


# Factors influencing the participation to individual and community forest conservation compensation agreements in Bolivia

## INTRODUCTION and OBJECTIVES

Designing forest conservation compensation programs that are successful over the long term requires to understand precisely the motivations underlying land-use behaviors in order to correctly target the causes of deforestation and build on different types of motivations to conserve forest.

Objectives :

- 1 Identify the initial causes and motivations of pre-intervention deforestation behaviours
- 2 Identify the motivations and barriers to participate to forest conservation agreements



## STUDY ZONE and DATA USED

Study Zone : two municipalities in the Bolivian inter-andean valleys



Randomized Control-Trial Experiment with 3-years Voluntary In-kind Forest Conservation Compensation Agreements

- Control Communities (Conservation agreements not offered)
- Communities with agreements offered on individual plots
- Communities with agreements offered on communal plots

Variables at the household level

Remote sensing data (Global Forest Change Dataset: Hansen et al., 2013) used to quantify deforestation behaviours on individual plots

= Defor

AND

Pre-intervention household face-to-face questionnaire survey (Natura Foundation Bolivia, 2014) Households' socio-economic and psycho-social characteristics =

- $X_1, \dots, X_n$  : economic factors
- $Y_1, \dots, Y_n$  : pro-social factors
- $Z_1, \dots, Z_n$  : pro-environmental factors

Voluntary Participation in the individual or communal agreements = Binary variable  $Particip = 1$  or  $0$

## MODELS and MAIN PRELIMINARY RESULTS

A. Analysis of the causes and variables affectig deforestation behaviours using **sample A** :

$$Defor_{2000-2016} = f(x_1, \dots, x_n; y_1, \dots, y_n; z_1, \dots, z_n) \text{ [Censored Model]}$$

B. Analysis of the motivations and barriers to participate to individual conservation agreements using **sample B** :

$$P(Particip_{ind}=1) = g(x_1, \dots, x_n; y_1, \dots, y_n; z_1, \dots, z_n) \text{ [Logistic Model]}$$

C. Analysis of the motivations and barriers to participate to communal conservation agreements using **sample C** :

$$P(Particip_{com}=1) = h(x_1, \dots, x_n; y_1, \dots, y_n; z_1, \dots, z_n) \text{ [Logistic Model]}$$

| Variable                      | A. Deforestation (ha)                                      |                      | B. Participation in individual agreements |                      | C. Participation in communal agreements |                      |    |
|-------------------------------|--|----------------------|---|----------------------|---|----------------------|----|
|                               | Coefficient  | P-value significance | Probability                               | P-value significance | Probability                             | P-value significance |    |
| Economic Factors              | Number of household members                                | -0.239               | ns  | 0.516                | ns                                      | 0.563                | *  |
|                               | Age of head of Household                                   | -0.006               | ns  | 0.496                | ns                                      | 0.493                | *  |
|                               | Number of cows   | 0.058                | *   | 0.501                | ns                                      | 0.508                | *  |
|                               | Grazing area   | 0.021                | **  | 0.500                | ns                                      | 0.501                | ns |
|                               | Ownership of grazing areas                                 | 2.143                | ns  | 0.854                | **                                      | 0.359                | ns |
|                               | Ownership of cultivated areas                              | 0.060                | ns  | 0.549                | ns                                      | 0.811                | *  |
|                               | No other remunerated activity (not dependent on land)      | 1.763                | .   | 0.661                | .                                       | 0.552                | ns |
| Pro-social Factors            | Perceived forested land suitability for agrarian purpose   | 3.740                | *   | 0.824                | **                                      | 0.664                | ns |
|                               | Member of an association of dairy/breeding producers       | -4.169               | *   | 0.736                | *                                       | 0.387                | ns |
|                               | Member of a water cooperative                              | -2.085               | *   | 0.510                | ns                                      | 0.634                | ns |
|                               | Number of days of collective work on neighbours' plot      | -0.009               | ns  | 0.638                | **                                      | 0.481                | ns |
|                               | Number of days of collective work on their own plot        | 0.021                | ns  | 0.448                | ns                                      | 0.695                | *  |
| Pro-environmental Factors     | Confidence in Institutions and NGOs                        | 1.415                | ns  | 0.802                | .                                       | 0.772                | .  |
|                               | Perceived consequences of water problems related to health | -0.613               | ns  | 0.646                | .                                       | 0.720                | *  |
|                               | Desire for support in environmental management             | -0.636               | ns  | 0.621                | ns                                      | 0.889                | *  |
| Forests kept for conservation | 1.619  | ns                   | 0.266                                     | ns                   | 0.725                                   | ns                   |    |
| AIC                           | 380.95   |                      | 360.34                                    |                      | 290.76                                  |                      |    |
| n                             | 136  |                      | 295                                       |                      | 470                                     |                      |    |

Signif. codes:

\*\*\* < 0.001

\*\* < 0.01

\* < 0.05

. < 0.1

'ns' >= 0.1

## DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION

Regarding economic factors :

- Deforestation that occurred between 2000 and 2016 is significantly related to livestock farming → The objective of the project to reduce livestock farming is justified.
- Farmers have to present their property document to enter in the individual agreements → A significant barrier to participate is the ownership of grazing areas (including grasslands and grazed forests), which are eligible for conservation as opposed to cultivation areas.
- Farmers do not need property document to enter in communal agreements as conservation is realized on communal land → Farmers who own the area they cultivate (who do not cultivate in the communal area) are more willing to participate in communal agreements, as they may have more security regarding their agricultural activity and would suffer less from potential extension limits due to conservation.
- Farmers who have kept forest because it was not an area suitable for other purposes have deforested more and participate more in individual contracts → The direct environmental additionality of the agreements may be low, because the compensation seem to reward some people for conserving forest on an area that is not subject to deforestation which will not require any behaviour change from them (pers. obs. on the process for the designation of the conservation areas). Moreover, the utilitarian perception of forested land as a land reserve may be a cause of deforestation.

Regarding pro-social factors :

- Farmers who are members of an association of dairy/breeding producers have deforested less and participate more in individual contracts → Lower dependence on the forest and/or existence of pro-social norms?
- Farmers who have done many days of collective work on the plots of other community members also participate more → The conservation program could echo pro-social norms of collective work, since the compensation agreements are presented to farmers as a form of "ayni" (ancestral collective work) towards Mother-Earth (Bétrissey & Mager, 2015).

Regarding pro-environmental factors :

- No existing pro-environmental values or attitudes are reducing deforestation → This does not mean that they do not exist, but that the methodology used to measure them may not be the most appropriate or that they do not have the opportunity to express themselves in the presence of other more decisive economic and social causes of deforestation → Any program wishing to reduce deforestation must address the existing economic and social causes while building on existing pro-environmental values and creating new ones.
- Pro-environmental factors do not influence participation in individual agreements but do influence participation in communal agreements, where economic and social factors have less influence.

To go further:

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Analysis of the factors affecting compliance with the conservation compensation program :

$$Compliance = f(Defor_{2000-2014}, X_1, \dots, X_n; Y_1, \dots, Y_n; Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$$

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Analysis of the impact of the conservation compensation program using the Randomized Control Trial Design on deforestation behaviours and its causes and motivations

## References

Hansen et al., 2013. High-resolution global maps of 21st-century forest cover change. *Science*, 342(6160), 850-853.  
Natura Foundation Bolivia, 2014. *Pre-intervention household face-to-face questionnaire survey*, Unpublished raw data., Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia.  
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