jury, and the administration of homicide investigation by the centralized courts.

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As Xavier Prévost rightly observes at the beginning of his book, there is a strange paradox between the great fame that Jacques Cujas has enjoyed throughout the centuries and the relative scarcity of studies on the man and his work. Driven by youthful energy and the urgent desire to fill that gap, Prévost read the 13,000 columns of the Fabrot edition of Cujas’s Opera omnia (1658) in addition to investigating archives in Toulouse, Bourges, and Paris with the aim of offering a comprehensive view of Cujas’s life, academic career, and scholarly work. Even after this meticulous research, many elements in Cujas’s biography remain uncertain—for example, we do not know exactly when he graduated as a law student—but the author has done about everything possible to advance our knowledge about Cujas. Prévost has also corrected false assumptions along the way; for example, rejecting Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s dating of Cujas’s marriage to Madeleine Du Roure (72, footnote 270).

Clearly, Prévost’s Jacques Cujas (1522-1590): Jurisconsulte humaniste is characterized by the same thirst for truth and scientific rigor that formed the basis of Cujas’s critical engagement with the Roman legal tradition. This explains why the book has already won several prizes, including the Prix Corbay of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences at the Institut de France. Interestingly, Prévost’s research demonstrates that legal humanists such as Cujas were much more indebted to the medieval ius commune than modern textbooks tend to acknowledge. He also highlights the profound divisions, if not enmities, between the legal humanists themselves, such as between Cujas and Hugues Doneau or, for that matter, Jean Bodin and Cujas. Bodin despised the prince of the jurist-philologists for his lack of familiarity with legal practice.

Prévost tries to offer a more nuanced picture, arguing that Cujas was not just an ivory tower scholar but a practice-oriented jurist engaged in the legal disputes of his day. After treating Cujas as a philologist and a humanist scholar in the first part of his monograph, Prévost therefore dedicates the second part to