IMISCOE
TEXTBOOKS

Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation

MARCO MARTINIELLO & JAN RATH (EDS.)

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Notes

1 Cf. Hemingway's celebration of Paris in *Paris est une fête*, quoted in Ory (1994).
2 This approach owes a great deal to the pioneer (in France) research work carried out by V. de Rudder, M. Guillon and I. Taboada-Leonetti. They focused on multiethnic cohabitation in several neighbourhoods of Paris (the Choisy neighbourhood in the thirteenth *arrondissement*, the Aligre and Lot Chalon neighbourhoods, and the wealthy neighbourhoods of the sixteenth *arrondissement*). Summing up the team's approach, Taboada-Leonetti (1989) writes: 'Our aim was to carry out empirical studies to show how people manage their differences in an *ad hoc* manner, depending on the issues at stake and the circumstances, and how they produce collective identities which can vary from one situation to the next without necessarily generating social crises, social dysfunction or ethnic identity crises.'
3 Unified Jewish Social Fund: this is the main source of funding supporting the various Jewish cultural, social and community institutions in France.
4 Survey conducted in front of shops in Belleville for a study on economic activity in the lower Belleville area (see Fayman and Simon, 1991).
5 The religious revival, which has affected the Jewish community in France, was also felt in Belleville. Today, most kosher stores close on the Sabbath.
6 A detailed map of Asian businesses in Belleville can be found in Ma Mung and Simon (1990: 99). However, this map dates back to 1985 and the neighbourhood's business infrastructure has changed considerably since then. More recent information is available in Live (1993).
7 This formulation is a condensed synthesis of the definitions of integration as given by two official sources; the Commission de la Nationalité (1988) and the Haut conseil à l'intégration (1991).
8 The notion of 'local social order' refers to the one G. Suttles formulated about a slum in Chicago. Even though those who live there have been rejected by mainstream society as 'people with disreputable characteristics', slums are not 'disorganized' (Suttles, 1968). Social order is interpreted here as a system of rules, norms and values making it possible for different social groups, which are interdependent yet reject each other, to live together. In Belleville, where residents belong to very different ethnic or social groups, the neighbourhood stands for a reference. Since all these groups live in the same area, to get along, they must develop a common code of behaviour for the neighbourhood.

For references please consult the bibliography of the book in which this article was originally published. (see List of sources, page 609)

Political dynamics in the city: three case studies

Hassan Bousetta

The article by political scientist Hassan Bousetta first appeared in 2000 in an edited book entitled *Minorities in European Cities*. Bousetta's doctoral thesis, from which this article is drawn, is one of the first systematic qualitative comparisons of the collective dynamics, the socio-political participation and the ethnic mobilisation of immigrant minorities in three mid-size European cities. It was followed in the 2000s by several other studies using a similar theoretical framework and an analogous research methodology. Bousetta's work is considered pioneering in the field of comparative studies of immigrant associations in Europe.

This chapter on the collective dynamics, sociopolitical participation and ethnic mobilization of immigrant minorities is based on comparative case studies of Moroccan communities in three small and medium-sized cities in Belgium (Liège), the Netherlands (Utrecht) and France (Liège). Three main ideas inform the design and rationale of this research.

ethnic mobilization

The *first* is that immigrant incorporation is increasingly being shaped by socioeconomic and political dynamics at work locally. In this age of postindustrial transition, inter-ethnic relations are increasingly entangled with broader social and economic phenomena affecting cities. In countries like France, the Netherlands and Belgium, this is reflected in patterns of policy management of ethnic diversity. The policy interventions of these countries' public authorities have gradually begun to address the socio-spatial dislocations confronting urban areas. A significant feature of European governments' policy response to urban decline and immigrant integration has been to decentralize power to local authorities. Whereas migratory flow regulation remains a matter for governmental and European intergovernmental approaches, the integration part of migration policies is often tailored to fit immigrant policy issues emerging in the big cities.

Second, it is important to emphasize that migrant communities are not necessarily at the forefront of the new relationship between economy and society, for which the city has set the stage. From a political sociology point of view, the city has surfaced as a relevant and privileged unit for empirical investigation. For political and social scientists, issues such as the political incorporation of migrants, the enfranchisement of foreigners and immigrant ethnic mobilization provide the basis for a new appraisal of relations between civil and political society. They raise the question of how best immigrant minority groups can organize and participate in local decision-making to defend and preserve their collective interests.

The *third* idea at the heart of this research is its focus on the collective response of one immigrant minority group in three settings and to study the focus and patterns of its collective sociopolitical insertion.

Ethnic mobilization and sociopolitical participation

Immigrant Sociopolitical Participation

immigrant labour force

Earlier research on postwar immigration showed that immigrants recruited as a labour force of guestworkers quickly confronted the need to organize their collective interests. Initially, they did it within the framework of industrial relations, but their claims quickly moved beyond that arena. Mark Miller (1981) and Catherine Withol de Wenden (1977, 1978, 1988) were among the first to reflect on these realities and to challenge the then dominant Marxist assumptions about the political quiescence of the immigrant labour force (Miller, 1981: 22-9). Both authors suggested that migrants were becoming more than a temporary labour force and were developing new kinds of political mobilizations that did not rely on electoral politics. In the framework of this theoretical and empirical reconsideration, immigrants came to be regarded as political subjects, rather than the political objects they had been seen as until then to sustain class divisions and the conservative needs of the capitalist economy.

Earlier work on the political sociology of immigration reintroduced some basic reflections on the boundaries of the nation-state's political community and on the sustained challenge migration posed to classical conceptions of citizenship and nationality. In most cases, first-generation migrant workers in continental Europe acquired differentiated and inferior citizenship statuses, to which Hammar later attached the label denizenship (Hammar, 1990). As non-nationals, immigrant workers in countries like France, the Netherlands and Belgium were granted access to various social and civil rights, but their political rights were restricted.[1] They were, in effect, excluded from electoral participation. An important exception to this rule occurred when the Dutch, Irish and Scandinavian governments gave foreigners the franchise at the local level. Unlike their counterparts in France, Germany and Belgium, immigrants in these countries were allowed active electoral participation (the right to vote and be elected) at the local level. In terms of political analysis, this was and still is a significant factor because immigrant communities in Belgium, Germany and France have never represented a significant electoral force.[2]

significance of immigrant socio-political activism

For a number of reasons, the sociopolitical participation of immigrant ethnic minorities is an important and worthwhile subject of study for the political sociology of liberal democratic societies. In recent years, it has become a bit more multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious. Withol de Wenden and Hargreaves (1993: 2-3) identify three reasons for the continuing significance of immigrant sociopolitical activism. First, are the memories of alternative means of political participation open to disenfranchized immigrant communities, such as strikes, hunger strikes and marches? Second, consultative institutions have been established in many countries where, as foreigners, immigrants are not entitled to full political rights. Third, immigrants have, to varying degrees, been granted access to nationality in their receiving countries. This option, which opens the door to full citizenship, has had particular relevance for the second and third generation, particularly in countries that have traditionally based their naturalization procedures on *jus soli*.[3] A fourth reason for studying the sociopolitical involvement of immigrants is because the binding relationship between nationality and citizenship, at least in its political dimension, has over the last 20 years been seriously thrown into question. Citizenship of the European Union and foreigners' experiences of enfranchisement at the local level are instances of a decoupling of citizenship and nationality, the main consequence of which is to open the door towards granting some political rights to non-nationals.

These elements indicate that, over the past 20 years, the situation in northwestern immigrant receiving European countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and France, has changed qualitatively. Immigrants and their supporters have gained some important victories. Whereas migrant workers and their families were left with practically no access to mainstream political institutions in the 1970s, most immigrant receiving European countries have now established a number of procedures and institutions to increase their political

participation and representation. Though some convergence is observable, the nature and scope of these channels of participation differ from one country to another (Layton Henry, 1990). Nevertheless, there are now a number of formal channels through which immigrants can articulate their political demands.

institutions and policies

These institutional developments have influenced methods of theorizing immigrants' political inclusion. Breaking away from culturalist interpretations of immigrants' sociopolitical behaviour, recent literature has paid increasing attention to the role and influence of institutions and policies. It has been argued, for instance, that both the nature and impact of immigrant political participation predominantly depend on the political context they confront (Ireland, 1994). This approach leads to a crucial point for European comparative research, for it holds that most of the variations that can be identified across national boundaries are more dependent on the specificities of the domestic political context than on the deliberate strategic choices of minority groups.

Without going deeper into the complexities of the theoretical debate, a cautious interpretation of the actual role of institutions and policies is called for to avoid turning the proper role of immigrants into that of a passive agent determined by structural political and institutional factors. Any attempt to influence politics and to gain more access to the political process necessarily implies the mobilization of collective actors. The organizational basis of immigrant political action should therefore be taken as a focal point in studying immigrant participatory patterns. Before discussing this in relation to the Moroccan experiences in three cities, a clarification of two related concepts of particular relevance to the *problématique* is proposed in the next section, namely the concepts of ethnic mobilization and of ethnic minority associationism.

Ethnic mobilization and ethnic minority associationism

As suggested earlier, several channels to political participation are open to ethnic minorities. In the three countries central to this analysis, social scientists have pointed out the importance of the liberalization of foreigners' rights of association to the political participatory opportunities available to immigrant communities (Layton Henry, 1990). The setting up of independent associations has been a major development for immigrant communities denied all the attributes of citizenship of the majority. It has opened a door for them to organize their own sociopolitical interests in institutions independent both of the country of origin and of the host country's various solidarity organizations. Ethnic minority associational life has in many instances

provided the organizational basis for new types of identity-driven mobilizations, such as ethnic mobilization. However, and this is the point to emphasize here, ethnic minority associations have a twofold orientation, which allows them to distinguish between their role as conveyors of ethnic solidarity and their role as ethnic political actors. The point is that the study of immigrant minority associational life does not provide the basis for a single conceptual approach in terms of ethnic mobilization. Ethnic minority associations can provide an organizational vessel to some forms of ethnic solidarity without necessarily being the vector of ethnic political mobilizations.

ethnic mobilization

By introducing this distinction, I wish to reinstate a point expressed earlier by ethnic competition scholars who established a theoretical and empirical distinction between the concepts of ethnic solidarity and ethnic mobilization (Olzak, 1983; Olzak and Nagel, 1986). There has been a tendency in the English-speaking literature to subsume all forms of immigrant collective action under the category of ethnic mobilization. Positing an immigrant ethnic mobilization needs a priori definition of what is ethnically defined in their mobilization, as well as a conceptual framework that allows one to account for forms of immigrant mobilization that are not organized solely along ethnic lines. As John Rex's Barthian perspective on ethnic mobilization suggests, this should depend above all on a situational definition of the projects in which ethnic groups engage (Barth, 1969; Rex, 1991, 1994). In other words, the meaning of ethnic political mobilization does not rest on the cultural values and norms of the group's membership, but on a process, which includes boundary drawing, in which ethnicity serves as an instrumental resource for collective action. This conception of ethnic mobilization is of interest because it provides one with a pivotal concept on which to build a broader conception of multicultural society. For Rex, ethnic mobilization in a multicultural society is a valuable strategy of collective action, which immigrant ethnic minorities should pursue to defend and preserve their collective interests (Rex, 1985, 1991, 1994). He does not see ethnic mobilization as being at odds with the definition of the idea of equal citizenship of all individuals of the liberal democratic tradition. As he put it (Rex, 1994: 15), 'In fact, one of the goals of ethnic mobilization is precisely the achievement of this kind of equal citizenship and it may well be that ethnically mobilized groups will act together to achieve such an end both with other ethnic groups in a similar position and with indigenous peers.'

With this clarification, we can now turn to the role of immigrant ethnic associations in relation to their communities and to the political process. Ethnic associations have received unequal interest from

academics. In France, they have formed the subject of numerous works; in other countries, such as the Netherlands, they have been almost ignored in social science research.[4] A brief international overview of studies of immigrant ethnic associational life shows a great variety of interests and approaches, which cannot be encompassed within a single *problématique*. Though social science researchers tend to view their roles and functions quite positively, ethnic associations have been analysed in different countries at different times for different analytical purposes. In an international comparative study, S. Jenkins and her co-authors looked at ethnic associations from the point of view of the satisfaction they provide to fellow co-ethnics. They suggested that their role be reconsidered for inclusion as policy actors in the delivery of social services (Jenkins et al., 1988). The role and functions of ethnic associations have also received consideration in Rex's classic community study of Sparkbrook (Rex, 1973). Another study by Rex, Joly and Wilpert (1987) looked at the functions of ethnic associations from an international comparative perspective and viewed them as a non-transitional phenomenon offering a range of identity options to immigrant populations. Schoeneberg (1983) provided an interesting and comprehensive assessment of the role and functions of ethnic associations in Germany. He sought to establish the relationship between organizational participation in ethnic associations, direct contact with majority group members and cultural assimilation. From his research, he concluded that these relationships are complex and depend largely on the nature of the organizations, though they can be assumed to have a general positive effect.

Three local case studies[5]

Liège

In 1996, the Moroccan community of Liège numbered 5270 individuals, most of who had come as immigrant workers or student migrants. This community included numerous organizations displaying diverse profiles. Moroccan ethnic associations in Liège are structured along a number of well-established cleavages, including gender, age, ideological orientation towards the country of origin, ideological orientation towards the country of residence, religion or secularism and regional identities (Berbers versus non-Berbers). Though the Moroccan community's formal organizational structure in Liège does not reveal much variation in comparison with the two other cities, one can contend that this community is weakly mobilized in the formal political field. It has also failed to establish a

weak mobilization

coherent political movement in the face of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. A good illustration of this is the absence of any significant involvement in electoral politics by Moroccans of Belgian nationality.[6] The relationship between the Moroccan community in Liège and local political parties is a chapter that still has to be written. Another indication is that Moroccan ethnic associations are clearly under-represented in local inter-organizational networks mobilized around immigration/integration issues. A range of multiethnic and Belgian solidarity organizations, such as human rights associations and antiracist groups, dominate the mobilized actors. The ideological fragmentation of these organizations may partly explain the Moroccans' under-representation. Many solidarity organizations are either affiliated to a specific segment of Belgium's rather pillar-like society, such as the Christian or socialist movement, or are close to alternative political parties such as Ecolo, the green party in French-speaking Belgium.

To explain this situation, it is necessary to go beyond normative judgements about the capacity of leaders to articulate the demands of their community. More interestingly, the point is to analyse the interaction between the internal and institutional factors that shaped the sociopolitical trajectory of the Moroccan community in Liège. The most important obstacles that Moroccans, like other smaller ethnic and religious minorities, have repeatedly confronted in Liège is a shared consensus among the political elite of the majority about the normative meaning of integration. So far, the dominant assimilationist ideological framework has impeded the emergence of alternative ways of representing ethnic minorities either in the formal political process or in the implementation of public policies. To some extent, one could contend that this has resulted in the reproduction of immigrant's powerlessness through a systematic non-politicization and non-specific decision-making. In comparison with the three other case studies, the absence of a specifically local policy theorizing on integration issues is evident.

In 1973, Liège had, however, experienced a pioneering initiative with the establishment of a consultative institution. This consultative council, the CCILg (Conseil consultatif des Immigrés de la Ville de Liège), was for a long time the only formal institution where immigrant minority communities could articulate their political demands. Like many peer consultative bodies, the CCILg has steadily confronted a number of difficulties in its communication with the local council and has never managed to increase its power within local politics (see Martiniello, 1992). The CCILg stopped its work in 1991 and the new municipal authorities, elected in 1994, have ten-

CCILg

tatively begun to develop a policy of *interculturalism*. This new policy framework has for the first time sought to stimulate a few associative projects promoting 'intercultural encounters'. However, the relationship between local authorities on the one hand, and multiculturalist and ethnic activists on the other, have suffered from the enduring lack of communication between the local council and voluntary associations. An illustration of this was given recently by a confrontational mobilization against the local authorities and Department of Intercultural Relations on the issue of the voluntary sector's representation in the newly established regional centres of integration, a new institution promoted by the Walloon government.

institution building

The lack of consistent and coherent avenues of political participation did not, however, lead to political quiescence. The public political sphere's lack of investment is counterbalanced by vigorous activity within the community's institutions and associations. In fact, the context in which Moroccan sociopolitical action takes place in Liège emerges from a historical outlook towards its institution building. In the earlier phases of Moroccan settlement in Liège, collective structuration took on two main orientations, in opposition to one another. The two dominant organizational forms were initially developed by Islamic groups under Moroccan government control[7] and by secular leftist groups. The former's objective was to establish Islamic associations committed to setting up and managing mosques. Political issues in the homeland, though, largely informed the political activities of the secularists of the left. However, these types of organizations, which included the Liège section of the National Union of Moroccan Students (UNEM) and Solidarité Arabe, have gradually focused their activities on local issues. Members of the Moroccan secularist left wing have for instance been involved in consultative politics at the city level in Liège within the CCILg and at the level of the French-speaking community within the CCPOE (Conseil consultatif pour les Populations d'origine étrangère).

A number of Moroccan Islamic organizations have in the past struggled for autonomy against Moroccan consular representatives and have fed a number of conflicts that have resulted in the creation of new mosques.[8] These conflicts involved mixed issues of identity, ideology and theology. It is apparent from these internal debates, however, that the sociopolitical interests and attitudes of Moroccan Muslims are fragmented and not amenable to a single strategy of ethnic mobilization. Empirical studies of Islamic institution building reveal considerable dissent among the membership of Islamic associations over the issue of publicizing Islam. Whereas some streams have pleaded for a more visible positioning of Islamic identities in the public sphere, others have opposed and mobilized to keep their religious space immune from public concern. The El Itissam mosque has undoubtedly gone furthest in the first strategy, while the El Mouahidin mosque has traditionally opted for the second one. The El Iman mosque, a stronghold of Moroccan consular agents and of the friendship societies of Moroccan merchants and workers (*amicales*), has on the other hand relied on forms of ethnic lobbying based on individual networks among the local political elite. These *amicales* have also had two representatives elected after the CCILg's elections of 1984.

national issues

Islamic associations in Liège enter the public political arena not only over local matters, such as a request for Islamic cemeteries[9] and the organization of educational activities, but over national issues such as the representation of Islam according to the Belgian law of 1974 (see Panafit, 1997). The Islamic association El Itissam is at the forefront of this claim and has developed a strategy of vertical integration (at both national and regional levels) with Brussels-based Islamic groups. Unlike the secular left wing, Islamic groups have not participated in regular political relays within the local political arena and have only managed to find occasional access to the policy process on issues of direct concern to them.

Lille

The 6260 Moroccans in Lille represent the most important group of non-nationals. Apart from a small minority who acquired French citizenship, first-generation Moroccan immigrants have had no access whatsoever to the electoral process. Their status as non-nationals has denied them access to the most formal political arena. The first significant developments in terms of electoral political participation appeared with the political emergence of the second generation. In Lille, the most recent municipal elections confirmed the slow and uneasy emergence of second-generation individuals in the political arena. In 1989, three candidates from North African youth organizations were put forward by the socialist party. One of them, a co-founder of Les Craignos, was elected and appointed the mayor's delegate for 'citizenship and human rights'. In 1995, several North African candidates ran again for a seat in the local council. Among them, two well-known figures in second-generation North African associational life and a social worker of Moroccan origin have been successful.[10]

Before the second generation started to organize politically and to set up its associations in Lille, first-generation Moroccans had been less quiescent than Beur historiography has sometimes tended to

suggest. In Lille, as in other European cities, the Moroccan government became involved early on in setting up collective infrastructures for Moroccan migrants. Setting up a federation of *amicales* in the north was here again the Moroccan regime's pivotal instrument for strategy of control. The role of Moroccan diplomats in this process of community organization and control was never clearer than in the 1986 conflict when Moroccan miners of the northern French coalfield opposed the Charbonnages de France. After a long strike led by a group of Moroccan miners from the French trade union CGT (Conféderation générale du Travail), 3600 Moroccan miners were unfairly dismissed after an agreement was reached between the Moroccan embassy and their employer, the Charbonnages de France (for more details, see Sanguinetti 1991: 75-8). Although many Moroccan miners were forced to return to Morocco, the struggle for their social and economic benefits is still going on today. In 1987, the former Moroccan leaders of the CGT who remained in France founded an independent association (Association des Mineurs Marocains du Nord) and joined the national federation of the Association des Travailleurs Marocains en France (ATMF).

community organizations

Parallel with the first-generation community organizations the second generation, most often headed by young Algerians, has emerged in the sociopolitical field at both local and national levels. As Bouamama recalls, the mobilization of the second generation and the setting up of associations started to become a central issue in Lille with the first nationwide 'Marches des Beurs' of 1983 (Bouamama, 1989). Texture and Les Craignos are two important associations that were founded in this period. The setting up of a large number of smaller associations, most often youth associations involved at a neighbourhood level, has recently followed their pioneering work in the city of Lille. While Les Craignos has set up a federation of neighbourhoods youth associations, the Fédération des Associations des Jeunes de Quartier (FAJQ), Texture has supported the foundation of a multiethnic immigrant women's association called Femmes d'ici et d'ailleurs.

In Lille, as in Liège and Utrecht, in recent years there has been a strong development of Islamic associations. The Lille Sud mosque is at the forefront of the mobilization of North African Muslims in the north. Its activities are strikingly similar to those of the El Itissam association in Liège. Vertical integration with regional Islamic associations and Paris-based federations, mobilization on educational matters, and the provision of services and activities to the second generation are some of the issues with which the Lille Sud mosque is engaged.

There are two interesting points about the nature of North African political incorporation.

universalistic political inclusion

First, there seems to be a strong generational divide between first- and second-generation collective action. Whereas the first generation relied mostly on ethnic mobilization within trade unions, independent associations and mosques, the second generation tends more towards universalistic political inclusion. This has given rise to some interesting debates among members of North African associations in Lille. Texture has promoted the idea of intergenerational solidarity within the migrant population and has sought to distance itself from narrow forms of ethnic mobilization. In 1989, for instance, it sponsored an electoral list purportedly composed of an aggregate of candidates from migrant communities and socially excluded populations. The mobilizations of France Plus and Espace Intégration are further examples of ethnic mobilizations not necessarily fitting the nature and profile of the organizations in question. In Lille and in the north of France more generally, these two organizations have developed a discursive strategy of republican integration (namely assimilation) into French society, while at the same time activating ethnic boundaries as a basis for political bargaining. This apparent contradiction has been widely discussed in the French literature; it is what Vincent Geisser (1997) tentatively identified as the emergence of a 'republican ethnicity'. Unlike Texture, which has deliberately avoided grounding sociopolitical activism in ethnic identifications, the latter are interesting examples of ethnic mobilization being embedded in discursive strategic use of an assimilationist vocabulary.

Second, the so-called town policy (*la politique de la ville*), which has been implemented as a partnership between national government, regions and municipalities, has provided a number of professional opportunities to individuals formerly involved in immigrant associational life. This policy has created and sustained a demand for leadership within impoverished immigrant neighbourhoods. One can speak here of the institutional production of an immigrant associational life of proximity. The seamy side of the story, however, is that it has increased control over the practices and ideologies of second-generation activists, while weakening the autonomous political action of civil society (Bouamama, 1989).

Utrecht

The Moroccan population in Utrecht consists of 13,595 individuals. Unlike their counterparts in Lille and Liège, Moroccans in Utrecht have been enfranchized for local elections since 1986. The Moroccan community has also been identified as a specific target group for the

national minority policy implemented since 1983. At the Utrecht city level, integration has been under constant consideration for at least two decades. In 1973, a consultative council was created in Utrecht to advise local authorities on community relations issues (Feirabend and Rath, 1996). The *amicales* responded very early on to the opening up of this avenue of participation. In Utrecht, as in several other Dutch cities, the *amicales*, with the support of Moroccan diplomats and through their networks of personal contacts within the Moroccan communities, have been acknowledged as legitimate representatives of the political interests of this population,[11] though for a very short period. After 1976, the *amicales* were vigorously challenged by the creation of a nationwide independent organization of Moroccan workers, the KMAN (van der Valk, 1996).

amicales

Most activists involved in establishing left-wing Moroccan associations in Utrecht have had some initial involvement with the KMAN. This was so for the founders of two very influential associations in Utrecht – AMMU and the KMANU, breakaways from the KMAN. Once the *amicales* had lost their influence in Utrecht (and in the Netherlands in general), AMMU played an important role as policy adviser to the local council and has come to be the most central actor in Utrecht's Moroccan community. AMMU has also stimulated the creation of separate ethnic associations for Moroccan women and for Moroccan youth (PMJU).

The activities of left-wing Moroccan activists in Utrecht raise important questions about the co-optation of elites. The minority policy in Utrecht (and more generally in the Netherlands) has created and sustained an impressive number of social work, multicultural and antiracist institutions and agencies. This has created numerous opportunities for elites, both as professionals and as leaders of ethnic communities.

Minority representation of these institutions by an elite clearly creates a number of non-political opportunities to voice immigrant claims within the mainstream. However, Moroccans have also pursued strategies that challenge the integrationist approach of Utrecht's Moroccan leaders of the secularist left. Among these are forms of ethnic mobilization around regional identities in the cultural field. Rifan Berbers are currently the most active in this area. Their strategy of institution building has steadily confronted the opposition of Moroccan left-wing associations. Ethnoreligious mobilization within Islamic associations is another strategy pursued by Moroccans in Utrecht.[12] As Feirabend and Rath (1996) point out, Utrecht is more reluctant than other Dutch cities to create a space for Islamic institutions within local sociopolitical life. This development is reflected in

the decision to stop funding the educational activities provided by the El Dawa mosque,[13] the biggest mosque in Utrecht.

Over the last year or so, the city of Utrecht has completely reconsidered its policy options in relation to immigrant minority communities. Publication of research the local council commissioned from the University of Utrecht was at the source of a new assessment of the *problématique*. The Burgers Report called for a shift from a minority policy towards corrective measures focused on socioeconomic differences (Burgers et al., 1996). The ensuing debate between the municipality and representatives of ethnic minorities led to the definition of a new policy hinged on the operationalization of the concept of 'interculturalization' – a far cry, however, from the intercultural approach of the city of Liège.

the Burgers Report

One element of this policy, besides its attempt to combat a dualization of urban life along ethnic lines, is a new partnership between ethnic minority self-organization and the municipality. The framework for this relationship had already been defined in a policy report of 1989. In the programme the municipality recently issued, the role of self-organization is identified as a bridge between societal and internal community dynamics. The concept of 'interculturalization' is a central idea in this policy framework seeking to develop a proactive approach to the forming of a social coalition within society (*maatschappelijke coalitievorming*). This reflects an attempt to avoid the separate development of ethnic communities, which was allegedly produced by the earlier minority policy. Indeed, the city of Utrecht's new policy implicitly gives a positive answer to the following questions: Has the minority policy led to the isolation of immigrant minority communities from the mainstream? And was the old policy framework disruptive in terms of social cohesion?

Conclusion

This comparative overview of three case studies has taught us some important lessons about patterns and forms of immigrant political incorporation. We have observed sociopolitical participation in mainstream political institutions, ethnic mobilization and less politically significant internal community dynamics. The minority response the Moroccan communities exemplified revealed the importance of ethnic mobilization within independent ethnic and religious associations, the deployment of civic, youth, gender and neighbourhood mobilization, as well as the involvement of minority candidates in mainstream party politics.

capacity for mobilization

The Islamic groups and associations have shown us that their form of ethnic mobilization may not be temporary. In all three cities, Islamic organizations proved their capacity to attract massive audiences within Moroccan communities and one could contend that the impact of Islamic ethnic mobilization is, in political terms, still in its infancy. Although some Islamic associations of the older generation are resisting Islam being brought into the public sphere, the opposite phenomenon has been growing in significance within Moroccan communities since the mid-1980s.

Though one can, of course, identify more secularized attitudes among the second and third generations, the ethnic mobilization of Islamic associations should not be seen as dependent on cultural and religious values and norms. Islam provides an identity option, the significance of which will depend in the long run on the projects pursued by this youth and by the place open to them within their societies. On the other hand, the secularist left-wing movement of Moroccan workers and students that dominated the stage during the 1970s and 1980s has in the three cities lost its capacity to engage in mass contentious collective action. We have also seen appearing the mobilization of youth, gender, generational and locational identities, which proves that minority communities are internally segmented along a number of consequential divides. These factors of internal division should be seen as being a problem intrinsically, even though they preclude the possibility of uniting resources and energies. Of course, a common immigrant political agenda cross-cutting internal and external ethnic boundaries is, under such circumstances, close to utopia.

In the three case studies, we have seen external institutional forces constrain integrationist forms of political incorporation. We have also seen that local authorities have a number of policy options at hand to deal with the sociopolitical demands of immigrant minority communities. The local authorities of the three cities under review adopted policies of sustained communication with ethnic and multiethnic minority associations (Utrecht, Lille), funding to ethnic and multiethnic associations (Lille, Liège, Utrecht), consultative politics (Liège, Utrecht), and enfranchisement for local elections (Utrecht).[14] The efficiency of these policies partly depends on their cumulation and coordination. However, as the Dutch case study reveals, a consistent, coordinated, multicultural approach still manifests serious difficulties.

This latter indication points out that both the institutional political strategy of incorporation and the minority response have not had far-reaching effects on the collective position of minority communities in the three societies. In other words, while the nature of immigrant's inclusion has diversified, the impact of immigrants' mobilization on a wide number of issues of collective importance has remained extremely weak. The collective position of Moroccans in areas such as education, employment or housing in the three countries, remains an issue of serious concern and the same holds true for the legal position of Moroccan women. Although Miller (1981) was partly right in saying immigrants and their offspring are neither voiceless nor powerless, the reality seems to fall short of his optimistic view of foreign workers as an 'emerging political force'. One must conclude that the social, political and economic emancipation of ethnic minority groups is still heavily dependent on the implementation of liberal political agendas from the majorities. The experience that Moroccans share with other ethnic minorities in northwest Europe leads to another more general conclusion. Although their demographic share is massively increasing within European urban populations, this has not yet been reflected in the most formal political institutions in which, collectively, they remain under-represented.

weak position

Notes

1 One should, however, call for cautious use of the classical Marshallian distinction of citizenship rights in three spheres: civic, social and political (Marshall, 1950). In many circumstances, political activities are not dependent on the possession of formal political rights. The civil and social rights open to immigrants play in many cases as a legal juridical protection to their extra-parliamentary political activities (see also Miller, 1981: 15-20).

2 On this particular point, the situation for foreign communities in continental Europe is substantially different from that in Britain, where foreign residents who are citizens of Commonwealth countries are fully enfranchized.

3 Withol de Wenden and Hargreaves (1993: 2) rightly note that this option has always been more than a theoretical possibility for foreign residents even in countries implementing *jus sanguinis*-types of naturalization regulations.

4 There are some notable exceptions to the rule, including among others de Graaf (1986); de Graaf, Penninx, Stoové (1988) and Van der Valk (1996).

5 Use is made in this research of a qualitative methodology based on the selection of three urban sites of empirical work in three different countries. The three urban contexts were chosen in the three countries with the largest Moroccan emigrant communities. Among the 1.1 million Moroccan emigrants settled in Europe, almost half are permanent residents in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. I have selected three cities that attracted significant numbers of immigrant workers in the period of massive immigration from the Mediteranean (1959-74). It should also be mentioned that they are university cities, which is a relevant consideration given that the migration of Moroccan students towards European universities has played an important role in the sociopolitical organization of these communities.

6 In Begium, the most formal aspects of political participation (the right to vote and to stand as a candidate) are dependent on the possession of Belgian nationality.

7 Historically, the first attempts to create collective infrastructures for Moroccan workers came from the government of the country of origin. These resulted in the establishment of a European-wide network of *amicales* (friendship societies of Moroccan merchants and workers). Their role consisted of organizing political control over the Moroccan communities. The very undemocratic activities of the *amicales* supported by Moroccan embassies and consulates have, in many middle sized European cities, triggered the same sort of fierce conflicts that were being activated in the same period in bigger cities like Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris (van der Valk, 1996).

8 The mosque of El Mouahidin early on refused to make any reference to the 'the Commander of the Faithfuls', King Hassan II of Moroccó, during the traditional Friday speech (Saïdi and Aghion, 1987).

9 Liège is one of the few Belgian cities with an Islamic cemetery within a Belgian one. The high demand for burial in this cemetery can no longer be handled, thus the request for a new Islamic cemetery in the region of Liège.

10 Farid Sellani, a young Algerian, running on the list of former and re-elected Mayor Pierre Mauroy, has been appointed the delegate to support the 'association's projects'.

11 One of Utrecht's first *amicale* activists, and later co-founder of the controversial Union of Moroccan Mosques in the Netherlands (UMMON), recently reflected on this period in a chapter of a book in which the leader of the Dutch right-wing party VVD held conversations with minority leaders (see, Bolkestein, 1997: 45-65).

12 There are six mosques in Utrecht, which can be classified in three groups: (1) the mosques controlled by the coalition of Moroccan consular agents, the *amicales* and the Union of Moroccan Mosques of the Netherlands (UMMON), (2) the El Dawa mosque of the Worldwide Islamic League and (3) a group of smaller independent and neighbourhood mosques.

13 In the Municipal Department for Welfare's 1997 programme, this decision is justified as follows: 'The project has been funded for two years (...) Although it answers a need, we are not ready to extend the subsidies. There is no more funding for 1997. It is important that we do not provide structural funding to educational activities organized by people who are not independent of religious organizations' (rough translation of *Ontwerp Welzijnsprogramma*, 1997, City of Utrecht, Department of Welfare).

14 Although the enfranchisement of foreigners is a prerogative of national authorities, local decision-makers can influence political participation through, for instance, policies of information in the languages of minorities.

For references please consult the bibliography of the book in which this article was originally published. (see List of sources, page 609)

Integration and nations: the nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe[1]

Adrian Favell

The proliferation of integration studies in Europe is, according to the sociologist and philosopher Adrian Favell, part and parcel of a wider 'nation-state-society' paradigm. Those who work within this paradigm see the nation state as the principal organising unit of society. Moreover, they see society as a bounded, functional whole. The state achieves this by creating policies and institutions. Favell has doubts about whether this 'nation-state-society' paradigm is still sufficiently appropriate for understanding the evolving relationship between immigrants and their host context. This article is a strong plea for research that goes beyond such crude and fairly static entities such as nation-states.

integration

Despite its somewhat old-fashioned, functionalist air, 'integration' is still the most popular way of conceptualizing the developing relationship between old European nation-states and their growing non-European, 'ethnic' immigrant populations. It is also widely used to frame the advocacy of political means for dealing with the consequences of immigration in the post-World War II period. Many similar, difficult-to-define concepts can be used to describe the process of social change that occurs when immigrants are 'integrated' into their new host society. But none occurs with the frequency or all-encompassing scope of the idea of integration across such a broad range of West European countries. This fact continues to decisively structure policy research and policy debate on these subjects in Europe.

The wide and varied ordinary language usages of the term are linked to a deeper association of the concept with a longstanding intellectual *paradigm* at the root of modern western society's conception of itself. This paradigm roots applied social policy thinking in the idea of the 'nation-state' as the principal organizing unit of society, with all the epistemological assumptions and political constraints that this term implies. By using the term, writers continue