## THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Authored by leading scholars in the field, this handbook delves into the intricate matter of digital evidence collection, adopting a comparative and intradisciplinary approach. It focuses specifically on the increasingly important role of online service providers in criminal investigations, which marks a new paradigm in the field of criminal law and criminal procedure, raising particular challenges and fundamental questions. This scholarly work facilitates a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted and cross-cutting challenges inherent in the collection of digital evidence, as it navigates the contours of current and future solutions against the backdrop of ongoing European and international policymaking. As such, it constitutes an indispensable resource for scholars and practitioners alike, offering invaluable insights into the evolving landscape of digital evidence gathering.

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# The Cambridge Handbook of Digital Evidence in Criminal Investigations

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## Contents

List	of Tables	page viii
List	of Contributors	ix
Fore	eword	
Johi	n Vervaele	xi
Pro	roduction: Gathering Electronic Evidence and Cooperation with Service widers in the Digital Era – A Jigsaw Puzzle of Technological and Legal allenges	
	nessa Franssen and Stanisław Tosza	1
	PART I COLLECTING DIGITAL EVIDENCE: TRANSVERSAL CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS	11
1	Impact of Digital Evidence Gathering on the Criminal Justice System: A Broader Perspective Anže Erbežnik	13
2	Unresolved Jurisdictional Issues in Law Enforcement Access to Data Dan Svantesson and Anna-Maria Osula	43
3	Effective Data Protection and Direct Cooperation on Digital Evidence Gavin Robinson	68
4	On Encryption Technologies and Potential Solutions for Lawful Access Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem	104
5	Admissibility of Digital Evidence Giulia Lasagni	126
6	Exchange of Data between National Security Agencies and Law Enforcement Challenges for Criminal Procedure Tatiana Tropina	t: 153
7	From Mutual Trust to the Gordian Knot of Notifications: The EU e-Evidence Regulation and Directive Theodore Christakis	r <b>e</b>

vi Contents

8	Moving in the Right Direction for Transborder Access to Digital Evidence in Criminal Matters? The Council of Europe and the Second Additional Protocol Introducing Direct Cooperation Mechanisms  Ma. Angela Leonor Aguinaldo and Paul de Hert	200
	PART II DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE COOPERATION OF SERVICE PROVIDERS IN EU CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS	219
9	Digital Evidence in Criminal Matters: Belgian Pride and Prejudice Sem Careel and Frank Verbruggen	221
10	Digital Evidence in Estonia Agnes Kasper, Eneli Laurits and Melita Sogomonjan	261
11	Digital Evidence and the Cooperation of Service Providers in Germany Dominik Brodowski	289
12	Accessing Digital Evidence in Criminal Matters: An Inadequate Irish Legal Framework T. J. McIntyre and Maria Helen Murphy	309
13	Digital Evidence and the Cooperation of Service Providers in Luxembourg Katalin Ligeti and Gavin Robinson	347
14	Gathering of Digital Evidence and Cooperation of Service Providers in Poland Maciej Rogalski	374
15	Access to Retained Data and Cooperation of Service Providers in Criminal Investigations in Spain Carmen Cuadrado Salinas and Juan Carlos Ortiz Pradillo	400
16	A Comparative Analysis of National Law and Practices: Unravelling Differences in View of EU-Wide Solutions Stanisław Tosza and Vanessa Franssen	4 <sup>2</sup> 3
	PART III COLLECTING DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE ROLE OF SERVICE PROVIDERS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE	455
17	Digital Evidence and Cooperation of Service Providers in China Li Zhe and Jin Zhenan	457
18	Cooperation of Service Providers in Criminal Investigations in the Russian Federation Maria Filatova, Olga Kostyleva and Tatiana Alekseeva	486
19	Digital Evidence Collection in Turkey Seçil Bilgiç	512
<b>2</b> 0	Obtaining Digital Evidence under UK Law Elif Mendos Kuşkonmaz and Ian Walden	539

Contents	vii
21 Digital Evidence Gathering by US Authorities and Cross-Border Cooperation with US-Based Service Providers Marine Corhay and Vanessa Franssen	569
Conclusion: Collecting Digital Evidence – From Present Challenges to Future Solutions Vanessa Franssen and Stanisław Tosza	

## Tables

9.1	Overview of cooperation duties	page 238
10.1	Data collection authorisations in investigations	26
12.1	Summary of data access methods under Irish law	327
18.1	Examples of data retention obligations	480
18.2	Types of liability for violations of data subjects' rights	493
19.1	Total number of reported section 10 offences over the years	51

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#### Foreword

Our digital information society comes with many advantages that will further increase with artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digitalized world, be it in the area of communications, the Internet of Things or platform economies, not only produces and processes an enormous amount of data but also creates, through interconnectivity, new data knowledge and related applications. This bright side of innovative technologies, however, also comes with a dark side. Our daily digital fingerprint, based on location data and other, meta data, creates the possibility to construct a full personal digital identity. Data knowledge can be abused for preventive surveillance by states and companies, and undermine fundamental rights and democratic values.

The digital society is also an environment in which crime patterns change. New digital crimes are emerging and digital tools are meanwhile being used for committing common offenses of all types. The result is that access to electronic data for evidence purposes, commonly called digital or electronic evidence, has become indispensable in the large majority of criminal investigations. In the 2022 Sirius EU Digital Evidence Situation Report by Eurojust and Europol, we can read to what extent the request from law enforcement and judicial authorities to internet service providers (ISPs) has exploded and become a decisive tool in criminal investigations (Europol, "SIRIUS EU Digital Evidence Situation Report," 4th Annual Report, 2022, p. 16). With the rapid advancement of AI technologies, the need for direct enforcement cooperation with ISPs and other private partners in the digital markets will only increase.

At the national level many states have adapted their criminal substantive law by introducing new cybercrimes and have revised their criminal procedural law by providing new tools for digital investigations, including production orders to ISPs located in their territory. The problem is, however, that the large majority of the ISPs are not established in the jurisdiction of the state of investigation or do not even offer services in that state, that the relevant data are located in multiple jurisdictions or that it is even unclear where they might be located. This globalization of digital criminal evidence leads to a disconnect with the territorial criminal jurisdiction of states and creates very significant obstacles for law enforcement agencies. As we all know, criminal law enforcement is strictly related to state sovereignty and territoriality, meaning that law enforcement agencies are not allowed to extend their operational investigative powers beyond their national borders. If they need transborder access to (digital) evidence, they have to rely on existing instruments of mutual legal assistance (MLA), which can be bilateral, multilateral or included in international repression conventions such as, for instance, the UN Convention on Transnational Crime (UNCTOC), the UN Convention on Corruption (UNCTAC) or the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention).

xii Foreword

The problem with these conventions is that they rely on interstate cooperation and interstate requests between central authorities at the ministerial level. Most of these conventions have not been designed for digital evidence that is moreover mostly not in the hands of state authorities but held by the real gatekeepers in today's digital society: the ISPs. These conventions are also cumbersome, time-consuming and thus not really adapted to volatile digital information. However, these conventions contain standardized rules for cooperation and also provide for some minimum rights and remedies for the persons concerned.

In the light of this new reality and given the enforcement gap and the risk of impunity, national authorities have been experimenting with and attempting to regulate forms of cross-border access to data, outside of the existing MLA box. Legislators have come up with concepts such as the obligation for ISPs to locate data in the national jurisdiction or forms of extraterritorial investigative jurisdiction for serious crimes in exceptional circumstances, for instance when the digital evidence in point cannot be obtained on the basis of MLA. For their part, the law enforcement agencies have elaborated, based on national law, models of cooperation with ISPs on a voluntary basis, or have issued unilateral subpoenas for the production of data by foreign ISPs, or have used remote search and seizure (including so-called governmental hacking) in foreign jurisdictions or in cyberspace, in some cases in a legal limbo. This national unilateralism comes, of course, with tensions and clashes between states as well as between states and ISPs, but also triggers important questions in relation to sovereignty, international law standards, concepts of jurisdiction, the protection of fundamental rights and even data security. International law, unfortunately, also does not offer us any clear answers to the question whether these cross-border criminal investigative techniques could constitute a violation of sovereignty.

The demand for new regulatory standards is high and the international communities have been trying to come up with a new legal framework for the cross-border gathering of digital evidence in criminal matters. At the level of the Council of Europe, negotiations were launched in 2017 to elaborate a Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest Cybercrime Convention to enhance cooperation and the disclosure of electronic evidence. Although this is a regional Convention, it is the most important multilateral convention and the international standard in the field, as it has been ratified by important nonmember states of the Council of Europe and has also been a model for many national legislators, even in countries that have not joined the Convention. The negotiations on the Second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention were very difficult and intensive (more than ninety meetings), but were eventually concluded in 2022 and the Second Additional Protocol has been tabled for signature from May 12, 2022 onwards. Only parties to the main Convention are allowed to join. The Protocol contains, inter alia, an "emergency" MLA procedure in the case of a significant and imminent risk to the life or safety of any natural person and direct cooperation with ISPs, but this is limited to less intrusive data such as domain name registration or subscriber information. This means that content data, also very important for law enforcement, are excluded from direct cooperation with the ISPs. Clearly, the second Protocol did not bring about a convincing solution and is certainly not a game changer.

At EU level, the European Commission submitted, for its part, an e-evidence package in April 2018, as part of its broader regulatory Digital Agenda (Digital Markets Act, Digital Services Act, EU Data Act, Data Governance Act, AI Act, EU Media Freedom Act), its Security Strategy and its Priorities for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The package contained a proposal for a directive and a proposal for a regulation. The directive provides for the obligation for ISPs active in the internal EU market to designate a legal representative in the EU. The regulation creates a European preservation order and a European production order, based on

Foreword xiii

mutual recognition, that a competent judicial authority can directly impose on foreign ISPs, thereby bypassing, to a large extent, the classic mutual recognition between the judicial authorities of the member states. Unlike the Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention, this proposal consists of a real paradigm change as it invests the ISPs with a public role: it puts them in the position of an extended arm of the judicial authorities and also delegates the fundamental rights compliance check in the executing state largely to them. The negotiations on the EU e-evidence package were very intensive and difficult, as there were many disagreements between the member states and also between the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. The disagreements related, inter alia, to the bypassing of the judicial authorities of the executing state, the duties of the ISPs to check compliance with fundamental rights, the broad range of offenses, the types of data that should be covered, the grounds for refusal and the enforcement regime in the case of noncompliance by the ISPs.

Both the Regulation and the Directive were adopted in July 2023 and it seems that the model of direct cooperation with the ISPs has survived. The ISPs will be embedded in an EU-wide platform to guarantee the authenticity of the orders and the security of communications. The rights of ISPs to refuse cooperation are limited and ISPs are in principle obliged to produce the required data. Enforcement procedures and potentially significant sanctions (going up to 2 percent of the total worldwide annual turnover) shall assure compliance with the orders. Contrary to the Second Protocol, the e-evidence package has greater chances to become a real game changer introducing a completely new paradigm of public—private cooperation in the cross-border gathering of digital evidence in criminal matters.

Relevant is also the United States' dimension where many important ISPs are established. In 2018, US Congress passed the CLOUD Act, under which ISPs can lift blocking provisions and produce data, including content data, related to non-US citizens and residents to foreign judicial authorities only if there is an executive agreement between the US and the country of the foreign judicial authority. Such agreement would allow for direct cooperation with the ISPs, even for content data, without channeling the judicial request through the MLA mechanisms. The first CLOUD Act executive agreement was concluded between the US and the UK in 2019, and entered into force on October 3, 2022. In the meantime, an agreement with Australia has been signed and negotiations with Canada have started. Negotiations between the US and the EU have also been launched, but have been stalled as they awaited the approval of the e-evidence package in the EU, and were revived once the agreement on the package was reached.

It is against the backdrop of all these challenges and legal developments that this Handbook comes in and is filling a real gap by giving us an insight into: (1) the phenomenon of digital evidence in criminal matters and the new challenges it creates, be they legal or technological; (2) the discussions at the scholarly and policy levels on relevant concepts and definitions; (3) the new legal instruments elaborated by the EU, the Council of Europe – including the issues that were discussed (heavily) around the negotiation table – and the US CLOUD Act; and (4) how national jurisdictions are (or will be) dealing with the challenges. As you will understand from these four dimensions, this Handbook offers a highly interesting and very valuable analysis of the state-of-the-art and the challenges to be overcome, from the point of view of both effective law enforcement and compliance with fundamental rights. The Handbook is based on an international and comparative research project directed by the two editors. They have in my opinion decided on a convincing structure for this Handbook, starting with Part I on "Collecting Digital Evidence: Transversal Challenges and Solutions." In this first part the contributions not only set

xiv Foreword

the scene (the phenomenon, the impact of digitalization on criminal justice and so on) but also deal with the problem of definitions of digital evidence and the types of data, with unsolved problems of jurisdiction, digital investigative measures, digital evidence law as well as encryption technology and criminal justice. The contributions have been written not only by criminal lawyers but also by international public lawyers and computer scientists. In this part we also get an in-depth analysis of the new European and international legal framework for direct cooperation with ISPs when it comes to the gathering of digital information for evidence purposes in criminal matters.

Even when new international and European standards are of the utmost importance for judicial cooperation, the national regulations on the gathering and use of digital evidence are and will to a large extent remain the backbone for the law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the editors have made a very wise choice to include in this Handbook a substantial part on comparative criminal justice both in Europe (Part II) and worldwide (Part III), based on a convincing set of jurisdictions for a functional comparison and making use of a modeled questionnaire for the exercise. The richness of the comparative approach is threefold. First, it shows to which extent the national legislator and the judiciary (including in many cases constitutional courts) have been struggling with giving content to the new challenges in this field. Second, it also demonstrates the regulatory gaps in many countries. Third, it shows very clearly that exercising enforcement jurisdiction, particularly investigative jurisdiction, outside the national territory, based on a unilateral approach encounters quite some difficulties in law and in practice, from the point of view of both effective enforcement as well as compliance with fundamental rights. And thus the need for international standards is also based on evidence that is delivered by this national comparative analysis.

The Handbook clearly underpins the need for new legislative solutions at the international level in order to provide for effective enforcement. However, it also stresses that the game changer, by including the ISPs in the cooperation mechanisms, cannot come with a substantial loss of procedural safeguards and fundamental rights. Outsourcing fundamental rights compliance to ISPs is also outsourcing a positive obligation of states toward a private party and entails the risk of the privatization of enforcement and of human rights compliance. Finally, both the Council of Europe and the EU are international communities in which the rule of law and fundamental rights are key values. If they want to be global trendsetters, they will have to find a convincing balance between the interest of effective criminal enforcement and the protection of fundamental rights. If the security approach were to become the leading factor in the new cooperation instruments, then these instruments would risk undermining the key values not only of the criminal justice systems but also of the international communities in which they are adopted.

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