VAN BAEL & BELLIS


#### General Court's Judgment in Lundbeck: A Critical Review

**Brussels School of Competition Morning Briefing** 

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### **The Agreements**



### Facts

#### Facts relating to Alpharma settlement:

- Lundbeck manufactures citalopram, a blockbuster antidepressant
- Alpharma preparing to enter the market upon expiry of the compound patent and had purchased product from supplier
- Just before expiration of compound patent, Lundbeck granted patent on process
- Lundbeck sued Alpharma in UK and threatened to sue elsewhere for infringement of process patents
- Parties settled: Lundbeck paid Alpharma and Alpharma agreed not to enter for 18 months.

# **Potential Competition**

Lundbeck and generics were potential competitors as generics had "real concrete possibilities" to enter the market

-- Generics had obtained or taken steps to obtain marketing authorizations

-- Some generics concluded supply contracts in anticipation of entry

Existence of process patent did not block entry

- -- 50 to 60% chance of invalidity
- -- generic could launch "at risk"
- -- possible to obtain non-infringing product
- -- presumption of validity of patent not the same as


presumption of illegality of generic products

-- Patent did not prevent generics from entering


# "By Object" Infringement

- -- Payment not linked to strength of the patent, but the expected profits of generic entering market
- -- Akin to a straight-forward market-sharing agreement exchanging uncertainty of patent litigation for certainty of no generic entry in return for a payment.

# What's Wrong With This Picture ?




#### No Settlement: 2 Possible Outcomes



### **Criticisms of Counter-Factual**

- It assumes that Generic is more likely than not to win in litigation, which is an incorrect assumption.
- Subtext of Commission decision and General Court's judgment is the notion that Lundbeck's process patent not very strong – but Commission ill-equipped to judge likely validity of patent



# A Better Approach

- Assume that patent is valid and infringed unless compelling evidence that Originator would lose in patent litigation.
- Assumption that patent is valid is more consistent with patent system than an assumption that it is invalid.

### **Relevance of Reverse Payment**

#### Is the direction of the payment relevant?

- Commission/General Court: reverse payment is anticompetitive because it suggests that Originator must think that it is likely to lose in litigation, so it must make a payment to keep Generic off the market
- But direction of payment is a red herring it is a function of the parties' relative bargaining positions and does not necessarily reflect the strength of the parties' claims.

### **Relevance of Reverse Payment**

#### Asymmetry of risk:

 Reverse payment by Originator to Generic simply reflects asymmetry of risk – even if Originator very likely to win, this asymmetry means that it may not want to take a chance of losing.



### **Relevance of Reverse Payment**

#### Key factors creating asymmetry of risk:

- Originator may face mandatory price reductions in jurisdiction of the litigation.
- Originator may face cascading price reductions in other jurisdictions due to reference pricing.
- Originator may incur significant damages due to length of litigation that it may have difficulty recovering.