Adolf Reinach’s Philosophy of Logic


Reinach was one of the most eminent representatives of the so-called “realist phenomenology” — a term which usually encompasses Husserl’s first pupils in Göttingen. In spite of his untimely death in 1917 at the age of 33, Reinach left a profound and powerful work, the significance of which went unrecognized until rediscovered by Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, James DuBois, and Karl Schuhmann about twenty years ago.¹ His numerous writings are devoted to a wide range of philosophical topics, especially language, right, action, and realist ontology.

The present study is about one of the most innovative aspects of Reinach’s philosophy, namely his theory of states of affairs. Its purpose is to show that this theory — like, to a lesser extent, Meinong’s theory of object, with which it has striking similarities — may be regarded as an insightful alternative to Bolzian semantic objectivism, including its phenomenological variant in Husserl’s Logical Investigations (B. Smith, 1987b, p. 192; B. Smith, 1989a, p. 52). For one of Reinach’s most original views on logic is that it should, at least to some extent, be redefined as a theory of states of affairs. This view of logic was very different from Husserl’s, and explicitly rejected by other realist phenomenologists, such as Alexander Pfänder.²

Reinach’s theory of states of affairs provides at least a healthy questioning of the Fregean view, at best a fruitful alternative to the “Myth of Meaning.” In any case, it raises some


² See Pfänder (1921), p. 165, who transfers states of affairs to the theory of knowledge and limits logic to “judgments considered purely as such.”
fundamental questions which are too often neglected, especially the question of *what logic is about* (cf. DuBois, 1995, p. 123). My aim is to sketch the contours of Reinach’s philosophy of logic, and to discuss its most important philosophical implications and difficulties. I shall first briefly recall what a state of affairs is in Reinach’s view, and outline his attempt to reduce logic to a theory of states affairs. Next, I shall try to show that Reinach’s phenomenological realism is a direct consequence of his bias in favor of states affairs against propositions. I shall conclude by pointing out some difficulties of Reinach’s approach, which are due less to its realist than to its Meinongian background.

1. States of affairs

The notion of state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) plays in Reinach’s philosophy a central role which has no equivalent, except perhaps in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* (B. Smith, 1982, p. 293; B. Smith, 1987b, p. 223). On this subject Reinach mainly refers to Husserl and Meinong. However, his states of affairs are, in key respects, more akin to Meinong’s “objectives” than to Husserl’s states of affairs. There are at least three important differences between his and Husserl’s states of affairs.

First, in a way that recalls the *Tractatus*, Reinach draws a sharp distinction between states of affairs and objects (*Gegenstände*). States of affairs certainly are “objectual correlates” of judgments, but they are not “objects in the strict sense” (*TnU*, p. 111/334, p. 114/338). The red flower I see is an object; the fact that the flower is red, “its being-red,” is a state of affairs.

As Barry Smith (1989a) has pointed out, the philosophical notion of state of affairs can be traced back to Julius Bergmann (1879), p. 2 ff., p. 252 ff., who defines the correctness of judgment as an “adequation with the state of affairs” (Übereinstimmung mit dem Sachverhalt). Another, better-known source is the 1888 lecture by Carl Stumpf to which Reinach refers in his essay on negative judgment. See *TnU*, p. 114/373. The following abbreviations will be used throughout this paper: *TnU* for Reinach, “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils” (page references are to the Schuhmann-Smith edition, followed by pagination of English translation); *EiP* for Reinach, “Einleitung in die Philosophie”; *NAS* for Reinach, “Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt”; *ÜPh* for Reinach, “Über Phänomenologie”; *WSU* for Reinach, “Wesen und Systematik des Urteils”; *WJ* for Reinach, “William James und der Pragmatismus”; *LU* for Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* (with German pagination of original, followed by English pagination). See Bibliography for complete references.
On the other hand, object and state of affairs, the flower and its being-red, are both "objectities" (Gegenständlichkeiten) or "objective formations" (gegenständliche Gebilde), these terms being generic titles for any entity of any kind.

Secondly, Reinach opposes the existence (Existenz) of objects to the "occurrence" or "obtaining" (Bestand) of states of affairs. This distinction is more than merely of a terminological kind. A noteworthy difference is that, given a state of affairs /S is P/, this state of affairs’s non-obtaining involves there being an obtaining negative state of affairs /S is not P/, while the inexistence of an object A does not imply the existence of a negative object non-A. For example, the fact that the flower’s being red does not obtain implies that the flower’s not being red obtains, but the inexistence of Santa Claus does not imply the existence of a non-Santa Claus (TnU, p. 117/341).

Husserl, too, used the verb bestehen to qualify states of affairs, but it does not seem that he ever treated occurrence and existence as mutually exclusive. Reinach’s view seems much closer, in this respect, to Meinong’s theory of “objectives,” with this difference, however, that for Meinong not only states of affairs “obtain,” but also ideal objects such as numbers and geometrical figures (TnU, p. 116/374).

Thirdly, Reinach and Husserl also disagree on non-obtaining states of affairs. The former clearly affirms, in his essay on negative judgment, that “occurrence is by no means included as an essential moment within the concept of a state of affairs” (TnU, p. 116/374). This means that a state of affairs does not need to obtain in order to be a state of affairs, or that states of affairs may obtain or not obtain. Hence we may suppose that a complete theory of states of affairs should deal with non-obtaining states of affairs such as the being-gold of a mountain, or even with necessarily non-obtaining states of affairs, like the being-round of a square. Here again, Meinong’s influence is obvious and explicit (TnU, pp. 116-117/340-341). From the point of view of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, by contrast, the being-gold of the mountain is not an object, nor, a fortiori, a state of affairs. It is nothing at all, even though “the mountain is golden” is an existing (false) proposition.

In his essay on negative judgment, Reinach proposes five necessary and sufficient conditions for states of affairs (TnU, p. 114/338 ff.; cf. WSU, pp. 343-344; EiP, p. 427):

1. A state of affairs may be “believed or asserted” (geglaubt oder behauptet).
In other words, states of affairs, and only them, are subject to “assertions” (*Behauptungen*) and to beliefs or “convictions” (*Überzeugungen*). It is impossible to assert or believe an object. As only belief and assertion are usually called judgments (*Urteile*), states of affairs may be defined as objectual correlates of judgments.

(2) States of affairs, and only them, may stand in relations of implication.

If we are in presence of antecedent-consequent or “foundation” (*Begründung*) relations, then we can be sure that we are in presence of states of affairs.4

(3) States of affairs, and only them, present modalities.

There are states of affairs not only of the form /S is P/, but also of the form /S is presumably P/, /S is possibly P/, etc. This very strong thesis is in marked contrast to the views of Husserl and Pfänder, who both admit ontological as well as logical modalities (cf. DuBois, 1995, p. 118 ff.). Likewise, Husserl does not seem to confine ontological modalities to propositional acts.

(4) States of affairs, and only them, may be positive or negative.

Thus, it is only in a “derivative” sense that propositions and judgments are said to be positive or negative. This condition corresponds to the view, usually associated with Aristotle and also defended by Brentano, that there can be no negative presentations. There are states of affairs of the negative form /S is not P/, but it makes no sense to talk of negative objects, for example of non-Socrates or a non-pen.

4 Cf. *EiP*, p. 460: relations of *Grund* and *Folge* are expressed by “hypothetical propositions.”
(5) States of affairs, and only them, may be known *(erkannt)*.

This condition should not be confused with condition (1). For knowledge, according to Reinach, is different from both belief and assertion. “Knowledge,” which Reinach also calls “evidence” *(Evidenz)*, is the mode of givenness peculiar to states of affairs *(TnU*, p. 123/375)*. Objects, when perceived or imagined, are “seen” *(gesehen)*, or *geschaut*; states of affairs are not seen, but “known,” or *erschaut*. Once again, Reinach’s analysis sharply contrasts with the *Logical Investigations*, in which states of affairs were held to be given in some special type of categorial intuition, in “acts of synthesis.” Reinach explicitly distinguishes his evidences from Husserl’s categorial intuitions, which he claims always give us objects, not states of affairs *(LU6, §§ 48-49; cf. TnU, p. 119/343)*.

According to Reinach, beliefs and assertions presuppose the knowledge of the state of affairs. Suppose, for instance, that you discuss with a colleague what color this or that object in the room is (cf. *TnU*, p. 97/317). You get closer and find that the object is red. This means that a state of affairs, the being-red of the object, is *given* to you, and it is only on the basis of this evidence that you can believe that the object is red. Next, you come back to your colleague and say: “This is red.” What is expressed by this statement, Reinach notes, is not merely a belief. There is also an act of asserting by which I “intend” or “mean” *(meine)* a state of affairs that is no longer given or “known.” So, belief and assertion are independent of the knowledge of the state of affairs, but at the same time they can possibly be based on such knowledge.

Interestingly enough, these distinctions are supposed to apply to negative states of affairs as well. The idea is that the belief that the object is not yellow does not merely presuppose that the subject is given a positive state of affairs /the object is red/, but also that she “grasps” a necessary implication relation between this state of affairs and the negative state of affairs /the object is not yellow/. Now, in Reinach’s view, both constitute a genuine knowledge or positive evidence of the negative state of affairs /the object is not yellow/.

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5 *TnU*, p. 124/353: “... wird auch dieser negative Sachverhalt erkannt.”
The five conditions above are necessary and sufficient conditions. They can be fulfilled only by states of affairs: “These determinations are to this extent sufficient, that every entity to which they apply is of necessity a state of affairs.” (TnU, p. 117/341.)

Note that Reinach’s lessons of 1913 published in the Sämtliche Werke as “Introduction to Philosophy” provide a slightly different list (EiP, p. 427). Reinach substitutes for condition (5) — the possibility of being “known” — the following criterion: unlike objects, which exist or do not exist, states of affairs and only them “obtain (bestehen) or do not obtain.” This criterion is closely connected to condition (4). The main difference, as we have seen, is that the non-obtaining of a state of affairs entails the obtaining of the contradictory state of affairs. For example: the fact that the flower’s being-red does not obtain entails that the flower’s not-being-red obtains. Nothing similar is true of objects: the inexistence of Santa Claus does not imply the existence of the negative object “non-Santa Claus.”

2. Propositions

In Husserl’s Logical Investigations, logic was defined as a theory of science or a theory of theories. Since a theory, in Husserl’s view, is a system of propositions, logic was equally defined to be a theory of propositions. According to Husserl, just as for Bolzano and Frege, logic is a theory whose objects are theories and parts of theories, that is, propositions as well as parts and systems of propositions, in short: meanings (Bedeutungen). Logic is thus distinct from formal ontology, which is the formal theory of objects, including states of affairs. Furthermore, logic in Husserl’s sense is also different from the psychology of judgment. According to the Investigations, the logician studies propositions in specie, “in themselves,” regardless of their instantiation in judgments, thoughts, questions, etc. This allows her to enunciate a priori or “ideal” laws, whereas descriptive psychology is confined to inductive or “real” laws.

6 The realist phenomenologist Jean Hering (1921), p. 497, made a similar remark about properties: while for any state of affairs /S is P/ there is a contradictorily opposed negative state of affairs /S is not P/, there is no negative property contradictorily opposed to the property P.
Reinach never defended such a Bolzanian-style view of logic, and this certainly makes his approach both unique and innovative when compared to Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. For him, as we shall see, logic must be, first and foremost, a theory of states of affairs. Thus, the first question to be asked is what becomes of propositions in Reinach’s philosophy of logic. Reinach’s preserved work gives only few hints about this crucial question, which is left largely unexplored by commentators.

A first point to be taken into account is that Reinach, far from rejecting the notion of proposition altogether, explicitly appropriates the distinction between proposition and state of affairs (*TnU*, p. 138/376; cf. Künne, 1987, p. 184). In a passage from the *Nachlass* quoted by Barry Smith, Reinach regrets that “all Austrians always confuse propositions and states of affairs.”

Likewise, in two footnotes of his essay on negative judgment, he objects to Meinong that his notion of “objective” rests upon a confusion between proposition and state of affairs, which leads him to erroneously hold them as true or false (*TnU*, p. 114/373-374, p. 116/374). In fact, he argues, “states of affairs obtain or do not obtain; propositions are true or false” (*TnU*, p. 116/374). Just as Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*, Reinach thus distinguishes between judgments which are correct or incorrect (*richtig oder unrichtig*), propositions which are true or false, and states of affairs which obtain or do not obtain.

In a lecture dated December 1910, Reinach defines proposition as follows:

> A proposition (*Satz*) in our sense is not a grammatical proposition, but the meaning of a group of words, the thought that serves as its foundation. The proposition is independent of the judging experiences and factual cases. It is ideal and extra-temporal. (*NAS*, p. 351.)

It is plausible to say that the term “thought” (*Gedanke*) is borrowed from Frege, whose works, as we know from the lecture *On Phenomenology* of 1914, were known to Reinach. However, Reinach uses the word in a broader sense, according to which not only propositional (*Satzgedanken*), but also nominal meanings are *Gedanken* (*EiP*, p. 419-420). In any case, this definition of proposition is hardly distinguishable from Husserl’s definition in the *Logical Investigations*.


8 The same use can be found in Pfänder (1921), p. 141 f., pp. 158-159.
In fact, the disagreement between Reinach and Husserl is not about the distinction between judgment, proposition, and state of affairs. The substantive difference in their positions turns on how they conceive of the mutual relationships between those three terms. On a closer look, it seems as if there were no more room for propositions in Reinach’s philosophy. One might even be tempted to see Reinach’s concept of proposition as an unnecessary import from the Logical Investigations. The import seems unnecessary, mainly because Reinach, unlike Husserl, does not need to appeal to propositions to account for the fact that an incorrect judgment has sense. Again, this results from his broadly Meinongian starting point. While the possibility for a proposition to be false allows Husserl to reject non-obtaining states of affairs, the acceptance of non-obtaining states of affairs allows Reinach to do without propositions in themselves. The question, then, is which parsimony is to be preferred.

Reinach’s depreciation of the propositional or semantic dimension creates a number of difficulties which are characteristic of his theory of states of affairs. On the one hand, the question arises whether it is possible in all cases to replace propositions with states of affairs. Thus, Reinach sometimes tends to ascribe to states of affairs certain functions which seem distinctive of propositions. Despite his — Husserlian — definition of proposition as the meaning of a statement, Reinach sometimes suggests that the meaning of the statement is provided by the corresponding state of affairs. Hence one can ask whether he did not make the same mistake he criticized in Meinong and “the Austrians,” namely the mistake of confusing propositions and states of affairs. For example, in the essay on negative judgment (TnU, p. 112-113/336), Reinach raises the question of whether states of affairs are necessarily relational. Consider the rose’s being red, which can be expressed by a statement such as “the rose is red.” This state of affairs, he notes, can be equated with obviously relational states of affairs such as /the rose forms the substrate of the red/ or /the red inheres in the rose/. But does this entail that the state of affairs /the rose is red/ is relational? Surely not, Reinach suggests. Although equivalent, that is, built up upon one and the same thing “the red rose,” the three states of affairs are different. Now, they are different, Reinach tells us, in that the three statements are “different in sense” (bedeutungsverschieden) (EiP, p. 112, footnote). The statements “the rose is red,” “the rose forms the substrate of the red,” and “the red inheres in the rose” are not synonymous, and the difference in meaning indicates that they refer to different states of affairs. However, this approach presents difficulties in the case of incorrect affirmative judgments. In Reinach’s view, two incorrect affirmative judgments, if they are
different in sense, must refer to two different states of affairs. But if so, then both of these must be non-obtaining states of affairs. Why, then, talk about states of affairs rather than propositions? It is now the notion of state of affairs that seems unnecessary. More on this below.

3. Logic as a theory of states of affairs

What is “logic”? And what do we take “logical” to mean when we talk about “logical principles”? Husserl and Reinach sharply differ in how they answer this question, and it is in that respect that Reinach’s philosophy of logic seems the most novel and forceful if compared with the *Logical Investigations*. The answer to this question is to be found in a footnote at the end of the essay on negative judgment, which I shall take as a starting point. The problem at stake is about the principle of non-contradiction, which Reinach construes in terms of states of affairs. Basically, he claims, the principle of non-contradiction means that two states of affairs /S is P/ and /S is not P/ cannot both obtain at the same time. The footnote generalizes this result to all logical laws, or at least to a large part of them:

It will be seen that these principles relate to states and their obtaining (*Bestand*); the same holds for the other fundamental principles of traditional logic. These have normally been related to judgments, e.g.: two contradictory judgments cannot both be correct. This principle is certainly incontestable, but it is a derived and not a primitive principle. A judgment is correct if the state of affairs corresponding to it obtains; and two contradictory judgments cannot both be correct because two contradictory states of affairs cannot both obtain. The law pertaining to judgments thus obtains its foundation from the corresponding law which relates to states of affairs. Attempts have been made from other quarters to relate this law not to judgments but to *propositions*. Two contradictory propositions, it is now said, cannot both be true. We acknowledge freely the difference between judgment and “proposition in itself”; but just as the proposition must be separated from the judgment, so also must it be separated from the state of affairs. A proposition is true when the state of affairs which is correlated with it obtains. And two contradictory propositions cannot both

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9 The contemporary philosopher Reinach most resembles in this respect may be R. Chisholm, who defined propositions as states of affairs “such that the laws of propositional logic may be interpreted as being applicable to them” (Chisholm, 1970, p. 19).
be true because two contradictory states of affairs cannot both subsist. Thus here too the propositional law is reducible to a law which relates to states of affairs. At the same time this provides an example which may indicate the sense of our claim above, that the major part of traditional logic will prove to have its foundations in a general theory of states of affairs (daß große Teile der traditionellen Logik sich ihrem Fundamente nach als allgemeine Sachverhaltslehre herausstellen werden). (TnU, p. 138/376, transl. by Smith, slightly modified.)

To some extent, these views still converge with the *Logical Investigations*. According to the first and fourth Investigations (LU1, § 29; LU4, § 14), certain logical laws can be formulated in an equivalent way as ontological laws. The logical principle of non-contradiction may thus be translated into an formal-ontological law stating that two contradictory states of affairs cannot both obtain. The difference between both authors is about what this equivalence relation really means and implies. In fact, Reinach did much more than call attention on this equivalence as Husserl had done before him (Seron, 2011). He claimed that the laws of proposition “are reducible to (zurückführen auf) laws which relate to states of affairs,” and that “the major part of traditional logic will therefore prove to have its foundations in a general theory of states of affairs.”

One should be careful not to overestimate the extent of this claim. Reinach’s ambition was certainly not to boil down all logical into ontological distinctions between states of affairs. On the contrary, it is consistent with the view that logical categories are, to some extent, autonomous vis-a-vis ontological categories.

Reinach’s argument is that one can make positive judgments about negative states of affairs (I assert that the flower is not red) and negative judgments about positive states of affairs (I deny that the flower is red). This shows, he claims, that the logical difference between positive and negative judgments cannot be merely reduced to the ontological difference between positive and negative states of affairs. In this sense, logical classifications lie in part beyond the sphere of states of affairs: “A logic which systematically carried through the distinction between judgment and judged state of affairs could scarcely decline to classify judgments according to the characteristics of their correlated states of affairs.” (TnU, p. 122/351.) Hence we may suppose that actually Reinach’s logic is not confined to states of affairs and applies to propositions and judgments as well (DuBois, 1995, p. 117-118; cf. B. Smith, 1987b, p. 192).

This approach is clearly illustrated in an obituary of William James published in 1910 (*WJ*, p. 50). In this text, Reinach starts by rejecting the pragmatist view of truth in the name of
correspondentism. Then, in (more unexpected) terms which recall neo-Kantianism, he attributes to James the merit of having refuted the copy theory of truth. Now, his line of argument against the *Abbildtheorie* fits well with the idea that logical structures do not merely reflect ontological structures. Most interestingly, the conception of truth Reinach adopts is certainly correspondentist, but not explicitly maximalist. “A judgment is true, he argues, if the state of affairs it refers to obtains.” The relation between truth and the state of affairs’ obtaining is conceived here as a relation of mere implication, not of equivalence. Herein lies an important difference between Reinach and Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, which defends maximalism about elementary propositions. The former does not rule out the possibility that a true proposition refers to a non-obtaining state of affairs.

It thus seems that Reinach’s aim is not merely to reduce propositional logic to an ontology of states of affairs. Nevertheless, it remains true that, *in another sense*, Reinach’s logic is no more than a theory of states of affairs. But other explanations are required in order to understand this idea.

The *Introduction to Philosophy* provides a precise definition of what logic is:

> Logic is (1) a general theory of science, as far as it provides the laws of foundation (*Begründungsgesetze*) in general and thus gives the form for the relations of foundation that apply to all science; (2) a special theory of science, as far as it refers to the laws of foundation relevant for special sciences, and to types of special science. (*EiP*, p. 453.)

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11 Wittgenstein (1963), 4.25: “Ist der Elementarsatz wahr, so besteht der Sachverhalt; ist der Elementarsatz falsch, so besteht der Sachverhalt nicht.”

12 The question of whether all true proposition corresponds to an (obtaining) state of affairs should not be confused with the question of whether all (true or false) proposition corresponds to an (obtaining or non-obtaining) state of affairs. While Reinach’s answer to the first question is clearly yes, his answer to the second one is far from clear.
In short: logic deals with relations of inference. It is a theory which supplies rules for grounding a judgment in another judgment, hence a theory whose objects are relations of antecedent and consequent.

Now, as we have seen, Reinach takes such relations to hold between states of affairs rather than between propositions or judgments. The powerful originality of his philosophy of logic lies in the fact that he undertook to ontologize the relations of implication and inference. Since these originally lie in the states of affairs, it is only in a derivative sense that implication is a relation between propositions or judgments. As a consequence, it is also in a derivative sense that logical principles, as rules of inference, apply to propositions or judgments. The principle of non-contradiction originally means that two contradictory states of affairs cannot both obtain; the principle of the excluded middle means that “there is no third between the obtaining and the non-obtaining of a state of affairs” (EiP, p. 477); etc.

Reinach clearly equates implication with inference, even going so far as to talk of “axiomatic” (axiomatische) and “theorematic” (gefolgerte) states of affairs (EiP, p. 404). But such an approach is fraught with difficulties. It may seem not too difficult to locate implication relations in the “things themselves,” at least in the sense that true conditional propositions must correspond to obtaining states of affairs. But the same hardly applies to inference. For inferences, unlike conditionals, are not true or false, but valid or not valid (cf. Gochet & Gribomont, 1990, p. 35-37).

4. Reinach’s realism and its difficulties

Of course, the fact that Reinach replaces talk of propositions by talk of states of affairs is not a detail. It is at least plausible to believe that the two approaches will have different ontological implications.

Consider, for example, an incorrect judgment that \( S \) is \( P \). The judgment is incorrect because the corresponding state of affairs, \( S \)’s being \( P \), does not obtain. From Husserl’s point of view, the judgment has sense, that is, has a false proposition as its content, even though there is no corresponding state of affairs. In a sense, this makes it possible to achieve a notable ontological economy. For propositions, in the Logical Investigations, are defined to be

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13 Cf. EiP, p. 453: “It is not contingent that certain types of foundation relations are connected with certain objective assumptions. The sphere of logic is obviously larger than the sphere of the foundation relations.”
“species of judgment,” that is, intentional contents which the psychologist considers as “intentional matters” and the logician as meanings “in specie.”

Certainly, the logician, for Husserl, considers propositions independently of their realization in mental acts. But this is just one face of the coin. The other is that the psychologist or phenomenologist reveals to the logician that her propositions really are abstract parts of mental acts. The “phenomenological foundation of logic” precisely means that the logician achieves her “ideations” on the basis of empirical materials which are, so to speak, provided by the psychologist. The general thought seems to be that, absolutely speaking, propositions ontologically commit us to the existence of no objects except the mental acts that instantiate them. Hence, as Barry Smith has rightly suggested, Husserl’s semantic objectivism in the *Investigations* is better seen as an Aristotelism of intentional contents than as a Fregean-style Platonism of meanings (B. Smith, 1989b; Seron, 2012; Seron, forthcoming).

How are incorrect positive judgments to be described within the frame of Reinach’s logic of states of affairs? First, Reinach assumes that non-obtaining states of affairs cannot be “known.” Yet, it remains that “we speak of states of affairs like the being golden of mountains or the being round of squares” (*TnU*, p. 117/340-341). In other words, non-obtaining states of affairs can be “meant” (gemeint). States of affairs — as opposed to objects, which are presented (vorgestellt) — are “meant” or “in view” (abzielen auf). What best characterizes the “meaning” of a state of affairs is that it always has a linguistic dimension (*TnU*, p. 102/323) and is independent of any intuitive givenness. Intuition — that is, “knowledge” or “evidence” — is not necessary for the state of affairs to be meant or thought. Intuition is to be seen as an “accompanying” (begleitend) content, which is not immanent in the state of affairs or its meaning (*TnU*, p. 106-108/328-330). Briefly: there still are states of affairs to be thought even where there are no states of affairs to be known, as it may be the case with incorrect positive judgment.

These views have difficulties. Suppose that an incorrect positive judgment “means” a non-obtaining state of affairs. This may suggest that non-obtaining states of affairs have some kind

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14 The interpretation here outlined — which is much indebted to Kusch (1995) — is developed in more detail in Seron (2012) and Seron (forthcoming).

15 Cf. *L5*, A322/79: “As with all ideal unities, there are real possibilities, and perhaps actualities, which correspond to meanings: to meanings in specie correspond acts of meaning, the former being nothing but ideally apprehended act characters of the latter (jene sind nichts anderes als die ideal gefaßten Aktcharaktere dieser).” B343: “… als ideal gefaßte Momente aus diesen.” I generally cite the first edition (A).
of objectivity. But obvious difficulties arise at this point: What would this objectivity consist in, if it must be distinct from the state of affair’s obtaining? Where are non-obtaining states of affairs to be found, if they cannot reside in the mental act?  

It may be noted in passing that it is not always clear that non-obtaining states of affairs, for Reinach, must be “meant” rather than “known.” In the essay on negative judgment, Reinach thus considers the case of a negative conviction in a positive state of affairs (TnU, p. 123-124/352-353). For example, I refuse to believe that this flower is yellow. The conviction, Reinach observes, rests on some positive evidence: I resist the belief that the flower is yellow because I see that it is red. But on the other hand, he also claims that the state of affairs /the flower is yellow/ provides some special form of evidence or knowledge, which he calls “negative evidence.” This seems to imply that non-obtaining states of affairs, too, are subject to evidence.

Barry Smith has clearly pointed out the problem in the introduction to his translation of the essay on negative judgment (B. Smith, 1982, p. 294-295). He first attributed to Bolzano, Frege, Meinong, and Chisholm a radical view according to which every correct or incorrect judgment requires a “statal entity.” Next, he argued that “a view of this kind is defensible only where it relates to entities belonging to the sphere of meaning (to Frege’s ‘realm of sense’) or, as in Meinong’s case, to some hybrid sphere of quasi-meanings.” To put it another way: for such a view to be tenable, the statal entities must be logical objects, namely Fregean-style propositions or (to some extent) Meinongian “objectives.”

The opposite view, Smith continues, is to conceive the states of affairs incorrect positive judgments refer to merely as “object-entities,” hence as truth-makers rather than as truth-bearers. But this view involves a very counterintuitive version of Platonism: “What mind-independent external referent, what constituent part or contour of the world, could correspond, for example, to a false sentence, to a counterfactual conditional, or to a judgment concerning the indefinite future?” Now, there are two options to escape the difficulty. The first one — which is the option chosen by Russell, for example — is to deny that incorrect positive

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16 Benoist (2005), p. 27, rightly argues that these difficulties are caused by a confusion of intentionality with presentation — a confusion which Reinach precisely avoids by his notion of “meaning.” Unlike presented objects, states of affairs do not need to exist or be present. Cf. EiP, p. 419: “Ein gemeinter Gegenstand braucht nicht zu existieren”; WSU, p. 339: “Das Denken ist ein Abzielen auf Nichtgegenwärtiges, das Vorstellen ist das Vorsichhaben eines Gegenwärtigen.” However, this does not release us from the need to identify the ontological status of states of affairs and to explicate why they cannot be replaced with propositions.
judgments have statal correlates. The second option is the one favored by Reinach. It consists in “distinguishing amongst the totality of autonomously existing states of affairs, subsistent states of affairs corresponding to true judgments, and non-subsistent states of affairs corresponding to those that are false.” Smith attributes this position to Reinach, Meinong, and the Tractarian Wittgenstein.

From this perspective, Husserl’s approach may seem more economical. Barry Smith thus defended the view that Husserl’s theory of states of affairs is naturalist rather than Platonist (B. Smith, 1989, p. 63). Husserl’s version of Platonism, if there is any, is about propositions, not states of affairs — which he considers to be mere truth-making components of the real world. Reinach, by contrast, is a Platonist about states of affairs, in that for him the timelessness of truth must be accounted for by appealing to a timeless sphere of (obtaining or non-obtaining) states of affairs.

I have suggested that the key claim of Husserl’s attempt at a “phenomenological foundation of logic” is that propositions are “species of judgment,” and hence abstract parts of mental acts. This means that, although they can be studied “in themselves,” propositions, in last resort, exist only “in” the mental acts that instantiate them. As Husserl argues in the first *Investigation* and in his review of Palágyi, the case of propositions is analogous to that of colors (Hua 22, p. 157; *LUI*, A100-101/230). It is no doubt possible to study colors *in specie*, with no concern whatever for colored things, so as to state a priori laws such as “the additive synthesis of green and red is yellow.” Yet, it remains that colors, absolutely speaking, exist only in spatially extended things. Likewise, Husserl considers the existence of “ideal” logical laws consistent with the fact that propositions are *abstracta* which exist only in mental particulars. Grounding logic, in his view, means revealing or “clarifying” the intuitive basis of logic, that is, descriptive materials for the logician’s ideations. But since logical objects are *abstracta* which exist only in mental acts, this intuitive basis must be psychological or phenomenological. To put it otherwise: the logician’s ideation is, as Husserl says in the sixth *Logical Investigation*, a “founded act,” namely an act which is based upon internal perception — this being, in the first edition of the *Investigations* just as for Brentano, the very experience that constitutes psychology as an empirical science. Accordingly, the foundation of logic requires one to assume no more than the existence of mental acts. This foundation is “metaphysically neutral” as to the objective world, for the simple reason that, in Brentano’s view, mental phenomena are the only things the descriptive psychologist needs to posit as really existent.
Now, what happens if we accept Reinach’s claim that logical laws are not about propositions, but about states of affairs? The divergence lies in the fact that for Reinach, as he repeatedly insists, the state of affairs’s obtaining or non-obtaining is independent of the subject. A proposition is true in itself, independently of the subject, because the corresponding state of affairs obtains in itself, independently of the subject (\textit{TnU}, p. 137/369-370; \textit{ÜPh}, p. 544-545).

In other words: the foundation of logic must be \textit{realist} rather than psychological or phenomenological (in the Husserlian sense). Certainly, the task still consists, as in the \textit{Investigations}, in clarifying the intuitive sources of logical laws. But the intuition concerned cannot be the psychologist’s experience. Rather, this intuition must be the “knowledge” of states of affairs which obtain mind-independently in the objective world.

Obviously, such a foundation, if it is to be called “phenomenological,” can be called so only in a very different sense than in the \textit{Logical Investigations}. Reinach’s phenomenology is not identical with descriptive psychology as in the first edition of the \textit{Investigations}; nor has it anything to do with the later transcendental phenomenology. Nevertheless, the comparison with the \textit{Investigations} helps to clarify exactly what a “realist phenomenology” is supposed to be. One of the key ideas in \textit{On Phenomenology} is that phenomenology does not distinguish itself by its domain of objects. Phenomenology is not, say, that science which concerns itself with purely immanent objects — with objects which should be marked off from the transcendent objects through phenomenological reduction. As James DuBois (1995, p. 148) has pointed out, the word “epoché” does not occur even once in Reinach’s published writings. Rather, Reinach’s phenomenology is a matter of “attitude.” It involves some new perspective on the same real world we deal with in our everyday life, namely a perspective grounded in the “intuition of essences.”\footnote{In this sense, the eidetic dimension aside, Reinach’s conception of phenomenology displays striking similarities with Drummond’s and Sokolowski’s externalist readings of Husserl.}

The theory of states of affairs has to play a central role in this respect. For intuiting essences, for Reinach, always means intuiting a priori states of affairs, namely essential connections in things. As Reinach puts in the \textit{Introduction to Philosophy} of 1913, phenomenological analysis is intended to give us access to the “things themselves” by “disclosing objectivities (...) in such a way that one can intuit (erschauen) their essences.”\footnote{“Much work and effort is needed for one to know the essential connections and to get to the things themselves (an die Sachen zu gelangen). (...) It has been said that phenomenology starts with the ‘intuition of essences’ (Wesenserschauung). This sounds mystical, but is clear. Analysis supersedes simple vision (tritt nämlich an die Stelle des blossen Dahinsehens) so as to disclose objectivities (...) in such a way that one can intuit (erschauen) their essences.” (\textit{EiP}, p. 448.)}
Reinach’s terminology, *erschauen* means intuiting a state of affairs, as opposed to *schauen* which means intuiting an object (see above). This approach is original when compared to the views of other realist phenomenologists, like Johannes Daubert and Jean Hering. These two philosophers, too, consider essence laws to be about foundation relations among essences. But Daubert does not mention states of affairs in this connection, and Hering explicitly rejects the view that these relations could be states of affairs (Hering, 1921, p. 524; cf. p. 496-497).

These last remarks bring us into the heart of Reinach’s realism. We might venture to say that the difference between his philosophy of logic and that of Husserl in the *Prolegomena* somehow coincides with the difference between the logical objectivity of truth and the metaphysical objectivity of states of affairs. This brings us back to Barry Smith’s discussion of Reinach’s Platonism. In the *Investigations*, Husserl certainly considers a proposition’s being true as trivially synonymous with its being true in itself. But on the other hand, he also conceives of logic as a reflective science (cf. *LU1*, § 34), in the sense that its “foundation” necessitates psychological or phenomenological description of the corresponding mental acts. In Reinach’s view, by contrast, the foundation of logic requires us to turn to the extra-mental world. Logical properties, relations, truths in general primarily lie in the states of affairs, which exist in themselves, independently of any mental acts.

For this reason, the central idea of Reinach’s realism is not merely that the obtaining of states of affairs is logically prior to the truth of propositions and the correctness of judgments. Reinach also needs the further premise that there are mind-independent states of affairs — a premise which Reinach (controversially) views as alien to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

The results of our discussions can be recapitulated as follows: First, Reinach’s aim is to replace Husserl’s idea of grounding propositional logic on psychological description by the

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19 On Daubert, see Fréchette (2001), p. 312 ff.

20 Matters are somewhat more complicated, however, since Husserl also holds in the *Investigations* that a proposition’s being true in itself implies a state of affairs’ obtaining in itself as its “necessary correlate” (*LU*, *Proleg.*, § 62). But what is important here is that the objectivity of states of affairs is the business of the logician (or the “formal-ontologist”), not of the phenomenologist.

idea of grounding a statal logic on the “knowledge” of a priori states of affairs. So, such a foundation can be called “phenomenological” only in quite a different sense. It is no longer the descriptive psychologist’s internal experience that defines the phenomenological attitude, but the intuition of states of affairs of a certain type. Now, Reinach’s characterization of states of affairs as essentially mind-independent involves a realist line of thought which surely represents a move away from the metaphysical neutrality of phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations*. This clearly shows the strategic role of the theory of states of affairs in Reinach’s philosophical project. For it is precisely the theory of states of affairs that makes phenomenology compatible with realism. If the intuition of a priori states of affairs is to define phenomenology, then the essential mind-independence of states of affairs entails that phenomenology must be intrinsically realist.

**Bibliography**


