very close past and future, in terms of retention and protention, is what makes us capable to apprehend the unity of the manifold. And as a matter of fact the structure of consciousness – looked at without bias – is dispersed over time. The temporal extension stands forth as a quality inherent in the perceived object itself, or with Husserl, “duration is before us as a mode of objectivity” (PIC, s. 90). We could not have a now without retention and protention because
consciousness lives in the past and future as well as in the present. As Aristotle indicated and as Heidegger later recalled, the now is “ek-static”: it stands outside itself, or rather outside of the momentary “now”. Retention and protention are essential aspects of this dispersed structure.

The perception constitutes the now – and the now is the basic unit of time. Is this to be taken in the sense that time begins with perception? Following Husserl's own line of thought, the answer is yes and no. Throughout his works Husserl will stay firm to his intuition of the now as “the basic unity of time”; never the less, he would come to vacillate as to the time and place, so to speak, of its birth. Because what about the pre-reflective experiences? Experiences not yet constituted as objects – perhaps not even possibly so, as in the eminent case of self-awareness, in the thematic sense of the word? As Dan Zahavi puts it in his book dedicated to subjectivity and the self: “Although Husserl seems to maintain that a pre-reflective experience can not be given as a temporal object, he did claim that self-awareness has a temporal infrastructure.

How is this modification to be understood?

In the Bernauer Manuscripts, the question is brought up in relation to the conditions of possibility of perception of an immanent object in general (s.191). When the object is perceived, it is perceived in a constituting process, and here it is, “esse est percipi”. But must it not also be without being thus perceived (s.191)? And if so, if we are to admit a pre-intentional object (a pre-perception, as is reiterated pronounced in the C-manuscript), is it to be considered a timeless layer of consciousness, prior only in a material or logical sense, or is it supposed to be considered prior in the sense of time? If that is the case, however, it is bound to have a time quality of its own; with which it would put into question one of the key-stones in the phenomenological edification, because it would put into question the eminence given to the “presentification” of the intentional object and, with that, the selfsame now as the “basic unity of time. (Nor is it of course coherent with the notion of the subject as an “absolute timeless subject”).

Is there such a thing as non-conscious perception (Vorstellung)? A life of the I (Ichleben) which is not itself perceived? (BM, 205, note 1). In the Bernauer Manuscripts Husserl formulates the hypothesis of an original process (Urprocess) of such a kind that it is in principal, or potentially, perceivable even though it is not actually perceived. The implications of this assumption are major. Accordingly we would have to consider a constitutional process in different temporal layers. Because, as he goes on arguing, does not an original process necessarily belong to every perception as a process that constitutes the giveneness of the temporal object (Zeitgegenstände) but is not itself perceived? Is not the constituted object virtually quite unthinkable without the being of this constitution (Sein der Konstitution), which, as such, must be prior to the object thus constituted? In other words, “does not every grasping conception (Erfasen) presuppose a former (Vorgängiges) non-grasping perceiving (Wahrnehme ohne Erfassen)? Doubtless!” (BM, p. 191).

Within the framework of phenomenology, where it would be correct to speak of a “constitution” of intentional objects only in a following reflection upon the original process, it seems inadmissible to understand the original process as, precisely, a constitutional process of time-objects (BM, p.203) and, with that, to consider it a kind of intentional consciousness. But then again, when we pay attention to the way in which it is given (die Gegenheitsweise desselbe), this line is a temporal line (BM, p.196). (1)
According to the Husserlian postulate, the question of the constitutive function of the pre-reflective original process turns out to be a semi-question as much as a key-one. The independent intentional character of the original process must be denied, yet the original process itself cannot be denied; and this process, in relation to the time of the constituting act, belongs to a non-retentional past. It has past, it might be recollected. Which suggests that “the analysis of temporality requires something more than an investigation of the temporal givenness of objects, because it requires two – and two quite different – orientations within the transcendental reflection: the one that turns to the constituting stream, and the other that turns to the constituted line of events (BM, p.262). Following Zahavi in the book mentioned above, Husserl's analysis of the structure of inner time consciousness serves a double purpose. It is meant to explain how we can be aware of temporal objects, but also how we can be aware of our own fluctuating stream of experiences. (...) Our perceptual objects are temporal, but what about our very perceptions of these objects? Are they or are they not subjugated to the strict laws of temporal constitution?” (Zahavi, p. 58)

Even though Husserl would come to revise his former position with regard to a pre-reflective temporalisation, the question – in my understanding – was to remain unsettled. In as far as the function of the reflective subjectivity is to reveal, and not to create, what is being thus constituted, the now in question will be hopelessly turned into past; and not only into the “just” (Soeben) past, but into a past that calls for recollection. For much width we would attribute to the present, sooner or later the phenomenon in question – the thing reflected upon – can no longer be said to be (part of the) present, with less than its distinctive features – as a non-past and a non-future – having been lost.

A suggestive complement to the Husserlian ambivalence regarding the temporality of the original process is found within the so called real-idealism elaborated by the 19th century philosopher Schelling (1775-1854). Well rooted in the idealistic tradition, Schelling shares Husserl's point of departure. The beginning of knowledge is to be found in an act of reflection, moreover, this act must have a “before” of a generically different kind. Whatever is brought to knowledge by way of reflection is bound to have a pre-reflective material or, with Husserl, a “hyletic” underlayer. They furthermore coincide in the idea that this “something” (=x) prior to reflection may not be constituted as such until unfolded or grasped through a reflective act.

The difference between these two, in many ways closely related German philosophers, is to be found in the place – and time – assigned to the “presenciating” act in question. While, according to Husserl as we know him, this must be a matter of a reflective act, according to Schelling, it can only be an act in between the potential level and the time of reflection. In as far as this event refers to a moment not of separation but of unification, we are due speak of an act; but as the very act in between, it is also foreign to any distance, oblivious of any outside, and quite unreachable by way of a reflective concept according to the old dictum determinatio est negatio. And still, it is precisely as such it would be able to offer what Husserl so eagerly sought for: “an Halt in the stream of unconscious life moments through which the Urmfindungsdatum could be given to apperception”. (BM, p.201). In other words, both Husserl and Schelling presuppose the hyletic process in terms of what is potentially – as a nacheinander or a flow – and both of them claim the reflective act to be the beginning of knowledge, but in Schelling's outspoken understanding of the dynamics underlying the reflective act, we have not one but two stages because in-between we have the all-inclusive act in the proper sense of actualisation; which is to say the moment – or the time – when that which was but potentially, as a scattered and differentiated being, coincides with its telos as a reconciled whole. As Schelling remarks, the unity of this act is immediately creative (Die Einheit dieses Gesetzes ist unmittelbar schöpferische) (SW VII, 345-346), and vice versa, it is only in virtue of the unifying force of this act that all there is, was and will be may come into being: be it the
object of consciousness or consciousness itself – here Bewusstsein is understood as Bewusstwerden –, be it Sein or Seiende or time alike. The intentional constitution of which belongs to a posterior moment, in a posterior time.

In terms of the Aristotelian dynamics the act in question corresponds to the time of the conjugated, unified now: a simultaneous time in which the three dimensions of time – past, present, future – are at the same time, only not as the same time. Such a mood of time would, surely, betray the flowing nature of time because it would be a time at rest (unthinkable within the Aristotelian universe), yet on the other hand, as a mood of time able to embrace identity and difference, it would answer well to the conditions of (its) being. But then again, is this not just another way to pronounce the very act that Husserl himself explores in terms of the spontaneous act of the anonymous I; the act of “affection” in which I am not directed to myself but captured by the other, and in which, consequently, the direction of time is the opposite to that of the intentional act? An “original now” (Urgegenwart), furthermore eloquently characterized as “the time of the original phenomenon to which all transcendental question (Rückfrage) in the method of phenomenological reduction is brought back” If we are to take this very distinction at face-value, the late teachings of Schelling might serve us. Understood as the instant of actualisation in-between the mere potential level and the act of reflection, the original now would be at odds with the notion of the “intentional now” for structural reasons. Whereas the latter speaks of a retentional past and a protentional future as the edifying moments underlying duration, the original now assign us a past in terms of a vital history and a future in terms of an enigmatic aimed for end, unified in the manner of fusion – confusedly exposed within a presence without duration, for a swift moment, yet eternal enough to respond to the old image of the one-and-all, hen kai pan. A non-conceptual totality which would grant us not just a Halt in the stream, but a founding event: that of a new, and ever new, beginning – for the conceptual labour to determine whatever was swiftly exposed as such. Moreover, recalling the issue of the present paper, it would grant us a time which is no longer the time of the other but the time of the inbetween the self and the other as the time of it all. Where after follows – we may hope – yet some time for reflection.

Notes

(1) As Husserl goes on saying: “Must not these Lebensreihen, in some sense or another, remain either we pay attention to them or not. In other words does not the process remain in its (due) time? (p. 204). If the latter is the case, we would have to admit something prior in terms of time to the first stage (erster Stufe) of immanent experience understood in terms of an unconscious process as a series (Urfolge) of “hyletic” moments which, again, would not themselves have the structure of a consciousness… of” (p. 200).
The Future of Husserlian Phenomenology: Time and Epoché
Louis Sandowsky

The Intertwining (Ineinander) of Time and Epoché

To ask about the future of Husserlian Phenomenology at this time is actually quite a natural gesture – caught up, as it is, in the anxiety wrought by the difficulties that come with the beginning of a new millennium and the malaise of the post-modern. Though, it must be borne in mind that it is a gesture that simultaneously puts the sense of ‘naturalness’ into question. It answers to a conscientious zeitgeist that seeks to catch itself in mid-act (between breaths) – as an attitudinal re-orientation, break, or moment of suspense – in order to find its bearings and to re-discover its responsibility as a rigorous philosophical praxis. And, as it does so, the history of the movement of phenomenology exemplifies nothing other than the constant re-iteration of this turn to momentarily step outside its history (or, at least, a naïve, un-reflective attitude to it) in order to re-turn to itself with greater clarity and precision. This is the epoché at the heart of phenomenology as it unfolds in time. Thus, in order to re-gather itself and to re-establish the sense / significance of its time / history so as to forge ahead, phenomenology must perpetually return to its beginnings. This is, arguably, the essence of the meaning of phenomenology as an ‘infinite task.’

This infinite task is none other than an infinite re-iteration of phenomenological questions that always remain open to further analysis. Such is the thought of a ‘phenomenology of phenomenology,’ which traces itself throughout Husserl’s work. (1)

To ask about the future of Husserlian phenomenology already problematizes the idea of a ‘terminus.’ If this elicits panic and alarm in certain philosophic and scientific domains then this is only the effect of an orientation that has not grasped the meaning of epoché. It is a question of a change in consciousness itself – a transformation of the manner of waiting-towards the not-yet. The apparent pointlessness of what seems to be nothing other than a Sisyphean task is actually the sign of a naïveté that requires examination. Of course, the issue of ‘how’ this critique might be conducted is a question that remains left over – thus inspiring hope at the very same time that it undermines it. The method or way only resolves itself in the doing. The movement of unfolding the question, if conducted conscientiously (with rigour), brings with it the true sense of what it is to ask about the future of Husserlian phenomenology and to what extent it may retain its Husserlian trace. (2)

To this end, which must not be confused with a terminus, Time and Epoché must be thought together.

As I prepare this writing for the submission date of February 2007, what is foremost in my mind is that it marks the centennial of the lecture course (of 1907) in which Edmund Husserl first introduced the working method of phenomenological reduction / epoché (later published as The Idea of Phenomenology (3)). Developmentally, it owes a great deal to the remarkable series of lectures that he presented at Göttingen in the winter semester of 1904-5 on the phenomenology of the consciousness of immanent / internal time. (4) Though the reduction is not thematized in the time-lectures as such, its trace is operative throughout the analyses.

Dorion Cairns reports in his journal of 1931:

“Husserl said that at the time of the 1905 time-lectures he had not yet come upon the phenomenological reduction, but that these lectures were what urged him on to think of the
phenomenological reduction.” (5)

With the publication of Husserl’s Ideen I in 1913, there ‘began’ a systematic account of the method of epoché, whose elaboration gradually turned into the most fundamental task of phenomenology. (6) Though the question of temporal constitution took a backseat during this middle-period of Husserl’s writing further application and development of the epoché inevitably led to questions of genesis, thus bringing time back into the foreground of his philosophy. It is the interwovenness of the themes of time and epoché that dominate his later and more mature transcendental phenomenology.

2. The Time of the Epoché

Existentialism (existential-phenomenology) and deconstruction have had a considerable effect on how Husserlian phenomenology is re-read today – particularly in regard to the themes of time and the epoché. It is important to note that Husserl’s egological investigations and the method of phenomenological reduction have been severely criticized by other phenomenologists, e.g., Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Shutz, (7) including the existential phenomenologists, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, on the basis of a common misunderstanding. Allegedly, both elements in Husserl’s phenomenology disregard the intersubjective pre-conditions of their possibility. For Shutz and Gurwitsch, the phenomenology of the Other / social existence / intersubjectivity – as exemplified by Emmanuel Levinas’s discourse on alterity and the primary of ethics, Martin Heidegger’s thematization of the fundamental role of ‘Mitsein’ / ‘Being-with’ in the constitution of Dasein, or Martin Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ relation, etc. – takes precedence over an egological route of inquiry into the constitution of the one shared Lifeworld. It is further claimed, according to a purely solipsistic interpretation, that the method of epoché – particularly the transcendental reduction is counter to the whole concept of the Lebenswelt. This is brought out famously in Jean-Paul Sartre’s early work The Transcendence of the Ego, (8) which argues against the notion of the transcendental Ego and the suitability of the epoché by emphasizing that the structure of the ego always already implies the Other, not the other way round.

In essence, it may be true that alterity is always already implied by discourse on the ego (from the standpoint of the Lebenswelt) but, at the beginning of the philosophical turn toward a truly phenomenological orientation on this question, it is not so ‘self-evident.’ For it is always ‘I’ the meditator / practicing phenomenologist who must first take this step, even if the outcome – after rigorous examination – should be the phenomenological-eidetic-deconstruction of my particularity to the general (communal / intersubjective) structures that permit the possibility of any ego. The author may lose its ontological priority by such a movement, but it wins back its existential authority – in constitutional terms – through that which is disclosed by this activity. The interplay of time and epoché is the unfolding of the alterity that lies at the heart of the shared Lifeworld to which I belong. It is in me just as I am inside it. This interpenetration is vertical as well as horizontal. There is no hint of solipsism here – which has always proved to be an impoverished determination of the meaning of epoché. Of all Husserl’s disciples, Eugen Fink (and perhaps Ludwig Landgrebe) probably came closest to understanding the intrinsic complementarity of egology (which is only one of the turns taken by the phenomenological reduction) and discourse on alterity in Husserlian phenomenology. This is evident in Fink’s fascinating Sixth Cartesian Meditation: the Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method, as endorsed and annotated by Husserl himself. (9)

The all-embracing theme that binds these issues together is temporality. Jacques Derrida’s various deconstructive re-readings of Husserl’s phenomenology of immanent time consciousness will, I believe, have a profound impact on how his discourse on time will be engaged by the most ‘careful’
philosophers over the next few decades. It is the theme of time itself that is, perhaps, the most outstanding problem of phenomenology – to the extent that it is a horizon of research that is inextricably linked to the problem of the unfolding of phenomenological methodology itself. On the one hand, Derrida’s deconstructive critiques demonstrate that time and its articulation are irreducibly tied to metaphysical conceptuality, while realizing that Husserlian phenomenology in its very ‘aim’ – through the continuous implementation of the methodological epoché – transcends or transgresses this limitation. Then again, every time that time is subjected to an epoché (in its many similar but non-identical forms of suspension, neutralization, bracketing, etc) there is still the time of the epoché. (10) This is nothing other than the most primordial dialectic operating at the heart of temporality, Being, and the relationship between phenomenology and itself.

Some commentators consider this kind of formulation to be philosophically absurd. Many phenomenologists – and I am forced to use this expression loosely since the practice of ‘phenomenology’ has come to signify a number of fashionable, but fundamentally incorrect determinations of its meaning (the same could be said of deconstruction) – dispute the relevance or correctness of Derrida’s deconstructions of Husserl’s work. I would like to see more readers in the ‘phenomenological camp’ re-read both Husserl and Derrida more carefully. (11)

With respect to the theme of time and the relations between epoché and temporization, I believe that the question of the future of Husserlian phenomenology is intertwined with that of the future of Derridian deconstruction. This is where the line between the past and futurity finds itself smudged again and again as phenomenology must return to the question of the task that lies before it after deconstruction. (12)

3. Time as Epoché

Despite the importance of Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness – which radicalized Western philosophical discourse on time as much as Einstein’s theory of relativity (spacetime) (13) revolutionized the way in which objective time came to be thematized in the physical sciences – the text is not well known, especially in the English-speaking world. Husserl’s phenomenological meditations on temporality are elegantly complementary to those of Einstein and certainly just as significant philosophically, scientifically, and above all historically. Einstein’s papers of 1905 that introduced the Principle of Relativity (or the Special [specific] Theory of Relativity), which first thematized the exotic forms of temporal dilation that occur at velocities close to that of light – thus refuting the classical concept of Absolute time – were published in the same year that Husserl presented his lecture course on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time. When taken together, their different orientations – Husserl’s ‘subjective’ discourse and Einstein’s ‘objective’ account – fulfil one another in exquisite harmony. This is even more markedly the case with the addition of Einstein’s General theory of relativity (1915/16). Husserl’s phenomenological discourse on Primordial Flux expresses the fundamental interplay of temporalization and spatialization – where successivity and simultaneity must be thought together. Heidegger’s concept of time-space surely finds its inspiration here as does Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm. In extension, Derrida’s use of the neologism difference – which equiprimordially combines space and time as difference and delay – is probably his greatest contribution to phenomenological thought on time and the epoché as temporization.

In every case, the traditional disjunction between time and space has been problematized. Temporalizing and spatializing cannot be articulated adequately within the bounds of the classic dyad. The twentieth century stands out as the epoch that truly radicalized discourse on the interrelated themes of spatialization and temporalization – through the many strands of thought that
deconstructed the differences that have traditionally ‘separated’ the treatment of time (as an order of successions) from that of a spatial order (as an order of coexistences). In contemporary terms, it is rather a question of intertwining (Ineindander). For example, the conceptual framework of Einstein’s theory of relativity is such that space and time should be treated as one word: spacetime.

Einstein’s Special theory of relativity demonstrates that it is no longer possible to speak of an Absolute time irrespective of an observer and their particular frame of reference while Husserl’s phenomenological investigations of temporal awareness demonstrate the primordial intentional / temporal conditions of possibility by which there can be such a thing as an observer.

Einstein’s post-Copernican reversal in astronomy, which ostensibly places the measuring observer at the centre of the universe, raises the problem of instantaneity / intersubjective contemporaneity – an issue that remains unquestioned in Newtonian theory. Due to the finite velocity of light (by which things make their appearance) anything that is at a distance from the observer actually lies in the past – including other observers. The classical substantive distinction between space as an order of coexistences and time as an order of successions breaks down here. For both Einsteinian cosmology and Husserlian phenomenology the perennial distinction between things as they are and things as they appear owes its intelligibility to a certain temporization / delay. The possibility of the measurement of this delay requires a radical re-situation of the meaning of the present and the notion of intersubjectivity since the rhythms of objective spacetime do not keep pace to a single universal beat.

The suspension of the idea of Absolute time – along with the suspension of Absolute contemporaneous space – has the extraordinary effect of bringing into the foreground the lived temporal-spacing through which they are already interwoven in manifold complexes of different frames of reference: fields of relativity. The methodological correlate to this suspension in phenomenology is the epoché.

It is fundamental to remember that phenomenological reduction is irreducible to doubt and the solipsism that seems to follow from the scepticism that it would otherwise engender. It is rather a question of the ‘suspension’ of a thesis – a ‘deferment’ of judgement. The issue of the solus ipse takes on quite a different meaning in phenomenology – and likewise, when considered according to relativity – since reality is certainly not reduced to a ‘point.’

The temporization announced by temporalization and its various cognates – e.g., ‘extension’ in the sense of ‘postponement’ as well as to ‘stretch-out’ – performs as the common tie between time and epoché. Such expressions of temporization as ‘to-suspend’ and ‘to-put-off-until-later’ articulate the ‘how’ of the reduction. To echo Derrida: it is a question of différence – where difference of a spatial order and deferral in temporal terms are inextricably intertwined. (14)

This is where the significance of Husserl’s analyses of immanent time-consciousness stands out with respect to the future of phenomenology itself. His richly descriptive discourse on the longitudinal and transversal intentionalties in play in the temporalization of consciousness provides us with the material to re-think the meaning of the future of Husserlian phenomenology in full regard to the rigour of the praxis that it names.

In the lectures on immanent time consciousness the route of inquiry is not strictly linear. Husserl actually spends far more time talking about the essential interplay of the now and the past (primal impression and retention) when describing the constitution of the ever-flowing present. The reader has to wait quite a while before the signifier of the future is uncovered. It is understandable that some readers have arrived at the conclusion that the givenness of futurity is somehow less original in Husserl’s phenomenology. This is by no means the case! Interestingly, the reader has to wait for its
signification to arrive through the very theme of waiting itself. It is in part 26, “Differences between Memory and Expectation,” of the time lectures that it is revealed how expectation, as the futural correlate of reproductive (secondary) remembrance, points to a more primordial form of anticipation: ‘protention.’

At first, it seems rather strange that it took Husserl so long to get round to the question of the originarity of protention, but if we look at his writing retroactively from the point of view of existentialist discourse on anxiety, then the detour that he takes through reproductive memory before disclosing the primordiality of protention makes perfect sense. Since Husserl is concerned to show how objectivities are given – that is, to demonstrate the experience of the giving of the given – then protention announces the problem of the giving of that which does not give itself. This is not to confuse such a lack of givenness with the sense of re-presentation that merely reproduces / substitutes without giving, since it points to a more primordial lack of givenness that originally motivates it. The original coming toward us of futurity is a waiting toward possibility, which is intrinsically discomforting. Unlike expectation, which fills the futural space of uncertainty that is disclosed by the originary intuitive openness of anticipation with familiar repetitions of an objective order that create the illusion of determined limits / certainty, protention is open and, in a peculiar sense, objectless. Husserl’s own narrative strategy and his route of inquiry had to proceed by way of the same unremitting tendency of consciousness to focus on the given. However, since his analyses traverse the path that leads to the question of the ‘giving’ of the given, the giving of that which does not give itself (objectively) is finally permitted, somewhat belatedly, to announce itself – even though it is, in a certain sense, more primordial.

Unlike expectation, which projects determinate (objective) phantasies that await their fulfilment in a future now (which is a kind of extension of memory into the not-yet), protention is actually open. It first unfolds the not-yet as the site in which we may project futural possibilities. This restores the future ekstasis to what is none other than the tri-partite union (triumvirate) of past, present and future in what Husserl comes to name as the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart) – which literally means ‘waiting-towards.’

Since expectation is a kind of memorial projection into the not-yet where futurity expresses itself as an extended act of foreclosure – initiated and maintained in the ever-flowing present – we are to understand that it is to wait for something to await the fulfilment of an objective. Protention, in contrast to the former, is openness upon an ever receding futural horizon of possibilities whose essence as ‘surprise’ exceeds any expectational delimitation. The articulation of this horizon of excess first makes room for that which would be projected into it, often flaunting its transcendence in the face of any naïve hopes of fulfilment. Protention names a dimension of intentionality where expectation is built upon a more primordial form of anticipation as the condition of its possibility.

Protention is the originary opening upon the fissure of the not-yet through which anxiety pours in as the prime indicator of what it is to exist or to be-thrust-into-the-world. Its objectlessness is what most significantly differentiates it from fear, which always has some kind of object. Protention correlates with anxiety as the horizonal opening through which one may first be motivated by one’s expectations – fears and hopes. It opens the lived-space of waiting-towards – that self-transcending sense of intentionality that is intrinsic to the structurality of the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart).

The movement of phenomenology is an unfolding of ‘depth.’ It aims at fleshing out the whole. But, this holistic telos is actually an ‘infinite task’ – of foundering – which is irreducible to a foundationalism. Husserl’s implementation of the epoché, in its many different phases (all of which invariably involve an eidetic component of fictionalizing) expresses the fundamental importance of a form of recuperation through distanciation – for distanciation, also read transcendence as it announces itself through delay.
and duration. It also expresses a certain kind of open-endedness with regard to possible modifications in orientation— which may free the 'depth' of the 'whole' from the 'shallow' limits of any totalizing grasp. In the case of protention, the movement is that of 'opening' rather than that of the 'closure' of expectation. The epoché is a rip in the fabric of lived experience from which pours forth the very structure of its own possibility— the opening-up of structurality. It is a movement of dehiscence. In these terms, it is the methodological analogue to the retentional and protentional interwovenness of time in its spacing— where retention passively provides the Other face of a transformational return, which is to be distinguished from memory as an act of evocation, through which active expectation as foreclosure answers to the primal and passive call of protention as opening.

The temporization in the play of epoché expresses the profound temporal resonance of what it is to postpone taking up a position / to defer metaphysical speculation. Everything remains left over, though a certain delay is in play with respect to any judgement concerning actuality or non-actuality (putting into suspense the two extremes of doubt and certainty). It is a question of working towards freedom by restoring the openness of protention as distinct from the foreclosure (constraints) of expectation. And, it is precisely through the temporization / deferral of that which would otherwise beguile us with the promise of completion / totalization that it becomes possible to deconstruct our prejudices; to entertain the hope of achieving true philosophical rigour, thereby extending toward that which is most Husserlian in the future of phenomenology.

Notes


(6) In XXVII: Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 20/11/31, Dorion Cairns reports that…

"[I]t is his [Husserl's] conviction that the most important thing about his whole philosophy is the transcendental reduction. He repeated what Fink had told me before, that the phenomenological reduction is something which must be continually repeated in phenomenological work" (p.43, Conversations).
(11) Other than a few texts by such authors as Rodolphe Gasché, David Wood, Claude Evans and, in particular, Leonard Lawlor, there is a huge degree of misunderstanding in the literature regarding the theoretical, strategic, and methodological relations between phenomenology and deconstruction.
(12) It should be noted that, along with Merleau-Ponty, Derrida distinguished his position on Husserl’s philosophy from the ‘French’ phenomenological scene of the early 1950’s by re-reading the history of phenomenology through Eugen Fink’s writing collaboration with the old master. In this regard, see Derrida’s M.A. dissertation 1953-54: The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy. Ronald Bruzina (who translated Eugen Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation into English) has produced a fascinating article entitled, “The Transcendental Theory of Method in Phenomenology; the Meontic and Deconstruction” (Husserl Studies 14: 75–94, 1997. Kluwer Academic Publishers) which equates Fink’s logic of ‘foundering’ as distinct from ‘foundationalizing’ with the most radical form of epoché in Husserl’s phenomenology and demonstrates how it functions in Derrida’s deconstruction as writing under erasure (sous rature).
Phenomenology in the Present-Day Philosophy

Denis Seron

In what follows, I will try to answer the question of what the future of Husserlian-style phenomenology will, or should, look like. I will provide some insights into the present-day situation in phenomenology and try to draw conclusions from it as to how Husserlian phenomenologists could play a part in the development of philosophy in general in the following decades. One thus needs to ask: is the phenomenological method still significant for philosophy in its current state, and if so, what purpose could it serve?

Husserlian-style phenomenology

Before answering the question, we should first agree on what is meant by Husserlian-style phenomenology. In my view, at least two aspects are important to consider.

1) Firstly, we expect a Husserlian-style phenomenology to be, no matter in what sense, a "scientific theory." This condition is to be understood in the broadest sense. I especially do not want to suggest that phenomenology should borrow its methods from natural sciences. The question whether phenomenology needs to be "naturalized" is a totally different question, to which we will return below. Now we just need to note that the foundationalist feature of the phenomenological project in its original form has been interpreted in two different ways. The difference actually rests on a divergence in interpretation of the reduction. Phenomenological research has evolved in two directions, one stressing the critical role of phenomenology within the system of sciences, and the other one emphasizing that the phenomenological reduction leads beyond all epistemic constructions of sciences to a more "original" existential experience that has much more to do with art, poetry, or religion. On the one side, phenomenology is considered as being a theory in the strict sense of the word. Although supposedly being a philosophical theory, i.e., a theory aiming to be universal, or perhaps to found other sciences, it must, as such, be governed by a norm or a set of norms addressing scientific theories in general. The "principle of all principles" in Husserl's Ideas I is a remarkable example of such a general norm of rationality, but of course many other alternatives are possible, too. On the other side, it is also claimed that phenomenological reduction should not be conceived as a technique for foundationalist purposes. The reduction thereby becomes something like a borderline experience (like angst, esthetic feeling, phenomenal "saturation," etc.) which occurs in the heart of practical existence. What I here call Husserlian-style phenomenology corresponds to the first view.

This approach asks whether Husserl's foundationalism can still be taken seriously in a time when foundationalism in general appears to be out of date. Of course, this problem is far too large for a short paper. I will simply argue here that a looser understanding of the term "foundation" - as opposed to the Cartesian sense - is possible as well, and that this looser sense is plausibly represented in Husserl's most significant employment of the term. (1) The idea is that it must be sufficient, here, to emphasize the critical role (in the most comprehensive sense of the word) of phenomenology among the sciences, without further explaining how and how far this role can be effectively achieved. It is important to note that this view does not a priori exclude stronger claims, such as the idea that phenomenology needs to be accomplished in the form of a "transcendental phenomenology" functioning as a "first philosophy."

2) The second aspect is more specific to Husserl's teaching. It concerns Husserl's theory of intentionality and its possibly "idealistic" implications. One can put the problem in an illuminating way in terms of the distinction between relations and properties. As defined by Brentano, intentionality means that the ego (or the mental process) "has" an intentional content. But in what sense should we understand the verb "to have" in this context? The question now to be raised is whether a relation in
the usual sense holds between the ego and the noema. Should intentionality be regarded as a relation in the usual sense, or as a property? In the same sort of way, we can ask whether the noema is a part "intentionally included" in and dependent upon the whole mental process, or whether instead it is an "external" entity the ego holds a relation to. The matter seems not too difficult. At first sight, the question seems only to pertain to the language one should adopt. But in fact this choice has far-reaching consequences in regard to a number of aspects of phenomenological methodology.

I confine myself to mentioning these problems, which have become acute since the late 1960's in Follesdal's Fregian interpretation of Husserl. I want to argue that the very principle of what I here call Husserlian-style phenomenology might lie in Husserl's thesis to the effect that intentionality is not a relation in the usual sense. (2) The general thought is that the noema, from a purely phenomenological point of view, can be nothing external to the mental process. It does not matter to the phenomenologist whether acts such as perceiving a tree, imagining Pegasus, etc., do correspond to something existing in the external world, since his or her whole thematic field, ontically speaking, consists in immanent objects. The noema, the object "just as it is given," must be something existing "inside" consciousness, something dependent that, as such, stands on an equal footing with psychological properties. Despite appearances, "perceiving a tree" is not a relational predicate. That is to say, although intentionality is to be regarded as a phenomenal (as opposed to ontic) relation, a predicate such as "perceiving a tree" now appears to be, from our point of view, a one-place predicate just like "being happy" or "being scared." These views imply some kind of dualism, namely a purely phenomenological dualism according to which one must distinguish, within the intentional act, between "real" and "intentional" contents. (3) This dualism - which also allows us to explain why it is impossible to avoid speaking of intentionality as if it were an ontic relation - is undoubtedly the chief thought underlying Husserl's transcendental idealism. The phenomenological reduction not only compels us to suspend all existence-positing other than purely immanent, but it also opens up an immense, universal field of mere phenomena, whose only existence is that of their immanent bearer.

This, however, is just one face of the coin. The fact that the noema is nothing "external" does not entail that it is a real component of the psyche as are sensations, feelings, acts of judgment, etc. According to Husserl's dualism, it does not make any sense to ask how the ego constitutes mundane objects with sense-data. We actually do not constitute anything with sense-data, except within special acts in which sense-data themselves become objects for reflexive knowledge. The intentional constitution of "objective senses" appears to be independent from the flow of hyletic data, although it surely can be motivated by empirical contents. That also means that intentional analysis, that is, the analysis of noematic structures of objects "as they simply appear," must be essentially distinguished from real psychological analysis. This distinction is the very principle of Husserl's battle against phenomenalism and logical psychologism. (4)

To summarize: Husserlian-style phenomenology is meant to be a theory of subjective experience, which not only addresses the real (hyletic or noetic) components of consciousness, but also its intentional contents. There are, of course, many serious difficulties to be overcome here. For example, one can conceive both features - being a theory and dealing with subjectivity - as being exclusive from each other. Is not a scientific theory of individual experiences just like a round square? Does the phenomenologist not throw the door wide open to subjective arbitrariness, to the intimate privacy where the descriptive probity of the scientist cannot be guaranteed? One has objected to phenomenology that, because a science must in essence be something objective, a science of subjectivity is a mere impossibility. This objection is quite convincing. Husserl continuously attempted to refute it, and to found the possibility of an eidetic phenomenology. But his reply, as is well known, gave rise to important controversies, and the discussion is far from being closed. (5)
Over the past few years, analytic and continental philosophers have taken a renewed interest in Husserl's work. On the European continent, this trend is, above all, a response to the recent decline of both hermeneutic philosophy and Heideggerian-inspired deconstructionism. Many philosophers, especially in France and Belgium, saw in Husserl's phenomenology an opportunity of escaping from a philosophical environment that was becoming more and more unproductive and unreceptive to what was happening elsewhere. In contrast with the splendid isolation of Heidegger and his followers, Huserlian-style phenomenology seemed to provide a basis for restoring a dialogue on equal terms with sciences and other philosophical traditions, as also for rebuilding some sort of philosophical rationalism on the ruins left behind by "postmodernists." It was in this context that Husserl research has made significant progress in acknowledging a common ground between analytic and phenomenological traditions. 

The recent attempt to "naturalize" Husserlian phenomenology in the light of cognitive sciences may be understood in this way as well. It is not only an attempt at reconciliation with cognitive sciences (or, conversely, the introduction of a new level of explanation in cognitive sciences), but also an attempt to make phenomenology more acceptable from the (substantially naturalistic) point of view of philosophers of mind.

This rediscovery of Husserl's work was rendered easier by the fact that analytic philosophers had for a long time been interested in some parts of Husserl's work, in particular in the fields of semantics and mereology. The revival of Husserl studies is in fact older on the analytic side. It plausibly originated in the 1960's and 1970's when Chisholm and others made considerable effort to rescue the Brentanian School from oblivion. Much of the work of Simons, Smith and Mulligan, for example, no doubt belongs to the same movement of thought. Yet all this has only the remotest connection with Husserlian phenomenology. The interest of the authors mentioned above was primarily in the realistic ontology of the third Logical Investigation, which they think is Husserl's contribution philosophy, and which supposedly later degenerated into a preposterous Kantianism called "transcendental idealism." Paradoxically, one of the most significant upholders of Husserlian-style phenomenology in analytic philosophy might at present be a philosopher who never openly labeled himself as phenomenologist. I am thinking of John Searle's theory of intentionality, whose close connection with Husserl's has often been stressed by commentators. As David Woodruff Smith recently put it in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Searle's theory of intentionality reads like a modernized version of Husserl's." While speaking about Searle's book Intentionality, Smith characterized it as "often similar in detail to Husserl's theory of intentionality, but pursued in the tradition and style of analytic philosophy of mind and language, without overtly phenomenological methodology." In spite of obvious divergences, especially in the naturalism debate, this analysis looks quite convincing. Actually, I am inclined to think that Searle fully satisfies both conditions above.

Let us now turn back to our original problem. I think the question as to the future of phenomenology only makes sense in a very large context. It cannot be settled purely by considering the advancement of research in phenomenology, but must also address the positive contribution to philosophy in general that phenomenology can provide in the future.

First, it is to be noted that Husserl's phenomenological epistemology is remarkable not only because of its strong foundationalist orientation, but also because Husserl rejected naturalism in favor of an a priori normative approach. Husserl was actually not very original on this point. His main thesis can be stated, somewhat crudely, as follows: if it is correct to say that the goal of epistemology is to provide a set of criteria for defining when a belief can be said to be a "valid," "justified," "rational" knowledge process, then the problems of epistemology cannot be solved in terms of natural causality. We thus have to distinguish between natural causes and "motivations," with the result that the question of rationality becomes a matter of determining whether a given belief is "rationally motivated" or not. In fact,
Husserl's foundationalism can itself be easily understood in this way. From a phenomenological perspective, the foundation of knowledge primarily consists in showing that beliefs of a given type, whether correct or not, are rationally motivated. Now, this line of thought is particularly relevant at a time when the difficulties raised by "naturalized" epistemology lead many philosophers to embrace some form of normative epistemology. For example, Husserl's notion of phenomenological foundation is quite close to that of "entitlement" recently introduced by John McDowell. (11)

Another contribution of phenomenology might be to provide methods to metaphysics. It is, of course, a controversial question in phenomenology what sort of relationship it should have with metaphysics. Here we can confine ourselves to saying that this relationship is certainly more complex than it first seems. That phenomenology somehow opposes metaphysics is clear, but this should not mislead us into supposing that it makes all metaphysics impossible. Actually, as Husserl says in § 64 of his Cartesian Meditations, phenomenology does not disqualify all, but only "naive" metaphysics. (12) Indeed, the idea of a transcendental phenomenology itself means nothing else than that Husserl's phenomenological concern with consciousness and intentionality is in the service of his metaphysical interest in objectivity in general. It is not surprising that, in his latest work, Husserl appeals for a universal science, whose lack he holds responsible for the crisis of the European sciences. Transcendental phenomenology is phenomenology now conceived as a theory dealing with the properties of all objects simply as they appear "in" consciousness. To put it briefly, it is exactly what the tradition calls "first philosophy."

As opposed to an interpretation that has become common today, I suggest that it might be a significant advantage of phenomenological approach in today's philosophical environment, where metaphysics most often goes hand in hand with blind realism, to allow for a highly fruitful continuation of Kant's critical project. In my view, phenomenology not only has opened a large field of metaphysical interrogation, but also has a critical, foundational function for metaphysics, which is to be understood in a Kantian manner. Phenomenology, in other words, is expected to "prepare" metaphysics. Did Husserl not say of his phenomenology that it was "an attempt to make true the most profound sense of Kant's philosophy?" (13) However, obvious difficulties arise at this point. The trouble is that the phenomenological methodology itself (as minimally defined by the two conditions above) possibly involves some metaphysical assumptions. In this case, phenomenological philosophy, at best, is just one metaphysical theory. Or should we rather affirm, just as Husserl did in Logical Investigations, the inherent neutrality of phenomenology with regard to metaphysical claims? I personally opt for the latter view, although good arguments have also been given for not accepting it. My hypothesis - which I assume is not itself a metaphysical one - is that the question whether phenomenological methods could be helpful in providing foundations for metaphysical research is, to a great degree, independent of the question of what ontological choices are required in order to practice phenomenology. In any case, I regard it as a mistake to think that one can approach metaphysical problems without questioning the a priori conditions of metaphysical knowledge, i.e., without any phenomenological investigation of the corresponding knowledge processes.

That, I think, is a very important point at a time marked by the renewal of metaphysics in analytic philosophy. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that these views also involve a decisive change of perspective. If by "metaphysics" is meant a theory of objects in the most proper sense, that is, a theory dealing with the most general properties of what exists, then phenomenology is obviously not a good candidate for giving foundations to metaphysics. If the starting point of a phenomenological metaphysics must be the phenomenological analysis of intentional contents, then this metaphysics, strictly speaking, is no longer a theory of the world in general, but a theory dealing with the phenomenon of the world in general. But how could we phenomenologically account for the existence of an "objective" world, i.e., for a world which is precisely supposed to transcend my own phenomenological data? The phenomenologist is not interested in the objective world itself, but in its constitution "in" consciousness. The objective world is this very world that everybody deals with, in
This brings us to the third point, which is concerned with the methodological aspects of Husserl's phenomenology. Another important reason why I think phenomenology could be very useful for research in various areas of philosophy is its highly-developed methodology. Husserlian-style phenomenology has the advantage of imposing rigorous and clearly defined methodological constraints in fields where methodological matters are often understated or even arrogantly disregarded. Methodological or "critical" reflection is most often absent in today's both analytic and continental philosophy. Some philosophers are suspicious about it just because they consider it incompatible with realism. In this view, the investigating of the validity of the knowing process itself is no more than an old Kantian quirk that turns us away from the real world. Other philosophers, in confining themselves to the history of philosophy, actually do not need other methods than those of history and philology. Others again seem to think that the method is a feature of modern thought that has been overcome by Heidegger and others. Yet, there are significant exceptions, such as the rich debate over introspection in philosophy of mind, which also generated deep methodological controversies among phenomenologists. In any case, I think this is a core aspect of the role to be played by Husserlian-style phenomenology in philosophy. Phenomenology does not aim to provide a new worldview, but to ground or to properly describe all actual or possible worldviews. It is always preferable to regard it as a descriptive method which can be utilized, together with other methods, in all sciences including philosophy, where it generally leads to good results. This should lead us to prefer the adjective "phenomenological" to the noun "phenomenology." If, instead, the word "phenomenology" is intended to refer to a theory having its own content, then it should be seen as an abbreviation for "phenomenological psychology," "phenomenological philosophy," etc.

Of course, these remarks raise but do not decide the question whether Husserl's phenomenological methodology is still relevant today. In my opinion, at least two features that are most characteristic of Husserl's methodology need to be discussed today. First, Husserl is clear, in Ideas I, that the method of his phenomenology is phenomenal introspection (see Ideas I, § 76-79). This means that the phenomenologizing ego must be able to objectify (in the most proper sense) his or her own subjective experience, in order to obtain knowledge about it somehow in the same way as the botanist has knowledge about plants, or the astronomer about stars and planets, etc. This claim must be understood in connection with what has been said above about the rational and "scientific" character of Husserlian-style phenomenology. If the subjectivity itself is an object as are plants and planets, then it is entailed that it must obey the laws of objectivity in general, and therefore that phenomenology, as opposed to art and poetry, cannot escape the laws of formal logic and must satisfy some very general constraints studied in the normative part of epistemology (which certainly involves circularity, but in my view not vicious circularity). The second feature is "eidetic description." Husserl held the paradoxical view, actually rejected by practically all his followers, that phenomenology, or phenomenological philosophy, must be an a priori science and, at the same time, a science firmly rooted in experience. On the one hand, phenomenological knowledge has this in common with empirical knowledge that it is, unlike mathematical knowledge, "incomplete," or "descriptive." On the other hand, it must consist, like mathematical knowledge, in laws in the strictest sense of the term, in "laws of essence" grounded in intuitive evidences of a special kind. Although the words "introspection" and "essence" sound out of date today, I tend to think that Husserl's methods are far from having become unusable in today's philosophical context. The obvious failures of opposite phenomenological projects such as Heidegger's ontology, which is characterized by its merely descriptive and non-introspective (i.e., non-objectifying) method, should at least incline us to think that the phenomenological method as
defined by Husserl is perhaps the best way of doing phenomenology.

The three points evoked above are interdependent. First, as already noted, the critical role to be played by phenomenology does not prevent it from being a theory on its own account. The fact that phenomenology can serve as an instrument for philosophy and sciences does not mean that philosophers and scientists should utilize the phenomenological method without taking it seriously as a theory. Phenomenology - the phenomenological method in general - should rather be characterized as a level of explanation. Secondly, Husserl considered his "eidetic" method as a condition for phenomenology to ground formal sciences such as logic and mathematics without being ensnared in psychologism. Finally, I have suggested that both normative and theoretical aspects discussed here have much to do with the problem of introspection. It is presumably the fact that cognitive processes are objectifiable that allows phenomenology to rise to the rank of an authentic theory and, at the same time, to play a normative role for other sciences, including metaphysics.

Of course, these are questions that deserve a more detailed and extensive examination than has been possible in this short paper. To conclude, I believe that Husserlian-style phenomenologists have a card to play in present-day philosophy, but also that the future of phenomenology will depend on their capacity to take advantage of the critical and normative potential of phenomenology. My contention is that this requirement, as defined above, could serve as a guiding line for phenomenological research in the coming years.

Notes

(1) Cf. Sebastian Luft's contribution in the same collection.
(3) This dualistic conception of mental processes, which Husserl had inherited from Brentano, is one of the main reasons why his phenomenology was so venomously criticized by Gestaltists and by neo-Kantians such as Cohen and Natorp.
(5) A lot has been written about this issue, especially in the philosophy of mind. A recent example of it is Daniel Dennett's emphasizing the need for a phenomenology in the third-person perspective, which he called "heterophenomenology." But it is quite plausible to say that Searle's reply to this objection already is satisfactory (see J. Searle, Mind, Language and Society, New York: Basic Books, 1998, p. 43-5, and "How to study consciousness scientifically." In J. Searle, Consciousness and Language, Cambridge: CUP, 2002, p. 22-3, 43-4). The whole argument, Searle said, actually relies on an ambiguity in the distinction between subjective and objective. There is a confusion between the epistemological and the ontological sense of "subjective" and "objective." A state of mind is, by definition, something which exists in the mode of subjective existence, i.e., something whose existence is dependent on that of an individual consciousness. Yet, this subjectivity in the ontological sense in no way entails that a science of consciousness—as far as it must be "objective," that is to say: objective in the epistemological sense of the term—is impossible.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/

Of course I am not claiming that the differences between the two authors are not significant. Searle has rightly stressed that his philosophical project itself is totally different from Husserl's: "From my point of view, both Husserl and Heidegger are traditional epistemologists engaged in a foundationalist enterprise. Husserl is trying to find the conditions of knowledge and certainty, Heidegger is trying to find the conditions of intelligibility, and they both use the methods of phenomenology. In my theory of intentionality, I have no such aims and no such methods." (J. Searle, "The Limits of Phenomenology." M. A. Wrathall & J. Malpas (eds.), *Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus*, Volume 2, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000: 90. Cf. J. Searle, "Neither Phenomenological Description nor Rational Reconstruction: Reply to Dreyfus," in Searle with his replies, *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 55/216, June 2001: 284.) It is also not to be denied that Searle's naturalism is light years away from Husserl's theory of transcendental reduction. These profound divergences, however, do not prevent Searle's account of intentionality from being remarkably similar to Husserl's. Unfortunately, as Searle himself admits on page 72 of the article quoted above, the debate is somewhat distorted by the fact that under the rubric "phenomenology" he generally discusses Dreyfus's personal views that have not much to do with Husserlian phenomenology.

Husserl, *Ideen I*, §136. Husserl often considers normative as opposed to naturalistic epistemology. See, for instance, Husserl's *Aufsätze und Vorträge* (1922-1937), Hua XXVII, 8-9, and the note on the concept of experience in *Aufsätze und Vorträge* (1911-1921), Hua XXV, 209-10.


*Cartesianische Meditationen*, Hua I, 182: "To prevent from misunderstandings, I would like to point out the fact that phenomenology rules out only naive metaphysics, dealing with the absurd things in themselves, but not metaphysics in general."

E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie*, Hua VII, 287. As Kant put it, "the critique is the necessary preparation for the advancement of a founded metaphysics as a science which must be treated dogmatically and systematically, so scholastically (not popularly)" (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, BXXXVI, cf. also Kant's letter to Mendelssohn, 8 April 1766, Ak. 10: 71). I have tried to sketch what such a "phenomenological metaphysics" might look like in two recent articles in French: "Métaphysique phénoménologique," *Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique*, I/2, September 2005: 3-174; and "Métaphysique phénoménologique, suite," *Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique*, II/2, March 2006: 3-75.

Landgrebe has well exposed the paradox which underlies the idea itself of a "phenomenological metaphysics." See *Phénoménologie und Metaphysik*, Hamburg: Marion von Schröder, 1949. Metaphysics, he observed, deals with transcendence (p. 156-8), so how could phenomenology, that is a discipline confined by reduction to the pure immanence of the cogito, give access to this transcendence, to any metaphysical knowledge? (Cf. p. 159, and also p. 149.) But, for Landgrebe, the paradox vanishes when one realizes that the egological epoché, the reduction to the "world for me," is "just a first methodic step" (p. 178). At least two conditions must be filled for a phenomenological metaphysics to become possible. We first need the intentionality thesis, which allows to preserve a "world for me," a world as pure phenomenon, in the reductive immanence itself (cf. p. 163, 167-8, 172). Second, we also need the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity, which makes possible an intentional analysis of the world as being the "objective" world. The principle of all possible contribution of phenomenology to metaphysics must be the notion of intersubjectivity (p. 168-80), and the phenomenological reduction itself can be fully achieved only as a "reduction to intersubjectivity." In this sense, Landgrebe is totally right in saying that such a phenomenological philosophy would enable us to get rid of the Kantian idea of a
world consisting of unknowable things in themselves. Now, the so-called transcendent world is a noematic sphere intersubjectively constituted as existing for each and every ego, as being universally valid, or "objective" (i.e., non-"subjective"). The absolute, Landgrebe says, is not the ineffable "completely other" (p. 191 et 194).

(15) See, for example, the recent controversies about Dennett's heterophenomenology in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, Vol. 6/1-2, March, 2007.
Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World
Andrina Tonkli-Komel

The one-hundredth anniversary of the publication of Husserl's Logical Investigations, which helped phenomenology pass on into the 20th century philosophy, was a new opportunity for reconsidering the basic elements and goals of phenomenological investigations as well as its future perspectives. In his letter to Levy-Brühl from 11 March 1935, Husserl promised that, by applying the phenomenological method, he would succeed in “grounding some sort of transrationalism that would overcome the old and insufficient rationalism, and at the same time justify its innermost intentions.”

The limited condition of the old, i.e. modern rationalism, which Husserl mentions there, does not refer to the reason’s capability of self-restriction but rather to its incapability of encountering at its outer limits anything else than sheer irrationalism. To oppose such leveling is the true meaning of any genuine transcendentism. “Transrationalism” could be conceived of as the new transcendentality without any absolutist pretensions of absolving all transcendent being of the world; as transcendentality, which cannot be adverse to the transcendence as absolute relativity. Just as transcendentality cannot simply abolish transcendance, transcendence cannot abolish transcendentality. A special movement is set free in-between the two, a course of history, the life-world.

We should take into account two absolute qualities; the absolute validity of being as evidenced by reason, and relative being in the world of the revealing life. The correlation between the flowing life and the becoming world is not identical with that of reason and the permanent being of the world. This identification is possible only on the ground of life in full critical responsibility, i.e. life’s attitude to the ultimate truth. Insofar as this ultimate validity of truth in its absolutistic pretension is in constant opposition to the only absolute relative flux, the rational critical responsibility finds as its correlate the permanent crisis of the life-world. It is but the insight into the crisis intruding between the reason and life and correlatively, between being and the world, that can radically change the character of phenomenological criticism or the transcendental criterion of this criticism. It does not suffice to persist in the name of strict science in the correlation between reason and being, and in the directedness of life as a whole toward the unconditioned truth secured by science as an infinite task of life fulfillment, or unification of life and science. What is needed is a critical distinction between the transcendental in terms of permanent transcendence of life striving for ontic fulfillment in the world, and the transcendental in terms of reflective grasping of the identity of life and the being of the world evidenced as the life of reason. Insofar as the reflective critical bearing – as witnessed in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy – is attainable and has already been attained on the basis of reductionist and corresponding constitutional methodical procedures, this distinction needs a methodical indication, especially if phenomenology is to be understood primarily as a method. This opens up the possibility of distinguishing between the transcendental reductive-constitutive methodical procedure and the movement of phenomenological epochē, which don’t exclude each other but rather set each other free. In other words, the initial and final moment of living in critical responsibility (of the method) is freedom. In what way does this become evident from the phenomenological viewpoint?

The rudimentary crisis of the unity of life and science compelled Husserl to seek a renewal of rationality, which as transrationality, bridges and overcomes the oblivion of the life-world in the ultimate validity of the scientific criticism of being as evidenced by reason. However, exactly in this respect it becomes evident that the phenomenologically concealed and thus forgotten unity of the life-world is even more genuine than the constructed unity of life and science, inasmuch it includes a distinction between the world and life, which in turn enables the aforementioned separation of life and science as well as all others. Getting a word in edgeways, the “unity of difference” of the life-world also grounds critical responsibility, which is perhaps even freer than the historically inherited freedom of critical responsibility. It is a momentous freedom as the most important achievement of phenomenology in general.

The momentous starting point of phenomenology also establishes the historical distance between
us and the origin of Greek philosophy and science, which can be compared to both Heidegger’s destruction and Derrida’s deconstruction; moreover, destruction and deconstruction are even made possible by epochê; Derrida explicitly states that without the “time of epochê” “deconstruction is impossible.” (1) Epochê simply gives evidence of the movement of the structure. The advantage of Husserl’s momentous structuring (phenomenological analytics) lies in excluding neither corporality, as is true of Heidegger, nor spirituality, as is true of Derrida. The momentous beginning and the transition are marked by the fulfillment of a life freed in itself, displaying its views as the unity in diversity.

Despite all this, it seems that already at the starting point such momentous phenomenological transition “overtakes” the leap to strict science. The life fulfillment in critical self-responsibility is thus felt as some sort of “overbearing” of the rational mind bridging the void between life and science. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that in Husserl we are likely to encounter a certain structuring which genuinely makes possible “filling” and “emptying”. A radically different outlook on his philosophy might open up if we, from the very beginning, distinguish between the scientific reduction to the transcendental consciousness with its rationally constituted ontic correlate, and the movement of phenomenological epochê, which is not reductive but, according to Husserl, re-productive, revealing to life the unity of the world; and it is also pro-reductive, giving evidence of the heterogeneity of life in the world. In the “intermediate being” of the life-world, which is not the being in the objective transcendent or in the subjective transcendental sense, there opens up a dis-tinction of life and the world which cannot be unified by way of transition to strict science, and homogenized by way of rationally evidenced being. As the evidencing of phenomena, it could be understood as a display, which both opens the world for life to provide it with meaning, and empties life so that it can find fulfillment in the world. This “game” of the life-world is perceivable in any moment of our everyday life. However, there is a possibility that, for a short moment, it can be momentously displayed. Such momentous reconstruction is in itself productive in terms of what we may justifiably call the phenomenology of the life-world.

Undoubtedly, such phenomenology of the world has important ethical and cultural implications. Is there something like an ethos of phenomenology, or even a phenomenological culture? Husserl’s ethical and cultural considerations seem to sum up in an alternative: “Either a collapse into spiritual hatred and barbarism or a spiritual rebirth arising out of the heroism of reason that will ultimately overcome naturalism.” If we reproach Husserl for his farsightedness, we can, retrospectively, reproach numerous contemporary ethical stands for their short-sightedness. The fear of heroism of reason is all too often an evidence of turning the blind eye to numerous forms of barbarism we are faced with today – as Europeans!

Moreover, we need to ask ourselves whether barbarism as a threat perhaps takes its main source from where it should be successfully overcome – from the power of science, which comprises political, artistic and religious fields. In Husserl’s criticism of the modern science movement, a particular emphasis is laid on two instances of oblivion: at the beginning, it’s the human being standing behind science and in the end the world extant before science. Science forgets itself both over its background and foreground, and revolves only in itself. It has thrown out both the excellence of the human being and the excellence of the world. The modern identification of the world with the mathematically calculable nature has moulded the calculable nature of man.

The ethos of phenomenology cannot be reduced to man’s taking part in this world as a disinterested spectator, or to letting ourselves be led by some special interest after its change, either out of rational heroism or servile revolt. What can be expected, however, is some sort of momentous intra-esse reaching also into the inter-esse of what Husserl thinks as intersubjectivity. This ethos of phenomenology, which acts “from within”, can be joined “from without” by a certain culture of the life-world. Of course, at this point there also opens up, in a largely modified form, a certain momentous possibility of excellence and extraordinariness joined by manifoldness and multi-layeredness.

The experience of the (everyday, scientific, artistic etc.) actuality is formed in interpretative capabilities, which can be historically concealed or yet unconcealed, overcome, unattained or even
unattainable. This dynamic openness of possibilities characterizes the life-world as such. The phenomenology of the life-world cannot principally stick only to (fundamentally-ontological) speaking in favor of possibility rather than actuality, but has to first of all carry out a transformation of critical reason into creative one. This transformation is necessary primarily because it is impossible to limit reason to critical evaluation of life practices. The criteria of reality making possible such an evaluation are directly formed in life practices themselves. The main task of phenomenological rationality is thus an explicit unfolding of basic tendencies of human life in order to be able to form the world through a network of meaningful identities and differences.

Notes

Phenomenology and Ethics
Francesco Saverio Trincia

One of the main features of Husserlian phenomenology is its opening to an infinite task of research. It should be added that this task is not in any case conceived as systematic. The ethical interpretation of the “beginning” is an original commitment and a very clearly spelled out feature of Husserl’s thought. This interpretation, or self-interpretation, has been confirmed after the publication of the Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften. It is also the result of the fact that the Krisis has been correctly seen as containing the idea of the possibility of a rebirth or of a rethinking of a philosophical humanism free in itself of any metaphysical meaning, and intrinsically alien to the tradition of the idealistic historicism.

(1) Associated with this general observation is the central role played by the activity of the evaluating and deciding subjectivity in the Husserlian ethics of 1914 (2): a role that is played within the schema of the correlation in which both the relationship to the axiological objectivity and to the universality of the practical reason are at stake. This is not without relation to the necessity of a deep understanding of consciousness and of subjectivity in what could be called the Husserlian “ideology,” that is the extra-theoretical use that can be made of phenomenology as a more or less hidden ethics of an immer wieder returning commitment to begin the phenomenological investigation without any presuppositions.

There is no doubt that the end of the 1914 Vorlesungen and the role there assigned to the “evidence” of a “living” ethical judgement, in which the evident rationality of the willing subject meets the sphere of values, in some way prepares the notion of the universal humanity to which Husserl’s attention in the “Kaizo” articles of the twenties is devoted, and the rational hope of a new humanity coming out of its “crisis” and based on the birth of a new kind of man, being no more a “factual man.” It can be said that the distinction sketched in the last pages of the 1914 Vorlesungen, between an ethical judgement based on the statement of an observer who remains external to the ethical Erlebnis and can pronounce itself only on its Richtigkeit, on the one side, and the “evident judging” where the subject who judges “lives his authentic duty,” on the other side, is the expression in the formal vocabulary of the phenomenological ethics of the distinction between the objective man of the scientific, empirical psychology (the man in the world), and the man constituted by the transcendental Ego (the man for the world) presented in the Krisis.

Jocelyn Benoist (3) has very well seen that one of the meanings of the “paradox” of subjectivity in the Krisis consists in the form of the correlation, which permits to “transform in poem” its inheritance and to build up a sort of “invented” history in which subjectivity “meets the possibility or the question of the most extreme universality.” Benoist points out with some irony the orientation of the phenomenological subjectivity to universality. It is interesting to observe that this ethical subjectivity is oriented to universality in a “poetic” way, but also through an “invention” of history which recalls the idea of the “apriori history” (this is the expression used by Husserl in the famous text of the Origin of Geometry). This kind of history may be able to host an ethical subjectivity oriented to universality, just because it does not depend on the contingency of empirical existence – where only “factual men” may live.

Help can be found by an interpreter of Husserl’s ethics in Rudolf Bernet’s last book. (4) Bernet very well shows which is the general “sense-horizon” within which the evaluating and deciding intentional consciousness is to be understood. From the point of view of the correlation-relationship between consciousness and existence, it appears very clearly that transcendental consciousness also is “already contaminated by the same illness that corrodes human existence.” We have remarked that at least the surface of Husserl’s attitude towards ethics (the one that is not expressed in phenomenology’s technical vocabulary and is rather a “spiritual atmosphere” of it) is conditioned by a sort of humanistic, ethical ideology. If the hypothesis can be advanced that the building of a “pure ethics” through Husserl’s pure theoretical arguing cannot avoid referring to human existence and to the “persons” that are to be met there, we have to recognize that the so called “ideological” side of Husserlian ethics cannot be put aside. It is certainly true that the notion of “person” which is important in the lectures of 1920-24 (5)
should not be considered as the expression of the man “in the world,” that is, of an empirical subject: the “person” is in any case something “constituted,” and not a natural human being. It is therefore true that the “existence” of which we talk when we say that Husserlian ethics is existence-related is not the natural and objective existence. But this does not mean that the phenomenological ethics does not meet the phenomenological existence and does not work for the orientation of (not factual) subjects. This is one of the main differences between the notion of “pure” ethics as thought by Immanuel Kant, and the same notion thought by Husserl. In the first case, but not in the second, “purity” means the exclusion of all content of the ethical choice, and the isolation of every influence of the sensible objects on it. This point drives us to say that what could be called “care for the world” is one of the main features of Husserlian ethics – and that this “care,” in some way unknown to Kant, has to be seen as the not paradoxical result of a not content-excluding “formality” which is in itself, again, different from Kantian “formality.”

On the one side, in fact, Husserl’s ethics refers to “values” which are seen as “material apriori” (this is the side of the content, which does not lack in it, and which is the way by which Husserl’s ethics takes care of the world and aims to build a certain kind of human being, not simply a rational being acting “by duty”). But on the other side, an equal emphasis should be put on the way in which Husserl presents the role of the subjectivity in ethics. The possibility to fix the degree of the “utility for the world” of the phenomenological ethics depends on the role of the subjectivity who “lives through” his or her evaluating judgement and in this way meets the duty that is “ready” for the rational and evident will, as Husserl points out in the 1914 lessons. It could be said, even more radically, that it is the role plaid by the phenomenological subject that allows us to speak of phenomenology as a “philosophy of ethics” and to realize an “apology” of it which does not accept the charge of its being an ideological construction in contradiction with its main epistemic inspiration. It should be remarked also that the “apology” of phenomenology as philosophy of ethics does not simply mean that phenomenology gives a solid philosophical foundation to ethics – a foundation which is supposed to be stronger than others. Were it so, we would obtain the not wanted result of losing the aspect for which phenomenology is not to be reduced to a mere theoretical construction. In any field of the range of action of the intentional consciousness, and in a very particular way in ethics, phenomenology is not the way of the reduction of the philosophical content (here the ethical will, and the activity of evaluation and of decision connected to it) to its mere theoretical form.

It is not easy to find the right way to express this point, but one could try to say that phenomenological ethics offers the possibility “to live from within” the ethical experience and that the harshness with which Husserl again and again in the 1914 Lectures explains the connection and the difference between formal logic and formal ethics, that is between what Kant calls “pure reason” and “practical reason,” is the hidden signal that his main concern is that of “saving” the practical reason, and the entire sphere of ethics, form the double risk of psychologism and of intellectualism, both seen realized, according to him, in Kant’s ethics. Husserl’s aim is similar to Kant’s, but it is not reached at all in the same way. And the role of subjectivity within the formal working of ethics is no less important point of difference. No subjectivity is necessary in Kant’s ethics. To say that, as a consequence of both being “formal,” logic and ethics are at the same time “parallel” and “interwoven,” means that they meet only because the logical judgement offers its voice to the ethical judgement, otherwise destined to remain mute. This allows Husserl to build the sphere of ethics as such that the main link with logic is to be seen in their being both “modes” of the intentional consciousness. The peculiar way in which subjectivity works in ethics refers to the common source in the intentional consciousness of both judging and evaluating and deciding, with the theoretical judgement only giving voice to ethics. But the opposite is also true: the common intentional source is the basis of a difference that just by its appearing as a “parallelism” must be conceived in such a way that the difference between logic and ethics is connected with the feature of the correlation of the evaluating and deciding subjectivity with its peculiar objects – those objects that, being values, can not be equal to the objects of the “parallel” logical intentionality. It is very clear therefore that no peculiar role of the ethic subjectivity could be admitted, if the difference between logic and ethics has no assumed the radical feature of the
parallelism."

Jocelyn Benoist gives a definition of a “subject or rather than of subjectivity” which is important for our argument. He writes that the subject is located “dedans et dehors: il est ce témoin implicite situé au point aveugle du champ visuel, comme aussi bien ce qui se montre en lui à chaque transition qu’il ménage.” (6) Something crucial for the specific feature of the ethical intentionality is very well expressed in this formulation of the problem of subjectivity: The phenomenological idea of the Doppelseitigkeit, of the bilaterality, of the correspondence and of the correlativity which connects the subjective and the objective side of intentionality also in its ethical mode. What is called by Benoist the “blind point” of the “champ visuel”, is at the same time what is supposed to accompany the steps that are made within its objective horizon (better: within its horizon of objectivation), thanks to the activity of the intentional consciousness. The way in which Benoist expresses the image of subjectivity is clearly fashioned according to the image which closes the important paragraph 95 of Formale und tranzendentale Logik, (7) where Husserl writes that “subjectivity of everybody” should be thought as “this subjectivity (that) I myself am, the I who becomes conscious of myself, about what is for me and is valid for me.” Husserl adds that “the subjectivity is the primary matter of fact that I have to face, and from which I as philosopher can never divert my glance.” It is true that for a beginner philosopher this can be der dunkle Winkel, the dark corner, in which the ghosts of solipsism, of psychologism and of relativism bustle around. But the true philosopher will prefer to fill this dark corner with light, instead of being scared by it.

Husserl is not talking of the ethical subjectivity. But this description concerns also the ethical subjectivity, of which one must say the same that has been said of the phenomenological subjectivity in general. The circumstance that we understand subjectivity as the blind point of the “champ visuel” and as the “dark corner” on which no light falls, means that we are talking of a subject that is devoid of any metaphysical and naturalistic consistence. And for what concerns specifically the ethical subject, the general feature of the phenomenological subject forbids us to imagine him as an ethical legislator, already present and active in the world. Even if we admit that the “person” is one of the last results of the Husserlian ethics, we still have to remember that the ethical subject is not a natural person, is not, as already said, a man in the world. It is just as important for the subject of the ethical intentional consciousness, as for the subject of the theoretical intentional consciousness, to accept the task of filling the darkness of subjectivity with light, whose darkness is the condition of its not being something given in the world – that is of its phenomenological feature. Light must be thrown on it if the risks of relativism of the psychological attitude have to be avoided. Therefore, light does not transform subjectivity in something natural and worldly. It is discovered that every subjectivity is based on his intentional activity on the bilateral structure of the intentional relationship to the objectivity. This is also the structural schema that underlies Husserlian ethics. Husserl’s thought maintains its promise of being the birth of an infinite research, just because it tries to give the foundation of a formal ethics, which is supposed to be able to “capture” in its formality both the deciding ethical subjectivity and its intentional objects, the “values.” Also in ethics, as in the whole of phenomenology, the bilaterality and the correlation are formal. It is this peculiar formality that opens the possibility of an ethical theory which does not forget the contents of our ethical activity.

On the basis of this interpretation of Husserl’s ethics (an anti-ideological and anti-idealistic interpretation) we can say that the phenomenological discovery of the phenomenon of feeling, of wishing, of being, offers to human beings a new instrument of an ethical orientation in the world.

Notes

(5) E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920-24, Husserliana XXXVII,
2004.


On the Radical and Erotic Reductions
Roberto J. Walton

Transcendental phenomenology has considered bodilhood as a constitutive dimension of transcendental subjectivity (L. Landgrebe). This has led on to the assertion, from an epistemological standpoint, of the priority of consciousness as the mode of access to the world, and, from an ontological standpoint, of a twofold relationship of reciprocal nonderivability (or irreducibility) and relevance (or conditioning) between the body and consciousness (E. Ströker). In a further step, recent trends in phenomenology have drawn a boundary between the body, which is the deep dimension of subjectivity correlated with the world, and the flesh, which withdraws from the world. On the one hand, Michel Henry has given priority to an original flesh, which, at work in the radical immanence of an “I can,” takes hold of the manifold functions of the organic body that is intertwined with the world. Here self-affection is cut off from hetero-affection, and this is essential to Henry’s “radical reduction” to pure immanence. On the other hand, Jean-Luc Marion has also developed the notion of flesh, but, following Emmanuel Levinas, stresses its intersubjective side insofar as my body attains a “face” and becomes flesh when it receives from the Other what I do not possess by myself and at the same time the Other receives from myself the flesh and the “face” that it does not possess by itself. Here hetero-affection is separated from self-affection, and this is central to Marion’s “erotic reduction” to what comes from elsewhere. My argument in this paper is that the so-called radical and the erotic reductions should be considered, in terms of the transcendental reduction, as an attempt to deal with modes of surplus within the intentional correlation with the world disclosed by the latter.

What seems particularly objectionable is the neglect of the stratification that underlies the contrast between the body and the flesh. For the surplus entailed by the flesh does not amount to the vanishing of the body, as both Henry and Marion put it, but rather to the emergence of a new level that can be understood, in terms of reciprocal relevance and nonderivability, in the light of the laws of stratification and categorial dependence advanced by Nicolai Hartmann. Applied to our subject, the law of stratification leads to the following formulations: something of the body returns in the flesh; the body does not come back as such in the flesh because it undergoes a variation, the flesh entails a novelty with regard to the body, and there is a leap leading from the body to the flesh. One could argue that the disappearance of the body in the radical and erotic reductions is due to the overlooking of return and variation as well as to the overstressing of novelty and leap. Furthermore, the following statements issue from the law of categorial dependence: the body is stronger than the flesh; the body is indifferent to the flesh; the body functions as an existential foundation for the flesh; and the flesh is free with regard to the body. In this respect, the disappearance of the body is the outcome of forgetting force and indifference and overemphasizing existential foundation and freedom. Again, misunderstandings arise when the four contentions are not taken together.

According to Hartmann, the upper stratum can emerge as an overformation (Überformung), in which the lower stratum comes back entirely as a matter that receives a new form, or as an overconstruction (Überbauung), in which it operates only as an existential foundation without influence on the contents of the upper stratum. To acknowledge this dependence in the line of existence instead of content both makes clear the ontological relevancy of the lower stratum and preserves the nonderivability or novelty of the upper stratum, and, therefore, renders possible the claim of an epistemological primacy in the case of consciousness and the assertion of a new mode of phenomenalization in the case of flesh. If we focus on the strata involved, flesh and “face” are a novelty with regard to body and visible countenance. They are phenomena of excess that appear as something new on the basis of a ground of being that must be overconstructed. Accordingly, when their function is restricted to that of an existential foundation, body and visible countenance withdraw in the overconstruction of flesh and “face,” but remain, as concerns their existence, indifferent to the upper stratum and do not break down. Were it otherwise, the body would be indeed undermined by the flesh.

In an ontological analysis, then, a mediation encompassing return and novelty is necessary between what belongs to a given statum of the world and what transcends it. Correlatively, from the viewpoint
of access, a mediation is also necessary between the givenness of the visible and the modes of phenomenalization of the invisible. Husserl’s view is that the visible body is the expression of an inwardness that can be explicated in a variety of levels that correspond to various strata in self-experience and the experience of the Other. Hence, the disjunction between visibility and invisibility, with an exclusive emphasis on the latter in the radical and erotic reductions, not only disregards stratification, but also ignores the phenomenon of expression in which my visible movements and the visible countenance differentiate themselves both from a corporeal surface, because they signify an inwardness, and from flesh and “face,” because they are visible. In order to show how visibility and invisibility are compatible, because there is a necessary link between them within an overconstruction, one must regard flesh and “face” within the larger framework of the notion of horizontality, to which overconstruction provides a specification. For the body as a given level of being is a theme that points beyond itself, and the flesh is experienced through these references that irradiate from it. Flesh and “face” are horizons that cannot come forth to visibility, but this “beyond” must be grasped in such a way that it cannot be detached from the visibility that intends to it. Their invisibility can be understood as a nonintuitive residuum, i.e., as an irreducible surplus, both in the horizon of self-affection opened out by the experience of the movement of my own body, and in the horizon of the Other revealed by the perception of the alien body. It can be recalled here that Marion examines a paradox of givenness because the given withholds the manifestation of givenness itself. Thus, every datum must be referred to its givenness by unfolding its fold. This does not seem to add much to the explication of an apperceptive horizon that, being intertwined with the perception of one’s own or the Other’s body, cannot be wholly laid open.

The convergence of invisible self-affection with visible hetero-affection does not rule out a further contraction of self-affection intermingled with hetero-affection into a pure self-affection as that described by Henry, or a further expansion of hetero-affection blended with self-affection into a pure hetero-affection as that outlined by Marion. Only in a second stage can self-affection become unraveled from outwardness, and hetero-affection become separated from inwardness. Both processes can be construed as an unfolding of horizontality in which we are directed towards an ideal pole. In addition, this analysis does not exclude speaking of an infinite self-affection or an infinite interpellation of the Other, which would enable our living in the world to surpass its narrow limits. Nevertheless, it avoids separating them from our worldly condition, so that, even if they are not manifest within the world, they are at least constructed over it. They can be referred back to a dimension of horizontality that is inexplicable or invisible, but announces itself in intentional modes of self-affection, and expresses itself through the visible countenance of the Other. Since this dimension entails a maximum of contraction and intensification of transcendental life in its relationship with itself, as well as a maximum of expansion and estrangement in its relationship with the Other, it accounts for the possibility of an acknowledgment of, and an answer to, infinite self-affection and infinite interpellation.

In contrast to the transcendental reduction, which attempts to show the true significance of the natural attitude as the self-concealment of the transcendental dimension, the radical and the erotic reductions establish a realm distinct to that of the natural attitude. The pregivenness of the world is not considered from a new angle by showing what is implied in it, but rather an attempt is made to disclose a different type of phenomenalization. This leads to set originary flesh against one’s own body and alien flesh against the body of the Other. On the contrary, an inquiry into the true significance of what is pregiven in the natural attitude shows one’s own body as the indication of an originary flesh tied to a transcendental “I can,” which cannot be separated from its body as an organ of actualization in the world, and exposes the body of the Other as the indication of a transcendental Other, which cannot be detached from its body as an organ of expression in the world. Only through contraction and expansion as modes of overconstruction in the horizon of these two phenomena can we have access to a dimension of invisibility. The upshot of this argument is that the attempt to think beyond worldly Being "the correlation between world and world-consciousness" amounts, on closer inspection, to the extrapolation of an infinite pole for the unfolding of the horizons of inwardness and elsewhere sustained by the correlation.
In the following brief paper I would like to give a few hints on the actuality of Husserl’s phenomenology and its relevance for the actual interdisciplinary discourse between psychopathology, cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind. My aim is to point out, that one way into the future of phenomenology maybe lies in the power of its methodological way to tackle some currently discussed psychological as well as philosophical problems. I think that a rediscovery of some Husserlian motifs – especially methodological ones – can be very fruitful for an interdisciplinary exchange between philosophy, psychology and psychopathology.

Some phenomenological themes in the Philosophy of Mind

Husserl’s phenomenology had two major aims. The first one was to cure philosophy of its speculative character and renew it as a “rigorous science.” The second aim was to elucidate the question of the possibility of scientific knowledge in an a priori way. Therefore the idea of philosophy as a “rigorous science” refers to methodological reflections about the a priori relation between the object of a scientific investigation and the investigating subject – a project which had already been enforced by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* 200 years earlier. These considerations lead Husserl – following Franz Brentano – to the discovery of a fundamental feature of our consciousness: to be conscious means in the main to be conscious of something. Every subjective conscious act – experiencing, thinking, hoping, wishing, judging, etc. – is directed on an object. It makes no difference whether this object is an innerworld object, a thought or just a matter of fact of a judgment. Thus consciousness is characterized through intentionality and therefore the distinction between a pure objective and a pure subjective sphere could no longer hold. This paradox that every objective truth is correlated with a subjective act in which it is known requires a systematical explanation.

As a result of these insights Husserl saw the first step of the development of a scientific philosophy in the investigation of the correlative structure of intentionality itself and its meaning for the investigation of the concept of reality. His motto could be formulated as follows: If we want to know something about the reality we live in, we need to take a step backwards from the “what we see” to the “how it is given” for us. This turn from a naïve directedness towards supposed objective facts to an investigation of the correlative structure between these facts and the subjective constitutive act is the main methodological step of phenomenological science. This systematic investigation of the constitutive functions of the subject’s attitude towards the objective world is also of interest in the philosophical discourse today – especially when the topic of scientific investigation and discourse is consciousness itself.

When we focus on consciousness itself the investigated object and the investigating subject are inseparable from one another, i.e., science must deal with the tricky methodological difference between a first-person and a third-person approach to consciousness. In the actual discourse on this topic Husserlian methodological claims are of special interest, above all in the dialogue between the empirical sciences that investigate consciousness and its features (e.g., neurosciences, cognitive psychology, etc.) and the philosophy of mind. David Chalmers points out that although we know a lot about consciousness from a third-person perspective (TPP), at the present stage we have hardly any formalisms to investigate and interpret data from a first-person perspective (FPP). It was one of Husserl’s main contributions that he developed a systematic methodological framework that tries to deal with this difference between a first- and a third-person view.

In the actual debate of the philosophy of mind it is exactly the above outlined subjective dimension and its importance for phenomenal experience which characterizes the main difficulties in theory construction within the project of a science of consciousness. According to Chalmers, consciousness may be understood in two different ways: on the one hand we have a psychological approach in which the mind is characterized by the way it does; on the other hand we have the phenomenal concept in
which the mind is characterized by the way it feels. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl outlines that in the phenomenological tradition consciousness is interpreted similarly: the mind is characterized through intentionality. That implies two aspects of conscious experience: first the directedness on something and second the present living through of the experience which represents that something.

Therefore, consciousness contains two major properties: phenomenal properties which characterize what it is like to be in a specific mental state and representational properties which represent a certain intentional content. A science of consciousness must now deal with the difficult question of what someone refers to when he refers to his mental acts. Because when someone talks about his phenomenological constitution, i.e., how it is for him to experience the world, he refers to his conscious mental states. This reference is different from his reference to any object in the world. Unlike his reference to an innerworld object “via an intention that picks out something that [...] causally connected to,” he has direct access to his conscious experiences. He can refer to these “via an intention that picks out something that [...] immediately acquainted with.”

This difference in the mode of givenness between an innerworld object and the subjective act directed on an object was — albeit in a different kind of meaning — already emphasized by Husserl: every innerworld object appears in a perspectival manner whereas the subjective act is itself given — so to speak — in an absolute way.

This difference between phenomenal and representational properties characterizes the gap between consciousness and cognition. It can therefore be understood as an expression of the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness, i.e., the problem of integrating phenomenal consciousness in the physical worldview. Maybe to revert to a Husserlian account of this problem can enlighten the debate as he tried to develop a universal framework that enables a systematic investigation of the correlation between mind and world.

Phenomenology and Psychopathology

Besides phenomenological motifs in the actual discourse of the Philosophy of Mind phenomenological approaches could also be found in the field of psychiatry and psychopathology. Husserl himself was already interested in psychological questions as he intended to substantiate empirical psychology in a phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. This examination could be found in diverse writings. Currently there are some interesting attempts to work with Husserlian “tools” in the treatment of psychological/psychopathological questions and problems.

In recent years, the impact of phenomena of mental disorders on a scientific understanding of consciousness has been intensively discussed. On this account some authors locate one of the main causes of schizophrenic diseases in the disturbed subjective concept that the schizophrenic has of himself. This disturbance is often mentioned as a form of self-disorder or ipseity disturbance. Therefore the discussion is led by questions like: given that schizophrenia is interpreted as a form of self-disturbance, what is the concept of “self” about? In seeking an answer to this question a phenomenological perspective on mental disorders such as schizophrenia may lead to new insights in the understanding and interpretation of these phenomena.

According to this perspective the experiencing subject is — depending on Husserl’s theory of intentionality — never an isolated pole but a subject who is directed on and related to objects of his world. Therefore, every subject must always be seen and understood in the fundamental and natural correlation with his/her world. In this context schizophrenia — as a form of self-disorder — is interpreted as a disturbance of the mentioned intentional correlation. An analysis of the intentional structure may support the development of a framework that enables scientists a better understanding of schizophrenic diseases like delusions and hallucinations.

After Josef Parnas and his colleagues, there are three major dimensions that seem to be affected in self-disorders like schizophrenia: 1. disturbance of intentionality, 2. disturbance in the realm of self (“unstable first person perspective”) and 3. disturbed dimension of subjectivity. The authors outlines that patients with schizophrenia rather tend to observe their experiences than to “live through” them.

In another publication, Parnas et al. furthermore lay stress on the fact that there is a need for a
change in the understanding of the development of the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenic disorders. This development may not be understood as “a contingent, unexpected popping up into consciousness of ‘primary’ (modular) eruptions from a malfunctioning organic substrate” but rather as a “complex temporal vissicitude” of the unstable structure of phenomenal (self-) experience. (10) A similar model for understanding and interpreting schizophrenic symptoms could be found in the psychiatric literature more influenced by cognitive science.

Psychopathological symptoms of schizophrenia, e.g., delusions and hallucinations, are often interpreted as a result of a form of disturbed self-reference (11), which means that a subject is no longer able to refer adequately to his/her own mental states as his/her own mental states which may lead to delusions of persecution, thought insertion or thought control. As I outlined above, according to the cited authors, schizophrenia and its symptoms must be understood as a form of ipseity-/self-disturbance. Again we see the necessity to investigate the phenomenon of our direct acquaintance with our conscious experiences and its relatedness to an objective world. Maybe phenomenological analysis, i.e., structural analysis of the intentional correlation between the subject and his/her world as well as the interpretation of the distortions of this correlation, enable us to understand phenomena of mental disorders in a more fundamental way.

In this short outline I did not want to develop a concrete idea of how the future of phenomenology should look. I rather wanted to give a few hints of how fruitful an interdisciplinary exchange between phenomenology and the empirical sciences might be.

Notes

(5) Chalmers, op. cit., p. 202
(9) See Parnas et al., 2002, op. cit., p. 132.
(10) Parnas 2000, op. cit., p. 139.
Phenomenology as a Transcendental Theory of Consciousness
Wolfgang Fasching

Following today’s objectivistic paradigm that reality means independence from subjective experience, the main endeavor of philosophy of mind has for a long time been to work out strategies to reduce consciousness to something objectively accessible: if reality means subject-independence, subjective experience itself must “in reality” consist — if existent at all — in something objectively verifiable and cannot be something only privately experienced. Consciousness has to be integratable into a physicalistic view of the world and explainable as a physical feature of the material world (e.g., according to the various identity theories, as certain brain processes or functions).

In recent years, however, a growing skepticism has arisen as to whether such a reduction of the psychical to the physical is indeed possible. The critique roughly amounts to the objection that such a reduction is based on (re-)defining consciousness in third-person terms from the start, i.e., as a set of objectively describable performances, and then asking which physical mechanisms in the organism make such performances possible. (1) With this move, consciousness in its first-personal sense (in its experiential dimension) actually remains unreduced because it has been left out from the very beginning. (2) This experiential dimension cannot be brushed aside as being just the mode in which something objective is subjectively experienced, to the effect that the difference between “phenomenal consciousness” and functionally describable performances of the brain would merely be epistemic in nature whilst the ontological identity would remain unaffected: the distinction between subjective appearance and objective reality loses its meaning when the reality of the subjective appearance, of experience itself is in question. Consciousness has its existence, its reality, in being subjectively experienced (in being conscious) (3), that is: it has a “first-person ontology.” (4)

Therefore, today it is a widely held view that consciousness in its subjective sense is an irreducible feature of the mind and that consequently first-personal, “phenomenological” investigations are indispensable for its unrestricted inquiry. (5) In contrast to the exploration of, for example, continental drift in investigating the mind it is not possible to abstract from how it appears subjectively without losing sight of the subject-matter, because being experienced belongs to the very nature of consciousness. In this case, the way it appears subjectively is a genuine and unneglectable feature of the subject-matter itself.

Herein one could see a certain reconciliation between the positions of the philosophy of mind and the “continental” tradition of phenomenology that always viewed itself as a science of experience, of the appearing, i.e., as a science of the first-person perspective and therefore always insisted on the irreducibility of the subjective. This could be a chance for phenomenology, indeed, to overcome the petrification sometimes observed in text exegesis or jargon and to regain an enhanced problem-orientedness by entering a discussion that goes beyond the one’s own “school.” But at the same time, in my view, a certain caution is necessary. It has to be asked whether with the concession that there are irreducible first-person facts, phenomenology as an autonomous, non-naturalizable discipline is already vindicated; whether its relevance should be exhausted in a suppositionless description of experiential facts in order to deliver an indispensable contribution to an uncurtailed inquiry of the mind — or whether being pinned down to such a role rather amounts to an integration of phenomenological insights in a naturalistic context and thereby to playing down or even abandoning phenomenology’s true claim.

For whereas Husserlian phenomenology decidedly understands itself as an anti-naturalist philosophy, the whole debate on the pros and cons of the reducibility of consciousness takes place within a naturalistic framework, if naturalism is understood in a broad sense that is not restricted to physicalism. The question the reductionism debate revolves around is: do only objective, outer phenomena really exist, or are there, in addition to that, also irreducibly “subjective” phenomena, that is, rather peculiar phenomena that are only privately accessible, not directly observable by any outer sense? But inquiring about the place consciousness has in the world of objective phenomena in this way already
presupposes the phenomenality of phenomena. And this is the thematic field of phenomenology. (6)

No matter whether the irreducibility of consciousness is denied or accepted, the existence of the objectively given is presupposed and the question is how (or if) within the world, amongst the objective things, something as unusual as only first-personally observable, “inner,” subjective facts can occur (which leads, if accepted, to a “dualism”). But to presuppose the existence of what is objectively given in this way leaves the givenness of the objectively given simply unreflected. Thus, posing the question in this way means to remain steadfastly within the naivety of what Husserl calls the “natural attitude.” (7) In this sense all theories that conceive of the consciousness as a part of the natural world can be labeled as “naturalistic.” (8)

In this way, the problem level of a truly phenomenological theory of consciousness is not achieved at all. From a phenomenological point of view, there are not objects on the one hand and on the other — additionally — subjective experience, but precisely the “being-there” of objects takes place in experience. For phenomenology, consciousness is not a phenomenon (albeit rather special) among others (not “the most vivid of phenomena” (9)) but the place of phenomenality. Thus, when phenomenology speaks of the non-circumventibility of consciousness it does not aim at an extension of what might count as real in the world, it does not claim that there are certain further entities and/or properties science has not taken into account so far. The phenomenological theory of consciousness is not about a special region within the objectively given world but about the givenness of the world itself. Therefore, its topic is not the subjective as opposed to the objective but objectivity as such. (10) This is what makes phenomenology a transcendental theory of consciousness.

Consequently, instead of contributing as a supplement to the investigation of “outer” phenomena, the investigation of “inner,” only introspectively accessible phenomena, phenomenology’s genuine task would rather be to question the presuppositions of such seemingly obvious distinctions. From a phenomenological point of view it is a peculiar prejudice that there should be outer and inner phenomena (if by the latter we mean conscious experiences) — a prejudice that has its origin, on the one hand, in our knowledge that an outer reality exists (which lies constantly before us and which science explores), and, on the other hand, in our intuition that there is also our consciousness which we, after all, also experience, but which is immediately accessible only to the respective subject: hence an “inner” phenomenon. But under phenomenological suppositionlessness it becomes highly questionable whether anyone has ever seen outer and inner phenomena, existing side by side. When one tries to observe one’s own consciousness one never finds a mere interiority, or just “oneself” (no less than one finds any exteriority “outside” of one’s consciousness). One never finds consciousness but only what one is conscious of. Consciousness precisely consists in its of-ness, that is, in that there is something there. Consequently, “inner” and “outer” phenomena do not exist side by side but the so-called inner phenomena are nothing but the phenomenal manifestation (the phenomenality) of the outer. Certainly, not all objects that manifest themselves in consciousness are “really there,” many are “only subjective,” and in this sense one can of course distinguish between inner and outer phenomena — but this is not a distinction between consciousness and outer object but one within the realm of objects; and it is certain intraphenomenal relations (a coordination of “inner” experiences) in which the “objectivity,” the “really-there” of appearing objects is constituted. So in a way there are “inner” and “outer” phenomena. However, consciousness is not an inner phenomenon but the being-there of phenomena — be they inner or outer.

Thus, phenomenology does not consider consciousness as an inner region in contrast to an external world. The phenomenological distinction between immanence and transcendence actually means the difference between “Erscheinendes” and “Erscheinen,” that is between that which appears and its coming to appearance, or between what is present and its being-present (its presence). For this reason they are not distinct realms of being but two inseparable aspects of one and the same. With regard to this immanence the subject in the sense of an innerworldly thing (the only sense contemporary philosophy of mind knows) is already something transcendent, as a subject substantialized in this way is no less something apperceptively constituted than any outer object, (11) and thereby owes itself to the taking-place of manifestation as such that hence is prior to itself.
Phenomenological immanence is nothing other than the opening-up of exteriority as such, which, in a certain sense, is more “interior” to consciousness in the phenomenological sense than the “psychological” interiority of a substantialized subject. (12)

Thus the phenomenologically understood consciousness is no interiority, and for this reason exactly has no exteriority. That is why Husserl claims against Descartes that the true question is not how to infer the external world from my interiority but “whether with regard to the egological sphere an ‘outside’ has any meaning at all.” (13) With this denial of an outside of consciousness, phenomenology can be labeled as an “idealism.” (14) It is a phenomenological idealism that does not deny that there are things outside of the subject (insofar there is no substantial “inside” of transcendental subjectivity at all) yet can be seen as the reflection on the fact that any reality we ever refer to is a reality that appears in one way or another. (15)

Instead of sweeping this idealist heritage of Husserlian phenomenology under the carpet in embarrassment, it is, in my view, precisely the point that should be put forward by phenomenology against the naïve naturalism of the majority of philosophy of mind. In my view, the discussion with philosophy of mind is one of the major tasks of phenomenology today and I wish to hold that phenomenology can contribute highly relevant insights concerning the nature and structure of consciousness. However, I think it is important to bear in mind that its sense is not a naïve description of inner occurrences, it is no introspective psychology (as philosophy of mind mostly understands the term “phenomenology” (16)), it is rather concerned with the status of consciousness and its relation to objectivity (what makes phenomenology a philosophical discipline in the first place). So one of the central points in the discussion has to be challenging philosophy of mind’s naturalism and the concomitant reification of consciousness. Phenomenology “does not merely provide an assortment of occasionally fruitful insights that can be cannibalised in the service of naturalism” but is “a coherent and plausible alternative to naturalism.” (17)

Notes

(4) Searle, op. cit., p. 16.
(5) Cf., e.g., Varela, F., and Shear, J. (eds.), The View from Within, First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness (Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 1996).
(6) In this respect the rather thoughtless and inconsistent use of the term “phenomenon” in the philosophy of mind is conspicuous: while “the phenomenal” is reserved for subjective experience and qualia, “phenomenon” is mostly used in the sense of the objectively given without giving a second thought as to the givenness itself. See, e.g., Kurthen, Martin, “Das harmlose Faktum des Bewußtseins” in Sybille Krämer (ed.), Bewußtsein, Philosophische Beiträge (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996): 17–35, p. 34; “Phenomena arise, are there and change. For some phenomena this process is describable naturalistically, for others not or not in an explanatorily economical way. The current hot fashion and the phenomenality of what-it-is-like probably belong to the badly naturalizable phenomena.”
(8) Hence Searle and Chalmers, for example, call their explicitly anti-reductionist positions expressis verbis — and rightly — “naturalistic” (“biological naturalism” or “natural dualism” respectively); that is,
they hasten to emphasize that they do not claim an outside of nature and the natural, i.e., something “super-natural,” but only want to extend our concept of nature.

(9) Chalmers, op. cit., 3.


(12) Husserl characterizes the projection of experiences into the immanence of the ego as just as phenomenologically derivative as the ejection of objects into an external world (Husserl, E., Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910), ed. by Bernhard Rang [Husserlianaan XXII] (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1979), p. 206) — that is, even psychological “interiority” rests on the constitution of transcendence and therefore interiorization too is an exteriorization with regard to phenomenological immanence.


Phenomenology for the 21st Century
Joanna Hodge

The vigour of a discipline can be read off from its capacity to stage disputes concerning its basic conceptuality, and from this point of view phenomenology can be seen to be flourishing. There are three major lines of dissensus, through which the protocols and techniques of phenomenology are being revisited, reconfigured and the results of their various applications clarified and refined. There is firstly the claim on Husserl’s legacy from those who would reattach philosophy to a thinking of divinity, the connection so scrupulously dissolved by Immanuel Kant. The writings of Emmanuel Levinas, of Michel Henry and of Jean Luc Marion all incline to this rewriting of Husserl’s programme, a move hotly contested by those of Dominique Janicaud and of Jean Luc Nancy. This opens up the difference between doing philosophy, as a branch of theology, and having a religious dimension to philosophical enquiry, for which what is in question is not the word of God, but the manifestations of the divine, in what presents itself in all the various givens of intuition. This has put pressure on the adequacy of specifications of what can be supposed to appear, in the domains accessible by consciousness, as opened up for enquiry by Husserl.

There is, secondly, the programme to naturalise phenomenology, which paradoxically appears to reverse the effects of Husserl’s invention of bracketing and reduction, in the 1907 lectures, *Idea of Phenomenology.* (1) However, it also reveals Husserl’s commitment to clarifying the status of scientific results. The publication of this text, separately from that for which it served Husserl as an introduction: *Ding und Raum,* (2) obscures the connection, for Husserl, between theoretical considerations and the practical question of getting clear on how meaning attaches to hypothesised entities. The theoretical innovations of bracketing and reduction reveal the unexamined prejudices of a Cartesian dualism, as still functioning in the activities of natural scientists, presuming rather than proving access to material contents. The radical nature of this critique of Descartes should have protected Husserl from the misinterpretation that his *Cartesian Meditations* were intended as an affirmation rather than a development of that critique. Thus the attempt to renaturalise Husserl’s results reveals the contestable status of attempts to attribute to Husserl either a Cartesianism or a Platonism. It also reveals that what counts as naturalism is under pressure, for it can no longer be a question of reducing all natural phenomena to the status of extended substance, or to the simple physicalisms of positivism.

There is a need then for a specification of the differences for Husserl between a genuinely naïve natural attitude, a naturalising attitude, and the attitude laden with presuppositions, for which the only entities to be entertained by philosophical enquiry are those which meet the criteria of a group of now outdated positivistic sciences. Husserl can be seen to be in the vanguard of the critique of the latter in his insistence on the role of mathematisation and formalisation in the exact sciences. Thus the result of the affirmation of a naturalism in phenomenology has been a broadening of what philosophers understand to be the possible objects of the natural sciences, and a question, even so, to the exhaustiveness of these for the relevant regional ontologies. For the phenomena analysed in the cognitive sciences are rather more diverse in ontological status than the abstractions more usually discussed in a philosophy of mind, still committed to a naively understood Cartesianism of a mind body relation. This line of enquiry, along with the emphasis in Renaud Barbaras’ reconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, on the motility of intentionality, and that in Shaun Gallagher’s mode of reading Husserl, as one among a number of contributors to a discussion of time, has the salutary effect of reconnecting Husserl studies to contemporary discussion, focusing on issues, rather than focusing solely on an unending hermeneutical labour of proposing readings of texts and placing them in relation one to another.

There is, thirdly, a series of scholarly interventions, concerning Husserl’s texts, which have shown that there is a development of three strands in Husserl’s own enquiries which shift the interpretation of those texts away from canonical, but sterile, discussions of early or late, realist or idealist, descriptive or transcendental, to reveal all over again that there never was an ideality of meaning without inter-
subjectivity, and without corporeality. The publications of Natalie Depraz, Dan Zahavi and Donn Welton have relayed this work to a wider audience. Thus the construction of Husserl as committed to a mind body dualism, to solipsism and to a Platonism is now demonstrably false, and embedded in a refusal to read the texts, as opposed to relying on the first generation of Husserl's critics: Ingaarden, Adorno, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, indeed Gadamer, all of whom have quite specific reservations about the viability of Husserl's enquiries, which then inflects their reception of them. Husserl's commitment to the embodiment of intentionality, demonstrable in analyses of corporeality, to inter-subjectivity and above all to the indispensability of actual judgments for the articulation of ideal meanings re-emerge for attention.

The result is both a fascinating slice of intellectual history and, more importantly, a refiguring of the main concern for phenomenology, as a need for a re-description of the notion of horizon, so important for Husserl's enquiries, but which remains, in Eugen Fink's phrase, operative rather than thematic. This notion of a horizon has been thought in terms of the Husserlian reflections on the concept of world, but my proposal is that it should rather be thought in terms of a primordial non-simultaneity of the temporality of human understanding. This structure is distinctive of the human, and leaves its mark on all human activity, and especially on the structure of intentionality. It permits the articulation of the operations distinctive of the human understanding, by contrast with intimations of the divine. Only for human understanding can there be a gap between meaning intending, and a meaning fulfilment. Husserl's enquiries into internal time consciousness appear to run into an impasse, or to be over swiftly resolved in favour of a conception of the lived present, the lebendige Gegenwart. However, if primordial temporality is thought not as lived present, but as an irreducible non-simultaneity of intentionality, as temporally distended, the irreducibility of the time of superstrings to the time of an experience of forwards directed history may be respected.

Thus these various controversies about how to read Husserl and in what context contribute to opening out the possibility, and the need, to re-activate Husserl's questioning of the adequacy of Kant's notion of transcendental aesthetics. Such questioning is both more than a move in intellectual history, but rather less than a fully developed set of descriptions of meaning intentions, to be fulfilled, or disappointed, or left under-determined in the various relevant approximating intuitions of essences. It is worth going back to the two published texts in which the project of rethinking transcendental aesthetics is announced, but not performed, by Husserl. These are Formal and Transcendental Logic (3) and Cartesian Meditations, (4) the first five of which were in draft before the writing of the former. In the closing pages of Formal and Transcendental Logic the following is to be found, in Dorion Cairn's translation:

“Transcendental aesthetics” — in a new sense of the phrase (which we use because of an easily apprehensible relationship to Kant's narrowly restricted transcendental aesthetics) — functions as the ground level <in a world logic>. It deals with the eidetic problem of any possible world as a world given in “pure experience” and thus precedes all science in the ‘higher’ sense; accordingly it undertakes the eidetic description of the all embracing/Apriori, without which no Objects could appear unitarily in mere experience, prior to categorial actions (in our sense, which must not be confounded with the categorial in the Kantian sense), and therefore without which the unity of Nature, the unity of a world, as a passively synthesized unity, could not become constituted at all. One stratum of that Apriori is the aesthetic Apriori of spatio-temporality. Naturally this logos of the aesthetic world, like the analytic logos, cannot become a genuine science without an investigation of transcendental constitution- and even from the constitutional investigation required here an exceedingly rich (and difficult) science accrues. (5)

The remarks in section 61 of Cartesian Meditations on transcendental aesthetics can then be understood as a clarification of some of the dimensions of such an enquiry. This section opens by remarking the combination of physical, physiological and psychological genesis in the human and animal word and the question is raised how to think about children acquiring a “life of the soul,” through which, for Husserl, access to questions of meaning arrives. The relation of animal to human, of child to adult and of self to other as ‘generative problems of birth and death and the generational
context of animality’ are all invoked in the course of a pair of paragraphs. The move from lived world, to world as object of the natural sciences, and then back to a notion of a world, as primordially given in transcendental constitution, is sketched, and Husserl then remarks:

We may then also describe this exceptionally large complex of enquiries connecting to the primordial world (which makes up a distinct discipline) a ‘transcendental aesthetic’ in a very much expanded sense, whereby we take over the Kantian title, because the space and time arguments of the critique of reason evidently, when also in an exceptionally limited and not clarified manner, aim towards a noematic Apriori of sensuous intuition, which, broadened into a concrete Apriori of pure sensuously intuited nature, indeed as primordial, demands a phenomenological transcendental expansion through a connection to a constitutive problematic.

Husserl indicates that on this basis, as a first level of enquiry, there is under development a theory of experiencing otherness, both of other people and of the objectivity of the world.

There are then three possible routes into this enquiry into the specification of these noematic and concrete Aprioris. There is first the route set out by the text of Experience and Judgment: towards a genealogy for logic, as the text for which Formal and Transcendental Logic is designed as an introduction. This puts the emphasis on the meaning constraints within which such an enquiry might be developed. The second is the development of the methodological problems with which Fink and Husserl wrestled in their incomplete attempts to write a Sixth Meditation, as a doctrine of method. The third route is marked out by the considerations developing in the writings going into the last publication; The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Between these three lines of enquiry, there are to be found the elements for this transcendental aesthetic, as a theory of the temporality, distinctive of human existing, in which attempts are made to make sense of what appears. The reactivation of this insight is the destiny of phenomenology. The questions raised by the theologising and the naturalising strands of appropriation of Husserl’s writings throw into high relief the manner in which, by contrast to naturalised and divine time, Husserl explicitly thematises the temporalities specific to human thinking and activity, in meaning intending and in fulfilling intuitions. These questions intensify the need to revisit the thinking of horizons for enquiry, and their reinterpretation, in a reactivated transcendental aesthetic.

Notes

(1) HUA 2: 1950.
(2) HUA 16: 1973.
(3) 1929: HUA 17, 1974.
(4) 1931: HUA 1, 1950.
(6) HUA 1, 150.
Especially in various circles of current European thought, the readings of Husserl by Jean-Luc Marion are becoming of more and more interest. Marion's work appears to be the latest in what Dominique Janicaud has diagnosed as “the theological turn” from Husserlian phenomenology. (1) His main thesis does not seek to confront Husserl's phenomenology with a theology of exteriority so much as it seeks to re-read Husserl's phenomenology as a propaedeutic for a revealed theology. I see this direction in phenomenology as dangerous because it leads phenomenology into something that the latter sought to overcome. It introduces phenomenology to a justification for a religious dogmatism that is antithetical to the possibility of pluralism, and religious pluralism in particular. As James K. Smith says, it even “colonizes being.” (2)

My contention is not only that such a treatment of phenomenology ends in a bad state of affairs but also that in fact the Husserlian analyses of the temporal being of consciousness should be read — and indeed can be read — with a view towards pre-empting this trend and reeling it back in, away from theology. Where Marion reads a thesis of “donation” into phenomenality that “would reverse the condition of a horizon (by surpassing it, instead of being inscribed within it),” (3) Husserl at least implicitly denies this reading by positing originary givenness in the context of a logos that is wrought with a multifority underneath thought and thus, as a non-object, that is insuperable. With this in mind, the lesson derived from Husserl's phenomenology could very well be the potential for an ontopluralism that is not only the precondition of thought but that also reveals the wrong-headedness of a univocal metaphysico-theology.

Husserl's thought, according to Marion, opens up an avenue for the possibility of an advent, and in that sense it calls for a reversal of the Heideggerian treatment of phenomenology in favour of a non-ontological, non-representational nature of Christly love. This is made possible, Marion thinks, by a ‘negative phenomenology’ that is significant precisely for its sense of passivity which defies any apophantic discourse and representation. Insofar as he argues that the noetic-noematic correlation can be immediately transgressed by a hyperbolic ek-stasis, characterizing a total dominance over the subject, there breaks into phenomenology a diktat so forcible that it is not contestable but abruptly moral. It is indeed true that, as Marion says, Husserl transforms the problem of a “logical idol,” i.e., the problem of a wholly calculative, rational thinking, into the problem of an original self-givenness that forces a broadened meaning of the term “evidence.” But, according to Marion, this eventually also means that “intentionality is inverted” and that experience is hereby submitted “to the presence of a call” (4) because now givenness “gives life to the reduction as much as to evidence, since it alone gives charge over phenomenality.” (5) Which is to say: because of the transformation of thought in Husserl to include the lived and non-thought, his phenomenology apparently shows that horizonality is not merely something which could potentially be reduced. It therefore allows us to see a possibility for “auto-manifestation,” i.e., the “possibility of the impossibility,” (6) a non-anthropomorphized and unrestricted access to the being itself that could “give itself as a self.” (7) Although Marion is clear that phenomenology does not prove it, by giving us this notion of an “unconditioned horizon” phenomenology nevertheless creates the possibility of a theophanical revelation of Being.

This unconditioned horizon relies on the assertion that in Husserl there is a transgression of all possible knowing. What phenomenology succeeds in revealing is thus a specifically post-metaphysical characteristic of the phenomenon that would come to us as a total absence. Such a treatment of Husserl reads horizonality as having a “before,” something in which philosophical discourse takes place, and an “after,” something beyond which there can no longer be philosophical discourse. If the after is called religious by Marion, it is because he thinks the field of religion as exclusive from philosophy (8) and because, in the Scholastic tradition, he wants to make the hard distinction between the “God of the philosophers” and the “God of the theologians” (Pascal). Phenomenology, oddly, introduces us to the latter.
But if Heidegger is right that “any true phenomenological chronology has nothing to do with the order or success and the science of established dates,” (9) this should lead us to doubt the validity of Marion's treatment. Although of course Husserl did not foresee a treatment of his thought such as Marion's, Heidegger's reading of him here speaks of a ground of consciousness that tacitly pre-empts it. Husserl should see no need to posit an exteriority that transgresses this essential correlation: the Vorvergangenheit of the being of consciousness, I want to say, even disallows the thought of an exteriority that is pure absence because it is not absent and present in exact diametrical measure but both absensing and presencing itself at once; there is no complete presence just as there is no complete absence.

This is seen in Husserl's notion of the living-present (lebendige Gegenwart) of the temporal being of consciousness that needs to be made true in the sense that it must await veri-fication. We will understand something, according to this thesis, only on the basis of what has already-been, in which case there is a retroactive movement of truth. Whatever is true is in constant movement, and the movement it makes is towards the archaic. It is thus more proper to say that in Husserl truth has a “temporal fringe” in which the primordial production of experiences cannot be situated on a time axis of earlier or later but rather in the context of an “anterior past” (Vorvergangenheit): “this now apprehension is, as it were, the head attached to the comet’s tail of retentions relating to the earlier now points of the motion.” (10) Husserl's concern is so thoroughly with the birth or originating of an understanding in being that he denies the potential for anything that does not belong to that very process. Instead of thwarting its possibility, for Husserl thought is bound to an always already ongoing relation. In which case he affirms Heraclites’ saying that “the upward and downward paths are the same,” (11) where the downward path is complex of being that perpetually re-asserts itself anew. For instance, in order to cause aspects of my environment to be given to me, I have to constantly adjust my living-body (kinesis) to perceive (aesthesis) things qua indissoluble unities. Thus, indispensable to the definition of my cogitations is my ability to move about in the midst of a complex of being that offers itself up in a variety of ways.

If we can also read the transformation of a notion of evidence in this light, then the following theses about religious experience, I contend, can be understood with a new clarity about pluralism. Of a theologico-metaphysics, Husserl writes in the Cartesian Meditations that it is undermined: truth, he writes, “has gained a new significance” because it now excludes “every naïve metaphysics that operates with absurd things in themselves” by providing a distinct opening into the investigation of “ethico-religious problems.” (12) Phenomenology can even break open an investigation of the “problem-motivates that inwardly drive the old tradition into the wrong line of inquiry and the wrong method.” (13) Just what these “motivates” are according to Husserl is not quite clarified until a lecture given in the 1930's: they are certain “horizons of knowledge and feeling” so that any phenomenology of religious experience is really a matter pertaining to “Existenz.” (14) If Husserl is employing the term in the sense that Karl Jaspers employs it, phenomenology can include an exposition of what Jaspers calls “limit situations,” e.g., death, sorrow, anxiety, etc., which, because they transgress intentionality, are not initially begun with pure reflexivity.

The question of a human relation to the theophany is thereby transformed by phenomenology into an inquiry in which the question grounds itself not on theology but on certain meta-noetical and factical modes of being in which the world is always already meaningful for the human when that human reflexively or intuitively turns to it. When we bring these comments connection with the above paragraph, the consequent Husserlian position is not merely that there are inner, temporal motivations of the religious life but also that these motivations are premised on a certain understanding of the present of consciousness which allows for a more sophisticated pluralism of the religious life. After all, here we have a temporal ground of consciousness that relies neither on a claim to the absolute nor on a naively relativistic understanding of thought. What we seem to encounter in Husserl is a rejection of absolutes that is not, on the other hand, a rejection of all understandings of grounds.
Notes

(4) Ibid., p. 267.
(5) Ibid., p. 21.
(6) Ibid., p. 218.
(7) Ibid., p. 219.
(9) Heidegger, M., Gesamtausgabe 21 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978)
(10) PCT, p. 32
(13) Idid.
In undertaking their studies of the social world, sociologists who carry out research at the “micro” level have looked for guidance to Husserl’s investigations of intersubjectivity and the *lebenswelt*; especially, they have taken their direction from Husserl’s “principle of all principles” (1) — that no theorizing should intervene between reflection and what directly presents itself. Husserl has re-taught sociologists how to take the world seriously. Unfortunately, in arguing for his program, Husserl sought formulaic grounding, generally in idealistic terms (by which sociologists mean the reduction of complicated social behavior to the concepts that people use). Husserl’s insights can be applied effectively beyond a strictly conceptual analysis, and so these sociologists seek ways to implement what is vital in Husserl’s program and to retain what is essential to his rigor, as well as the rigor of his students Gurwitsch, Schutz, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty. Contemporary social researchers have successfully respecified Husserl’s program and in doing so have sometimes been forced to choose between Husserl’s phenomenological theories and a fidelity to his deepest insights. The best among them have chosen to work with-and-beyond Husserl’s achievements, and they have kept asking themselves, what is the role of phenomenology? What does it study? What is its rigor?

Husserl provided an answer for sociologists, which was spread across several of his works but was never developed in specific details. Today, contemporary sociologists undertaking ethnomethodological or other social phenomenological research are providing the specification for sociology that Husserl’s investigations lacked. Husserl argued that the criticism of the reason that operates in any scientific province should include a “criticism of the effective performances that remain hidden during the inquiry and theorizing directed straightforwardly to the province.” (2) These hidden “effective performances” are the *in situ* acts that Harold Garfinkel and his ethnomethodology have made the focus of their inquiries. Disclosing and describing these “hidden” practices requires taking up the actual site of practitioners of reasoning and their effective performances just-where and just-how the scientists, mathematicians, jazz musicians, airplane factory workers, freeway drivers, conversing parties, Tibetan philosopher-monks, etc., perform their tasks. These effective performances, which are the proper objects of phenomenological inquiry, are not concepts — Husserl understood this — but he had a proclivity for turning phenomenology into a body of formal ideas that occasionally lose their grip of the real world affairs from which they derive their pertinence.

In her posting on this website, Elizabeth Behnke recommends that we focus primarily not upon those passages where Husserl discusses his method explicitly, but on passages where his methods are actually in play. This recommendation is parallel to a policy that ethnomethodology adheres to scrupulously — it does not engage in discussions about phenomenology, but restricts its work to the description of actual local activities, just as Gurwitsch explains in his Preface to *The Field of Consciousness*, “In writing this book, I wanted to make it a phenomenological study, not a book about phenomenology.” (3) The reason for all of these prescriptions is the same, and that is that the most fecund insights are to be gained not from concepts alone but from careful scrutiny of events. This, too, is “the principle of principles.”

Another contemporary Husserlian commentator, Dan Zahavi, similarly cautions that in rejecting the idealism that the theory of transcendental consciousness can bear, postmodern thinkers have overemphasized the problem of Husserl’s essentialism. This concern, which may have been necessary for us to gain clarity regarding how the phenomenological project had to be respecified, has prevented us from coming to the fullest appreciation of Husserl’s phenomenology. Derrida seems to solicit the promise of this fuller objective when he comments, “Like most of Husserl’s texts, *The Origin of Geometry* has both a programmatic and an exemplary value,” (4) and it is in the latter that phenomenology is to find its “infinite task.” That Husserl may be wrong about some of his theorizing does not mean that he is incorrect about what is most vital in his thinking.
Garfinkel, who was a student of both Gurwitsch and Schutz of the New School, has described ethnomethodology's debt to Husserl, but also how it has been compelled beyond Husserl's program: "Ethnomethodology's initiatives originated with Husserl's program; however, it has developed its own rival program for investigating the \textit{lebenswelt} origin of the sciences, and this program is one of ethnomethodology's central research areas. Unfortunately, while these "origins" are mentioned and described by Husserl, they witnessably escape Husserl's formal descriptions of his program." (5) That is the crux of the problem — Husserl's inquiry into the effective performances of the life-world is only a "mention" of the problem and not a comprehensive inquiry into lived praxis.

Sociological practitioners of Husserl's method are determined to move the inquiries further, but their more local interests differ from the concerns of Husserl's postmodern critics. They do not wish to build further upon phenomenology's conceptual structures by adding more concepts and distinctions. Instead, they wish to subvert the conceptualizing by attending to the actual practices of persons who are engaged in social activities, i.e., how they organize their practices and the understanding that emerges as their indigenous work. As Merleau-Ponty has suggested, "Our effective involvement in the world is precisely what has to be understood." (6) Instead of engaging in any theoretical revisions of Husserl's project, these social researchers wish to do Husserl's project.

There are moments when Husserl recognizes the social aspect of his inquiry: "In the unity of the community of communication among several persons the repeatedly produced structure becomes an object, not as a likeness, but as the one structure common to all." (7) This implies that there is an intersubjectivity that is greater than the sum of its parts, a recognition that Husserl does not seem to fully appreciate since he falls back into the egological and logocentric language with which he conceived the phenomenological project. Levinas is critical of Husserl about this: "The intersubjective reduction, based on the other, wrecks the ego from its coincidence with self and with the center of the world — even if Husserl continues to conceive the relationship between the ego and the other in terms of knowledge." (8) What more is there to social interaction than word-meanings, and that would exceed constitutional phenomenology?

By way of illustration, organizing the intelligibility of a matter (\textit{Sinnbildung}) is a practical concern not only for individuals or for analysts but also for parties who are working to gain an understanding about something and to communicate that understanding. Parties actively work toward accomplishing an understanding-in-common. It is not as though each one has their understanding \textit{in advance} of the others; rather, the understanding proceeds as a \textit{common} project, sustained by the objective articulation of what they have assembled so far. The intelligibility orders the attention and work tasks that a collection of people faces. The coherency of a social group is dependent upon their maintaining the common intelligibility of an affair, and this maintenance of order is the practical concern of all. Sociological phenomenologists treat understanding as the public event it usually is. They offer inquiries that search beyond how an individual understands something to how a collective does so. Intersubjectivity was one of Husserl's greatest theoretical contributions, and one that naturally led philosophers into the region of the social, but Husserl did not get intersubjectivity perfectly right. Ethnomethodology offers an additional perspective in which persons are not treated as monads, as self-contained receptacles for concepts, and the intelligibility it studies is not egocentric or logocentric. The ideal objective meanings to which philosophers are mostly addressed must be related not only to the synthetic operations of consciousness, as Husserl taught us, but to the interconnections of sense synthesized in and by the social congregations in which people usually find themselves. That is, the temporality of the synthetic interconnections of sense must be identified, witnessed, and described at what some may wish to still call the intersubjective level.

While it may be said that throughout his life Husserl acknowledged the importance for his sense-investigations of events at the intersubjective level, and also that intersubjectivity is given ever increasing value as Husserl's thinking matured, he never recognized how originary to sense-production intersubjectivity was. Instead, at the end of his career in "The Origin of Geometry," Husserl still speaks of the "primary intrapersonal origin" of ideas. He asks, "How does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the
conscious space of the first inventor’s soul, to its ideal objectivity?” (9) Who is this imaginary inventor who works all alone late at night in his basement? Husserl has not posed his question correctly. When he asks, “How does the intrapsychically constituted structure arrive at an intersubjective being of its own as an ideal object?” (10) it is not that the intersubjective emerges from the intrapersonal; rather, the intrapersonal can emerge from the intersubjective life of a concrete community. The ego is not the only thing that is “concrete.” (11)

In this passage from “The Origin of Geometry,” Husserl writes:

In the contact of reciprocal linguistic understanding, the original production and the product of one subject can be actively understood by the others. In this full understanding of what is produced by the other, as in the case of recollection, a present coaccomplishment on one’s part of the presentified activity necessarily takes place; but at the same time there is also the self-evident consciousness of the identity of the mental structure in the production of both the receiver of the communication and the communicator; and this occurs reciprocally. (12)

Husserl mischaracterizes the situation when he offers such an inter-monadic model of linguistic communication. Instead, meaningful signs produced by a local cohort concerned to concert their interaction in an orderly manner provide the mechanisms with which the intelligibility is developed and displayed. It is not like recollection (although some reinterpretation of signs may be involved) because the activity is social, not individual. This work does not take place inside the heads of each monad; rather, the effective work takes place in the public space between persons, and each party has oriented his or her gaze to the public sphere in order to learn what the signs mean, including the meaning of their own utterances.

Such social inquiry is faithful to the instability of concepts as they move from experience to articulation and to reinterpretation; however, these phenomenological sociologists do not just offer a “mention” of this phenomenon but study it where it occurs, as it occurs, as part of the local social tasks of communicating parties. As Garfinkel has phrased it, this is an inquiry into “embodied, situated, congregationally concerted practical action and practical reason.” (13) “Meaning-fulfillment,” an eminent topic of Husserlian studies, is captured as an embodied social activity undertaken in situ, i.e., in and as some local affairs. People are not left as monads, and intersubjectivity is not John Locke on steroids. The phenomenon that was Husserl’s very own discovery is thereby being investigated in a way more radical than Husserl had imagined, but in keeping with the vital directions of his own thinking. As Levinas has suggested, “Phenomenologists are not bound to the theses formulated by Husserl; they do not devote themselves exclusively to the exegesis or the history of his writings. It is a way of proceeding that they have in common.” (14)

Notes

(10) Ibid. p. 369.
What I consider phenomenology to be

Phenomenology is a specific attitude towards the world. The purpose of taking this attitude is twofold. First, it is meant to recover human experience on a very large scale, i.e., to disclose so-called original phenomena or (to use a Husserlian coinage) to go back to the things themselves. By means of doing so phenomenologists, secondly, critically reflect on the basic concepts and general frameworks of our usual ways of representing, conceptualizing and practically modelling human reality. In particular, they claim to gain a new grasp of commonly known philosophical issues (e.g., the mind/body-problem). It is clear from this that phenomenology’s first task is to explain what original phenomena (or things themselves) are and how it happens that we tend to lose sight of them in the course of our daily life and scientific work. It is true that, since the origins of a phenomenological movement at the beginning of the 20th century until today, there has been no agreement among phenomenologists on how to introduce the term “phenomenon.”

However, there is a common conviction among adherents of different phenomenological approaches, for instance, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. This conviction amounts to the idea that original phenomena are not immediately accessible. As long as we assume our everyday-attitude towards the world they are in a certain sense hidden. Therefore we require a specific attitude to go “back to the things themselves.” Depending on what specific idea of phenomenological philosophy we are ready to follow, the characterization of this attitude significantly differs. (1) It differs, among other things, with regard to its voluntary feasibility and its ontological commitments as well as with regard to the notion of the subject whom we ascribe the attitude in question.

From the point of view of a Husserlian-style phenomenology the most important implication of this is to realize that whenever we talk about (original) phenomena we are not straightforwardly directed at something which is given (e.g., the newspaper lying on the table which I perceive while sitting in front of my computer). Instead, while talking about phenomena we are, in an entirely non-sceptical manner, interested in how things are given, how they appear. (2) We are interested in how special modes of appearances are correlated with special modes of being directed to the things which appear. We cannot talk about phenomena without, at the same time, talking about the intentional structure of our consciousness, i.e., about the relation holding between changing appearances and changing attitudes towards appearing things. In this sense, doing phenomenology means to focus on the form of givenness (whatever it is that is presently given). By analysing the formal structure of our intentional relations to different species of objects, phenomenologists aim at making explicit the presuppositions adhering to different (scientific) representations of reality.

It is due to this peculiar type of higher-level analysis (compared with all those forms of scientific analysis which immediately refer to certain types of objects) that Husserl’s phenomenology can be rightly stamped as foundationalist, although the term “foundationalism” easily gives rise to serious misunderstandings. There is no transcendental phenomenology which is without this foundationalist bias which, in my view, simply reflects the metatheoretical approach of an intentional analysis. This analysis, consequently, requires distinguishing different spheres of objects as well as different levels of discourse with pertaining terminologies, attitudes, and experiences, which differ in accordance with the former. It is only from this “foundationalist” point of view that these distinctions present themselves as necessary in order not to confuse heterogenous projects of explanation, (3) for instance, brain physiological investigations of the so-called readiness-potential and a philosophical reflection on the idea of free will. (4)

According to the above, it is not really surprising that the peculiar idea of philosophical reflection
which Husserl calls “phenomenological reduction” is meant not to reduce but, on the contrary, to release the whole range of human experience. It is by reflecting and receding from our ordinary way of experiencing things (which does not involve any interest in the formal structure of appearances) that we discover the varieties of givenness and, subsequently, are able to analyse what “human experience” means. It is well known that Husserl’s idea of an impartial observer which is said to be realized by means of phenomenological reduction is widely rejected. This clearly is a methodical ideal which, on principle, cannot be fully realized (see, for instance, Merleau-Ponty’s arguments in favour of an essential incompleteness of the phenomenological reduction). However, we have to acknowledge that it is this peculiar philosophical reflection which enables us to save the phenomena. It is due to our ability to withdraw from everyday experience that we are able to understand what experience means relating to different domains of objects. In other words, experience can only be understood by means of reflection. On the other hand, philosophical reflection represents a new type of experience which operates within the range of intentional relations, i.e., within the range of transcendental subjectivity. Reflection manifests itself as a special kind of experience. It is in this double dimension of disclosing natural experience as well as phenomenological experience that, according to transcendental phenomenology, the concepts of phenomenon, givenness and reflection inseparably belong together.

Phenomenology as Practical Philosophy

Recent debates on ethical issues among phenomenologists often focus on thinkers like Ricœur and Lévinas or, with a view to approximating phenomenological and poststructuralist or postmodernist approaches, on Foucault, Derrida, Agamben, and others who have a strong interest in the intellectual genesis and social mechanism of power and repression. To be sure, these are important projects. However, we still lack an overall and deep understanding of ethics as formal axiology and material value theory as it was formulated during the classical period of phenomenology (roughly speaking, between 1890 and 1950). Systematically interpreting the ethical reasoning of this period (among others: Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Pfänder, Reinach, Hildebrand, Hartmann, and Reiner) certainly would impinge on a reconsideration and re-evaluation of later developments in the field of ethics like the revival of virtue ethics (e.g., Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse) and its critical attitude towards deontology and utilitarianism or the rise of communitarianism (e.g., Alasdaire McIntyre, Charles Taylor). What does it mean to demand “an overall and deep understanding” of classical phenomenology’s approach to ethical theory? It does not only mean to strive for a better understanding of the astonishing variety and dissent on ethics which we, for instance, find among Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Much successful work has been done in order to investigate the moral philosophy of single phenomenological authors. Much less has been done to furnish us with encompassing insights into a history of ethics (or specific ethical issues) as part of a history of phenomenology, namely in terms of a history of problems. This systematic work should be done by addressing contemporary concerns in ethical theory, e.g., internalism/externalism. The fruitfulness of a phenomenological philosophy has to be proved by showing how such issues can be reformulated and newly appraised in the wake of a phenomenological analysis which lays bare the tacit implications of commonly accepted approaches to ethical issues and ethical reasoning.

According to Husserl, a self-reflective and self-critical bias called phenomenology of phenomenology, is part of a phenomenological philosophy. This being the case, it is obvious that the most fundamental challenge of a phenomenologist’s occupation with practical philosophy lies in finding out whether transcendental-phenomenological reflection demands some kind of practical commitment which, in a first step, need not be grasped in terms of a (new) ethical theory. In a more specific sense, this matter has to be considered with regard to a central thesis of Scheler’s as well as Hartmann’s (and others) value ethics which undermines a common understanding of how descriptive and normative aspects interfere with a view to our (scientific) idea of reality. We may designate this thesis the primacy of value-givenness as against the givenness of facts. Taking this thesis (which actually has to be carefully
scrutinized) for granted, we should ask whether it has any consequences with regard to our idea of phenomenology as a theoretical philosophy. Is the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy not as basic and as troublesome and questionable as, for instance, the distinction between subjective and objective whose refinement undoubtedly is of prime interest for any phenomenological philosophy?

What it means to give prominence to either subjective or objective moments is one of the main topics, if we intend to systematically compare different accounts of phenomenological ethics. It is conspicuous that those ethical theories of classical phenomenology which centre around the notions of person and value mostly refuse Husserl's transcendental idealism. They are grounded in a more or less uncompromising and more or less specified ontological approach. In a rigid sense this is true of Nicolai Hartmann, whose philosophy as a whole is not of an outright phenomenological stamp, although his ethics is deeply rooted in a phenomenological attitude. Max Scheler received Husserl's Logical Investigations, especially his conception of material-a priori insight, with enthusiasm, and never ceased to admire this early breakthrough of phenomenology. He did not sympathize with Husserl's later idea of transcendental subjectivity. Nevertheless, his ethical work, as far as the juxtaposition of subjective and objective moments is concerned, tries to balance these moments by proceeding from Husserl's thesis of an a priori correlation between the structure of consciousness and the structure of objects. This enables Scheler to avoid a rigidly objectivistic account of values which had to be spelled out in ontological terms, on the one hand, and to include considerations concerning the historical and cultural relativity of values without thereby getting stuck in subjectivism and relativism, on the other hand. Wherever subjectivistic and objectivistic tendencies clash with one another, phenomenologists will agree that the matter has to be settled by scrutinizing the extent to which these different approaches are able to open up the field of moral experience, to understand our common moral practice and, what is more, to help us improve our moral sensibility. Ethics, first of all, is a matter of perception, not a matter of judgement or principles by means of which rules of behaving or judging could be justified in a generally valid manner. Correspondingly, it is primarily from the point of view of moral experience that a phenomenological ethics gains its driving question: what is the phenomenological basis of ethical reasoning? Thereto, a phenomenological ethics goes beyond the widely accepted starting question of modern normative ethics, namely: what ought I to do (in order to realise moral goodness)? Taking this to be the most basic and most profound ethical question amounts to severely narrowing the scope and richness of our moral experience. In terms of saving the moral phenomena which actually are given, the more comprehensive question is: what kind of person do I want to become? Or: what kind of person am I?

It is in the light of basic conceptual distinctions like theory and practice, theory and experience, phenomenological experience, everyday experience, and scientific experience, and with reference to contemporary scientific as well as alternative philosophical (e.g., analytic) approaches, that a phenomenological ethics should discuss its main topics. Among these are: emotion and cognition, autonomy and authenticity, causes and motives (including so-called unconscious motives), the fact/value-dichotomy, personal being and personality and freedom of will. Methodically viewed, doing this aims at reconsidering both our common views on ethical issues and our general idea of phenomenology from the point of view of a phenomenological ethics.

Notes


(3) Thereto, we are drawn to a remarkable methodological asymmetry which bears on debates on naturalism and anti-naturalism (Rinofner-Kreidl, S., “What is Wrong with Naturalizing Epistemology? A Phenomenologist’s Reply” in Feist, R. (ed.), Husserl and the Sciences. Selected Perspectives (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 2004): 41-68.


On Neo-Husserlianism
Michael K. Shim

First, let’s distinguish between Husserlian phenomenology and Husserl scholarship. I take Husserl scholarship to be analogous to Kant scholarship, Hegel scholarship, or to whoever scholarship. It’s a historical approach: you try to figure out what Husserl thought and why he thought it in the appropriate historical context. Since Husserl wrote so much, changed his mind not too infrequently, and much of his Nachlass is written in a frustratingly cryptic style, serious Husserl scholarship can be a life absorbing endeavor.

By the same token, it can be endlessly fascinating connecting the exegetical dots between this published departure from a previously published work (e.g., the departure from psychologism, the departure from Cartesianism, the genetic revision of transcendentalism, etc.) and that group of unpublished manuscripts, and so on. Exemplary of this kind of approach are the works of Ludwig Landgrebe, Klaus Held, Karl Schumman and Donn Welton. To ask after the value of this kind of approach is to ask after the value of historical scholarship in philosophy in general. I take it for granted that it is at least slightly ludicrous to question the value of the latter. Since unlike, say, Gassendi or Baumgarten, Husserl had a huge impact on a hundred years’ worth of philosophy, I take for granted that the pursuit of Husserl scholarship is prima facie irreproachable.

In contrast, Husserlian phenomenology must be a kind of phenomenology that is defensive of most, if not all, of Husserl’s original views against more recent rivals. This kind of work is actually rarer. Dan Zahavi comes to mind as a good recent example of a Husserlian phenomenologist proper. Just think for a moment about what Zahavi’s been up to. He’s defended Husserl against the Frankfurt school (1), the Heidelberg school (2), Sartre (3) and Levinas (4), all the while claiming that Husserl remained competitive with recent developments in analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (5) I mean that’s got to be what “Husserlian phenomenology” should look like: you haven’t quite understood Husserl, so he can’t be wrong for the reasons you mention, and moreover, whatever you may think right he’s said already.

Of course, not obviously relevant for present purposes is the best-known approach, that approach simply co-extensive with the “phenomenological tradition:” namely, the heretical (6) approach. You redefine phenomenology by criticizing Husserl’s original views. That’s Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Derrida, Hermann Schmidt, et al. That would render Husserlian phenomenology a foregone conclusion, an already obsolete enterprise, a remnant of a broadly Cartesian endeavor no longer viable.

But a double-take on some of these heretics reveals a fourth possibility vis-à-vis Husserl, which I want to characterize as “neo-Husserlianism.” What I’m calling “neo-Husserlianism” is analogous to what analytic philosophers call “neo-Fregeanism.” Searle, for instance, is a Fregean because he buys into Frege’s two-dimensionalist semantics: there is both sense and reference that are irreducible to each other. (7) And that’s a recognizably original Fregean position. However, he is not strictly Fregean but instead neo-Fregean, since Searle centers his analysis of sense and reference on intentional consciousness, which is a very unFregean thing to do. (8)

Similarly, three of the above enumerated heretics trade in one version of Husserl in favor of another. But what they buy is recognizably original with Husserl. All three philosophers reject the Husserl represented by Ideas I: they reject the internalist, solipsistic and static Husserl, which is the Husserl most people mean when they talk about “Husserl.” However, what they wind up advocating (or at least wind up advocating at some point) were albeit somewhat eccentric renditions of the lesser known Husserl — which Welton calls the “other Husserl.” For instance, Merleau-Ponty points to the Husserl of the lived body from Ideas II: that’s the non-internalist Husserl of the first half of the book whose analysis is conducted before the execution of the epoché in §49. Levinas points to Husserl of the Fifth Meditation: that’s the non-solipsistic Husserl who thinks intersubjectivity is more basic than subjectivity. And Derrida points to the “Origin of Geometry:” that’s the non-static Husserl who thinks genetic
phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology need not be mutually exclusive. Now, I’m not advocating any of these quasi-Husserlian renditions; I’m just pointing out how “neo-Husserlianism” may gain some sense and currency. The basic idea is that you point to what you like and think right about Husserl, and argue on its behalf. Having done so, however, it would just be dishonest to claim that you came up with all this stuff by yourself and so owe nothing to Husserl. Instead, what you have left over would remain recognizably and, for the most part, uniquely what Husserl would have said. So you pay your respects and label yourself a “neo-Husserlian.” But by doing so, you also admit that you’re not entirely faithful to Husserl so, unlike Zahavi, not strictly Husserlian.

In this light, as long as you admit it, there should be nothing illegitimate about isolating some subset of Husserlian theses as sound that may be contradicted by some other subset of Husserlian theses, even if the latter should be considered platitudinously canonical of Husserl — e.g., that he was an internalist or an epistemological foundationalist or whatever. To get a better sense of such an approach, let’s start by recalling an observation made by David Carr in 1973. Reacting to the Fifth Meditation, Carr writes:

[I]f the rigor of phenomenological analysis requires the apodictic givenness of the subjective to the phenomenologist, then only egological or solipsistic phenomenology can be rigorous. If, on the other hand, intersubjective phenomenology is to be regarded as equal in dignity, and thus presumably in rigor, to its solipsistic “subordinate stage,” then the apodicticity of the primary given is no longer the standard of rigor. (2)

In other words, if Husserl’s claim about the priority of intersubjectivity in the Fifth Meditation were to be taken seriously, then the claim from the period of Ideas I of epistemic infallibility of the first person perspective as the foundation of transcendental phenomenology must be renounced. And I take this to be a straightforwardly correct observation about a basic inconsistency in Husserl. If that’s right, then any attempt to remain entirely faithful to Husserl by retaining both these positions would be an incoherent position to take. In contrast, should you favor one of these two positions, then you should admit your renunciation of the other position. But either way, it’s Husserl’s position — he came up with it, and gave you some reasons for advocating it. And to admit both your renunciation of one Husserl while pledging fidelity to the other Husserl — that’s the neo-Husserlian thing to do.

Now here’s a list of positions that are all recognizably Husserlian, and I believe can hang coherently together if a competing set of positions equally recognizable as Husserlian are renounced. And of course I believe a view made up of these positions to be the most plausible in Husserl. Since it would also be the most comprehensive anywhere, it would also be the most preferable tout court.

(NH 1) The concrete self sedimented by habituality (10) is personally basic. Accordingly, the notion of an abstract “pure ego” (11) from Ideas I has to be renounced. Consequently, the notion of personal identity in the strong sense must also be renounced in favor of some version of the continuity thesis, as Husserl recommends in the Fifth Investigation (12), then again in the later development of genetic phenomenology. (13)

(NH 2) There is no “pure consciousness” not imbued by awareness of the lived body. And the concrete, continuous self, sedimented with habituality, just is the first person perspective imbued by awareness of the lived body. (14) To be conscious is to be conscious of the limitations imposed and perceptual abilities facilitated by one’s own lived body. (15) And to recognize the lived body in this sense is not the same as affirming the Körper of the third person perspective. Against the latter, the epoché remains applicable. (16)

(NH 3) Intentionality must be viewed as externally responsive. When I want an apple, it’s the apple itself that I want and no mere representation of it. (17) When I look at a photograph and believe the woman to be beautiful, I do not mean the photographic image but the woman herself who is beautiful, etc. (18) In light of the epoché, the analysis of intentionality thus construed should be kept separate from seemingly related epistemological and metaphysical issues, which may be intractable. For instance, whether I can know the thing in itself, or whether there is a causal connection between my belief and
what I believe, is what’s “suspended.” Accordingly, questions about whether Husserl was an epistemological internalist or a metaphysical idealist, etc., should not even arise. That Husserl himself occasionally describes his views as “idealistic” (19) should be regarded as simply misleading.

(NH 4) By virtue of NH 3, we should be weary of Cartesian locutions like “absolute certainty” or “apodicticity” or “self-evidence” as signaling strong epistemological or metaphysical views. At best, they signal only an asymmetry between the first person and third person perspectives.

(NH 5) Intentionality in Husserl ought to be given a pragmatist analysis, as Husserl himself suggests. To intend anything is the exercise of an ability, cognitive or bodily (20), originally acquired with activity, then gradually sedimented in habit to become “passive” or effortless. (21) Such know-how, Husserl talks about in terms of the “Ich kann.” (22) So intentionality is not simply given but is an achievement of the individual, in response to her external and social circumstances. Needless to add, it’s also nothing inherently representational.

(NH 6) Meaning [Bedeutung] is regulative or teleologically governing. (23) No individual possesses meaning somewhere in her head, and thus meaning cannot be confused with some internal episode. (24) Instead, meaning should be regarded as a token operator or proxy for a prospectively adequate scientific theory, which need not yet exist and may never come to exist. Yet, without such a regulative view of meaning, no individual cognitive exercise can be vindicated as correct or dismissed as erroneous. Regulatively viewed, meaning is what keeps us from believing “water” to be a sui generis element or “whales” to be fish.

(NH 7) Should meaning be thus regarded, the noema cannot be viewed as the equivalent of meaning. Instead, the conceptual portion of the noema is that about an individual cognitive exercise that is governed by meaning. I believe Husserl points to this kind of view in both the Logical Investigations and the Crisis. Accordingly, to believe that “water is H2O” is to subscribe to a certain theory about water, and commit oneself to the correctness of that theory. It is to let one’s individual cognitive conduct be constrained by extraneous rules of the right kind vis-à-vis truth and reason.

(NH 8) If NH 6 and 7 are acceptable, then we have to draw a corresponding distinction to accommodate Husserl’s essentialism about both natural kind terms (e.g., “red”) and artifact terms (e.g., “house”). That distinction is between nomological intersubjectivity, as spelled out by Husserl in the Crisis, and mere peer pressure intersubjectivity. A part of our community is involved in genuine scientific progress. That’s the part we obey when talking about the molecular components of a natural kind object or the species to which a mouse deer belongs. But a different part of our community is involved in telling us what counts as “furniture” or who’s a “bachelor” — and such pressure imposes no nomological constraint on eidetic intution. We simply go with the flow for the sake of convenience and little else.

(NH 9) But NH 8 also tells us that intersubjectivity must be regarded as more basic than subjectivity. At the pain of confrontation by the private language argument, insofar as thought must be bound by public rules of discourse, the agreements and reasons of others must precede whatever I think by myself. (25) Pedagogy, and not soliloquy, (26) is the model of thought.

(NH 10) Finally, let Husserl be a mathematical and logical intuitionist. Formalists more or less believed that logical and mathematical axioms were functions of closed systems and analytically true only by virtue of these closed systems. Psychologists, in contrast, believed that axioms were true only because we could not think them otherwise: i.e., axioms are true because of the way we think, because of psychological facts about us. In contrast, intuitionists like Husserl, Brouwer and Gödel believe we intuit logical and mathematical axioms because they are irreducibly true. There is neither proof that “A is necessarily A” nor is “A necessarily A” because we can’t think otherwise; instead, “A is necessarily A,” and we grasp this irreducible truth in intuition. And to admit the irreducibility of mathematical axioms and logical principles allows, for instance, constraint by consistency and coherence in our decision to subscribe to one theory while rejecting a competing theory.

Now if you look at these positions, what you should notice is that it is a view remarkably competitive with more recent views in mainstream philosophy. But unlike the latter, it is also a remarkably comprehensive view. Should a more comprehensive view be philosophically preferred, then the
proposed neo-Husserlian view should also count as preferable to any contemporary competitor. And as I see it, to look at things in this way may very well be the future of Husserlian phenomenology.

Notes

(6) A phrase coined by Herbert Spiegelberg.
(10) As outlined in the Cartesian Meditations. Cf. Hua I 100-106.
(11) Asserted most famously in Ideas I, but more pronounced in Ideas II. Cf. Hua IV 98, 103, 105, 112.
(12) Hua XIX/1 364-7, 374-5.
(13) Hua XI 117.
(14) Cf. Hua XIV 298-300.
(19) Hua I 118-19.
(20) Hua IV 253-54.
(21) Hua IV 299-300; Hua XXXI 3.
(22) Hua IV 11-13, 152, 253-69.
(23) Hua I 56; Hua VI 165; Experience and Judgment §83a.
(24) Hua XIX/1 38, 49, 110, 137, 660; Hua III 257, 296-7, 331, 347.
The Definition of Good

A path to resolve our moral quarrels, this is what here I would define as one of the most important contributions of husserlian phenomenology to the philosophical thought of our times. Husserl's moral philosophy is a remarkable product of his phenomenological research and it gives us a definition of good which allows us to orient ourselves in all of the choices of our lives.

There are three key words summarizing the husserlian definition of good: authenticity, duty and responsibility. Now I will try to go through the meaning of these words with the purpose of clarifying the definition itself.

Authenticity

Looking at the husserlian moral research we can notice how Husserl opens the doors of the transcendental dimension of human mind and discovers an ancient but deeply actual definition of human good. As with the Delphic saying “gnôthi seaiûton,” he refers the personal and common good to the idea of authenticity. He writes: “die Lebensform ‘echter Humanität’” it is born thanks to “beurteilenden Menschen sich selbst, sein Leben, sein mögliches Wirken.” (1) The authentic man is he who “auf Grund einer prinzipiell-allgemeinen Selbstbestimmung das praktisch Vernünftige überhaupt und rein um seines absoluten praktischen Wertes willen erstrebt, folglich konsequent das praktisch Wahre oder Gute als das Beste seiner jeweiligen Sphäre nach Kräften einsichtig zu erkennen und danach zu verwirklichen beflissen ist.” (2) According to Husserl the practical good consists in everyone's power to be an authentic man. A man who knows himself rationally and tries to realize his absolute value through the self-determination activated by his rational will. For absolute value Husserl means the best telos rationally chosen in relation to practical horizon of everyone's possible option. Only this absolute value makes life “jeweils b e s t m ö g l i c h e s (...) für sein Subjekt” and “charakterisiert als das absolut Gesollte.” (3) Thanks to the realization of this kind of life, man can grasp what Husserl calls the best practical good.

Duty and Responsibility

As for the concept of duty we can say that, according to Husserl, the personal good of everyone is not only a personal good but a duty which involves all of the rest of society too. “Jeder Mensch steht,” he writes, “(...) einem ‘k a t e g o r i s c h e n Imperativ’ unter. Er kann’ wahrer Mensch’ schlechthin als gut zu bewertender nur sein, sofern er sich selbst willentlich dem kategorischen Imperativ unterstellt — diesem Imperativ, der seinerseits nichts anderes sagt als: Sei ein wahrer Mensch; führe ein Leben, das du durchgängig einsichtig rechtferigen kannst; ein Leben aus praktischer Vernunft.” (4) Thus the best practical good consists in the realization of a life which can be justified before our rational will. The practical good is in the observation of a categorical imperative which drives everyone to live complying with knowledge of own absolute value. The Husserlian categorical imperative “tue dein Bestes nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen!” (5) is itself the absolute value everyone has to know and to respect. It involves not only the development of our capacity for knowledge but also our conscience, that is our sense of responsibility.

For Husserl, every human being should have the personal responsibility (Verantwortlichkeit) of knowing and trying to realize his or her own value. “Verantwortlichkeitsbewußtsein der Vernunft” is “das ethische Gewissen” (6) itself, considered as the infinite starting and ending point of every responsible act. The infinite task of the acquisition of good is so for us that “die Sorge einem zeitlich Unendlichen und im Zeitlichen dem Ewigen gilt – der Zukunft der Menschheit, dem Werden wahren Menschen gilt (...)
wofür wir uns doch selbst verantwortlich fühlen.” (7) The acquisition of good is infinite because the
time when it occurs is infinite and because human nature is opened to infinite possibilities of choice.
For that matter every man should contribute to this research to improve the society he lives in. “Die
einzelnen – in fact – nicht nebeneinander und gegeneinander, sondern in verschiedenen Formen der
Willensgemeinschaft (willentliche Verständigung) handeln.” (8) Then everyone has the duty to
contribute to the creation of a voluntary agreement through the increase of the common and personal
good.
Thus, if we want to summarize the main characteristics of the husserlian definition of good, we
might say that: 1) the personal good is not a personal good only but also a moral and social duty; 2) the
personal good coincides with the idea of an authentic human being who acts on the basis of the
principle of the best choice considered as the absolute value of every person; 3) the personal good is
deeply linked to the concept of responsibility which represents the infinite task of every ethical
conscience; 4) the ethical good can be a personal and common, a theoretical and practical good.
Now I will seek to develop one of the consequences of this definition of good by employing it in
today’s world.

Freedom and identity

In the previous paragraph I have pointed out the correspondence between common or personal
good and the man. Now, in order to introduce husserlian definition of good within our social context, I
have to clarify briefly husserlian definition of the subject.

About the subject Husserl writes: “der Andere ist Spiegelung meiner selbst.” (9) Every subject can be
deply in contact with other persons, because every man can live the analogue experience of another
man through his perceptions. He says: “Ich habe eine Monade in sich bezogen auf eine andere Monade
und habe die andere Monade bezogen oder sich infulungsmässig beziehen könnend auf die erste
Monade. Und so habe ich eine Vielheit von Monaden in wirklicher und möglicher Kommunikation,
dann aber in Beziehung auf sie eine identische Natur, eine intersubjektive, allen zusammenseienden
möglichen Monaden als möglich gemeinsame.” (10) Husserl affirms: “I am a monad” and “the other is
simply a pure modification of myself.” The other lies in me due to entropaty, that is through my
capability to perceive the other and to live the analogue feelings of mine. We are linked to each other
and this link is absolutely pure because it derives from my original structure. Everyone is born in fact in
a family or in a specific environment, surrounded by parents or friends. Everyone grows up in a
particular educational context with precise habits and rules. His history, his personal character and his
way of living are the result of all these interactions. No one is born in solitude and in a totally isolated
place. His behaviors and a big part of himself are the sum of all this. His corporeity is already
constituted by other monads. Like Husserl says: “Ich erfahre einen Leibkörper dort, und in eins mit
derer Erfahrung ist, und durch die Analogie mit meiner Leiblichkeit motiviert, eine zweite Monade
präsentiert.” (11) Even the experience of my pure corporeity as monad includes, through my
entropatical or analogue experience, the representation of a second monad.

Then, according to Husserl’s thesis, Rousseau’s famous sentence “l’homme est né libre, et partout il
est dans les fers” (12) seems to stress a theoretical situation that is difficult to justify. For Husserl
freedom from society and from the others is, often, an illusion because we are the others and society.
From the theoretical point of view the passage from a state of nature to a state of law and order is
difficult to explain because everyone from the moment of his birth is in a particular form of society.
We can not say that there is a moment when we get into a political society and we give up our freedom
because we are politics, we are the society. So our freedom is in society and, first of all, in our identity;
it consists in our capability to find new legal solutions to express our identity which change over time.
We can be free in time if, as Walzer writes (13), we make possible “the escape.” Women’s rights or the
right to divorce are an example of this specific connotation of freedom. All the rights and the rules
which are in society are results of our evolutionary struggle: we are formed by them and we create
them. Our identity changes, our needs change and so our duties and rights have to change too. The
freedom consists in this struggle for being what we want to be. “Freiheit ist,” Husserl write, “ein Ausdruck für das Vermögen und vor allem für den erworbenen Habitus kritischer Stellungnahme zu dem, was sich (…) als wahr, als wertvoll, als praktisch seinsollend bewusstseinsmäßig gibt.” (14) The absolute value of every person consists just in this capability to put into practice our freedom through the correspondence between duty and will. Our freedom considered as the expression of our identity is the “Gesollte” that everyone has to respect.

When we talk about freedom, we are talking about an effort that everyone has to make to express his identity. Freedom consists in the possibility for everyone to choose rationally and voluntary to be what everyone is, according to his rational will. So the freedom of a man, who is at the same time “the other,” consists in this capability to struggle in order to acquire new forms of expressions of identity which are more and more true. Human rights are the results of this struggle because they are at the same time the expressions of everyone’s freedom and moral, social and political duties. They are the perfect contemporary expression of the husserlian idea of good applied in a social, ethical and political context.

The method

The method to understand the distinction between good and bad can be understood always within the phenomenological description of the human being. According to the characteristics which came out during the analysis, for Husserl the subject is a monad originally connected to others and to the world it lives in. Husserl writes: “die objektive Welt als I d e e, als ideales Korrelat (…) ist wesensmäßig bezogen auf die selbst in der Idealität endloser Offenheit konstituierte Intersubjektivität (…). Danach gehört zur Konstitution der objektiven Welt wesensmäßig Harmonie der Monaden.” (15) The world is described as an idea correlated and referred to the inter-subjective life of every monad. The harmony of the world depends on the inter-subjective harmony between monads. From the ethical point of view, as we already know, this harmony can be generated by the effort of every monad to reach its good. “Es gehört also — Husserl writes — zu meinem echt menschlichen Leben dass ich nicht nur mich als Guten, sondern die gesamte Gemeinschaft als eine Gemeinschaft Guter wünschen und, soweit ich kann, in meinen praktischen Willens-, Zweckkreis nehmen muss. Ein wahrer Mensch sein ist ein wahrer Mensch sein wollen und beschließt in sich, Glied einer ‚wahren’ Menschheit sein wollen oder die Gemeinschaft, der man angehört, als eine wahre wollen, in den Grenzen praktischer Möglichkeit.” (16)

The good of every man corresponds to everyone’s authenticity, and every man hopes to live in a community formed by authentic and good people. Surely “eine jeweilige Gemeinschaft ist (…) eine Vielheit von Menschen, die teils von egoistischen, teils von altruistischen Motiven und meist passiv geleitet sind, Menschen, unter denen manche Selbstzucht haben, freie Überlegung, freie Entscheidung üben und manche dabei einen ethischen Lebenswillen.” (17) In this context the possibility of an inter-monadic harmony can be only approximately reached through the rational will of every monad. “Die ethische Besinnung (…), dass die ethische Form unseres individuellen Lebens diesem nur einen sehr beschränkten Wertgehalt geben kann und dass wir, wie alle gut Gesinnten, dahin wirken müssen, die Gemeinschaft nach Möglichkeit der Idee einer guten Gemeinschaft anzunähern in dem oben bezeichneten Sinn.” (18)

The method (that’s meta-odòn, the path) that Husserl shows in order to pursue this idea of good community is the epoché. The epoché consists in the neutralization of all empirical reality, fulfilled with the aim of understanding the original nature of the man. “Vollziehe ich aber die phänomenologische epoché, verfällt, wie die ganze Welt der natürlichen Thesis so ‘Ich, der Mensch’ der Ausschaltung, dann bleibt das reine Akterlebnis mit seinem eigenen Wesen zurück.” (19) Through the epoché we can change our ethical attitude toward ourselves and toward the world we live in. Namely, the epoché applied to the mundane man allowed to activate the responsible research of his own absolute value.

Consequently, in this phenomenological context, the bad derives from the incapability or lack of will of a man to express and to know his “good and bad parts.” In fact, everyone can be dominated by passion or egoism. The man “steht nun im täglichen Kampf und übt immer neue Entscheidung und
fühlt sich in ihr verantwortlich. Leidenschaften überrennen seinen guten Willen, er wird zu Überlegungen motiviert, wie sich dagegen versichere (...). Er irrt sich auch tief in der Beurteilung maßgebender Umstände, er vergreift in den Mitteln und wählt statt des Nützlichen das Schädliche, statt eines edleren Werts einen minder edlen. Oder er beurteilt andere Menschen falsch, und auch wo er von keinen egoistischen Motiven geleitet ist, sondern in wahrer Menschenliebe lebt (...). Alle solche Erfahrungen zeigen ihm, dass er unvollkommen ist, dass er lernen muss, sich vor Irrtum zu hüten, seiner Erkenntnisfähigkeit zu besinnen. So hat er neben der Verantwortung der Entscheidung im einzelnen Fall auch verantwortliche Sorgen für die Vorbereitung von Fähigkeiten von einzelnen Entscheidungen für Klasse von Fällen sichern könnten.” (20) The man can learn from the experiences of his past and can avoid repeating all of his mistakes derived from his irrational part. Every man is a whole constituted both by rational and irrational characteristics. Everyone has to know also his irrational, impulsive or usual aspects because only in this way can he better control himself and better understand the surrounding world. Our explication of the world is the result of the comprehension of ourselves; if we were able to explain and to manage our irrational part we could comprehend better the irrational part of the world. Then, the task of every person is to pursue his identity, changing his attitude toward himself and the world. The world is the product of our experience and we can improve it only through acting responsibly.

Notes

(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., p. 36.
(6) Husserliana XXVII, op. cit., p. 32.
(7) Ibid., p. 12.
(8) Ibid., p. 46.
(11) Ibid., p. 263.
(13) Walzer, M., Ragione e passione (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1999), p. 34.
(14) Husserliana XXVII, op. cit., p. 63.
(16) Husserliana XXVII, op. cit., p. 46.
(17) Ibid., pp. 46-7.
(18) Ibid.
(20) Husserliana XXVII, op. cit., p. 45.
Naturalizing Intentionality?
A Husserlian Contribution to the Internalism/Externalism Debate
Thomas Szanto

The philosophical and cognitivist project of naturalizing the mind represents undoubtedly one of the most pressing challenges Husserl's transcendental theory of consciousness is facing today. It is my contention that the future of Husserlian phenomenology is largely dependent on its success in contributing to the epistemological clarification of the very metaphysics underlying contemporary debates on naturalism in philosophy of mind.

Now, if there is minimal consensus within the highly diverging naturalist camps, it is the assumption that the naturalization of intentionality will in the long run provide the least troublesome or most plausible route to a full-fledged naturalistic theory of the mind. Recent attempts to naturalize intentional consciousness dominantly center upon two lines of argumentation: namely, (semantic) internalism and externalism.

In what follows I propose to face the issue of naturalizing intentionality by laying bare the common metaphysical implications of these two prima facie opposed positions from the perspective of Husserl's phenomenology. The guiding idea of my paper is that both internalistic and externalistic accounts of intentionality work on the common background assumption of scientific realism. I shall argue that Husserl's transcendental theory of intentional consciousness undermines the metaphysical legitimacy of scientific realism and, by the very same token, the cognitivist standard opposition of internalism and externalism in view of intentional content.

Internalizing or Externalizing Intentional Content?

To begin with, there is not only a notorious discord concerning the question of how to specify the verificational-criteria for determining whether the entity to be naturalized does at all constitute an epistemologically autonomous property; even amongst those who endorse a realistic stance towards intentional states there are fundamental disagreements on what a successful naturalization of intentionality would exactly amount to. Does it suffice to naturalize intentional content? If so, what would a naturalistic theory of intentional content have to explain? Or, is there actually more to the problem of naturalizing intentionality than intentional content alone?

I believe that in the context of the internalism-externalism debate the issue typically comes down to the problem of how to address the following two correlative concerns:

1) How is the very constitution of intentional states possible? Or to put it in the manner of intentional realism: how could the epistemic reality of intentional states possibly be captured within a naturalistic ontology, conceived as a continuous matrix of causal-fuctional interactions?

2) What determines the contents of these states? Accordingly, what (internal and/or external) properties are responsible for the individuation of intentional states?

Following common usage, roughly, what internalism holds is that the relation that intentional states entertain to their objects is determined by the internal function of the contents of these states. Thus, according to this view, the individuation of intentional states (their being about this or that specific object) is due to the intra-mentally fixed representational structure of their contents. To make things more complicated, internally construed contents are said to be narrow, if their reference to an intentional object is solely determined by the functional organization of an individual. On this picture, semantic internalism can be regarded as a position either entailing epistemological realism or anti-realism, depending on how one conceives of the relation between mental representations and external reality. One possibility is to construe this relation as merely epistemic; the other is to adhere to a
logical/conceptual or a foundational/causal dependence. But in either case, internalism is intrinsically bound to hold what H. Putnam has critically labelled “methodological solipsism.” (2) Methodological solipsism is the assumption that all one need grasp in order to know the properties of the state of affairs to which an individual subject refers to is the organization of the inner mental representations mirrored on the functional level of the brain of that individual subject. Roughly, this is the view adopted by prototypical internalists like J. Fodor (3) as a heuristic research strategy for a computational modelling of the mind.

Externalism, in contrast, can be conceived in one of the two ways: first, as the view that narrow, intentional contexts are not sufficient for fixing intentional objects, for reference is essentially co-determined in the intersubjective/social process of constituting meaning. Meaning in this construal is usually termed broad content. Alternatively, one can — à la McDowell (4) — define externalism in a more radical line of interpretation (and perhaps in a way more sympathetic to a Husserlian perspective (5)) as the view that content, construed narrowly, has no functional role in determining reference whatsoever. For the radical externalist, meaning, conceived as broad content, is originally embedded in the (real) world to which it refers, just as the subject, the bearer of broad content, is embedded in the intersubjective world of which it is a constituent. Both externalist accounts of broad content imply a version of epistemological realism, couched basically in a common-sense realist ontology. In a nutshell, although meaning is intrinsically related to the divergent conceptual sets of the referring subjects (socially, environmentally, etc.), reference in terms of the extension of meaning is ontologically not dependent on the respective conceptual frameworks at a given time.

What follows from these accounts for the project of naturalizing intentionality is this: if only we can reach a purely naturalistic description of intentional content (i.e., to a description which makes no reference to the intentional idiom, be it causal, functional, teleological, etc.), then the distinctive feature of the mental, namely, its “epistemic perspectivity” (6) subsequently can be fixed in naturalistic terms.

Given this brief outline of internalism and externalism, it is clear that both ways of characterizing the role meaning plays in determining reference share the assumption that the representational content of intentional acts is key to ascribing semantically and epistemologically evaluable intentional states to an organism at all. The point I wish to highlight here is that both models of the intentionality reduce the problem of the constitution of the epistemologically relevant properties of intentional states to the question of how to spell out the representational function of intentional content. (7) The epistemological idea that lies at the heart of this reduction might thus be called representational verificationism. It is the idea of representational verificationism that overtly or covertly governs all naturalistic attempts to explain the intentional correlation between mind and world in terms of empirically determining the objective properties of reference. Yet, as far as I see, the very possibility of representational verificationism is based on the ontology of scientific realism (8) — an ontology whose legitimacy was convincingly challenged by transcendental phenomenology about a hundred years ago.

The Phenomenological Test for Naturalizing Intentionality

The general epistemological task of phenomenology is to elucidate the conditions of possibility of the very givenness of an objective entity for a subjective being. For Husserl, intentionality marks the basic first-personal epistemic structure of this givenness. Hence, intentionality is not an internal property of consciousness amongst its other cognitive properties (like, e.g., attentiveness), but the hallmark of its very phenomenal mode of being. Intentionality is the overall dispositional state or feature of consciousness as such.

On the phenomenological account — in contrast to the cognitivist paradigm — the question concerning the constitution of intentional states is not: “what makes a representation to an internal and consequently to a mental representation?” In fact, within the metaphysical framework of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, this question is, strictly speaking, nonsensical. For Husserl, the question of the constitution of intentionality cannot be a matter of determining which properties (internal or external) give consciousness the very function of referring to a transcendent object. A phenomenological theory
of the constitution of intentional consciousness is not to be confused with the quasi-inductive method of explaining the constitution of intentional states by determining the representational function of intentional contents. Just as for Husserl the referential function of a meaningful expression is descriptively not deducible from any single property of consciousness other than its intrinsic intentionality, so also the function of being intentional is a descriptively ultimate property of being conscious of something. In short: intentionality constitutes the openness of the mind to the world of meanings. Or more properly: intentional consciousness is nothing but the phenomenological title for this openness. The fact that the world appears to the mind means that the world bears objective sense for a subject.

Phenomenologically viewed, there are two levels to the immanence of mental states, which must be distinguished: namely, the intentional immanence of — broadly speaking — objectifying representations and the real (reell) immanence of non-representational phenomenal states. According to Husserl, when performing an intentional act or simply being in an intentional state, we are not directed to the intentional act nor to the intentional — sensual, perceptual or signitive — contents the acts bestow with objective meaning, but to the intentional object itself. It is only by virtue of performing the phenomenological reflexion that the real immanent field of the noetic act-components of intentionality is unfolded. So we might well say that the “intentional stance,” that is the ability to reflect thematically on the intentional object as intended by the act, is first brought to the fore by the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. However, the core of the the phenomenal aspect of intentional consciousness, the living through the experience of something functions unthematically and prereflectively in every conscious act — independently of whether we perform the reduction or not.

Thus, what has to be markedly distinguished within every intentional state is the relational mode of object directedness and the non-relational mode of performing this relational direction. The latter mode of intentional consciousness, the experiential practicing of intentionality, is an intransitive consciousness of one’s being in an intentional state. Its intrinsic subjective character cannot in principle be totally captured by a third-personal description. It is true that every consciously performed intentional act can be reflectively turned into an intentional object of a succeeding higher-order intentional act. But what is thus objectified are solely the properties of the relational contents of the act, not the phenomenal aspect of actually performing the intentional relation. (11)

The crucial mistake of both semantic internalism and externalism is to separate the two intrinsically co-relative aspects of intentional consciousness. What has to be emphasized in connection with the internalism-externalism debate is that intentional content must not be internalistically conceived as the result of a merely formal and syntactical interplay between the different “noematic levels,” but rather as the result of the interplay of the experiential horizons in which the experiencing subject is constitutively embedded. (13)

In the given context, Husserl’s transcendental-idealistic stance is then best captured as the epistemological position alternative to the two extremes of either — externalistically — naturalizing or — internalistically — “over-intentionalizing” the phenomenal “region of sense.” Husserl shows not only that the very attempt to naturalize the phenomenal level of intentionality is fundamentally flawed; he is also well aware that this does not mean that the objective space of sense in which the subject is embedded is exhaustedly characterised by being purely intentional. For, as Husserl succinctly points out: “The being of living through an experience is not the being of an object.” Yet it is precisely this fine-grained phenomenological distinction that the fundamental epistemological distinction between first- and third-person-perspective is based on and which in turn represents the very test for naturalizing intentional consciousness.

To conclude, the lesson to be drawn from the phenomenological account of consciousness for the specific project of naturalizing intentionality is this: if naturalizing means to provide an explanatory framework of the relation between mind and world capable of a complete integration into the realistic ontology of the natural sciences, then the naturalization of intentional consciousness must fail in principle. One can neither naturalize consciousness by simply internalizing the properties of intentional objects nor by simply externalizing the properties of phenomenal experiences. So if there is more to
the concept of intentional consciousness than what is contained inside or outside the head — that is, if there is more to intentionality than intentional content — we had better stick to results obtained by transcendental phenomenology thus far, instead of taking the project of naturalizing consciousness for granted. (4)

Notes


(14) Cf., e.g., Dretske, F., Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 1995).


(4) This paper is part of a research project supported by the DOC-Program of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.
The Body of Phenomenology; Unforeseen Phenomenological Outcomes of Biotechnologies

Martin G. Weiss

Preliminary Remark

Just as rationalization, with its tendency to objectivity, in the end leads to the destabilization of any kind of substantialism (at least for Nietzsche), the biotechnologies, which were originally intended as an extreme method of bodily control, are becoming the most blatant example of how this domination is not possible. That is to say, there can be no totally autonomous subject completely cut off from whatever historical-bodily determination. The desire to absolutely control human animality by way of reason, as expressed in the biotechnologies, transforms itself into the incontrovertible demonstration of humanity's constitutive finitude and of the unsustainability of the dualistic mind-body-concept. So biotechnologies paradoxically became a hint for the up-to-datedness of the phenomenology of the body established by Edmund Husserl and developed further by Jean-Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Hermann Schmitz und Bernhard Waldenfels.

The Body-Nature-Equation and its Dissolution by Biotechnologies

Starting with Plato and enforced by the Christian tradition, on the one side the body has been opposed to the mind and on the other side identified with "nature." In the history of philosophy it is possible to identify three main concepts of nature: First, the word "nature" designates the "essence" of things. Second, the term "nature" is used to indicate the realm of the inorganic given death matter, which results from itself and cannot be ascribed to human acting. Third, the term "nature" is used to designate the realm of live, of the beings which have the principle of their motion in themselves, as Aristotle puts it, whereas Aristotle's concept of motion includes local movement as well as becoming and dying. All these traditional meanings of nature, essence, matter and life, coincide in one aspect: what is natural is independent of the human subject. Nature is objective, the other in relation to the human being, that which resists the human will, which again is the essential attribute of reality at least for Schelling, one of the fathers of German Idealism.

Now the contemporary Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo identifies "reality" with power, or with violence, and this in turn with the kind of speech that allows no contradiction. By reality, Vattimo means the violent immediacy of the "direct force of the given, an incontestable self-obtrusion of the an sich ["as such' or 'in-itself']." This reality is violent, as violence is definable only as the evident ground that excludes all contradiction. Vattimo identifies violence with naked actuality, with an ultimate "resort, which one does not transcend and which silences all questioning, as it terminates the conversation." Here, Vattimo does not locate violence in the dominance of the general over the particular, as existentialism had, but in the rendering impossible of free contradiction in the widest sense of the word. According to Vattimo, this non-questionable, and therefore by definition violent real, i.e., the objective, is being increasingly weakened by the findings of modern science: "Modern science, heir and completion of metaphysics, is that which transforms the world to a place where there are no (more) facts, but only interpretations."

The same dissolution of objectivity is currently occurring in anthropology, because new biotechnological practices are undermining the concept of a stable and given human nature (i.e., the body) as biological basis for human ratio.

Defined as animal rationale, or rationabile as Kant puts it, the human being is considered as the animal, which is not yet what it is, but has to become what it is. Up to now this process was limited to the ratio, whereas the natural side remained untouched. The human being was manipulable, but never producible; and this because the biological nature remained unttouchable. But with the rise of biotechnology, also this last constant term is no longer something fixed. In the age of biotechnology the expression "human nature," in the sense of "biological substratum" as well as in the sense of "essence," has lost its meaning. What consequences does this loss of "essence" have for the human
self-conception? When the difference between grooving and producing becomes unclear, then it's impossible to consider the human nature as something given. Is this the beginning of posthumanity?

Concerning this question, the actual philosophical discourse offers two different approaches. The first could be described as “conservative,” driven by the fear of losing the “essence” of what is human. The exponents of this approach try to maintain the concept of human nature as some sort of unchangeable norm. This concept is very similar to the old-fashioned metaphysics of substance and is therefore not very satisfying. The “progressive” position instead embraces the dissolution of human nature as ultimate liberation and emancipation from the biological boundaries, which obstruct human freedom, which for this position is the very essence of man. In this view the human animal represents only a transitory stage in the evolutionary history of this species, which has not yet reached its end. The human animal is not yet what it has to be, but must achieve his very essence by enhancing his proper nature. This thesis, commonly labelled as “Posthumanism” is surprisingly also the core of the classical Humanism, which identifies man as the animal whose specific essence consist in not having a given essence at all. Man is the only being, which is not what it is, but, as essentially free, has to decide by himself what to be. In his “Oration on the Dignity Of Men,” a sort of humanist manifesto published in 1486 Pico della Mirandola writes:

Finally, the Great Artisan mandated that this creature who would receive nothing proper to himself shall have joint possession of whatever nature had been given to any other creature. He made man a creature of indeterminate and indifferent nature, and, placing him in the middle of the world, said to him: ‘Adam, we give you no fixed place to live, no form that is peculiar to you, nor any function that is yours alone. According to your desires and judgment, you will have and possess whatever place to live, whatever form, and whatever functions you yourself choose. All other things have a limited and fixed nature prescribed and bounded by our laws. You, with no limit or no bound, may choose for yourself the limits and bounds of your nature. We have placed you at the world's center so that you may survey everything else in the world. We have made you neither of heavenly nor of earthly stuff, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with free choice and dignity, you may fashion yourself into whatever form you choose. To you is granted the power of degrading yourself into the lower forms of life, the beasts, and to you is granted the power, contained in your intellect and judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, the divine. (5)

Whereas the conservative faction tries to save a normative concept of nature, risking thereby falling into the naturalistic fallacy which deduces norms from facts, the posthumanist or genuine humanist position forgets the constitutive contingency of the human being and is based on the latent idea that the human body is only the accidental substratum of human freedom. This is because only if one thinks that the free subject is something different from his physical incarnation, is it possible to identify the control over the body as liberation of the subject.

So both positions are problematic. The first one because it tries to maintain a concept, which risks being overruled by the developments of biotechnologies; the other because its concept, standing in the tradition of Descartes and the Enlightenment, is subject to the “dialectics of enlightenment” described by Adorno and Horkheimer: What started as liberation from the boundaries of the biological nature of man turns into reification of the human being. So the pretended liberation from nature results in a new form of manipulability, as the alleged liberation of the subject from its corporal limitations finally proves to be a new sort of suppression of the human being, who thus tragically learns that the body is not the grave of the soul, to quote Plato, but the only mode in which the mind exists. Given that, perhaps there is a third way to read Biotechnology.

In fact, the dissolution of human nature, which is an effect of pharmacological, prosthetic and genetic manipulations of the human bios, can be read as an aspect of the weakening of being diagnosed by Vattimo. In this view, the dissolution of human nature caused by biotechnologies corresponds to the general tendency toward a weak ontology. In this view biotechnologies would only
realise in the field of philosophical anthropology the same dissolution, which already has taken place in epistemology. But this weakening also of the biological nature of man, which on the one hand leads to a new form of oppression, could on the other hand, according to Vattimo, also be interpreted as another sort of liberation: not as domination of nature through reification but as liberation from unquestionable objectivity. This is because the paradoxical effect of the technical attempt to control human nature through reification operated by biotechnologies finally results in the intuition of the essential “Unverfügbarkeit,” i.e., “unavailability” of the human “physis,” as Heidegger puts it. The effort of biotechnology to manipulate human nature, which represents the acme of reification, leads paradoxically to the insight that this ultimate reification, which aims at total control of the objective nature by the human subject, is not possible, as the alleged liberation of the subject through domination of nature (the classical program of the enlightenment), shows that in the case of biotechnology it is not a subject to take control of a mere body, but that what here is manipulated is the human being as a whole. So the unintentional effect of biotechnology, which is based on the uncritical assumption of a dualistic model of man — which defines man as connection between objective nature and subjective ratio — consists in the demonstration that this dualistic model is no longer suitable. Begun as consequence of the mind-body-dualism, biotechnology finally leads to the conclusion, that the human being is an indivisible unity, which also means that the aim of total control over the human bios ends in the demonstration of the constitutive “unavailability” of human nature, here in the sense of human essence. What becomes evident is the fact that biotechnologies cannot be seen as a sort of manipulation of the mere body perpetrated by a pure subject, because biotechnologies show that the object of manipulation is always the human being as a whole.

Two Concepts of Body-Mind-Relation. Materialism vs. Phenomenology

Even if one concedes that biotechnologies undermine the traditional dichotomist mind-body-concept, forcing us to conceive the human being as a mind-body-unity, still we do not know how to describe this unity, as both a phenomenological and a naturalistic description are possible. A strong version of the naturalistic conception can be found in the “Identity-Theory,” which stresses the identity of “mental states” with biochemical processes of the brain. From a phenomenological point of view this naturalistic position is not very satisfying because it is not able to explain the fundamental psychic activity, i.e., “intentionality.” “Intentionality” here means the “Korrelationsapriori” of “noesis” and “noema,” i.e., that psychic acts always refer to an object. To think means always to think something. The materialistic theories are not able to do justice to the mental, because all they can do is detect a concomitance of mental phenomena and certain biochemical processes. The mental as such can’t even be detected in this model. Maybe, someday, Physiology will be able to describe exactly what biochemical processes happen, when I see something red, but this information doesn’t say anything about what it means for me to see this color. The phenomenon as such remains outside this description.

“Intentionality” and “Phenomenality,” the two aspects the naturalistic model of the mind-body-unity is not able to explain, are at the core of the phenomenology of the body, that represent a more convincing concept of mind-body-unity. Phenomenology of the body, inaugurated by Husserl and developed by Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hermann Schmitz and Bernhard Waldenfels, does not try to reduce the mind to an epiphenomenon of the body, like the materialistic theories, but conceives the “living body” (Leib) as the way in which the human being exists. From an phenomenological point of view the body is the medium of our existence, i.e. “in-der-Welt-sein.” The body is both the medium of human acts and the place where the World appears. The description of the Body as medium of existence also clarifies how it is possible to be a body and at the same time to have a body.

If biotechnologies have paradoxically resulted in undermining the tradition mind-body-dualism, the question arising of how to conceive the newly discovered unity of man shows the importance of the phenomenological approach to the mind-body-problem, especially because the naturalistic model of
the mind-body-identity is not able to explain all aspects of this unity.

Notes

(2) Ibid., p. 107.
(4) Ibid., p. 34.x
Husserl is the founding father of phenomenology, but it has often been claimed that virtually all post-Husserlian phenomenologists ended up distancing themselves from most aspects of Husserl's original program. It has consequently been claimed that phenomenology is a tradition in name only. It has no common method and research program. It has even been suggested that Husserl was not only the founder of phenomenology, but also its sole true practitioner. I think the latter view, which for opposing reasons has been advocated by ardent Husserlians and anti-Husserlians alike, is wrong. It presents us with a distorted view of the influence of phenomenology in 20th century philosophy, and it conceals the extent to which post-Husserlian phenomenologists continued the work of the founder. Although phenomenology has in many ways developed as a heterogeneous movement with many branches; although, as Ricoeur famously put it, the history of phenomenology is the history of Husserlian heresies; (1) and although it would be an exaggeration to claim that phenomenology is a philosophical system with a clearly delineated body of doctrines, one should not overlook the overarching concerns and common themes that have united and continue to unite its proponents.

Many still tend to think of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's hermeneutical and existential phenomenology as excluding alternatives. The argument given is frequently that only the latter introduced the topics of intersubjectivity, sociality, embodiment, historicity, language, and interpretation into phenomenology and that this led to a decisive transformation of the Husserlian framework. Thus, according to the received view, Husserl's commitment to a Cartesian foundationalism made him conceive of phenomenology as an investigation of a detached transcendental ego for whom its own body, worldly things, and other subjects were but constituted objects spread out before its gaze. If this standard interpretation had been correct, it would indeed have been difficult to maintain that Husserl's phenomenology had much in common with Merleau-Ponty's or Heidegger's phenomenology. But we are dealing with a pejorative caricature that recent Husserl research has done much to dismantle. The continuing publication of *Husserliana* has made an increasing number of Husserl's research manuscripts available, and a study of these has made it clear that Husserl is a far more complex thinker than the standard reading is suggesting. He frequently anticipated and formulated many of the critical moves made by subsequent phenomenologists.

Steven Crowell recently claimed that the future prospects of phenomenology will depend on the talent of those who take it up. (2) As I see it, it will also depend upon their ability to articulate and strengthen what is common to the phenomenological enterprise instead of getting involved in the sectarian trench warfare that has regrettably plagued much of its history. A first step in this direction would be for phenomenologists to recognize and embrace the Husserlian heritage. This is in particular so, given that there are core features of the Husserlian methodology that remain indispensable to contemporary phenomenology, the most prominent one being the transcendental reduction.

But how can one today argue for the indispensability of the reduction? It is well known that already Heidegger criticized it. In truth, however, Heidegger didn't consider the reduction *per se* to be a problem, rather he argued that Husserl didn't think it through in a sufficiently radical manner. This objection has been repeated frequently by Heideggerians ever since. Let us take a closer look at a more recent version of this criticism, the one espoused by Marion.

According to Marion, Husserl is to be praised for his focus on various modes of givenness, but unfortunately, as it has been put, he “laisse interroger la donation dont il a pourtant accompli l'élargissement.” (3) In other words, Husserl fails to pose the fundamental question concerning givenness as such. What does giving mean, what is at all at play in the fact that something is given? This failure has wide-ranging implications. Rather than letting his investigation orient itself in accordance with the things themselves, Husserl is instead led by traditional, or to be more specific, Cartesian presuppositions and decisions. This is why Husserl's phenomenology ultimately remains
unphenomenological, (4) or at least not wholly phenomenological. (5) The phenomenality of the phenomena is reduced to the certitude of actual presence; (6) it is reduced to objectivity understood as an assured permanence. This focus on objective subsistence goes hand in hand with Husserl's inability to consider the nonpresent and absent. (7) This is why the Husserlian phenomenon – defined as and confined to presence for consciousness – is a flat phenomenon, a phenomenon without any depth. (8) But it is not sufficient simply to thematize the phenomena – which Husserl managed to do quite well - we also need to thematize their phenomenality. (9) Such a move will bring us from a surface phenomenology to a depth phenomenology. This move which might be considered the second phenomenological breakthrough (after Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen) was accomplished by Heidegger insofar as he calls for an investigation of the Being of beings. (10) Thus, another way of describing Husserl's fundamental mistake is by saying that he never understood that the true and innermost destination of phenomenology is to provide ontology with its proper method. (11) Of course, it could be, and it has been, objected in Husserl's defence, that Husserl does in fact speak repeatedly of the ontological dimension of phenomenology in works such as Cartesianische Meditationen, Ideen III, Erste Philosophie II, and Formale und transzendentale Logik. But the reply should be obvious. Although Husserl even prior to Heidegger maintained that phenomenology had ontological implications, this in no way signifies that he meant the same by ontology as Heidegger. (12) In fact, Husserl's ontology is and remains an ontology of objects. Beings are only in the measure that a judgment persists in determining them. His investigation of formal ontology, for instance, aims at articulating the general substratum of predication. (13) But for the very same reason, Husserl's ontology prevents or prohibits him from understanding the question of Being that Heidegger had posed. Despite Husserl's frequent emphasis on the cardinal difference between reality and consciousness, he never really understood that this difference amounts to an ontological difference, a difference in Being; rather he consistently took consciousness to be a region that could be objectively determined and failed to realize that its mode of Being differs radically from the mode of Being of worldly entities. (14) To summarize the criticism, Husserl's transcendental reduction “équivaut à une constitution d’objets. (a) Elle se déploie pour le Je intentionnel et constituant. (b) Elle lui donne des objets constitués, (c) pris dans des ontologies régionales toutes conformes, à travers l’ontologie formelle, à l’horizon de l’objectivité. (d) Elle exclut ainsi de la donation tout ce qui ne se laisse pas reconduire à l’objectivité, à savoir les différences principales de manières d’être (de la conscience, de l’ustensilité, du monde).” (15)

Let me summarize the main points: 1) Husserlian phenomenology doesn’t thematize the very phenomenality of the phenomena. 2) It privileges an active constituting. 3) It doesn’t do justice to the specific mode of being of consciousness since it consistently interprets it as a form of object being. 4) Finally, due to its emphasis on objective subsistence, Husserlian phenomenology has only an eye for presence; it fails to consider the givenness of the absent and non-present.

If this criticism holds true, I think it is fair to say that Husserlian phenomenology is beset with severe limitations, and that post-Husserlian phenomenology has had no choice but to break out of such a framework. But is the criticism valid? I don’t think so. In my view, Husserlian phenomenology has the resources to tackle all four issues: It has investigated the very dimension of phenomenality, rather than merely different types of phenomena. It has repeatedly emphasized to what extent intentional activity presupposes passivity. It has analysed the non-objectifying mode of Being of consciousness, and it has discussed the interplay between presence and absence in extenso. To put it differently, I think that Husserl himself most certainly passed beyond what might be called a flat, surface phenomenology. If there is anything that lacks depth, it is not Husserl's phenomenology, but the standard criticism of it.

It can be conceded straight away that there is an important and decisive difference between an investigation of object-intentionality, i.e., an investigation that explores the difference between perception, empathy, imagination and pictorial consciousness for instance, and the ontological question posed by Heidegger, but it is highly problematic to look for a possible parallel to this radicalization in Husserl's writings on formal ontology. Rather the obvious and natural place to look is of course in Husserl's writings on time. To put it differently, any serious attempt to gauge the radicality of the
Husserlian enterprise must necessarily discuss Husserl's writings on the deepest layers of constitution. It must discuss his writings on time and passive synthesis. It is in these writings that Husserl's most profound reflections on the structure of phenomenality, the nature of subjectivity, and the interplay between presence and absence is to be found.

Time, or rather space, will not permit me to account in detail for Husserl's sophisticated analyses of time-consciousness, self-consciousness, constitution, passivity, facticity, alterity, and intersubjectivity. Nor is it necessary, since all of these areas have already been discussed at length by numerous Husserl scholars in recent years. Thus, there is an extensive corpus of research readily available that any serious criticism of Husserl must take into account. So what I will do instead is simply to present a few key passages from different works of Husserl that speak directly against one of the frequently repeated criticisms, namely the claim that Husserl consistently conceived of the being of subjectivity as a form of object being.

Already in *Logische Untersuchungen* we find Husserl resisting this suggestion. In the 5th investigation, for instance, Husserl writes that the intentional experiences themselves are lived through, but he denies that they appear in an objectified manner; they are neither seen nor heard. They are conscious without being intentional objects. (16) This is not to deny that we can, in fact, direct our attention towards our experiences and thereby take them as objects of an inner perception, (17) but this only occurs the moment we reflect upon them. In contrast to Brentano, who famously held that our experiences are conscious by being taken as secondary objects, Husserl does not seek to identify the (self)givenness of our experiences with the givenness of objects. As he explicitly states in the 6th Investigation: “Erleben ist nicht Gegenständlichsein.” (18) Or as Husserl was to write 17 years later in the Bernau manuscripts: “Sein sein ist aber ein total anderes als das aller Objekte. Es ist eben Subjektsein...” (19)

We find Husserl occupied with a similar question in his 1906/07 lecture course *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*. He begins by observing that we are aware of the perceptual object when we are engaged in a perception. But what about the sensations and the perceptual experience itself? They are also conscious, but are not given as perceptual objects; they are not perceived? (20) We know that we can turn our attention away from the perceptual object and towards the perceptual experience. In this sense, it is possible to reflect upon the experience. To repeat the question, how is the perceptual experience given prior to reflection; how is it pre-reflectively present? (21) In 1906/07 Husserl answers the question by distinguishing between consciousness in the sense of experiential being and consciousness in the sense of intentionality. Whereas the latter involves directedness towards an object, i.e., object-consciousness, the former does not. As Husserl explicitly writes: “‘[E]rleben’ bedeutet nicht ein Gegenständlich-Haben und auf das Gegenständliche in dieser oder jener Weise ‘Beziehung haben’.” (22) And as he then continues a few pages later:

\[\text{Nicht verwechseln darf man das Bewusstsein vom gegenständlichen Hintergrund und das Bewusstsein im Sinn des Erlebtseins. Erlebnisse als solche haben ihr Sein, aber sie sind nicht Gegenstände von Apperzeptionen (wir kämen ja sonst auf einen unendlichen Regress). Der Hintergrund aber ist uns gegenständlich, er ist es durch den Komplex von apperzeptiven Erlebnissen, die ihn gleichsam konstituieren. Diese Gegenstände sind unbekleidet [...] aber etwas ganz anderes für uns als die bloßen Erlebnisse, z.B. die sie objektivierenden Apperzeptionen und Akterlebnisse selbst. [...] Das attentionale Bewusstsein des Hintergrund und das Bewusstsein als bloßes Erlebtsein ist ganz zu scheiden. (23)}\]

Husserl's position is, consequently, relatively unequivocal. An intentional experience is conscious of something different from itself, namely the object intended. At the same time, the experience also manifests itself. Thus, apart from being intentional, the experience is also characterized by what Husserl occasionally calls its “Urbewusstsein.” (24) This notion of *Urbewusstsein*, which Husserl already used in the 1906/07 lecture course, is not meant to denote a particular intentional experience. Rather, the term designates the pervasive dimension of pre-reflective and non-objectifying self-consciousness that is part and parcel of any occurring experience. (25)
Much more could be said, but I think it should at least be clear that I find the Heideggerian criticism of Husserl unsatisfactory. Marion is of course right in saying that Husserl frequently comes to us through Heidegger. But is there any reason to assign Heidegger’s Husserl interpretation a privileged status? Is there any reason to consider Heidegger’s account of the limitations of Husserl’s phenomenology a particularly reliable source? I don’t think so. Not only because of its own limited textual basis – Heidegger is by and large only referring to Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I, but certainly also because Heidegger had his own agenda, his own reasons for wanting to emphasize his own originality vis-à-vis his old teacher.

Coming back to the issue of the methodology, why did Husserl insist that we have to perform the reduction if we want to do phenomenology? The ultimate aim of the reductive procedure is not to enable us to describe objects or experiences as precisely and meticulously as possible, nor does it aim at an exhaustive investigation of the phenomena in all their factual diversity. No, its true task is to investigate the phenomena qua phenomena, that is, it is concerned with understanding the dimension of phenomenality and to explore its innermost structure and very condition of possibility. This task is a transcendental philosophical task. It is a move from a straightforward metaphysical or empirical investigation of objects to an investigation of the very framework of meaning and intelligibility that makes any such straightforward investigation possible in the first place. Contrary to widespread misunderstandings this methodological step is per se neither committed to Cartesian internalism, to a naïve metaphysics of presence, nor to the privileging of an active and controlling I. In my view, Husserl’s notion of reduction is the original breakthrough. It is the reflective move that once and for all opened the field of phenomenological research. It is an opening that is presupposed in every proposed radicalization by subsequent phenomenologists.

Notes

(4) Cf. ibid., p. 78.
(5) Cf. ibid., p. 124.
(6) Cf. ibid., p. 81.
(7) Cf. ibid., p. 89.
(8) Cf. ibid., pp. 90, 93, 97.
(9) Cf. ibid., p. 99.
(10) Cf. ibid., p. 159.
(12) Cf. ibid., p. 217.
(13) Cf. ibid., p. 230.
(14) Cf. ibid., pp. 77, 187-188.
(15) Ibid., p 304.
(17) Ibid., p.424.
(18) Ibid., p. 669.
(21) Ibid., p. 244.
(22) Ibid., p. 247.
(23) Ibid., p. 252.
The Possibility of Husserlian Phenomenological Practice
Elizabeth A. Behnke

In 1988, Margaret van de Pitte issued a challenge: have we indeed mastered the distinctive methods of phenomenology in a spirit of “resolute cooperation” (1) and carried Husserl’s project forward through original phenomenological investigation, or do we merely write “about” phenomenology instead of doing it? (2) It is true that there have been many appropriations and extensions of phenomenological method in areas beyond philosophy (notably in the human sciences), although many of these approaches take their cue from existential or hermeneutic phenomenology rather than appealing directly to Husserl’s own writings. However, we can also point to “a considerable number of good philosophers who know very well what Husserl said, who make ample use of his research results, and who nevertheless show not the slightest interest in plying the distinctive method that is supposed to have generated them.” (3) For me, this challenge is still relevant today, and I shall accordingly respond to it with a vision for the future of Husserlian phenomenology that includes not only the phenomenological philosophizing currently robustly underway, but also the grand experiment of Husserlian phenomenological practice.

Why an “experiment”? I am assuming that Husserlian phenomenological method is an abiding intersubjective possibility (4) irreducible to the philosophical use that Husserl himself made of it. (5) In contrast, Ingarden, for example, was unwilling to edit Husserl’s Bernau time manuscripts because he felt that the research project itself entailed an idealism that he could not endorse. (6) The only way to settle the issue is to test my assumption by putting Husserl’s methods into practice for ourselves. (7) But how are we to proceed? What principles must we follow? What style of investigation is at stake here? (8)

“To deal with these questions would require an extensive and thorough look at what Husserl does. This is meant quite literally, i.e., very often we ought not to follow what Husserl says about what he does, but what he actually does,” (9) something that requires a number of shifts in our way of reading him. These include suspending interest in philosophical “positions” in order to attend to dimensions of method; deactivating attention to “arguments” in order to bring other methods into view; focusing not on passages where Husserl explicitly discusses these methods, but on passages where they are actually in play; tracing the results of these investigations back to the specific type of practice that produced them; and testing these results by reading in a thoroughly participatory way, consulting the appropriate experiential evidence in each case. (10)

I find that when I read Husserl in this fashion, I “see what he means” with far greater clarity, precisely because in order to consult the relevant phenomena for myself, I must take up a certain attitude, make certain sorts of distinctions, and follow him experientially at every step. When I do this, the words leap off the page in a new way. At the same time, however, I am “practicing” assuming these attitudes, making these distinctions, and cashing in these words for the fulfilling evidence, just as musicians and athletes “practice” their craft and hone their skills. The result is twofold: I am able both to take a critical stance toward Husserl’s own findings, (11) and to put his methods into practice on themes that he himself did not address.

It is true that other authors’ explications and demonstrations of Husserlian methods can be enormously helpful. (12) But there can be no substitute for attempting to take up phenomenological practice for oneself and on one’s own, engaging, leibhaft, in the lived experience of doing original phenomenological investigation. And as I have already indicated, taking Husserl’s own descriptive analyses as musical “scores” that I must “perform” in order to make full sense of them—where the “performance” consists of giving his claims an appropriately phenomenological “realization” (13)—can be a very effective way of tuning in to Husserlian phenomenological practice and making its possibilities my own. (14)

Of course, I do indeed want to acknowledge that there can be many possible directions for the future of Husserlian research, encompassing not only the ongoing labor of editing and exegesis, but
also the work of clarifying (or seeking to systematize) his philosophical position; unearthing the traces of his assistants’ concerns in the writings he gave them to edit; (15) using his approach to address problems arising within philosophical traditions outside of phenomenology; (16) defending him against various “post-phenomenological” (mis)understandings; and so on. But for me, it is equally crucial to maintain a permanent place for Husserlian phenomenological investigation as well, as a continually open possibility of taking up the powerful yet protean theoretical practice that is Husserl’s distinctive legacy and bringing it to bear in original investigations of the emerging problems of our times. (17)

Notes

(1) 19-1/16f. All references in the form: volume number/page number(s) are to Husserliana.
(3) Ibid. 34.
(4) For me, Husserlian phenomenological practice displays a certain “open generosity” in that it is available in principle to “anyone” who is able to adopt certain attitudes, perform certain shifts, engage in certain operations, etc. (cf. 15/384 n.1), just as the set of numbers can be generated (and/or reactivated) by anyone who is able to count and to grasp the principle of an open-infinite “und so weiter” in its essential iterability. This does not mean that every beginner will instantaneously understand higher mathematics, or that each newcomer to the phenomenological tradition will immediately be able to carry out complex phenomenological analyses. It does, however, stand in contrast to a tendency in some interpretively-accented approaches within the phenomenological tradition (in the broader sense) to award a special role to an interpreter whose task is in fact to do something that not “everyone” can do—namely, to provide an interpretive framework in terms of which something is to be understood, a task that is necessary precisely because the desired interpretation is “zunächst und zumeist” hidden from view, requiring the intervention of a privileged figure who “somehow” already has access to the “correct” interpretation. Cf. Harald Delius, “Descriptive Interpretation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (1952–53), 305–23, especially 321ff.; see also Thomas M. Seebohm, “The Phenomenological Movement: A Tradition without Method? Merleau-Ponty and Husserl,” in Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, ed. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 53ff., on the related topos of understanding an author better than s/he understands him/herself.
(5) Cf. not only the distinction between “reinen Phänomenologie” and “phänomenologischen Philosophie” in the title of the Ideen—as well as the distinction between “phänomenologische Methode” and “phänomenologische Philosophie” in the title of the 1922 London Lectures—but also the foreword to the inaugural issue of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (1913), which begins by clearly distinguishing “Phänomenologie” and “phänomenologisch fundierte Philosophie,” then explicitly claims that a phenomenological approach (understood as encompassing both phenomenological methods and achievements of investigations using these methods) can be fruitful not only for philosophical problems in the proper sense, but also for extra-philosophical disciplines (see 25/63f.). Thus my assumption that Husserlian phenomenological practice is an abiding intersubjective possibility sides with the notion of phenomenology as a rigorous science, rather than merely seeing “phenomenology” as one philosophy among others (whether we take it as “a” philosophy linked with Husserl’s name, or as several philosophies linked with several names and standing in various relations of indebtedness and critique, etc.). And what I wish to emphasize is that the “rigor” of this rigorous science does not depend solely on its engagement with issues of ultimate legitimation, but is also tied to the possibility of intersubjective (and generative) corroboration and transmission not only of research results, but also of the research methods used to arrive at them and the criteria used to evaluate them.
(6) See Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl, ed. Roman Ingarden (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 139, 154f. On Ingarden’s reading of

(7) This can be seen as a version of Husserl’s method of critique of presuppositions; see 19-1/24, where the principle of “presuppositionlessness” is quite specifically characterized as requiring the exclusion of any claims “die nicht phänomenologisch voll und ganz realisiert werden können.” Thus the properly phenomenological way to test the presupposition that Husserlian phenomenological practice is an intersubjectively available possibility, irreducible to the historical Husserl and his own philosophical commitments or concerns, is to consult the relevant experiential evidence by actually attempting to do some “Husserlian” phenomenological investigation. And it is this attempt per se that I term the “grand experiment” of phenomenological practice (in contrast to, e.g., my own more modest series of “experiments in phenomenological practice” on themes connected with phenomenology of the body), an experiment open to anyone interested in trying it out (and able to learn the methodical approach in question)—cf. Richard M. Zaner, “The Phenomenology of Epistemic Claims and its Bearing on the Essence of Philosophy,” in Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 30ff.


(10) Husserl emphasizes that it is not enough merely to read “attentively”; rather, one must adopt an attitude of “unprejudiced cooperation” and consult the phenomenon under discussion for oneself in order to co-perform the analyses and descriptions (20-1/319, 326), “cashing in” or “redeeming” the words for what fulfils them, i.e., bringing what is emptily intended in them to the mode of itself-givenness appropriate to the type of experiencing/experienceable in question (cf. 19-1/10; 2/62; 16/9; 25/32; 3-1/41). This style of reading is not only necessary in order to understand Husserl’s investigations as “investigations,” but also supplies a criterion for distinguishing which passages are actually examples of phenomenological description and analysis: if a given passage will not support our efforts to cash in the words for the Evidenz, it is likely that the passage in question is a text of another sort (e.g., a summary of, or polemic against, a certain philosophical position) rather than a report of the results of phenomenological investigation. Note also that this style of participatory reading must be eidetically attuned: I need not have access to the very same example Husserl was describing—e.g., the brown beer bottle he was looking at in Seefeld during the 1905 summer vacation (see 10/237ff.)—but can consult another example of the style or structure in question, following a principle of “appropriate substitutability,” a locution coined to complement Robert Sokolowski’s important notion of “appropriate sensibility”; see his Husserlian Meditations (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 108–109.

(11) Consulting the appropriate experiential evidence for myself can allow me either to confirm or to challenge Husserl’s analyses; being motivated to cancel his findings outright (which implies being unable to corroborate them in any respect) would appear to be rather rare, but in many cases, it may well be possible to correct his descriptions and to carry his investigations further or to contextualize his results (e.g., by showing that they hold good at a different degree of universality than previously thought). Thus the rigor and radicality of Husserlian phenomenological practice may require the retroactive revision of results already achieved. However, my critical evaluation of these results must
take into consideration the type of experiencing that is at stake in the investigation (e.g., transcendental rather than mundane) and the type of account that is being offered (e.g., static rather than genetic), as well as the larger context of motivation guiding the research at any given moment (e.g., the task of working out the correlational a priori rather than that of addressing the question of being or providing a metaphysics of the lifeworld). On the latter, cf., e.g., Gerhard Funke, Phänomenologie—Metaphysik oder Methode? (Bonn: Bouvier, 1966). Note, however, that the very fact that Husserlian research can be, and has been, transposed out of its original context of motivation and into other philosophical contexts of relevance supports the distinction between “Phänomenologie” and “phänomenologisch fundierte Philosophie.”


(13) 19-1/24

(14) I find that this also helps me to recognize and value descriptive phenomenological analyses conducted within other methodological horizons—e.g., the newly available work of Romanian phenomenologist Alexandru Dragomir, who studied with Heidegger. See Studia Phaenomenologica 4/3–4 (2004) for a special issue devoted to his work.

(15) See, e.g., Marianne Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 73–89, 153–62, on Stein’s editorial work on Ideen II, carried out under a commitment to Ingarden’s position in general and to a non-idealistic conception of “constitution” in particular; Ronald Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology 1928–1938 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), on Fink’s efforts not only to systematize, but to shape the direction of Husserl’s later work, efforts carried out under the influence of Heidegger’s question of being and Hegel’s speculative thinking.

(16) This is, for example, one of the aims of the working group “Phénoménologies” (Liège), who—as the plural form of their name indicates—also draw upon other methods besides Husserl’s; see their new e-journal, Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique.

(17) A network has recently been formed under the title of an “Initiative in Phenomenological Practice” to further this aim in a context of disciplinary as well as methodological pluralism.
The Future of Phenomenology. Naturalization and Phenomenology of Perception
Carmelo Calì

One of the most hotly debated issues, from where the discussion about the features and the usefulness of phenomenology for contemporary scientific and philosophical research has evolved so far, has been the naturalization of phenomenology. The underlying assumption is that to settle the debate is to define to what extent phenomenology is suitable for the framework of the actual cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind paradigms. The debate, involving phenomenologists, post analytic philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists, unavoidably represents a wide range of positions.

Thus, I am going to outline some of these positions and then argue that Husserlian phenomenology does not have to wait for a radical theoretical reconstruction in order to be taken as able to integrate actual research, though it necessarily demands to let some of its claims drop or at least being reinterpreted in the light of current theoretical, experimental needs.

The Naturalization Problem Continuum

To discuss some implications of the naturalization problem, I am going to see whether a few positions can be mapped onto a continuum ranging from the most favourable to the less consonant ones. It must be noticed that I am going to take into account neither the claims that phenomenology is something which might be directly ascribed to some brain mechanisms or to some properties of physical matter adequately arranged at the right level of low energy scales, nor the claims that state an absolute skepticism about the possibility of relating phenomenology to contemporary scientific research. I don't aim at covering every position in this controversy, but only to discuss some issues and objections to the naturalization position.

At one end, we have the Petitot & Varela & Pachoud & Roy (1999) proposal. They claim that Husserlian phenomenology might be used to close the explanatory gap which affects the cognitive sciences, thanks to the descriptions and analyses Husserl carried out, often found to be supporting recent findings. The accounts provided by Husserl of the perspective dependence of the phenomenal world, of consciousness, of intentionality and time-space ordering of experience are supposed to be rich enough to give a satisfactory answer to the question about what kind of relationship holds between a computational and a phenomenological mind raised by Jackendoff (1987). But this could be the case only if Husserlian phenomenology is properly fitted to the explanatory framework of contemporary science, which stands on the claim that every property at stake must be continuous with properties admitted by natural sciences. This claim entails what is dubbed "naturalization of phenomenology" and requests that Husserl's anti-naturalism must be refused, the alleged impossibility of a mathematical formulation of phenomenological descriptions must be abandoned. In a nutshell, the transcendental dimension of phenomenology as it covers the descriptions and analyses with a philosophical interpretation unfit to integrate with those sciences which could turn them to profit must be dropped.

On the other hand, we have Zahavi (2004) who points out, very clearly, some objections. He maintains that there are meaningful philosophical reasons for Husserl's (1987) antinaturalism to be upheld. Husserl stressed the difference between phenomenological psychology and transcendent phenomenology, because phenomenology doesn't simply contribute to positive knowledge but investigates its basis and possibility. The need for phenomenological reduction would be justified, for, it avoids any confusion with a natural and objectivist investigation, which would be to blame for treating consciousness as one object among the others in the world, whether it be taken as a psychical or a physical one. Hence, it is not possible to part the transcendental interpretation from phenomenology, because it not only prevents phenomenology from the "natural attitude", as is the case with the non-reductionist phenomenological psychology, but it also lets consciousness be the condition for any
meaning, truth, validity, appearance.

Thus Zahavi questions that a mutual exchange between phenomenology and cognitive sciences could result in a closure of the explanatory gap, and that a mathematical reconstruction would be of any profitable sense at all or that there might be a way to explain how experiences could be properties of the brain.

Both Petitot & Varela & Pachoud & Roy (1999) and Zahavi (2004) recognize many kinds of relationships between phenomenology and cognitive sciences that could instantiate their own points of view. So, from the naturalization point of view, the instances amount to (a) the reductionism of the sort involved by the Identity Theory; (b) the "as if" strategy formulated by Dennett in his heterophenomenology; (c) the mutual constraining-variety. This ranges from (c1) the bridge locus argument, supporting the research of linking propositions between explanatory neural properties and phenomenal properties where the link is provided by a to be specified looking like-relation, to (c2) the isomorphist thesis, wherein the phenomenological descriptions are relevant in indentifying the right physiological mechanisms which in turn explains them, and finally to (c3) the operational generative thesis which allows for phenomenology and, say, neurobiology to share a common abstract and formal definition of properties that could belong to both at the same time, if considered at the right level of emergence. From the transcendentalist point of view, there is room for (d) the phenomenologists and scientists refusal of making their researches interact because of alleged independence for the former and the discredit of phenomenology by the latter; (e) one way relation from phenomenology, which would lay bare the foundation for other sciences, to empirical science, whose findings are not able to affect phenomenology; (f) the sharp distinction between a phenomenological psychology, which could contribute to empirical science, and the untouched transcendental phenomenology; (g) the mutual exchange between phenomenology and science only if transcendental phenomenology will change the very concept of nature and accordingly of naturalization.

A Mutual Constraining Isomorphism: The Case of Phenomenology as Formal Theory of Perception

Exploiting the points above mentioned, I will argue that some difficulties stem from not considering phenomenology already as a descriptive science dealing with the structures of different kinds of appearances and providing a model of the various types of phenomnic manifolds from a phenomenological explanatory stance. Husserl (1973) provides a striking example of the way phenomenology can explain the laws ruling the visual world by appealing to concepts that are fit to a mathematical modelling. These analyses employ widely Riemann’s concept of the n-dimensionality continuum and Weierstrass’ concept of field, which prove to be profitable both in mathematical analysis and in physical science.

On the one hand, the visual object, with its aspects and phenomenal properties, is considered as a whole made up by parts being its variables varying along defined dimensions, corresponding to the visual and objective field multifariousness (Vielfältigkeit). Thus, the whole object is functionally equivalent to a manifold (Mannifältigkeit) constituted by groups of appearances which are ordered spatio-temporally by their positions and variations as to an inner manifold (the object field glanced at a current scrutiny), and a wider manifold (the neighbouring object fields). The relationships holding between these two manifolds are described then in terms of coeherent connections (Zusammenhänge) among the appearances and various kinaesthetic manifolds.

On the other hand, the very concepts used by Husserl to designate the operations and the interconnections obtaining in the manifold system of vision have an intrinsic mathematical or geometrical meaning, such as congruency (Übereinstimmung), overlapping (Deckung), overlaying (Bedeckung), or admit a formal characterization, such as independence and non-independence. These observations make clear that it is neither necessary nor is it maybe desirable to narrow Husserlian phenomenology down to a mere philosophy of consciousness. Even though as an eidetic material science, as opposed to an eidetic formal one, phenomenology provides in a clear specifiable way the objective laws ruling a particular phenomnic dominion, giving the set of what pertains typically and
generally to it. The possibility of a formal, even mathematical, formulation of the laws described by Husserl's analyses does not imply Computational Mentalism, according to which mental contents consist of mathematically definable operations on symbolic representations. It amounts only to saying that it is possible to build a mathematical model endowed with compelling phenomenological features, accordingly to what has been stated as the argument (c). In fact, this model might correspond to specific and non trivial organizational laws of the visual world and possess an explanatory or predictive power on its own. An example is the concept of double object elaborated by Husserl (1980) which has been given a great explanatory value in picture perception theory as Niederée & Heyer (2003) attest.

This interpretation leads to the refutation of argument (d) and the assessment of argument (f) in a different way. To be sure, there remains in Husserl's view a difference between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. However, one might assume a quite deflationary view about this distinction. If phenomenology is also a descriptive science of the phenomenal objective side of experience, then phenomenological psychology might be dealing with the phenomenal subjective side of it, thus contributing in psychophysics to relate phenomenological (how things look) and physical properties as Horst (2005) points out. The importance of phenomenological data for the psychophysical study of the Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet effect plays against naturalization form (a) and (b). At the same time, the anti-objectivistic side of transcendental phenomenology could be rephrased in a more contemporary flavour as the compelling request for a pure theory of consciousness or perception, that is an abstract theory which employs only concepts derived from analyses of the intrinsic structure of perception. The reasons Mausfeld (2002) expounds for such a theory sound strikingly similar to those supporting Husserlian transcendentalism: phenomena must be studied in a non reductionist way. Therefore, a theory of perception must be formal in that it must not borrow its fundamental concepts primarily from physics or physiology, thus avoiding what Mausfeld calls the physicalistic trap. It is a pure theory of perception with the concepts mirroring the way the observer parses the world to specify the level and extent at which physical and physiological concepts might play an explanatory role.

These considerations make the position (c) look like a plausible one, because they exclude an incommensurability between Husserlian phenomenology, mathematical modelling and the needs of a modern scientific perception theory. But how to fit phenomenology as a formal theory of perception with a mutual isomorphism constraint? The general principle could be shaped as the strong (c3), taking as example works such as Petitot (2003), Smith (1993), Petitot & Smith (1997), but for the time being it seems better to assume a balanced version of (c2), while admitting a variety of cross-talk cases between phenomenology and contemporary sciences. Overgaard (2004) challenges this possibility by requesting that the constraining must be fully reciprocal. I think this condition could be met. Phenomenology constrains cognitive sciences with its rich descriptions, fully specifiable at the desired formal level, thus letting models be built up and collecting richly defined data in order to find neural correlates which match the structure of appearances, as Todorovic (1987) suggests, whose claim makes room for a structural reinterpretation of (c1). Cognitive sciences constrain phenomenology in such a way that a phenomenologist is not forced to change her description only because a new brain area is found to be causally involved, but she does have to feel compelled to do that if a neurobiological study finds that some binding relations, structurally corresponding to those dependence relations held as fundamental ones, are a by-product of more fundamental ones. This means that the isomorphism constraint must be kept at the relevant matching level, which causes a change in the phenomenological explanation of phenomenal relations. This last specification narrows a bit the (c2) argument and rests upon the conviction that phenomena are neither theoretical posits nor subjective qualia, but instead immediate, reproducible, undeniable facts of experience and hence a prime source of scientific investigation, as Ehrenstein & Spillmann & Sarris (2003) argue. Finally, this makes the (g) assumption unclear and unnecessary.

Literature


(5) Mausfeld, R. (2002). The physicalistic trap in perception theory. In Heyer D. & Mausfeld R. (Ed.), Perception and the physical world (pp. 75 - 114), Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.


The Future of Husserlian Phenomenology
David Carr

Here are a few loosely related topics that come to my mind when I think of the future of Husserlian phenomenology:

Future and Past

In his early years Husserl was one of those thinkers who believed in a sharp distinction between “doing” philosophy and doing its history. In this he was like his admired predecessor, Descartes; and many philosophers who came later, notably in the analytic tradition, have shared this view. Such philosophers often share another belief, that the key to “doing” philosophy is to be found in a method: the Cartesian method, the phenomenological method, the method of “linguistic analysis,” and the like. To solve or dissolve philosophy’s problems, we need only to find and apply the right method. The history of philosophy can be left to historians of ideas. Critics of the phenomenological tradition, from within and from without, often express their irritation that so many books are written about Husserl, about Heidegger, about Merleau-Ponty, and so few are devoted to “doing” phenomenology. Isn’t this a betrayal of Husserl’s spirit? And given the many volumes of pedantic scholarship and trivial philological interpretation, these sentiments are understandable.

When we indulge these sentiments, however, it is useful to remember that in his later years Husserl somewhat changed his view on this matter. What he realized was that the problems of philosophy, our idea of “doing” philosophy, our ideas of method, do not simply hang there in the air, waiting for us to take them up; they come to us from the tradition, whether we are aware of it or not. To be fully conscious of what we are “doing,” we need to be aware of where it comes from. The history of philosophy and of phenomenology can be done badly, to be sure; but then “doing” phenomenology can be done very badly too. And both can be done very well. Like the future in general, the future of phenomenology cannot be cut off from its past.

Where is the future?

Phenomenology has its roots in central Europe, and in European philosophy. For many years it has been a vital part of philosophical life in North and South America. In the fall of 2001 a large conference was held at Peking University to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the publication of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. This conference, which was also attended by philosophers from Japan, Taiwan and Korea, also marked the founding of the Research Center for Phenomenology at Peking University. A similar Research Center also exists at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The Chinese Society for Phenomenology has existed since the early 1990s. The practice of phenomenology by Asian scholars, apart from its intrinsic interest, raises questions about the connection between culture and philosophy. Speaking in geopolitical terms, people often say that the future lies in Asia, and in China in particular. Perhaps the future of phenomenology lies there too.

Mind and Brain

Meanwhile, back in Euro-North America, the topic of the day is the mind-brain relation. For long time, philosophers in the positivistic-analytic tradition thought that if we just learned more about the brain, the problem of consciousness, and maybe consciousness itself, would just go away, an appearance whose underlying reality would fully account for it. Curiously, as many of these philosophers now recognize, while our knowledge of the brain and its functions has grown enormously, understanding its relation to consciousness has become more and more elusive. More knowledge about the complex physical events of the brain has not provided us with a clear-cut account of how these relate to such phenomena as awareness, thinking, feeling, imagination, and the like. One
problem here is the reigning assumption that we all already understand all there is to know about consciousness, and what's needed is yet more knowledge of the brain. But in fact the understanding of consciousness, even by philosophers who sometimes use the term “phenomenology” to refer to subjective experience (Dennett is one), is very naïve. It is not uncommon to find psychologically very dubious notions like stimulus-response, the reflex arc, and the constancy hypothesis being employed by contemporary philosophers to describe conscious experience. Causality is routinely conflated with intentionality to produce the kind of confusion that could be easily cleared up by reading some passages from Husserl or Merleau-Ponty. The future of phenomenology might lie in part in the discovery by these philosophers that phenomenologists in the Husserlian tradition have developed some very sophisticated concepts and descriptions for dealing with consciousness from the first-person point of view. If we want to understand the relation between consciousness and the brain, our first-person approach to consciousness has to be at least as conceptually sophisticated and refined as our approach to the brain.

I and We

Speaking of the first person, it is often forgotten that this grammatical position has a plural as well as a singular form. The first-person singular has been explored richly in Western philosophy since Descartes, and Husserlian phenomenology is often thought of mainly as a continuation and improvement of this tradition. And so it is. But the emergence of an interest in the we-subject occurs already in Hegel’s notion of Geist, and Husserl, of course unaffected by Hegel, begins to develop ideas of a plural subject in many of his manuscripts on intersubjectivity. The concept of the communal or plural subject is related to but different from the problem of intersubjectivity. The latter explores how I experience the other, and is focused on what Alfred Schutz calls the face-to-face relation and Buber the I-thou relation. Levinas’ critical response to both Buber and phenomenology is still concerned with this one-on-one encounter. The sense of membership in a community, and the manner in which the “we” functions as the proper subject of experiences, actions, memory, expectation, and of a form of existence which outlives that of its individual members, are topics deserving of future phenomenological attention. These topics are important for developing the phenomenological contribution to the philosophy of history, but also for connecting phenomenology to ethics and political and social existence.

The phenomenology of the future

Part of the future of phenomenology should be devoted to the phenomenology of the future. By this I mean the phenomenological description of protention and expectation. Husserl somewhat neglects these topics in his treatment of time-consciousness, even though he gives us some useful hints; but it is obviously as important as the phenomenology of retention and recollection. Heidegger, of course, argues for the priority of the future, but the phenomenology of the future needs a much more detailed description than the one he gives us. Investigations in the Husserlian style would complement and correct the undue influence held by Heideggerian thought in this domain.
“In fact, we are all pragmatists, but we figure out that we are theoreticians, just to be considered as ‘serious’ by a community of philosophers which in reality is quite mythical.” Nietzsche could have written such a sentence; as a matter of fact, it is by William James, who identifies pragmatism 1) as a method of the freeing of the conscious mind and 2) as a quality of transformation of our relationship to the phenomenal reality. Now, these two features remarkably coincide with Husserl's revolutionary method of the époché 1) as a move of freeing oneself from the alienating resistance of the world-pregivenness and 2) as a resulting radical change of attitude of the subject with regards to the appearing objects, the emerging events and the other subjects one may encounter in given situations.

Hence my contention about phenomenology: It is not primarily a (new, that is, post-Cartesian or post-Kantian) transcendental theory of knowledge, even though it intrinsically contains an inherent dimension of knowledge of the phenomena, in the sense of a noetic intuition of invariant essences. The intuited essence, however, is not a universal representation of an object; it is a movement into a specifically directed action. The process of reflecting upon one's own conceptual elaboration therefore amounts to nothing else than to the practicing of how we are involved as subjects in what we are elaborating. In short, there is no rational knowledge before acting: Knowing is knowing-how to handle what appears in a particular and concretely individuated situation.

The failure of rationalist philosophy is to enclose knowledge within itself without developing it further into a practice: It creates concepts that are abstract closed-up totalities instead of insisting on their relatedness to each other. On the contrary, pragmatism invents a method for what is just being done, not for what is already done or has to be done. Whereas the theoretical point of view relies on the fact that knowledge contains in itself its own aim, the point of view of practice considers knowledge as intrinsically incomplete, indeterminate, open to multifarious possibilities of the future. As a practician, the philosopher works at freeing us from the theoretical closedness. Hence the requirement of alterity as an exemplary structure of openness, being as such the leading thread of the philosophical research. In this respect, alterity is endowed with a double and correlative aspect, either as a self-alterity (one may think here of the many forms of consciousness as a dynamical relationship to oneself, well illustrated in the methodologies in the first person), or as the alterity of others (the interaction with other disciplines as well). Now, such a method founded on alterity as openness is best revealed in the priority given to praxis. Indeed, praxis corresponds to the exemplary “otherness” of the philosopher, which he often does not dare acknowledge, since he or she is most frequently closed up in theoretical arguments and rational contentions.

However, straightaway I would like to do away with a remnant misunderstanding concerning the distinction between theory and practice. Such a misunderstanding could easily lead to a founded objection of the philosopher in favor of the defense of reason. From my point of view, theory and practice are not opposed as if they were two different activities carried out in the field of science and speculation theoretically and in the useful and technical field practically. On the contrary: They both indicate kinds of attitude or ways of doing, the first one being always “retrospective,” that is, arising in the aftermath (as a reflection upon the action once the latter is completed and achieved), the second one being “prospective,” appearing within the coming action itself, literally coinciding with it. The attitude of the philosopher as a practician therefore amounts to using the concepts as so many guides, or again, as leading instructions, as orienting panels for the action in the very course of its development, rather than considering these concepts as closed-up a priori representations of action. In this respect, the phenomenologist is such a practician: He or she relies on philosophical texts and categorial arguments as so many accurate supports of the description of his or her experience (not as goals in themselves). In fact, lived-experience remains the unique criterion of the lived truth, that is, of the interest of the subject for “evidence” (where we find the echo of the Latin “videre”: to see) in the elaboration of a philosophical problem.
If the concept brings us to action (to living, thinking, dreaming, speaking, etc.), it means that we do not conceptualize for the sake of conceptualizing. At the very least, we build up concepts in order to build others, that is, in order to produce new ideas and to renew our way of thinking. Conceptualizing therefore is an activity, a process, which means that we do not control what is going to happen: It might be that we produce or construct a concept that was not expected or foreseen first. Thinking, like any other activity, has to do with the risk of not obtaining what was to be expected, but of welcoming something else that could be referred to as the surprise inherent in any undertaking: The risk of action is the risk of indeterminacy, that is, of not knowing apodictically where the running of thoughts are going to lead us. Such a risk has to do with the immersion into and the merging with the “other,” this being other than what we usually identify as ourselves. Now, such a risk intrinsically belongs to life: It is also an essential part of philosophical research, which is then hardly identifiable with the idealistic security of conceptual closure.

In short, the very process of knowing amounts to a remarkable practice: How is it that knowledge is made of constructed series? How is it that an idea without ceasing brings about other ideas which are linked to each other in a mostly unexpected way? Of course, we may “explain” in the aftermath, in short “rationalize” the kind of connection at work between these ideas, but such a reconstruction does not account for the dynamics of the continual emergence and relations of the thoughts between them. If the thoughts, as so many actions, if the acts, as so many emerging ideas, follow an unceasing process of producing each other and renewing each other, one may think that the dynamic transition between them is the very concern of the phenomenologist as a practician. Reflexion and rationality as closed-up models of thinking are unable to account for such a plastic dynamics. We need something else. Another such thing than the rational closure is what radically modifies the meaning of truth by putting it to work in the framework of the very practice of the subject.

Now, phenomenology quite uniquely paves the way for such a putting to practice of truth and reason.

First, Husserl himself calls for such a priority of practice over theory: “Die Praxis steht überall und immer voran der ‘Theorie’” (Hua XIV, p. 61). Now, the core of Husserl's method, the reduction, is to be seen entirely under the light of its praxis, and not of its theoretical a priori justification of knowledge.

In this respect, the phenomenological reduction amounts to operating thanks to three different but related gestures: 1) a suspension of preconceived beliefs; 2) a conversion of my way of looking at the objects; 3) a variation of the different features of the object in order to discriminate its invariant structure.

Suspending one's own beliefs amounts to observing one's natural tendency to judge and to contend without questioning what is judged and contended. In order to make such an observation, one needs to stop the inner flow of thoughts and to look at what is going on. It does not mean that I will not judge anymore but I will develop the ability to look at my judgements in a different way; in fact, such a conversion of my way of looking at things corresponds to the second correlative gesture of the phenomenological reduction: in order to do so, I redirect my attention from the object as I see it in its content and in its objective properties to the lived act through which I am intending it. In short, I achieve a double inner move (both proprioceptive and kinetic) of putting away (the object in itself) and of coming back to the lived act. In other words, my modality of attention changes radically, insofar as I do not intend the object any longer but the subjective way I am looking at it; in order to situate such gestures of suspension and conversion at a universal level, one still needs to achieve what Husserl calls a “variation”: It literally consists in the procedure of discrimination between the intrinsic properties of an object (an armchair necessarily has “arms”) and its contingent ones (an armchair is not necessarily made of wood). The more features you produce (while using both imagination and perception), the more you are able to refine the inherent quality of the object. While so doing, you are able to lay out the stability of the object (both universal and necessary).

Now, one further step will aim at embodying such a phenomenological praxis of épochè in a more radical way. It is our thrust toward in On Becoming Aware: An Experiential Pragmatics, where we lay
out a threefold dynamical structure of the époché. The three principal phases are the following:

**époche**

- suspension
- redirection
- letting-go

A0. Suspending your “realist” prejudice that what appears to you is truly the state of the world. This is the only way you can change the way you pay attention to your own lived-experience. In other words, you must break with the “natural attitude.”

A1. Redirecting your attention from the “exterior” to the “interior.”

A2. Letting-go or accepting your experience.

We call époché the organic whole of the three phases, because phases A1 and A2 imply that the phase A0 is always reactivated at each step. Moreover, this gesture of suspension is also at work, albeit with different qualities, at each of the other steps of the reflecting act (i.e., evidence, expression and validation, which are discussed in the following chapters of the book).

Notes

(1) About this issue, see the coming book by Armand Colin, La phénoménologie comme pratique (Paris, 2006).


(3) A first step in this direction was taken by N. Depraz in "La phénoménologie, une pratique concrète", Magazine littéraire, Numéro spécial "La phénoménologie", octobre 2000.


Continuing Husserlian Phenomenology
Lester Embree

Phenomenology is a century-old planetary tradition initiated, and still chiefly influenced, by the investigations of Edmund Husserl. The future development of this tradition is best approached by characterizing some of the core Husserlian positions and methods that have stimulated further developments in so many different directions (1) (including traditions now seen as standing outside phenomenology per se (2)), and then by sketching how the work continued at the New School by Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz, who are the mature Husserl’s closest disciples, is not only true to Husserl’s own life-long project, but can still show ways for phenomenology to address continuing and emerging issues.

The present writer studied with Cairns and Gurwitsch during the 1960s and has published on their work as well as on that of Schutz, so the fact that the opportunity for the present essay comes from the Husserl Archive at the New School, where he was himself the secretary in 1968–69, is a particular delight for him.

There now exist over 125 phenomenological organizations across the planet. Besides the extensive continuing activity in North America and in Western Europe, there are recently established regional organizations in Central and Eastern Europe, in East Asia, and in Latin America. Moreover, a worldwide Organization of Phenomenological Organizations was founded in Prague in 2002 and has met for the second time in Lima in August 2005.

Space is not available to list all the archives, book series (especially posthumous editions like Husserliana), centers, graduate programs, journals, newsletters, and other support institutions for the planetary tradition. But it must be mentioned that phenomenology is a tendency not only in philosophy, but also in such disciplines as architecture, communicology, economics, film studies, geography, music, nursing, pedagogy, political science, psychiatry, psychology, and sociology.

Although phenomenology may still not be adequately appreciated in the former British Empire—the United States of America included—by virtue of its long-term multidisciplinary spread across the planet, as well as its vast wealth of results, it is nevertheless arguably the most significant non-positivistic intellectual tradition in the 20th Century. Given the rich heritage to date, then, how can it continue?

What, Briefly, Is Phenomenology?

The definition of phenomenology has often been discussed within the tradition. Space is available for very few remarks.

To begin with, phenomenology can be contrasted with two other positions, notably representationalism and naturalism. While indirect experiencing via indications, depictions, and linguistic expressions is recognized in phenomenology, representationalism is rejected where perception, recollection, expectation, and the seeing of ideal objects are concerned. In these cases, no image is reflectively discernable between the mental process and its object. Then again, rather than being modeled in its metaphysics as well as epistemology on naturalistic science, phenomenology, be it mundane or transcendental, is fundamentally concerned with sociocultural life, something returned to below.

Phenomenology itself is better characterized as an approach than as a set of doctrines. The method is not straightforward, but reflective, and thus it thematizes things-as-encountered as well as encounterings of them (Husserl spoke of “noema” and “noeses”). Concrete encounterings include components of experiencing, believing, valuing, and willing in broad significations. Moreover, although many in non-Continental traditions may find it incomprehensible, the approach is not argumentative, but rather descriptive or interpretative, and thus more like comparative anatomy than theoretical physics. Far more can be said about the approach, such as how it is chiefly eidetic but also sometimes
empirical and thus able to describe particular cultural phenomena, but this characterization of it as reflective and descriptive may suffice here. (3)

Have We Lost Our Way?

There is a strong and clear emphasis in Husserl and other major phenomenological figures on the species of research best called investigation, yet the vast majority of so-called phenomenologists today engage instead in a species of research that some call philology and others call scholarship. The latter species includes editing, interpreting, reviewing, and translating, and its methods are no different from those used in scholarship on other traditions of philosophy and science. Scholarship is extremely valuable because the works of many are difficult to understand, but it is not an end in itself. It is essentially instrumental. Its purpose is to assist investigation, which is where phenomenology is phenomenology.

Yet during their lives, that vast majority of “phenomenologists” seem not to get beyond scholarship. Why? Perhaps it is easier and safer to produce texts that can be judged in relation to other texts than to stand behind the results of one’s own reflective analyses of some “things themselves.” Devoting oneself to scholarship is understandable early in a career, when much remains to be learned and it is important to communicate with non-phenomenological colleagues. Then, perhaps established research habits are difficult to transcend, especially if “everybody else” does just scholarship too.

However, such explanations do not excuse the failure to continue one’s tradition by pursuing actual investigations. Some, of course, say that what seems to be mere scholarship is actually phenomenology because they are constantly seeing the things themselves through the texts they are interpreting. If this is so, however, why are there so few objections to and corrections of the errors by predecessors, who certainly disagree in many respects, and why are there so few descriptions of new things? It is not as if there is nothing left for phenomenologists to investigate.

Some Exemplarism

The three teachers of the New School are exemplary for continuing phenomenology. They began from knowledge gained in part directly from their master, but even though they made valuable contributions to scholarship, it was not at all the focus of their efforts. Cairns prepared crucial translations, but fundamentally developed a critically revised account of intentionality on the basis of reflective observation in his famous New School lectures, copies of student notes from which have long and widely circulated; (4) Gurwitsch influentially wrote “The Last Work of Edmund Husserl,” but produced above all The Field of Consciousness; and Schutz published major critiques of Sartre and Scheler as well as Husserl on intersubjectivity, but more fundamentally created the phenomenological theory of the social sciences single-handedly. These were not accomplishments in scholarship on texts, but required genuine original investigation.

In this situation, it might help if some writings were sometimes shown by their footnotes, etc., to be entirely scholarship; others were shown to be purely investigative by lacking footnotes, quotations, and references to authorities other than the things themselves; and yet others could be seen to have a mixed structure, with the work of some others critically discussed in a first part and then the results of original investigation distinctly expressed in a second part. Most importantly, the obligation today of those well versed in the literature is to show through example how phenomenology is done and not just talked about. Delightfully, there are promising signs of late. (5)

What to Investigate?

The three teachers of the New School were also exemplary with respect to Husserl’s own research focus. Under the influence of Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink, and Ludwig Landgrebe, most phenomenology in Europe after World War II has a metaphysical emphasis, while the focus in what
Husserl published in his lifetime was on Wissenschaftslehre, especially in the theory of logic and mathematics, but also in the theories of the naturalistic sciences and even to some extent in the theory of the Geisteswissenschaften. Along with the distinctive interests of Realistic, Existential, and Hermeneutical Phenomenology, the many volumes of Husserliana now available may obscure the conscious focus of Husserl's considered opinions for some scholars.

But Cairns's reflections on psychology will be published soon, Gurwitsch's Phenomenology and the Theory of Science is widely known, and Schutz reflected on and/or taught about economics and political science and even linguistics, as well as sociology, in a phenomenological perspective during his twenty some years at the New School. Provided one come to know something about other disciplines, the phenomenological theory of science can be continued further. (6)

The cultural, formal, and naturalistic sciences and the technologies based on them cannot be ignored, not only because they are foundational for the modern world, but also because they are among humankind's greatest achievements. Gurwitsch taught a course on the mathematization of nature that went beyond Husserl but still did not exhaust that topic, particularly where the use of mathematics in the cultural sciences is concerned. What about the good as well as bad influences of so-called technoscience on sociocultural life? The focus continued by the New Schoolers is not a species of scientism, but rather the ongoing development of a critique of science most clearly present in Husserl's Krisis. Further work in this respect is needed now more than ever.

Interest in disciplines beyond philosophy has been continued by students of the New School's golden age, e.g., Lester Embree on the cultural sciences, Maurice Natanson in relation to literature, Gilbert Null with respect to formal ontology, Osborne Wiggins with respect to psychiatry, and Richard Zaner in relation to the body and medicine. Robert Jordan does phenomenological ethics. And Fred Kersten has carried on the interest of his three teachers in method, also something relatively unusual for phenomenology in Europe after World War II.

A Fifth Stage?

But the recent expanding thematic scope of phenomenology is not confined to New School students. In fact, a fifth tendency and stage of the phenomenological tradition seems to have begun internationally in the 1990s, emerging, for example, with reflections on religion in France and on interculturality in Germany. The latter in particular stem from reflections by Husserl in the 1920s and the former revive a theme that was not only of interest to his disciples in that time, but can now be seen, on the basis of his manuscripts, to be part of his ever growing interest in society and history.

Other restored or new areas for investigation within this fifth tendency include the body, dance, film, ecology, gender, interspeciality, and politics. Beginnings have been made regarding generational differences and social class. Efforts to recollect a century of work in aesthetics (2) as well as the phenomenological tradition in moral philosophy (8) are being made. In all these cases, there has been learning from the past—from Husserl to begin with—but new knowledge has been sought as well through reflective description with respect to encounterings and things-as-encountered.

In other words, although the exact method may vary, the fifth phenomenalological stage and tendency is characterized both by a focus on investigation (rather than on scholarship) and by a breadth of vision that encompasses various novel lifeworldly themes and issues (rather than solely on traditional philosophical problems).

What to Call This New Stage?

In view of the concern with, for example, acquired attitudes of valuing and willing toward such things as ethnicity and gender that are sedimented in secondary passivity and thus part of the constitution of the sociocultural world, such a fifth stage might be called “cultural phenomenology.” But “lifeworldly phenomenology” might be an even better name because it alludes to well-known developments in phenomenological philosophy as well as in the other cultural disciplines.
Must It be Transcendental?

There might seem to be a problem concerning how the transcendental phenomenology might square with such a lifeworldly tendency also focal in the mature Husserl (this seems less a problem with the realistic, existential, and hermeneutical tendencies developed from his philosophy). The other cultural disciplines naturally remain in the natural attitude. Yet this would seem less of a problem than once thought, now that it is known that transcendental intersubjectivities as well as subjectivities for Husserl are embodied, gendered, social, historical, and otherwise cultural, and may even occur in nonhuman species, jellyfish included. (2)

The mature Husserl posited a parallelism between “mundane” and “transcendental” phenomenology. Again where New School phenomenology was concerned, Schutz always found the “constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude” sufficient for his philosophical purposes; Gurwitsch recognized this; and while Cairns never hesitated in his commitment to transcendental phenomenology, his lectures were deliberately kept in the perspective of a pure phenomenological psychology because that is easier to understand and provides the best preparation for transcendental epochē, reduction, and purification.

Whether phenomenological philosophy must ultimately be transcendental or can suffice as mundane in philosophy as well as science will no doubt continue to be productively discussed within the planetary and multidisciplinary tradition that Husserl inaugurated and continues chiefly to influence.

Notes


(4) Lester Embree, Fred Kersten, and Richard Zaner are currently preparing a multivolume edition on the basis of Cairns’s lecture scripts and manuscripts.


(6) Interest by phenomenologists in cognitive science has followed from interest by cognitive scientists in phenomenology. But one can wonder if the phenomenologists in this case are seeking to continue phenomenology or are joining the naturalistic and explanatory psychology that is interested once more in mental life. In contrast, the major hermeneutical phenomenologists seem to have benefited from Greek philology but not to have become philologists, Merleau-Ponty drew on psychiatry and psychology but did not become a psychiatrist or psychologist, etc. Additionally, it can also be wondered if bridges built across the gap with analytic philosophy will carry more than one-way traffic.


(8) Cf. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, eds., Phenomenological Approaches to Moral

(2) For Husserl on jellyfish, see, e.g., Husserliana 14, 113ff., 135 n. 1, 175; for Husserl on seeing others as transcendental even if these others do not recognize themselves as having this status, see Husserliana 15, 113, 384 n. 1.
Globalization: The Phenomenological Consequences
Lennart Heerwagen

According to Husserl, we can understand the distinction between home and alien as a distinction concerning accessibility: Normally we live in our homeworld, or better, in a surrounding world, which truly is a familiar world to us (although not familiar in all particularities), which is to be truly realized for us through intuition. In the mediate horizon there are alienlike humanities and cultures. They belong to this horizon as alien and alienlike, but alienness means accessibility in the genuine inaccessibility, in the mode of incomprehensibility. (1)

Thus, on the one hand we have our homeworld, a world of familiarity, an accessible world. Following Husserl, we can examine the acquisition of this homeworld. As far as we can remember, Husserl explains, we have been rooted in this world of well-known sense. In our childhood it did perhaps not possess the same sense for us as it does now, but nonetheless it had, and maintained to have, a unity as the one and familiar world. (2) As we grow older we become more and more aware of the richness of our world. It takes on new layers of sense in a development that can be described as “ring-shaped”. (3) At first we have a relatively confined, familiar world, perhaps restricted to our local area, our local people, family etc., but later on we gain an insight in an even more embracing world which we come to consider as familiar. This familiarity could overall be said to concern our world as a cultural world, which occupies its own cultural space as a “territory” [Territorium]. (4) A constitutional feature of our cultural and familiar world is our language. (5) Through our language we can communicate with the people we share our world with, our “homefellows” [Heimgenossen], and make it a world common for us all, for our special intersubjectivity. Our language points to yet another constitutional basis. Our past, our traditions and history become known to us through narratives, and we can see that our world has been formed through a far-reaching chain of generations. Our present world, with its familiar customs, its well-known objects and so forth, is in other words the result of generativity, of the shaping and continuation of sense by precedent generations. And we, ourselves, become a part of this generative process when we as “co-bearers” [Mitträgern] of our world, that is, as subjects constituting exactly our familiar world, are able to pass it by. In this manner, a world is given to us as ours, as a world in which sense is accessible for me and you in our “homefellowship” [Heimgenossenschaft].

On the other hand, we also encounter worlds that are different from ours, alienworlds, which are neither familiar nor accessible to us. Surely, we have previously experienced matters in our world that seemed unusual or surprising, and in this way diverted from what was familiar. But there is a difference between these anomalies and the encountered alieness. The anomalies, the apparent “unfamiliarities”, in my familiar world, refer to what is normal. When we meet people who act surprisingly, who speak our language in a funny way, who wear strange clothing, this all connects with what is normal behavior, language, clothing and so on, in our world. In this manner the anomalies of our own world are only “modifications” of the familiar normality. (6) When we encounter the alien, however, we experience that the “anomaly” of the alien does not refer to the normality of my world. The alien, for example the concrete alien subject, behaves in a way that seems strange to us, speaks a language we do not understand and wears odd clothing, but this cannot be reduced to mere modifications of the normality we are familiar with. The alien claims a normality of its own; a normality that is not dependent on our normality. In other words: the alien refers to its own familiar cultural world. (7) The alien world has its own language, its own traditions, its own histories and myths that take on a familiar sense for the alien subject. We can thereby speak of the constitution of the alienworld, but also of the constitution of our own homeworld as such. Before we encountered the alienworld, before it became thematic for us, we could not know that our world was homeworld. Only in the confrontation with the alien we become conscious that our world is not the only one, but nevertheless privileged in the sense of home. (8) The alienworld is to be sure a homeworld as well, but in the sense of an “alien homeworld”. In contrast to the accessibility of our homeworld, the alienworld is given to us as inaccessible. This is not merely because of the appearing differences in language and customs, but because of the generativity of the
alienworld to which these appearances refer. As a homeworld the alien homeworld exhibits “a different historical totality” (9) that we cannot grasp. Being such a totality, we are not able to encompass the appearance of the alien into our own understandable normality, and so it becomes incomprehensible to us.

The structure “home- and alienworld” describes how the world is pregiven to us as a cultural world, and how this world receives its proper meaning in relation to other cultural worlds. It shows each of us the meaning of our being as “subject of a cultural world” [Subjekt einer Kulturwelt]; that is, as a subject living in an intersubjective world with familiar traditions and conventions that is inherited, kept, shaped and passed on, with a common language, and a common cultural space. However, my question would be: how important is this? This is not a question which concerns the truthfulness of the constitution of home- and alienworld as Husserl identified it. Rather, it is a question of relevance, and relevance is determined by the particular situation of the questioner; following Alfred Schutz we could say her “biographically determined situation”. (10) If we fashion this biographical determination in a more intersubjective manner we could perhaps say: How important is this for our time, how can this help us understand the world we live in?

Since this question depends on the definition of “our time” and “our world”, let me provide a possible leading clue. The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has recently discussed the somewhat blurred social phenomena of “globalization”. Not so much what it actually means as its consequences. According to Baumans line of thought, a major consequence of globalization is a social stratification focused on the concept of mobility. In the top of this stratification we have a social segment that lives “in time”. Of course they must in every moment be situated in a particular location, but this location has only little significance to them. They are not bound to any special geography, and travel as they please either in reality or virtuality for the sake of entertainment, work or other reasons. In the bottom of the stratification we have a social segment that lives “in space”. Not because they necessarily wish to do so, but because they do not have any other alternative. They are bound to a specific location, and are forced to bear any change that may happen to this place. They too live in time, but they have no use of it. “Nothing ever happens”, where they live, and time looses its significance. In this way we have, according to Bauman, two sorts of worlds: “the world of the globally mobile” and “the world of the locally tied”. (11)

As Bauman also emphasizes, we do not choose the society we are born into. (12) We have a familiar world, a cultural homeworld with its generative sense, pregiven to us. However, the process of globalization, as Bauman states, “divides as it unites”, (13) and, we may add, does so across cultural homeworlds. There is the world of the global elite of businessmen, leaders and academics with its privileges, wealth, resources, power and freedom and the world of a restgroup with its deprivation, poverty, impotence, powerlessness and constraint. (14) We could say that the process of globalization creates two fundamental types of practical horizons where the generative density, the original language and familiar normality of the cultural homeworld seems less significant. Perhaps we could even say that globalization makes familiar “homeworlds” in a new sense of which some are accessible to us and others are not. If so, there seems to be a challenge in explaining not how, for example, generativity matters for the constitution of an accessible homeworld or an inaccessible alienworld, but how it does not matter.

A development like “globalization”, could obviously be of no concern to Husserl, but it should be of concern to us if transcendental phenomenology is to explain social aspects of our age. And this concern should raise new relevant questions for transcendental phenomenology in regard to the constitution of accessible and inaccessible worlds.

Notes

(1) "Wir leben normalerweise in unserer Heimwelt, oder besser, in einer Umwelt, die für uns wirklich vertraute (obschon nicht in allen individuellen Realitäten vertraute) Welt ist, die für uns wirklich durch Anschauung zu verwirklichen ist. Im mittelbaren Horizont sind die fremdartigen Menschheiten und

(2) Ibid., p.138.
(3) Ibid., p.429.
(4) Ibid., p.206.
(5) Ibid., pp.224-225.
(6) Ibid., p.154.
(7) Ibid., p.214.
(8) Ibid., p.214.
(9) Ibid., p.139.
(12) Ibid., p.85.
(13) Ibid., p.2.
(14) Ibid., p.70. Text
Within the methodological perspective where I place myself, there is no gift of the phenomenon except in the gift of language, nor any gift of language outside the plurality of, or better said, the diversity of languages. The diversity of languages constitutes the presuppositions of the work of translation. Language, languages, translation therefore enter into the very heart of the constitution of sense.

The word “gift” – in its most general meaning, taken from ordinary language – is suitable to be used in at least three meanings in our discourse: the first with respect to phenomena or, if you prefer, to life; secondly with respect to language, where phenomena manifest themselves as capable of being said; and thirdly with respect to the plurality of languages, where language itself becomes real.

Language is a gift because we find ourselves alive, open to the appearance of the world. It is a gift because phenomena appear capable of being said, in that they are already said and can be expressed in a different way. It is a gift because they appear in their capacity to be said in many languages we can understand; they show themselves in their possibility, even in their effectiveness, which we can only very partially achieve, starting from our own language, which was given to us for free.

I believe we can talk of a ‘gift’ in all three of these cases, just as we can say that life is a gift. This note can be further specified and deepened – it implies in all forms, even in the most ordinary use of the term, the notions of gratuity, of passivity, of receptivity.

If the giving of phenomena can never disregard language, this does not mean one should close oneself to the characteristics and peculiarity of every language; it means realising that language expresses and that all languages, even if different, have the power to translate one into the other. This is therefore not a pure phenomenology but a hermeneutical phenomenology, a linguistic phenomenology that interprets the gift and the giving. These three forms of giving – life, language and languages – refer one to the other and sustain themselves reciprocally.

It is important to stress that the third form presupposes and clarifies the former two: the gift of life (which is the essential openness to the world as phenomena, as it appears) and the gift of language as a logos, thanks to which we are living beings with the capacity of speech. In the gift of the mother tongue these two aspects (to have a world and to have the ability of describing it) converge, but our being within a world which is common to all speaking beings is also implicit, thanks to the fact that every different ‘tongue’ belongs to the universe of language and thanks to the translatability, in principle, of all languages.

Here are topics regarding the linguistic and anthropological problem of translation within the context of an open philosophical debate: language as an inescapable characteristic of the finite and bodily condition of man, the constitution of sense in the phenomenon-language relationship, the tension between universality and finitude that comes out of this constitutive duality of what is human, and, finally, translation as a moment in which it is possible to dissipate that tension and as a paradigm of the different forms of interaction and communication among people.

In this way, translation becomes a privileged moment of a reconstruction of the plural unity of human discourse that opens the way to an ethics of hospitality and of conviviality. The gift of language and of languages becomes a paradigm of gratuity that corrects the contemporary obsession towards the general commodification of lifeworlds and it gives a glimpse of a possible foundation for the social bond, in a perspective of solidarity and of solicitude for people.

The modern paradigm of politics, grounded on the idea that the monopolistic use of strength concentrated in the hands of the sovereign, could generate the collective advantage of peace, security and social order, must today be called into question. It seems unable to fulfill the needs of humanity in the age of globalization.

The challenge, instead, is to think of a nonviolent ground for the social bond. Following Ricoeur’s
Parcours de la reconnaissance, the idea of linking the great Hegelian theme of the struggle for recognition of subjects to that of the economy of the gift seems to me to be potentially seminal. The struggle among subjects does not necessarily fall under the sign of an irreducible aggressiveness; from the conflict a reciprocal recognition can arise.

This Hegelian theme is well-known (it is the famous theme of the dialectic of master and slave). The master needs the slave and depends on him to satisfy his need, so that at the end there is no difference between the two consciousnesses.

The search for identity and recognition is inescapable, but the conflict between subjectivities is not the last word. Reciprocal recognition can be sought somewhere else, in the gift. In fact, as the extensive literature of anthropological studies has made evident, starting with Marcel Mauss, in primitive societies the gift and its return generate a complex net of social relationships. Why must the gift be returned? The anthropologists’ answer is that the gift symbolizes a magic power that has to be circulated. This is an insufficient answer that would condemn discourse on the gift to remain in the sphere of pre-modernity. What must be sought, instead, is a non-magical sense of the gift, which is neither more nor less than reciprocal recognition. I give a gift because I give something of myself and I expect to be recognized by the one I give my gift to. The gift is still a symbol, but not in a magical sense, rather it is a symbol of a humanity that is expressed in the other and myself, in our reciprocal relationship.

Then, we could also say that what constitutes the social bond is the gift of languages that allows us to become part of the human consortium in the twofold form of the gift of the mother tongue and the reciprocal gift of languages (these two forms are strangers each to the other) that becomes real through translation, thanks to the practice of linguistic hospitality.

It is an original gift, in that it is given for free, before any social contract, the moment we enter into human existence: it is evident that to establish a contract we need to understand each other. We are here talking of something that comes first in a transcendental sense, as an a priori condition of possibility. This coming first an equal dignity – in principle – of all human beings, giving foundation to the possibility that speech can oppose violence and dominion.

This original gift is given to us in the form of a mother tongue. The mother tongue is the place where consciousness is born; it is no mere set of instrumental signs. In the mother tongue words embody reality itself; through it the world is born into our conscience. Nevertheless, we cannot stop here. The relationship between consciousness and language, the same metaphor of language as a verbal body of thought used by Husserl and the French existential phenomenology of language allows us to go deeper.

In fact, we are and we are not our body, we conform to our mother tongue, but at the same time it has its own relative autonomy. Language is placed between the world and us, with everything that this implies, i.e. to say and not to say, the possibility of equivocation and deception, a world of implicit or hidden meanings that need to be reactivated and re-discovered. This ambiguity of language, which has its roots in our mother tongue, makes it possible for us who are born to the world thanks to it, to also take stand back from it. We always can and have to distance ourselves. Our consciousness of the world, and of ourselves, is not only a given but has to be re-conquered. There is a space here, I think, for the work of interpretation but also for an ethic of answering to the gift we have received.

The mother tongue, which is my verbal body, does not shut me in. Rather, it opens me to other languages, to humanity and to history.

On the basis of the considerations I have presented, I think we can affirm that translation helps us to reconsider the phenomenological method.

The three fundamental theses of phenomenology are:

1. Meaning is the most comprehensive category of phenomenological description;
2. The subject is the bearer of meaning;
3. Reduction is the philosophical act which permits the birth of a being for meaning.

These three theses, as presented above, are listed in the order of their discovery. If we read them in
the opposite order, they follow the order of their founding.

My hypothesis is that all three of these theses can be clarified when we test them against the diversity of languages and against translation.

Let us start from the third one, reduction. If we consider that every language is like a world, then to reduce or distance ourselves from a language, methodologically neutralizing it, is exactly what happens when one deals with a foreign language (and with every other language considered as a language of otherness). When reduction is meant in this way, it loses its potential as a fantastic and impossible operation of exiting the world. It becomes possible and necessary to reach that particular level which enables the understanding among different people. It thus becomes possible to reach that transcendental humanity that is the basis of people speaking a language in which they were born to consciousness, but we also are able to understand other human beings speaking different languages.

This has clear influence on the conception of the subject that is always embodied in a world through the mediation of a language; but all the particular worlds eventually belong to a common world and our subjectivity exists in the communion with all the real and possible subjects, recognized in their essential and peculiar identity.

The subject of a hermeneutical phenomenology is never an isolated ego but is the self, as a contingent, finite, bodily being that coincides with our concrete condition of suffering and acting human beings. We are required to realize ourselves in the praxis of a whole life, in the reciprocity of the intersubjective relationship, and to find a place in the world and in history. Then, the essential core of our life and our search for an identity in which our struggle and desire to live are expressed, which Ricoeur calls the “original affirmation,” must undergo an enormous and never final process of translation and translations, of all sorts, which is tantamount to the telling of our own stories, with the infinite web of our actions and passions, with the work of mourning and memory that such a work requires, with its always renewed challenges and the joy that it can bestow on us.

Finally, meaning is neither the will to say, belonging to a subject without relationships, nor the access to a world of separate essences. It is, on the contrary, the space opened by translation in order to compare and let our perspectives on the world be communicated.

In this way a phenomenological hermeneutics of translation can help us to realize that humanity, just like language, exists only in the plural mode.

Translated into English by Angelo Bottone

Notes

The Well-Founded World: On a Possible Rapprochement of Phenomenology and Logical Analysis
Jonathan Kim-Reuter

What is the future of Husserlian phenomenology? In proposing this question, the Husserl Archives at the New School for Social Research has taken upon itself that most difficult of reflections, namely the value of a legacy. Such actions as this usually come at a time when a tradition, and particularly a research tradition, has begun to feel its age. It is both the privilege and price of maturity. Every archive is an infinite resource and a finite recollection, an unstable mixture of intellectual transcendence and material permanence, and where the chief energies of thought mobilize themselves around the latter to the detriment of the former, there is the very real danger that the tradition has ceased to be relevant but to those who only ever heard the call of the master. Is this the situation facing Husserlian phenomenology today? Does Husserl matter to more than just we Husserlians?

To take up and test this provocation I want to consider one of the most severe critics of phenomenology. (1) In the long and distinguished career of the analytic philosopher John Searle, the concept of intentionality has emerged as perhaps the most basic feature of conscious life. Searle’s efforts, in this respect, would be a boon to Husserlians, were it not for the fact that intentionality is explained almost entirely on naturalistic grounds. Intentional states of consciousness are simply higher level expressions of what is at bottom a neuronal configuration or biological system. (2) There is an “underlying structure” of consciousness, and this “structure” is located inside the brain. (3) Phenomenology, of the Husserlian type, is for Searle exclusively a descriptive research project: it portrays how things outwardly seem to us. (4) As such, it is methodologically and epistemically useless when compared with logical analysis of consciousness. The latter, Searle’s chosen mode of knowing, is not content with merely staying close to the surface features of phenomena. Logical analysis, as he describes it, looks to “dig deeper” into the constitutive origins and conditions of intentional life. (5) When compared with its logical competitor, as Searle writes, “phenomenology is largely, though not entirely, irrelevant.” (6) Exactly where Searle makes good on this gesture of acceptance is not at all clear.

For Searle, then, Husserlian phenomenology is largely a relic. If it retains any interest, it is only as an archival document from the period before modern science and neurophysiology began to map the causal frontiers of the mind. Phenomenology is and remains tainted with the older traditions of philosophical idealism. Husserl’s critical defense of the phenomenal character of human existence against the reductivism of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften), so Searle’s thinking goes, left him without any engagement with the real world, the world, that is, in which it matters whether our perceptions are veridical or illusory. The first principle guiding the phenomenologist is the directive to ignore “all relation to empirically real existence.” (7) This is the source of the assumed priority of logical over phenomenological analysis. Without any concern over the objective reality of the world, Husserl left himself unable to account for the way in which the world presents itself to the subject within specific parameters of normalcy and familiarity. This ontological oblivion of naturalistic being may have been necessary in light of the value given to the first-person account of perceptual experience. From Searle’s point of view, however, it drastically ignores the very real fact that the perceptual contents of consciousness come with conditions of satisfaction, which in turn can only be studied if it is granted that intentional states have a determinate content whose “underlying structure” is reflective of the biological, constitutive bases of mental phenomena. Without anything more to add than the static analysis of intentionality, phenomenology is doomed to remain a merely a curiosity, a “first stage,” (8) a rest-stop, as it were, on the road of discovery already well-paved by science.

To put Searle’s point another way, what is absent from Husserlian phenomenology is an inquiry into the “Background” for all conscious states, whether intentional or not. The notion of the “Background” is one of Searle’s most original and fundamental contributions to the theory of intentionality. Originally, it was introduced to explain how the semantic content of propositions can be meaningfully
grasped. (9) Searle writes: “The Background is a set of nonrepresentational mental capacities that enable all representing to take place. Intentional states only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, and thus only are the states that they are, against a Background of abilities that are not themselves Intentional states.” (10) It is “nonrepresentational” or “preintentional” inasmuch as it is only on the supposition of the “Background” that the intentional object is meaningfully grasped. (11) Perceptual reality comes to have a coherent, structured organization, which is grasped throughout the variety of empirical appearances and sensory distortions, on the basis of the “Background.” Logical analysis is able to ferret out this operational existence of mental capacities because it seeks to discover how it is, prior to phenomenological description, that there is at all a determinate object or state of affairs present to intentional consciousness. (12) The “Background” provides what Searle calls “enabling conditions”: they are not part of the descriptive content as they permeate that content and establish the foundations for perceptual reality, (13) precisely that domain of concern evacuated by Husserl from his original research program.

So it appears that with the idea of the “Background” firmly in place, logical analysis is able to explain how descriptive phenomenology is at all possible, thus rendering it “largely irrelevant.” Husserlian phenomenology, like the history of science itself, ceases to any longer play a formative, active role in determining the future direction taken by research in cognitive and consciousness studies. However, despite appearances to the contrary, Husserl never considered any of his theoretical positions to be beyond questioning or critique. There is the orthodox purity and formal discipline of phenomenology as a “rigorous science” of essences; yet, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty so shrewdly observes, in his last works there emerges for Husserl a more direct, “factical” investigation of the pre-reflective world, an inquiry whose overtly “genetic” scope takes into account the constitution of perceptual reality. (14) The second volume of Ideas and the text of the Crisis (15) introduce an account of intentionality no longer divorced from the lived world. This arguably radical turn in Husserlian phenomenology takes up the world in its intimate proximity to the subject. The reluctance to account for the givenness of perceptual reality is dropped in favor of a closer inspection of the manner in which the world (the “lifeworld,” Lebenswelt) originally acquires a primordial familiarity, such that I always find myself, prior to reflection, in a world that is always present “for me,” not “in itself,” (16) and never without a constant sense and perceptual certainty. “To live,” Husserl writes, “is to always live-in-certainty-of-the-world.” (17)

The return to the world is not a journey back to the consciousness of the world as an object like any other. If the world is not originally a simple multitude of things but is instead characterized as the world for the subject, (18) if the world is grasped through a “wakeful certainty” that is prior to all cognitive, third-person perspectives, (19) then we can understand how Husserl came to re-evaluate the former and formal primacy of the theory of intentionality. Intentionality now stands as a phenomenon conditioned by and grounded in a thoroughgoing and irreducible “background” familiarity with the world. The latter constitutes that “world-horizon” within which objects appear in their concrete and meaningful givenness. (20) Phenomenology ceases to be any longer an exclusively descriptive enterprise: it acquires a “genetic” or “constitutive” dimension. Henceforth, and this is the focus of the studies that one finds in Ideas II and in the Crisis, phenomenology maps out a new ontological landscape for itself. The phenomenologist, Husserl writes, is to turn toward that background of intentional consciousness, toward “how, that is, there arises in us the constant consciousness of the universal existence, of the universal horizon, of real, actually existing objects.” (21) The actual being of objects, not merely their possible being, becomes the focus of Husserl’s research. His interest turns to the question of how it is, taken in a universal sense, that the world is at all a place wherein the phenomenon of objectivity not only appears but is the very precondition for all practical and theoretical activity—as revealed through the first-person perspective and its basic experience of perceptual- or world-familiarity. (22)

It would appear, then, that far from being “largely irrelevant,” Husserlian phenomenology is in fact an ongoing mode of inquiry—within and co-extensive with logical analysis itself. Like logical analysis, it too seeks to understand how basic features of the world-experience—“the solidity of things, and the
independent existence of objects and other people” (23)—are constituted for us as meaningful unities possessing determinate sense. Searle would like to do without Husserl, but given his own attempts to make explicit the pre-intentional, operational work of the “Background,” it seems he would do so at his own peril. If Searle paid closer attention to the evolving nature of Husserl’s reflections on intentionality, he would find much that is very relevant. Both philosophers seek out the pre-reflective — “lived” — foundations of perceptual reality. They no doubt differ ultimately on the ontological status of the “Background.” But since neither Searle nor Husserl is interested in jettisoning that which makes consciousness a subjective experience, (24) it is clear that far from being merely an historical artifact, Husserlian phenomenology remains a vital program and prospect for research. As such, in inviting the phenomenological community to assume the burden for its own future, the Husserl Archives enjoins us to think evocatively, and to look beyond the surface disparities of contemporary debates for that turn of thought which offers new differences and therein, perhaps, also new moments of rapprochement.

Notes

(1) For a much broader treatment of the points made in this paper, the reader would do well to consult the article “Background Ideas,” by David Woodruff Smith, originally published in Italian as “Idee di sfondo,” Paradigmi, XVII, 49 (Rome, 1999), pp. 7-37.
(3) Ibid., p. 91.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid., p. 76.
(8) This point is made in a quotation from Husserl’s disciple, Eugen Fink. The quotation appears in Ronald Bruzina’s Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928-1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 197.
(9) See, for example, the discussions of the “Background” in Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and The Construction of Social Reality ((New York: The Free Press, 1995). 
(10) Searle, Intentionality, p. 143.
(11) Ibid.
(12) In a significant point of agreement with Husserl, and Heidegger as well, Searle rejects the idea that the object of an intentional state is a mental representation. Since what is most revolutionary about the phenomenological theory of intentionality is precisely its abandonment of all traces of a mental representation that is supposed to mediate between consciousness and our knowledge of the external world, Searle, on this point, is more phenomenologically relevant than he is perhaps willing to admit. Consider, for example, the following observation by Searle on the nature of the intentional object, take from his work Intentionality (p. 16): “To call something an Intentional object is just to say that is what some Intentional state is about. Thus, for example, if Bill admires President Clinton, then the Intentional object of his admiration is President Carter, the actual man and not some shadowy intermediate entity between Bill and the man.”
(13) Ibid., p. 158. Searle’s commitment to realism is a logical outcome of the functioning of the Background: our practical life would be incoherent if there were not already in place a real world—not a hypothesis—on the basis of which all of our questions and inquiries acquire their meaningfulness and determinate value. 


(17) Husserl, Crisis, p. 142.

(18) Ibid., p. 143.

(19) Ibid., p. 142.

(20) Ibid., p. 143.

(21) Ibid., p. 144.

(22) Ibid., p. 146.

(23) Searle, Intentionality, p. 143.

Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Constitution of the Intercultural Sense

Dean Komel

Contemporary philosophy is conspicuously broken into numerous areas. A certain part of contemporary philosophy deliberately renounces the possibility of rational argumentation, another part reduces philosophical argumentation solely to logical analysis. Beside this, we are witnessing constant redefinitions of the historical possibilities of philosophy. In such a situation, it is more than justified to raise the question of whether we can still put forward a philosophical claim for the constitution of intercultural sense.

Deconstructivism, as a philosophical basis of the post-modern age, claims that all that is available is the reduction of sense, and not reduction to sense. However, constitution is not reduction to sense, and even less construction of sense. Constitution points to the ongoing event of sense, which can also include its own negation, as Hegel pointed out. Hegel, however, together with counter-Hegelian deconstructivism and critical theory, in principle fail to grasp the constitutional problem, because they all state it within the world, rather than on the level of the worldliness of the world itself. And by doing so, they also overlook the boundaries of philosophical consideration of interculturality as a possibility of an encounter within a culture, as well as among cultures.

The philosophical presuppositions of interculturality can be discussed in several ways. We can take philosophy as it has developed in its two-and-a-half-thousand-year-old history for the traditional ground of the intercultural sense of Europe and the West. Then it is possible to consider how we can, on this very ground, philosophically handle intercultural phenomena. And finally, we can detect the influence of mutual intercultural understanding in the way that contemporary philosophy understands its sense and purpose. Since the first line of thinking about the philosophical presuppositions of interculturality is fairly far-reaching, we can focus only on its delineation.

To consider how interculturality can employ philosophical thinking anew implies that we already know what constitutes interculturality from the philosophical viewpoint. We thus find ourselves caught within a hermeneutic circle, in which both the philosophy of interculturality and intercultural philosophy seek a way out for each other. Although this circle most probably cannot be totally avoided, we shall try not to get completely caught up in it and lose our stance. It is our standpoint that the path of thought which is trying to establish itself as an intercultural philosophy – as far as it is not merely some type of comparative culture studies – in principle overlooks the essential intercultural sense of philosophy which has been present since its very beginning and which contributed essentially to the foundational idea of European humanity, and can in the future help bring about its redefinition. Such a redefinition does not imply a repetition in the sense of historical restoration with a renewed return and recourse to origins. The redefinition differs from repetition in the same way that constitution differs from construction: it does not accept the historicity as a past identity, but rather re-establishes it in the openness of its future difference.

Within the philosophy of the twentieth century, this foundational idea of European humanity, as well as the need for its redefinition, was especially emphasized by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenological philosophy. Among his followers, we should also mention Hans-Georg Gadamer, and more recently Klaus Held and Bernhard Waldenfels. Since Husserl’s reflection on the worldliness of the world is being acknowledged by diverse critics, such as Habermas, Luhmann, Levinas or Derrida, it can serve as an example of a special hermeneutic problem of contemporary philosophy in general. It is related to the question of whether and how philosophy should mediate a unified understanding of the world without disregarding the differences which determine it and the exteriority it verges on.

The question is pointed interculturally in a specific way, such that it makes culture an agent of mediation, insofar as it opens its middle and mediates itself interculturally. And it is here that the philosophical issue of the constitution of this mediating middle of the inter-dimension of interculturality appears. This mid-dimension is not given per se, but demands our involvement. We are
justified in claiming that such philosophical involvement, already sketched by Husserl, contributes to
the acknowledgement and recognition of a common world experience, in that it does not set up a
culture as “ours” or “yours,” but rather in the mediation between “own” and “alien.” It does not take
possession of the alien in order to achieve its own acknowledgement; nor does it exclude the alien in
order to defend its own essence. The “essence” in the sense of “identity” as a mode of existence
preserves itself only in the prospect of its own mediation, otherwise it becomes alienated and is seized
by fear of annihilation. The annihilation of the life-world is deeply related to the question of the
foundational redefinition of European humanity, as is evidenced by Nietzsche’s designation of
“European nihilism,” Scheler’s “age of reconciliation,” Husserl’s “crisis of European humanity,” and
Heidegger’s “oblivion of being,” not to mention literary examples.

It is this very mediating sense of culture as interculturality that may reveal that the alienation of the
modern world does not imply only negativity, which should be overcome, but also a certain
positiveness, which calls for the constitution of sense, and which primarily implies that a dimension of
the world goes on “among” us, also between “us and us.” Even though in truth it can never be reduced
solely to us, it is accepted by us already through opening the questions, what is and what is not real.
This is even a basic “lesson” given by philosophy – namely, that we cannot commune with the world as
something private, not even when we ask for it to change.

The philosophy of culture today cannot rely, for example, on a critical theory of society which would
transform into a revolutionary practice, nor on any “pure theory” which shows no interest in the world
and its alienation. The global development segregates “us” and “them,” but in this special way that both
“we” and “they” remain unacceptable in what is genuine as our own. The Other cannot be accepted if
we do not first accept and even change ourselves; and here a pure philosophical question arises: who
are we?

In what way can we say that philosophy, since its very beginnings, has been interculturally effective,
and that, on this basis, it historically affected the foundational understanding of European humanity?
Philosophy stems from wonder about what is, about Being as such and as a whole. We thus roughly
referred to Aristotle’s definition of philosophy. It is obvious that such a question cannot persist in the
closed environment of one’s own culture, but has to be open in and for itself towards a world in which
various cultures meet, transcending themselves as ordinary environments. The world means the
opening up of one’s own culture. In this trans-cultural sphere, philosophy manifests itself in the
opening up of the world’s horizons, in which various cultures find themselves as if within a certain
whole or even a universe of sense. It started raising questions as to what is the meaning of this and that
and what is the sense of it all. This cannot prevent one culture from outrunning another, nor can it
directly enable one culture to cross into another. The primary effect of this loosening of global
horizons is that culture as such becomes a question, that there arises the need for its definition, and that
on the basis of this, a culture itself transforms into its constitutionality, which is the main criterion of
its acceptability. A testimony of this first transformation of the sense of culture into a foundational
sense, which makes culture meaningful for us, can be found in Cicero’s sentence “philosophia cultura
animi est,” insofar as it explicitly co-defines culture and philosophy. Before that, the word cultura had
the sense of “cultivation” and “growing,” but not its own foundational sense, which was
philosophically indicated already by Protagoras: “Of all things, the measure is man – of the things that
are, that they are; of the things that are not, that they are not.”

Precisely in the manner it is defined in its foundational sense, the world cultura from the beginning
points to the crisis of its own definition, which in the late condition of European culture, in the work
of Georg Simmel, turns out to be a “tragedy of culture.” This crisis of culture is also connected with
philosophy within the framework of mutual definitions. Culture does not presuppose only one, binding
philosophy in the form of a worldview, and philosophy itself does not include only one, but more
cultures. No doubt that certain conditions had to be fulfilled for Cicero to be able to articulate the
definition of culture in philosophical terminology; first and foremost, philosophy at its very beginning
had to comprehend itself as an elucidation of mind.

What is the philosophical elucidation of mind? For the Greeks, the soul does not mean only human
life, but living beings in general. However, only the human soul can be elucidated. It is precisely because of this “fact” that the elucidation of mind leans towards the education of the spirit, as is shown in Plato’s metaphor of the cave. The elucidation of mind and education of spirit mean the search for the unity of different aspects of life. This search for Unity in Diversity is a concern for that which is, inasmuch as it is becoming and passing away, staying and leaving, growing and fading away. That the world shows itself in its diversity is an announcement of the freedom in which life fulfils itself as praxis, and at the same time, this life experiences the revelation of a world. Life and world are different, but nevertheless unified. Human beings grow at the locus of this unity in difference by simultaneously yearning for it. A magnificent indicator of this yearning is Greek art, which makes sense – and not without reason – of our culture in general. This is why culture is up to this very day a synonym for life with a higher, excellent, and differentiating sense.

Since philosophy defines being as such and as a whole, which opens up a kind of global horizon, it is necessary that there arises the issue of the relationship between diversity and unity, between the One and the Many. Philosophy is thus searching for “unity in difference,” in which differentiation itself is understood as ascending to something higher, which perfects the very human essence. In his novel Hyperion, Friedrich Hölderlin writes: “The great Heraclites’ saying hen diapheron heauto (the One differentiated within itself) could only be discovered by a Greek, because it is the essence of beauty, and before it had been discovered, there was no philosophy...The Egyptian was incapable of doing it. He who doesn't live with the sky and the earth in the same love and counter-love, he who doesn't live in harmony with this element, in which he moves, is by nature in himself disharmonious and doesn’t experience eternal beauty, at least not as easily as the Greek.” (1) This “One differentiated within itself,” hen diapheron heauto, if we follow Hölderlin’s notes, therefore proves a lot harder nut to crack than it might at first appear. Where do the difference and the differentiated stem from? What is the sense of the One and Unity in this difference? This question leads to the disclosure of being as such, the comprehension of the world within Unity in Diversity, which reveals a special type of the good, the true and the beautiful.

The actuality of this issue is shown by the fact that intercultural philosophy directs its primary attention to diversity rather than unity. This attention should, of course, be critically questioned, since the advocacy of diversity, and not unity, is not as simple as we would want it to be. Difference and diversity are not to be considered as things “in themselves,” but rather as things “in relation”; if, however, we would like to consider difference outside the relation, we have to think of it as the differentiating One, as something that is beyond comparison, which also holds for Derrida’s différence. However, this “differentiating One” is already pondered by Heraclites. Would it not be more appropriate to open-mindedly reconsider this original beginning of the One in Diversity, rather than forcefully – and at any cost – prefer diversity to unity? If we make such a decision, there instantly arises the question of the coordinates of our own starting point.

“Unity in Diversity,” magnificently epitomized in the Greek logos, is the founding event of European and Western humanity; it is not intra-cultural (i.e. an ancient Greek and then Latin event), it is emphatically intercultural, provided that it forms the ground for the development of European history and Western civilization. It enables contact and permeation among cultures, as is obviously the case in early Christianity which would later ground its sense only in logos, understood in the unity of the universal, individual and particular. With Christianity, we can detect the formation of a specifically individual attitude to the world on the one hand, and that universalistic supremacy of the West, which in its eschatological pretensions often directs its destructive power against other cultures, if they are thought worthy of this designation in the first place. This is where the problem of freedom comes into play, with its particular and universal senses, provided that a human being has to acknowledge the freedom of all human beings in order to attain their own freedom. The cultivation of this freedom can be understood as the development of humanity, which is no doubt a fundamental feature of the spiritual history of Europe; it is particularly characterized by the phenomenon of the Enlightenment, in which the human essence sets itself apart as something unique; the fact that human beings have free use of mental abilities, gives them the assurance that they can have at their disposal whatever can be
rationally represented. The modern human of the Enlightenment is as self-reliant as the emancipated conqueror.

With humans placing themselves, through their mental faculties at the base point of all knowledge and practice in the world, the understanding of Unity in Diversity changed at its very core. The world is in principle and primarily no longer grasped as a place in which life fulfils itself, but rather as something that is at our disposal already. Unity in Diversity is set up systematically, be it arithmetical, geometrical, transcendental, dialectical, or a positivistic model of systematics. This aspect of systematics is not traceable only in the field of philosophy and science; it is effective also on the intercultural level. European nations also establish themselves systematically as countries cultivating and enabling international relations. The basic positive heritage of this systematic regulation of international relations is the United Nations.

The systematic regulation of Unity in Diversity nevertheless suffers from exclusionism, in that the One of the system remains outside all the differences, while on the other hand diversity in the system can never be entirely subjected to the One if it is to remain diverse. Thus we are losing touch with the initial understanding of the world as Unity in Diversity. Within the framework of philosophy, this issue was tackled by Leibniz, who found his historical adversary in Voltaire; taken historically, systematically, the best possible world can also be the worst possible world. More far-reaching than this, however, is that we can methodically strive for history and nature taken as a system. This methodology of mastering history and nature each day turns more and more into a method of power, which can no longer be satisfied with acquired power, but desires to manipulate this power and become more and more empowered in this management of power, in ruling, mastering and prevailing.

Where systematics subjects historicity to its rule, we are faced with the disastrous consequences of this method of power, and the distinction is put into force between historical and non-historical nations, not on the grounds of historically manifested culture, cultural tradition, but on the grounds of systematically enforced power. The systematic regulation of history establishes itself as a historical world order and as that which even transcends this order with its power. Directly or indirectly, this inflames historical revolutions "from below," and restorations "from above," all of them culminating in the first half of the 20th century. They are not declining even today, at the beginning of the 21st century; quite the contrary, they are gaining strength, even though we are inclined to talk about the end of history after the establishment of the system of liberal democracy. We too easily forget that even an abolished history can strike back, not only in various aspects of traditionalism or even more threatening radicalisms and fundamentalisms, but also in the barely noticeable annihilation of the world.

The second half of the 20th century, the period of the so-called cold war, already saw the consequences of such self-assurance in the power of the system, which is rooted in subjectivist views of the modern age, inasmuch as they seek to develop the ability of traversing from the unified to the diverse, the universal and individual, and the reverse. Undoubtedly, one of these is the positivism of the 19th century, which dared keep its “positive sense” even in the midst of contempt, annihilation, and the destruction of European humanity. Positivism is necessarily accompanied by ideologies which seek to enforce upon the world a historical sense on the basis of a dogma, in which differences between ideas, ideals and idols are sooner or later lost.

Two world wars, totalitarianisms, the age of the cold war, the deepening gap between developed and undeveloped nations, and the present general threat of terrorism are a living proof that the positions and counter-positions of power can pass over, through the “formal emptiness” of systematic regulation, into a destructive history, also annihilating the political as such. “Formal emptiness” here means primarily operating with empty values, forgetting the loss of the unified value of life and diversity of its evaluations, enforcing supremacy instead, by continuously proving that everything can be regulated by being controllable. What is essential here is to keep on the virtuality of power, since this is supposedly the only means of retaining the aspect of Unity in Diversity.

Although in a modified version, Nietzsche’s discovery of European nihilism is still relevant, inasmuch as it calls our attention to the possibility of a historical spirit turning into a phantom, which is especially dangerous today, when this is far more efficiently achievable by using the power of system.
According to Nietzsche, nihilism stems from the incapacity of power to acknowledge differences. However, he did not become fully aware of the nihilism of power regulating all the differences. What is the sense of nihilism in the sense of traversing from identity to difference and back? Firstly, this traversal gives the appearance of power, and secondly, as power it leaves behind both the unifying One and differentiating diversity, circling self-contentedly within itself. This means that in the unconditional enforcement of power there falls a question concerning the sense of that which empowers this power. It is to the great credit of Husserl and other philosophers of the phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition that they warned us of the self-sufficient enforcement of the power of science as a system, which shows itself in the form of modern technology. Can, perhaps, a philosophical constitution of interculturality help form an alternative by taking culture as its mediator?

This is a question of a possible future sense of European humanity and of humanity in general, as far as it establishes itself in the values of “science,” “politics,” “freedom,” “management,” and “solidarity”. Particularly from within the midst of interculturality, culture can mediate between these sectors in that it mediates Unity in Diversity in their worldly activities. This, of course, implies newly establishing culture in the direction of interculturality, which would sensibly build upon tradition rather than reject it. The perspective of this culture is as yet undetermined, but its horizon has already been revealed to us on the ground of the tradition of European humanity in its philosophical, artistic, religious, political, scientific and other aspects. On the one hand, it is supported by the complexity of the contemporary world dispersing into numerous worlds, and on the other, it has become quite clear that this complexity cannot be simplified on the grounds of a unified worldview, be it political, scientific, artistic, philosophical, or economic. The world is not one on the grounds of an enforced worldview; the world is not dispersed into a multitude of unrelated worlds, the world is common to us all in the encounter of differences. It is individual for everybody, and yet common to us all. Its counterpart is exclusionism, limiting the shared world, interwoven with the own and the alien, solely to what is “ours,” eventually reducing it to mere nothingness. This is perhaps one of the most difficult constitutive problems of the intercultural grounding of Europe, although its sense is strengthened by the fact that European culture has not constituted itself solely by defending its own essence, but more often in the element of crucial mediation between the own and the alien.

The direction towards philosophy of interculturality is not limited only to the European internal sense; it has become, as it were, global, in that it acknowledges the Earth as a community of existence. The redefinition of European humanity points not only to the inner, but also to the outer dimension, in that it delineates to itself the fate of the whole planet, not only in the usual ecological aspect, but rather in the cultural, “inhabiting” aspect, already implied in the former. This sets the problem of interculturality in a much larger context of confronting Europeans with “Outer-Europeans,” which also requires a changed concept of culture; it is no longer possible to cling solely to the notion of our own culture, not even the European one – every cultural self-representation comes to light in intercultural openness. “Leftist” theoreticians in particular detect in this nothing but the expansion of “Europencentrism” and “hegemony and imperialism” by other means, directed by the power of the capital. However, we have to distinguish between the “economic propaganda” of multiculturalism and potential perspectives of interculturality, since we have no other starting point for confronting the most topical issues of contemporary society, including those compelled by the logic of capital. The possibility of encountering in the same world
On the Future of Phenomenological Sociology
Nam-In Lee

1. Applied phenomenology is one of the fields in which the phenomenology of the 21st century has to advance. This paper will deal with the possibility of developing applied phenomenology with respect to phenomenological sociology. There have been some debates on phenomenological sociology in the second half of the 20th century. In 1965, Tiryakian proposed a list of phenomenological sociology that includes the different aspects of sociology developed by Vink and Tiryakian's view, and Tiryakian himself attempted to defend his position. (1) However, unfortunately no agreements have been reached in regard to the proper definition of phenomenological sociology. Heap/Roth proposed another list of phenomenological sociology that includes hermeneutic sociology, Schutzian sociology, reflective sociology, and ethno-methodology. By assessing these debates, I will attempt to clarify what phenomenological sociology is about and furthermore to show that there are abundant possibilities of developing it.

2. Even though Tiryakian and his critics have contributed a great deal for the clarification of phenomenological sociology, their researches have fundamental limitation that have prevented them from understanding the proper meaning of phenomenological sociology. Focusing mainly on empirical sociology, most of them did not attempt to clarify the field of phenomenological sociology with respect to the general context of phenomenology as a whole. To understand the proper meaning of phenomenological sociology, one, however, has to take into account the whole context of phenomenology in which phenomenological sociology takes a place. Concerning this context, we have to pay attention to the two following facts. First, Husserl conceives of phenomenology as an organic whole that is comprised of not only the various dimensions of the philosophical phenomenology such as the transcendental phenomenology, formal ontology, and regional ontology, but also of empirical science that is founded on the philosophical phenomenology in various ways. Second, phenomenological sociology could be developed on the various dimensions of phenomenology, namely on the dimension of the transcendental phenomenology, that of regional ontology, and that of empirical science, since the sociological facts could be investigated on three different dimensions of phenomenology mentioned above. (However, we cannot develop phenomenological sociology on the dimension of formal ontology, since formal ontology is a formal science that is empty in its contents.) Correspondingly, we have to make a distinction among three different dimensions of phenomenological sociology: the dimension of the transcendental phenomenological sociology, that of the ontological phenomenological sociology, and that of the empirical phenomenological sociology.

a. The empirical phenomenological sociology is a kind of empirical science and, as empirical science in general aiming to describe and to explain various kinds of empirical facts, it attempts to describe and explain the sociological facts in terms of empirical facts.

b. The ontological phenomenological sociology is a kind of regional ontology, and as regional ontology in general aiming to clarify the essential structures of the facts, it seeks to elucidate the essential structures of sociological facts.

c. The transcendental phenomenological sociology is a kind of transcendental phenomenology and, as transcendental phenomenology in general aiming to clarify the condition of the possibility of something, it attempts to explicate the condition of the possibility for the constitution of sociological facts.

3. These three dimensions of phenomenological sociology are called phenomenological, insofar as they use the various kinds of phenomenological method. But they do not need the same kind; rather they need different kinds of phenomenological method.
a. In order to develop the empirical phenomenological sociology, we have to carry out, first of all, the sociological phenomenological reduction. The sociological phenomenological reduction is the method that enables us to go back to the sociological facts as empirical ones. From the phenomenological point of view, various kinds of sociological fact are the products of intentionalities. Therefore, in order to clarify the sociological facts, one has to go back to the various kinds of intentionalities. In fact, Husserl developed the phenomenological method, namely the method of phenomenological psychological reduction, to go back to the intentionalities. In this sense, the sociological phenomenological reduction is the variation of the phenomenological psychological reduction applied to the sociological facts. The ethno-methodological reduction used by some proponents of ethno-methodology is a kind of sociological phenomenological reduction. Various kinds of the sociological phenomenological reduction should be elaborated, since there are different kinds of sociological fact that have different ontological structures. For example, the sociological phenomenological reduction required for ethno-methodology should be distinguished from the requirement for sociology of knowledge.

b. In order to establish the ontological phenomenological sociology, we have to carry out the sociological phenomenological reduction first, and then the eidetic reduction must be added. The eidetic reduction is a necessary component of the method in the ontological phenomenological sociology, since the latter aims to clarify the essential structure instead of the empirical structure of the sociological facts.

c. In order to develop the transcendental phenomenological sociology, we have to perform the transcendental phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction. The transcendental phenomenological reduction as the method of transcendental phenomenological sociology aims to grasp the plurality of transcendental subjectivity that provides the condition of the possibility for the constitution of various kinds of sociological fact. We have to examine which of the various kinds of the transcendental phenomenological reductions developed by Husserl are relevant for this purpose. The transcendental phenomenological sociology is a kind of essential science, and the method of eidetic reduction is an essential component of its method.

4. We have to lay emphasis on the fact that the essential characteristic of phenomenological sociology is the explicit or implicit use of the various kinds of the phenomenological methods. Phenomenological sociology is distinguished from those concepts of sociology that do not use the method of the phenomenological reduction at all. Therefore, it is distinguished from those concepts of sociology that are bound up with natural science or are quantitatively oriented. The distinction between the phenomenological and the non-phenomenological sociology should be dealt with in more detail. Some scholars participated in the debates on phenomenological sociology also consider the use of the phenomenological method to be the essential characteristic of phenomenological sociology. However, they do not make a clear distinction among different kinds of the phenomenological reduction. Most of them simply assume that there might be only one kind of the phenomenological reduction, namely the transcendental phenomenological reduction. According to them, in order to be called phenomenological, empirical sociology has to use the method of the transcendental phenomenological reduction. But this position contradicts the basic tenet of phenomenology. According to phenomenology, science has to conceive its method of research on the basis of the matters that it is dealing with, and it should not borrow its method of research from another science that is dealing with another kind of matter. The empirical phenomenological sociology could not borrow its method of research from the transcendental phenomenology, since its proper domain of matter is not the matter of the transcendental phenomenology. If empirical sociology uses the method of the transcendental phenomenological reduction, it becomes an anti-phenomenological science, since, being totally blind to the empirical sociological facts, it could not investigate the latter properly.

5. The fact that three different dimensions of phenomenological sociology have to use different kinds
of the phenomenological method should not motivate one to imagine that they do not have any relationships with each other. Contrary to what one might believe, there are foundational relationships among them.

In the debates on phenomenological sociology, most scholars, implicitly or explicitly, paid attention to the foundational relationship between the “transcendental phenomenology” and the “phenomenological sociology.” However, they did not understand the proper meaning of the foundational relationship in this context. According to them, the foundational relationship between them implies that the latter has to use the same method as the former, which contradicts the basic phenomenological tenet as mentioned above.

Properly speaking, the foundational relationship between among different dimensions of phenomenological sociology means something totally different from what they have in mind. For example, the foundational relationship between the empirical phenomenological sociology and the ontological phenomenological sociology means that the former has to be guided by the latter in its method of research. The reason for this lies in the fact that the essential structures of the sociological facts clarified by the ontological phenomenological sociology could give us a norm that has a direct implication for the research method of empirical phenomenological sociology. In this context, it should be noted to the fact that “a certain method [...] is a norm which arises from the fundamental regional specificity and the universal structures of the region in question” (Hua III/1, 161). As the ontological phenomenological sociology could show, it is the essence of the sociological fact that it is the product of intentionalities. In this case, the essence of the sociological fact could give us a methodological norm for the empirical phenomenological sociology, namely the norm that the empirical sociology has to use the sociological phenomenological reduction, because it has to investigate the sociological facts from the perspective of intentionality. Thus, the foundational relationship between the empirical phenomenological sociology and the ontological phenomenological sociology consists in the fact that the former gets a direction for its method of research from the latter, it does not mean that the former has to use the same method as the latter.

As shown above, the foundational relationships among three dimensions of phenomenological sociology are much more complicated than one might imagine. That is, the transcendental phenomenological foundation means something other than the ontological foundation. The various kinds of foundational relationship should be examined in more detail.

6. In order to develop phenomenological sociology systematically, it is necessary to make a clear distinction among three different dimensions of phenomenological sociology. However, in the debates on phenomenological sociology, this distinction has not been investigated sufficiently. When closely examined, one can see that each dimension of phenomenological sociology has abundant possibilities to be developed in various directions.

a. The empirical phenomenological sociology is the discipline that could have a great impact on the empirical sociologists. Among the different concepts of sociology mentioned above, there are some kinds of sociology that could be classified under empirical phenomenological sociology. For instance, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, Weber’s religious sociology, Thomas’s sociology, Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, and reflective sociology can be regarded as kinds of empirical phenomenological sociology. In this context, one has to keep in mind that, in dealing with sociological facts as products of intentionality, it is necessary to use the method of the sociological phenomenological reduction. Yet besides these concepts of sociology, there are more possibilities to develop the empirical phenomenological sociology. Sociology conceived by A. Giddens is a good example for the further development of the empirical phenomenological sociology which concerns the process of the social construction of reality.

b. The ontological phenomenology also has abundant possibilities to be developed in various directions. There are examples of the ontological phenomenological sociology among various kinds of
sociology mentioned above. For instance, one can find the ontological phenomenological sociology in Weber's theory of social action, since he attempts to clarify the essential structures of social action as the basic category of verstehende Soziologie. In this sense, one could say that, developing his theory of social action, Weber is carrying out the sociological phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction implicitly. Weber's theory of social action as the ontological phenomenological sociology is the fundamental ground for his religious sociology, which, as verstehende Soziologie, is developed on the empirical dimension. The other examples of the ontological phenomenological sociology are Vierkandt's formal sociology, Parsons's general theory of action, and Schutz's phenomenological sociology. Husserl, as a founder of phenomenology, also attempted several times to elaborate the ontological phenomenological sociology; however, to the best of my knowledge, he never sought to develop the empirical phenomenological sociology. Various kinds of the ontological phenomenological sociology that have not yet been conceived could be developed as the ontological foundation of various kinds of empirical phenomenological sociology, for example, the ontological sociology of knowledge as the ontological foundation for the empirical sociology.

c. There have been no attempts to develop the transcendental phenomenological sociology in the debates on phenomenological sociology. However, there are also abundant possibilities to develop the transcendental phenomenological sociology in various directions. Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity articulated from the perspective of transcendental phenomenology is a good example of the transcendental phenomenological sociology. As an empirical sociologist, one might not have any interest in the transcendental phenomenological sociology, but one should not forget that it has a great significance for the empirical phenomenological sociology, since it deals with the transcendental phenomenological foundation of the latter. The transcendental phenomenological sociology could be developed in various directions, for example, it could be developed in as a static as well as a genetic one.

Notes


(3) Here phenomenological psychological reduction should be understood as a procedure that does not include the process of eidetic reduction, does not necessitate in advance imperialist global supremacy. On the contrary, this is what the philosophy of interculturality should demonstrate in reconsidering the concept of the world in a permeation of unity and diversity, without ideologically overthrowing the power of the One and suppressing diversity under the supremacy of the One.

“Encountering” is thus understood as the key word of the philosophy of interculturality, which has not only a methodological, but also a relational sense. Within encountering, we encounter someone or something, while we also encounter someone or something for the sake of the encounter itself. Translated from Slovenian by Janko Lozar.

Notes

Working With Husserl
Sophie Loidolt

This brief outline on the future of Husserlian phenomenology is rather a commitment with a few thematic references than a typical academic text. To point out how we can encounter and account for Husserl's legacy, I would like to refer to the methodological aspect which is so essential to phenomenology. Therefore I am not going to develop any special motifs that are to be engaged in future philosophical debates but simply try to highlight the always striking benefits of working with Husserl. Whatever issue we engage in, whatever questions we ask, we can try to think our way through with the directives and tools Husserl consigned to us: a carefully developed way how to work with phenomena as such insofar as they are regarded without any methodological precondition; thus, a method that is committed to its object to such an extent that it coincides with it and tries to become the non-method par excellence or the method without any content but that what is 'given'; and, most important, the understanding of the given as meaning (Sinn) for a consciousness that has to be investigated in its structure and genesis. It is the last point I would like to build my argument on with the aim to show what makes a phenomenological approach so fruitful. This includes the thesis that the future of Husserlian phenomenology still lies in the unique perspective on phenomena as meanings for a consciousness – a perspective in which numerous issues have not been considered yet or need to be reconsidered in the future.

To Look at Something as a Meaning: Reduction and Consciousness

To look at something as a meaning means to go back to the most elementary category of human understanding. Everything appears in the horizon of meaning (which thus includes absurdity as the borders of meaning) and to take this apparently so trivial fact seriously into account is a unique quality of the phenomenological approach. What turns meaning into meaning? Meaning is always meaning for . . . . In the broadest sense, meaning is for a consciousness. May it be ‘anonymous’ (as for the early Husserl) or the consciousness of a transcendental ego, in any way we need a conception of consciousness to be able to speak of meaning at all and vice versa. To speak of meaning or of consciousness as consciousness of something leaves the subject/object divide behind and focuses on the correlation which marks the very essence of consciousness. If we take a step back and look at consciousness itself we find that it is that correlation and thus the domain of meaning. We can also see that this ‘step back’ is not a step out of the world but consciously into it with the realisation that everything we can mean by ‘world’ is already conscious and thus within consciousness. In short: It is not consciousness that is within the world, but the world itself is conscious. This view opens up a whole new sphere where the accomplishments of consciousness that make our world a meaningful world can finally be visible – and these accomplishments go to the very basic point of perceiving and thus constituting the category of ‘reality’ itself. The eidetic structures and correlations Husserl has sketched out, work as a perfect ‘map’ of that normally hidden sphere of consciousness which is mainly a sphere of accomplishments. For philosophical and other investigations this field of building-up of or generation of meaning (Sinnbildung) cannot be neglected, if a theory is intended that takes the basic structures of experience (Erleben and Erfahren) into account. Neither the basic tools nor concepts can be neglected that Husserl developed for this purpose, such as ‘consciousness,’ ‘intentionality,’ ‘correlation,’ ‘act and content’ etc.

To Look at the Structures of Sinnbildung: Intentionality and Constitution

Husserlian phenomenology renders the possibility to take a close look at the different stages and structures of ‘Sinnbildung.’ The key term of intentionality allows a systematic differentiation between act and content and more elaborated, between noesis and noema. On the one hand, the investigation of
’noesis’ is an investigation of the intentional ‘Erlebnis’ (e.g. the Erlebnis of ‘judging’ in judgement: das Urteilen im Urteil) that looks at it like an object and thus makes those accomplishments visible which produce meaning. On the other hand, the intentional ‘Erlebnis’ is consciousness of something: this noematic correlate now contains all the layers of meaning in the aspect of the given (the Perceived, the Judged, the Intended…) as such. This twofold analysis developed by Husserl grasps the eidetic structure and essence of consciousness as Bewusstsein von… and makes its apriori of correlation (Korrelationsapriori) clear. The insight that all reality is through Sinngebung within this correlation leads to the transcendental turn in Husserl's philosophy. However, the activity of the transcendental ego is not necessarily an all over sovereign that is the only ‘competent authority’ of the building up of meaning. Especially Husserl's style of investigation and devotion to the phenomena (Zu den Sachen selbst!) has led him to diverse explications in the complicated structures of Sinnbildung – I will only mention a few aspects and exemplary approaches: Husserl's concept of passivity as well as the aligned modalities of sedimentation and habitualisation show, how meaning is produced, stored, modified and reproduced without the direct participation of an ego. At the same time, the core analysis of time that touches the deepest layers of consciousness possible, fleshes out the thesis that this ego is not a mere construction but a living ‘nunc stans’. Furthermore, the analysis of the body leads to the recognition of a passive intentional drive (Triebintentionalität) in kinaesthesia; it engages phenomena like severe pain that turn around the structures of normal experience and make a subject visible that is constituted by its openness. All these differenciated approaches that include so many aspects, will make Husserlian phenomenology indispensable also in the future. Its enormous potential lies in highlighting the multiple dimensions and modalities of Sinnbildung – even if Husserl himself emphasizes sovereign achievement of experience. This has to do with his preference for the capacity of self-preservation of the subject and a certain tendency to harmonize experience. But what is the case for Husserl is not necessarily the case for Husserlian phenomenology: there are numerous developments and radicalisations of themes and indices that were raised by Husserl himself – this is why working with Husserl still starts from a very fruitful ground, where many issues are still in question. It is important that with Husserl it is possible to come to an edge of experience where some philosophers have chosen to speak of counter-intentionality instead of intentionality, where Sinnbildung turns into Sinnereignis and where the sovereignty of constitution is deeply in question. But at the same time, subjectivity is never out of sight or out of question but appears as the indispensable core of self-affection and self-awareness that ensures the possibility to have experiences at all. Given this possibility of a balanced analysis, it is possible to talk about the generation of meaning in terms of intentionality, motivation and acts of a transcendental ego, without ignoring the impact of the body, of intersubjectivity or of the mundane structures of the social and historical world. Husserl's phenomenology thus is a transcendental philosophy that engages the fundamental structures of sensuality and acknowledges their right and role in the process of Sinnbildung.

To Look at the Genesis of Sinnbildung

One of Husserl's most successful concepts is that of genesis or genetic phenomenology. This includes another dimension of Sinnbildung: while static phenomenology deals with validities, genetic phenomenology investigates the genesis of these validities. Again, the transcendental perspective is crucial because the genetic structure reveals the conditions of the possibility of experience by starting from experience itself. Investigating the fundamental conditions of consciousness in the genetic perspective renders the key features how to think and conceptualize a core form of subjectivity. It gives an outline of the most passive layers of fungierender Intentionalität and shows the importance of association, affection and succession in Sinnbildung not only on a psychological but on a transcendental level. The striking characteristic feature of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the elaboration of a prepredicative sphere which in itself already shows structures of receptivity that have a preparing character for the entry of spontaneity. As Husserl has demonstrated this for logical categories, the whole life of reason with its justifying features could be newly understood from the
predicative sphere. Husserl offers a possibility to speak about reason without the exclusion of sensibility or, more precise, to speak of reason within a subject that is also determined and pre-structured by its receptivity. This also allows a comprehensive approach on intersubjectivity that embraces all dimensions from the affective to the reasonable in ethic and social life. Through the genetic question the issue of Sinnbildung reaches a profoundness that cannot be neglected in future philosophical discussions on any question that concerns subjectivity and intersubjectivity and its constitution of a meaningful world.

How to Work with Husserl: The Idea of Arbeitsphilosophie in the Future

The aim of this brief sketch was only to give a short idea about the richness and profoundness of topics in Husserlian phenomenology viewed under the core term of Sinnbildung. Concerning the future significance of Husserlian philosophy it is very probable that Sinnbildung as a term and a whole issue has the potential to engage in all sorts of discussions: be it a classical philosophical question on the role of the transcendental, be it a dialogue with the cognitive sciences on the question of consciousness as such, be it a new phenomenological approach in the social sciences, be it an effort to engage in the analysis of phenomena like violence and war that touch the borders of meaning and understanding. To achieve this wide range of subject matters, it is however, important to reflect on what it means to work with Husserl. Of course it does not mean that we regard his writings as a ‘system’ that is completed – not only the style of Husserl’s work but primarily his own concept of phenomenology would prohibit that perception. It is known that Husserl thought of phenomenology as methodische Arbeitsphilosophie: he regarded the new ground of experience (Erfahrungsboden) that was opened up through the phenomenological reduction as an infinite field where all kinds of philosophical questions could be newly posed and decided on.

The way how to work fruitfully with Husserl’s phenomenology has been practiced in the past and will also guarantee the future of Husserlian thought: To a high extent it was French philosophers who opened up Husserlian phenomenology to its own more radical potential. They demonstrated that looking for the dissonances and fractures in Husserl’s opus was often more productive for phenomenology than keeping an orthodox reading. Phenomenology is after all, a method that coincides with its object. The fact that phenomenological reflections have kept and will keep phenomenology in motion, even unorthodox modifications or alterations cannot run contrary to Husserl’s intentions and will keep his legacy truly alive.
Prospects of Husserlian Phenomenology
Algis Mickunas

To articulate the prospects for Husserlian phenomenology first we must suggest briefly the points of contention his work has provoked in major trends which, as a matter of fact, are aspects of and inspired by his opus. In this sense one current requirement of Husserlian phenomenology is to take to task the various attacks on his work, not to demonstrate by arguments that they are wrong, but to investigate the undisclosed prejudgments in awareness that such attacks contain. We know that from Heidegger through various hermeneutical systems, to deconstruction and post-modernity, Husserl's thought was the main target for criticisms on whose basis the careers of such attacks were made. Thus, the first claim suggests that Husserl's understanding of Being is impoverished in contrast to his epistemic focus of establishing a domain of absolute awareness founded on transcendental ego. In this sense, his phenomenology is not a presuppositionless science, but a Cartesian reduction of Being to being known. Another aspect that supposedly discredits Husserl's claims is the impossibility to obtain apodictic evidence of retentional dimension of temporal experience and the radical difference of the other's experience. Unable to eradicate these difficulties, Husserl attempts to support his claim to absolute evidence by accepting, uncritically, the language of presence that pervades the metaphysical legacy of the West. Finally, and despite his discovery of the life-world, both his method and content of his researches are Western, and even epistemically imperialistic. After all, all cultural and historical differences are subsumed by him under the claim that phenomenology is the secret longing of the Greco-European man. These contentions require a brief response and above all an opening to the future tasks for Husserlian phenomenology.

Husserlian phenomenology has one pervasive and general characteristic: analytic precision. It demands that all claims be demonstrated precisely in awareness accessible to everyone. Moreover, it demands that any philosophical position must include and explicate the awareness required for the very grounds of such a position. Lacking such an explication, a position remains dogmatic and speculative. It is therefore essential to disclose the transcendental awareness that comprises the very condition for attempts to depose this phenomenology. Such an awareness is reflective and demands that any philosophical or even anti-philosophical venture take into account its own reflection as a condition on which it differentiates itself from other positions. This sort of reflection is a vast field for phenomenological researches leading to precise eidetic insights into philosophical positions and what sort of awareness such positions require. For example, while Kant proposes to account for all knowledge on the basis of his a priori structures and the manner of their transcendental deduction to explicate the empirical domain, he does not account for the mode of awareness required to access the a priori domain. Such an awareness is required if the a priori, or any other epistemological, ontological, or even metaphysical claims are to become legitimate. Anyone making such claims will also have to show the manner in which they are accessible to awareness. Only such awareness will be able to decipher what is essential in each claim. This is one major venture that faces phenomenological work.

Given this state of affairs, first contention concerning the lack of attention to Being is grounded on an initial insight that the entire tradition had hidden the meaning of Being through metaphysics and hence it is the task of hermeneutics to secure access to it. But this is precisely Husserl's point: one assumes an awareness of the concealed status of Being's meaning prior to the demand for hermeneutical method. This is a transcendental insight into an eidetic invariant that is seen as a ground of all Western metaphysics. While the explication of this invariant has been accomplished, the modes of awareness correlating to it is the task of Husserlian phenomenology. Another task, following the question of Being is the notion that as being in the world, the human is bound by his situation, history, facticity, temporality, etc. which must equally assume a status of transcendentally accessible eidetic invariant that transcends any situation, history and temporality. After all, the claim is made that in principle all humans live within this invariant and thus becomes unbound from factual contexts. Only transcendental phenomenology is in a position to explicate all sorts of variants while maintaining the
eidetic invariant as a correlate of direct awareness. The domain of this awareness is still outstanding for phenomenological research. Similar tasks are involved in the claims that Husserlian phenomenology cannot have access to retended past, because it assumes presence as if it were the sole given to awareness. This claim assumes an ontological, sequential notion of time with points following one another. Yet this claim does not include the exposition of awareness of such a time such that past-present-future is not given one after another, but is present as a total field of mutual differentiations. It is precisely the transcendental time awareness that allows the co-presence of the three phases as transparent one through the other in their differences. Indeed, the deconstructive notion of difference assumes this time awareness as its unstated ground. Once again, the future task of Husserlian phenomenology opens up with precise research into time awareness at this level of transparency.

Husserlian phenomenology has to concern itself with various other major themes: philosophical anthropology, civilizational-cultural studies in the context of life world problematic, history, sciences and world horizon. Philosophical anthropology is called for by modern philosophical, cultural, and historical relativity. Within the latter, two claims have been preeminent: (a) different cultures, historical periods and societies offer various, and even clashing interpretations of human beings. It was mentioned above that Husserlian phenomenology was accused of being bound by Western prejudices and hence could not deal with other cultural worlds, (b) modern scientific and technological thinking offers the means to “make” the human into something “new” or even radically different from what has been previously considered to be the case. Phenomenology has to explicate such views and proposed transformations of the human in order to disclose a tacit “essence” at least as far as awareness is concerned, that allows the different views to be of a presupposed invariant human. Without the latter no sense could be made of the claim that what humans are depends on cultural, historical, social and even technical definitions and constructs. All these constructs seem to be different from one another. Yet simple differences would allow only the claim that at different times and in different places there were descriptively different creatures resulting in a catalogue of various depictions differing one from the others. Yet even those who claim that there are radical differences in cultures, societies and histories, still insist in using the phrase “different interpretations of what it means to be human.”

Husserlian phenomenology must be at the forefront of phenomenological philosophy insofar as various new trends in research make awareness their point of departure. For example, there is a temptation to point to cognitive psychology as if it were scientific affirmation of phenomenology. Such a psychology is both empiricistic and speculative. Neither empiricism, emphasizing contingency of all facts, nor speculative rationalism, stressing conceptuality and universal necessity, are adequate to account for human concrete awareness. The former, with its “internal faculties” as psychological facts cannot account for the continuity and unity of experience. The latter can account neither for the unity of experience without positing the “I think” accompanying all representations, nor for individuality wherein such representations could be attributed as “mine.” In terms of philosophical anthropology, for empiricism the human would be a “factum brutum,” while for rationalism, the factual human would be an instance of a universal concept. Hence another task of Husserlian phenomenology consists of precise delimitation of what comprises an individual experience without it becoming solipsistic. Here the prospects for intersubjective awareness and dialogical phenomenology is an open field for research and philosophical grounding without reverting to transcendental idealism. At this level some of the Husserlian inadequacies will have to be admitted, above all the concept of “intentionality” that correlates to any objectivity but cannot account for the world horizon.

Husserlian phenomenology is in an excellent position to investigate the pragmatic domain that has been alluded to, but never concretely disclosed, by “reconstructive pragmatism” and even the critical school. Here the researches into the domain of the primacy of “I can” or “I cannot” perform something, build and make are most suggestive. This domain opens the concrete architectonic of social life in action. Intersubjectivity is primarily formed at the level of bodily abilities such that we recognize ourselves and others on the basis of activities. The latter, in turn, are not arbitrary, but are in correlation to things that make their objective demands on such activities. This means that the world is not in doubt and is not our construct. Being Euclidean beings, we must move around and not through
things. Yet this claim must not be confused with any kind of realism or naturalism. The natural presence of the world still requires an explication of the processes of awareness that are structurally distinct from the composition of things. Here Husserl opens up the unexplored understanding of corporeal activities in their essential generality that ground analogization and even technology as an extension of bodily abilities.

This level of primal awareness also opens up horizons founded on the “I can.” One may be aware that in one’s own region there are hills, and more hills, but the horizon does not close; it is possible that beyond the hills there are deserts, lakes, flatlands, forests, cities, and strangers who “do things differently.” This horizon extends into indefinite possibilities which I can concretize by going from my region to that region “then” and discover whether my intentional orientation toward the “that and then” region say, as a possible desert, is concretized or disappointed. I expected a desert and there appeared a lake. It needs to be said that at the level of movement formation of horizons of awareness there is a shift from direct perceptual fulfillment to an open world horizon of possibilities that can only be concretized in direct awareness partially. Hence, the more in this awareness is “consciousness” that suggests perceptual fulfillability, but at the same time is experienced as a transcendental condition for the experience of the world as totality, although never completely accessible to a singular subject in her engagements with the world. This leads to phenomenological explication of theoretical and experimental sciences which, in their practice of forming hypotheses open possibilities some of which will be fulfilled in awareness and some of which will remain empty, although available for future fulfillment. Sciences could not function without such a horizon consciousness.

Historical awareness is a horizon of past achievements of others and how current inhabitants of the life world appropriate and vary such achievements. At this level a question concerning our experience of historical past arises. The task is to replace Hegelian dialectics, Marxian materialism, and empirical research. None can travel to the past, except symbolically, and none can account for such would be symbolic understanding. Apart from that, these metaphysical “accounts” of history assume a continuous theoretical time and have not offered any justification for such a continuity. In this sense, we cannot think of history as if it were a succession of events “in time” as if ruled by causes, or a deduction from “eternity,” such as “laws of dialectics” either of Hegelian or Marxian brand. Rather, history is an active engagement of making and building, of concrete projects based on what we can do and what others have done. What they have done is present to us in architecture, texts that signify the world in a particular way and reveal that we too could have acted and performed similar tasks, but we no longer do them in this way. We have acquired different abilities and hence have no necessary continuity with our predecessors. The discontinuity does not imply that we are not open to the understanding of how they made things, what purposes are present in their buildings, implements and comportment. We may learn some abilities from what they did, but also vary them in order to perform our tasks. As was the case with the horizon of awareness, history comprises a horizon of what others have accomplished, thus extending our own horizon to the possibility of transforming and varying our own abilities. This means that the historical others extend my perception and abilities thus forming a poli-centric field of understanding. Our own perceptions would be quite limited without the others from whom we “borrow” perceptions and abilities and thus recognize our limitations and possibilities. And indeed are open to the future. This view prevents to speak of a singular historical aim. Some tasks are completed and discontinued, the accomplishments abandoned; others are taken up in part after the builders and makers have long since disappeared, and still others are postponed for the future. The historical horizon of possibilities cannot be concretized in totality and hence this openness precludes any claim to history as having a singular purpose. The prospect of rethinking history that does not rely on contingency nor does it imply necessity is still outstanding.

There is another level of historical awareness that has to be investigated: transcendental. This type of awareness comprises a way to access the modes of perception that others assumed in their understanding of the world. Thus, while we may not have any knowledge of Aristotle’s psychological, social, political and personal life, we can say, from his writings, that Aristotle regarded the world as composed of substances. Each substance could be regarded under specific categories accessible to
Aristotle as well as us. In this sense, historical awareness of others is not regarded psychologically or internally, but as a mode of awareness that comprises transcendental orientation toward the world accessible to anyone. Even when we disagree with Aristotle or Plato, we also must be aware of the way Plato or Aristotle regarded the world. This type of awareness is already intersubjective and is a condition for the claim that our own awareness is limited and in turn extended through others. We can “borrow” Aristotle’s mode of awareness and enhance our own. Once again, we comprise a field of poli-centric awareness that has historical depth prior to specific temporal locations. From this vantage point we can avoid various theoretical dilemmas. If some social philosophy claims that all social life, including theoretical thinking, is a result of material conditions, then previous historical views would not be accessible to us, since we do not live under those conditions. In turn, the very view that all theories are based on given material conditions is itself one theory that reflects current material conditions and cannot make a universal claim. The same holds for theories of history that are premised on the notion that history is a contingent fact and all necessary truths, even in logic, are a result of “historical development.” A contingent fact cannot be posited as a ground of necessity.

Finally, there is a question whether there is a presumed one life world as a ground of various societies and cultures, or do such societies and cultures comprise distinct and, at times, incompatible life worlds. If there were one life world, and we were completely immersed in it, then we would not recognize our immersion. If there were more than one, then we would either belong to one or another and thus would interpret the other in terms of our own and hence fail to recognize the distinction between them. If we can access both, then we cannot belong to either and must have an awareness of both and their differences. This awareness is taken for granted in all such comparative studies of cultures and civilizations. The prospects for Husserlian phenomenology in this domain are vast, since the current cultural researches are at a loss concerning what methodology is appropriate and whether the current approaches are, in fact, bound by specific cultural prejudgments. The very notion of comparative cultures, as it relates to the issue of life world(s) requires a level of awareness that includes itself as its own methodological condition. The awareness that engages in comparisons must open the possibilities of accessing the others in terms of their awareness in order to note similarities, identities and differences. This is the transcendental problematic of method that would offer the final reaches of Husserlian phenomenology.


Husserl and the Being of Time
Anna-Lena Renqvist

In his investigations on the intricate relation between time and consciousness from 1907-08, Husserl proposes a conception of time in which the “now” - in line with the Aristotelian analysis of time - is the fundamental category. Time is thought of as something rooted in the the original object of consciousness - the object of perception - since, as it is perceived, will always be presently perceived, that is, perceived in a “now”. As Husserl says: “perception (Wharnemung) constitutes the now”. (1)

Being in time is being perceived, and vice versa, because being perceived is being present, and being present is a temporal quality.

Due to the significance attributed to the perceptive act within the phenomenological project - “consciousness is nothing without an impression” (2) - the investigations will subsequently be circling around a clarification of the nature of this “now”. With Husserl’s own words, “all objectivation takes place in time-consciousness, and no clarification of the identity of an Object in time can be given without a clarification of the identity of temporal position.” (3) As opposed to the Aristotelian physics, and more in line with the Agustinian approach, the called for identity of the temporal position will henceforth (by art of memory as “retention”) be understood in terms of temporal extension, of duration. It will furthermore be of such a kind that it stands forth as a quality inherent in the perceived object itself; or with Husserl, “duration is before us as a mode of objectivity”. (4) This means that even though the “now”, in one sense, is subordinated to the law of constant modification – known as the flux of time – it can also appear as objectively the same (due to the continuity of apprehension). (5)

Ten years later the Husserl’s investigations have taken on a slightly different course. When they reach us in the Bernauer Manuscripts (1917-18), the focus is placed upon the underlying conditions of possibility of what is presently perceived in such a way that it indicates a former time. (6) As Husserl puts it: “How are we to understand the conditions of possibility of perception of an immanent object in general. (7) When the object is perceived, it is obviously perceived in a constituting process, and here it is (esse est percipi). But must it not also be without being thus perceived? (8)

In as far a this pre-intentional object is a constitutional part prior to the constituted Cogito, the question arises as to the eventual time of that which is prior: is it to be considered a timeless stratum of the ego, prior only in a material or logical sense, or is it to be considered prior in the sense of time? (9) If the “prior” is to be understood in terms of time, we would be witnessing a sliding operation such that the fundamental category of time may no longer be understood as the present dimension but rather as the past.

The question of time and time consciousness stands forth as a key question, and will so remain. Husserl never finds the conclusive answer regarding the intricate nature of time, of its relation to consciousness and to the genesis of its object, though in his search for clarification he brings us insights of a lasting kind, inspiring and illuminating. In order to get an idea of the profundity of the issue at stake, I would like to repass some of its clue remarks as they appear in the BM, and to interpret them in the light of a similar proposal, posthumely elaborated some 75 years before Husserl’s own intent, in the doctrine of time of F.W.J.Schelling.

Is there such a thing as a non conscious (unbewusste) perception (Vorstellung)? Is there such a thing as a life of the I (Ichleben), which is not itself conscious, or even that is not itself perceived? (10) In the BM, Husserl formulates the hypothesis of an original process (Urprozess) of such a kind that it is, in principal, perceivable even though it is not actually perceived. Herupon follows the distinction between perceptions that can be conceptionally grasped, and perceptions that can not. (11) And, as Husserl observes, does not an original process necessarily belong to every perception as a process that constitutes the givenness of the temporal object (Zeitgegenstände) but is not itself perceived? As a matter of fact, is not the constituted object quite unthinkable without the being of this constitution (Sein der Konstitution) which, as such, would be prior to the object thus constituted? In other words, does not every grasping conception (Erfassen) presuppose a former (Vorgängige) non-grasping perceiving
(Wharnemen ohne Erfassen)? Doubtless! (12)

Within the framework of phenomenology, where it would be correct to speak of “constitution” (of intentional objects) only in a following reflection over the original process, it seems inadmissible to understand the original process as a constitutive process of timeobjects (13) and, so, to consider it as a kind of intentional consciousness. But then again, when we pay attention to the way in which it is given (die Gegegenheitsweisen desselbe), this line (Reihe) is a temporal line. (14) As Husserl says: “Must not these Lebensreihen, in some sense or another, remain either we pay attention to them or we do not? In other words, does not the process remain (verharrt) in its time?” (15) If the latter is the case, we would have to admit something prior to the reflection of the first stage (erster Stufe) of immanent experience, understood in terms of an unconscious process as a series (Urfolge) of ‘hyletic’ moments which, again, would not themselves have the structure of a “consciousness-of”. (16) Given that the field assigned to the phenomenological investigation is precisely the objects of consciousness, this would suggest, furthermore, two quite different orientations within the transcendental reflection: the one that turns to the constituting stream, and the one that turns to the constituted line of events. (17) But – as Husserl exclaims – is it really possible for the immanent events (Ereinisse) to be (to have being) through a constitution based on a comprehension (Auffassung) of a mere potential kind? (18) The confusion thus expressed, which runs through the BM, is linked to the presumptive independence of such an original process, that is, understood as an autonomous stage within the selfsame intentional consciousness. Such an admission would threaten the very bases of phenomenology: that the object is what it is through an act of consciousness. The question of whether the relation between the original process and the temporal events (Ereignis) is a matter of a constituting relation. (Konstitutionszusammenhang) (19) remains a question that will never be completely solved.

According to the Husserlian postulate that the constitution of an (intentional) temporal object is due to an act, and given that the power to act is a function exclusively found in consciousness, or that it is originated in the “ego based conception” (“ichlichen Erfassung”) as an act of reflection, (20) the question of the constitutive function of the pre-conscious original process turns out to be a semi-question as much as a key one. At the same time as the independent and intentional character of the original process must be denied, the original process itself cannot be denied. Any alternative determination of the original process remains hopelessly entangled with the problem of the consciousness here involved. Because how is this prior (“Voraussetzen”) to be understood if not in terms related to consciousness? As Husserl puts it in a marginal note: On the one hand the impression (Auffassen) is not to be considered an art of Attention (Aufmerksamkeit), yet on the other hand it is “a spontaneous act of the I” (Spontaneität des Ich). (21) Or as he goes on clarifying: What would the existence of an event as time event (Ereignisse als Zeitereignis) mean “vor der Zuwendung und eigentlichen Konstitution”? Nothing else than the ideal possibility for the I to exercise its spontaneous functions, based, that is, on the original process prior to the objectivation (auf Grund des der Objektivation vorauslegenden Urprozessus, bwz. In der Wiedererinnerung). (22)

A suggestive complement to the Husserlian ambivalence regarding the temporality of the original process is found within the so-called “real-idealism” elaborated by the German philosopher Schelling (1775-1854). Well rooted as he was in the idealist tradition, Schelling shares the husserlian point of departure. The beginning of knowledge is to be found in an act of consciousness, and this act has a “before” of a generically different kind. What is brought to knowledge through a reflective act, is bound to have a pre-conscious material or, with Husserl, its hyletic stratum. They furthermore coincide in the idea that this something (=x) prior to consciousness may not be constituted as such until grasped in reflection, through the reflective act.

The difference between these two, in many ways closely related, German philosophers, in my view illuminating, is to be found in the place – and time – assigned to the act in question. While according to Husserls thinking, this place is a reflective act, in Schellings philosophy it is a pre-reflective act; an act, that is, apt to offer what Husserl is searching for and can not find: a “Halt” in the stream of “unconscious life-moments” through which the “Uremfindungsdatum” could be given to apperception. (23) In other words, both Husserl and Schelling presuppose the hyletic process in terms
of what is potentially (not actually) as a “nacheinander” or a flow – all according to Aristotelian
dynamics – and both of them claim the reflective act as the beginning of knowledge, but while Husserl
thinks of this step as an immediate step leading from what is potentially knowable to the reflective act,
Schelling proposes an intermedium, a metaxy in the form of a pre-reflective actualisation.

In Schelling's conception of the dynamics underlying the reflective act, we have not one but two
stages: on the one hand we have the hyletic “urprozess” in terms of what is potentially – as a non-
constituted, though potential “being”, with its lack of unity and identity –, on the other hand we have
the actualisation of this scattered, manifold being as a unified, self-identical all. In the philosophy of
Schelling, this all is understood by way of the old image, reintroduced in modern philosophy by
Spinoza and operating as a key concept within the romantic and German idealistic tradition, “Hen kai
pan”, one and all.

The pre-reflective act is an all inclusive act in the precise sense that it includes the subject and the
object. Since there is nothing – no subject and no consciousness – outside this relation, there is no eye
in which this unity could be reflected, thus differentiated and judged (teilen, “ur-tailen”). As a matter of
fact, in this act we have the genesis, the conception or creation of two things: of the consciousness
itself (and the conscious self) in the precise sense of a becoming conscious (here Bewusstsein is
above all Bewusst-werden), and of the object (Gegenstand) in relation to which this consciousness stands
forth.

This pre-reflective, all-inclusive act offers the material for – a later – differential act proper to
reflection; here we find the unity on the basis of which knowledge is possible and scientific system
could be edified.

As for the question at stake: time and the constitution of time, Schelling and Husserl coincide in as
far as they consider the act of consciousness as the outcome of a process prior to the act itself; either it
would be called an original process, an original life or a pre-history which, moreover, is not yet as such.
It is not, nor could not be as such, since it is not yet constituted. Though according to Schelling, and as
opposed to Husserl, it could become constituted as what it was. In other words, it is surely not
constituted in its own potential time, though through the act, afterwards so the speak, it may become
what it was and remain what it is: a potential time in the key of the past.

My proposal is that this very intuition is present within Husserl's own work., at the same time as he is
forbidden to draw the conclusion of his own insights. Due to the postulate of the cartesian cogito, of
the “absolute consciousness” and the “identical, “über-zeitliche” I, Husserl can not admit a time that is
not conscious time, and with that he lacks the categories to think an original life (Urleben) in terms of
temporal life, or of such a kind that it would bring temporal objectivity into consciousness. (24)
Meanwhile he is well aware that the intentional object requires a pre-conscious “stratum” which is – in
some way or another – before the constitution of the object in consciousness and, in so far as “before”
is a temporal quality, it is also due to be considered, in one way or another, as a timely event.

Given Husserl's many references to such a time he leaves us with the inspiring target to develop a
phenomenology of time based on Husserl's own writings which would not, necessarily, coincide with
the conclusions drawn by Husserl himself. As he himself shows us: If we consider a process which
itself is unpercievable (unwahrgenommen), a perception of it must still be thinkable (according to the
principle that everything that is, have its origial possible apperception, its possible “Wahrnehmung”).
Furthermore, this latter process must be a new kind process, different from the one apperceived”. (25)

Notes

(1) E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, 1905 – 10 82.
(2) Ibid. 131.
(3) Ibid. 88.
(4) Ibid. 90.
(5) Ibid. 89.
(6) Already in the earlier work this problem is announced in relation to the absoluta consciousness. How
is the Wesensbestimmung of the “absolut” conscious as “urprozesses” to be understood relation to the therein known (bewussten) “immanenten Zeitgegenständen” or “Ereignissen”? (See BM XXXVI).

(7) Bernauer Manuscripte, 1917-18, 191.

(8) Ibid. 191.

(9) In the last case it is bound to have a time quality of its own – and in that case it will put into question that the foundation of time is to be found in the “presentification” of the thing perceived. It is not coherent with the description, or the view, of the subject as the absolute: “an absolute timeless subject”.

(10) Ibid. 205, note 1.

(11) Ibid. 191.

(12) Ibid. 191.

(13) Ibid. 203.

(14) Ibid. 196.

(15) Ibid. 204.

(16) Ibid. 200.

(17) Ibid. 262.

(18) Ibid. 200.

(19) To put it otherwise: does the Ereignisse in the original process, understood as an (immanent) object, really reach (gelanen) the Abhebung und Erfassung? (See text 10 and 11).


(21) Ibid. 255, note 2.

(22) Ibid. 257.

(23) Ibid. 201.

(24) Ibid. 195-196.

(25) Ibid. 206.
We are finally now seeing attempts to bridge the philosophical divide that began somewhat around Husserl's time. Interestingly, the moves to span the chasm between what are usually called “continental” and “analytic” philosophy often hearken back to the works of Husserl. And this, I think, is neither a mistake nor a matter of happenstance. Husserl's phenomenology, by its very nature, is an attempt to bring opposing philosophical positions together, for the very reason that it is meant to be applied. The phenomenological method is an approach that blends both theory and praxis, demanding both highly rigorous abstract thought and an acute awareness of the philosopher's embedded existence in the lifeworld. For this reason, it makes sense that, as the philosophical world attempts to repair its own internal schism, we would look very carefully at, and employ, Husserl's philosophy.

But it is easy for one to claim that Husserl's work might provide the antidote to philosophy's current rift. Instead, in the true spirit of Husserl's phenomenology, I wish briefly to examine his body of work for evidence that it has always already been involved in both maintaining and resolving philosophical tensions. Some of this evidence will clearly be obvious to my colleagues in Husserlian phenomenology, and some may simply be my own, situated interpretations. But I believe that, as we look to the future of Husserl's phenomenology, a systematic approach that lays out the flow of phenomenology as an active methodology will also highlight for us where this stream is taking us—and where we can take it.

Modernism and Postmodernism

It is my firm belief that Husserl opened the door to the postmodern movement, although he himself did not step through. Husserl's work, especially in Ideas I, provides descriptions and arguments that sustain both the groundedness of essential structures and the multiplicity and relativity of appearances. On the one hand, the object of our perception is always given—and taken—as the same thing. On the other hand, though, Husserl's very description of the noema gives us the radical philosophical insight that this object is also consistently and necessarily given in varying modes of givenness. Thus we have, in the same object, both a stable core and a necessarily fleeting nature.

Likewise, the essential structures of consciousness—Husserl's primary goal of investigation in Ideas I, the details of which, however, are laid out in his On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time—maintain a similar tension: The forms of temporalizing consciousness, i.e., the living present with its primordial impression, retention, and protention, are essential structures of consciousness that remain ever constant. Meanwhile, however, the contents of conscious experience (which, in a way, are the conditions of possibility for these structures' existence—although this could be debated, as Husserl himself made problematic claims in this regard), are by definition continually passing away. Consciousness itself, therefore, is necessarily both a stable force and a flowing away, a standing and streaming. These fundamental definitions for phenomenology, therefore, exhibit both the essentialism of modern philosophy and the relativism of postmodernism. And not only that, but they require that these two philosophical paradigms, which seem anathema to one another, work together to describe our existence phenomenologically.

“Nature” and “Discourse”

Strains of this debate can be seen not only in the differences between modernism and postmodernism, but also in the attitudes of analytic versus continental philosophers. For the layperson, it appears to be what distinguishes the sciences from the humanities. This discussion plays out in an extremely pertinent way, I believe, in the area of the philosophy of the body. On the one hand, we have a presumption of the body as material, and subsequently, consciousness is only a physiological by-product upon which we humans have laid too much value. On the other hand, the body is seen as
constituted by language itself, appearing only through the discourses that make it possible. The body, for example, could only be seen as “sexed” once the discourse of sexuality arose, and it is only through discourse that it is further “raced,” “gendered,” etc. It would seem that these two paradigms are antithetical, to say the least, but Husserl’s phenomenology makes possible their coexistence. In his Ideas II, Husserl argues carefully for two manifestations of the body: The first is the body’s inner sense, which identifies the senses of the body as immanent to my consciousness, and as not perceivable by anyone else. Thus he validates my experiences of pain, pleasure, and all of the senses, identifying them as viable material for phenomenological investigation. The second manifestation of the body is as a physicalistic thing, an object perceivable not only by myself (at certain, limited angles) but also by others. This second manifestation gives us the object of the sciences and the subject of discourse—and it is this body which finds itself in the philosophical (and scientific) debate. Husserl’s insight, however, of the body as both inner sense and physicalistic thing, mediates this dialogue: The body both is constituted through worldly and social engagement, and it (usually) is associated with a sense of “ownness,” i.e., it is individual to me. And it has a “voice” that arises from its “inner sense,” I believe, that can, to some extent, influence the discourses that surround it.

Philosophy and Psychology

As has been well established, phenomenology provides a valid critique of a psychology that tries to answer all its questions through a scientific method limited to the physical realm. While we certainly can do tests of our responses to stimuli or the effects of various influences on our cognitive abilities, it is clear that we are driven by more than our mere physiological structures, and a science that includes a discussion of intentionality is able to address those questions that exceed what biology can answer. From this phenomenological perspective, we can talk about the “motivations” of an intending consciousness, and how the meaning of a perceived object is essentially involved in its constitution. Husserl introduced the notion of motivations from a phenomenological perspective in his Ideas II, but he addressed these and several other key notions in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis and even in the Cartesian Meditations. For example, since we cannot intend anything but noemata, i.e., we can only intend meanings, then psychology needs to allow for our activity of constitution in our perceptions, and from there, we can examine how and why we make the “associations” we do. Husserl analyzed associations carefully in his Passive Syntheses, and, interestingly, this led to his introduction of the notion of “affectivity,” which describes how we can be called by an object to bring it into the foreground of our perception. Tied in with these discussions are Husserl’s notions of “habitualization” and “sedimentation,” which also arise in the Cartesian Meditations. Here we can describe how repeated behaviors, both in our thought processes and in our kinesthetic movement, become part of embodied consciousness, even when we are not directly aware of them, or how individual, meaningful events can remain central to consciousness. All of these, of course, tie into Husserl’s understanding of the structures of temporalizing consciousness. And thus, a psychology that includes a phenomenological model of consciousness, or at least attends to how consciousness constitutes its objects—and its temporal existence—is able to address a broader set of questions while still remaining linked to a physiological science.

Philosophy and the Sciences

Husserl’s Ideas II offers us a brilliant distinction between the different “attitudes” that the scientist—now understood in the broadest sense possible—can maintain, and he provides us the insight that, depending on the attitude held at the time, we may draw completely conflicting conclusions. These conclusions, however, are usually directed at very different goals, goals identified by their attitude. Thus the naturalistic (physicalistic) attitude will conclude that the material body is required as the condition of possibility for consciousness, a logical conclusion based on a position that examines the physical and causal interrelations of bodies in the world. On the other hand, the phenomenological attitude
identifies consciousness as the condition for the possibility for the world as the whole of meaning for consciousness. The personalistic attitude, similar to the natural attitude we learn about in Ideas I, is our everyday relation with the world that makes possible the above more theoretical and focused attitudes. In this way, Husserl validates both the scientific and phenomenological paradigms and gives them a way to negotiate—not on one turf or the other—but on the ground of our everyday dealings. But Husserl’s claims about the sciences are more popularly known through his analyses in his Crisis of European Sciences. Mathematics can answer a multitude of questions, he admits, but if we try to make the lived world as abstract and calculable as formulas of mathematics, then we miss the most fundamental aspects of experience, and further, we do bad science. His argument, once again, is not to rip mathematics from the sciences, but rather to recognize its value—and its limits. His warnings have slowly crept into the studies of nursing, psychology, even medicine, in spite of Husserl’s honest recognition in the Cartesian Meditations that the sciences weren’t exactly leaping over themselves to heed a phenomenologist’s analysis. Nevertheless, Husserl provides an avenue where philosophy and science can enter into dialogue, where philosophy becomes practical and science is called to be more self-critical.

I have clearly left out a multitude of references here. Included in these musings are implicit indications to the works of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Derrida, Foucault, and man
The Future of Husserlian Phenomenology
Biagio Tassone

In attempting to restore a notion of genuine science (Wissenschaft) centre stage to the philosophical program, Husserl was following a deep-seated impulse of the Western metaphysical tradition. Since long before the systems of Plato and Aristotle philosophers have sought to explain the world through necessary concepts or principles. Husserl's phenomenology took up this very challenge and attempted to push the intellectualist impulse of Western thought to its farthest extreme. Although, ultimately, I think Husserl's attempted transformation of philosophy into a strict and rigorous science must be deemed a failure, the important point is not that a scientific philosophy is impossible but rather that there are real lessons to be learnt from its unfeasibility. As it seems currently fashionable to disparage the quest for ultimate foundations for knowledge or any kind of essentialism, nonetheless, Husserlian phenomenology may gain in credibility upon realization of the salubrious proposition that it is not at all clear how intellectual movements based on principles that move away from truth (at least as a transcendent ideal) and from metaphysics in general will leave us with any lasting intellectual satisfaction or remove and mitigate the human need for cognitive transcendence. In order to understand what propels the above Husserlian phenomenology can provide considerable insight. This is because Husserlian phenomenology can help to shed light on what we can label, “the problem of cognitive transcendence,” indeed the basic starting point of transcendental phenomenology is nothing less than what Husserl himself called: “the riddle of transcendence”. (1) In what follows therefore we must attempt to explore and provisionally defend Husserl's unique contribution to philosophical practice: the transcendental phenomenological reduction. The reduction and epoché (that leads to it) as Husserl's self-proclaimed greatest achievements should naturally be viewed as of central importance to any evaluation of the continuing worth of Husserlian phenomenology. As a mode of attending to the “eidos,” (the essential properties of reality) and establishing an ultimate ground for their explication, i.e., transcendental subjectivity, the phenomenological reduction is important not so much for how Husserl formulates it as for what motivates him to do so. (2) Edward Marbach is certainly correct when he claims that: “[t]he distinction between sciences of fact and sciences of essence, which constantly reappears in Husserl's general deliberations on the theory of science, is rooted in his doubtlessly “Platonically inspired” conception of the relationship between facts and essences”. (3) In Husserl’s case this Platonic conception of science gets radicalized as the ultimate essential insights are claimed not to be of timeless forms participating in being but rather into the ground of all appearances as they manifest themselves (the self-mundinization of the omni-temporal, self-constituting, inter-subjective flux of experience, later called the “life-world”). Husserl’s thought dealt persistently with this relation of consciousness to world and more specifically with the constitution of both meaning and objective knowledge in the intentional correlation of subjectivity to transcendent objects.

Intentional analysis begins with the relational structure of consciousness, which Husserl also viewed as the ultimate source of Evidenz for cognitive transcendence within immanence. This transcendence is precisely what the reflective thematization of consciousness in the reduction was supposed to make intelligible. The givenness of objects to consciousness can be explored naturalistically; (4) Brentano’s original reintroduction of the problem of intentionality was not opposed to such a treatment. However, as a transcendental philosophy, Husserlian phenomenology is ultimately interested in the possibility conditions and foundations for justified knowledge (what Kant called the quid juris of our knowledge); not factual, empirical, descriptions of psychological processes. Can this approach still be of significance for contemporary thought?

At this point let us reflect that modern cognitive science is currently very far from able to account for all the properties of what makes consciousness intrinsically self-aware or provide any purely physicalist model to which consciousness can be reduced. Subsequently, some analytic philosophers are becoming interested in the irreducible and non-objectifiable aspects of the first-person perspective
which consciousness provides and are also taking very seriously the possible role that this elusive aspect of mental life may provide in accounting for anything remotely approaching a complete account of our place in the world and [the totality of] our knowledge. It goes without saying that Husserl's phenomenology is an excellent candidate to contribute to this contemporary debate. As we have stated above, the relational essence of consciousness (its intentionality) is explored by Husserl under the aspect of a transcendental reduction to its essential structures on the model of a noetic-noematic correlation of intended objects in a horizontal manifold. These intended objects can be directly experienced (as emplty intended) or seen as possessing a further potential, i.e., that of being intuitively given. The mode of givenness with or without evidence, within their horizons, is the ultimate ground upon which, for Husserl, ontological questions are formulated. These insights, which were the fruits of Husserl's phenomenological intentional analyses, also lead to many still relevant studies on the nature of internal time consciousness. The popular, static conception of Husserl's phenomenology, therefore, betrays (as many contemporary studies have made explicit) the actual sophistication of his methodology and the viability of his phenomenological epistemology. In effect, within Husserlian thought we are presented with an elaborate reformulation of earlier representationalist models of perception and cognition. The sense datum theories of mental life, postulating transcendent “objects” (somehow) out there beyond our immediate awareness and entering into consciousness [the latter viewed as a private inner space] is not the Husserlian model of cognition. As a non-natural phenomenon, Husserl views consciousness as incapable of spatial extension, and, therefore, unable to be reduced into a causal relationship with natural entities. Husserl's intuitive method on the one hand expands on an earlier modernist, Cartesian project of absolute enquiry and the subsequent status of philosophy as a foundational (rigorous) science however this balanced, on the other hand, by Husserl's transcendental Kantian project of securing an ultimate epistemic ground in experience. In effect, Husserl reformulates Kant's idealism as a teleological metaphysics of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, building on the (originally) Kantian project of transcendental idealism, Husserlian phenomenology helps to clarify Kant's ambiguous transcendental deduction. The above accomplishments aside, however, we gain a first intimation into why Husserl's project is problematic when we investigate his methodological strategy in detail. The relation that is characteristic of the intentionality of consciousness to the worldly structures it manifests, as Levinas has pointed out, leads Husserl to a new conception of being. The phenomenological conception of being is nothing less than a determination of all being by the transcendental structures of conscious life. This relational structure of being—said by Husserl to be constituted ultimately by a multiplicity of intersubjective monads in the “life-world”- is supposed to disclose (in immediate intuitive fullness) the structures of transcendental subjectivity but breaks down both conceptually and metaphysically when we inquire into the ultimate ground for the intentional relation of transcendental (inter-) subjectivity to world itself. The ground for the being of intentionality must be a more general being, and must be conceived as existing beyond the being of any singular ontic terms even as they are presented in the reduction. The evidentially disclosed ground for beings (the noetic-noematic correlation precisely as it is disclosed within the transcendental phenomenological reduction) can never be intuitively given in the way a proper ground or foundation, in accordance with Husserl's own theory, should be. The transcendental ego, as the consciousness within which all objectivity is constituted and upon which experience of all temporality and thus of constitutive analysis itself is founded cannot be made explicit to subjectivity. Husserlian phenomenology therefore is revealed to have certain limitations inherent to it within its own conceptual framework.

While some may take the above conclusions as a confirmation that Husserlian phenomenology is a relic from the past and of (at best) merely historical interest, it is the present writer's contention that Husserl's thought, with its philosophically rich view of the proper use and limits of objective or scientific knowledge, despite its shortcomings, is still of considerable contemporary relevance. I contend that the main value of Husserl's writings today lies precisely in the very approach they offer to understanding scientific or positive knowledge as knowledge of contingent entities constituted vis-à-vis their relation to a subject in the world. Without accounting for the constitution of knowledge for a
cognizant subject, the problems of meaning and reference necessary for a philosophically valid epistemology may never move forward. Phenomenology was one attempt, a fruitful if unsuccessful one, within modern philosophy to restore a viable framework for our justification of knowledge of the absolute. Husserl’s approach to the theory of knowledge is one that can still serve as a viable alternative to any merely naturalist or conventionalist and pragmatic approach to epistemological problems and philosophy of science. Husserlian phenomenology is also (in the present writer’s opinion) an advance, in many respects, on earlier neo-Kantian and positivist approaches to the same problems. Essential to the continuing influence of Husserlian phenomenology on contemporary thought will be the acknowledgement of its failure as a presuppositionless propaedeutic method to a “truly scientific philosophy,” and an incorporation of the Husserlian project into the broader tradition of transcendental philosophy. As a philosophy of reflection, Husserlian phenomenology still has much to offer.

Notes


(4) In this way Husserl’s thought can even be made compatible with the linguistic turn, where a psychological model is made the ultimate ground for meaning and where the “hard problems” of consciousness are avoided or declared not worthy of serious consideration. I would maintain that the lasting legacy of Husserlian thought however (one developed from his early writings onwards), will be his insight that norms cannot be naturalized and reflection in itself cannot be reduced to an act of theoretical self-objectification.


(6) That is, Husserl's intentional analyses lead him ultimately to the insight that all intentional experience [intentionale Erlebnisse] is essentially a modification of temporal intentionality, cf., Husserliana X. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseens (1893-1917), Edited by Rudolf Boehm (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), Translated by John Barnett Brough as Collected Works Vol. IV. On the

Contemporary studies have done a great deal to emphasize the genetic, historical as well as the transcendental developmental aspects of Husserl's thought (See for example: Bernet, Kern & Marbach 1993, Berner 1994, Steinbock, Anthony J. Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1995), Welton, Donn. The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1983) & The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2000), and Zahavi, Dan. Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique, Translated by Elizabeth A. Behnke (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2001) & Husserl's Phenomenology (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003), to list only a few.


Cf., Husserliana XI. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918-1926. Edited by Margot Fleischer, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966), Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock as E. Husserl Collected Works Vol IX: Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 377-381. y others, including my esteemed, contemporary colleagues in Husserlian phenomenology. But my point is not that Husserl created a world of phenomenology that keeps to itself, as these names might indicate; rather, Husserl's phenomenology opened the door to critiques of psychology, medicine, patriarchy, race and gender, sociology, anthropology, history, criminology, and even of itself. And for this reason, phenomenology has been the perfect choice to enable the beginnings of a dialogue between the analytic and continental “traditions,” for example, by entering into discussions with cognitive psychology and neuroscience. My goal, however, has been to show that, beyond the theoretical squabbles of contemporary philosophy, phenomenology is able to apply itself to any area, bringing not only critique, but also an extreme philosophical rigor as well as a method of conceptualization and application. Phenomenology can transform those theories it encounters, and not only that, but it also forces them back into the lived world. For this reason, then, I believe that the future of phenomenology lies in its ongoing application to both theoretical and practical realms, and, in doing so, its own, continued, critical reworking of itself.
Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World
Andrina Tonkli-Komel

The one-hundredth anniversary of the publication of Husserl's Logical Investigations, which helped phenomenology pass on into the 20th century philosophy, was a new opportunity for reconsidering the basic elements and goals of phenomenological investigations as well as its future perspectives. In his letter to Levy-Brühl from 11 March 1935, Husserl promised that, by applying the phenomenological method, he would succeed in “grounding some sort of transrationalism that would overcome the old and insufficient rationalism, and at the same time justify its innermost intentions.”

The limited condition of the old, i.e. modern rationalism, which Husserl mentions there, does not refer to the reason's capability of self-restriction but rather to its incapability of encountering at its outer limits anything else than sheer irrationalism. To oppose such leveling is the true meaning of any genuine transcendentalism. “Transrationalism” could be conceived of as the new transcendentality without any absolutist pretensions of absolving all transcendent being of the world; as transcendentality, which cannot be adverse to the transcendence as absolute relativity. Just as transcendentality cannot simply abolish transcendence, transcendence cannot abolish transcendentality. A special movement is set free in-between the two, a course of history, the life-world.

We should take into account two absolute qualities; the absolute validity of being as evidenced by reason, and relative being in the world of the revealing life. The correlation between the flowing life and the becoming world is not identical with that of reason and the permanent being of the world. This identification is possible only on the ground of life in full critical responsibility, i.e. life's attitude to the ultimate truth. Insofar as this ultimate validity of truth in its absolutistic pretension is in constant opposition to the only absolute relative flux, the rational critical responsibility finds as its correlate the permanent crisis of the life-world. It is but the insight into the crisis intruding between the reason and life and correlative, between being and the world, that can radically change the character of phenomenological criticism or the transcendental criterion of this criticism. It does not suffice to persist in the name of strict science in the correlation between reason and being, and in the directedness of life as a whole toward the unconditioned truth secured by science as an infinite task of life fulfillment, or unification of life and science. What is needed is a critical distinction between the transcendental in terms of permanent transcendence of life striving for ontic fulfillment in the world, and the transcendental in terms of reflective grasping of the identity of life and the being of the world evidenced as the life of reason. Insofar as the reflective critical bearing – as witnessed in Husserl's phenomenological philosophy – is attainable and has already been attained on the basis of reductionist and corresponding constitutional methodical procedures, this distinction needs a methodical indication, especially if phenomenology is to be understood primarily as a method. This opens up the possibility of distinguishing between the transcendental reductive-constitutive methodical procedure and the movement of phenomenological epoché, which don't exclude each other but rather set each other free. In other words, the initial and final moment of living in critical responsibility (of the method) is freedom. In what way does this become evident from the phenomenological viewpoint?

The rudimentary crisis of the unity of life and science compelled Husserl to seek a renewal of rationality, which as transrationality, bridges and overcomes the oblivion of the life-world in the ultimate validity of the scientific criticism of being as evidenced by reason. However, exactly in this respect it becomes evident that the phenomenologically concealed and thus forgotten unity of the life-world is even more genuine than the constructed unity of life and science, inasmuch it includes a distinction between the world and life, which in turn enables the aforementioned separation of life and science as well as all others. Getting a word in edgeways, the “unity of difference” of the life-world also grounds critical responsibility, which is perhaps even freer than the historically inherited freedom of critical responsibility. It is a momentous freedom as the most important achievement of phenomenology in general.

The momentous starting point of phenomenology also establishes the historical distance between
us and the origin of Greek philosophy and science, which can be compared to both Heidegger's
destruction and Derrida's deconstruction; moreover, destruction and deconstruction are even made
possible by epochē; Derrida explicitly states that without the “time of epochē” “deconstruction is
impossible.” (1) Epochē simply gives evidence of the movement of the structure. The advantage of
Husserl's momentous structuring (phenomenological analytics) lies in excluding neither corporality, as is
true of Heidegger, nor spirituality, as is true of Derrida. The momentous beginning and the transition
are marked by the fulfillment of a life freed in itself, displaying its views as the unity in diversity.

Despite all this, it seems that already at the starting point such momentous phenomenological
transition “overtakes” the leap to strict science. The life fulfillment in critical self-responsibility is thus
felt as some sort of “overbearing” of the rational mind bridging the void between life and science. At
the same time, however, it cannot be denied that in Husserl we are likely to encounter a certain
structuring which genuinely makes possible “filling” and “emptying”. A radically different outlook on
his philosophy might open up if we, from the very beginning, distinguish between the scientific
reduction to the transcendental consciousness with its rationally constituted ontic correlate, and the
movement of phenomenological epochē, which is not reductive but, according to Husserl, re-pro-
ductive, revealing to life the unity of the world; and it is also pro-re-ductive, giving evidence of the
heterogeneity of life in the world. In the “intermediate being” of the life-world, which is not the being
in the objective transcendent or in the subjective transcendental sense, there opens up a dis-tinction of
life and the world which cannot be unified by way of transition to strict science, and homogenized by
way of rationally evidenced being. As the evidencing of phenomena, it could be understood as a dis-
play, which both opens the world for life to provide it with meaning, and empties life so that it can find
fulfillment in the world. This “game” of the life-world is perceivable in any moment of our everyday
life. However, there is a possibility that, for a short moment, it can be momentously displayed. Such
momentous reconstruction is in itself productive in terms of what we may justifiably call the
phenomenology of the life-world.

Undoubtedly, such phenomenology of the world has important ethical and cultural implications. Is
there something like an ethos of phenomenology, or even a phenomenological culture? Husserl's
ethical and cultural considerations seem to sum up in an alternative: “Either a collapse into spiritual
hatred and barbarism or a spiritual rebirth arising out of the heroism of reason that will ultimately
overcome naturalism.” If we reproach Husserl for his farsightedness, we can, retrospectively, reproach
numerous contemporary ethical stands for their short-sightedness. The fear of heroism of reason is all
too often an evidence of turning the blind eye to numerous forms of barbarism we are faced with
today – as Europeans!

Moreover, we need to ask ourselves whether barbarism as a threat perhaps takes its main source
from where it should be successfully overcome – from the power of science, which comprises political,
artistic and religious fields. In Husserl’s criticism of the modern science movement, a particular
emphasis is laid on two instances of oblivion: at the beginning, it’s the human being standing behind
science and in the end the world extant before science. Science forgets itself both over its background
and foreground, and revolves only in itself. It has thrown out both the excellence of the human being
and the excellence of the world. The modern identification of the world with the mathematically
calculable nature has moulded the calculable nature of man.

The ethos of phenomenology cannot be reduced to man’s taking part in this world as a
disinterested spectator, or to letting ourselves be led by some special interest after its change, either out
of rational heroism or servile revolt. What can be expected, however, is some sort of momentous intra-
esse reaching also into the inter-esse of what Husserl thinks as intersubjectivity. This ethos of
phenomenology, which acts “from within”, can be joined “from without” by a certain culture of the
life-world. Of course, at this point there also opens up, in a largely modified form, a certain
momentous possibility of excellence and extraordinariness joined by manifoldness and multi-
layeredness.

The experience of the (everyday, scientific, artistic etc.) actuality is formed in interpretative
capabilities, which can be historically concealed or yet un concealed, overcome, unattained or even
unattainable. This dynamic openness of possibilities characterizes the life-world as such. The phenomenology of the life-world cannot principally stick only to (fundamentally-ontological) speaking in favor of possibility rather than actuality, but has to first of all carry out a transformation of critical reason into creative one. This transformation is necessary primarily because it is impossible to limit reason to critical evaluation of life practices. The criteria of reality making possible such an evaluation are directly formed in life practices themselves. The main task of phenomenological rationality is thus an explicit unfolding of basic tendencies of human life in order to be able to form the world through a network of meaningful identities and differences.

Notes

Phenomenology and Ethics
Francesco Saverio Trincia

One of the main features of Husserlian phenomenology is its opening to an infinite task of research. It should be added that this task is not in any case conceived as systematic. The ethical interpretation of the “beginning” is an original commitment and a very clearly spelled out feature of Husserl's thought. This interpretation, or self-interpretation, has been confirmed after the publication of the Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften. It is also the result of the fact that the Krisis has been correctly seen as containing the idea of the possibility of a rebirth or of a rethinking of a philosophical humanism free in itself of any metaphysical meaning, and intrinsically alien to the tradition of the idealistic historicism. (1) Associated with this general observation is the central role played by the activity of the evaluating and deciding subjectivity in the Husserlian ethics of 1914 (2): a role that is played within the schema of the correlation in which both the relationship to the axiological objectivity and to the universality of the practical reason are at stake. This is not without relation to the necessity of a deep understanding of consciousness and of subjectivity in what could be called the Husserlian “ideology,” that is the extra-theoretical use that can be made of phenomenology as a more or less hidden ethics of an immemorially returning commitment to begin the phenomenological investigation without any presuppositions.

There is no doubt that the end of the 1914 Vorlesungen and the role there assigned to the “evidence” of a “living” ethical judgement, in which the evident rationality of the willing subject meets the sphere of values, in some way prepares the notion of the universal humanity to which Husserl's attention in the “Kaizo” articles of the twenties is devoted, and the rational hope of a new humanity coming out of its “crisis” and based on the birth of a new kind of man, being no more a “factual man.” It can be said that the distinction sketched in the last pages of the 1914 Vorlesungen, between an ethical judgement based on the statement of an observer who remains external to the ethical Erlebnis and can pronounce itself only on its Richtigkeit, on the one side, and the “evident judging” where the subject who judges “lives his authentic duty,” on the other side, is the expression in the formal vocabulary of the phenomenological ethics of the distinction between the objective man of the scientific, empirical psychology (the man in the world), and the man constituted by the transcendental Ego (the man for the world) presented in the Krisis.

Jocelyn Benoist (3) has very well seen that one of the meanings of the “paradox” of subjectivity in the Krisis consists in the form of the correlation, which permits to “transform in poem” its inheritance and to build up a sort of “invented” history in which subjectivity “meets the possibility or the question of the most extreme universality.” Benoist points out with some irony the orientation of the phenomenological subjectivity to universality. It is interesting to observe that this ethical subjectivity is oriented to universality in a “poetic” way, but also through an “invention” of history which recalls the idea of the “apriori history” (this is the expression used by Husserl in the famous text of the Origin of Geometry). This kind of history may be able to host an ethical subjectivity oriented to universality, just because it does not depend on the contingency of empirical existence – where only “factual men” may live.

Help can be found by an interpreter of Husserl's ethics in Rudolf Bernet's last book. (4) Bernet very well shows which is the general “sense-horizon” within which the evaluating and deciding intentional consciousness is to be understood. From the point of view of the correlation-relationship between consciousness and existence, it appears very clearly that transcendental consciousness also is “already contaminated by the same illness that corrodes human existence.” We have remarked that at least the surface of Husserl's attitude towards ethics (the one that is not expressed in phenomenology's technical vocabulary and is rather a “spiritual atmosphere” of it) is conditioned by a sort of humanistic, ethical ideology. If the hypothesis can be advanced that the building of a “pure ethics” through Husserl's pure theoretical arguing cannot avoid referring to human existence and to the “persons” that are to be met there, we have to recognize that the so called “ideological” side of Husserlian ethics cannot be put aside. It is certainly true that the notion of “person” which is important in the lectures of 1920-24 (5) should not be considered as the expression of the man “in the world,” that is, of an empirical subject:
the “person” is in any case something “constituted,” and not a natural human being. It is therefore true that the “existence” of which we talk when we say that Husserlian ethics is existence-related is not the natural and objective existence. But this does not mean that the phenomenological ethics does not meet the phenomenological existence and does not work for the orientation of (not factual) subjects. This is one of the main differences between the notion of “pure” ethics as thought by Immanuel Kant, and the same notion thought by Husserl. In the first case, but not in the second, “purity” means the exclusion of all content of the ethical choice, and the isolation of every influence of the sensible objects on it. This point drives us to say that what could be called a “care for the world” is one of the main features of Husserlian ethics – and that this “care,” in some way unknown to Kant, has to be seen as the not paradoxical result of a not content-excluding “formality” which is in itself, again, different from Kantian “formality.”

On the one side, in fact, Husserl’s ethics refers to “values” which are seen as “material apriori” (this is the side of the content, which does not lack in it, and which is the way by which Husserl’s ethics takes care of the world and aims to build a certain kind of human being, not simply a rational being acting “by duty”). But on the other side, an equal emphasis should be put on the way in which Husserl presents the role of subjectivity in ethics. The possibility to fix the degree of the “utility for the world” of the phenomenological ethics depends on the role of the subjectivity who “lives through” his or her evaluating judgement and in this way meets the duty that is “ready” for the rational and evident will, as Husserl points out in the 1914 lessons. It could be said, even more radically, that it is the role plaid by the phenomenological subject that allows us to speak of phenomenology as a “philosophy of ethics” and to realize an “apology” of it which does not accept the charge of its being an ideological construction in contradiction with its main epistemic inspiration. It should be remarked also that the “apology” of phenomenology as philosophy of ethics does not simply mean that phenomenology gives a solid philosophical foundation to ethics – a foundation which is supposed to be stronger than others. Were it so, we would obtain the not wanted result of losing the aspect for which phenomenology is not to be reduced to a mere theoretical construction. In any field of the range of action of the intentional consciousness, and in a very particular way in ethics, phenomenology is not the way of the reduction of the philosophical content (here the ethical will, and the activity of evaluation and of decision connected to it) to its mere theoretical form.

It is not easy to find the right way to express this point, but one could try to say that phenomenological ethics offers the possibility “to live from within” the ethical experience and that the harshness with which Husserl again and again in the 1914 Lectures explains the connection and the difference between formal logic and formal ethics, that is between what Kant calls “pure reason” and “practical reason,” is the hidden signal that his main concern is that of “saving” the practical reason, and the entire sphere of ethics, form the double risk of psychologism and of intellectualism, both seen realized, according to him, in Kant’s ethics. Husserl’s aim is similar to Kant’s, but it is not reached at all in the same way. And the role of subjectivity within the formal working of ethics is no less important point of difference. No subjectivity is necessary in Kant’s ethics. To say that, as a consequence of both being “formal,” logic and ethics are at the same time “parallel” and “interwoven,” means that they meet only because the logical judgement offers its voice to the ethical judgement, otherwise destined to remain mute. This allows Husserl to build the sphere of ethics as such that the main link with logic is to be seen in their being both “modes” of the intentional consciousness. The peculiar way in which subjectivity works in ethics refers to the common source in the intentional consciousness of both judging and evaluating and deciding, with the theoretical judgement only giving voice to ethics. But the opposite is also true: the common intentional source is the basis of a difference that just by its appearing as a “parallelism” must be conceived in such a way that the difference between logic and ethics is connected with the feature of the correlation of the evaluating and deciding subjectivity with its peculiar objects – those objects that, being values, can not be equal to the objects of the “parallel” logical intentionality. It is very clear therefore that no peculiar role of the ethic subjectivity could be admitted, if the difference between logic and ethics has no assumed the radical feature of the “parallelism.”
Jocelyn Benoist gives a definition of a “subject or rather than of subjectivity” which is important for our argument. He writes that the subject is located “dedans et dehors: il est témoin implicite situé au point aveugle du champ visuel, comme aussi bien ce qui se montre en lui à chaque transition qu’il ménage.” (6) Something crucial for the specific feature of the ethical intentionality is very well expressed in this formulation of the problem of subjectivity: The phenomenological idea of the Doppelseitigkeit, of the bilaterality, of the correspondence and of the correlativity which connects the subjective and the objective side of intentionality also in its ethical mode. What is called by Benoist the “blind point” of the “champ visuel”, is at the same time what is supposed to accompany the steps that are made within its objective horizon (better: within its horizon of objectivation), thanks to the activity of the intentional consciousness. The way in which Benoist expresses the image of subjectivity is clearly fashioned according to the image which closes the important paragraph 95 of Formale und transzendentale Logik, (7) where Husserl writes that “subjectivity of everybody” should be thought as “this subjectivity (that) I myself am, the I who becomes conscious of myself, about what is for me and is valid for me.” Husserl adds that “the subjectivity is the primary matter of fact that I have to face, and from which I as philosopher can never divert my glance.” It is true that for a beginner philosopher this can be der dunkle Winkel, the dark corner, in which the ghosts of solipsism, of psychologism and of relativism bustle around. But the true philosopher will prefer to fill this dark corner with light, instead of being scared by it.”

Husserl is not talking of the ethical subjectivity. But this description concerns also the ethical subjectivity, of which one must say the same that has been said of the phenomenological subjectivity in general. The circumstance that we understand subjectivity as the blind point of the “champ visuel” and as the “dark corner” on which no light falls, means that we are talking of a subject that is devoid of any metaphysical and naturalistic consistence. And for what concerns specifically the ethical subject, the general feature of the phenomenological subject forbids us to imagine him as an ethical legislator, already present and active in the world. Even if we admit that the “person” is one of the last results of the Husserlian ethics, we still have to remember that the ethical subject is not a natural person, is not, as already said, a man in the world. It is just as important for the subject of the ethical intentional consciousness, as for the subject of the theoretical intentional consciousness, to accept the task of filling the darkness of subjectivity with light, whose darkness is the condition of its not being something given in the world – that is of its phenomenological feature. Light must be thrown on it if the risks of relativism of the psychological attitude have to be avoided. Therefore, light does not transform subjectivity in something natural and worldly. It is discovered that every subjectivity is based on his intentional activity on the bilateral structure of the intentional relationship to the objectivity. This is also the structural schema that underlies Husserlian ethics. Husserl's thought maintains its promise of being the birth of an infinite research, just because it tries to give the foundation of a formal ethics, which is supposed to be able to “capture” in its formality both the deciding ethical subjectivity and its intentional objects, the “values.” Also in ethics, as in the whole of phenomenology, the bilaterality and the correlation are formal. It is this peculiar formality that opens the possibility of an ethical theory which does not forget the contents of our ethical activity.

On the basis of this interpretation of Husserl's ethics (an anti-ideological and anti-idealistic interpretation) we can say that the phenomenological discovery of the phenomenon of feeling, of wishing, of willing, offers to human beings a new instrument of an ethical orientation in the world.

Notes

Transcendental phenomenology has considered bodilhood as a constitutive dimension of transcendental subjectivity (L. Landgrebe). This has lead on to the assertion, from an epistemological standpoint, of the priority of consciousness as the mode of access to the world, and, from an ontological standpoint, of a twofold relationship of reciprocal nonderivability (or irreducibility) and relevance (or conditioning) between the body and consciousness (E. Ströker). In a further step, recent trends in phenomenology have drawn a boundary between the body, which is the deep dimension of subjectivity correlated with the world, and the flesh, which withdraws from the world. On the one hand, Michel Henry has given priority to an original flesh, which, at work in the radical immanence of an “I can,” takes hold of the manifold functions of the organic body that is intertwined with the world. Here self-affection is cut off from hetero-affection, and this is essential to Henry’s “radical reduction” to pure immanence. On the other hand, Jean-Luc Marion has also developed the notion of flesh, but, following Emmanuel Levinas, stresses its intersubjective side insofar as my body attains a “face” and becomes flesh when it receives from the Other what I do not possess by myself and at the same time the Other receives from myself the flesh and the “face” that it does not possess by itself. Here hetero-affection is separated from self-affection, and this is central to Marion’s “erotic reduction” to what comes from elsewhere. My argument in this paper is that the so-called radical and the erotic reductions should be considered, in terms of the transcendental reduction, as an attempt to deal with modes of surplus within the intentional correlation with the world disclosed by the latter.

What seems particularly objectionable is the neglect of the stratification that underlies the contrast between the body and the flesh. For the surplus entailed by the flesh does not amount to the vanishing of the body, as both Henry and Marion put it, but rather to the emergence of a new level that can be understood, in terms of reciprocal relevance and nonderivability, in the light of the laws of stratification and categorial dependence advanced by Nicolai Hartmann. Applied to our subject, the law of stratification leads to the following formulations: something of the body returns in the flesh; the body does not come back as such in the flesh because it undergoes a variation, the flesh entails a novelty with regard to the body, and there is a leap leading from the body to the flesh. One could argue that the disappearance of the body in the radical and erotic reductions is due to the overlooking of return and variation as well as to the overstressing of novelty and leap. Furthermore, the following statements issue from the law of categorial dependence: the body is stronger than the flesh; the body is indifferent to the flesh; the body functions as an existential foundation for the flesh; and the flesh is free with regard to the body. In this respect, the disappearance of the body is the outcome of forgetting force and indifference and overemphasizing existential foundation and freedom. Again, misunderstandings arise when the four contentions are not taken together.

According to Hartmann, the upper stratum can emerge as an overformation (Überformung), in which the lower stratum comes back entirely as a matter that receives a new form, or as an overconstruction (Überbauung), in which it operates only as an existential foundation without influence on the contents of the upper stratum. To acknowledge this dependence in the line of existence instead of content both makes clear the ontological relevancy of the lower stratum and preserves the nonderivability or novelty of the upper stratum, and, therefore, renders possible the claim of an epistemological primacy in the case of consciousness and the assertion of a new mode of phenomenalization in the case of flesh. If we focus on the strata involved, flesh and “face” are a novelty with regard to body and visible countenance. They are phenomena of excess that appear as something new on the basis of a ground of being that must be overconstructed. Accordingly, when their function is restricted to that of an existential foundation, body and visible countenance withdraw in the overconstruction of flesh and “face,” but remain, as concerns their existence, indifferent to the upper stratum and do not break down. Were it otherwise, the body would be indeed undermined by the flesh.

In an ontological analysis, then, a mediation encompassing return and novelty is necessary between what belongs to a given statum of the world and what transcends it. Correlatively, from the viewpoint
of access, a mediation is also necessary between the givenness of the visible and the modes of phenomenization of the invisible. Husserl's view is that the visible body is the expression of an inwardness that can be explicated in a variety of levels that correspond to various strata in self-experience and the experience of the Other. Hence, the disjunction between visibility and invisibility, with an exclusive emphasis on the latter in the radical and erotic reductions, not only disregards stratification, but also ignores the phenomenon of expression in which my visible movements and the visible countenance differentiate themselves both from a corporeal surface, because they signify an inwardness, and from flesh and "face," because they are visible. In order to show how visibility and invisibility are compatible, because there is a necessary link between them within an overconstruction, one must regard flesh and "face" within the larger framework of the notion of horizontality, to which overconstruction provides a specification. For the body as a given level of being is a theme that points beyond itself, and the flesh is experienced through these references that irradiate from it. Flesh and "face" are horizons that cannot come forth to visibility, but this "beyond" must be grasped in such a way that it cannot be detached from the visibility that intends to it. Their invisibility can be understood as a nonintuitive residuum, i.e., as an irreducible surplus, both in the horizon of self-affection opened out by the experience of the movement of my own body, and in the horizon of the Other revealed by the perception of the alien body. It can be recalled here that Marion examines a paradox of givenness because the given withdraws the manifestation of givenness itself. Thus, every datum must be referred to its givenness by unfolding its fold. This does not seem to add much to the explication of an apperceptive horizon that, being intertwined with the perception of one's own or the Other's body, cannot be wholly laid open.

The convergence of invisible self-affection with visible hetero-affection does not rule out a further contraction of self-affection intermingled with hetero-affection into a pure self-affection as that described by Henry, or a further expansion of hetero-affection blended with self-affection into a pure hetero-affection as that outlined by Marion. Only in a second stage can self-affection become unraveled from outwardness, and hetero-affection become separated from inwardness. Both processes can be construed as an unfolding of horizonality in which we are directed towards an ideal pole. In addition, this analysis does not exclude speaking of an infinite self-affection or an infinite interpellation of the Other, which would enable our living in the world to surpass its narrow limits. Nevertheless, it avoids separating them from our worldly condition, so that, even if they are not manifest within the world, they are at least constructed over it. They can be referred back to a dimension of horizonality that is inexplicable or invisible, but announces itself in intentional modes of self-affection, and expresses itself through the visible countenance of the Other. Since this dimension entails a maximum of contraction and intensification of transcendental life in its relationship with itself, as well as a maximum of expansion and estrangement in its relationship with the Other, it accounts for the possibility of an acknowledgment of, and an answer to, infinite self-affection and infinite interpellation.

In contrast to the transcendental reduction, which attempts to show the true significance of the natural attitude as the self-concealment of the transcendental dimension, the radical and the erotic reductions establish a realm distinct to that of the natural attitude. The pregivenness of the world is not considered from a new angle by showing what is implied in it, but rather an attempt is made to disclose a different type of phenomenalization. This leads to set originary flesh against one's own body and alien flesh against the body of the Other. On the contrary, an inquiry into the true significance of what is pregiven in the natural attitude shows one's own body as the indication of an originary flesh tied to a transcendental "I can," which cannot be separated from its body as an organ of actualization in the world, and exposes the body of the Other as the indication of a transcendental Other, which cannot be detached from its body as an organ of expression in the world. Only through contraction and expansion as modes of overconstruction in the horizon of these two phenomena can we have access to a dimension of invisibility. The upshot of this argument is that the attempt to think beyond worldly Being "the correlation between world and world-consciousness" amounts, on closer inspection, to the extrapolation of an infinite pole for the unfolding of the horizons of inwardness and elsewhere sustained by the correlation.
Die Phänomenologie der Zukunft: Eidetisch, transzendentale oder naturalisiert?
Dieter Lohmar


Die Phänomenologie Husserls will eine eidetische und transzendentale Aufklärung des Bewusstseins und seiner Leistungen aus der erlebten Innenperspektive des Empfindens, Wahrnehmens, Erkennens, Wollens usw. sein. Hauptgegenstand der Analysen Husserls sind die Konstitution der verschiedenen Typen von Gegenständen und die zugehörigen Evidenzstile, d.h. die verschiedenen Stile der Erfüllung dieser Intentionen. Die beiden wichtigsten Methoden der Phänomenologie sind die eidetische Methode und die transzendentale Reduktion.


1. Ist transzendentales Denken noch zeitgemäß?

Das bedeutet nicht, dass ich auch der Ansicht wäre, sie sei nicht sinnvoll oder sie sei nicht zu motivieren. Im Gegenteil, ich bin von beidem überzeugt und werde kurz die Gründe dafür darlegen. Die transzendentale Reduktion ist eine Methode im Rahmen der phänomenologischen Analyse des Bewusstseins und seiner Inhalte. Mit ihrer Hilfe können wir von dem Phänomen, d.h. dem Bewusstsein wirklicher (oder möglicher) Gegenstände, zurückgehen auf die Sinnlichkeit und die Operationen des Geistes, die es uns ermöglichen, diesen Gegenstand zu haben.

In den Ideen I soll die epoché das Rätsel lösen, wie wir auf dem Boden recht schwacher sinnlicher Evidenzen und beschränkter Erfahrung zu der Ansicht kommen, daß die Welt im Ganzen und die Gegenstände in ihr „wirklich“, „objektiv“ seien, d.h. dass sie nicht nur jetzt existieren, sondern auch in Zukunft, dass sie nicht nur in meinem Erleben sondern für Jedermann auf gleiche Weise sind. Die Aufgabenstellung besitzt Parallelen zur sogenannten akademischen Skepsis, denn Husserl will nicht bezweifeln, ob die Welt tatsächlich existiert. Sondern: Er will lediglich genau wissen, wie und durch welche Anschauungssätze, wir dazu gekommen sind, dies zu glauben. Reduktion ist daher auch kein Zweifel oder Skepsis, denn wir müssen für die Untersuchung der Frage des „Wie“ immer - sozusagen heuristisch - von unseren tatsächlichen Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Welt ausgehen, aber deren Geltungsansprüche radikal befragen. Transzendentale Analysen im Husserlschen Sinne setzen also den Vollzug der transzendentalen Reduktion voraus, d.h. sie setzen voraus, daß wir alle Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Wirklichkeit oder Unwirklichkeit der wahrgenommenen Dinge und hinsichtlich der Geltung uns bereits bekannter Theorien (z.B. der Physik, Chemie und aller Naturwissenschaften) zeitweilig aussetzen bzw. einklammern. Dies dient dazu, die Frage nach dem anschaulichen Ursprung der Wirklichkeits-Setzung (und aller anderen Modalitäten, wie möglich, zweifelhaft usw.) auf einem Erfahrungsboden zu klären, der genau diese Setzung, deren Recht wir prüfen wollen, nicht (oder nicht mehr) enthält. Es geht also um eine Aufklärung der Konstitution einer Setzung, welche von irreführenden Zirkeln frei ist. Dasselbe gilt übrigens auch von den anderen Formen der Reduktion, welche Husserl vorschlägt (Primordiale Reduktion, Reduktion auf den rellen Bestand, die Reduktion auf die lebendige Gegenwart usw.). (1)

Dennoch ist die Methode der Analyse im Rahmen der transzendentalen Reduktion nicht von der Erfahrung abgewandt. Im Gegenteil, die Bezeichnung „transzendentale Erfahrung“ ist nicht falsch. Sie trifft sogar den Kern dieser transzendentalen Untersuchungsrichtung. Das Residuum der transzendentalen Reduktion (d.h. dasjenige, was nach ihrer Anwendung übrig bleibt) ist in erster Linie ein Erfahrungsfeld, das der Beschreibung zugänglich ist. Hierbei spielt die Bezeichnung „Feld“ ganz bewusst auf andere Felder der Erfahrung an, wie z.B. das visuelle Feld, das taktuelle Feld usw. Es ist ein Feld, in dem alle intentionalen Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung und der Erkenntnis zu finden sind, die auch bisher in unserer alltäglichen Welt aufgetreten sind. Es gibt nur die Besonderheit, daß wir jetzt nicht mehr den Setzungscharakter des wirklich (von Dingen) und des geltend (von Theorien) mitmachen. Dieser Setzungscharakter wird universal außer Kraft gesetzt, sozusagen in Klammern gesetzt. Auf diese eingeklammerte Weise bleibt er noch bewußt, und zwar mit seinem problematischen
Die tranzendentale Reflexion mit Gebrauch der transzendentalen Reduktion ist also ein auf die Klärung solcher grundlegenden Geltungsansprüche gerichtetes Verfahren. Sie steht daher notwendigerweise ganz am Anfang des gesamten Vorhabens der Aufklärung dessen, was Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis ist, und wie diese möglich ist. In diesem Sinne ist sie für eine grundlegende Erste Philosophie (prima philosophia) unentbehrlich.


2. Ist die Phänomenologie wesentlich eidetisch?


Mit diesem Erkenntnisanpruch, nämlich dass mit Hilfe der eidetischen Methode nicht nur Fakten, sondern auch notwendig vorkommende Sinnelemente an allen Einzelgegenständen einer bestimmten Art von Gegenständen bestimmt werden können, grenzt sich Husserl von der empirischen Psychologie ab. Es ist der spezifisch phänomenologische Begriff von apriori, der hiermit bestimmt wird. Empirische
Wissenschaft formuliert ihre Ergebnisse auch in Allsätzen, die jedoch auf der immer beschränkten Erhebung von faktischen Daten beruhen, die dann mit Hilfe der Induktion verallgemeinert werden.


3. Das Bewusstsein im Blick der Cognitive Science - auf dem Weg zur einer naturalisierten Phänomenologie?


Allgemein wurde und wird die Einbeziehung empirischer Ergebnisse in die Philosophie schon seit Aristoteles’ Zeiten von vielen Seiten immer wieder und in verschiedener Weise gefordert. In der heutigen Situation heisst dies: Philosophen sollten heute nicht mehr eine Theorie des Geistes entwerfen, ohne die relevanten empirisch-pschologischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungen zu berücksichtigen.
So propagieren z.B. George Lakoff und Mark Johnson eine neue „empirisch verantwortungsvolle Philosophie“, die auf einem kognitionswissenschaftlichen Verständnis des kognitiven Unbewussten gründet und den Bereich präreflektiver Kognition umfaßt. Sie sehen in Merleau-Ponty und John Dewey Vorbilder dieser Weise philosophischen Denkens und halten eine gegenseitige Befruchtung zwischen Philosophie und Kognitionswissenschaften für möglich und sinnvoll. (3)

Wo sind aber die Grenzen der Zusammenarbeit bei den methodisch so unterschiedlichen Wissenschaften wie Neurologie und ihrer kognitivistischen Interpretation auf der einen und Phänomenologie auf der anderen Seite? Worin liegt der mögliche Nutzen einer solchen Zusammenarbeit? Auch auf diese Fragen gibt es verschiedene Antworten.


Umgekehrt kann die Phänomenologie die Interpretation von empirischen Ergebnissen der Neurowissenschaften leisten, denn sie geht von einem genuinen Einblick in die Innenperspektive des Erlebens aus, d.h. sie hat bereits den Sinn der Erlebnisse erfahren. Es scheint auch durchaus möglich, dass phänomenologische Einsichten neue Anregungen für die experimentelle Forschung geben können. Insofern bietet sich hier eine Kooperation zum gegenseitigen Nutzen an.


Weiterhin ist auch ein Austausch möglich, der vor allem in der phänomenologischen Interpretation der Ergebnisse der Cognitive Neuroscience besteht. Diese Art der Interpretation scheint mir besonders wichtig, weil die Phänomenologie sowohl die Inhalte als auch das Subjekt der Intentionalität ernst nimmt und eine wissenschaftliche, auf Anschauung gegründeten Analyse aus der Innenperspektive des erlebenden Bewusstseins anstrebt. Oft werden die experimentellen Ergebnisse der Cognitive Neuroscience lediglich mit alltagspsychologischen Mitteln interpretiert. Auch die analytische Philosophie des Geistes kann, und zwar wegen ihrer überwiegend behaviouristisch motivierten
Ignoranz hinsichtlich des erkennenden und leistenden Subjekts (die sich z.B. in dem Jargon der 'mental states' ausdrückt) bislang keine geeignete Interpretationsgrundlage für die differenzierten Ergebnisse bieten.

Die schwächste Form einer möglichen Zusammenarbeit ist die gegenseitige Anregung zu neuen Forschungen. Aber auch diese Art der Kooperation kann sehr fruchtbar sein.


4. Warum wird gerade heute die „Naturalisierung“ der Phänomenologie diskutiert?


Wie nahe sind aber die Neurowissenschaften den konkreten Inhalten des Bewusstseins schon gekommen? Wie weit sind die heute üblichen Verfahren schon dazu geeignet, die Beziehungen z.B. eines Musters neuronaler Aktivität und den entsprechenden Bewusstseinsinhalten zu bestimmen?

Durch die Verbesserung der bildgebenden Beobachtungsverfahren der neuronalen Aktivität des Gehirns, wie z.B. PET (Positronen-Emissions-Tomographie) fMR (functional magnetic resonance), hat die detaillierte Erforschung der Funktion einzelner Hirnregionen in den letzten Jahrzehnten einen grossen Schritt nach vorne getan. So kann man heute im Gehirn kognitive, emotionale und motorische Aktivitäten mit verschiedenen Verfahren beobachten, die die Unterschiede in der Stoffwechselaktivität und damit auch der neuronalen Aktivität bildlich darstellen können. Aber bisher reichen auch diese eindrucksvollen bildlichen Darstellungen für eine zuverlässige Identifikation der genauen Art der mentalen Aktivität, d.h. des bewußten Inhalts, aufgrund von neuronalen Aktivitäten nicht aus. Das bedeutet: Man kann auf Grund der Beobachtung der neuronalen Aktivität mit bildgebenden Verfahren heute noch nicht sagen, was der Inhalt des Bewusstseins ist, d.h. auf den Menschen zugeschnitten, was jemand wahrnimmt, will oder denkt. So dokumentieren PET-Darstellungen lediglich die Aktivität des Stoffwechsels in bestimmten Arealen des Gehirns. Wenn man dann die allgemeine Funktion dieses Gehirnareals kennt (z.B. aufgrund von Ausfall-Forschungen), dann kann man auch über die Art der jeweiligen Funktion etwas aussagen - aber eben nur sehr allgemein.

Zum Beispiel ist der Motor Cortex für die Steuerung von Bewegungen zuständig, das limbische System ist ganz generell an Gefühlen beteiligt, es gibt verschiedene Bereiche des Gehirns, die vor allem den Prozess der Wahrnehmung leisten usw. Gibt es z.B. eine erhöhte Aktivität in einem Teil des limbischen Systems, dann wissen wir, daß das Subjekt wahrscheinlich ein Gefühl empfindet. Wir können aber anhand der erkennbaren Muster der Stoffwechselaktivität nicht genau unterscheiden, ob es sich um Angst oder eine Überraschung handelt, und ob es die Furcht vor einem Tiger im Gebüsch ist oder die
Angst, den Versuchsleiter zu enttäuschen. (7) Eine solche genaue Zuordnung von Aktivitätsmustern und Inhalt der Furcht ist bisher nicht zufriedenstellend gelungen. Natürlich kann man versuchen, die Ergebnisse noch präziser einzugrenzen, wenn man die jeweilige Versuchsanordnung experimentell auf eine bestimmte Angst (z.B. indem man einen Film über Tiger zeigt) zugeschnitten hat. Letztlich wissen wir aber nicht genau, worauf sich die Angst richtet, weil der erhöhte Stoffwechsel, - selbst wenn er ein relativ bekanntes räumliches Muster produziert - keinen Schluß auf den genauen Inhalt des Gefühls erlaubt. Eventuell ermöglichen künftige Verbesserungen dieser Methode oder die Entwicklung neuer Methoden aber eine genauere Identifikation. (8)


Dies tun wir, obwohl die Identität dessen, was das Röntgenbild oder die Tomographie zeigt, mit meinem Leib nicht bewiesen werden kann. Es gibt nur einen statistisch verlässlichen Zusammenhang zwischen dem räumlichen und zeitlichen Zusammentreffen: Immer - oder zumindest fast immer - wenn das Tomogramm ein gefährliche Veränderung aufweist, stellt sich bei dem anschliessenden Eingriff heraus, dass diese tatsächlich vorhanden war. Dieser statistische Zusammenhang weist bei aller Zuverlässigkeit dennoch eine gewisse Unsicherheit auf, weil gelegentlich Interferenzen und Artefakte bei der Herstellung des Bildes vorkommen, auch hier sind Verwechslungen und Fehldiagnosen möglich. Dennoch ist unsere Überzeugung von der Zuverlässigkeit so stark, dass wir unser Leben dafür riskieren würden.

Eine überzeugende statistische Verlässlichkeit - wie in dem Beispiel des Röntgenbildes - würde uns also im Prinzip auch von der Identität eines Bewusstseinsinhaltes mit einem bestimmten differenzierten Muster neuronaler Aktivität überzeugen können. Es muss nur statistisch zuverlässig gelingen, das Vorliegen des einen aus der Anwesenheit des anderen erschliessen zu können.

Genau dies kann man heute schon leisten, wenn auch in einem sehr beschränkten Gebiet. Hierzu muss ich kurz auf die Forschung an sogenannten Spiegelneuronen (mirror neurons) eingehen und zwar insbesondere auf das dabei verwendete Verfahren. Es gibt nämlich schon heute weit präzisere Instrumente zur Erforschung der Gehirnaktivität als die bildgebenden Verfahren (PET, fMR).


Ich will hier jedoch nicht zu sehr auf die Forschung an Spiegelneuronen eingehen, das ist hier nicht mein Thema. (9) Dennoch möchte ich erwähnen, dass die Untersuchung von Rizzolatti und Gallese eine überraschende Einsicht in die Art geben, wie wir uns die Bewegungen anderer vorstellen, d.h. wie wir sie bewußt haben. Denn es zeigte sich, dass die Neuronen des Motor Cortex nicht nur bei eigenen leiblichen Bewegungen ein charakteristisches Aktivitäts muster hervorbrachten, sondern dass dieses Muster auch zu beobachten war, wenn die Versuchstiere lediglich die Bewegungen anderer Affen oder auch die des menschlichen Versuchsleiters beobachteten. Dabei war zwar immer nur ein Teil der Neuronen aktiv, doch das Muster der Aktivität blieb identifizierbar dasselbe. Diesen Teil der Neuronenpopulation nannte man deshalb Spiegelneuronen, weil sie in der Lage waren, irgendwie die nur gesehene Bewegung des anderen Subjekts zu simulieren, und zwar so, als ob es seine eigenen wären. Dies scheint ein wichtiger Aspekt der Art zu sein, in der leibliche Bewegungen von Affen - und vielleicht auch von uns - vorgestellt werden.
Wir müssen also folgern, dass in diesem Fall die „Identifikation“ des bewussten Inhalts mit einem messbaren neurologischen Phänomen schon statistisch zuverlässig geleistet ist. Natürlich handelt es sich um einen relativ einfachen Bewusstseinsinhalt mit geringer Komplexität. Vergleichbare Untersuchungen an Menschen wurden mit einer anderen Methode versucht, die mit berührungslosen, computergestützten Verfahren lediglich das Niveau der Erregbarkeit (level of arousal) einer Hirnregion untersuchen. (10) Aber dennoch sieht man hier die Richtung der experimentellen Untersuchungen schon klar vorgezeichnet. Das Interesse an der Identifikation von Bewußtseinsinhalten ist geweckt und die Methoden müssen diesem Interesse noch angepasst und weiter verbessert werden. (11)

Die statistisch zuverlässige Identifikation von neuronaler Aktivität und bewussten Inhalten ist also bereits in ganz kleinem Umfang gelungen. Der wesentliche Anstoss dafür, warum uns heute eine eingehende Zusammenarbeit von Cognitive Neuroscience und weiteren Richtungen der empirischen Psychologie auf der einen und der Phänomenologie auf der anderen Seite als sinnvoll und notwendig erscheint, ist der heutige Stand und der weiter zu erwartende Fortschritt der neurologischen Verfahren, die letztlich den Inhalt des Bewusstseins bestimmen wollen.

Das Motiv der Phänomenologie zu dieser Zusammenarbeit kann aber nicht einfach sein, dass sie diese Bestrebungen unterstützen will, sondern nur, dass sie in ihrem genuin eigenen Forschungsgebiet mit ihren eigenen Methoden Fortschritte erzielen will. Und hierzu hilft die angestrebte Kooperation sicher.


Husserls Bedenken - die er z.B. in „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft“ vehement äussert - gegen die experimentell-empirische Psychologie richten sich gegen die Naturalisierung des Bewusstseins selbst, welche viele Vertreter dieser experimentellen Psychologie auch vertraten. Dieser Reduktionismus, der in der ontologischen Gleichsetzung eines intentionalen Bewusstseinserlebnisses mit einem elektrischen Schaltzustand in den Neuronen liegt, reduziert den Sinn der Inhalte des Bewusstseins auf physikalische
Zustände und ist für Husserl daher nicht akzeptabel. Und dieser Reduktionismus ist auch heute nicht akzeptabel, weil hierdurch eine ganze eigenständige Dimension der Erfahrung zu einem blossen Epiphänomen herabgesetzt wird.


Am Ende dürfen wir also für die zukünftige Phänomenologie hinsichtlich aller drei methodischen Richtungen optimistisch sein: Sie wird eidetisch, transzendental und auch naturalisiert sein.

Anmerkungen:
(8) Mit dem Hinweis auf „künftige Forschungen“ provoziert man natürlich den möglichen polemischen Einwand, es handele sich lediglich um eine „versprechende Wissenschaft“ aus bloßen Plänen, die niemals das einlösen wird, was sie verspricht.
Man fragt sich natürlich, wie diese Entwicklung weiter gehen wird. Es könnte daher möglicherweise der Tag kommen, an dem es eine Art Geistese-Maschine (mind-reading machine) gibt, die mit grosser statistischer Wahrscheinlichkeit darüber Auskunft geben kann, was eine Person jetzt gerade denkt, will und fühlt. Dies ist keineswegs Science Fiction, sondern nur eine einfache, sinnvolle Verlängerung von klaren Forschungsinteressen, die schon länger verfolgt werden. Bereits die Erfindung des Lügendetektors zielte auf die Erforschung des Inhalts unserer Gedanken ab. Naturlich stellen sich hier auch eine Reihe von ethischen und juristischen Fragen: Vielleicht wird es sogar einmal notwendig werden, ein Gesetz zum Schutz der persönlichen Gedankeninhalte zu erlassen (wie bei dem Briefgeheimnis).
