

THE DOUBLE NEGATION IN THE EARLIEST UPANIṢADS AND IN THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHICAL BHĀṢYA

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§ 1.- When you read the Indian rules of logic worked out by Gautama and their commentaries (*the Nyāya-bhāṣya* of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana and the *Nyāya-vārttika* of Uddyotakara), or the ritual treatise (*Bhāṣya*) on of Śābara, you are struck by the great number of negations and the action they have on the uttering of the thought. The pages below are an attempt to check how far these negative devices are already present in the *Upaniṣads*.

Thirteen of these latter have been reviewed, namely the *Brhadāraṇyaka-*, *Chāndogya-* and *Mahānārāyaṇa-up.*, the largest ones; the *Aitareya-*, *Taittirīya-*, *Praśna-*, *Kena-*, *Īśā-*, *Kātha-*, *Mundaka-*, and *Māṇḍukya-up.* (notably shorter); the *Maitri-* and *Śvetāśvatara-up.* (comparatively late inside the group).

Between the earliest *Up.* (the first three above) and the beginnings of the philosophical *Bhāṣya*, there is a span of time of 800 or even 1000 years.(500 B.C.-300/500 C.E.?)

I. The *Upaniṣads*

§ 2.- The syntax of the *Up.* is loose. These texts are mainly made up of praises and prayers. Therein we do not examine the phrases containing just one negation, but those with two of them, namely the negation *na* plus a privative term beginning with the prefix *a-* (*an-* before a vowel) or incidentally *niḥ-/vi-*.¹

The privative term can be:

- an adjective, occasionally used substantively, contrasted with its positive form occurring in the close context or also inserted in a series. Exx. *asādhu* "not good" (*ChU* II 1 1) ; *anādimat* "beginningless" (*ŚvetU* IV 4) etc,
- a noun. Exx. *ahiṃsā* "refusal to do harm" (*ChU* III 17 4) ; *alolupatva* "steadiness" (*ŚvetU* II 13),²

1. The exx. below are borrowed from the handy work of S. Radhakrishnan, *The principal Upaniṣads*, Ed. with Intr., Text, Translation and Notes, London-N.Y., 1974. As to the *MhNU* of minor importance, I used the ed.-French tr. of J. Varenne, 2 voll., Publ. de l'Inst. de Civilisation Indienne, fasc.11, Paris 1960. Some translations too from R. C. Zaehner, *Hindu Scriptures*, London, 1966. - The texts below partly drop the sandhi rules in order to make the privatives more easily recognizable.

2. Sometimes, the privative word ends up with the suffix *-ka* that emphasizes its adjectival character, e.g. *alomaka* "without hair, hairless" (*BĀU* I 4 6), *adhūmaka* "without smoke, smokeless" (*KāthaU* II 1 13). Compare with *nirindhana* "without fuel" (*MaitU* VI 34).

- a present active participle. Exx. *avadan* "not speaking" (*BĀU* IV 1 2) ; *anejat* "not moving" (*ĪśāU* 4). We can join here the perfect participle *avidvān* "not knowing" (*ChU* I 10 10 etc.) well-represented in every *Up*,
- a present passive participle, e.g. *anadyamāna* "uneaten" (*ChU* IV 3 7),
- a participle in *-antya*, e.g. *asamkalpantya* "wrongly conceived" (*ChU* I 2 6),
- a past passive participle. The most famous is *amṛta* "immortal", which occurs everywhere and embodies the basic yearning of the Upanishadic man.³ We can also quote *apraṭiṣṭhita* "not-founded" (*ChU* I 8 6), *ananvāgata* "not followed" (*BĀU* IV 3 16),
- an infinitive, e.g. *anaśitum* "not to eat" (*ChU* IV 10 3),
- a gerund in *-tvā* or *-ya*. Exx. *aviditvā* "without knowing" (*BĀU* III 8 10), *ananuśisya* "not instructing" (*ChU* V 3 4),
- compounds of various nature. Exx. *akāryakārin* "doing what is not to be done" (*MhNU* IV 159), *aparaprayojya* "not to be moved by another" (*MaitU* VII 2), *apāṇipada* "without hands or feet" (*MuṇḍU* I 1 6).

We are now in position to examine sentences where these various privatives occur in company of the negation, mainly *na* but also *mā* + injunctive.

§ 3.- *Na* + privative adjective

Ex.1 *KaṭhaU* I 2 10 : *na hy adhruvaiḥ prāpyate hi dhruvaṃ tat*

"For by things unstable, the stable cannot be attained".

Ex.2 *MaitU* IV 3 : *na atapaskasya ātmajñāne adhigamaḥ*

"If one does not practise austerity, there is no success in the knowledge of the Self".
+ *ChU* VI 8 5, *KaṭhaU* II 18, *MaitU* VII 10.

On one occasion, the sentence, following its positive counterpart, has been reduced to the negative components:

Ex.3 *ChU* IV 17 10 : (*tasmād evaṃvidam eva brahmāṇaṃ kurvīta*) / *na anevaṃvidam*

"(Therefore one should make one-who-knows-this as his Brahma priest) / not one-who-does-not-know-this".

In this series of rather short clauses, *na* and the privative term are never far from each other.

§ 4.- We can gather here the passages where the privative term is half way between a noun and a pure adjective.

3. Minard, *Trois énigmes sur les cent chemins II* (Paris 1956), §§ 50a etc., points out that, despite their negative form, privatives may convey a fairly positive value. *Amṛta* is there to prove it. Let us cite also *abhaya* "security", lit. "non-fear" (*TaittU* II 7) and *anāgata* "future", lit. "not (yet) occurred" (below, n.11). Discussion thereabout already in the *Abhidharmakośa* III 28c-d = French tr. of La Vallée Poussin, vol.2 (Louvain, 1926), pp.88sv. - In his contribution (*Divorzio all'indiana*) to the *Papers in honour of Prof. Dr. Ji XianLin*, A. Wezler notes, p.804, in reference to *amokṣa*, that the privative prefix *a-* does not deny the posterior member but forbids it. Such a meaning, suited e.g. for *asamkalpantya*, above § 2, can only be determined by a case pro case investigation.

- Ex.1 *ChU* V 11 5 : ...*me janapade...na anāhitāgnir na avidvān*
 "Within my realm...(there is) no man without a sacred fire or a knowlege (of the Veda)".
- Ex.2 *MuṇḍU* III 2 9 : *na asya abrahmavit kule bhavati*
 "In his family, no one who does not know Brahman will be born".
 + *MāṇḍU* 10 ; *MuṇḍU* III 2 11.

§ 5.- *Na* + privative noun

- Ex.1 *ChU* IV 4 5 : *na etad abrahmaṇo vivaktum arhati*
 "None but a Brāhmaṇa could thus explain".
- Ex.2 *BĀU* VI 1 14 : *na ha vā asya anannaṃ jagdhaṃ bhavati / na anannaṃ pratigṛhitam*
 "What is not food is not eaten or accepted by him".
- Ex.3 *ŚvetU* VI 22 : *vedānte paramaṃ guhyam...na aprasāntāya dātavyaṃ na aputrāya aśiṣyāya vā punaḥ*
 "This highest mystery in the Vedānta...should not be given to one whose passions are not subdued, nor again to one who is not a son or a pupil".
- Ex.4 *MuṇḍU* III 2 4 : *na ayam ātmā...labhyaḥ...tapaso...alīṅgāt*
 "The Self cannot be attained...through austerity without an aim"
 + *ChU* V 2 1, VII 22 1, *BĀU* VI 3 12, *MaitU* VI 29
 We meet the same elliptic scheme as above § 3/3 in
- Ex.5 *BĀU* II 1 8 : (*pratirūpaṃ ha eva enam upagacchati*)/ *na apratirūpaṃ*
 "(To him comes what is like [him]), not what is unlike (him)."
 Once there is a combination of 2 privatives:
- Ex.6 *TaittU* I 11 3 : *aśraddhayā adeyam*
 "Do not give without faith".

In a last example the privative term has been substituted by *vinā* and instrumental

- Ex.7 *MaitU* VI 14 : *na vinā pramāṇena prameyasya upalabdhiḥ*
 "Without proof, there is no apprehension of the thing to be proved".

All these privative nouns convey crucial elements and key notions of the Vedic-upanishadic ideology : *brāhmaṇa*, *anna*, *putra*, *śraddhā* etc. As above (§§ 3-4), *na* is generally close to them while often occupying the front position in the sentence. Could we imagine that the right formation and use of the privatives were a part of the hidden lore handed over from *guru* to *śiṣya*?

§ 6.- *Na* + privative past passive participles

- Ex.1 *ChU* VI 4 5 : *na no adya kaś ca na aśrutam amatam avijñātam udāharisyati*
 "No one today will mention to us any (idea) which has never been heard of, thought of or known before".
- Ex.2 *BĀU* II 5 18 : *na enena kiṃca na anāvṛtam / na enena kiṃca na asamvṛtam*
 "There is nothing that is not covered by him, nothing that is not pervaded by him".

Ex.3 *KaṭhaU* I 2 24: *na avirato...na aśānto na asamāhitaḥ
na aśāntamanaso vā...enam āpnuyāt*

"Not he who has not desisted (from evil ways), not he who is not tranquil...not he who has not a concentrated mind, nor even he whose mind is not composed can reach this (Self)".

+ *KaṭhaU* II 8 and here ex.5/3.

These examples are not very significant. Let us notice that

- the privatives may occur in a chain;
- the positives are absent in the vicinity.

§ 7.- *Na* + privative present participles

This pattern is supplied by 4 clauses of the *ChU* among which 3 are in almost immediate succession. Here is one of them

Ex.1 *ChU* VII 20 1 : *na anistiṣṭhan śraddadhāti (/nistiṣṭhann eva śraddadhāti)*

"No one has faith without having an ideal (; only by having an ideal does one have faith)",

+ *ChU* I 10 4, VII 17 1, VII 19 1.

In each case, the positive counterpart lies close by.

§ 8.- *Na* + privative gerunds

Ex.1 *ChU* VII 18 1 : *na amatvā vijānāti (matvā eva vijānāti)*

"No one understands without thinking (; only by thinking first can one understand)".

Ex.2 *ChU* VII 21 1 : *na akṛtvā nistiṣṭhati (/kṛtvā eva nistiṣṭhati)*

"No one has an ideal without acting first (; only by acting first has one an ideal)".

Ex.3 *BĀU* IV 1 2 : *na anuśīṣya hareta*

"One should not accept (gifts) without first imparting instruction".

These 3 examples are not entirely relevant because there are actually 2 clauses therein and not just one endowed with 2 negations. This would be still more obvious if the gerunds had complements. In exx.1-2, we see how far a privative term is adduced or itself adduces its positive counterpart.

II. The early *Bhāṣya*

A. The *Śabara-bhāṣya*(350-500 C.E.?)

§ 9.- In the philosophical *Bhāṣya* in general and in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsa-sūtras* in particular,⁴ the negation is massively present and focuses the attention of

4. For further information on these works, see J.M.Verpoorten, *Mīmāṃsa Literature, History of Indian Literature*, f.VI/5, Wiesbaden, 1987.

the reader by the variety of its uses. However, we must note that the genuine double negation is less common than expected. We cannot, indeed, regard as such the following extracts selected in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* on *MīmS* I 1 5⁵:

- negative answer to an objection, followed by one or more causal ablatives⁶:

Ex.1 : (...*iti cet*) *na, svapne viparyayadarśanād aviparyayāc ca itarasmin* (F 28/3-4)

"(If it is objected that...) (the answer is) No for, in the case of dream-cognition, sublation is seen, while for another (cognition) no sublation (takes place)" (J 12).

Obviously there are here 2 sentences, the first one being reduced to the unique word *na*.

- privative term inside an absolute locative

Ex.2 : (*indriyamanorthasamnikarṣo hi jñānasya hetuḥ*) *asati tasmin ajñānāt* (F 26/15)

"(What brings about a right cognition is the contact of the sense organ, the mind and the object), for, when there is no such (contact), there is no cognition" (J 11).

The absolute locative (*asati tasmin*) is actually a clause by itself.

§ 10. In the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, the privatives are distributed in the same categories as in the *Upaniṣads* (cf. 2)

- adjectives, e.g. *apauruṣeya, aneka, avitatha, asamīcna, anarthaka, aśakya, anitya* etc.,
- nouns, predominantly abstract ones, e.g. *aviśaya, asmarana, asaṃbandha, anartha, animitta, akāraṇatva, abhāva, anapekṣatva, analambana, anupalambhana, aviparyaya* (cf. § 9/1), *apramāṇa, asādhakatva, anavasthā, anupalabdhy, avirodha*. We can join here *apāṇini* and *apīṅgala* which negate the proper names *Pāṇini* and *Pīṅgala* (F 44/5-6),
- present passive participles, e.g. *ananumanyamāna, anavagamyamāna* (see § 14/1-2), *anādriyamāna, ajñāyamāna,*
- past passive participles, e.g. *adṛṣṭa, anupapanna,*
- present active participles, 2 examples only : *acetayan, aśaknuvan,*
- gerunds, 2 exx. : *adṛṣṭvā, aparīkṣya,*
- compounds which are more complex and more often employed than in the *Upaniṣads*, e.g. *akṛta-laprasiddha-lapratipanna-saṃbandha, adṛṣṭa-kalpana, anadhīta-veda, avikalendriya, adṛṣṭarthatā-aparihāra* (with a privative as posterior member), *atatsamṭati-ja, ayāvachchārtra-bhāvitva* etc.

§ 11.- The double negation can be the remainder of a more extensive sentence in which elements have been dropped. The complete pattern with the positive term lies nearby.

5. At the end of each Sanskrit passage below the reference (F) is to page and line of the text edited by E. Frauwallner in *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā*, Vienna, 1968, Österr. Ak.d. Wiss., Philos.-hist. Kl., Sb 259, Abh.2. At the end of the English line, the reference (J) is to the page of the translation by G. Jhā, Gaekwad's Or. Ser., vol.66, ²Baroda, 1970.

6. This pattern is unknown in the *Upaniṣads*.

- Ex.1 (*tat tatsaṃtatijena anyena upalabhyate*)/ *na atatsaṃtatijena* (F 54/20-21)
"It is recalled by another [cognition] occurring in the same series), not by a (cognition) not appearing in the series of it" (J 28).
- Ex.2 (*utpannāyām eva buddhau artho jñāta iti ucyate*)/ *na anutpannāyām* (F 30/3-4)
"It is only after the cognition has come into existence that you speak of the object), not when it has not come into existence" (J 14).
+ F 52/17-18 (*upalabdhapūrvā/anupalabdhapūrvā*).
As a matter of fact, the last passage is questionable because *na* and the privative term belong to distinct semantic units.

§ 12.- More relevant are the following extracts:

- Ex.1 *tasmān na avyapadeśyā buddhir* (F 30/8)
"Hence the cognition is not free of definition" (J 14).
- Ex.2 *tasmān na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ* (F 30/16)
"Hence cognition is not without a substratum" (J 15).
- Ex.3 *na ca -dṛṣṭe kāraṇe sati- adṛṣṭam kalpayitum śakyate* (F 34/3)
"And, so long as a perceptible cause is there, there is no justification for assuming an imperceptible one" (J 17).
- Ex.4 *na ca himavadādiṣu...asmarāṇam bhavitum arhati* (F 42/21-22)
"In the case of (such important things as) the Himālaya mountain and the like, it would be impossible to forget (the creator)" (J 23).
- Ex.5 *na ca (-jñātari vijñānād anyasminn asati jñāne ca anitye-) aparedyur icchā anupapannā* (F54/8-9)
"And it is not impossible for desire to appear on the next day (even though we have no cogniser apart from the cognition and even though the cognition is not a lasting entity)" (J 28).
- Ex.6 *na ca adṛṣṭapūrve smṛtir bhavati* (F 54/14-15)
"Nor is remembrance possible of what has not been perceived before" (J 28).
+ F 40/1, 44/18, 54/6-7, 54/19.
Among the foregoing examples, we have to pick out those uttering a negated (im/)possibility and using the verbs ŚAK and ARH or the past passive participle *anupapanna*.⁷

§ 13.- One scheme is worth mentioning because it exemplifies what will get more common in the *Nyāyavārttika*: the double *na* (below §§ 28ff.).

7. The phrases containing the ablative *abhāvāt* in addition to the negation *na* are not quite relevant. Although there are 2 negations, it is not clear if that is felt so. E.g. : *yadi sambandhur abhāvāt niyogato na arthā upalabhyeran* (F 46/1) "If it were a fact that in the absence of a creator (of word-relations), the meanings are never comprehended" (J 24).

Ex.1 *na hi ciravṛttaḥ san na smaryeta* (F 42/21)

"Even if he had existed a long time back, it would not be impossible to remember him" (J 23).

As we will see later, *na* n°1 amounts to the clause "it is not possible/true that..."

§ 14.- A more specific group of phrases, unknown in the *Upaniṣads* as well as in the *Nyāya* works, exhibits several negations and the instrumental *etāvataḥ*. This pattern is meant to utter delicate shades of meaning requested by the subtle discussion ongoing.

Ex.1 *na hi -laukikaṃ vacanam anupapannam ity etāvataḥ- pratyakṣādibhir anavagamya māno 'rthaḥ śakyo abhyupagantum* (F 38/16-17)

"Simply because a certain popular assertion is unjustifiable, it cannot be right to admit the existence of something which is not vouched for by (any means of knowledge, e.g.) sense perception etc." (J 19).

Ex.2 *na -gaunaḥ śabdo mā bhūd ity etāvataḥ- pratyakṣādibhir anavagamya māno 'rthaḥ śakyaḥ parikalpayitum* (F 40/4-6)

"It would not be right to assume something not vouched for by sense perception etc., simply for the purpose of saving the (sacred) Word from being a subordinate (cause)" (J 20).

Ex.3 *yathā -vidyamānasya apy anupalambhanaṃ bhavati iti na etāvataḥ- vinā pramāṇena śaśaviṣṇaṃ pratipadyemahi* (F.44/14-15)

"For instance, even though it is possible for an existing thing to be not perceived, we do not, merely on the ground of that possibility, admit the existence of the hare's horn without a proof of it" (J 20).

Here one of the negative elements is *vinā* "without" + instrumental (instead of *apramāṇena*).⁸

Ex.4 *na ca -tan na śakyaṃ nidarśayitum ity etāvataḥ- na asti ity avagamyaṃ* (F 58/2)

"And yet simply because the colour cannot be pointed out (to another), it is not concluded that it does not exist" (J 29).

In each of these sentences, there are 3 negations. Three times, there is a negation ahead and it bears on the word *etāvataḥ* ; once, *na* is just before this latter. The couple *na...etāvataḥ* can be rendered by "it is not because...(that)". Each time too, the group closed by *etāvataḥ* is negative and contains either a privative (*anupapanna*, *anupalambhana*) or *mā bhūt* or *na* + verb. The main clause contains a negative element : twice *anavagamya māna*, once *vinā* + complement, once a negative *iti* group.

This complex pattern is meant to point out that an absurd contention is not allowed to be made even if it shuns another undesirable conclusion. In these sentences, the negations start being wielded as in the intricate utterances of the later logic.

8. In this research, we do not dwell upon the scheme *na* + privative preposition. E.g.: *na śakyaṃ upāyam antareṇa upeyam upetum* (F 60/6) "The end cannot be attained without the means" (J 30) + F 44/13-14.

B. The *Nyāya-sūtras* and *-Bhāṣya*

On the side of the logical works, we can first of all mention some examples of double negation in the *Nyāya-sūtras* themselves (date of composition, the first two centuries C.E.)

§ 15.- The double negation is not common in the *Sūtras*. We can quote:

Ex.1 NS III 1 36 : *na anumānamānasya pratyakṣato anupalabdhir abhāvaheṭuḥ* (Nd 764)⁹
"It is not because something inferable is not perceived that there is a ground for vindicating its non existence/absence" (J III 1191).

There are here 2 negations provided we take into account the word *abhāva* "absence" which, however, can convey a positive notion according to the Indians.

Ex.2 NS II 1 24 : ...*na anavarodhaḥ* (Nd 435)

"(There can be) no non-inclusion (of it)" (J II 669).

These double negations have nothing to do with the pattern *na* + negative ablative, which actually encloses 2 negative sentences, the prior one being reduced to *na* itself.

§ 16.- In the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (3rd c.C.E?), the negative utterances are still close to those exhibited in the *Upaniṣads*.

Na is associated with a privative term in the following passages:

Ex.1 ad I 1 1 : *na anupalabdhe...arthe nyāyaḥ pravartate* (Nd 35/5)

"Reasoning does not function with regard to an unknown thing" (J I 44).

Ex.2 ad I 1 22 : *na iṣṭam aniṣṭena ananuviddham sambhavati* (Nd 231 4-5)

"There is (nothing) desirable and not mixed up with an undesirable (element)" (J I 288).

Ex.3 ad I 1 22 : *tena aviśeṣo na asti* (Nd 230/3)

"Thus there is no non-difference" (J I 287).

Ex.4 ad II 1 13 : *atha na upādīyate apradarśitam hetvarthasya dṛṣṭāntena sādhatvam* (Nd 428/6)

"The quality of being a proof is not accepted when it is not exemplified by the example of an object (conceived) as a logical reason" (J II 625).

§ 17.- Incidentally the double negation member is devoid of verb:

Ex.1 ad I 1 22 : *na sukha-abhāvāḥ / na anabhivyaktir asti* (Nd 228/4)

"There is neither absence nor no-manifestation of pleasure" (J I 285).

9. Nd = *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika...critically edited...by T.N. and A. Tarkatirtha*, ²Delhi 1985 ; J = *The Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara*, transl.into English by G. Jhā, 4 voll.,²Delhi, 1984. This translation is not reproduced here word for word.

Ex.2 ad II 1 13 : *na ca tarhi pratyakṣādmām apramāṇyam*(Nd 428/2)

"You cannot deny the character of proof in regard to perception etc." (J II 624).

Ex.3 ad II 1 31 : *na aṅghyamāṇam ekadeśāntaram vṛkṣo gṛhyamānaikadeśavat* (Nd 463/4)

"Neither is the unperceived part the tree nor the perceived part" (J II 682).

§ 18.- The double negation can also be formed by 2 (or more) privatives:

Ex.1 ad I 1 22 : *asamvedane ca avidyamānena aviśeṣaḥ* (Nd 229/4)

"In case of non-experience, it is as if it ceased existing" (J I 286).

Ex.2 ad II 1 32 :...*anupalabdhir anupapannā* (Nd 470/5)

"It is not possible that there be no perception" (J II 697).

§ 19.- In the following passages, the tag "double negation" does not fit as well:

Ex.1 ad I 2 22 : *na ca asti anumānam : aśarīrasya ātmano bhogaḥ kaś cid asti iti* (Nd 230/4-5)

"There is no inference that any pleasure exists for a bodyless soul" (J I 287).

Ex.2 ad I 2 22 : *na kṣyate iti : na asti anumānam* (Nd 229/7-8)

"There is no inference that it does not perish" (J I 286-7).

Ex.3 ad II 1 24 : *na ca -asamyukte dravye- samyogajasya guṇasya utpattir asti* (Nd 454/2-3)

"When an object is deprived of contact, there is no production of any such quality as can be produced by contact" (J II 669).

In those quotations, each of the 2 negations belongs to a separate stretch.

§ 20.- Like in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* (§ 13), the presence of 2 *na*(s) is exceptional also in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, just once in about half the text.

Ex.1 ad II 2 65(62 Jha) : *na vai padārthena na bhavitum śakyam* (Nd 670/5)

"It is not possible that the (word) has no denotation at all" (J II 1034).

Among the 11 examples supplied above, 9 present the negation *na* ahead in the clause. Once it follows *atha* (§ 16/4), and once too, it is inserted before the final verb (§ 16/3).

C.The *Nyāya-vārttika*

In the *Nyāya-vārttika*, a later commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtras* and *-Bhāṣya* written by Uddyotakara (550-610 C.E.), we first find the traditional schemes.¹⁰

10. For the edition and translation of the *Nyāya-vārttika*, see above note 9. Here, Jha's translation is sometimes modified and provided with brackets.

§ 21.- *Na* + privative adjectives.

These adjectives are no longer the simple words of the *Upaniṣads* (above § 2) but, generally, heavy technical terms.

Ex.1 ad I 1 4 : *tasmād na aprāpyakāri* (Nd 105/10)

"Thus the (eye does) not (operate) without getting at the object" (J I 131).

Ex.2 ad I 1 23 : *na idaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvacchartram* (Nd 245/5)

"The living body is not without soul" (J I 317)

Ex.3 ad II 1 37 : *na hi vyabhicārasya apramāṇatvasādhakasya vyabhicāraḥ pratipādayitum śakyaḥ* (Nd 515/6-7)

"When a non-proof is established by a wrong reasoning, this latter cannot be vindicated" (J II 801).

§ 22.- *Na* + negative passive past participles¹¹.

Ex.1 ad I 1 1 : *yadi upalabdho, na anirñtāḥ / atha anirñto, na upalabdhaḥ* (Nd 36/7-8)

"If something known is not uncertain, then something uncertain is not known" (J I 51).

Ex.2 ad II 1 33 : *asamhatās tu paramāṇavo na santi* (Nd 491/7)

"But there are no such things as the disintegrated atoms" (J II 742).

+ ad I 1 16 (= Nd 217/6-7 : *na asamḥbaddham*) ; ad I 2 7 (= Nd 382/6 : *na aviśiṣṭaḥ*).

§ 23.- *Na* + privative nouns.

The simplest formula is as follows:

Ex.1 ad II 1 6 : *na asaṃśayaḥ* (Nd 417/18)

"There is no absence of doubt" (J II 604).

+ ad I 1 1 (Nd 36/9 : *na anivṛtīḥ*) ; ad II 1 42 (= Nd 525/9 : *na anārambhāḥ*).

Elsewhere the phrase is somewhat longer:

Ex.2 ad I 1 22 : *na hi brāhmaṇaviśeṣe bhavati abrāhmaṇa iti* (Nd 224/15)

"As regards a particular *brāhmaṇa*, (the qualification) "non-*brāhmaṇa*" never occurs" (J I 283).

Ex.3 ad I 2 1 : *na ayaṃ doṣo asaṃsakarāṇena parihriyate* (Nd 347/9)

"This absurdity is not avoided by not compounding the words" (J I 494-95).

Ex.4 ad II 1 12 : *na hy anabhyupagatasāmānyasya viśeṣapratīṣedho avakāśaṃ labhate* (Nd 426/13)

11. Ad I 1 9 : *tadanupādānād anāgatau dharmādharmau na bhavataḥ* (Nd 184/6), "As he does not have recourse to these (activities), no further merit or demerit accrues to him" (J I 216), is not relevant because the ablative ahead is a separate clause, whereas *anāgata*, despite its negative form, is felt as keeping the positive meaning "further, future", + n.3.

"For someone not admitting the (existence of *pramāṇa*) in general, there is no room for the denial of a particular (*pramāṇa*)" (J II 622).

+ ad I 2 22 (= *Nd* 233/6 : *anutpādo na...*) ; ad I 2 13 (= *Nd* 394/11-12: *na hi aviśeṣaśabdena...*); ad II 1 33 (= *Nd* 496/2 : *na hi...aprāptim*) ; ad II 2 66 (= *Nd* 687/4 : *na hi...abhāve*)

§ 24.- We can put in a separate group the cases where *na* appears with privative ablatives and locatives. As already said, indeed, we actually have 2 clauses.

Ex.1 ad II 1 33: *anarthāntarabhāve na avayavatvaṃ sidhyati tantūnām* (*Nd* 479/9-10)

"If the yarns are not something distinct (from the cloth), they cannot be called its components" (J II 710).

Ex.2 ad II 1 31 : *vṛkṣasya asiddhatvena abhyupagamāt na pratisamdhānam* (*Nd* 466/2)

"As the tree (as a composite whole) is a thing which you hold to be wholly unknown, no remembrance (of it is possible)" (J II 689).

+ ad II 1 33 (= *Nd* 494/12 : *na aprastutatvāt*; *Nd* 491/8-9 : *na ca asaṃhata-pratiśedhe*).

§ 25.-A new type of privative is the negated adverb.

Ex.1 ad II 1 32 : *na ekam anekatra vartate* (*Nd* 473/11)

"It would no longer be the one (subsisting) in the many (lit. in the not-one)" (J II 703).

Ex.2 ad II 1 36 : *na akasmād bhavitavyam* (*Nd* 509/15)

"(And this conception) should not be due to mere chance" (J II 790).

§ 26.- As in the *Upaniṣads*, we meet the combination of 2 (or more) privatives.

Ex.1 ad I 1 35 : *avyāpakatvaṃ anivṛttam* (*Nd* 305/4-5).

"The non-inclusion is not led to an end" (J I 423).

Ex.2 ad II 1 33 : (*vayaṃ tu brūmah:*) *aprāpter adarśananimitta iti* (*Nd* 496/2)

"(Our own view is that) it is due to our not perceiving their disjunction" (J II 753).

Ex.3 ad II 1 58 : (...*na yuktam...vaktum* :) *mantrāṇām asāmarthyāt putrānutpattiḥ* (*Nd* 551/17)

"(It is not right to say that) the non-appearance of a son is due to the inefficiency of the Vedic texts" (J II 855).

+ ad I 2 13 (= *Nd* 394/12 : *aviśeṣaśabda-anabhidhāna*).

§ 27.- The examples above supply us with privative terms of various nature : adjectives (§ 21), past passive participles (§ 22), nouns (§§ 23-24) and even adverbs (§ 25). Many of them are compounds. The double negation sentence is of different sizes, either very short (§ 23/ex.1 etc.) or somewhat longer (§ 23/exx. 2sv.). In most of the cases, it is opened by

na (exceptions : §§ 21/1, 22/2, 24/1-2) and incidentally by *na* + causal *hi* (§§ 21/3, 23/2,4).¹² The couple *na hi* again occurs in the next group, the one made up of the double *na* sentences.

§ 28.- Double *na* sentences.

The double *na* is probably one of the most typical devices in the phraseology of Uddyotakara. It is used in the frame of philosophical polemics to state ideas and contentions with enough carefulness and subtlety. It is unknown in the *Upaniṣads* and quite uncommon with the writers of rival philosophical traditions like the *Mīmāṃsā* (see however above § 12; for the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, cf. § 20). It might have been borrowed from the Buddhist *Bhāṣya*, but further research is needed to ascertain the fact. In any case, Jha renders it by a variety of translations. One of the easiest is : "it is not true that... not...".

- Double *na* can be present in very short clauses.

Ex.1 ad I 1 1 : *na na prāpnoti* (Nd 43/3)

"It is not true that it does not hold good" (J I 56).

Ex.2 ad I 1 5 : (...*na pramāṇam asti*) *na na asti* (Nd 160/1-2)

"(...There is no proof). It is not true that there is none" (J I 182).

+ ad II 1 33 (Nd 494/7) ; ad III 1 1 (Nd 702/18, 704/7).

- Clauses with post-verbal expansions

Ex.3 ad I 1 1 : *na na asti arthasya tathābhāvāt* (Nd 33/7)

It is not true that there is no (proof), because such is the actual state of the object" (J I 42).

Ex.4 ad I 1 4 : *na na asti yugapajñānānupapatteḥ* (Nd 124/14)

"It is not true that it is not (mentioned separately), because the simultaneity of the knowledge is impossible" (J I 192-93).

§ 29.- Elsewhere one of both *na(s)* opens the clause while the other is inserted just before verbs such as *asti/santi*, *bhavati*, *sambhavati*, *apekṣate*.

Ex.1 ad I 1 2 : *na punar vartamānam na bhavati* (Nd 81/11)

"It is not meant that his present (body) ceases to exist" (J I 95).

Ex.2 ad I 1 5 : (*evam hi asati eva nāsti*) *na punar na asty eva* (Nd 166/5-6)

"(As it [= the horn] is absent only in the non-existent subject) it is not true that it is not present" (J I 192-3).

Ex.3 ad I 1 5 : ...*vartamāno na vipakṣe na asti* (Nd 163/9-10)

"It is not true that (something) lying...is not present in the counter-example" (J I 189).

12. In the Vedic "*Bhāṣya*", e.g. in the *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa*, *hi* is well-known and sometimes occurs with an unusual word order, see J.M. Verpoorten, *L'ordre des mots dans l'Aitareya-brāhmaṇa* (Liège-Paris, 1977), §§ 292ff.

- Ex.4 ad I 1 5 : *na hi nāntarīyakaḥ syāt na arthaḥ* (Nd 161/9)
 "As what is already concomitant cannot be but a thing" (J I 184).
 Ex.5 ad I 1 10 : *na hi naḥ pakṣe smṛtir na saṁbhavati* (Nd 189/3)
 "But as a matter of fact, it is not true that no remembrance is possible under our theory" (J I 227).
 Ex.6 ad I 1 35 : *na hy asau pakṣadharmo na bhavati* (Nd 297/8-9)
 "For that cannot be but a feature of the (logical) subject" (J I 406).
 Ex.7 ad II 1 33 : *na punaḥ karmāśrayādi api na apekṣate* (Nd 482/10-11)
 "It does not mean that it does not need the help of (such things as) its own substratum etc.", (J II 717).

§ 30.- Elsewhere the verb is less trivial.

- Ex.1 ad I 1 4 : *na hi na manuṣyaśabdasya brāhmaṇo na vācyaḥ* (Nd 131/13)
 "It is not right that the *Brāhmaṇa* is not spoken of by the word 'man'" (J I 150).
 Ex.2 ad I 1 4 : *na ca taiḥ saha anabhidhānāt na ukto bhavati* (Nd 131/14)
 "Simply because it does not denote (a *Brāhmaṇa*) with these (specific features), it is not right that he is not spoken of (by the word *manuṣya*)" (J I 150).
 This clause contains 2 *na*(s) and a third negation : *anabhidhānāt*
 Ex.3 ad I 1 5 : *na ca agner deśamātrasaṁbandho na pratīḥ* (Nd 153/9-10)
 "It is not true that the relation of fire to any place is unknown" (J I 173).
 Ex.4 ad I 1 7 : *na hi devadattaprakāśitam ghaṭam yajñadatto na paśyati* (Nd 175/10)
 "It is not a fact that Yajñadatta does not see a jar shown by Devadatta" (J I 203-04).
 Ex.5 ad II 1 32 : *na hi...tatsahacarito 'vayavī na saṁnikṛṣṭaḥ* (Nd 470/9-10)
 "The composite helped by them does not fail to be in contact (with it)" (J II 699-700).
 Ex.6 ad II 1 33 : *na hi paramāṇava indriyeṇa na sambadhyante* (Nd 489/14)
 "For it is not true that atoms are not related to the sense-organs" (J II 737).
 An uncommon scheme occurs in:
 Ex.7 ad I 1 4 : *na hi te na marīcayo na vā spandante* (Nd 114/4)
 "It is not true that the (rays are) not rays nor that they are not flickering" (J I 135).
 Ultimately, we have a combination of 4 negations and thus a rather intricate translation in:
 Ex.8 ad II 1 33 : *na* (1) *ca -uttarādharānapekṣeṇa* (2) *saṁyogena ihabuddhiḥ na* (3) *kriyate iti-tatpūrvikā na* (4) *bhavati* (Nd 484/18-19)
 "And as the notion of "herein" is not coined due to a contact regardless of the upper or lower (position), it is not true that it is not preceded by that contact" (J II 723).

§ 31.- A first separate group gathers sentences with an indefinite component.

- Ex.1 ad I 1 1 : *na hi kaś cit padārtho jñāyamāno hānopādānopekṣābuddhinimittam na bhavati*(Nd33/5)

"Because it is not true that whatever category - provided it is known - is not the cause of either discarding, or acquiring, or indifference" (J I 41).

Ex.2 ad I 1 1 : *na hi kasya cit kvacit ca tattvajñānaṃ na asti* (Nd 34/5)

"As there is no person who has no knowledge of even one of the categories" (J I 42).

Ex.3 ad I 1 7 : *na hi kiṃ cid apūrvam na abhivyaktam* (Nd 177/2-3)

"There would be no apūrvā that would be not manifested (at any time)" (J I 206).

Ex.4 ad I 1 14 : *na hi kasya cit kaścit viśeṣaṇam viśeṣyo vā na bhavati* (Nd 203/12)

"As there is not any (*guṇa*) which cannot be the qualification or the qualified of something else" (J I 246).

Ex.5 ad II 1 49 : *na hi kadā cic chabda upalabhyamāno na pramāṇam bhavati* (Nd 533/4-5)

"Whenever a word is heard, it never fails to become an (efficient) means of knowledge" (J II 827).

§ 32.- A second separate collection contains the passages combining the group *na śakyam/yuktam (vaktum)* + a negative completive clause. But as this pattern is actually the meeting of 2 distinct negations acting each on their side, it can be dealt with more briefly.

Ex.1 ad I 1 9 : *na śakyam -na asti iti- vaktum* (Nd 183/10)

"It cannot be said that there is no (such thing as pleasure)" (J I 215).

Ex.2 ad I 2 1 : *na ca varṇe gurulāghavam āśriyata iti na yuktam* (Nd 348/11)

"It is out of place (to contend) that terseness and diffuseness do not pertain to the phoneme" (J I 479).

Ex.3 ad II 2 66 (or 63 Jha) : *na hi -yo yasya avācakaḥ / sa tacchabdaḥ iti-śakyam vaktum* (Nd 679/17)

"For when a word is not expressive of a thing, it cannot be called 'word for that thing'". (J II 1051).

§ 33.- General conclusion.

In the four works studied above the basic pattern *na* + privative term is represented. This latter is of various nature: adjective, noun, non-personal forms of the verb (participles, gerunds) and even adverbs. These categories occur more or less frequently according to the nature of the texts. In the philosophical *Bhāṣya*, the gerunds seem have been comparatively rare.

At times, the double negation is formed by two privatives.

Two schemes deserve special attention. In the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, the *na+etāvata* group is meant to formulate a subtle play of ideas by means of several negations (§ 14).

In the *Nyāya-vārttika* and almost only there, the double *na* comes to the fore, particularly in sentences linked by *na hi* (§§ 28ff.).

Everywhere, we shall be careful to distinguish between the genuine double negation that is enclosed in one sentence and bears on a unique verb, and the bogus double negation where each of them has a separate field of action (e.g. § 31).