Patent Settlements under EU Competition Law

VAN BAEL & BELLIS

Competition Law in the Pharma Sector


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
Patent Settlement Cases

Year	Companies	Investigated Practice	Country	Fines
2016	GSK & Generics	Illegal patent settlement agreements	UK	£45 million
2014	Servier & Generics	Illegal patent settlement agreements and illegal acquisition of a competing technology	EU	€427.7 million
2013	Lundbeck & Generics	Illegal patent settlement agreements	EU	€146 million

Commission's Analytical Framework




The Commission's Simplistic Analysis




Question 1: What is the counterfactual? Generic enters and wins in litigation? Less restrictive settlement?

Question 2: Has the Commission proven that its counterfactual is likely (or – in a by object case – so likely that a detailed assessment is redundant)?

Many Counterfactuals Are Possible





Relevance of Reverse Payment

- Is the direction of the payment relevant?
- Commission: reverse payment is anti-competitive because it suggests that Originator must think that it is likely to lose in litigation, so it must make a payment to keep Generic off the market
- But direction of payment is a red herring it is a function of the parties' relative bargaining positions and does not necessarily reflect the strength of the parties' claims.

Relevance of Reverse Payment

Asymmetry of risk:

Reverse payment by Originator to Generic simply reflects asymmetry of risk – even if Originator very likely to win, this asymmetry means that it may not want to take a chance of losing.



Relevance of Reverse Payment

- Key factors creating asymmetry of risk:
 - Originator may face mandatory price reductions in jurisdiction of the litigation.
 - Originator may face cascading price reductions in other jurisdictions due to reference pricing.
 - Originator may incur significant damages due to length of litigation that it may have difficulty recovering.