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Present-day English constructions with *chance(s)* in Talmy's greater modal system and beyond

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Abstract
Based on qualitative and quantitative corpus research, this chapter argues that constructions with *chance(s)* in Present-day English enrich Talmy's (1988) greater modal system in various ways. Firstly, in their modal uses they are equivalent to core modal auxiliaries and encode especially dynamic and epistemic meanings. We maintain that the partial decategorialization of *chance* allows for more fine-grained expression of modal meanings by bringing in constructional templates that incorporate slots for potential premodification, as in *have a good chance of* V-*ing*. Secondly, they can express caused-modal meanings, in which case a causative operator is added to a basic modal meaning. Finally, structures with *chance(s)* also exceed Talmy's (1988) greater modal system, as they can still be used lexically, which core modals no longer can.

1. Introduction

This chapter deals with Present-day English constructions with the noun *chance(s)*, which is a semiotic noun or "shell noun", i.e. an abstract noun that is used to "characteriz[e] and perspectiviz[e] complex chunks of information which are expressed in clauses or even longer stretches of text" (Schmid 2000: 14). More specifically, it focusses on constructions in which the content of this shell noun is either explicitly or implicitly present in the co-text, i.e. the actual words surrounding this node, by means of a complement. This complement can be clausal, taking the form of an *of*-gerundial clause in (1) and a *to*-infinitival clause in (2), or phrasal, taking the form of a prepositional phrase whose noun phrase complement contains an action nominal, as in (3).

(1) Having been kicked out of the Spanish Cup in the early rounds by Figueres, of the second division, they now have only a mathematical *chance* of winning la liga, which is to say no chance at all. (WB, sunnow)[1]
(2) I thought you would die and I'd never get the *chance* to tell you I was s-s-sorry. (WB, brbooks)
(3) Last November's referendum on the method of electing the president scuppered his *chances* for the job – leaving it to a future freely elected parliament to select the new head of state. (WB, brspok)

[1] See Section 2 for more information on the Collins Wordbanks*Online* corpus (WB) used for this study.

Looking at the etymology of this noun tells us that it was borrowed from Old French and is attested in English from Early Middle English onwards. The oldest meanings of *chance* listed in the OED*Online* are "[t]he falling out or happening of events; the way in which things fall out; fortune; case"; "[a]n opportunity that comes in any one's way. Often const. of"; "[a] possibility or probability of anything happening: as distinct from a certainty: often in plural, with a number expressed." The OED also points out that *chance* is often used in phrases, such as "[t]o stand a (fair, good) chance"; "Is there any chance of….?"; "[t]o be in with a chance". Our study will show that the earliest – happenstance – meaning of *chance* is very infrequent in the data studied, and that *chance* is indeed found in a number of recurrent patterns or phrases. For a detailed account of the diachrony of constructions with *chance*, the reader is referred to Van linden (Forthc.).

The examples in (1) to (3) not only illustrate different types of complements found with *chance*, they also exemplify, we argue in this chapter, three distinct uses, viz. lexical, grammatical and caused-modal use. In (1) *chance* shows lexical use, in which statistical probability is at stake. In (2) *I'd never get the chance* expresses the dynamic modal meaning of participant-imposed impossibility as the *I*-person would never be able to apologize. In (3) it is said that the referendum has decreased the likelihood of him getting the job of president. Rather than expressing a modal meaning, this is a caused-modal use, in which *scupper his chances* adds a (semantically) negative causative operator to the basic epistemic meaning. On the basis of these observations, we put forward that constructions with *chance(s)* enrich the greater modal system (cf. Talmy 1988) in three ways (cf. Van linden & Brems 2017). Firstly, they expand the inventory of, mostly, epistemic and dynamic modal expressions, as they appear to be functionally equivalent to modal auxiliaries. Secondly, they also go beyond the functional reach of core modal auxiliaries by still allowing lexical uses, as shown in (1), which is no longer possible for the core modals. Thirdly, they can express 'caused modality' in augmented event structures that add a (positive/negative) causative operator as in (3). More generally, this work on constructions with *chance(s)* fits in with earlier work on the grammaticalization of constructions with semiotic nouns such as *doubt* (Davidse, De Wolf & Van linden 2015), *question* (Davidse & De Wolf 2012), *way* (Davidse et al. 2014), *fear* (Brems 2015), *wonder* (Gentens et al. 2016; Van linden, Davidse & Matthijs 2016) and *need* (Van linden, Davidse & Brems 2011), which combine with either complements or relative clauses and have been shown to have developed modal uses over time.

For the basic distinction between lexical and grammatical uses of constructions with *chance(s)* we use the criteria proposed by Boye & Harder (2007, 2012) in terms of primary versus secondary discourse status, as implemented in the studies on semiotic nouns referred to above as well. They argue that lexicalization and lexical status involve discourse primariness, whereas grammaticalization and grammatical status involve coded discourse secondariness. This will be explained in more detail in Section 3.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and methods used for the synchronic corpus study underlying this chapter. Section 3 discusses how we distinguished between the three main expression types observed, i.e. lexical, grammatical and caused-modal uses, drawing on Boye & Harder's (2007, 2012) criteria used to tell between lexical and grammatical expressions. Comparing the three main uses of constructions with *chance(s)*, we will also focus on the role of polarity in grammaticalization, and on reflexes of decategorialization of the noun *chance* in grammatical uses (cf. Hopper 1991). Sections 4 to 6 will then home in on the three main uses separately, providing in-depth qualitative and quantitative discussions of, respectively, modal, caused-modal and lexical(ized) uses. In these sections we will use the term 'verbo-nominal patterns' to refer to constructions in which *chance(s)* together with a verb brings in a complement. This can be the case in modalized grammatical uses (e.g. *get the chance* in (2)) as well as lexicalized uses in which *chance* is incorporated into a complex predicate (e.g. *take a chance*; see Section 6.2). Constructions in which the semiotic noun *chance(s)* itself brings in the complement will be referred to as regular uses when they are lexical (see Section 6.4). Section 7 wraps up with some overall conclusions.

2. Data and methods

The dataset for this chapter is drawn from the British subcorpora of Collins Wordbank*Online* (henceforth WB), excluding brregnews, i.e. British regional newspapers like the *Belfast Telegraph* and *The Irish Times*. More precisely, we took two random samples of 250 tokens each targeting the lemma *chance*, one from the spoken and one from the written British English subcorpora. Table 1 gives an overview of the specific subcorpora that were used, specifying the total number of tokens per subcorpus and their contents. For each of the examples given in this chapter, we will mention the subcorpus it comes from, using the labels in the first column.

Subcorpus	**Total number of tokens**	**Description**
brbooks	76,062,449	Fiction, Non-Fiction
sunnow	51,805,654	Sun, News of the World
times	46,759,194	Times, Sunday Times
brmags	16,349,388	Magazines
brnews	6,006,167	Newspapers
brephem	4,977,155	Ephemera: Pamphlets, Brochures, Tickets etc.
brspok	41,403,450	Transcribed Speech: British Spoken Corpus: Cobuild, BBC World Service

Table 1: British subcorpora in WB used

It is clear from Table 1 that for the British subcorpora the written data outweigh the spoken ones. This holds true for WB as a whole with written data of various kinds making up 88.88% of the corpus and spoken data only 11.12%.

The corpus query targeted the lemma *chance*, thus netting in both singular and plural uses of the noun. We manually sorted the data keeping only semiotic or shell uses of the nouns that have complements, which are either overtly expressed as in (4) and (6), or retrievable from the co(n)text (5):

(4) They saw her entry into the war as an opportunity to pursue their own interests rather than as a *chance* to devise a new alliance strategy. (WB, brephem)
(5) Mr Bush is being criticised for not having pursued the Iraqi leader when he had the *chance*. (WB, brspok)
(6) If you are in debt and under stress, the *chances* are that your personal life is suffering. (WB, brbooks)

In (5) the implied complement is *to pursue the Iraqi leader* and can be retrieved from the preceding co-text. Complements can take the form of a *to*-infinitive (4), *that*-clause (6), *of*-gerundial (1), or preposition + action nominal (3) among others.

We excluded hits in which *chance* functions as a nominal classifier, as in *a chance finding* in (7) for instance, as well as hits in which *chance* was incorrectly tagged as a noun but was in fact a verb form, as in (8). In addition, we excluded phrases such as *by chance* (9).

(7) There were no differences except for clotting function, though this may be a *chance* finding. (WB, brmags)

(8) I didn't want to *chance* losing my kids. (WB, brspok)
(9) If, *by chance*, anyone disagreed with this, they were executed or sent to a labour camp, under Joseph Stalin, or declared mentally ill and put in an asylum under Leonid Brezhnev. (WB, brspok)

The remaining two sets of 250 relevant examples each were then classified into three main expression types, i.e. grammatical(ized), lexical(ized) and caused-modal uses, to which we will turn immediately below.

3. General overview: tripartite classification

This section sets out to explain the criteria used to distinguish between lexical and grammatical uses of constructions with *chance(s)* based on Boye & Harder (2007, 2012), as well as the recognition criteria for caused-modal uses, comparing also the frequencies of these three uses in the corpus data. In addition, it will concentrate on two aspects of grammaticalization discussed in the literature, i.e. the role of negative polarity as a trigger for the development of modal meaning, and effects of decategorialization The grammatical uses of constructions with *chance(s)* concern the expression of modal meanings, mostly dynamic and epistemic, with the possibility of the former getting a deontic inference, and some examples being vague between dynamic and epistemic meanings (see Section 4).

For the distinction between lexical and grammatical uses, we used the criteria proposed by Boye & Harder (2007, 2012) in terms of primary versus secondary discourse status. They argue that lexicalization and lexical status involve discourse primariness, whereas grammaticalization and grammatical status involve coded discourse secondariness. "Grammar is constituted by expressions that by linguistic convention are ancillary and as such discursively secondary in relation to other expressions" (Boye & Harder 2012: 2). As opposed to lexical expressions, grammatical ones, such as modal auxiliaries, are "noncarriers of the main point serving instead an ancillary communicative purpose as secondary or backgrounded elements" (Boye & Harder 2012: 6-7). In keeping with Davidse, De Wolf & Van linden (2015: 26), we argue that because of their discourse primariness lexical uses of *chance(s)* are inherently "addressable" (Boye & Harder 2007: 581–585; 2012: 7–8) for instance by means of tags, *really*-queries and *yes/no*-questions as shown in (10a)-(10c) respectively. Example (4) from Section 2 is repeated here as (10):

(10) They saw her entry into the war as an opportunity to pursue their own interests rather than as a chance to devise a new alliance strategy. (WB, brephem)
(10a) It was a chance to devise a new allegiance, wasn't it?
(10b) It was a chance to devise a new allegiance strategy. — Really?
(10c) Was it a chance to devise a new allegiance strategy?

In (10) the notion of chance is discourse primary as it is the main point of the communication to see whether something should be qualified as an opportunity or a chance. Obviously, the co-text is very important in this analysis.

By contrast *The chances are* in (11), which repeats (6), is secondary in the discourse compared to the proposition it modifies. It cannot be queried by a *yes/no*-question, nor tagged, as shown in (11a) to (11c):

(11) If you are in debt and under stress, the *chances* are that your personal life is suffering. (WB, brbooks)
(11a) Are the chances that your personal life is suffering?
(11b) ?The chances are that your personal life is suffering. — Really?
(11c) *The chances are that your personal life is suffering, aren't they?

In (11) *the chances are* modifies the following lexical content, which is the main point of the communication, by assessing the likelihood with which it will occur (see Section 4 on modalized expressions). In (11b) the query by means of *really?* is as such not impossible, but it is important to note that it does not target the matrix with *chances are*, but rather the contents of the complement clause: would your personal life really be suffering in these circumstances?

It should be noted that the distinction between lexical and grammatical use is not always clear-cut. That is, some cases had better be analysed as bridging contexts (Evans and Wilkins 2000: 550), i.e. examples that contextually support both a lexical and a grammatical reading. A case in point is (12).

(12) We gave it everything we had but it was not quite enough. We had a *chance* to win it but there are no excuses. (WB, times)

In a lexical reading, the chance referred to in (12) refers to the football players having a chance to score the winning goal, and this is the most important information. In a grammatical reading, *chance* refers more generally to the whole game offering the opportunity to win and the sentence is interpreted as the speaker assessing, in hindsight, that their team could have won (epistemic judgement), or the speaker indicating that their team had the capacities to win (dynamic expression), but unfortunately did not succeed. For a more detailed discussion of these modal notions, the reader is referred to Section 4. As indicated in Table 2 below, bridging contexts are very infrequent in our datasets, and will hence not be discussed in further detail.

The third main type of use we distinguish in this chapter is that of caused-modal uses, as in (13) (cf. Van linden & Brems 2017):

(13) Chairman John Yorkston has admitted Richard Gough's plan to draft in Archie Knox as his right-hand man has boosted his *chances* of being Pars gaffer. (WB, sunnow)

In these patterns a (positive or negative) causative operator is added to a basic modal meaning. In (13) Richard Gough's plan to draft in Archie Know as his right-hand man makes it more likely that he will become the manager of Dunfermline Athletic Football Club (or "Pars gaffer"). Rather than epistemically assessing the likelihood of the propositional content coded in the complement, as in (11), examples like (13) make a statement on how to *increase* the likelihood of something. As will be explained in greater detail in Section 5, we do not consider caused-modal uses to be grammatical proper.

Table 2 below presents the quantitative instantiation of the three main expression types in the spoken and written datasets studied, which will be discussed in more detail in Sections 4 to 6 below. In addition to describing the semantic and discursive features of structures with *chance*, these sections will also look for correlations of the three expression types with specific constructional properties, such as the presence of a larger unit *chance* takes part in (e.g. *have a chance*), the formal type of complement, and modification of the noun *chance*, as well as polarity value preferences.

OVERVIEW	Spoken		Written		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Modal	117	46.80	87	34.80	204	40.80
Caused-modal	41	16.40	54	21.60	95	19.00
Lexical(ized)	90	36.00	108	43.20	198	39.60
Bridging modal/lexical	2	0.80	1	0.40	3	0.60
Total	250	100.00	250	100.00	500	100.00

Table 2: The distribution of types of uses of *chance* in spoken and written UK English

Table 2 shows that there are more modal uses in the spoken data. In fact, Fisher's exact tests indicate that the share of modal uses is significantly larger in the spoken dataset compared to the written data (p=.008). This might indicate that the grammaticalization of *chance(s)* in spoken language precedes changes in the written mode. This is in keeping with Halliday (1978), Chafe (2003) and Du Bois (2003), who have all singled out casual conversational language as an important locus of language change and innovation because it is less subject to overly conscious forms of monitoring or engineering. The shares of caused-modal and lexical(ized) uses do not differ significantly across the two language modes studied. Whenever the mode variable is found not to reach statistical significance, the findings for the two datasets will be conflated in a single table in Sections 4 to 6.

We now turn to the role of polarity in the development of grammatical meanings in patterns with *chance*. Whereas previous research on other semiotic nouns has shown that negative polarity is often an important trigger for their grammaticalization (see among others Davidse et al. 2014 on *no way*; Davidse & De Wolf 2012 on *no question*; Davidse, De Wolf & Van linden 2015 on *no doubt*; and Van linden, Davidse & Matthijs 2016 on *no wonder*), this seems far less the case for constructions with *chance(s)*. Table 3 shows the percentages of the three main uses related to polarity.

Spoken	Positive polarity		Negative polarity		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Modal	81	69.23	36	30.77	117	100.00
Caused-modal	35	85.37	6	14.63	41	100.00
Lexical(ized)	69	76.67	21	23.33	90	100.00
Bridging modal/lexical	0	0.00	2	100.00	2	100.00
Total	185	74.00	65	26.00	250	100.00

Table 3: Polarity values among types of uses of *chance* in spoken UK English

Written	Positive polarity		Negative polarity		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Modal	64	73.56	23	26.44	87	100.00
Caused-modal	44	81.48	10	18.52	54	100.00
Lexical(ized)	94	87.04	14	12.96	108	100.00
Bridging modal/lexical	1	100.00	0	0	1	100.00
Total	203	81.20	47	18.80	250	100.00

Table 4: Polarity values among types of uses of *chance* in written UK English

If we first compare Tables 3 and 4, we see that the shares of positive and negative polarity do not differ so much across the two datasets studied. This is validated by a Fisher's exact test; the p-value does not reach the .05 level of significance (p=.06). If we then home in on the difference in polarity preferences between the basic uses, we find that – if we disregard the infrequent bridging contexts – modal uses show significantly higher rates of negative polarity than lexical(ized) and caused-modal uses (Fisher's exact p=. 004 for spoken and written data together). Yet, compared to other semiotic nouns such as *wonder*, *doubt* and *way*, the association between negative polarity and grammatical meaning is far weaker in the case of *chance*. Van linden (Forthc) shows that this observation holds for the diachronic development of constructions with *chance* as well.

A second aspect of grammaticalization we consider relevant to our corpus study is one that has received considerable attention in grammaticalization research, also beyond the study of semiotic nouns in English, i.e. Hopper's (1991) principle of decategorialization. This principle measures the 'degree' of grammaticality or grammaticalization of an item or construction; it refers to the fact that as a noun or lexical verb grammaticalizes they typically lose (some of) the morphological properties associated with their original lexical category. For countable nouns this concerns the singular/plural contrast, but also

the possibility to be premodified by adjectives. The principle hence predicts that in its lexical use *chance(s)* still acts as a real noun that can be modified by adjectives and can appear in the singular and plural form. This is motivated by the categoriality principle (Hopper & Thompson 1984), which states that categories, i.e. word classes, should be related to their basic discourse functions. In this view, nouns are viewed as the prototypical instantiation of the basic discourse functions of identifying referents and their morphosyntactic properties are attributable to these functions. As we will see in Sections 6.1 to 6.4, lexical uses do indeed appear quite easily with a variety of adjectives and we also find singular count, plural count as well as uncount uses of *chance*.

As will be argued in Section 4, the premodifying adjectives that appear in grammatical uses are restricted to degree modifiers such as *better*, *good* and *fair*. They are compatible with and can be said to further reinforce the modal value expressed rather than attest to *chance* still being a noun and hence lexical in nature (cf. Davidse & Van linden 2019). Figure 1 shows that in the three main uses distinguished here *chance* is premodified in less than 30% of the cases. This figure includes data from both datasets studied, as the shares of examples showing premodification do not differ significantly across spoken and written mode (Fisher's exact p=.6). Interestingly, our data show that modalized expressions may very well show premodification of *chance*; the difference in frequency with lexical(ized) uses is not statistically significant (Fisher's exact p=.1). It will be shown in Sections 4 to 6 that it is not the frequency of premodification that matters in relation to the type of use, but rather the semantic nature of the premodifiers.



Figure 1: Premodification of *chance* across the basic uses in spoken and written UK English

Similarly, in the context of the grammaticalization of size noun expressions such as *a lot of* and *a bunch of*, Brems (2011: 194-201) showed that both lexical uses and grammatical quantifier uses occur with premodifying adjectives, seemingly undermining decategorialization and grammaticalization claims. However, the premodification patterns differ systematically and are reduced to degree modifiers like *whole* for quantifier uses, whereas lexical uses appear with all kinds of premodification. It was argued that this partial decategorialization displayed by quantifier uses does not detract from their being grammatical and that this potential for restricted premodification actually enriches the quantifier paradigm. In almost the same vein, Brems (2011: 191) argued that plural size noun quantifiers such as *lots of* and *heaps of* have lost their true plural meaning and instead reinforce the grammatical quantifier semantics. This also goes for *chance* and *chances*, which refer to a single chance and more than one chance respectively in their lexical use, whereas in their grammatical uses this functional contrast is lost.

In sum, we argue that modal constructions with *chance* and *chances* do show at least partial decategorialization, which seems in keeping with the idea of ongoing grammaticalization processes.

4. Modalized expressions

In the first type of constructions to be dealt with in more detail, *chance(s)* is used in modalized expressions which convey basically dynamic or epistemic meaning, or which are vague between these two meanings, as discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 will show that these expressions show less variety in terms of constructional properties than the caused-modal and lexical(ized) ones discussed in Sections 5 and 6.

4.1 Types of modal meaning

Patterns with *chance* are found to express different modal notions in the Present-day English data studied; Table 5 details the quantitative instantiation of these in the spoken and written datasets. It is clear that the different types of modal notions take up similar shares across the two mode types studied; Fisher's exact tests confirm there are no statistically significant differences between the two types for any modal notion. We can see that epistemic and dynamic modality account for equal shares of about 40%.

Modalized expressions	Spoken		Written		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Dynamic	49	41.88	36	41.38	85	41.67
Dynamic + deontic	6	5.13	2	2.30	8	3.92
Dynamic/epistemic	14	11.97	12	13.79	26	12.75
Epistemic	44	37.61	36	41.38	80	39.22
Epistemic + volitional	3	2.56	1	1.15	4	1.96
Epistemic/polar	1	0.85	0	0.00	1	0.49
TOTAL	117	100.00	87	100.00	204	100.00

Table 5: The types of modal meanings expressed by structures with *chance*

Epistemic modality has been defined as involving the speaker's (or someone else's) assessment of a propositional content in terms of likelihood. Epistemic expressions thus convey the degree of probability of a specific propositional content, as assessed by a modal source (cf. Palmer 1979: ch. 3, 2001: 24–35; Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994: 179–180; Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 81; Nuyts 2006: 6). An example with *chance* is given in (14).

(14) It [i.e. NATO] has spoken of extending the hand of friendship to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It has declared that it'll take account of legitimate Soviet security worries. And there's every *chance* the NATO summit will unveil a revised military strategy for the Alliance. (WB, brspok)

In (14), *chance* is found in the verbo-nominal pattern (VNP) *there* BE (det) CHANCE,[2] and the utterance can be paraphrased as 'the NATO summit will most likely unveil a revised military strategy for the Alliance.' The speaker thus uses the pattern with *chance* to give their assessment of the future NATO summit unveiling a revised military strategy for the Alliance in terms of likelihood. Note that the

[2] In the rendering of matrix patterns, (det) stands for (determiner).

meaning of (high degree of) probability is not the main point of uttering (14); epistemic assessments are always ancillary to the propositional content they apply to.

In a few cases (2%, see Table 5), we found epistemic meanings with an implicature of volitionality. In (15), for example, the speaker not only estimates the occurrence of Stevie going in January as impossible, they also imply that they do not want that to happen. This implicature very much hinges on the ensuing co-text, which explicitly refers to the club's intentions. In our data, it is restricted to constructions showing negative polarity.

(15) But chief executive Rick Parry is backing boss Rafael Benitez to lead a drive for honours that will convince local boy Gerrard to stay with the club he has supported since he was a boy. Parry said: "There is no *chance* of Stevie going in January. That just won't happen. Our intention is that we will never let him go." (WB, sunnow)

One example presents a special case of negative polarity construction in which *no chance* is not incorporated in a larger unit, and is used as an anaphoric adverbial which serves as a response to a preceding speech act, cf. (16).

(16) "But so are you two You two will get together" — "Oh yes" — "and you'll say Right I want this and he'll say *No chance*." — "No chance. We can't do it. That's it." (WB, brspok)

No chance thus functions as an emphatic variant to the negative response item *no* (cf. Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 849; Brems & Van linden 2018; Van linden forthc.). Uses like in (16) express the same basic meaning of epistemic impossibility; they are termed 'epistemic/polar' in Table 5 and account for a mere 0.50%.

In addition to epistemic modality, modalized structures with *chance* are found to express dynamic meaning in over 40% of the cases (see Table 5). Whereas the definition of epistemic modality given above is fairly uncontroversial, the category of dynamic modality is not generally recognized; for example, it is conflated with deontic modality in the two-way classification between root and epistemic modality (e.g. Coates 1983; Sweetser 1990). In those accounts that do include it as a separate basic modal category, it has received both narrow and broad definitions. The traditional definition is a narrow one, involving the ascription of an ability or capacity to the subject participant of a clause, as in *Jones can speak Spanish* (see von Wright 1951: 28; see Depraetere and Reed [2006: 281–282] for an overview of the relevant literature). In a broader, more recent definition, dynamic modality is taken to apply to all indications of abilities/possibilities, or needs/necessities inherent in agents or, more generally, participants of actions (which are not necessarily syntactic subjects) or in situations (Palmer 1979: 3–4, ch. 5–6, 1990: ch. 5–6; Perkins 1983: 11–12; Nuyts 2006; Van linden 2012: 12–16). What is common to both definitions is that this type of modality does not involve an attitudinal assessment (e.g. of the speaker); rather, the abilities/possibilities or needs/necessities are indicated on the basis of grounds that are internal to (the participants in) the situation. This chapter adopts the broader definition, which applies in (17).

(17) "It's great for us," Richardson said. "It's been well documented that the club's struggling for cash and I'm just pleased we've got the *chance* to test ourselves against Premiership opponents here." (WB, times)

In (17), the opportunity for the club to test themselves against Premiership opponents certainly does not reside in the physical abilities of the players, but rather in the external circumstances – or the context of the utterance – that is, decisions on the calendar of the soccer season. The VNP HAVE (GOT) (det) CHANCE can here be paraphrased by the semi-modal *be able to*: 'I'm just pleased we're able to test ourselves against Premiership opponents here.'

In about 13% of the cases (see Table 5), *chance* occurs in VNPs that are vague between epistemic and dynamic meanings. Semantically vague examples are different from bridging context, which involve semantic ambiguity (see Section 3 above), in that they involve "two or more semantic features *simultaneously* playing a role in the interpretation of a structure: grasping the meaning of such a structure involves incorporating two or more different semantic features into one global interpretation" (Willemse 2007: 562). The relevant cases here could be interpreted epistemically and dynamically at once. Example (18) is a case in point.

(18) He knew he was being followed. Since he was quite unable to run he had no *chance* of outstripping his pursuer, so he resigned himself to imminent recapture. (WB, brbooks)

In (18), the same paraphrase proposed for (17) works ('he was not able to outstrip his pursuer'), but at the same time another paraphrase with the semi-modal *be likely to* also seems to adequately capture the meaning of HAVE (det) CHANCE here: 'he was unlikely to outstrip his pursuer.'

Finally, there are a small number of cases in which the basic modal meaning is dynamic, but in which the co-text triggers an additional deontic implicature (about 4 % in Table 5). Deontic modality has traditionally been associated with the notions of permission and obligation (e.g. von Wright 1951: 36; Lyons 1977: 823–841; Kratzer 1978: 111; Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 81). While more recent approaches have argued to restrict the category to purely conceptual meanings related to the desirability of a situation, i.e. an attitudinal assessment on the basis of SoA-external grounds (Nuyts et al. 2010; Van linden & Verstraete 2011), this chapter will include directive notions like obligation and permission under the label of deontic modality. It is the latter notion that is strongly implied in example (19) below, especially because of its preceding co-text.

(19) "What about erm do you think while you were at school there was anything that you weren't allowed to do because you were a girl?" — "Mm. as well we had the *chance* to play football and we had a" — "Oh right" — "girls' football team and er it was really good." (WB, ukspok)

In (19), the pattern with *chance* indicates what the girls were able to do within the circumstances at school (they had the opportunity to play football), but because the preceding question explicitly asks about instances of absence of permission, a directive-deontic notion, the pattern HAVE (det) CHANCE here also comes to imply the notion of permission. Note that the speaker reports here on the existence of permission; they do not grant this permission themselves. That is, we are dealing here with objective deontic modality rather than subjective deontic modality (cf. Verstraete 2001).

4.2 Constructional properties

Interestingly, the data indicate that the types of modal notions expressed by verbo-nominal patterns with *chance* discussed above correlate with certain constructional characteristics, such as the type of VNP (or matrix construction), the formal types of complement, polarity value preferences, and types of premodifiers. As the spoken and written datasets did not show statistically significant differences in terms of the distribution of modal notions (Table 5), the tables in this section conflate the two datasets, with a total of 204 examples.

A first observation is that the 204 examples are realized by just five VNPs, which differ in terms of specialization for modal subtype, as evident from Table 6. The pattern (the) CHANCES *are*, for example, is used in epistemic expressions only, whereas GET (det) CHANCE is restricted to dynamic expressions (with or without deontic inference). The most frequent patterns, HAVE (GOT) (det) CHANCE and *there* BE/SEEM (det) CHANCE are also the most versatile ones. In addition to five VNPs, the string *no* CHANCE is also attested without a verb and without overt complement in expressions that combine epistemic meaning with other types of meaning.

VNP	dynamic	Dynamic + deontic	Dynamic/ epistemic	Epistemic	Epistemic + volitional	Epistemic/ polar	Total
(the) CHANCES *are*	—	—	—	11	—	—	11
GET (det) CHANCE	12	3	—	—	—	—	15
HAVE (GOT) (det) CHANCE	69	3	20	18	—	—	110
STAND (det) CHANCE	1	—	2	4	—	—	7
there BE/SEEM (det) CHANCE	3	2	3	47	2	—	57
no CHANCE	—	—	1	—	2	1	4
Total	85	8	26	80	4	1	204

Table 6: VNPs of modalized expressions with *chance* in spoken and written UK English

If we now turn to the formal types of complement found for each modal notion expressed, as detailed in Table 7, we can draw conclusions similar to those on the distribution of VNPs across modal subtypes. *That*-clauses specialize in epistemic expressions, while *to*-infinitives are restricted to expressions that are (at least) dynamic in meaning. More versatile complement types include *of*-gerundial clauses and *of*-prepositional phrases whose noun phrase complement refers to an event or a propositional content. In about 7% of the cases and across many modal meanings, the complement is not overtly expressed, but can be inferred from the co-text (see example (5) above).

Modalized expressions	*that*-clause	*to*-inf	*of* V-*ing*	*of*-PP (event/ prop)	*for*-PP (event)	*on*-PP (event)	implied	Total
Dynamic	—	66	9	2	1	—	7	85
Dynamic + deontic	—	6	1	1	—	—	—	8
Dynamic/epistemic	—	4	17	2	—	—	3	26
Epistemic	34	—	26	18	—	1	1	80
Epistemic + volitional	—	—	1	1	—	—	2	4
Epistemic/polar	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
TOTAL	34	76	55	24	1	1	14	204

Table 7: Types of complements in modalized VPNs with *chance* in spoken and written UK English

Furthermore, the data point to two correlations between modal subtype and polarity value of the modalized expressions with *chance*, i.e. the two least frequent modal notions only occur in negative polarity contexts, cf. Table 8. In the case of epistemic + volitional uses (e.g. (15) above), the combination with negative polarity is statistically significant (Fisher's exact p=.006) compared with other modal subtypes. All the other types of modal meanings occur far more frequently (about 73%) in positive than in negative polarity contexts.

Finally, as referred to in Section 3 above, the premodifiers found with *chance* in modalized expressions convey quantification or degree modification of the overall modal meaning expressed (cf. Davidse & Van linden 2019 on *wonder*). Frequent examples include the indefinite quantifiers *little* and *more*, and the evaluative adjectives *good*, *better*, *fair* and *real*.

Modalized expressions	Positive polarity		Negative polarity		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Dynamic	62	72.94	23	27.06	85	100.00
Dynamic + deontic	7	87.50	1	12.50	8	100.00
Dynamic/epistemic	17	65.38	9	34.62	26	100.00
Epistemic	59	73.75	21	26.25	80	100.00
Epistemic + volitional	0	0.00	4	100.00	4	100.00
Epistemic/polar	0	0.00	1	100.00	1	100.00
TOTAL	145	71.08	59	28.92	204	100.00

Table 8: Polarity values in modalized expressions with *chance* in spoken and written UK English

5. Expressions of caused modality

While patterns with *chance* are found to be polysemous in the modal domain, expressing a wide range of grammatical, qualificational meanings similarly to English modal auxiliaries (Section 4), they also exceed the functional range of the modal auxiliaries in that they are found in what we call "caused modality" constructions (cf. Van linden & Brems 2017). Again, we can distinguish a number of semantic subtypes within this use, which will be discussed in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we will home in on the constructional properties of the types of caused-modal uses found.

5.1 Chance *and Talmy's greater modal system*

The category of "caused modality" constructions has been recently proposed by Van linden & Brems (2017) to refer to constructions which add a causative operator to a basic modal meaning. An example is given in (20).

(20) The Welsh star [i.e. Ryan Giggs] added: "When I get the children to Manchester, I'd like them to meet all the United lads – it'll give the kids a *chance* to touch people they'd only before seen on TV." (WB, sunnow)

The pattern GIVE (det) CHANCE in (20) shows an augmented event structure compared to dynamic utterances like (17) above, in that an additional Causer participant has been added. This is clear from the corresponding paraphrase 'it [i.e. meeting Giggs' teammates from Manchester United] will *make* it *possible* for the kids to touch people they'd only before seen on TV'. The subtype illustrated in (20) is termed caused-dynamic meaning. Table 9 indicates the different subtypes of caused-modal meanings attested in the corpus. Fisher's exact tests point out that there are no statistically significant differences between the spoken and written datasets for any subtype. Caused-dynamic expressions like (20) above chalk up about 50% of the caused-modal uses.

Caused modality	Spoken		Written		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Caused-dynamic	18	43.90	29	53.70	47	49.47
Caused-dynamic + deontic	15	36.59	13	24.07	28	29.47
Caused-epistemic	8	19.51	12	22.22	20	21.05
Total	41	100.00	54	100.00	95	100.00

Table 9: The types of caused-modal meanings expressed by structures with *chance*

Second most frequent are examples like (21) below, in which a basic caused-dynamic meaning is overlaid with a deontic implicature (about 30%, see Table 9). Example (21) could thus be regarded as similar to the non-caused example (19) above, to which a causative operator has been added: 'Voting is due to start on Friday afternoon to allow people to cast their ballots before they head off to the country for the weekend.'

(21) Voting is due to start on Friday afternoon to give people the *chance* to cast their ballots before they head off to the country for the weekend, which is common here. (WB, ukspok)

We are of course not the first ones to note semantic affinity between modal and causative expressions. In fact, the patterns we found with *chance* offer support for – and onomasiologically enrich – Talmy's (1988: 80–81) "greater modal system", which is part of his (then proposed) semantic category of force dynamics. This category is concerned with "how entities interact with force" (1988: 49); the main force-dynamic (semantic) roles include the Agonist, i.e. the focal force entity, and the Antagonist, i.e. the force entity that opposes the Agonist (1988: 53). The greater modal system includes regular-verb members (the causative verbs *make/let/have/help*) as well as modal auxiliaries (or modal idioms like *had better*), as in the second and first line in (22) respectively.

(22) He can/may/must/should/would not/need not/dare not/had better
I made him/let him/had him/helped (him)
–push the car to the garage. (Talmy 1988: 81, ex. (33))

Talmy (1988: 81) argues that the members of this system share the same syntactic properties, as they all combine with bare infinitives, and the same semantic properties, as they all have force-dynamic reference. However, the members fall into two groups in terms of which force-dynamic participant is mapped onto the subject function: causative verbs code the Antagonist as subject, while modals code the Agonist as subject. This difference amounts to a difference in verb argument structure, in which causative structures have an additional syntactic slot for the Causer participant (Antagonist in Talmy's terms) compared to structures with modal auxiliaries. The same relation holds between the caused-modal structures with *chance* in (20) and (21) compared to the modalized structures in (17) and (19) above. Expressions with *chance* thus evidence the conceptual connection between basic modal and caused-modal meanings that is at the basis of Talmy's (1988) greater modal system.

In addition to caused-dynamic structures, with or without deontic implicature, we also found patterns with *chance* that we propose to analyse as caused-epistemic, which – in our understanding – is not included in Talmy (1988). They account for about 20% of the caused modality constructions. Examples are given in (23) and (24).

(23) The mayor has expressed concern that anti-English feeling in the city [i.e. Turin], aroused by the Heysel stadium tragedy five years ago, could greatly increase the *chances* of violent disorder. (…) The majority of the thirty-five Italians who died at Heysel were Juventus supporters from Turin. (WB, brspok)

(24) Having now sampled what Scottish life has to offer, the player is keen to stay for longer – but fears a dispute over a transfer fee might scupper any *chance* he has of making the move permanent. (WB, brbooks)

In (23), the mayor of Turin is concerned that anti-English feeling could make violent disorder more likely, and in (24), a dispute over a transfer fee might make it unlikely that football player McKenna's move from Cottbus to Edinburgh – initially on loan – becomes permanent. Note that (24) is grammatically positive but at the same time semantically negative because of the verb *scupper*.

5.2 Constructional properties

In terms of constructional characteristics, caused-modal expressions with *chance* differ most notably from modalized expressions in that they show a lexically varied set of verbs with more specific meanings than the verbo-nominal patterns surveyed in Table 6 above. Other properties to be dealt with in this section include the formal types of complement, polarity value preference and prenominal modification. As the spoken and written datasets for caused-modal uses did not show statistically significant differences (cf. Section 5.1, Table 9), the tables in this section again put the two datasets together, totalling 95 examples.

Let us start with the verbo-nominal patterns found in caused-modal expressions, which are presented in Table 10. Comparing this table to Table 6 above, it is clear that far fewer tokens (95 vs. 204) occur in far more matrix types (23 vs. 5 or 6), and that the verbs carry more specific semantics. Caused-modal expressions thus show far greater lexical variability than modalized utterances. This lexical specificity, in our view, is another reason to deny grammatical status to caused modality.

Pattern	Caused-dynamic	Caused-dynamic + deontic	Caused-epistemic	Total
ALLOW X (det) CHANCE	—	2	—	2
BOOST (det) CHANCES	—	—	1	1
COST X (det) CHANCE	2	—	—	2
DENY X (det) CHANCE	1	1	—	2
DILUTE (det) CHANCES	—	—	1	1
ENHANCE X*'s* CHANCES	—	—	1	1
GET (det) CHANCE	2	2	—	4
GIVE X (det) CHANCE	31	18	3	52
HEIGHTEN (det) CHANCES	—	—	1	1
IMPROVE (det) CHANCES	—	—	3	3
INCREASE X*'s* CHANCES	—	—	3	3
JEOPARDIZE (det) CHANCES	1	—	—	1
KEEP UP (det) CHANCES	—	—	1	1
MINIMIZE (det) CHANCES	—	—	1	1
OFFER X (det) CHANCE	7	3	—	10
PROVIDE X *with* (det) CHANCE	1	—	—	1
QUASH (det) CHANCE	—	1	—	1
RAISE (det) CHANCE	—	—	1	1
REDUCE (det) CHANCE	—	—	2	2
REMOVE (det) CHANCE	1	—	—	1
SCUPPER (det) CHANCE	—	—	2	2
STRANGLE (det) CHANCE	—	1	—	1
WRECK (det) CHANCES	1	—	—	1
Total	47	28	20	95

Table 10: VNPs of caused-modal expressions with *chance* in spoken and written UK English

Another observation regarding the VNPs in Table 10 is that they divide in semantically positive (e.g. *allow*, *boost*, *increase*, *raise*) and semantically negative items (e.g. *cost*, *deny*, *dilute*, *scupper*, *wreck*), for each of the three semantic subtypes.

Moving on to grammatical polarity, we can observe that caused-modal expressions predominantly occur in positive polarity contexts (83%), as shown in Table 11. The differences between the semantic

types of caused modality are not statistically significant, with Fisher's exact p-values ranging between p=.3 and p=1.

Caused modality	Positive polarity		Negative polarity		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Caused-dynamic	41	87.23	6	12.77	47	100.00
Caused-dynamic + deontic	23	82.14	5	17.86	28	100.00
Caused-epistemic	15	75.00	5	25.00	20	100.00
Total	79	83.16	16	16.84	95	100.00

Table 11: Polarity values in caused-modal expressions with *chance* in spoken and written UK English

In terms of formal types of complement, detailed in Table 12, the caused-modal expressions are similar to the modalized ones in that they combine with clausal complements in more than 80% of the cases, but they differ in that they do not pattern with *that*-clauses, which account for 16.5% of the modalized expressions (see Table 7 above). While caused-dynamic expressions clearly favour *to*-infinitival complements (as do dynamically modal expressions, cf. Table 7), caused-epistemic expressions prefer *of*-gerundials.

Caused modality	*that*-clause	*to*-inf	*of* V-*ing*	*of*-PP (event/ prop)	*for*-PP (event)	implied	Total
Caused-dynamic	—	23	2	1	0	2	28
Caused-dynamic + deontic	—	35	6	3	1	2	47
Caused-epistemic	—	1	15	3	1	0	20
TOTAL	0	59	23	7	2	4	95

Table 12: Types of complements in caused-modal VNPs with *chance* in spoken and written UK English

The last constructional property to be looked at is prenominal modification. Figure 1 in Section 3 indicated that among the three main types of uses, caused modality features the lowest share of premodifiers (10.5%). If we take a closer look at the semantics of these premodifying elements, we find not only quantifiers (*little*, *more*) and evaluative adjectives expressing degree modification (*great*, *fair*, *best*), just like we recorded for modalized expressions, but also ordinal numbers (*second*) and nominal classifiers (*long-term*), which cannot serve the purposes of quantification or degree modification. These findings on the premodification of *chance* thus constitute another ground on which we do not regard caused modality as a purely grammatical category.

6. Lexical(ized) expressions

As explained in Section 3, in lexical uses *chance* and *chances* are considered to be discourse-primary, i.e. the main point of the communication. The co-text in these uses makes it clear that these nouns refer to specific events or things that can be considered to constitute an opportunity or a coincidence. In Sections 6.1 to 6.4 we distinguish between subtypes of lexical uses in terms of the constructional template they occur in. Although lexical(ized) uses take up about 40% of the data analysed (see Table 2 in Section 3), they are treated here with far less quantitative detail as the other two main uses in the context of this volume.

6.1 Lexical uses: chance *is discourse-primary*

We first focus on uses in which *chance(s)* is discourse-primary and combines with a limited set of light verbs like *have* and *be*. Interestingly, as we have seen in Section 4, the constructional template with *have* can also accommodate modal uses in which *chance(s)* is discourse-secondary. In examples (25) to (27), however, the co-text makes clear that we are dealing with discourse-primary uses. Note that the template with *be* is different from those in modalized expressions, as it involves predicative structures with fully referential subjects (cf. (26)-(27)), while the latter involve existential structures (cf. (the) CHANCES *are*; *there* BE (det) CHANCE in Table 6).

(25) Mackie was the goal hero again in 70 minutes when Quino, Hart and Culkin got in a tangle and the Dons youngster pounced to poke the ball through the keeper's legs. The Dons twice had good *chances* to grab a dramatic late winner. (WB, sunnow)

(26) Britney is constantly looking for more grown-up pop and that is exactly what Natasha manages. "It is also a brilliant *chance* for Natasha to raise her profile in America." (WB, sunnow)

(27) Nicola Chenery, 33, hopes to conceive by the end of the year using a controversial technique not usually available in Britain. She and partner Mike Smith, 52, from Plymouth, have saved £6,000 for gender selection IVF treatment. (…) Nicola said yesterday: "Ever since I was a child I dreamed one day I would be a mum with a daughter. I love my four boys, but this could be my last *chance* to have a baby girl." (WB, sunnow)

Example (25) refers to two real chances to score a goal in the context of a football match. In (26) American popstar Britney Spears contacting the British singer Natasha Bedingfield to write songs for her offers the latter an exceptional opportunity to raise her profile in America. In (27) an expensive and controversial IVF treatment abroad is seen as the last opportunity Nicola Chenery has to have a daughter. In examples (25) to (27) *chance(s)* is premodified by adjectives that further qualify or evaluate the opportunities, for instance in terms of how realistic or brilliant they are, as in (25) and (26) or whether it is seen as the final one (27).

6.2 Lexicalized uses: chance *in complex predicates*

Chance or *chances* can also combine with a limited set of lexically full verbs including *take* to form a complex predicate that allows for a paraphrase involving the verb *to risk*, as in (28).

(28) They gave the bands dressing rooms at opposite ends of the backstage area. A spokesman said: "We didn't want any punch-ups and took no *chances* on Liam and James coming face to face." (WB, sunnow)

In (28) the T in the Park organisers do not want to risk any kind of bust-up between the British bands Oasis and Starsailor and therefore give them dressing rooms at opposite ends of the backstage area.

6.3 Lexical uses: chance *meaning 'coincidence'*

In just two cases, *chance* has the specific happenstance meaning of 'coincidence'. These cases show the template *it* BE (det) CHANCE + *that*-clause, i.e. extraposition constructions[3] with anticipatory subject *it* that refers to a specific situation (coded in a *that*-clause) as being a coincidence or not. Remarkably, in

[3] For a critical assessment of the extraposition construction from a diachronic perspective, see Davidse & Van linden (2019).

(29), negative *It is no chance* gets a mirative overtone and expresses that the content of the complement clause is unsurprising (Delancy 2001: 369; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 37; Gentens et al. 2016). Van linden, Davidse & Matthijs (2016) have argued that mirative uses of *no wonder* typically work within a discourse schema involving a mirative marker (i.e. *no wonder*), a proposition that is assessed miratively, and a justification motivating this assessment. In (29) too we see that the fact that Shakespeare owned a legal textbook, rather than another type of textbook, is assessed as unsurprising given that he was litigious throughout his life.

(29) Will Shakspere [sic] was indeed leapingly ambitious and determined. He was startlingly confident of his own abilities (as Nashe tells us) and had a greedy eye for gold. It is no *chance* that the book bearing his Westminster address is a legal textbook -- Will was to prove litigious and acquisitive throughout his life. (WB, brbooks)

In the other case (30), there is no such mirative overtone; *it's just like chance* points out that it is purely coincidental, and not on purpose, that two people happened to buy similar boots.

(30) that I I got for Christmas a nice pair of boots and then erm I I She didn't see them and then er she went out and bought herself a pair of boots and they were very similar. So sometimes it's just like *chance* that we wear Mm. Mm. the same things. (WB, brspok)

6.4 Regular uses

What we call 'regular uses' of *chance(s)* include structures in which *chance(s)* does not form a larger unit with a verb in the way it does in all the examples discussed so far (apart from the adverbial use in Section 4). That is, in regular uses, it is the noun *chance(s)* itself that brings in the complement, rather than the combination of *chance(s)* + verb. Regular uses display a lot of variety in terms of their constructional make-up. *Chance(s)* and its complement can for instance be the direct object of the main verb (31) or the subject of a clause, as in (32) and (34). Example (33) is similar to the existential construction *There is an eighty per cent chance of a shower*.

(31) Lydia Syson of the BBC assesses the *chances* of success of this new populist approach to Canada's perennial problem. (WB, brspok)
(32) Nina Blair, however, appeared to be deteriorating and her condition was critical; the *chances* of her survival were said to be minimal. (WB, brnews)
(33) At the moment we're talking an eighty per cent *chance* of a shower. (WB, brspok)
(34) That is why England's botched *chance* to sell cricket to a young public increasingly attracted by other sports, will probably be rued for years to come. (WB, times)

In these lexical uses *chance(s)* can be premodified by a percentage (33) or other specific adjectives such as *botched* in (34). As mentioned earlier, this kind of premodification can be seen as a true lack of decategorialization and further proof that *chance(s)* is truly nominal and lexical here, as its lexical meaning can still be modified by various adjectives.

7. Conclusion

In this chapter we have shown that constructions with *chance(s)* enrich Talmy's (1988) greater modal system in a number of different ways. In their modal uses they are equivalent to core modal auxiliaries and encode especially dynamic and epistemic meanings. In addition, dynamic uses can get an objective deontic inference when the co-text mentions some sort of authority, in which case the modalized

utterance as a whole comes to refer to an ability that is due to or linked to permission being granted. Epistemic uses can get volitional inferences when the co-text contains an explicit reference to someone's intentions. Those cases then assess the likelihood of an event and indicate whether the (represented) speaker would like this to happen or not. In addition, some constructions are also genuinely vague between two modal values, namely dynamic and epistemic meaning. In such examples it is impossible and unnecessary to disambiguate between these two, as they refer both to abilities inherent in a situation or participant, and an assessment of the likelihood of something happening. Rather than seeing such cases with inferences or vagueness as detracting from the grammatical status of these modal uses, we want to argue that it is actually part of their assets within the modal paradigm and can be seen as pragmatico-semantic enrichment of the modal paradigm (cf. Brems & Davidse 2010).

In addition to this type of enrichment, constructions with *chance(s)* also bring in constructional variation and enrichment in at least two ways. Firstly, modal uses can either appear in verbo-nominal patterns, forming clausal structures, or as the anaphoric adverbial *no chance*. In the latter case, it is not integrated into a larger unit and functions as an emphatic negative response item to a speech act. With regard to verbo-nominal patterns, it was noted that modal uses typically appear with a limited set of very frequent light verbs including *have* and *be*. Partly because of these verbo-nominal patterns, modal uses of *chance(s)* can still appear with a restricted set of premodifiers, as in *have a good/fair/amazing chance*. We argued that such premodifiers modify the modal value and do not attest to *chance* still being a noun and hence lexical in nature. In addition, the plural form *chances* can appear in modal uses too. In both cases we argue that this partial decategorialization enriches the paradigm by allowing for more fine-grained and expressive renderings of modal meanings, bringing in constructional templates that incorporate slots for potential premodification.

Verbo-nominal patterns with *chance(s)* also further enrich the greater modal system in that they can express caused modality, more specifically caused-dynamic and caused-epistemic meanings, the former potentially involving a deontic inference. The category of caused-epistemicity, we feel, is new with regard to the causative notions already put forward by Talmy (1988). We argued that the category of caused modality is not purely grammatical, as it adds a causative operator to basic modal meanings. This claim squares with the lexical specificity found among the matrix verbs and premodifiers of *chance(s)*.

Constructions with *chance(s)* also exceed the range of modal auxiliaries because they still have lexical uses, which modal auxiliaries typically no longer have. These lexical uses either appear in complex predicates such as *take (no) chance(s)*, providing an alternative to 'to risk', or in verbo-nominal patterns with light verbs that are similar in surface structure to those attested for modal uses. Furthermore, there are also regular uses, which do not form part of a larger unit including a verb but bring in their complement by themselves.

With regard to polarity, finally, we noted that negative polarity is more frequent for modal uses of *chance(s)* constructions overall, but its role seems less important here than for other semiotic nouns, for which it was found that negative polarity was a trigger in their grammaticalization (e.g. *(no) wonder* (Van linden et al. 2016; Gentens et al. 2016), *(no) doubt* (Davidse et al. 2015), *(no) way* (Davidse et al. 2014), *(no) question* (Davidse & De Wolf 2012). In the case of *(no) need*, in turn, grammatical uses also emerged in positive negative polarity contexts, but the data nevertheless show a clear diachronic tendency to express more abstract modal meanings (e.g. deontic rather than dynamic) when combined with negative polarity (Van linden et al. 2011). Future research is needed to reveal why negation serves as a triggering or facilitating factor in some but not in other lemma-specific grammaticalization paths.

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Corpus

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