Heideggers Hermeneutik der Faktizität
L'herméneutique de la facticité de Heidegger
Heidegger's Hermeneutics of Facticity

Herausgegeben von / Edité par / Edited by
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Die Grundbegriffe
Les concepts fondamentaux
The Fundamental Concepts

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Introduction

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The publication of Martin Heidegger's early writings as part of the *Gesamtausgabe* in the 1980s and 1990s[1] deeply modified the reception of his whole work. The first (mostly North American) commentators of these early writings favored a "genealogical" reading. Theodore Kisiel's book, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (1993),[2] is a paradigmatic illustration of this line of interpretation, which treated that part of the corpus as a set of preparatory drafts for the 1927 *opus magnum*.

This genealogical approach was almost always associated with a contextualized reading of Heidegger's early writings, in particular of his Freiburg lecture courses from 1919–1923. Theodore Kisiel, John Van Buren, and Jeffrey Barash, among others, were very sensitive to the historical background of Heidegger's early writing against which he progressively shaped his mature philosophy. They highlight what these early writings owe to Husserl's phenomenology, Brentano's psychology, Neo-Kantian schools of thought, and Diltheyan Life-philosophy, but also, to another extent, to Sören Kierkegaard, Augustine, Paul, Aristotle, and Plato. Consequently, late 20th-century exegesis of the early Heidegger remained for a long time comparative, inso-

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[1]. See "Heideggers Werke" below.

[2]. See also T. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Some other works representative of this philosophical moment are: J. Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger. Rumor of the Hidden King*, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994; T. Kisiel, J. Van Buren (eds.), *Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in His Earliest Thought*, New York: SUNY Press, 1994; J.-F. Courtine (ed.), *Heidegger 1919-1929. De l'herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du* Dasein, Paris: Vrin, 1996; T. Kisiel, T. Sheehan, *Becoming Heidegger. On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927*, Evanston: Northwest University Press, 2007. The history of this postponed reception of Heidegger's early philosophy has been recounted by S.-J. Arrien and S. Camilleri in the editor's foreword of their book *Le jeune Heidegger (1909-1926). Herméneutique, phénoménologie, théologie*, Paris: Vrin, 2010, 7-23.

far as it limited itself to piecing together Heidegger's reading and interpretation of the aforementioned thinkers. From a doxographic point of view, these genealogical and comparative approaches have undoubtedly been very fruitful. Among other things, they made clear that Heidegger's early philosophy, far from being unmoored and isolated, was in fact deeply grounded in main issues, representatives, and concepts of late 19ᵗʰ-century German philosophy. Heidegger struggled from the start to find his own way – a way that would ultimately lead him to write *Being and Time*.

There are, however, some limitations to those approaches. Over the last two decades, a new generation of commentators of the early writings (among them Christian Sommer, Sophie-Jan Arrien, Francisco de Lara, etc.) has cast some doubt on the relevance of a reading that is mainly, and sometimes merely, retrospective. The most valuable contribution of this new line of approach was perhaps to draw attention to the fact that "comparative" readings tend to overlook the relative originality of Heidegger's early thinking, both in comparison to the work of his predecessors, and to the later developments of his own thought. In other words, the first wave of commentators more or less explicitly denied that the early Heidegger had developed an autonomous philosophy. Conversely, the new commentators favored an "immanent" reading of the early writings. This allowed them to emphasize the specificity of the methodology, concepts, and philosophical objects to be found in what is now commonly known as Heidegger's "phenomenology of life," or "hermeneutics of facticity."

Expanding on this recent reading, the present book aims to shed new light on Heidegger's early philosophy by analysing some of its *fundamental concepts*. Heidegger's early writings present themselves as a radical reformulation of the task of philosophy in general, and that implies a whole new set of concepts. This volume will focus on the peculiar and *ad hoc* vocabulary of Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity. However, its purpose is less to draw up a kind of *Lexikon* than to examine the "conceptual signature" of Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity within the history of philosophy.

A first set of concepts are clearly inherited from the (historical or contemporary) philosophical tradition, although they are invested with new meaning within Heidegger's phenomenology of life: *Intentionalität, Kategorie, Kairos (kairologisch), Leben/Erlebnis, Phänomen, Phänomenologie, Psychologie, Ontologie, Wissenschaft, Theorie, Ursprung/Ursprünglichkeit, Verstehen, Verantwortung, Weltanschauung, Wert/Geltung*, etc. Other concepts are typical of Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, but disappeared in

his later philosophy: *Formale Anzeige, Begriff (Ausdrucksbegriff, Ordnungs-begriff), Diahermeneutik, Grunderfahrung, (sich-selbst) Haben, Das Heute, Rhythmus, Ruinanz, (hermeneutische) Situation, Selbstgenügsamkeit des Lebens, Vollzug, Selbst-, Mit-, Um-welt,* etc. Lastly, there are some concepts that Heidegger introduced during the early period, and which he retained, sometimes with a different meaning, in the later work: *Alltäglichkeit,* das *"Als", Angst, Bekümmerung/Sorge, Augenblick, Auslegung/Interpretation, Bedeutsamkeit/Bedeutung, Bewegtheit/Bewegung, Destruktion/Abbau, Existenz, Faktizität, Geschichtlichkeit, Das Man, Vorgriff/Vorhabe, Wie (Grundwie), Wiederholung, Zeitigung,* etc.

The systematic explorations of these concepts will lead us to a better understanding of Heidegger's early philosophy and to new insights on its originality.

The twelve articles collected in this volume are divided into six sections, each with a different conceptual focus. The first two articles (Arrien, De Lara) address the concept of "science" (*Wissenschaft*) and seek to clarify what Heidegger had in mind when he coined the expression "originary pre-theoretical science." The second section (Guidi, Gauvry) deals with methodological issues, focusing on the method itself of the newly designed philosophy (formal indication, *formale Anzeige*), as well as on the status of its novel concepts. The third section (Farin, Serban, Fagniez) is concerned with central concepts in Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, namely that of life (*Leben, Erleben*) and lived-experience (*Erlebnis*). The fourth section (Sasaki, Eychenié) analyses Heidegger's reformulation of the concept of "inner life" through an analysis of the concepts of "mood" (*Stimmung*) and "inner experience" (*innere Erfahrung*). The fifth section (Floyd, Camilleri) delves deeper into the complex connection between the hermeneutics of facticity and the philosophy of religion by reviewing the elemental concepts of "inner experience," "proclamation" (*Verkündigung*), and "Christian facticity" (*christliche Faktizität*). The last section (Camilleri, Slama) investigates the social dimension of facticity by interrogating the place of "intersubjectivity" and "social intentionality" in the early Heidegger.

Sophie-Jan Arrien's opening chapter identifies the theoretical relevance as well as the limits of the philosophical undertaking of the early Heidegger. His critical yet productive effort to elaborate a new type of conceptuality (e.g. "formal indicative" conceptuality) is explicitly rooted in the mobility of life it strives to describe. Arrien shows how the idea of an "originary pre-

theoretical science," from its first appearance in the 1919 "war-emergency semester," sets the scope, methodological goal, and conceptual requirements of the "hermeneutics of facticity" to come.

Francisco de Lara examines some key elements of Heidegger's early philosophical project as they are outlined in the lecture courses taught between 1919 and 1921. His aim is to scrutinize Heidegger's conception of philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. In particular, he problematizes and analyzes the tension between "originary science" and "science of origin" in order to gain a better grasp of Heidegger's understanding of the task of philosophy in its relationship to concrete existence.

Lucilla Guidi analyzes the performative dimension of Heidegger's phenomenological language through the method of formal indication. She argues that Heidegger's specific use of language entails a performative dimension. It does not communicate any semantic content, but rather makes a transformative enactment that is required from the reader as well. In that respect, the method of formal indication can be seen to stand in continuity with Greek and Christian concepts of conversion. By analyzing the difference between formal indication and objective concepts, Guidi shows that formal indication may be understood as a critique and a radicalization of Husserl's occasional expressions. Finally, by examining Heidegger's concept of guilt in *Being and Time*, she shows how Heidegger continued to use formal indication in that later work, albeit without thematizing it.

Charlotte Gauvry focuses on the early Heidegger's concept of anticipation (*Vorgriff*) in order to outline the main features of his philosophical method and, more precisely, the specificity of his theory of "concepts." First, she clarifies the meaning of the "anticipation" concept by contrasting it with some kindred Heideggerian concepts, like idea (*Idee*) and prefiguration (*Vorzeichung*). Second, she characterizes the role played by anticipation in Heidegger's "formal indication" method as a connection between *Gehaltssinn* and *Bezugssinn*. She illustrates this interpretation by analyzing one of Heidegger's own examples: the concept of "history." This allows Gauvry to draw conclusions on both the formal and experiential aspects of concepts in the early Heidegger.

In his chapter, Ingo Farin shows that Heidegger uses the concept of life in four different theoretical contexts: (1) the theoretical claim that life is the ground for all theory and scientific thematization; (2) the phenomenology of life, which delineates the structures of lived life in the world; (3) the metaphysical postulation of a "pre-worldly" life as pure potentiality; and (4) the

theoretical claim that all life-relations are executed by the self, making it the center of lived life. The first two contexts are constructive, whereas the last two are critical and deconstruct the customary self-sufficiency of the objectivities in the world. Farin argues that Heidegger conspicuously avoids any attempt to unify these very different conceptions into one coherent life-philosophy. Instead, he uses the life-philosophical idiom of his time to articulate such themes as the everyday immersion in a meaningful and pre-theoretical world, the essential world-distance of the self, and the ontological difference between the pure potentiality of Being and the actuality of entities in the world.

Claudia Serban analyzes the strategy Heidegger develops in order to give a pre-theoretical and non-objectifying description of the structure of lived-experience (*Erlebnis*) in his 1919 and 1920 Freiburg lecture courses. In this way, Heidegger gave a fresh start to philosophy in general, and to phenomenology in particular. Serban explores the meaning and consequences of this choice. She shows how several key concepts that the young Heidegger will abundantly use at least until *Being and Time* – such as worldliness (*Weltlichkeit*), significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*), accomplishment (*Vollzug*), and historicity (*Geschichte*) – progressively emerge in this early description of *Erlebnis*. She also argues that this conceptual framework allows Heidegger's remarkable characterization of lived-experience as an enowning (*Ereignis*) to appear as grounded and consistent: the enowning of the *Erlebnis* is to be understood both as accomplishment and as intrinsically historical.

Guillaume Fagniez examines how Heidegger develops his early concept of world from the perspective of life. Heidegger unfolds the life-world as a hermeneutical concept of the world, that is to say, as a concept based on the practical articulation of meaning and life and characterized by its processuality. But this anchoring of the world in life raises difficulties that are reflected by the internal tension of the conceptual triad: *Selbstwelt*, *Umwelt*, and *Mitwelt*. The chapter sheds light on the disappearance of this triad from Heidegger's philosophical vocabulary by pointing out the paradigmatic function of *Umwelt* in the initial determination of the world as such. Finally, it draws attention to the fact that the world progressively takes on the meaning of dispossession of life and non-coincidence with oneself. Because the world is, moreover, conceived as an ontological model inadequate to life, the overcoming of the world as a hermeneutical concept appears to be a presupposition of self-interpretation of life as such.

Masatoshi Sasaki takes up an original stance by arguing that the early

Heidegger's phenomenological inquiry into facticity soon led him to discover that "being in the world" means nothing other than "being brought in a disposition in the world," and that the very phenomenon of "disposition" (*Stimmung*) has the power to unveil the basic characteristics of the being of life (*Leben*) or *Dasein*. Sasaki further argues that if *Stimmung* has such a power, then it is bound to play a prominent methodological role part in the hermeneutics of facticity.

Mathieu Echeynié, for his part, reminds us that Heidegger, from the *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1919/1920) onwards, seems to drop the idea of an interiority of the self: he explains that the examination of the pure life, in which he intends to be engaged, is not an internal examination. However, Echeynié argues that it should not lead us to conclude that the early Heidegger totally breaks away from the idea of interiority. One concept, forged during the first Freiburg lecture courses, testifies in particular to the persistence of this idea in the early Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, namely the concept of *Selbstwelt*, world of the self. The point of the chapter is to determine the meaning and sources of this conception of the self's interiority. The chapter focuses on three texts of Heidegger's phenomenology of religion: the lecture courses on Paul (1920/21), those on Augustine (1921), and a brief talk entitled *The Problem of Sin in Luther* (1924). Echeynié attempts to demonstrate that the early Heidegger finds in Luther, and more precisely in his interpretation of Paul's inner man, a genuine conception of interiority, one that is compatible with the life's being in the world.

Gregory Floyd focuses on Heidegger's 1920/21 course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, which he reads in the light of the clarifications and contextual claims provided in the later courses. First, Floyd examines how Heidegger articulates the prejudice for the theoretical in contemporary religious scholarship and shows why it is philosophically and phenomenologically problematic. He then seeks to clarify the meaning of formal indication, especially in the context of the phenomenology of religion. He shows that formal indication is intended as a procedure for circumventing our "falling" into theoretical significance. Finally, relying on the *Ontology* lecture course of 1923, Floyd explores how language ultimately manifests both phenomena and our prejudices. What we see in the religion courses is a preference for the given language of Paul and Augustine over the objective language of a science of religion or philosophy. This is a central dimension of the hermeneutics of facticity, one that holds beyond the religious realm to all phenomena. To favor common sense or everyday language in the initial phe-

nomenological description of experience is part of the process of formal indication.

Sylvain Camilleri explores the meaning and scope of intersubjectivity in Heidegger's early work, especially his phenomenology of religion. While acknowledging that Heidegger, like many of his peers and mentors (Dilthey, Husserl, or the Neo-Kantians), for the most part follows the "subjective way" as the way to go back to the origins of life and lived-experience, Camilleri argues that Heidegger – unlike his predecessors – did thematize more or less elliptically an "intersubjective way" in parallel with and in addition to the subjective one. Consequently, he turns to Heidegger's lecture courses on Paul from 1920/21 in order to analyze his understanding of with-world (*Mitwelt*), community (*Gemeinde*), and empathy (*Einfühlung*) in the context of early Christian facticity. Camilleri's goal is to show precisely under what conditions it might be possible to really acquire knowledge of one's (inner) self through the other.

Paul Slama's closing chapter contrasts the hermeneutics of the early Heidegger with the "comprehensive sociology" of Max Weber about social intentionality. The heart of the controversy is explicitly present in one of Heidegger's lecture courses, and resides in the way he describes collective intentionality. In Weber, collective intentionality is mostly irrational, but it must nevertheless be considered by sociology "as if" it were rational and teleological, even if the price to pay for that "as if" is a theoretical transformation of the social object. In the early Heidegger, while ordinary intentionality is indeed social, the description must preserve the singularity of the lived-experiences by means of variation and formal indication. In describing this controversy, Slama wants to show how phenomenology might be able to account for social reality. To this end, he underscores everything that separates phenomenology from a certain conceptual sociology [3].