Jason Cullen, *Deleuze and Ethology: A Philosophy of Entangled Life* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 216 pp.

Although the title of Cullen's book is *Deleuze and Ethology*, the author does not focus on passages in which Gilles Deleuze discusses ethology or animals. Cullen does not even quote Deleuze's valuable definition of ethology as "the study . . . of the capacities for affecting and being affected that characterize each thing." Instead, Cullen tries to construct a philosophical ethology of his own with reference to Deleuze's works on cinema, which, Cullen argues, allowed the philosopher "to describe his ontology from the point of view of the particular beings that inhabit the world." It is this emphasis on *particular* beings rather than species that, according to Cullen, lies "at the heart of philosophical ethology."

Philosophers have often asked if it is possible to understand what animals feel, as for instance in the famous article "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" by Thomas Nagel. In films, the question of what characters see and feel is also important. When filmmakers use a subjective camera, it is almost always paired with an objective one. They might first show the fearful face of a character (objective view) before letting us see the snake she is seeing (subjective view). Most often, a film will then return to the objective view. The shot/countershot is an essential film technique, because the subjective view is not reached by eliminating the observer (in this case, the objective camera) but by oscillating between the observer's and the character's points of view. Moreover, Cullen adds, the distinction between a subjective and an objective shot is not always clear. In one shot we may see, for example, an intoxicated character from the perspective of a third-person camera, but that camera is swinging and blurred in order to suggest the character's subjective state. Deleuze terms this sort of shot "semi-subjective."

Ethologists likewise mingle points of view. They do not put themselves in an animal's shoes—an impossible task, as Nagel has contended. Instead, they learn to pay attention to what the animals they are studying pay attention to. Ethologists blend their perspective with that of animals, semi-subjectively, and the result is a viewpoint neither completely human nor entirely animal. And so, Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the ethologists to some extent "become-animal." Becoming-animal is not an identification with animals at large but a creative process triggered by encounter with one particular animal; the semi-subjective view is a new perspective that did not exist before the encounter. While ethologists change and become-animal, the animals they study also change during their interactions with ethologists, since they too learn to understand what matters to the particular humans with whom they live. Curiously, Cullen introduces the notion of becoming-animal only in the book's conclusion. But by approaching it indirectly, via Deleuze's consideration of cinema rather

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than his writings about animals, Cullen offers us a refreshing characterization of a concept central to Deleuze.

—*Thibault De Meyer*

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Victor Klemperer, *Licht und Schatten: Kinotagebuch, 1929–1945*, ed. Nele Holdack and Christian Löser (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2020), 363 pp.

When Klemperer's diaries became public in the 1990s, editors mostly excluded the material about film to keep the publication a manageable size. This new edition restores entries from between June 1929 and April 1945 with a focus on what Klemperer describes as one of his "addictions"—watching movies. Film scholars will be happy to have Klemperer's glosses on films both famous and forgotten. Almost everyone knows *The Blue Angel*, but not *The Three from the Filling Station* (1930), which outgrossed it at the box office. Klemperer despises the first talkies in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Awful (*scheusslich*) is his word for them—as jarring, he says, as a voice coming from a burning bush. He finds them disturbingly artificial and argues that film must become an expressive art, like ballet, and be carried by music, or else it will become an obnoxious dead mechanism (and disgusting as well).

This edition includes more than Klemperer's reports on his avid film-going. Some of them are quite personal. An entry for 1931 concerns how "helpless" his partner Eva's severe depression has left him feeling. That same year, he reports the torment "that I have grown old and no longer have any career prospects" as a scholar. It may be that the social and political context of Klemperer's life will attract the most readers. By the first part of 1933, Klemperer was already writing: "I will never trust Germany again." It was in 1933 that he realized Hindenburg was a puppet and that Hitler was being recast by newspapers as a "statesman" and "genial diplomat." By the end of 1938, all "non-Aryans" were banned from cinemas, and despite his self-identification as a Protestant, Klemperer was classified as a Jew. Matters grew, as the Germans say, *immer schlimmer*, worse and worse. During the horrific bombing of Dresden in mid-February 1945, Eva and Victor were able to escape from the city. They tore the Jewish star from their clothes and disappeared into the crowd. A few days later, at a soldier's invitation, they were in Klotzsche, north of central Dresden, in a movie theater, watching *Das war mein Leben* (*That Was My Life*).

—*Bruce Krajewski*

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