The philosopher coming out of the corner

Philosophical friendship in Plato’s *Gorgias*
and some echoes from Plutarch to Damascius

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Abstract. R. Duncan’s observation that friendship (φιλία) is an important theme in Plato’s *Gorgias* has gone unnoticed for the past four decades. In the first part of this paper, I remedy this by discussing the theme of φιλία in the Callicles episode. There, friendship, as opposed to flattery (κολακεία), turns out to be closely connected with the practice of the philosopher, viz. with his frankness (παρρησία). The nexus φιλία – κολακεία – παρρησία can again be found elucidating the philosophical life in works of Plutarch (*Maxime cum principibus esse disserendum* and *De adulatore et amico*), Maximus of Tyre (*Or.* 14), Themistius (*Or.* 22), and Damascius (*Vita Isidori*). Guided by Callicles’ mocking description of the philosopher as a strange fellow hiding ‘in a corner’ (ἐν γώνιᾳ) – a caricature rejected by the aforecited authors – I follow the track of this motif in the second part of the paper and suggest that the *Gorgias* served as an inspiration in constructing a philosophy – even a Neoplatonic philosophy – that is not otherworldly.

In a three-page 1974 note R. Duncan suggested that insufficient attention had been paid to the theme of friendship (φιλία) in Plato’s *Gorgias*. So far his call to consider the *Gorgias* (in particular the discussion between Socrates and Callicles) a dialogue about φιλία has gone unnoticed by and large. However, Duncan’s concise observations do deserve an elaboration. I will start by linearly discussing the theme of φιλία throughout the Callicles episode in order to reveal the dynamics of the positions taken by the interlocuters. Φιλία as discussed in the confrontation between Socrates and Callicles will turn out to be closely connected to the practice of philosophical conversation (dialectic) and to the philosophical τέχνη. Frankness (παρρησία), friendship’s close ally, and flattery, its arch-enemy, will prove pivotal terms in...
understanding the practice of the philosopher and the philosophical life. In the second part of this paper I will trace the reception of this specifically Platonic notion of philosophical φιλία by Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Themistius and Damascius.

1. Φιλία in Plato’s Gorgias

1.1 Callicles intrudes upon the ongoing conversation out of exasperation, albeit not so much at Socrates as at his own allies Gorgias and Polus, Socrates’ first interlocutors. According to Callicles they both succumbed to shame. As a consequence, he justifies his participation in the discussion by claiming that he, by contrast, will not be shamed by Socrates’ questioning (482c-e). He immediately goes on to prove this by making a charge against Socratic morals and pleading in defence of the right of the stronger to pursue his own pleasure, whatever the circumstances (482e-484c).4

In Callicles’ opinion, Socrates is utterly mistaken in defending morality and – as a consequence – in his pursuit of the philosophical life: engaging in philosophy might be charming in youth, but it is pernicious to every person who wants to carry some weight as a citizen – who wants to become καλὸς κάγιαθὸς5:

[W]henever they [i.e. philosophers] come to some private or political business (ἐξπόσον εἰς τινα ἱδαν ἦ πολιτικὴν πράξιν), they prove themselves ridiculous (καταγέλαστοι). (484d-e; transl. T. Irwin6)

[T]his person [i.e. the philosopher] is bound to end up being unmanly (ἄνάνδρως), even if he has an altogether good nature; for he shuns the city centre and the public squares (φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς7) where the poet [i.e. Homer, Ili. 9, 411] says men win good reputations. He is sunk away out of sight for the rest of his life, and lives whispering with three or four boys in a corner, and never gives voice to anything fit for a free man, great and powerful.

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3 482d: αἰσχυνθήματι; 482e: αἰσχυνθεῖσι. This is repeated by Socrates at 487b (αἰσχυντηροτέρῳ, αἰσχύνης, αἰσχυνθεῖσα). Earlier in the text Polus addressed the same accusation to Gorgias (461b: ἀγορα). Further on both Callicles (482c) and Socrates (494d, 508c) call the shame of the first two interlocutors to mind.

4 Callicles’ focus on pleasure was already hinted at when he evaluated the discussion between Gorgias and Socrates not by its truthfulness but by the pleasure it had brought him (458d).

5 Obviously Callicles’ understanding of καλὸς κάγιαθὸς – to his mind synonymous with εὐδόκιμος – is different from Socrates’ (cf. 470e en 515a).

6 For the Gorgias, I use the edition by Dodds 1959 and the translation by Irwin 1979. Throughout the Gorgias, Irwin translates παρρησία by ‘free speaking’ and παρρησιάζωμαι by ‘speaking freely’. I modified his translation by replacing this with the more adequate translations ‘frankness’ and ‘to speak frankly’. Further on I will not indicate these specific modifications.

7 Dodds 1959, p. 274: ‘In Homer an ἀγορά is a place of public assembly, not a market, and it is in this sense that Callicles uses the word’.
Contrary to what one could expect, Callicles’ insulting attack on philosophy (484c-486d), which Socrates has called his ‘beloved’ (482a: παιδικά) just moments ago, is not immediately countered. Quite the contrary: Socrates commends the man who treated him with such contempt:

I know well that if you agree with what my soul believes, these very beliefs are the true ones. For I believe that someone who is to test adequately the soul which lives rightly and the soul which does not should have three things, all of which you have: knowledge, goodwill, and frankness (ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν). (486e-487a)

What Socrates sets out here are the criteria for a correct philosophical dialogue. The three criteria are cumulative, as it appears from Socrates’ clarification (487a-d). Many people do not pass the test because, unlike Callicles, they did not receive a proper education: they lack ἐπιστήμη. Others, although they do possess ἐπιστήμη, are according to Socrates ‘unwilling to tell me the truth because they don’t care for me as you [i.e. Callicles] do’. A third group, including Gorgias and Polus, shows both ἐπιστήμη and εὔνοια, but ultimately lacks the final criterion: παρρησία. This was shown by their shame, which led them to contradict themselves. Now we can understand why Socrates was apparently not harassed by Callicles’ attack: by insulting philosophy he adduced evidence of his παρρησία, which he had promised by resolving not to get shamed. In Socrates’ words: ‘And as for being the type to speak frankly without shame (παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι) , you say it yourself and your speech a little earlier agrees with you’ (487d-e).

Now Socrates can rest assured that if Callicles, who has met all three criteria, agrees with Socrates’ defence of the philosophical life, truth will be attained:

For [if you agree with me] you would never have conceded it either from lack of wisdom (σοφίας) or from excess of shame (αἰσχύνη), nor would you concede it to deceive me (ἀπατῶν); for (γάρ) you are a friend (φίλος) to me, as you say yourself. In reality, then, agreement between you and me will finally possess the goal of truth (τέλος [...]) τῆς ἀληθείας. (487e)

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8 Cf. Foucault 2008, p. 336: ‘Il me semble que, dans ce passage [Grg. 486d-488b], se trouvent définis, même d’une façon rapide et en quelque sorte purement méthodologique (comme règles de la discussion), le mode d’être du discours philosophique et sa manière de lier l’âme à la fois à la vérité, à l’Être (à ce qui est), et puis à l’Autre.’ Foucault 2008, pp. 335-344 discusses παρρησία in the Callicles part of the Gorgias at the very end of his 1982-1983 Collège de France lecture series. For the characterization of the philosopher as a person testing (βάσανείς) souls in Plato see La. 187e-189a. That same dialogue makes clear how important παρρησία is for a philosophical dialogue (La. 178a; 179c; 189a). On παρρησία in the Laches see Monoson 2000, pp. 155-161; Foucault 2001, pp. 91-105; 2009, pp. 117-150.

9 Shame and self-contradiction were already connected at 482e.
In this passage the three criteria are repeated. However, the order in which they are mentioned has changed in comparison to both the first mention and Socrates’ clarification. This, in my view, is not without purpose: here φιλία is no longer solely connected with εὐνομία, as it was previously\(^\text{10}\), but seems to have become a more encompassing label of which παρρησία is also an aspect\(^\text{11}\). That this is Socrates’ understanding of the matter appears from his referring back to Callicles’ profession of friendship (‘as you say yourself’). This profession (485e: φιλικῶς\(^\text{12}\)) marked the transition from a general attack on philosophy to a personal exhortation to leave philosophy aside. Although Callicles himself emphasizes the εὐνομία which led him to this exhortation\(^\text{13}\), Socrates, as we saw, mentioned the harangue as a proof of παρρησία in his reaction. Thus Socrates seems to gradually bring παρρησία into the concept of φιλία, which in everyday language was primarily associated with εὐνομία. Contrary to everyday φιλία, the φιλία established here by Socrates is a philosophical method with truth as its objective\(^\text{14}\).

The same conclusion can be drawn from the next scene. Once Socrates has encouraged his conversation partner to keep up his critical attitude (488a-b), Callicles continues his defence of amorality. Once again he emphasizes that he will show frankness in this endeavor (491e: ὁ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω). Once again Socrates commends him for that:

You’re carrying through your speech nobly, Callicles, and speaking frankly. For now you’re saying clearly what the others think but aren’t willing to say (διανοοῦνται μὲν λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἑθέλουσιν). And so I’m asking you not to slacken at all, so that it will really become clear how we should live. (492d)

At the beginning of the conversation Socrates specifically denied εὐνομία to those who were ‘unwilling to tell me the truth’ (487a: οὐκ ἑθέλουσι δὲ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν). In this instance, however, the conduct of those who λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἑθέλουσιν seems to indicate a lack of παρρησία.

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\(^{10}\) 487b: ‘Gorgias and Polus are wise and friends (φίλος) of mine, but short of frankness’. Cf. 447b, where Chaerephon calls Gorgias a φίλος.

\(^{11}\) Both Schiller 1959, p. 871 and Scarpato 2001, p. 67-68 mention this passage from the Gorgias to point out that παρρησία is an indispensable part of φιλία.

\(^{12}\) Dodds 1959, p. 276 deems it probable that in ἐπιεικῶς φιλικῶς (485e) the second adverb is a gloss on the first. That this is however improbable appears from Socrates’ reminiscence of Callicles’ profession of friendship (487e). This most likely refers to the use of φιλικῶς, the only explicit profession of friendship so far.

\(^{13}\) 486a: ‘And look, my dear Socrates and don’t be annoyed with me at all, when I’ll be saying it out of goodwill (εὐνομία) to you’.

\(^{14}\) Aristotle emphasizes that φιλία en εὐνομία should not be confused (EN 1166b-1167a), thus indicating that they sometimes were confused indeed. The difference between φιλία more philosophico and everyday φιλία is depicted aptly by Plutarch, Quaestiones convivales 659e-f. Cf. White 1983, p. 870: ‘The object of it all is truth, and its [i.e. dialectic’] method is friendship, the full recognition of the value of self and the other in a universe of two.’
Once παρρησία is brought into the φιλία discourse and the rules of philosophical conversation are thus established, the discussion takes a crucial turn. Socrates starts to undermine Callicles’ equation of pleasure with the good. All of a sudden, after Socrates’ umpteenth exhortation to join him in not being ashamed and accordingly to uphold mutual παρρησία for the sake of their philosophical discussion (494c: ὁπως μὴ ἀπαίσχυνῃ, δεὶ δὲ, ὡς ἐοικε, μηδ’ ἐμὲ ἀπαίσχυνθημαι), Callicles refuses to answer one of Socrates’ questions. Instead, he accuses Socrates of acting ‘absurd’ (494d: ἄτοπος) and of asking questions like a ‘mob-orator’ (ibid.: δημιγγόρος) because he keeps on applying everyday situations to Callicles’ theories. Once again Socrates expresses his confidence in the fundamental difference between Callicles and the other interlocutors (viz. in Callicles’ παρρησία; 494d: μὴ αἰσχυνθης) and persuades him to answer after all. Callicles wonders if Socrates is not ashamed himself by his own ridiculous questioning (494e: οὐκ αἰσχύνη;) but appears to stand his ground in his reply. However, his amoralist thesis is no longer the outcome of his own convictions. It is merely an attempt to prevent his discourse of becoming ‘inconsistent’ (495a: ἄνομολογούμενος). At this point an opposition has arisen between what Callicles thinks to be true and what he says. The promise of παρρησία has been broken. Nevertheless, we could still expect the discussion to continue for some time longer. After all, Callicles is still keeping up appearances by being consistent: the formal proof of a lacking παρρησία (viz. the interlocutor contradicting himself, as in the cases of Gorgias and Polus) has not yet been produced. Therefore Socrates, never impressed by appearances, issues a final warning in the form of a conditional accusation:

You're destroying your first statements (τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους), Callicles, and you’d no longer be properly searching for the truth with me if you start speaking contrary to what you think (εἰπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρείζ). (495a; transl. Irwin modified)

The ‘first statements’ Socrates refers to are of course Callicles’ professions of παρρησία\textsuperscript{15}.

Unsurprisingly, the formal proof of Callicles’ broken promise presents itself soon enough. When Callicles retracts an earlier statement by claiming that it was only ‘a joke’ (499b: παίζων), he is revealed to speak not only against his convictions but also against his

\textsuperscript{15} Dodds 1959, p. 307: ‘Socrates is thinking of Callicles’ professions of παρρησία.’ To my mind proof of Dodds’ interpretation can be adduced from the beginning of the Laches (178a-b) where παρρησιαζοθαι is opposed to λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν ἀυτῶν δόξαν (as it is in our Gorgias passage: παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρείζ) and likened to εἰπειν ἀ δοκεῖ υμῖν. \textit{Contra} Irwin 1979, p. 69, who takes τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους to mean ‘the previous discussion’. If this were the correct interpretation the Greek would be rather strained, for in the preceding sentence Plato used the singular (λόγος) to refer to the whole of his contribution to the previous discussion. Besides, by becoming inconsistent in the future (ἐρείζ) Callicles would not render invalid the discussion up to the point where he started being inconsistent.
earlier statements. In his reaction Socrates does not refer directly to Callicles’ lack of παρρησία; instead he passes judgment on their φιλία:

Ah Callicles, what a scoundrel you are. You treat me like a child, telling me now that the same things are this way, and again that they’re some other way, and deceiving me. And I didn’t think at the start that you’d voluntarily deceive me, because I thought you were a friend (ὡς δυντος φίλου). But it turns out I was misled. (499b-c)

Indeed, by breaking his promise of παρρησία Callicles also broke the bond of philosophical friendship, thus justifying Socrates’ transition from an objective claim of friendship (487e: φίλος γάρ μοι εί) to a subjective one (499c: ὡς δυντος φίλου). Socrates now cannot but conclude that Callicles is neither a friend nor a παρρησιαστής16. The dialectical contract has been broken.

What is more, in rejecting philosophical φιλία and its ally παρρησία, Callicles has left the door wide open to the opposite of these concepts. This becomes clear when Callicles, in his attempt to end the discussion after his refusal to answer Socrates’ questions, continues answering only because Gorgias insists. From that moment on the discussion, at least as far as Callicles is concerned, is continued not for truth’s sake (the intention of the philosophical conversation, cf. 487e) but ‘for Gorgias’ sake’ (505c: Γοργίου χάριν17). Friendshap has made way for flattery18. That this reversal was due to a lack of παρρησία and not so much to a lack of one of the other criteria for friendship (viz. ἐπιστήμη and εὐνοία) is clear from the consultation between Callicles and Gorgias:

C. But Socrates is always like that, Gorgias. He keeps asking these petty, worthless questions, and cross-examines.

G. Well, what does it matter to you? Anyhow, it is not your reputation (τιμή) which is at stake, Callicles. Do allow Socrates to cross-examine as he wishes. (497b; transl. T. Irwin modified)

16 Contra Michelini 1998, p. 53, who states that at this point in the dialogue ‘Socrates has shown that frankness does not guarantee sincerity’. The alteration is on the contrary that παρρησία is no longer the mode of the conversation.

17 Cf. 497c: ‘Then go on you, and ask these petty trifles, since that’s what Gorgias wants (ἐπειπέρ Γοργία δοκεί ὡτως)’ [transl. T. Irwin modified]; 501c: ‘I’m going along with you, to let the discussion progress for you, and to gratify Gorgias here (ταύτα […] Γοργία τοδε χαρισμαι)’.

18 In the Gorgias Socrates often links the pursuit of χάρις with κολακεία (462c-463a; 502b-c; 502e-503a; 521a-b). Cf. Isocrates, Ep. 4.6, where frank speakers (παρρησιαζομένους) are opposed to people who say everything with an eye to χάρις, thereby ironically not being worthy of χάρις (τῶν ἀπαντα μὲν πρὸσ χάριν, μηδὲν δὲ χάριτος ἐξον λεγόντων).

19 To my mind most translations (including T. Irwin’s) and interpretations (including E.R. Dodds’) miss the point here in taking πάντος οὔ ση αὐτή η τιμή to mean ‘it is not for you to estimate their value [i.e. the value of Socrates’ questions]’ (cf. Dodds 1959, p. 313, following L. Robin and B. Jowett). This standard interpretation seems problematic for two reasons. (1) In accordance with the rules of dialectic, to which Socrates refers throughout the dialogue, it is actually the interlocutor’s task to value Socrates’ words (486e, cf. 461c-d, 466e-467a, 472b-c, 475e-476a, 499e-500a). (2) The standard interpretation seems incompatible with Callicles’ following reply. He agrees to continue the discussion though he repeats that he deems the questions ‘petty trifles’.
What is revealed here is obviously not a lack of ἐπιστήμη or ἐνοικία. The real problem is that an excessive self-consciousness has taken possession of Callicles. He feels like his τιμή is at stake. In other words: he is ashamed – and this kind of shame has been established as the opposite of παρησία throughout the dialogue. Callicles is ashamed to say what he thinks and thus becomes guilty of the charges he had brought against Gorgias and Polus.

1.2 After this revelation Socrates continues what can hardly pass for a dialogue anymore. After all, trying to keep up the dialogue form would only yield bad philosophy as long as the interlocutor rejects παρησία. Socrates’ basically continuing on his own is thus paradoxically justified by the rules of dialectic. Now that the difference between pleasure and the good is established, it all comes down to distinguishing good pleasure from bad pleasure. The question is which τέχνη can make that distinction. At this point the theme of φιλία and

(497c). In other words: he repeats his judgment of Socrates’ method of questioning. If Gorgias’ message were really that this judgment was not for Callicles to make, it is quite unlikely that Callicles would have repeated his judgment so bluntly straight away, for he states explicitly that he is yielding to Gorgias’ wish (ἐπείπερ Γοργία δοκεῖ ὃτι). The standard interpretation partly seems to be prompted by the wish to render the particle ἀλλά in the next sentence (ἀλλά ὑπόθεσες Ἀκραῖτε ἐξελεγχαί ὅπως ἢν βοηθήσῃ) strictly adversative: do not judge the quality of questioning, but let Socrates ask the questions as he wishes. However, for ἀλλά ‘following a rejected suggestion or supposition’, thus translated by ‘well’ or ‘well then’, see Denniston 1954, pp. 9-11. All this is compatible with the idea that the person who takes παρησία seriously has to abandon τιμή from time to time, cf. e.g. Isocrates, Ep. 4.7. Thus, Callicles is unknowingly right when he calls the philosopher ‘dishonoured’ (486c: ἀτιμος, cf. the assenting repetition by Socrates at 508c): as opposed to Callicles, the philosopher would never abandon his παρησία for τιμή.

With ‘this kind of shame’ I mean shame as far as it plays a role in the dialectical process, i.e. the feeling preventing an interlocutor to speak his mind (482e: αἰσχυνθείς δὲ ἐνέκει εἰπεῖν). Cf. Lc. 179c, where initial shame (ὑπακοχνώμεθα) is topped by παρησία, thus making a dialectical conversation possible. One could call this kind of shame the everyday definition (cf. Dover 1974, pp. 236-238: ‘[Shame is] a very powerful motive for conforming to the behaviour expected by one’s family, friends and fellow-citizens. […] The fear of being judged inferior is the kind of fear which overrules rational calculation’). It is the only kind of shame with which I am concerned in the present paper. However, in the Gorgias an important role is also played by a more philosophical kind of shame, being a valid moral intuition (cf. Race 1979; McKim 1988; Kahn 1996, pp. 138-142; Moss 2005 with a reply by Futter 2009; see also Levy 2013, discussing the function of the closely related notion of ridicule in the elenchi examination). In her brilliant interpretation of the Gorgias Tarnopolsky 2010, pp. 98-110 and passim labels these two kinds of shame ‘flattering shame’ and ‘respectful shame’ respectively; she also discusses their relation to frankness (‘flattering shame’ being opposed to παρησία and as such to philosophical practice), ‘respectful shame’ being compatible with παρησία and as such, on the contrary, being an asset to philosophical practice. Cain 2008 calls the first kind ‘false shame’ and discusses the ambiguity running throughout the dialogue. Beversluis 2000, pp. 291-376 on the other hand does not take the deeper moral sense of shame into account, thus considering shame merely a rhetorical device of Socrates’ ‘shame tactics’. His critique of Socrates’ modus operandi is therefore often gratuitous. Conversely, McKim 1988 only discusses this deeper moral shame (although once he seems to distinguish ‘competitive shame’ from ‘moral shame’ (p. 41 n. 17)), which causes him to neglect the relevance of παρησία in the Gorgias and dialectic in general.

21 Cf. Dodds 1959, p. 307: ‘The unshockable Callicles is shocked at last’; Kahn 1996, p. 136: ‘Callicles’ defeat will nevertheless also be precipitated by his sense of shame’; Beversluis 2000, p. 369: ‘Plato accounts for Callicles’ recalcitrance not in logical or epistemic terms, but in psychological ones. Callicles’ recalcitrance is not traceable to his lack of knowledge or to his inability to follow an argument’; Monoson 2000, p. 164: ‘Callicles will not continue to speak with parrhesia about the subject at hand because his own manliness is now at stake’. Contra van Raalte 2004, p. 295, who judges that ἐπιστήμη is the lacking criterion.
κολακεία, up until now only relevant for the concrete philosophical practice of dialectic, is brought to a more general level. Socrates refers back to a moment in the discussion with Polus (462d-466a), where a remarkably elaborate classification of real and false crafts was introduced. Socrates then labeled the false arts ‘flattery’ (463a; 464e; 465b; 466a; 466e: κολακεία, cf. 464c: ἡ κολακεύτικη [τέχνη]) because their only purpose is yielding pleasure. In addition to cookery, cosmetics and sophistry, rhetoric, the métier of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, is said to be a part of κολακεία too. The danger of these parts of flattery is that they tend to mimic (464c; d: προσποιεῖται) their real art counterparts very closely while they are really nothing but a faint image, an ἔδωκολον (463d) of these counterparts (sophistry mimicking legislation, rhetoric justice, cosmetics gymnastics and cookery medicine).

Just after having called this classification back to mind in his discussion with Callicles (500a-b), Socrates invokes a most strange deity:

And for the sake of the god of friendship (πρὸς Φιλίου), Callicles, don't think you should make jokes at me, and don't answer capriciously, contrary to what you think (παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα), nor again take what I say that way, as making jokes. (500b)

Once again the link between friendship and παρρησία (viz. not speaking παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα) is suggested. What is more, the rare invocation also proves relevant in the context of the classification of crafts. In his reiteration of the distinction between real and false crafts, Socrates adduces other examples than the first time. Now philosophy represents the true craft aimed at the good, while κολακεία, aimed at pleasure, is exemplified by ‘speaking in the people's Assembly, practising rhetoric, conducting politics the way you conduct it now’ (500c). This ‘flattery’ (501c; 502d; 503a) is thus rejected and replaced by Socrates’ care for the soul – the craft of philosophy, which invokes the god of φίλια.

In a next move Socrates goes on to explain this care of the soul by stating that one should at all times aim for justice and moderation instead of pursuing pleasure at all costs. The underlying cause of this – and this transition may seem uncalled-for to the reader not

22 Cf. Dodds 1959, p. 226: ‘This passage goes much beyond what is strictly required for the immediate purpose’. Socrates points out the unusual length of his exposé himself (465e). After all, it seems to contradict his earlier disapproval of μακρολογία (449b; 461d). In this case the long statement is justified by Socrates’ opponents’ not understanding the short version.

23 The second invocation of the god of friendship in the Gorgias (519e) again combines Socrates’ call for παρρησία (this time by deploiring that Callicles does not want to answer) with yet another reference to the classification of crafts (517c-519e, cf. Irwin 1979, pp. 236-237). The third and last instance of the invocation is Eutypfr. 6b. Cf. Phdr. 234e: πρὸς Δίος φιλίου.

24 Note that Socrates emphasizes that he is talking about rhetoric and politics as they were conducted in his day by people like Callicles. In the Gorgias, as in the Phaedrus, Plato seems to leave open the possibility of good (i.e. philosophical) rhetoric and politics. See e.g. Stauffer 2006 and Collobert 2013.
paying attention to the recurrent theme of friendship, flattery, and frankness – turns out to be φιλία:

[A man] should not allow his appetites to be intemperate and try to fulfil them – an endless evil – while he lives the life of a brigand. For no other man would be a friend (προσφιλής) to such a man; nor would god. For he is incapable of community (κοινωνεῖν); and when there is no community with a man (κοινωνία), there can be no friendship (φιλία) with him. Now the wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men are bound by community and friendship (φιλία) and order and temperance and justice; and that is why they call this whole universe the ‘worldorder’ (κόσμον), not ‘disorder’ or ‘intemperance’, my friend (ἐταίρε). But I think you don’t heed them, though you’re wise yourself. You haven’t noticed that geometrical equality has great power among gods and men; you think you should practise taking more, because you are heedless of geometry. (507d-508a)

Callicles was repeatedly called φίλος by Socrates when he was still honoring παρθενία (e.g. 487c; 499c). At this point, however, he turns out to understand nothing about φιλία25, while philosophy is established as the true craft of φιλία26. The philosopher masters the craft of not committing injustice because he has a sense of the transcendent order. Accordingly, the rather abrupt mention of geometry could be taken as the representation of philosophy in general27.

The person who, on the other hand, goes out of his way to avoid suffering injustice – both Socrates and Callicles agree on this point – will only succeed by unjustly gaining power or by being in favour with the unjust powers that be (509d-510b). In other words: he will have to act like a flatterer. So, when the macrocosmic power of φιλία just described is neglected, this presents disastrous consequences for the microcosm:

I think one man is a friend (φίλος) to another most of all when, as wise men of old say, like is friend to like. […] Then wherever a brutal and uneducated tyrant is the ruler, won't he surely be afraid of anyone in the city who is far better than him, and won't he be quite unable to become a friend (φίλος) to him with all his mind? […] And if someone is far worse than himself, he won't be a friend either; for the tyrant will despise him, and never treat him seriously as he would treat a friend (πρός φίλον). […] Then the only friend (φίλος) to such a man worth consideration who’s left is whoever has a similar character, blames and praises the same things, and is willing to

25 A ἔταίρος, as Callicles is called here (and Alcibiades at 519a), is certainly not the same as a φίλος, the former being a broader and much more ambiguous term. In other words: ἔταρνία does not necessarily imply φιλία. On the difference in Plato (and the problem of translating the two terms in English) see Bartlett 2004, p. viii and passim. Cf. also Konstan 1997, pp. 58-59 on the difference between the two in Euripides’ Orestes. To this evidence we can add a fragment of Antiphon (fr. B65 DK) where the ἔταιρος is not only distinguished from the φίλος, but also identified with the κόλαξ.

26 Cf. the description of the state as a community of friends under the leadership of philosophers in Resp. 9, 590d.

27 Cf. Festugière 1936, pp. 391-392. See Irwin 1979, pp. 7-8 for the growing importance Plato attaches to geometry from the Gorgias on. Cf. also Morrison 1958 on the importance of geometry, contra Dodds 1959, p. 340 who states that ‘the humble status assigned to geometry […] is not in question here’. This passage could perhaps be compared to Plutarch, De genio Socratis 579a-d, where an exhortation to geometry turns out to be a disguised exhortation to philosophy in general.
be ruled by the ruler and to be subject to him. This man will have great power in this city; no one will do injustice against him without being sorry for it. (510b-d)

Just as flattering crafts mimic their corresponding real crafts, flattery in personal relations mimics friendship. By being submissive to the ruler – and as a consequence constantly changing his mind in order to adapt himself to new rulers – the flatterer abandons any claim to παρρησία by unavoidably contradicting himself. He merely poses as a friend (511a: μιμήσιν, μιμούμενος, μιμούμενον), thus becoming the very antipode of the philosopher, whose ‘argument (λόγος) is always the same’ (509a, cf. 482a; 490e; 491b-c; 527d). To this flattering craft (viz. the contemporary rhetorical politics that were opposed to philosophy in the reiteration of the classification of crafts) Callicles wants to exhort Socrates (511c). Socrates realizes indeed that whoever wants to rise to power in democratic Athens has to ‘become as much like the Athenian people as possible’ thereby giving up ‘what is dearest’ (513a: φιλτάτοις) to him. The ‘friendship with the Athenian demos’ (513b: φιλάν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ) pursued by Callicles is thus by definition based on flattery28. For want of παρρησία – the friend of the people only says what the people wants to hear (513c: χαίρουσι) – this friendship can never be a true friendship, being not aimed at the good, but at the pleasure of the people29.

Now that the difference between the real craft of philosophy and the flattery of contemporary politics has been elucidated, Socrates calls for a renewal of παρρησία one last time. He is turned down by the flatterer and draws his final conclusion.

S. […] Tell me the truth, Callicles. Since you began by speaking frankly to me (παρρησίας εσθαλ), it’s only just that you should go on saying what you think. Tell me now as well as before, well and nobly.

C. Well, I’m telling you you should serve them [i.e. the people].

S. Then it’s flattery (κολακεύσουστα) you’re urging on me, most noble sir. (521a-b; transl. T. Irwin modified)

Callicles’ professed παρρησία has been utterly perverted. Paradoxically he claims to speak frankly by encouraging flattery. Socrates on the other hand emphasizes that ‘all flattery, to ourselves or to others, few or many, we must shun’ (527c, cf. 522d)30. In the end the only practitioner of ‘the real political craft’ (521d: τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ) turns out to be Socrates himself – the philosopher helping people in the direction of the good instead of the

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28 Contra Konstan 1997, p. 103: ‘Unlike relations with kings […] one does not talk of being friends with the Athenian assembly. The issue of philoi vs. flatterers falls outside the discourse of the democracy.’ Cf. Socrates’ earlier mention of Callicles’ love (481d: ἐφσαίτε) for the Athenian demos.

29 The opposition of ἡπόνη and παρρησία appears explicitly in Isocrates, Ep. 4.6: τοὺς ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον λέγειν προαιρεμένους versus τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ παρρησιαζομένους.

30 On the strange combination of Callicles’ flattering the people and his anti-democratic traits see Kamtekar 2005.
merely pleasurable. The politics to which Callicles invites – and this is the very last sentence of the Gorgias – is worth nothing.

1.3 The conversation between Socrates and Callicles has been a complex play of reversing positions. Callicles claimed παρρησία and φιλία but turned out to be a champion of κολακεία. He accused Socrates of asking questions like a ‘mob -orator’ (482c, 494d: δημιουργός31) but exhorts to δημιουργία himself32. Socrates claims not to be a politician at all (473e), thus seemingly agreeing with Callicles’ caricature of the otherworldly philosopher, but turns out to be the only politician there is (521d). Socrates’ philosophy is depicted by Callicles as a practice of whisperers (485e: ψυχρétζοντα) in contrast with παρρησία33, but is in the end established as the craft of παρρησία – a frankness Socrates upheld until the very end of his life34. According to Callicles philosophy is useless fiddling (486c: τὰ κομψά ταῦτα), but, as it turns out, this description can be applied to his own endeavors (521d: τὰ κομψά ταῦτα). Callicles deems philosophers to be unmanly cowards (485d: ἀνάνδρως), though the real coward turns out to be him, while real courage is philosophical παρρησία35. He considers philosophers ridiculous (484e: twice καταγέλαστοι; 485a: καταγέλαστον) but makes himself look ridiculous in the discussion (509a: καταγέλαστος). In other words: during the dialogue the roles are completely reversed. The philosopher has come out of the corner – a place not suited for Socrates as we know him anyhow – and the anti-philosopher has been driven into it36.

31 Cf. 482c: δημιουργεῖ; 482e: δημιουρκά.
32 At 503a κολακεία, to which Callicles invites, is identified with δημιουργία.
33 Cf. Dodds 1959, p. 275, who comments on ψυχρέζοντα by pointing out that ‘the philosopher does not dare to speak his mind plainly and in public’ (my italics).
34 Cf. Irwin 1979, p. 129: ‘It will appear later that Socrates is the only one who really speaks freely and tells the truth without concern for personal safety’.
35 Near the end of the dialogue Socrates states that ‘being put to death itself – no one fears that unless he’s altogether unreasoning and unmanly (ἀνάνδρος)’. It is precisely by this fear that Callicles is defined (see Austin 2013). Callicles’ unmanliness is pointed out as well, when he is shamed into rejecting παρρησία when confronted with the fact that his understanding of the good life resembles the life of a catamite (494e: ὁ τῶν κυνάδων βίος), cf. the analysis of this passage by Monoson 2000, p. 164 and her remark that at the end of the conversation ‘Callicles is reduced to advocating precisely the kind of risk-averse conventional attitude he had earlier derided’. That παρρησία on the other hand is a sign of courage is made clear at 494d, cf. 495c where the connection between ἐπιστήμη and ἀνδρεία is mentioned and 507b where the just and pious man is shown to be brave as well. The courage involved in upholding παρρησία is of great importance in the interpretations of Foucault 2009.
36 Socrates certainly did not shun the public ἄγορά and its surroundings, where he used to address all and sundry with unusual questions. Cf. e.g. Xenophon, Mem. 1.1.10; 3.10.1; 4.2.1; Plato, Ap. 17c; Phdr. 230d. Note that at the beginning of the Gorgias Socrates and Chaerophon are just arriving from… the ἄγορα (447a). To my mind the excellent interpretation of the Gorgias by Festugière 1936, pp. 381-400 has after all these years lost nothing of its relevance in showing how in this work vita contemplativa and vita activa are in fact not opposed but reconciled. On the other hand, it should be pointed out (as an anonymous reviewer kindly did) that Callicles’
Then what should we think of Socrates’ attribution of παρρησία and by extention of φιλία to Callicles? Was he utterly mistaken? That does not sound like Plato’s Socrates. Was he being merely ironic or even sarcastic? In any case not in the way most interpretations tend to understand the irony. Callicles does possess the παρρησία Socrates is ascribing to him (viz. the brutal παρρησία he showed in his anti-philosophical harangue): the attribution in itself is not ironic. But it is true that the use of the term is ironic – or at least ambiguous. Callicles’ παρρησία is the παρρησία as it functions in the Athenian democracy: a παρρησία acting frankly and even brutally or provocatively, but vanishing when the majority is unfavorable and the speaker’s reputation is at stake. Contrary to this Socrates gradually introduces a more philosophical παρρησία that does not take orders from a majority but is led only by its own consistency. The irony at play here is what G. Vlastos called ‘complex view of the otherworldly philosopher bears some striking similarities to the view expressed by Socrates himself in the famous Theaetetus digression (172c-177c). However, in this case as well, the conclusion may well be that the apparently approving description of the otherworldly philosopher should not be taken at face value and that it paints a one-sided picture of the philosophical life. See the inspiring discussions, often stressing the contrast between Socrates and this apparently ideal philosopher, by Rue 1993; Mahoney 2004; Lännström 2011.


Cf. van Raalte 2004, p. 288: ‘[Callicles] is simply saying whatever the δήμος wants – a kind of caricature of democratic παρρήσια curbed by shame, strategically adopted by Callicles in daily practice.’ Similarly, at 471e-472a Socrates explains to Polus the difference between refutation in court, where number and reputation (ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούσων) prevail, and philosophical refutation, where truth is all that counts. The situation as we have it in the case of Callicles can be contrasted with the situation in the Laches, where after philosophical παρρησία (178a; 179c; 189a) has done its job, it is ‘by knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) [that] one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule (ὁδὸν πλῆθει)’ (184e [transl. R. Kent Sprague]).

Cf. Foucault 2001, p. 96: ‘[U]nlike the parrhesiastes who addresses the demos in the assembly, for example, here [in the Laches] we have a parrhesiastic game which requires a personal, face to face relationship.’ As we saw earlier, Socrates described Callicles’ particular brand of παρρησία as ‘saying clearly what the others think but aren’t willing to say’ (492d: λέγεις ἄ ν ο ἄλλοι διαλθοῦσαι μὲν, λέγειν δὲ ό οκ ἐθέλονσι). The mention of the others might well be significant in distinguishing everyday democratic παρρήσια from philosophical παρρησία: while the philosopher speaks his mind, Callicles is in fact speaking the mind of the others. Compare Callicles’ breakdown caused by excessive care for his πιθυ with Gorgias’ concern for the wishes of the audience (458b-e). Plato mentions democratic παρρησία in R. 5.557b. On παρρησία in Athenian democracy and political παρρησία in general see e.g. Momigliano 1973; Monoson 2000, pp. 51-63 (with more references at p. 51 n. 2); Saxonhouse 2005; Markovits 2008; Landauer 2012.

The interpretation by Monoson 2000, pp. 161-165 of how ‘Plato appropriates the role of speaking with parrhesia for philosophy (and Socrates) in his effort to articulate the political and moral work philosophy can do’ (p. 165). Although I agree with Monoson’s reading of the Gorgias in general, she tends to overemphasize the similarities between democratic and philosophical παρρησία for the purpose of her general point that the view of Plato as a virulent antidemocrat should be reconsidered. Cf. Erler 2011, p. 162, who discusses the paradoxical combination of παρρησία with Socratic irony (the latter always involving a degree of concealment which the former seems to exclude): ‘[T]he Gorgias illustrates the transformation and integration of political parrhesia into a philosophical context’ (see also p. 157 for a more general characterization of this technique of Plato’s).
irony”: ‘what is said both is and isn’t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one sense, false in another’.

The same goes for Callicles’ ἐπιστήμη and εὐνοεῖα. He was in all likelihood an educated young man and a skilled conversationalist by Athenian standards, and would, thus, as a πεπαδευμένος, able to give account (λόγον διδόναι) of his actions and opinions, rightly be credited with ἐπιστήμη within the Athenian community. He also sincerely seems to worry about Socrates’ life, thus showing a fairly commonsensical εὐνοεῖα until the very end of the dialogue (511b; 521a-c). His ἐπιστήμη (as is the whole of the Athenian education system in Socrates’ eyes), however, is not founded upon a true τέχνη and is consequently nothing like the ἐπιστήμη Socrates introduced, nor is his εὐνοεῖα in worrying about the survival of Socrates’ body like the Socratic εὐνοεῖα which cares for the soul. Three times Socrates has introduced a philosophical version of an everyday concept, and three times Callicles has failed to live up to the newly introduced standards of philosophy and thus of philosophical φιλία.

This φιλία, its ally παρρησία and its enemy κολακεία played a double role in the discussion: on the concrete level of the procedure of the conversation (the practice of philosophy as a dialogue with certain rules, viz. ἐπιστήμη, εὐνοεῖα and παρρησία) and on

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40 Vlastos 1991, p. 31. Cf. also pp. 21-44 and pp. 236-242 (with at pp. 240-241a case study of Socrates’ complex-ironic statement that he is at the same time not a politician and the only Athenian politician).

41 The analysis of Dodds 1959, p. 279 comes close to this by parenthetically remarking that ‘Socrates does not really credit Callicles with ἐπιστήμη (in the Socratic sense)’. More problematic, however, are Dodds’ statements that, while he deems the ascription of ἐπιστήμη ironic, the ‘other compliments [viz. εὐνοεῖα and παρρησία] need not be taken as purely ironical’ and that Socrates’ profession that truth will be attained when he and Callicles will have reached agreement (486e-487e) is ‘not ironical’ (Dodds’ italics). Obviously this last claim can only be uttered without irony if all three criteria (and not, as Dodds has it, only two out of three) have been met (cf. 487a: γάρ indicating the link between the attainment of truth and the three criteria). This apparent inconsistency in Dodds’ interpretation can be avoided by considering complex irony.

42 Austin 2013.

43 Cf. Socrates’ remark that, although Callicles claims to be better, Callicles’ “better” is different from Socrates’ “better” (512a). Foucault 2008, p. 343 at the very end of his 1982-1983 Collège the France lecture series, just after admitting that ‘il faudrait évidemment compliquer un peu les choses, même pas mal, malheureusement je n’ai pas le temps…’, suggests a similar interpretation: ‘Car en fait ce jeu se joue à deux, c’est-à-dire que ni l’épistémê [sic], ni l’eunoia, ni la parrêsia de Calliclès ne sont les mêmes que l’épistémê [sic], l’eunoia et la parrêsia de Socrate.’ Unfortunately, he does not take up the interpretation of the Gorgias in the next year’s lectures (although he mentions the part where Gorgias is speaking, see Foucault 2009, pp. 134-135).

44 To my mind the relevance of ἐπιστήμη, εὐνοεῖα and παρρησία in the Gorgias is not limited to the conversation with Callicles. In a note at the end of this paper I try to extrapolate some of my conclusions.

45 Clement of Alexandria (Paed. 1.11.97.3) cites ἐπιστήμη, εὐνοεῖα and παρρησία as the three reasons why the divine παιδαγογός should be trusted. However, the three criteria are put in a purely biblical context and have as such no bearing on the Gorgias (cf. Scarpat 2001, p. 125-126). A passage from Isocrates’ Ad Nicoclem (27-28) is of greater interest. While discussing what friends (φίλους) Nicocles, the future ruler of Salamis, should seek after, Isocrates advises to grant παρρησία to whomever displays φρόνησις, to be careful for flatterers (κολακεύοντας) and to cherish advisers extending εὐνοεῖα. As in the Gorgias φιλία is thus characterized by ἐπιστήμη/φρόνησις, εὐνοεῖα and κολακεία. Cf. also Isocrates’ letter to Antipater, where παρρησία is considered evidence of goodwill towards friends (Epist. 4.4: τῆς εὐνοεῖας τῆς πρὸς φίλους, cf. 4.9-10) and is opposed to
the more general level of the subject matter of the conversation (the craft of philosophy as the search for the good life). (1) Callicles distinguishes himself from the other interlocutors because of his παρρησία, a concept which Socrates subsequently involves in a new understanding of φιλία. Callicles’ παρρησία and φιλία cannot live up to the standards of philosophy: out of shame he eventually stops speaking his mind, starts contradicting himself and turns to κολακεία by serving the pleasure of Gorgias. (2) Within Socrates’ classification of true arts and flatteries, the rhetorical politics Callicles advocates belong to the κολακεία, while Socrates’ philosophy is in accordance with the cosmic φιλία. Philosophy aims for the good, not merely for the pleasurable. By never contradicting herself, philosophy turns out to be the craft of παρρησία. On both levels φιλία goes hand in hand with παρρησία and is opposed to κολακεία. In both cases the stairway to φιλία turns out to be philosophy.46

As a rule in current scholarship Aristotle is considered the first to develop a philosophy of friendship47. Moreover, if Plato’s legacy is noted, in general only Lysis, Phaedrus and/or Symposium are taken into account48. However, I hope to have enforced R. Duncan’s point that Plato’s Gorgias should also be considered a source of a philosophy of friendship and of philosophy as friendship49. What is more: the important nexus of friendship, the pursuit of ἔδοιχι and χάρις (both signs of flattery, as appears from the Gorgias) (ibid.) and to flattery (Epist. 4, 7: κολακεία). On παρρησία in Isocrates see Landauer 2012 and also Spina 1986, pp. 87-90; Konstan 1997, pp. 93-98 and pp. 101-104; Scarpat 2001, pp. 55-57 and pp. 68-69; Foucault 2001, pp. 80-83.

From the very beginning of the dialogue, the opposition of Socratic dialectic and Calliclean rhetoric is prepared. The Gorgias starts by Socrates and Chaerephon’s arriving late for Gorgias’ rhetorical show (447a: ἐπεδείξατο; 447b: twice ἐπεδείξεται; 447c: ἐπεδείξεν, ἐπεδείξετο; the sophistic terminology is being emphasized, cf. Dodds 1959, pp. 189-190). Socrates indicates that he is not interested in epideictic rhetoric and asks if Gorgias would on the contrary (447b: ἄλλο)’ enter a dialogue with him (447c: διαλεγήσαι). The same opposition is immediately applied to Polus: when Polus wants to take Gorgias’ place – the latter needs some rest after his show – Socrates soon realizes that ‘Polus is more practised in what is called the rhetorical craft (ῥητορική) than in dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι)’ (448d, cf. Socrates’ repeating this at 471d). Throughout the discussion with Polus ‘Plato mocks the rhetorician’s ineptitude at the philosopher’s game of dialectic’ (Dodds 1959, p. 223).


E.g. Price 1989; Reeve 2006; Nichols 2009. Cf. also Fraisse 1974, pp. 125-188; Pizzolato 1993, pp. 37-47. See Fitzgerald 1997a, p. 7 n. 9 for more references. Of course there are exceptions, see e.g. El Murr 2012 and Caluori 2013 on friendship in the Republic; Schofield 2013 and El Murr 2014 (with the references at p. 28 n. 10) on friendship in the Laws.

The theme of philosophy as friendship is not absent from the other dialogues on friendship. See esp. the interpretation of the Lysis by Nichols 2006 and 2009, pp. 152-194. Nichols 2009, p. 154: ‘Far from replacing friendship with philosophy as the truly satisfying human activity, or turning to the philosopher’s relation to wisdom as the exemplar of friendship, I argue that we must understand philosophy as an experience analogous to friendship’. I think passages such as Smp. 203e-204c and Phdr. 252e-256e can be interpreted within the same framework.
flattery and frankness, the occurrence of which has always been situated in Hellenistic philosophy\textsuperscript{50}, seems to have emerged already in Plato.

\textbf{2. The motif in later tradition}

In the second part of this paper I would like to track down this nexus in four later ancient authors, confining myself to passages where \phi\lambda\iota\alpha is linked to the practice of the philosopher coming out of his corner and thus rejecting Callicles’ caricature of philosophy hiding \epsilon\nu \gamma\omicron\omega\nu\iota\varsigma. My suggestion will be that these authors were inspired by Plato’s \textit{Gorgias}.

The texts under discussion are Plutarch’s \textit{That a philosopher ought to converse especially with men in power} and \textit{How to tell a flatterer from a friend}, Maximus of Tyre’s \textit{By what criteria should one distinguish flatterer from friend} (Or. 14), Themistius’ oration \textit{On Friendship} (Or. 22) and Damascius’ \textit{Life of Isidore}.

2.1 Although he was an important exponent of theoretical school philosophy in his time\textsuperscript{51}, Plutarch (ca. 45 – ca. 125) could not possibly be compared to the philosophers Callicles ridiculed. That Plutarch led an active, political life is beyond any doubt\textsuperscript{52}. He could not settle for otherworldliness, nor did he ever leave philosophy in order to indulge in worldly affairs. In the short work \textit{That a philosopher ought to converse especially with men in power} (\textit{Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum}) this balanced attention for both philosophy and politics is exemplified.

In this work Plutarch encourages philosophers to follow his example in not shunning political figures. Somewhat surprisingly it is the philosopher’s task to seek out these figures and to advise them as actively as possible. From the very outset, this turns out to be an

\textsuperscript{50} Konstan 1996a, p. 7: ‘While the association between the three terms [i.e. friendship, flattery, and frankness] may appear to be natural, it is in fact the product of a specific cultural moment. […] [T]he conceptual complex consisting of friendship, flattery, and frankness emerged in Hellenistic discourse’. Cf. Konstan 1997, p. 15 and p. 21. Konstan’s statement seems to presuppose a strict distinction between ethical and political spheres: according to him, whereas in the classical period \pi\rho\rho\nu\sigma\iota\alpha was a purely political concept, in Hellenistic times it became an ethical concept under the influence of the expansion of the political sphere (Konstan 1997, p. 103; cf. Peterson 1929; Momigliano 1973, p. 259-260; Foucault 2001, pp. 86-87; Erler 2011, p. 156 and p. 159). Such distinction however seems untenable, certainly in a Platonic context where the ideal state is a reflection of the well-arranged soul (cf. the criticism of Foucault by Mulhern 2004 and also Spina 1986, pp. 78-95; Gallo 1988a, pp. 21-22; 1988b, p. 121; Whitmarsh 2006, p. 97).

\textsuperscript{51} Cf. e.g. his \textit{De animae procreatione in Timaeo} and \textit{Quaestiones platonicae}. See e.g. Dillon 1996, pp. 184-230 on Plutarch’s theoretical philosophy.

\textsuperscript{52} As a young man he was sent to the proconsul of Achaea as an envoy. Throughout his life he remained closely associated with local politics in his hometown Chaeronea and was no stranger on the Roman political scene. In all likelihood, his rich political career was crowned by his receiving the \textit{ornamenta consularia} from Trajan and his appointment as procurator of Greece by Hadrian. On Plutarch’s life and works see e.g. Russell 2001; Sirinelli 2000; Lamberton 2001. A succinct overview of Plutarch’s political life can be found in Roskam 2009, pp. 17-19, see also e.g. Renoirte 1951, pp. 25-27; Ziegler 1951, cols. 657-659; Jones 1971, pp. 13-38. On his political philosophy see Aalders 1982; Aalders – de Blois 1992; de Blois e.a. 2004-2005.
exhortation to φιλία. In the first sentence the addressee is congratulated because he is ‘prizing, pursuing, welcoming, and cultivating the friendship [with political leaders] - a friendship which will prove useful and fruitful to many in private and to many in public life’ (776a-b; transl. H.N. Fowler modified). The mention of the philosopher’s φιλία, which makes a second appearance later in the work, is followed by a plea for a philosophy that ‘strives to make everything that it touches active and efficient (πρακτικά) and alive, inspires men with impulses which urge to action, with judgements that lead them towards what is useful’ (776c-d). After all, it would have been absurd had the Stoic Panaetius refused to accompany Scipio Aemilianus on an embassy to Egypt and Asia Minor. With a nice feeling for irony Plutarch stages that refusal:

Now what should Panaetius have said? ‘If you were Bato or Polydeuces or some other person in private station who wished to run away from the midst of cities and quietly in some corner solve or quibble over the syllogisms of philosophers (τὰ μέσα τῶν πόλεων ἀποδιδράσκειν βουλόμενος, ἐν γωμίᾳ τινί καθ’ ἴσωχαν ἀν αλών συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἰπεριέλκων φιλοσοφῶν), I would gladly welcome you and consort with you; but since you are the son of Aemilius Paulus, who was twice consul, and the grandson of Scipio Africanus who overcame Hannibal the Carthaginian, I will not converse with you.’ Is that what he should have said? (777b; transl. H.D. Fowler modified)

Plutarch, undoubtedly familiar with Callicles’ tirade, thus echoes the attack on otherworldly philosophers with consent:

Plu.: τὰ μέσα τῶν πόλεων ἀποδιδράσκειν
Grg. 485d: φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως
Plu. = Grg. 485d: ἐν γωμίᾳ

However, the attack on otherworldly philosophy does not entail a denunciation of philosophy across the board. Plutarch is no Callicles. Timid philosophers who make themselves look ridiculous with every worldly undertaking (cf. Grg. 484d: πράξιν) are being mocked indeed, but a philosophy effecting πρακτικά (776d) and not shunning public life (776b: ὁ φεύγων; 776c: ἡμεῖς δὲ φευξούμεθα; 778a: οὐδὲ φεύγει; 778b: οὐ φεύξεται) is, on the contrary, encouraged.

53 On the text-critical problem in the first sentence see Roskam 2009, pp. 147-150. 
54 All translations of Plutarch are taken from the Loeb Classical Library. 
55 The theme of φιλία reappears when Plutarch points out that the goal (τέλος) of human λόγος - both the mental (λόγος ἐνυλάθετος) and the uttered (λόγος προφόρικος) kind – is φιλία (777c). Plutarch himself admits that this theory of two λόγοι is anything but new. His linking of the familiar theory of the two λόγοι to φιλία is however considered original by Roskam 2009, p. 101 (cf. pp. 96-105 for a discussion of the tradition). Perhaps we could compare this novel interpretation with Grg. 507d-508a, where the goal (ἀκοπός) of life is considered temperance insofar as this is in accordance with the φιλία that holds everything together. 
Plutarch opposes this political philosophy engaging in φιλία with rulers to flattery:

They who make those men good upon whom many depend confer benefits upon many; and, on the contrary (τούναυστίου), the slanderers, backbiters, and flatterers (κολάκες) who constantly corrupt rulers or kings or tyrants, are driven away and punished by everyone, as if they were putting deadly poison, not into a single cup, but into the public fountain which, as they see, everyone uses. (778d-e)

Subsequently, Plutarch quotes from Eupolis’ comedy The Flatterers and goes on to contrast the flatterers of a private person with the flatterers of a ruler. The former only corrupt that single individual, thus doing relatively small damage, while the latter corrupt ‘many through one’ (778d: πολλοίς δε ἐνός), thus being the exact opposite of political philosophers who benefit ‘many through one’ (777a: πολλοίς δε ἐνός).

In Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus, as in Plato’s Gorgias, we encounter φιλία as opposed to κολακεία as a characterization of the philosopher’s practice. Although παρρησία is obviously part and parcel of the philosopher’s speaking truth to power, this is not explicitly brought up here57. We find the nexus of φιλία (an important theme in many of Plutarch’s works58), κολακεία and παρρησία completed and again related to the practice of

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57 Roskam 2009, pp. 124-125: ‘The counterpart of the πολιτικος φιλόσοφος […] are the slanderers, denouncers, and flatterers […] [W]hereas the friend always promotes what is honourable and assists the better part of the soul, trying to strengthen and to preserve what is sound and making use of salutary and useful frankness (παρρησία) in order to cure what has to be cured, the flatterer primarily tickles the negative part of the soul.’ The characterization in Maxime cum principibus of the otherworldly philosopher being ‘afraid of every whisper’ (776b: ζοφοδεής) could perhaps be compared to the description in the Gorgias of the otherworldly philosopher ‘whispering’ (485e: ψυφιζομένη). Both characterizations link the avoidance of παρρησία (by not daring to speak in the Gorgias, by not daring to listen in Maxime cum principibus) to cowardice (cf. the semantic analysis of φοφοδεής in Roskam 2009, pp. 151-152). The true philosopher, as is apparent from the Gorgias, is the one who engages in dialogue, who practices dialectic. In Maxime cum principibus the philosopher’s readiness to enter a dialogue is crucial as well (776b: προσθαλαζήτα; 776c: διαλέγεσθαι; 777c: διαλέγομαι; 778a: διαλέγομενος). Cf. also the Greek manuscript title of the work (with the caveat of Roskam 2009, p. 72 n. 6 that it is not certain whether or not it can be traced back to the author):

Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῖς ἤγεμοις δεῖ τῶν φιλόσοφων διαλέγεσθαι.

58 Friendship is an important theme in Plutarch’s work. See, in addition to the works discussed here, esp. De amicorum multitudine (with Van der Stockt 2011 and Giannattasio Andria 2000). The theme reoccurs in numerous other works from the Moralia (e.g. Amatorius, De fraterno amore, De capienda ex inimicis utilete with Pérez Jiménez 2005, Coniugalia praecepta, De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, De amore prolis, De invidia et oto, Præcepta gerenda republicae, …) as well as in the Lives (see Brokate 1913, pp. 48-61; Lucchesi 2007; Giannattasio Andria 2008, pp. 147-148). Lost are furthermore a Letter on friendship (Περὶ φιλίας ἐπιστολή), fragments of which survive (fr. 159-171 Sandbach with Aguilar 2002, pp. 22-25; Giannattasio Andria 2008, pp. 139-141). It is possible that other works devoted to friendship were written by Plutarch, since the Lamprias catalogue mentions two letters on friendship (n. 83 and n. 132). On Plutarch and the theme of φιλία see esp. O’Neil 1997 and also Heybut 1876; Brokate 1913, pp. 1-31; Ziegler 1951, pp. 200-204; Fraisse 1974, pp. 434-441; Pizzolato 1993, pp. 187-192; Konstan 1997, pp. 98-106; Russell 2001, pp. 91-97; Aguilar 2002; Grossel 2005; Teodorsson 2007; Giannattasio Andria 2008; Beneker 2012, pp. 17-39. On political friendship in Plutarch see Van der Stockt 2002; on political friendship in antiquity see Hutter 1978, pp. 25-56; Konstan 1997, pp. 60-67; von Heyking – Avramenko 2008, pp. 21-114.
philosophy in *How to tell a flatterer from a friend* (Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur or simply *De adulatore et amico*)\(^9\).

Here Plutarch addresses the prince Philopappus, the grandson of the last king of Commagene and an important figure on the Athenian political stage\(^60\). The addressee alone leads one to suspect that the treatise will bear some relation to politics\(^61\); in other words: there seems to be a thematic unity with *Maxime cum principibus*. T. Engberg-Pedersen went as far as to suggest that the treatises are two sides of the same coin. Both works discuss the φιλία between philosopher and ruler and both show one side of that relation. While *Maxime cum principibus* was an exhortation for philosophers to pursue φιλία with rulers, *De adulatore et amico* is an exhortation for rulers to accept φιλία with philosophers\(^62\).

The same picture of the flatterer reoccurs, along with the same quotation from Eupolis (50d, cf. also 54b). Again Plutarch states that the flatterer would be relatively harmless if only he aimed at unimportant individuals. Alas he continually has his eyes on ‘ambitious, honest, and promising characters’ (49b; transl. F.C. Babbitt) and thus ‘oftentimes overturns kingdoms and principalities’ (49c). This is underscored by examples from the political realm (e.g. 56e-f)\(^63\). The most effective way to distinguish the flatterer from a friend is to look at παρρησία, ‘friendship’s very own voice’ (51c: ἤδιαν [...] φωνήν [...] τῆς φιλίας; transl. modified). Contrary to the flatterer, the friend knows how to apply παρρησία in a wholesome way, viz. in a way that combines it with εὐνοια (66d; 67d; 72a; 73a; 74c, cf. 59d)\(^64\).

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\(^9\) There is some discussion about the unity of *De adulatore et amico*. Some scholars (Brokate 1913, pp. 5-7; Gallo 1988a, pp. 18-19 and passim; Sirinelli 1989, pp. 67-71) consider the work as an artificial composition of two separate treatises, the first of which (chapters 1-24) discussed friendship and flattery while the second (chapters 25-37) was devoted to παρρησία. Engberg-Pedersen 1996 and Van Meirvenne 2002a, pp. 143-144; 2002b, pp. 257-259 have adduced convincing arguments to cast doubt on that strict distinction.


\(^61\) For a political interpretation of *De ad. et am.*, taking the dedication to Philopappus to be more than a formality, see Engberg-Pedersen 1996 and Van Meirvenne 2002a. However, the caveat of Van Meirvenne 2002a, p. 142 should be taken into account: ‘There are traces that suggest a political aspect in *De ad. et am.*, but only very discreet ones. […] This essay is thus primarily about true friendship and about the nature, behavior, and tasks of a true friend, who clearly must also be a philosopher.’ Foucault 2001, pp. 133-138 only discusses παρρησία in *De ad. et am.* as private παρρησία. See however the sound criticism of Opsomer 2009, pp. 92-93.

\(^62\) Engberg-Pedersen 1996, pp. 68-69 and passim.

\(^63\) Van Meirvenne 2002a, p. 142 connects these passages (*De ad. et am.* 49c; 56-e and *Max. cum princ.* 778d).

\(^64\) Forms of παρρησία and παρρησιαζόμαι occur no less than 76 times in *De ad. et am.*, which covers 65 *Loeb*-pages. The forms ἀπαρρησιάσων (51c) and ἀντίπαρρησιαζόμενον (72e) can be added to this count. Cf. O’Neil 1997, p. 116: ‘This word-group [scil. παρρησία, παρρησιαζόμαι, παρρησιαττήσις] may be the most commonly used one in Plutarch’s (as well as other authors’) discussions of friendship. In many ways the idea may be considered the very foundation of the relationship, for proper use of παρρησία is the surest mark of a true friend,
This last remark suggests that Plutarch is not talking about Cynic παρρησία or about frankness as discussed by the Epicurean Philodemus in his treatise On frankness. Cynic and Epicurean παρρησία do not take εὐνομία into consideration. Although the Peripatetic tradition is rightly named as the most important influence for Plutarch in De adulatore et amico and the themes of φίλια, κολακεία and παρρησία are obviously not absent from the Peripatetic tradition, it is not unlikely that some aspects of Plutarch’s notion of φίλια, like his emphasis on the importance of εὐνομία for παρρησία, can be considered distinctly Platonic and can ultimately be traced back to the Gorgias. I will confine myself to these aspects.

Plutarch underlines the difficulty of distinguishing a flatterer from a friend (50c-51a). The reason for this is that the flatterer almost flawlessly succeeds in imitating the friend: κολακεία is a μίμησις of φίλια (e.g. 50a; 51c; 52b; cf. Grg. 511a); the flatterer even imitates the friend’s παρρησία (59b-61d). The crucial difference lies in the fact that the flatterer only aims at pleasure and thus only imitates the pleasurable part of friendship, while the real friend aims at the good (50a; 51b-c; 54d-55e). This can be compared to the condemnation Plutarch expresses in Maxime cum principibus for those who see friendship merely as a source of reputation, thus only engaging in ‘a deceptive, showy, and shifting appearance in lieu of friendship’ (777e, cf. Grg. 463d).

That εἰδωλον and μίμησις are deceptive is quite trivial for a Platonist. Therefore, it cannot come as a real surprise that in De adulatore et amico, as an opposite to the flatterer,
who is ‘variable and many in one’ (52b) and ‘nowhere constant, with no character of his own’ (53a), we encounter... the (Platonic) philosopher, whose concern is divine truth and the good as understood by Plato (49a) and whose motto is ‘Know thyself’ (49b; 65f: γνῶθι σαυτόν) – the philosopher’s motto par excellence\(^\text{72}\). Friends are philosophical companions in search of truth (53b: συναληθεύοντος καὶ συνεπικρίνοντος, cf. 59d; 62c). This reflects in their caring for each others soul:

One mode of protection, as it would seem, is to realize and remember always that our soul has its two sides: on the one side are truthfulness, love for what is honourable, and power to reason, and on the other side irrationality, love of falsehood, and the emotional element; the friend is always found on the better side as counsel and advocate, trying, after the manner of a physician, to foster the growth of what is sound and to preserve it; but the flatterer takes his place on the side of the emotional and irrational, and this he excites and tickles and wheedles, and tries to divorce from the reasoning powers by contriving for it divers low forms of pleasurable enjoyment. (61d-e)\(^\text{73}\)

Like the philosopher in the Gorgias, the friend in De adulatore et amico is likened to the physician throughout the work\(^\text{74}\). The friend resembles the physician in aiming for the good instead of the merely pleasurable (54e-55b), the medicine (φάρμακον) used by the friend being a judiciously applied παρρησία (74d-e; cf. 55b; 60b; 66a-b; 67e-f; 73a-b). Although the comparison of the friend and the physician (as well as that of the philosopher and the physician, which also occurs in Max. cum princ. 776d) is a topos\(^\text{75}\), it cannot but remind us of the classification of τέχναι in the Gorgias when Plutarch goes on to compare flattery to cookery (51c; 54f-55a), cosmetics (54d\(^\text{76}\)) and sophistry (71a)\(^\text{77}\). Παρρησία, on the other hand, should be appreciated as a true craft (74d: δεί καὶ περί τὴν παρρησίαν φιλοτέχνειν). Thus,

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\(^{72}\) Van Meirvenne 2000, pp. 143-144: ‘True friends are represented as true philosophers, i.e. well-trained persons capable of judging between good and bad on their own, and devoted to a life of truthfulness (ἀληθεία), nobility (τὸ καλὸν), and dignity (τὸ σεμνὸν). [...] De ad. et am. can be considered a strong moral call for a philosophical way of living.’ Cf. Konstan 1997, p. 101; Engberg-Pedersen 1996, p. 68.

\(^{73}\) Like most other Middle-Platonists, Plutarch regarded the bipartite (rather than the familiar tripartite) division of the soul as the correct understanding of Plato’s psychology (De virtute morali 441e-442b, cf. Dillon 1996, p. 194). It should be added, however, that Plato himself in the Republic (4.439e) posits a basic bipartition upon which the more refined tripartition is based, as an anonymous reviewer rightly remarked. See also Opsomer 2012, pp. 321-22 for this point.

\(^{74}\) On references to medicine in the Gorgias, see Vegetti 1967.

\(^{75}\) On the comparison of the friend and the physician see Bohnenblust 1905, pp. 38-39, who also indicates further passages in De ad. et am. and interestingly remarks that the comparison does not occur in Aristotle. On the comparison of the philosopher and the physician in Plutarch see Fuhrmann 1964, pp. 41-43 and pp. 149-157, as well as Said 2005, pp. 22-23, who considers the Platonic influence to be obvious (contra e.g. Gallo 1988b, p. 125 who emphasizes the topicality).

\(^{76}\) Perhaps 60b could be read in the same framework. Plutarch laughingly compares the flatterer, who tries to imitate the physician, to a hairdresser – ‘imagine a man using a surgeon’s lancet to cut the hair and nails of a person suffering from tumours and abscesses’ – thus indicating that, while medicine is a real τέχνη, cosmetics is merely κολακεία.

\(^{77}\) Cf. Opsomer 2009, pp. 114-116, who connects Plutarch’s account of τέχνη in De ad. et am. with the classification of crafts in the discussion with Polus.
in *De adulatore et amico* the philosopher – both Socrates (69f; 70f; 72a) and Plato (52d-f; 67c-e; 69f; 71e, cf. *Max. cum princ.* 777a; 779b-c) serve as textbook examples – appears as the ideal friend and παρρησιαστής, as opposed to the mimicking flatterer.

2.2 Maximus of Tyre was probably born ca. 120 – 125, at the very end of Plutarch’s life. At some point in his life – most likely during the reign of the emperor Commodus (180 – 191) – he was in Rome delivering philosophical orations (διάλεξεις)\(^{78}\). In the manuscripts, one of these orations bears the title *By what criteria should one distinguish flatterer from friend* (Τίσιν χαριστέου τῶν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου, *Or*. 14)\(^{79}\). That alone should remind the reader of Plutarch’s *De adulatore et amico*\(^{80}\).

The oration begins with an adaptation of Prodicus’ myth about Heracles, who is prompted to choose between two roads, one of which has Pleasure as a guide, the other Virtue (apud Xenophon, *Mem*. 2.1.21-34). Maximus substitutes Pleasure for the Flatterer, Virtue for the Friend. The former may be ‘pleasant to the eye’ (ὁδιστός ἰδεῖν), the latter is ‘truthful’ (ἀληθεύστατος). The former is ‘full of praise’ (ἐπαινῶν) and promises extraordinary pleasures (ἡδονάς), the latter ‘says little, but what he does say is the naked truth: that the rough part of his road is long and the smooth part short’ (*Or*. 14.1, transl. M.B. Trapp\(^{81}\)). From the outset the difference between flattery and friendship is clear: as in Plato and Plutarch, flattery only has an eye for pleasure while friendship aims at the good. The difference between the flatterer as singer of empty praise and the friend as truth-teller sounds familiar as well.

Through a barrage of *topoi*, the differences are further explored in the rest of the oration\(^{82}\). Of more interest for our purposes, however, are two extrapolations at the end of the surviving part of the text. First Maximus warns for the political consequences of flattery (7-8): most harmful are ‘flatterers whose rewards [are] not trivial, not confined to the pleasures of

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\(^{78}\) For a vague reconstruction of Maximus’ life (inevitably so, given the scarcity and unreliability of the sources), see Trapp 1997a, pp. xi-xii.

\(^{79}\) Trapp 1997a, p. lviii doubts the authenticity of the manuscript titles. See however Koniaris 1982, pp. 102-110 for an elaborate argumentation in favour of authenticity.

\(^{80}\) Since all parallels between Maximus’ *Or*. 14 and Plutarch seem to be *topoi*, it is impossible to establish whether Maximus was influenced by Plutarch. Cf. Trapp 1997a, p. 125: ‘[T]he general position taken [by Plutarch] is the same as Maximus’, but there are no very close similarities of detail between the two discussions.’; Szarmach 1985, p. 106: ‘[W]ahrscheinlich entnahm er [i.e. Maximus] ihm [i.e. Plutarch] einige Gedanken’. *Contra* Volpe Cacciatore 2000, p. 528: ‘[l]opuscolo plutarcheo [i.e. *De addulatore et amico*] da cui naturalmente Massimo Tirio non poteva prescindere’. Volpe Cacciatore 2000 provides a stylistic and rhetorical comparison of Plutarch’s *De ad. et am.* and Maximus’ *Or*. 14, while Van der Stockt 2011, p. 37-38 initiates a comparison of Plutarch’s *De amicorum multitudine* and Maximus’ other oration about friendship (*Or*. 35), which mainly explores the link between friendship and virtue.

\(^{81}\) All translations of Maximus are by Trapp 1997a; for the Greek, Trapp 1994 is used.

food and sex, but made up instead of the misfortunes of the whole of Greece’. This is the kind of flatterers Maximus says to be flourishing in democracies, a thought well familiar to the reader of the *Gorgias*. The second extrapolation (8) concerns the realm of crafts. More explicitly than Plutarch, Maximus repeats the classification of true crafts and kolakeia as established in the *Gorgias*. By this extrapolation Maximus spells out the link indicated in the *Gorgias* between friendship in the personal/ethical realm and friendship in a broader context. Like Plato and Plutarch he calls cookery (τέχνην ὁψοποικής) a flattery of medicine. Sycophancy replaces the flattery of the rhetoric craft, which Maximus apparently refrained from calling a kolakeia. Finally, sophistry is considered a flattering imitation of philosophy.

At this point the text in the manuscripts unfortunately breaks off. How much has been lost is unclear. Did Maximus continue the extrapolating tendency of his discourse? Did he explore the subject of the philosopher as a friend, like the opposition of flattering sophistry and philosophy might have indicated? That philosophy is the via regia to friendship is after all emphasized in Maximus’ other oration on friendship (*Or.* 35.8). Was there a rebuke of otherworldly philosophers? Reprimands à la Callicles often occur in Maximus’ discourses (*Or.* 1.8; 21.4; 27.8; 30.1; 37.2). Did he go on to tackle the subject of παρφησία? In similar contexts he repeatedly did. In the oration on Socrates’ trial παρφησία is opposed to kolakeia and established as the method of the true philosopher (*Or.* 3.7). In the first oration on Socratic love, Socrates, a philosophical model if there ever was one, is characterized by his παρφησία twice (*Or.* 18.4-5) and in the second oration on this same subject Socratic love is called the source of φιλία, distinguished by παρφησία (*Or.* 19.4).

These questions obviously must remain unanswered, but it is beyond doubt that the subjects of friendship, flattery and – albeit perhaps only in other orations – frankness were dear to Maximus and that he linked them to the practice of philosophy, of which he saw himself as a representative. In any case we unmistakably encounter in *Or.* 14 the double

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83 This passage is linked to the *Gorgias* by Puiggali 1983, p. 415: ‘Le démagogue est le flatteur du peuple. Cette idée, qui vient du *Gorgias* 466a et que l’on retrouve chez Aristote *Pol.* IV 4, 1292a 20, était devenue banale. Maxime la développe en 20, 7e [i.e. *Or.* 14, 7 Hobein/Trapp/Koniaris].’

84 Puiggali 1983, p. 416 presumably refers to this second link with the *Gorgias* when he indicates ‘à la fin, un élargissement de la notion de kolakeia inspiré du Gorgias’. Cf. also Trapp 1997a, p. 131 n. 17 and p. 132 n. 20.

85 Trapp 1997a, p. 132 n. 21.

86 Puiggali 1983, p. 414 sees a reference to the topic of frankness in Maximus’ mention that ‘the friend desires truthfulness in all dealings’ (ἀληθείας ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ, *Or.* 14.6).

87 Cf. e.g. *Or.* 3 on Socrates’ trial. Cf. Puiggali 1983, p. 571: ‘Maxime voue un véritable culte à Socrate’.

88 On Maximus’ self-presentation as a philosopher, see esp. the introductory *Or.* 1 and also e.g. *Or.* 4; 22; 25; 29. Lauwers 2009; 2012; 2015 has particularly drawn attention on Maximus’ self-presentation as a philosopher, thus questioning the modern presentation of Maximus as a Halbphilosoph (e.g. von Christ 1961 [= 1924], p. 767), an
function of friendship and flattery: both on the level of individual ethics and on the more general level of the crafts. We can be fairly certain that this is a reminiscence of Plato’s Gorgias.

2.3 Not unlike Maximus, Themistius (ca. 317 – ca. 385) can be labeled as a philosophical orator. As a philosopher involved in politics, on the other hand, he seems to resemble Plutarch. In 355 the emperor Constantius adlects him to the senate of Constantinople. By then he has been running a philosophical school in the same city for a decade. Soon, however, he becomes a fully-fledged politician and a prominent ambassador for Constantinople. Nevertheless, Themistius kept considering himself first and foremost a philosopher throughout his life. And even though the most of his 34 surviving orations are imperial panegyrics (Or. 1-19), from the so-called ‘private’ orations (Or. 20-34) one can certainly see emerging a competent philosopher, albeit perhaps not ‘the best of philosophers’, as Libanius called him (Ep. 1186).

In Or. 22 Themistius tackles the theme of φιλία. He starts off with a complaint: people enjoy listening to stories about war and strife without wanting to learn about friendship (264c-265a). However, this charge is corrected straight away, for the orator cannot, after assuring himself of his listeners’ attention (attentum parare) with a provocative opening, risk losing their goodwill (benevolum parare). As it turns out, the problem is not that the audience, whose inquisitiveness is beyond dispute (docilem parare), does not want to be instructed on an invented category which obviously has nothing to do with how the author saw himself. On Maximus’ self-presentation see also Trapp 1997b, pp. 1950-1954. On Maximus’ notion of philosophy it is interesting to compare the account of Szymmach 1983, pp. 13-44, who affirms the view of Maximus as Halbphilosoph, with that of Lauwers – Roskam 2012, who pay attention to Maximus’ self-presentation.

Both practiced the genre of διαλεξις, which combines philosophy with rhetoric. Cf. Themistius’ Or. 28, entitled Ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων διαλεξις. Interestingly, Roskam 2009, pp. 25-28 argues that Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus falls under the genre of the διαλεξις as well. On the genre and its characteristics see Puiggali 1983, pp. 23-33.

From that stage of his career some important paraphrases of Aristotelian works survive (edited in CAG 5.1-6). In 357 he visits Rome in the presence of Constantius, around the same time assuming the proconsulship of his city. A year before his death we find him holding the office of urban prefect, a function that has superseded the proconsulship by then. On Themistius’ life and works, see esp. Vanderspoel 1995 and also Maisano 1995, pp. 9-48; Leppin – Portmann 1998, pp. 1-26; Penella 2000, pp. 1-48; Heather – Moncur 2001, pp. ix-xvi.

Cf. Or. 21, where Themistius ironically argues that he is not a philosopher; Or. 23 and 29, where he defends himself as a philosopher after being accused of being a sophist; Or. 24, where he recommends himself as a teacher of philosophy; Or. 31 and 34, where he points out that he did not betray philosophy by accepting public office.

See Penella 2000, pp. 6-9 for the distinction (introduced by modern editores) between λόγοι πολιτικοί and λόγοι ισωτικοί.

It is not surprising that, in a philosophical oration of this kind, docilem parare boils down to affirming the inquisitiveness of the audience a priori. After all, they have come to listen to a philosopher: their showing up alone indicates that they will be eager to listen to whatever the philosopher chooses to talk about. Still the affirmation of the inquisitiveness is all but futile: by stating that his listeners are φιλήκοι, the philosopher
the topic of friendship. The real problem is that they are never given the opportunity to be so instructed:

What you do not seem to me to have many opportunities to hear, however, are orations that can improve people’s lives. This is no fault of yours; it is the fault of those so-called philosophers, who have assumed that it was enough for them to whisper their words to the young in some isolated corner. They thought, as Callicles put it in his criticism [of Socrates], that they could avoid the center of the city and those gathering places wherein the poet says that men gain distinction

(ἐν γωνίᾳ μόνη πρὸς τὰ μειράκια ψιθυρίζειν, φεύγειν δὲ τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως κατὰ τῶν Καλλικλέους ὀνειδισμῶν καὶ τὰς ἄγορας, ἐν αἷς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς ἀριπρεπέας τελέθειν τοὺς ἀνδράς). Well, we must let those philosophers stay where they want to stay; it will be my duty to bring speech out into the light and to accustom it to tolerate the crowd and to put up with noise and with the clamor of the seated assembly. If speech is capable (ικανοῖ) of benefiting people individually, it certainly will be able to benefit many individuals at once. (265b-c; trans. R.J. Penella95)

Again, as in Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus, Callicles’ criticism of the otherworldly philosopher is repeated with consent:

Them.: ἐν γωνίᾳ μόνη πρὸς τὰ μειράκια ψιθυρίζειν

Grg. 485d-e: μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζουτα

Them.: φεύγειν δὲ τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως κατὰ τῶν Καλλικλέους ὀνειδισμῶν καὶ τὰς ἄγορας, ἐν αἷς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς ἀριπρεπέας τελέθειν τοὺς ἀνδράς

Grg. 485d:
φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἄγορας, ἐν αἷς ἐφὶ ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἀριπρεπεῖς γίνεσθαι

Callicles’ reprimand must have been particularly dear to Themistius: it occurs more than once in his orations and he seems to have known it by heart96. Consequently, he also takes it to

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95 Unless indicated otherwise, all translations of Themistius are from Penella 2000; for the Greek, Downey – Norman 1965-1974 is used.

96 Or. 2.30b-c: ‘[You probably reckon a philosopher is someone who] likes to keep on nagging about virtue and courage and manliness to three or four boys (πρὸς μειράκια τρία ἢ τέτταρα) while sitting in his little chair, through weakness not being able to peer out of his little house’ [my transl.] (cf. Grg. 485d-e: μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν [...] τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων); Or. 23.284b: ‘Those who are shooting arrows at me, then, do not want to come out into the open (προελκαίειν) and stand in your midst (ἐν μέσῳ), where they could be seen. They lie hidden somewhere, in secluded spots and caverns (ἐν γωνίαις που καταδεῦκασιν ἢ χιμαρώις)’ (cf. Grg. 484d: ἐπειδὴ ὁ ἐλάχιστος ἐφὶ τις [...] πράξῃ, καταγέλαστοι εἰσίν; 485d: φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως [...] καταδεῦκοτι [...] ἐν γωνίᾳ); Or. 26.313d [Themistius voices his otherworldly critics]: ‘He does not sit quietly in his room and converse solely with his pupils; instead, he comes out into the public arena, does not hesitate to appear in the very heart of the city (ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῆς πόλεως), and ventures to speak before all sorts of people’ (cf. Grg. 485d: τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως); Or. 28.341d: ‘As for the descendants of Socrates [i.e., philosophers], in our day they have vanished and become nonentities – understandably and deservedly so. For they are fearful (I know not why) and wary of public assemblies, where the poet says men become famous, and they cannot bear to look away from their couches and secluded corners (φρίττονοι τε καὶ εὐλαμβάνοι τὰς ἁγορὰς, ἐν αἷς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς ἀριπρεπεῖς τελέθειν τοὺς ἀνδράς, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχονται παρακύπτειν ἐξα τοῦ σκῆμποδος καὶ τῆς γωνίας)’ (cf. Grg. 485d: φεύγοντι [...] τὰς ἁγορὰς, ἐν αἷς ἐφὶ ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἀριπρεπεῖς γίνεσθαι, καταδεῦκοτι [...] ἐν γωνίᾳ); Or.
heart: as opposed to the otherworldly philosopher, who was not able to say anything powerful (Grg. 485e: ἱκανόν), Themistius has the ambition to speak words that are highly effective (ἱκανοὶ)⁹⁷. Although the modus operandi is different⁹⁸, the message again resembles that of Maxime cum principibus (776c-777b; 779f-779c): the philosopher should come out of his isolated corner because in that way he can have a greater impact. By teaching his listeners about true and sincere friendship – the one thing of which he is a devotee (266a: ἐνὸς δὲ εἰμι κτήματος ἑραστῆς, φιλίας ἀληθινῆς καὶ ἀδόλου) – and thus improving their lives, Themistius establishes himself as a true philosopher and as a true friend, thus linking the themes of friendship and philosophy by means of his own persona⁹⁹.

After this exploit of self-presentation, Themistius turns to a member of the audience who is singled out as the ‘leader of this chorus’. Just like the speaker he is said to be truly devoted to friendship (266c). Themistius goes on by arguing that, although friendship is important for a person not involved in politics (ἰδιώτη), it is far more important for ‘the man who oversees many cities and much territory’ (266d). This remark leaves little doubt that the ‘leader of the chorus’ was a prominent political figure¹⁰⁰. By commending the politician for giving heed to friendship and thus obliquely encouraging him to be or become his friend, Themistius repeats the other side of Plutarch’s message: while the philosopher should be open to friendship with public figures (Max. cum princ.), the powers that be should take friendship

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³⁴.¹²: ‘For right from the beginning, when I was young, I chose not to practice philosophy in secluded corners (τὴν ἐν ταῖς γωνίαις φιλοσοφῶν)’ (cf. Grg. 485d: ἐν γωνίᾳ). I take it there are several indications that Themistius is quoting Callicles’ reprimand by heart. (1) Themistius changes the word order. (2) Plato mentions the flight from the ἀγορά before placing the philosopher ἐν γωνίᾳ. Themistius turns it around, even though mentioning ἐν γωνίᾳ in the second place would have made a better transition to the next sentence. (3) Themistius partly restores Homer’s language (II. 9.441: οὐδ’ ἀγοράς, ἵνα τ’ ἀνήρ ἀμπρεπέςς τελέθοισαι), which Plato modernized, by not contracting the ending in ἀμπρεπέςς and by using the epic verb τελέθω.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Criticism on the otherworldly stance of contemporary philosophy often occurs in Themistius’ orations. In Or. 17; 31; 34 he responds to the philosophers who found that by accepting the office of urban prefect he betrayed philosophy. In Or. 26 and 28 he responds to the critiques of (mostly Neoplatonic) philosophers who found fault with Themistius for addressing large audiences. Even in several of his imperial panegyrics he emphasized the importance of philosophy for political affairs (see Leppin – Portmann 1998, pp. 23-24).

⁹⁸ Themistius addresses ‘many individuals at once (πολλοῖς ἄμα), while Plutarch urges the philosopher to benefit ‘many through one’ (Max. cum princ. 777a, cf. supra).

⁹⁹ There are further suggestions that for Themistius friendship and philosophy (viz. the kind of philosophy Themistius professes) go hand in hand. (1) The beneficence of both is emphasized at the beginning of the oration (264d: friendship; 265c: philosophy). (2) To recognize true friendship one needs the assistance of Athena, viz. of (philosophical) wisdom (267d). (3) In the allegory at the end of the oration the right hand of Friendship is Good Judgment (Φροίνης) (280c-282c) – a philosophical ally if there ever was one. Friendship herself, moreover, appears as an ideal philosopher: ‘She had a soul that was more visible than her body’ (281b).

¹⁰⁰ Penella 2000, pp. 17-18 reports H. Scholze’s generally accepted opinion that the ‘leader of the chorus’ is the emperor Valens but leaves open the possibility that Themistius was addressing another emperor or high-level official. Maisano 1995, p. 735 argues that the emperor Constantius is the addressee.
– and preferably friendship with philosophers – more seriously than anyone else (De ad. et am. 49c).\footnote{This double dynamics of philosophy (philosophers should engage in public life and the public should pay heed to philosophers) is an important line of argument throughout Themistius’ orations. The interpretation set out in Méridier 1906 is built around this theme.}

The remainder of the oration, which concludes with the Prodicus myth already narrated by Maximus\footnote{Bohnenblust 1905, pp. 16-22 compares both accounts. Konstan 1997, p. 154 takes the reoccurrence of this myth as an indication that Themistius’ oration was inspired by Maximus’.}, is devoted to methods by which one can find, chase and hold on to friendship. As in the case of Plutarch and Maximus, most of the arguments are topoi, mostly taken from the Peripatetic tradition\footnote{See Colpi 1987, p. 102 and the discussions of Or. 22 by Pizzolato 1993, pp. 197-202; Konstan 1996a, pp. 16-18 and 1997, pp. 153-156; Van der Stockt 2011, pp. 31-35 (in comparison with Plutarch’s De amicorum multitudine).}. To my mind, however, there are some distinctive reminiscences of Plato’s Gorgias when Themistius discourses on the possibility that the quest for friendship can go wrong. Right from the start Themistius urges to guard against ‘pretense’ (ὑπόκρισις), which ‘mimics friendship’ (φιλίαν μιμεῖται) (267b). This warning against ‘the villainous ability to mimic true friendship’ (ἡ πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν κακουργία, ibid.) brings to mind both Plutarch’s warning against κολακεία as a μίμησις of real friendship and Plato’s distinction between real and false crafts (flatteries)\footnote{At the end of the oration the close association between pretense (ὑπόκρισις) and flattery (κολακεία) is revealed: flattery ‘goes in advance of pretense’ (282d). Pretense is, in other words, the consequence of flattery. I do not see any indication for the rather sharp distinction Konstan 1996a, pp. 17-18 and 1997, pp. 153-154 tries to draw between the two concepts.}. Somewhat further Themistius indeed tackles the theme of friendship and flattery\footnote{The flatterer is mentioned briefly and opposed to the friend for the first time at 272d, where Themistius discusses praise.}:

Now there is a big difference between a friend and a flatterer. What really puts them worlds apart is that a flatterer praises everything in his associate, whereas a friend would not let you off if you go wrong. […]. Thus we must gently free our friends from their [moral] diseases, not causing them much pain but not letting them go untreated either. Physicians often leave the knife aside and cure an ailment painlessly by administering drugs (ϕάρμακα). This is also how you should treat a friend. You too can heal your friend by using drugs instead of cautery and surgery. The drugs I refer to are words – not sweet words intended to charm, but words brimming with goodwill and frankness (ευνοίας καὶ παρρησίας). (276c-277a)

Themistius continues to develop the theme of παρρησία and its similarity to the practice of the physician for a while\footnote{Although his core business was imperial panegyric, Themistius claims never to have lost his παρρησία (cf. e.g. Or. 34.14). On Themistius’ (political) παρρησία see esp. the thorough study by Gerhardt 2003 and also Brown 1992, pp. 61-70; Vanderspoel 1995, p. 13; Penella 2000, p. 3. Many valuable insights on how Themistius tried to reconcile the flattering practice of panegyric with the parrhesiastic practice of politics can be found in Vanderspoel 1995.}. He concludes by pointing out the contrast between the good physician and the false physician who is only concerned with the pleasure of his patients. The
latter is not worthy of the name “physician”: he is merely a ‘wine-pourer or table-setter’ (277b-c).

Once again – as we saw in Plato, Plutarch and Maximus – the ethics of friendship is closely linked with the classification of real crafts and flatteries, the friend resembling the physician as opposed to the flatterer, who merely mimics the craft and only cares about pleasure. Returning to Themistius’ reprimand of the otherworldly philosopher we can infer once again that the philosopher who does not hide in a corner is the true friend and that philosophy is the true craft of friendship. Needless to say that by ‘philosopher’ and ‘philosophy’ the audience is supposed to understand first and foremost Themistius and his craft.

2.4 In the cases of Plutarch, Maximus and Themistius the rejection of the isolated philosopher could not possibly have come as a real surprise. Our last author, Damascius (ca. 462 – after 538 AD), is undoubtedly the odd one out. Neoplatonists were for a long time considered to have advocated purely otherworldly philosophies without showing any interest in social ethics. Moreover, Damascius, the last head of the Athenian Academy, is still regarded as a particularly difficult Neoplatonist, indulging in the most abstruse and complex metaphysical problems.

Apart from commentaries and treatises, Damascius also wrote the Life of Isidore (Vita Isidori), at the same time a biographical tribute to his teacher Isidore and a history of Platonism from the mid-fifth century on. The work survives in fragments. In this Vita, which has unfortunately been studied to a large extent as a merely historical source, we get a remarkable characterization of the ideal philosopher:

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107 It is beyond doubt that Themistius had a thorough knowledge of Plato’s works. Although as a professional philosopher he was mostly occupied with the study of Aristotle, Plato has a special place in Themistius’ orations as a literary and philosophical model (cf. Colpi 1987, pp. 85-93). We can be less sure about his knowledge of Plutarch and Maximus (and of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle in general). Certainly there are numerous remarkable thematic parallels with Plutarch and Maximus (Colpi 1987, pp. 131-143 on Plutarch and p. 145 n. 255 on Maximus). It is, however, hard to establish whether these parallels emerge from Themistius’ direct acquaintance with these authors: they could be mediated through other authors or have become ethical loci communes in his time. Cf. Colpi 1987, p. 19 on the problem of Quellenforschung in Themistius. Volpe Cacciatore 2005, p. 490 n. 18 claims, inconclusively to my mind, that Plutarch’s De ad. et am. is ‘presente nell’orazione temistiana [i.e. Or. 22]’; Van der Stockt 2011, p. 32 n. 39 rightly is more careful.

108 On the dating of Damascius’ life see Combès 1986, pp. ix-xi. On his life and works in general Hoffmann 1994 is the most complete account. See also Van Riel 2010.

109 Fortunately, with scholars like O’Meara 2003, who reacts vigourously against the assumption that Neoplatonists had no political philosophy – an assumption he calls ‘the conventional view’ (pp. 3-5) – the times are changing.


111 I know of only two exceptions: Masullo 1987 and O’Meara 2006. I disagree, however, with O’Meara’s philosophical interpretation of the work. O’Meara takes it that Damascius composed the Vita Isidori with the
People tend to apply the label ‘virtue’ to a life of hating everyday business (τῆς μισοπράγματος ζωῆς). I do not agree with this view, for the virtue which engages in the midst of public life through political activity and discourse (ὁ γὰρ ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ διὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἔργων τε καὶ λόγων ἀναστρέφο μένη ἄρετή) fortifies the soul and strengthens through exercise what is healthy and perfect, while the impure and feigned element that lurks in human lives is fully exposed and more easily set on the road to improvement. And besides, politics offers great possibilities for doing what is good and useful; also for courage and firmness. That is why the learned, who sit in their corner and philosophise at length and in a grand manner about justice and moderation, utterly disgrace themselves if they are compelled to come outside and take some action (οἱ ἐν γωνίᾳ καθήμενοι λόγοι καὶ πολλὰ φιλοσοφοῦστες εὐμάλα σεμνῶς περὶ δικαίουσης καὶ σωφρόσυνης, ἐκβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀναγκαζόμενοι δεινὰ ἀσχημονοῦσιν). Thus bereft of action, all discourse appears vain and empty. (fr. 124 A = fr. 324 Z; transl. P. Athanassiadi modified)\[112]\n
Just like Plutarch and Themistius – and this time it is more surprising – Damascius refers assentingly to Callicles’ tirade against the otherworldly philosopher:

**Dam. = Grg. 485d:** ἐν γωνίᾳ

**Dam.:** ἐκβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀναγκαζόμενοι δεινὰ ἀσχημονοῦσιν

**Grg. 484d:** ἐπειδὰν οὐν ἐλθωσιν εἰς τινά ὅδιαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πράξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίνονται

Moreover, Damascius also resembles the previous authors in not considering this an attack on the whole of philosophy. Instead of shunning public life, the real philosopher engages in it.

**Dam.:** ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ

*contra Grg. 485d:* φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως

This makes the real philosopher once again the opposite of Callicles’ philosopher: he is not a coward, a runaway or a ridiculous figure.

Not only does the great danger not come to a weak, as Pindar says, but equally the great man will not take on a small cause; but where others desert (φυγάδες) and run away through unmanliness (ἀνανδρίαν), he will risk himself in the fray where, as the poet says, ‘a man’s worth is brought to light’. (fr. 31B A = fr. 65 Z; transl. modified)

**Dam.:** φυγάδες ἄλλοι δι’ ἀνανδρίαν ἀποδιδόσκουσι

**Grg. 485d:** ἀνανδρίῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντί

**Dam.:** ἐνθ’ ἄρετῇ διαειδέσται ἀνδρῶν κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν [Homer, *Il.* 13.277]

**Grg.:** ἐν αἰς ἐφὶ ὁ ποιητής τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριστεροὶς γίγνεσθαι [Homer, *Il.* 9.441]
The last allusion is particularly elegant: although the quotations are different verses from the *Iliad*, Homer is referred to in the same way and the meaning of the verses is the same.\footnote{This is enforced by the use of forms of ἀνήρ, as opposed to ἄνανθρα and ἄνανθρος, in both verses. Moreover, it is not unlikely that an author had the feeling, due to their semantic affinity, that ἀρετή and ἄρπεντης were etymologically related (probably undeservedly so, according to Beekes 2010 s.vv. ἀρετή, ἄρπ-, ἄρσας). Damascius in particular liked this kind of etymological ventures, cf. Strömberg 1946, pp. 185-187.}

This general characterization is applied to the model philosopher Isidore with another possible allusion to the *Gorgias*. Callicles explained the ridiculousness of the philosopher engaging in real-life business by quoting from Euripides’ *Antiope*:\footnote{On the allusions to Euripides’ *Antiope* in Plato’s *Gorgias* see e.g. Nightingale 1992.}

Each man shines in that and strives for it, devoting the greatest part of the day to it (νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τοῦτῳ μέρος) where he finds himself best.\footnote{The parallel is indicated by Zintzen 1967 ad loc. The changes in the wording may lead one to suspect that this is rather a coincidence than a parallel. It should, however, be taken into account that various readings of the *Antiope* verse are attested (see fr. 184 TrGrFr). Particularly interesting (though not listed in TrGrFr) in explaining the change from νέμων (Plato) to ἀνήλισκε (Damascius) is a paraphrase of the verse in an anonymous commentary on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: ἐπὶ τούτῳ σπουδαίζει ἐκάστος, ἵνα καὶ ὅπως αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ κριτὴς φαίνηται, νέμων καὶ καταναλίσκων ἐντάθη τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῆς ἡμέρας (CAG 21.2, p. 68).} Damascius seems to refer to the same lines but applies them to the opposite message (viz. that the real philosopher is not merely an otherworldly figure):\footnote{Athanassiadi omits Zintzen’s fr. 23.}

[Isidore] was not a lover of money, though thrifty by nature. He was in all respects a wise manager of his household, and spent a large part of the day dealing with its affairs (πολύ τι τῆς ἡμέρας εἰς ταῦτα ἄνηλισκε μέρος), both working himself, and giving instructions to others. (fr. 24B A = §24/fr. 50 Z)

Indeed Isidore, instead of shunning the ἄγορά (*Grg.* 485d: φεύγοντι […] τὰς ἄγοράς) and not being able to defend himself in court (*Grg.* 486a-c; 521b-d) like Callicles described, was a philosopher who, as the head of the Platonic Academy, prosecuted defaulters himself before the courts of the ἄγορά (fr. 24 A A = fr. 53 Z: δικαστῶν ἄγοραίων). He considered the philosopher to be ‘a greater benefactor than an excellent king’ (fr. 149B A = fr. 366 Z, cf. fr. 26B A = fr. 24 Z) and laziness to be ‘as bad as any vice, perhaps the greatest of them all’ (fr. 16 A = fr. 21-22 Z, cf. fr. 23 Z).\footnote{Athanassiadi omits Zintzen’s fr. 23.}

Opposed to the worst of vices stands the ‘mother of virtues’: φιλία, which our model philosopher is said to have cultivated more than any other virtue (fr. 26A A = fr. 49 Z).

Furthermore, φιλία is opposed to κολακεία and entails παρρησία:

[Isidore] was extremely quick to do good deeds (ἐνεργεσίαν) and even quicker to censure vice. This is why he often came into conflict with many people, as he could not bear to gloss over their wickedness; nor did he practice celebrated flattery instead of true friendship.

113 This is enforced by the use of forms of ἀνήρ, as opposed to ἄνανθρα and ἄνανθρος, in both verses.
114 On the allusions to Euripides’ *Antiope* in Plato’s *Gorgias* see e.g. Nightingale 1992.
115 The parallel is indicated by Zintzen 1967 ad loc. The changes in the wording may lead one to suspect that this is rather a coincidence than a parallel. It should, however, be taken into account that various readings of the *Antiope* verse are attested (see fr. 184 TrGrFr). Particularly interesting (though not listed in TrGrFr) in explaining the change from νέμων (Plato) to ἀνήλισκε (Damascius) is a paraphrase of the verse in an anonymous commentary on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: ἐπὶ τούτῳ σπουδαίζει ἐκάστος, ἵνα καὶ ὅπως αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ κριτὴς φαίνηται, νέμων καὶ καταναλίσκων ἐντάθη τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῆς ἡμέρας (CAG 21.2, p. 68).
None of his [i.e. Isidore’s] friends ever accused him of making excuses for inaction or timorous hesitation in times of need, nor of the inactivity which is born of sloth or cowardice. But he himself brought such charges against many of his friends (φιλων). (fr. 16B A = fr. 64 Z)

[Isidore] rebuked error, and exposed injustice and courageously checked wrong-doing with truly paternal frankness (πατρικὴ παρρησία). (fr. 15B A = fr. 18 Z)

Here as in the case of Plato, Plutarch, and Themistius, the philosopher’s παρρησία is never bereft of εὐνοία. Isidorus ‘did not harbour a censorious or resentful disposition towards anybody’ (fr. 15C A = §19 Z) and ‘he did nothing out of hostility or prejudice’ (fr. 68 Z). Not only is παρρησία a part of φιλία, it is also an antidote to mimicking (fr. 23A A = fr. 45Z: προσποιούμενον), which was characteristic of flattery in the Gorgias (464c, d). Isidore’s παρρησία appeared from his consistency: he always ‘said […] the same things about the same subjects (τα αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν) – about virtue and vice’ (fr. 12B A = fr. 75 Z; transl. modified), which was the main criterion of παρρησία in the Gorgias.

Once again we encounter the theme of φιλία, κολακεία and παρρησία applied to the philosopher, who is encouraged to be anything but otherworldly. This rejection of the Neoplatonic cliché suggests that Neoplatonism is perhaps less monolithic than sometimes assumed. While in other works Damascius tends to consider politics beneath the task of the true philosopher, he encourages political activity in the Vita Isidori. While he quotes Callicles and alludes to his speech with assent, the same Callicles is considered merely a sick and irrational man in a surviving Neoplatonic commentary.

2.5 In Plutarch, Themistius and Damascius – and Maximus certainly shared the same outlook – Callicles’ criticism of the philosopher remaining hidden in a corner was repeated with assent. These reminiscences, however, did not serve to reject philosophy as a whole, but to

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117 Contra Athanassiadi 1999, p. 93 and p. 167 I see no reason to follow LSJ s.v. πολυάρατος in postulating for this word, next to the normal meaning ‘much-wished-for’, ‘much-desired’, a pejorative meaning ‘cursed’ which would only occur in Damascius’ Vita Isidori (here and in fr. 60 A = fr. 138 Z, where Salastius is said to commit himself to ‘the popular forensic oratory’. Cf. Asmus 1911, p. 11 and p. 51.

118 Cf. fr. 17 Z (omitted by Athanassiadi): ‘[Isidore] was very severe for who committed an error’. Plutarch (Praec. ger. reip. 802f) also mentions παρρησία πατρική. The opposition of φιλία and κολακεία reoccurs in fr. 100A A = fr. 258 Z. The importance of friendship is suggested again in fr. 105D A = §163 Z. The dangers of flattery are mentioned in fr. 145B A = fr. 351 Z; fr. 146E A = fr. 358 Z.

119 Omitted by Athanassiadi.

120 Cf. also fr. 140D A = fr. 345, where a charlatan pretending to be a real philosopher (τὸ πλασμα τῆς Ἀκαμάτου φιλοσοφίας) is exposed by Isidore.

121 Compare the wording at Grg. 527d: ταύτα δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

122 On Damascius’ view on political virtue in his Commentary on the Phaedo see Demulder – Van Riel 2015.

123 Olympiodorus, In Grg. 21.2; 25.1.
promote the philosopher’s engaging in real life. In other words: the authors took a part of Callicles’ tirade and integrated it in their notion of philosophy – with Callicles they went against Callicles. In the same context, they discussed the theme of φιλία, its opposite κολακεία and its asset παρρησία and linked it to the practice of philosophy. Both motives are in a way connected. Both show consistency as an indispensable feature of philosophy. Φιλία, by entailing παρρησία, is a guarantee for the consistency of words which is essential in a philosophical conversation aiming for truth. The plea for a philosophy that does not shun public life, on the other hand, is to ensure consistency between words and deeds.124

All discussed texts thus reflect on the identity of the philosopher. All of them are in one way or another protreptics or even apologiae125, defending philosophy against the widespread prejudice that it was an otherworldly affair.126 However, the authors had to be careful not to overstep the mark, lest they be labelled “sophists”.127 Thus, the ideal

124 Grg. 488a-b: ‘If you [i.e. Callicles] catch me [i.e. Socrates] having agreed with you now, and later on not doing the same things that I agreed about (πράττοντα ἀπ’ ἀπήρωμάτων), count me a complete idiot, and don’t bother to reprove me ever again, since I won’t deserve anything.’ Cf. 461c: ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις; La. 188d-189a where Laches delights in the harmony between the speaker (i.e. the speaker’s deeds) and the words he speaks and goes on to accept that Socrates will speak with παρρησία on account of Socrates’ deeds. Dodds 1959, p. 225 connects this with the theme of κολακεία: ‘κολακεία is the antithesis of the forthright integrity of word and act practised by Socrates’. See also Gadamer 1972 on consistency between λόγος and ἔργον in Plato. On this topic in Plutarch in general (see notably De profectibus in virtute 79f; 84b-85b) and in Maxime cum principibis in particular see Roskam 2009, pp. 65-69, who considers it one of the ‘basic pillar[s] on which the work rests’ (p. 65). Neither is it absent from De adulator et amico, where the philosopher-friend is said to ‘combine deeds with words’ (55c: τῷ ἔργῳ ἀμα τῷ λόγῳ συνηγαγομεν). Maximus (e.g. Or. 17.214a; 20.239d; 31.352c; 34.1) also state repeatedly that philosophy should combine λόγοι with ἔργα. The occurrence of this topic in Damascius has already been indicated (fr. 124 A = fr. 324 Z, cf. fr. 23B A = fr. 46 Z). On the general importance of an author’s deeds for the interpretation of his words see Mansfeld 1994, pp. 177-191.

125 F. Schleiermacher was the first to state that the Gorgias was Plato’s apologia pro vita sua, i.e. for the philosophical life (apud Dodds 1959, p. 31), cf. Kahn 1996, pp. 125-147, reading the Gorgias as ‘Plato’s manifesto for philosophy’ (see particularly p. 141). Cuvigny 1984, p. 7 spoke of Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibis as an apology for (political) philosophy as did Trabattoni 1985 in the case of Damascius’ Vita Isidori.

126 Attention has been paid in due course to the authors’ rejections of otherworldly philosophy and their self-presentation as philosophers. That the otherworldly character of philosophy was assumed by outsiders, appears for example from Damascius’ statement that “people (οἱ ἄνθρωποι) tend to apply the label “virtue” to a life of hating everyday business” (fr. 124 A = fr. 324 Z). This can be compared to one of Plutarch’s eloquent attacks on otherworldly philosophy in An seni respublicam gerendum sit 796d-e: ‘Most people (οἱ πολλοί) […] think of course that those are philosophers who sit in a chair and converse and prepare their lectures over their books; but the continuous practice of statesmanship and philosophy, which is every day alike seen in acts and deeds, they fail to perceive. For, as Dicaearchus used to remark, those who circulate in the porticoes [i.e. the peripatetics] are said to be “promenading”, but those who walk into the country or to see a friend (τρέχοντες φίλοι) are not’ (transl. H.N. Fowler). Plutarch goes on to describe the activities of Socrates, who ‘lounged in the market-place’ (συνηγραφομένω) with his pupils instead of ‘seating himself in an armchair’. That the same prejudice was ingrained in Themistius’ contemporaries appears from the fact that he had to defend himself against those who no longer considered him a philosopher once he had taken office (Or. 17; 31; 34).

127 On Plutarch’s rejection of sophistry see Stanton 1973, pp. 351-353 (cf. e.g. De audiendo 43e-f, where παρρησία is mentioned as the characteristic by which a philosopher can be distinguished from a sophist). Maximus, too, although one could see why one manuscript calls him ‘sophist and philosopher’ (Laurentianus Conventi Soppressi 4), uses ‘sophist’ as a derogatory term, as we could see in the discussion of Or. 14 (cf. also
philosopher – according to these authors, who were obviously careful to make themselves meet that ideal – was neither an otherworldly intellectual nor a sophist. It must have been important to get that message out, not to their peers – that would merely be preaching to the choir – but to a larger audience\textsuperscript{128}. After all, the philosophers had to position themselves strategically on the education market, which had numerous stallholders in a society without compulsory education, let alone a standardized curriculum. By identifying the practice of philosophy with \textit{φιλία} – and who is not looking for friendship? – and making it accessible to people who did not want to be otherworldly fanatics but were just looking for \textit{παιδεία}, the authors we discussed launched a powerful protreptic. While the sophist (like Callicles) is merely a flatterer and the otherworldly philosopher (like the philosopher from Callicles’ caricature) obviously lacks the involvement to be capable of \textit{φιλία}, these philosophers were the only ones who could truly utter these alluring words in front of their audience: ‘You have got a friend in me.’

3. \textbf{Note: the unity of the Gorgias once again}

The thematic and structural unity (or the lack thereof) in the \textit{Gorgias} has always been an issue\textsuperscript{129}. To my mind, the criteria Socrates proposes for a philosophical dialogue (viz. \textit{ἐπιστήμη}, \textit{ἐύνοια} and \textit{παροιμία}), positioned directly in the middle of the \textit{Gorgias}, form one of the elements of the (organic) unity, in accordance with F. Schleiermacher’s intuition that this work was Plato’s \textit{apologia pro vita sua}: an apology for philosophy. Complex irony is a technique used throughout the dialogue: of each criterion the everyday, non-philosophical use voiced by Socrates’ interlocutors is proven to be deficient and is replaced by a philosophical interpretation of the same term.

e.g. \textit{Or.} 1.8; 18.4; 20.3; 26.2; 30.1). Themistius even devotes two orations to defending himself against charges of sophistry (\textit{Or.} 23; 29, cf. e.g. \textit{Or.} 25.310c; 26.314a-315c). See Méridier 1906, who shows how Themistius presents himself as a philosopher in opposition to both sophists and otherworldly philosophers. Finally, Damascius opposes philosophy to sophistry in fr. 62 A = fr. 140 Z; fr. 108 A = fr. 282 Z.\textsuperscript{128} Ziegler 1951, p. 703 ranks Plutarch’s \textit{De adulatore et amico} under ‘popularphilosophische Schriften’ (cf. Van der Stockt 2011, pp. 19-21 on the notion of popular philosophy in Plutarch). Obviously, \textit{Maxime cum principibus} does not fall under that category. However, although the work is aimed at students of philosophy (Roskam 2009, p. 28), it shows how Plutarch cared about \textit{Popularphilosophie} by encouraging philosophers to conduct philosophy on a more popular level themselves. Maximus’ orations were aimed at beginners, particularly young adults (\textit{νεανίς}) and other interested people who had received a general education (cf. Koniaris 1982, pp. 113-114; Trapp 1997a, pp. xx-xxii). As a consequence, the philosophy in Maximus’ orations is not for specialists; it is ‘philosophy made easy’ (Trapp 1997a, p. xvi). Themistius, then, praised his father because he made philosophy accessible to a large audience (\textit{Or.} 20.235). Themistius evidently continued that mission (cf. Vanderspoel 1995, p. 37). As a consequence, the audience of the oration of friendship is described by Penella 2000, p. 17 as ‘a mixed urban audience’. We can assume indeed that the audience of the so-called private orations was more heterogeneous than that of the public orations, consisting mainly of senators (see Heather – Moncur 2001, p. 29-38 for a detailed reconstruction of that audience). In \textit{Or.} 26; 28 Themistius defends himself against critics who found fault with him for addressing a large audience, considering that unworthy of a philosopher. Finally, the intuition of Athanassiadi 1999, p. 27 that, in his \textit{Vita Isidori}, Damascius is ‘addressing a wider audience, the educated man beyond the confines of a purely philosophical milieu’ is undoubtedly sound (cf. also pp. 47-48).\textsuperscript{129} Cf. Dodds 1959, pp. 1-5 and more recently e.g. Stauffer 2006.
(1) The conversation with Gorgias tackles the issue of ἐπιστήμη. The question is of what τέχνη Gorgias possesses ἐπιστήμη – Socrates himself calling Gorgias’ endeavors ἐπιστήμη (449d) and τέχνη (447c; 448e; 449a; 453a; 454a; 455c)\(^{130}\). In the end Gorgias contradicts himself in first claiming that rhetoric is amoral (456d-457), then insisting on the moral aspect of his craft (460a). His ἐπιστήμη is shown to be ambiguous (460e-d), and therefore not being an ἐπιστήμη in the Socratic sense at all. (2) The discussion with Polus raises the subject of εὖνοια (i.e. what one should wish for oneself and others). Against Polus’ opinion that suffering injustice is worse than committing it and that it is always better to escape punishment, Socrates states on the contrary that there is nothing worse than committing injustice and that it is a sign of concern (480a: κηρῆται) to bring charges first and foremost against oneself and one’s friends (480a: τῶν φίλων). Polus’ understanding of εὖνοια turns out to have nothing to do with εὖνοια in the Socratic sense. (3) As has been shown, Callicles’ παρρησία is very different from παρρησία in the Socratic sense.

The transitions between the three parts are smooth: Polus takes up the issue of ἐπιστήμη from Gorgias (461b-466a) before discussing questions related to εὖνοια; Callicles on his part starts by discussing what he and Polus consider to be εὖνοια (viz. saving the body at all costs; 481b-486d, cf. 486a: εὐνοῶν) before the subject is changed to mainly παρρησία. The cumulative character of the criteria is implied by this structure: while the discussion with Gorgias is confined to ἐπιστήμη, the discussion with Polus combines questions of ἐπιστήμη and εὖνοια and Callicles’ part tackles all three subjects. After Callicles has dropped out of the conversation (i.e. he only remains present to flatter Gorgias), the three criteria, which have been mainly deconstructed by Socrates’ negative irony, are reconstructed positively by including them in the practice of philosophy. Philosophy combines the three criteria rightly and can thus be seen as ideal φίλα: its ἐπιστήμη, εὖνοια and παρρησία heed the cosmic φίλα.

Two recurring motives are interwoven in this structure; both concern the practice of philosophy. On the individual level of philosophical conversation Socrates often reminds his interlocutors of the rules of dialectic (e.g. 447c; 449b-c; 453a-c; 454b-c; 457c-458b; 461a; 461e-462a; 471e-472c; 474a-b; 475e-476a; 482a-c; 495a-b). On the more general level of the philosophical craft the classification of τέχναι, which opposes real crafts to κολακεῖαι, is recurrent (462d-466a; 500a-501c; 517c-518a), cf. the opposition of the orator and the physician (456a-b; 459a-b) as well as the comparison of the philosopher and the physician, who in turn is placed in opposition to the cook (e.g. 521a)\(^{131}\).

4. Bibliography


\(^{130}\) Cf. 448e: τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης; the same formulation at 448b, c (Chaerephon speaks) and 449a, c (Socrates speaks).

\(^{131}\) Cf. supra n. 76. Numerous other oppositions occurring in the Gorgias can be inserted into this framework: the opposition of learning and persuasion (458e-459a), of the good and the pleasurable (462c; 464c-d; 495a; 497a, d; 500a, d; 506c; 513d; 521d), of soul and body (463e; 465d; 477c-d; 512a), of wanting (βολήσθαι) and thinking fit (δοκεῖν) (466c-468e), of knowledge and belief (454c-455a), ... and ultimately of being and seeming (464a). Cf. Dodds 1959, p. 227 commenting on 463e-466a who signals the ‘distinction between being and seeming, inner reality and outward appearance, which runs through the whole of the dialogue from this point’.

33


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