Effect of Voltage Constraints on the Exchange of Flexibility Services in Distribution Networks

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Introduction

- European energy sector and regulation
- Gredor project
 - Collaborative project with actors of Belgian electricity sector (TSO, 2 DSO, producers and retailers)
 - Think about new ways to operate the distribution sytems of the future, from investment planning to real-time control





Unbundling in Europe Energy Sector

- A DSO cannot
 - directly control the production means connected to its network
 - be a retailer
- European directive (Article 26 of the directive 2009/72/EC)

2. In addition to the requirements under paragraph 1, where the distribution system operator is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, it shall be independent in terms of its organisation and decision-making from the other activities not related to distribution. In order to achieve this, the following minimum criteria shall apply: (c) the distribution system operator must have effective decisionmaking rights, independent from the integrated electricity undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. In order to fulfil those





Fit and forget Vs.Transactive energy

- Fit and forget
 - Network planning based on critical scenarios
 - Operational margins always ensured without control over the loads or the generation sources
 - May lead to prohibitive reinforcement costs
- Transactive energy (active network management)
 - Network planning using the flexibility services proviced by generation sources, loads and storage





Flexibility services covered by Interaction models

Framework defining the interactions between the actors





Access bounds and access contracts







Flow of interactions

- Bullets: optimization problems
 - Grid users Arrows: flow of information Producers & Retailers Flexibility Global baseline contracts TSO Flexibility Local Settlement baselines offers DSO Flexibility Flexibility activation needs requests Flexibility platform



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A day in the life of a grid user

- 1. Sends its baseline to the TSO and DSO
- 2. Obtains flexibility needs of the flexibility service users
- 3. Proposes flexibility offers
- 4. Receives activation requests
- 5. Decides the final realizations





Studied interaction models

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	
Access type	Restricted	Dynamic	Unrestricted	
Financial	None	None	Full	
compensation				

Full financial compensation:

- DSO pays a reservation and activation cost
- DSO pays for the resulting imbalance cost caused by the activation of flexibility services





DSIMA

- Distribution System Interaction Model Analysis
- Open source test bed available at http://www.montefiore.ulg.ac.be/~dsima/
- Implemented in Python
- Every agent modelled individually with mixed-integer linear programs
- Optimization written in ZIMPL and optimized using SCIP






DSIMA

• HTML interface to visualize the results

Power & Energy Society*



Network flow Vs. Linear power flow

- Network flow
 - Takes into consideration line capacity constraints
- Linear power flow
 - Takes into consideration line capacity and voltage constraints, but neglect losses
 - S. Bolognani and S. Zampieri, "On the existence and linear approximation of the power flow solution in power distribution networks," *IEEE Trans. on Power Systems*, no. 99, 2015





Bounded approximation error



Linearizing constraints

- Maximum power constraints
- Minium and maximum voltages constraints






Conservative error of 3.5% with a voltage angle of 15°



Test system

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
- Test system based on a real MV distribution network from ORES (Belgium DSO)
- 328 MV buses





Results – Welfare


Sum of the benefits and costs of each actor with their sign, and a protection cost (penalty for under and over-voltages, cost of shedding)







Results



Conclusion

- With voltage constraints
 - Weaknesses in model 0 and 2 (restricted and unrestricted)
 - Model 0 is too restrictive
 - Model 2 is too permissive
- Motivates the use of model 1 (dynamic) as a solution in-between
 - All problems are not solved using flexibility
 - Some reinforcement necessary
 - Can be identified with the simulations









Results breakdown

	Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		
	Netflow	LinOPF	Netflow	LinOPF	Netflow	LinOPF	
Welfare	19216	15616	19216	18888	19216	16725	€
Protections cost	0	318	0	283	0	2393	€
DSOs costs	0	0	0	0	0	0	€
TSOs surplus	-2349	-2492	-2349	-2376	-2349	-2349	€
Producers surplus	19010.6	15891.8	19010.6	19007.7	19010.6	19059.7	€
Retailers surplus	2554.06	2534.31	2554.06	2535.32	2554.06	2407.57	€
Total production	633.14	501.1	633.14	624.22	633.14	629.05	MWh
Total consumption	-1142.74	-1141.4	-1142.74	-1141.53	-1142.74	-1133.44	MWh
Total imbalance	0	0.32	0	0.28	0	1.58	MWh
Max. imbalance	0	0.03	0	0.03	0	0.29	MW
Total usage of flex.	29.63	26.82	29.63	27.42	29.63	29.63	MWh
Total energy shed	0	-0.32	0	-0.28	0	-1.3	MWh





Protection cost and quality of service

- Shedding of MV buses
 - Value of Lost Load (VOLL)
 - VOLL: 1000 €/MWh
- Under- and Over-voltages
 - Base power: Sb: 100 MVA
 - Base voltage: Vb: 10 kV
 - VOLL*Sb/Vb = 10 000 €/kV
 - ± 5% voltage variations



