THE DOUBLE NEGATION IN THE EARLIEST UPANIŚADS
AND IN THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHICAL BHĀṢYA

Jean-Marie Verpoorten, Université de Liège

§ 1.- When you read the Indian rules of logic worked out by Gautama and their commentaries (the Nyāya-bhāṣya of Pāṇini, Vatsyāyana and the Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara), or the ritual treatise (Bhāṣya) on of Śabara, you are struck by the great number of negations and the action they have on the uttering of the thought. The pages below are an attempt to check how far these negative devices are already present in the Upāniṣads.

Thirteen of these latter have been reviewed, namely the Brhadāraṇyaka-, Chāndogya- and Mahānārāyanuṇa-, the largest ones; the Aitareya-, Taittirīya-, Praśna-, Kena-, Īsā-, Kaṭha-, Munda-, and Māṇḍukya-up. (notably shorter); the Maitri- and Śvetāśvatara-up. (comparatively inside the group).

Between the earliest Up. (the first three above) and the beginnings of the philosophical Bhāṣya, there is a span of time of 800 or even 1000 years. (500 B.C.?–300/500 C.E.?)

I. The Upāniṣads

§ 2.- The syntax of the Up. is loose. These texts are mainly made up of praises and prayers. Therein we do not examine the phrases containing just one negation, but those with two of them, namely the negation na plus a privative term beginning with the prefix a- (an- before a vowel) or incidentally niḥ-/vi-.¹

The privative term can be:

- an adjective, occasionally used substantively, contrasted with its positive form occurring in the close context or also inserted in a series. Exx. asādhu "not good" (ChU II 1 1); anādimat "beginningless" (ŚvetU IV 4) etc,
- a noun. Exx. ahiṃsā "refusal to do harm" (ChU III 17 4); alolupatva "steadiness" (ŚvetU II 13),²


² Sometimes, the privative word ends up with the suffix -ka that emphasizes its adjectival character, e.g. alomaha "without hair, hairless" (BĀU 14 6), adhūmaka "without smoke, smokeless" (KaṭhaU II 1 13). Compare with nīrinḍhana "without fuel" (MaitU VI 34).
- a present active participle. Exx. avadan "not speaking" (BĀU IV 1 2); anejat "not moving" (IṣaU 4). We can join here the perfect participle avidvān "not knowing" (ChU I 10 10 etc.) well-represented in every Up,
- a present passive participle, e.g. anadāmya "uneaten" (ChU IV 3 7),
- a participle in -antya, e.g. asaṃkalaṃpya "wrongly conceived" (ChU I 2 6),
- a past passive participle. The most famous is amṛta "immortal", which occurs everywhere and embodies the basic yearning of the Upanishadic man.3 We can also quote apratīṣṭhita "not-founded" (ChU I 8 6), ananvāgata "not followed" (BĀU IV 3 16),
- an infinitive, e.g. anāśītum "not to eat" (ChU IV 10 3),
- a gerund in -rā or -ya. Exx. aviditva "without knowing" (BĀU III 8 10), ananuṣīṣya "not instructing" (ChU V 3 4),
- compounds of various nature. Exx. akāryakārin "doing what is not to be done" (MhNU IV 159), aparaprajayya "not to be moved by another" (MaitU VII 2), apānipada "without hands or feet" (MundU I 1 6).

We are now in position to examine sentences where these various privatives occur in company of the negation, mainly na but also mā + injunctive.

§ 3.- Na + privative adjective

Ex.1 KathaU I 2 10 : na hy adhrvavāḥ prāpyate hi dhruvam tat
"For by things unstable, the stable cannot be attained".

Ex.2 MaitU IV 3 : na atapakṣasya atmajāṁśe adhigamah
"If one does not practise austerity, there is no success in the knowledge of the Self".
+ ChU VI 8 5, KathaU II 18, MaitU VII 10.

On one occasion, the sentence, following its positive counterpart, has been reduced to the negative components:

Ex.3 ChU IV 17 10 : (tasmād evanvādam eva brahmāṇam kuruṣṭa) / na evanvādam
"(Therefore one should make one-who-knows-this as his Brahma priest) / not one-who-does-not-know-this".

In this series of rather short clauses, na and the privative term are never far from each other.

§ 4.- We can gather here the passages where the privative term is half way between a noun and a pure adjective.

3. Minard, Trois énigmes sur les cent chemins II (Paris 1956), §§ 50a etc., points out that, despite their negative form, privatives may convey a fairly positive value. Amṛta is there to prove it. Let us cite also abhāya "security ", lit. "non-fear" (TaittU II 7) and anāgata "future", lit. "not (yet) occurred" (below, n.11). Discussion thereabout already in the Abhidharmakośa III 28c-d = French tr.of La Vallée Poussin, vol.2 (Louvain, 1926), pp.88sv. - In his contribution (Divorzo all'indiana) to the Papers in honour of Prof.Dr.Ji XianLin, A.Wezler notes, p.804, in reference to aṁokṣa, that the privative prefix a- does not deny the posterior member but forbids it. Such a meaning, suited e.g. for aṣaṃkālpantya, above § 2, can only be determined by a case pro case investigation.
THE DOUBLE NEGATION IN THE EARLIEST UPANISADS

Ex. 1 ChU V 11 5 : "me janapade...na anāhitāgnir na avidvān
"Within my realm...there is no man without a sacred fire or a knowlege (of the Veda)"

Ex. 2 MunḍU III 2 9 : na asya abrahmacit kule bhavati
"In his family, no one who does not know Brahman will be born"
+ MunḍU 10 ; MunḍU III 2 11.

§ 5.- Na + privative noun

Ex. 1 ChU IV 4 5 : na etad abrāhmaṇaḥ vivaktum arhati
"None but a Brāhmaṇa could thus explain"

Ex. 2 BĀU VI 1 14 : na ha vā asya anānmaḥ jagdhūm bhavati / na anānmaḥ pratigṛhitam
"What is not food is not eaten or accepted by him"

Ex. 3 ŚvetU VI 22 : vedānte paramaṁ guhyam...na apraśāntaya dātavyam na aputrāya aśīśyaya vā punah
"This highest mystery in the Vedānta...should not be given to one whose passions are not subdued, nor again to one who is not a son or a pupil"

Ex. 4 MunḍU III 2 4 : na ayam ātmā...labhyah...tapaso...alingāt
"The Self cannot be attained...through austerity without an aim"
+ ChU V 2 1, VII 22 1, BĀU VI 3 12, MaitU VI 29
We meet the same elliptic scheme as above § 3/3 in

Ex. 5 BĀU II 1 8 : (pratirūpaṁ ha eva enam upagacchat)/ na apratirūpam
"(To him comes what is like [him]), not what is unlike (him).
Once there is a combination of 2 privatives:

Ex. 6 TaittU I 11 3 : aśraddhāvā adeyam
"Do not give without faith"
In a last example the privative term has been substituted by vinā and instrumental

Ex. 7 MaitU VI 14 : na vinā pramāṇena prameyasya upalabdhiḥ
"Without proof, there is no apprehension of the thing to be proved"
All these privative nouns convey crucial elements and key notions of the Vedic-upanishadic ideology : brahmaṇa, anna, putra, śraddhā etc. As above (§§ 3–4), na is generally close to them while often occupying the front position in the sentence. Could we imagine that the right formation and use of the privatives were a part of the hidden lore handed over from guru to āśīya?

§ 6.- Na + privative past passive participles

Ex. 1 ChU VI 4 5 : na no adya kaś ca na aśrutam amatam avijñātam udāharyati
"No one today will mention to us any (idea) which has never been heard of, thought of or known before"

Ex. 2 BĀU II 5 18 : na enena kimca na anāvṛtam / na enena kimca na asaṃvṛtam
"There is nothing that is not covered by him, nothing that is not pervaded by him"
Ex. 3 *Kātha* U I 2 24: *na avirato...na asānto na asamāḥitaḥ
   *na asāntamanaśa vā...enaṃ āpnuydī*

"Not he who has not desisted (from evil ways), not he who is not tranquil...not he who has not a concentrated mind, nor even he whose mind is not composed can reach this (Self)".
+ *Kātha* U II 8 and here ex.5/3.

These examples are not very significant. Let us notice that
- the privatives may occur in a chain;
- the positives are absent in the vicinity.

§ 7.- *Na* + privative present participles

This pattern is supplied by 4 clauses of the *ChU* among which 3 are in almost immediate succession. Here is one of them

Ex.1 *ChU* VII 20 1: *na anisitaḥ śraddadhati* (*nistiṣṭham eva śraddadhāti*)

"No one has faith without having an ideal (; only by having an ideal does one have faith)",
+ *ChU* I 10 4, VII 17 1, VII 19 1.
In each case, the positive counterpart lies close by.

§ 8.- *Na* + privative gerunds

Ex.1 *ChU* VII 18 1: *na amarva vijñāṇati* (*marvā eva vijñāṇati*)

"No one understands without thinking (; only by thinking first can one understand)"

Ex.2 *ChU* VII 21 1: *na akṛtvā nistiṣṭhati* (*kṛtvā eva nistiṣṭhati*)

"No one has an ideal without acting first (; only by acting first has one an ideal)"

Ex.3 *BĀU* IV 1 2: *na anuśāsa hāreta*

"One should not accept (gifts) without first imparting instruction".

These 3 examples are not entirely relevant because there are actually 2 clauses therein and not just one endowed with 2 negations. This would be still more obvious if the gerunds had complements. In exx.1-2, we see how far a privative term is adduced or itself adduces its positive counterpart.

II. The early *Bhāṣya*

A. The *Śabara-bhāṣya* (350-500 C.E.?)

§ 9.- In the philosophical *Bhāṣya* in general and in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* in particular,* the negation is massively present and focuses the attention of

4. For further information on these works, see J.M. Verpoorten, *Mīmāṃsā Literature, History of Indian Literature*, f.VII/5, Wiesbaden, 1987.
THE DOUBLE NEGATION IN THE EARLIEST UPANIŠADS

the reader by the variety of its uses. However, we must note that the genuine double negation is less common than expected. We cannot, indeed, regard as such the following extracts selected in the Śabara-bhāṣya on Mīmśa 1 1 5:

- negative answer to an objection, followed by one or more causal ablatives:
  Ex.1 : (...iti cet) na, svapne viparyayadarśanād aviparyayāc ca tarsamīn (F 28/3-4)
  "(If it is objected that...) (the answer is) No for, in the case of dream-cognition, sublation is seen, while for another (cognition) no sublation (takes place)" (J 12).
  Obviously there are here 2 sentences, the first one being reduced to the unique word na.

- privative term inside an absolute locative
  Ex.2 : (indrīyamanaṁarthasaṁnikarṣo hi jñānasya hetuḥ) asati tasmin ajñānāt (F 26/15)
  "(What brings about a right cognition is the contact of the sense organ, the mind and the object), for, when there is no such (contact), there is no cognition" (J 11).
  The absolute locative (asati tasmin) is actually a clause by itself.

§ 10. In the Śabara-bhāṣya, the privatives are distributed in the same categories as in the Upaniṣads (cf. 2)

- adjectives, e.g. apauruṣeya, aneka, avitatha, asamīcīna, anarthaka, aśakya, anitya etc.,
- nouns, predominantly abstract ones, e.g. aviṣaya, asmarṣa, asaṁbandha, anarthā, animitra, akārayatva, abhāva, anapekṣatva, analambana, anupalambhāna, aviparyaya (cf. § 9/1), apramāṇa, asaṁdhakarṣa, anavasthā, anupalabdhr, avirodha. We can join here apanīni and apiṅgala which negate the proper names Pāṇini and Piṅgala (F 44/5-6),
- present passive participles, e.g. ananumanyamāna, anavagamanyamāna (see § 14/1-2), anādṛtyamāna, ajñāyamāna,
- past passive participles, e.g. adṛṣṭa, anupapamana,
- present active participles, 2 examples only: acetayan, aśaknuvan,
- gerunds, 2 exx. : adṛṣṭvā, aparākṣya,
- compounds which are more complex and more often employed than in the Upaniṣads, e.g. akṛta-laprasiddha-lapratipanna-saṁbandha, adṛṣṭa-kalpana, anadṛṣṭa-veda, avikalendriya, adṛṣṭārthata-arpariṣṭha (with a privative as posterior member), atatsamṣati-ja, ayāvacchāra-rītra-bhāvitva etc.

§ 11.- The double negation can be the remainder of a more extensive sentence in which elements have been dropped. The complete pattern with the positive term lies nearby.

5. At the end of each Sanskrit passage below the reference (F) is to page and line of the text edited by E. Frauwallner in Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamāntās. Vienna, 1968, Österr.Ak.d.Wiss., Philos.-hist.Kl., Sb 259, Abb.2. At the end of the English line, the reference (J) is to the page of the translation by G.Jhū, Gaekwad's Or.Ser., vol.66, 2Baroda, 1970.
6. This pattern is unknown in the Upaniṣads.

193
Ex.1 (tat tatasmtatiyena anyena upalabhyate)/ na atatsamtitijena (F 54/20-21)
"(It is recalled by another [cognition] occurring in the same series), not by a
(cognition) not appearing in the series of it" (J 28).
Ex.2 (upamitymn eva buddho artha jhatata iti ucyaete)/ na anupamitytm (F 30/3-4)
"(It is only after the cognition has come into existence that you speak of the object),
not when it has not come into existence" (J 14).
+ F 52/17-18 (upalabdhatvra/anupalabdhatvra).
As a matter of fact, the last passage is questionable because na and the privative term
belong to distinct semantic units.

§ 12.- More relevant are the following extracts:

Ex.1 tasmn na avyapadesya buddhir (F 30/8)
"Hence the cognition is not free of definition" (J 14).
Ex.2 tasmn na nirabamnaha pratyayah (F 30/16)
"Hence cognition is not without a substratum" (J 15).
Ex.3 na ca -drste karan sati- adrstant kalpayitum sakyate (F 34/3)
"And, so long as a perceptible cause is there, there is no justification for assuming an
imperceptible one" (J 17).
Ex.4 na ca himavaddisu...asmaranam bhavitum arhati (F 42/21-22)
"In the case of (such important things as) the Himadaya mountain and the like, it would
be impossible to forget (the creator)" (J 23).
Ex.5 na ca (-jhatari vijhatand anayasmimm asati jhatane ca anitye-) aparedyur icch anupapanne(F54/8-9)
"And it is not impossible for desire to appear on the next day (even though we have
no cogniser apart from the cognition and even though the cognition is not a lasting
entity)" (J 28).
Ex.6 na ca adrsatapare sneur bhavati (F 54/14-15)
"Nor is remembrance possible of what has not been perceived before" (J 28).
+ F 40/1, 44/18, 54/6-7, 54/19.
Among the foregoing examples, we have to pick out those uttering a negated
(im/)possibility and using the verbs SAK and ARH or the past passive participle
anupapanne.7

§ 13.- One scheme is worth mentioning because it exemplifies what will get more
common in the Nyayavarttika: the double na (below §§ 28ff.).

7. The phrases containing the ablative abhavt in addition to the negation na are not quite relevant. Although
there are 2 negations, it is not clear if that is felt so. E.g.: yadi samhandhur abhavt niyagato na artha
upalabhyeran (F 46/1) "If it were a fact that in the absence of a creator (of word-relations), the meanings are
never comprehended" (J 24).
THE DOUBLE NEGATION IN THE EARLIEST UPANIŚADS

Ex.1 na hi ciravṛttha san na smaryeta (F 42/21)
"Even if he had existed a long time back, it would not be impossible to remember him"
(J 23).
As we will see later, na n°1 amounts to the clause "it is not possible/true that..."

§ 14.- A more specific group of phrases, unknown in the Upaniṣads as well as in the Nyāya works, exhibits several negations and the instrumental etāvatā. This pattern is meant to utter delicate shades of meaning requested by the subtle discussion ongoing.

Ex.1 na hi -laukikam vacanam anupapannam ity etāvatā- pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamāno 'ṛthah śakyah abhyapagantum (F 38/16-17)
"Simply because a certain popular assertion is unjustifiable, it cannot be right to admit the existence of something which is not vouched for by (any means of knowledge, e.g.) sense perception etc." (J 19).

Ex.2 na -gaunah śabdo mā bhūd ity etāvatā- pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamāno 'ṛthah śakyah parikalpayitum (F 40/4-6)
"It would not be right to assume something not vouched for by sense perception etc., simply for the purpose of saving the (sacred) Word from being a subordinate (cause)" (J 20).

Ex.3 yathā -vidyāmānasya apy anupalambhanam bhavati iti na etāvatā- vinā pramāṇena śāsaśvīṣānam pratipadyemahi (F.44/14-15)
"For instance, even though it is possible for an existing thing to be not perceived, we do not, merely on the ground of that possibility, admit the existence of the hare’s horn without a proof of it" (J 20).
Here one of the negative elements is vinā "without" + instrumental (instead of apramāṇena). 8

Ex.4 na ca -tan na śakyate nidarśayitum ity etāvatā- na asti ity avagamyate (F 58/2)
"And yet simply because the colour cannot be pointed out (to another), it is not concluded that it does not exist" (J 29).
In each of these sentences, there are 3 negations. Three times, there is a negation ahead and it bears on the word etāvatā; once, na is just before this latter. The couple na...etāvatā can be rendered by "it is not because...(that)". Each time too, the group closed by etāvatā is negative and contains either a privative (anupapanna, anupalambha) or mā bhūt or na + verb. The main clause contains a negative element: twice anavagamyamāna, once vinā complement, once a negative iti group.

This complex pattern is meant to point out that an absurd contention is not allowed to be made even if it shuns another undesirable conclusion. In these sentences, the negations start being wielded as in the intricate utterances of the later logic.

8. In this research, we do not dwell upon the scheme na + privative preposition. E.g.: na śakyam upāyam antareṇa upēyam upetum (F 60/6) "The end cannot be attained without the means" (J 30) + F 44/13-14.

195
B. The Nyāya-sūtras and -Bhāṣya

On the side of the logical works, we can first of all mention some examples of double negation in the Nyāya-sūtras themselves (date of composition, the first two centuries C.E.)

§ 15.- The double negation is not common in the Sūtras. We can quote:

Ex.1 NS III 1 36 : na anumāṇānasya pravyaṣṭato anupalabdhir abhāvaḥhetuḥ (Nd 764)°
"It is not because something inferable is not perceived that there is a ground for vindicating its non existence/absence" (J III 1191).
There are here 2 negations provided we take into account the word abhāva "absence" which, however, can convey a positive notion according to the Indians.
Ex.2 NS II 1 24 : ...na anavarodhaḥ (Nd 435)
"(There can be) non non-inclusion (of it)" (J II 669).
These double negations have nothing to do with the pattern na + negative ablative, which actually encloses 2 negative sentences, the prior one being reduced to na itself.

§ 16.- In the Nyāya-bhāṣya (3rd c.C.E?) , the negative utterances are still close to those exhibited in the Upaniṣad.

Na is associated with a privative term in the following passages:
Ex.1 ad I I 1 : na anupalabdhe...arthe nyāyāḥ pravartate (Nd 35/5)
"Reasoning does not function with regard to an unknown thing" (J I 44).
Ex.2 ad I I 22 : na iṣṭam aniṣṭena ananuviddham saṁbhavati (Nd 231 4-5)
"There is (nothing) desirable and not mixed up with an undesirable (element)" (J I 288).
Ex.3 ad I I 22 : tena avilśeṣo na asti (Nd 230/3)
"Thus there is no non-difference" (J I 287).
Ex.4 ad II 1 13 : aha na upādiyate apradarsitam hetvarhasya dṛṣṭāntena sādhakatvam (Nd 428/6)
"The quality of being a proof is not accepted when it is not exemplified by the example of an object (conceived) as a logical reason" (J II 625).

§ 17.- Incidentally the double negation member is devoid of verb:

Ex.1 ad I I 22 : na sukha-abhāvāḥ / na anabhīvyaktir asti (Nd 228/4)
"There is neither absence nor no-manifestation of pleasure" (J I 285).

9. Nd = Nyāyadarśanam with Vatsyayana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika...critically edited...by T.N. and A. Tarkatirtha, Delhi 1985 ; J = The Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vatsyayana and the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, transl.into English by G. Jhā, 4 voll., Delhi, 1984. This translation is not reproduced here word for word.
The double negation in the earliest Upaniṣads

Ex. 2 ad II 1 13: na ca tarhi prayākṣaḍādhīm apramāṇyam (Nd 428/2)
"You cannot deny the character of proof in regard to perception etc." (J II 624).
Ex. 3 ad II 1 31: na āgṛhyamāṇam ekadesāntaram vṛksa āgṛhyamāṇaikadesavat (Nd 463/4)
"Neither is the unperceived part the tree nor the perceived part" (J II 682).

§ 18.- The double negation can also be formed by 2 (or more) privatives:

Ex. 1 ad I 1 22: asaṃvedane ca avidyamānena avīśeṣaḥ (Nd 229/4)
"In case of non-experience, it is as if it ceased existing" (J I 286).
Ex. 2 ad II 1 32:...anupalabdhir anupapannā (Nd 470/5)
"It is not possible that there be no perception" (J II 697).

§ 19.- In the following passages, the tag "double negation" does not fit as well:

Ex. 1 ad I 2 22: na ca asti anumāṇam: aśaṃtrasya ātmano bhogaḥ kaś cid asti iti (Nd 230/4-5)
"There is no inference that any pleasure exists for a bodyless soul" (J I 287).
Ex. 2 ad I 2 22: na kṣaye iti: na asti anumāṇam (Nd 229/7-8)
"There is no inference that it does not perish" (J I 286-7).
Ex. 3 ad II 1 24: na ca -asaṃyukte dravye- saṃyogajasya guṇasya upattir asti (Nd 454/2-3)
"When an object is deprived of contact, there is no production of any such quality as can be produced by contact" (J II 669).

In those quotations, each of the 2 negations belongs to a separate stretch.

§ 20.- Like in the Śabara-bhāṣya (§ 13), the presence of 2 na(s) is exceptional also in the Nyāya-bhāṣya, just once in about half the text.

Ex. 1 ad II 2 65(62 Jha): na vai padārthena na bhavitum śakyam (Nd 670/5)
"It is not possible that the (word) has no denotation at all" (J II 1034).

Among the 11 examples supplied above, 9 present the negation na ahead in the clause. Once it follows atha (§ 16/4), and once too, it is inserted before the final verb (§ 16/3).

C. The Nyāya-vārttika

In the Nyāya-vārttika, a later commentary on the Nyāya-sūtras and -Bhāṣya written by Uddyotakara (550-610 C.E.), we first find the traditional schemes.10

10. For the edition and translation of the Nyāya-vārttika, see above note 9. Here, Jha’s translation is sometimes modified and provided with brackets.
§ 21.- *Na* + privative adjectives.

These adjectives are no longer the simple words of the *Upaṇiṣads* (above § 2) but, generally, heavy technical terms.

Ex.1 ad I 1 4 : *tasmād na aprāpyakāri* (*Nd* 105/10)
"Thus the (eye does) not (operate) without getting at the object" (I I 131).

Ex.2 ad I 1 23 : *na idam nirātmakam jīvacchartram* (*Nd* 245/5)
"The living body is not without soul" (I I 317)

Ex.3 ad II 1 37 : *na hi vyabhicārasya apramāṇatvasādhakasya vyabhicāraḥ pratipādayitum ākhyāḥ* (*Nd* 515/6-7)
"When a non-proof is established by a wrong reasoning, this latter cannot be vindicated" (I I 801).

§ 22.- *Na* + negative passive past participles\(^{11}\).

Ex.1 ad I 1 1 : *yadi upalabdho, na anirṇītya / athe aṇirṇīto, na upalabdhaḥ* (*Nd* 36/7-8)
"If something known is not uncertain, then something uncertain is not known" (I I 51).

Ex.2 ad II 1 33 : *asaṃhūtāts tu paramāṇavato na santi* (*Nd* 491/7)
"But there are no such things as the disintegrated atoms" (I II 742).
+ ad I 1 16 (= *Nd* 217/6-7 : *na asaṃbaddham* ; ad I 2 7 (= *Nd* 382/6 : *na aviśīṣṭaḥ*).

§ 23.- *Na* + privative nouns.

The simplest formula is as follows:

Ex.1 ad II 1 6 : *na asaṃśayaḥ* (*Nd* 417/18)
"There is no absence of doubt" (I II 604).
+ ad I 1 1 (*Nd* 36/9 : *na anivṛttiḥ*) ; ad II 1 42 (= *Nd* 525/9 : *na andrāmbhāḥ*).
Elsewhere the phrase is somewhat longer:

Ex.2 ad I 1 22 : *na hi brāhmaṇa viśeṣe bhavati abrāhmaṇa iti* (*Nd* 224/15)
"As regards a particular brāhmaṇa, (the qualification) "non-brāhmaṇa" never occurs" (I I 283).

Ex.3 ad I 2 1 : *na ayaṃ doṣo asaṃsakaraṇena pariḥriyate* (*Nd* 347/9)
"This absurdity is not avoided by not compounding the words" (I I 494-95).

Ex.4 ad II 1 12 : *na hy anabhyupagatasāmānyasya viśeṣapratisedho avakāśaṁ labhate* (*Nd* 426/13)

\(^{11}\). *Ad* I 1 9 : *tadanupādaṁ na anāgatau dharmādharmau na bhavataḥ* (*Nd* 184/6), "As he does not have recourse to these (activities), no further merit or demerit accrues to him" (I I 216), is not relevant because the ablative ahead is a separate clause, whereas *anāgata*, despite its negative form, is felt as keeping the positive meaning "further, future", + n.3.
"For someone not admitting the (existence of pramāṇa) in general, there is no room for the denial of a particular (pramāṇa)" (I II 622).
+ ad I 2 22 (= Nd 233/6 : anupādo na...); ad I 2 13 (= Nd 394/11-12: na hi aviśeṣaśabdena...); ad II 1 33 (= Nd 496/2 : na hi...aprāptim); ad II 2 66 (= Nd 687/4 : na hi...abhāve)

§ 24.- We can put in a separate group the cases where na appears with privative ablatives and locatives. As already said, indeed, we actually have 2 clauses.

Ex.1 ad II 1 33: anarthāntarabhāve na avayatvam sidhyati tantūnām (Nd 479/9-10)
"If the yarns are not something distinct (from the cloth), they cannot be called its components" (I II 710).

Ex.2 ad II 1 31 : vrksasya asiddhatvena abhyupagamāt na pratisaṃdhānam (Nd 466/2)
"As the tree (as a composite whole) is a thing which you hold to be wholly unknown, no remembrance (of it is possible)" (I II 689).
+ ad II 1 33 (= Nd 494/12 : na aprastutavat; Nd 491/8-9 : na ca asaṃhata-pratishedhe).

§ 25.- A new type of privative is the negated adverb.

Ex.1 ad II 1 32 : na ekam anykatra vartate (Nd 473/11)
"It would no longer be the one (subsisting) in the many (lit. in the not-one)" (I II 703).

Ex.2 ad II 1 36 : na akasmād bhavītyayam (Nd 509/15)
"(And this conception) should not be due to mere chance" (I II 790).

§ 26.- As in the Upaniṣads, we meet the combination of 2 (or more) privatives.

Ex.1 ad I 1 35 : avyāpaketvam anyvṛttam (Nd 305/4-5).
"The non-inclusion is not led to an end" (I I 423).

Ex.2 ad II 1 33 : (vayam tu brūmaḥ:) aprāpter adarśananimitta iti (Nd 496/2)
"(Our own view is that) it is due to our not perceiving their disjunction" (I II 753).

Ex.3 ad II 1 58 : (...)na yuktam...vakṣṭum : mantrāṇām asaṃarthīt putrāṇupattīḥ (Nd 551/17)
"(It is not right to say that) the non-appearance of a son is due to the inefficiency of the Vedic texts" (I II 855).
+ ad I 2 13 (= Nd 394/12 : aviśeṣaśabda-anabhidhāna).

§ 27.- The examples above supply us with privative terms of various nature: adjectives (§ 21), past passive participles (§ 22), nouns (§§ 23-24) and even adverbs (§ 25). Many of them are compounds. The double negation sentence is of different sizes, either very short (§ 23/exx. 2 etc.) or somewhat longer (§ 23/exx. 2sv.). In most of the cases, it is opened by
na (exceptions: §§ 21/1, 22/2, 24/1-2) and incidentally by na + causal hi (§§ 21/3, 23/2, 4). The couple na hi again occurs in the next group, the one made up of the double na sentences.

§ 28.- Double na sentences.

The double na is probably one of the most typical devices in the phraseology of Uddyotakara. It is used in the frame of philosophical polemics to state ideas and contentions with enough carefulness and subtlety. It is unknown in the Upaniṣads and quite uncommon with the writers of rival philosophical traditions like the Mīmāṃsā (see however above § 12; for the Nyāya-bhāṣya, cf. § 20). It might have been borrowed from the Buddhist Bhāṣya, but further research is needed to ascertain the fact. In any case, Jha renders it by a variety of translations. One of the easiest is: "it is not true that... not...".

- Double na can be present in very short clauses.

Ex.1 ad I 1 1: na na prāṇoiti (Nd 43/3)
"It is not true that it does not hold good" (J I 56).

Ex.2 ad I 1 5 : (...na pramāṇam asti) na na asti (Nd 160/1-2)
"...(There is no proof). It is not true that there is none" (J I 182).
+ ad II 1 33 (Nd 494/7); ad III 1 1 (Nd 702/18, 704/7).

- Clauses with post-verbal expansions

Ex.3 ad I 1 1 : na na asti arthasya tathābhāvāt (Nd 33/7)
It is not true that there is no (proof), because such is the actual state of the object" (J I 42).

Ex.4 ad I 1 4 : na na asti yugapajjñātānupapateḥ (Nd 124/14)
"It is not true that it is not (mentioned separately), because the simultaneity of the knowledge is impossible" (J I 192-93).

§ 29.- Elsewhere one of both na(s) opens the clause while the other is inserted just before verbs such as asti/santi, bhavati, sambhavati, apekṣate.

Ex.1 ad I 1 2 : na punar vartamānaṁ na bhavati (Nd 81/11)
"It is not meant that his present (body) ceases to exist" (J I 95).

Ex.2 ad I 1 5 : (evaṁ hi asati eva nāsti) na punar na asty eva (Nd 166/5-6)
"(As it [= the horn] is absent only in the non-existent subject) it is not true that it is not present" (J I 192-3).

Ex.3 ad I 1 5 :...vartamāno na vipakṣe na asti (Nd 163/9-10)
"It is not true that (something) lying...is not present in the counter-example" (J I 189).

12. In the Vedic "Bhāṣya", e.g. in the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa, hi is well-known and sometimes occurs with an unusual word order, see J.M. Verpoorten, L'ordre des mots dans l'Aitareya-brāhmaṇa (Liège-Paris, 1977), §§ 292ff.
THE DOUBLE NEGATION IN THE EARLIEST UPANISHADS

Ex. 4 ad I 1 5 : na hi nāntartyakah syāt na arthah (Nd 161/9)
"As what is already concomitant cannot be but a thing" (J I 184).

Ex. 5 ad I 1 10 : na hi naḥ pakṣe smṛtir na sambhavati (Nd 189/3)
"But as a matter of fact, it is not true that no remembrance is possible under our theory" (J I 227).

Ex. 6 ad I 1 35 : na hy asau pakṣadharmo na bhavati (Nd 297/8-9)
"For that cannot be but a feature of the (logical) subject" (J I 406).

Ex. 7 ad II 1 33 : na punāḥ karmāśrayaḍī api na apekṣate (Nd 482/10-11)
"It does not mean that it does not need the help of (such things as) its own substratum etc." (J II 717).

§ 30.- Elsewhere the verb is less trivial.

Ex. 1 ad I 1 4 : na hi na manusyaśabdasya brāhmaṇo na vācyah (Nd 131/13)
"It is not right that the Brāhmaṇa is not spoken of by the word 'man'" (J I 150).

Ex. 2 ad I 1 4 : na ca taḥ saha anahadhānāt na uktō bhavati (Nd 131/14)
"Simply because it does not denote (a Brāhmaṇa) with these (specific features), it is not right that he is not spoken of (by the word manusya)" (J I 150).

This clause contains 2 na(s) and a third negation : anahdhānāt

Ex. 3 ad I 1 5 : na ca agner desamātrasambandho na prattah (Nd 153/9-10)
"It is not true that the relation of fire to any place is unknown" (J I 173).

Ex. 4 ad I 1 7 : na hi devadatta-prakāśitam ghatam yaśadatto na paśyati (Nd 175/10)
"It is not a fact that Yajñadatta does not see a jar shown by Devadatta" (J I 203-04).

Ex. 5 ad II 1 32 : na hi...tattahacarito 'vayāt na sāmnikṛṣṭah (Nd 470/9-10)
"The composite helped by them does not fail to be in contact (with it)" (J II 699-700).

Ex. 6 ad II 1 33 : na hi paramāṇava indriyena na sambadhyante (Nd 489/14)
"For it is not true that atoms are not related to the sense-organs" (J II 737).

An uncommon scheme occurs in:

Ex. 7 ad I 1 4 : na hi te na marccayo na vā spandante (Nd 114/4)
"It is not true that the (rays are) not rays nor that they are not flickering" (J I 135).

Ultimately, we have a combination of 4 negations and thus a rather intricate translation in:

Ex. 8 ad II 1 33 : na (1) ca -uttarādharānapaksena (2) samyogena ihabuddhiḥ na (3) kriyate iti-tatpūrvikā na (4) bhavati (Nd 484/18-19)
"And as the notion of "herein" is not coined due to a contact regardless of the upper or lower (position), it is not true that it is not preceded by that contact" (J II 723).

§ 31.- A first separate group gathers sentences with an indefinite component.

Ex. 1 ad I 1 1 : na hi kaś cit padārtho jñāyamāno hānopādānaṃ paksābuddhinimittam na bhavatī (Nd33/5)

201
"Because it is not true that whatever category - provided it is known - is not the cause of either discarding, or acquiring, or indifference" (J I 41).

Ex.2 ad I 1 1 : na hi kasya cīt kvacit ca tattvajñānānaḥ na asti (Nd 34/5)
"As there is no person who has no knowledge of even one of the categories" (J I 42).

Ex.3 ad I 1 7 : na hi kim cid apūrvam na abhivyaktam (Nd 177/2-3)
"There would be no apūra that would not be manifested (at any time)" (J I 206).

Ex.4 ad I 1 14 : na hi kasya cīt kaścit viśeṣaṇam viśeṣyo vā na bhavati (Nd 203/12)
"As there is not any (gupta) which cannot be the qualification or the qualified of something else" (J I 246).

Ex.5 ad II 1 49 : na hi kādaḥ cīc chabda upalabhyaṁ no na pramāṇaṁ bhavati (Nd 533/4-5)
"Whenever a word is heard, it never fails to become an (efficient) means of knowledge" (J II 827).

§ 32.- A second separate collection contains the passages combining the group na śakyam/yuktam (vaktum) + a negative completive clause. But as this pattern is actually the meeting of 2 distinct negations acting each on their side, it can be dealt with more briefly.

Ex.1 ad I 1 9 : na śakyam -na asti iti- vaktum (Nd 183/10)
"It cannot be said that there is no (such thing as pleasure)" (J I 215).

Ex.2 ad I 2 1 : na ca varṇe gurulāghavam adṛtyata iti na yuktam (Nd 348/11)
"It is out of place (to contend) that terseness and diffuseness do not pertain to the phoneme" (J I 479).

Ex.3 ad II 2 66 (or 63 Jha) : na hi -yo yasya avacakāḥ / sa tucchabdaḥ iti-śakyam vaktum (Nd 679/17)
"For when a word is not expressive of a thing, it cannot be called 'word for that thing'". (J II 1051).

§ 33.- General conclusion.

In the four works studied above the basic pattern na + privative term is represented. This latter is of various nature: adjective, noun, non-personal forms of the verb (participles, gerunds) and even adverbs. These categories occur more or less frequently according to the nature of the texts. In the philosophical Bhāṣya, the gerunds seem have been comparatively rare.

At times, the double negation is formed by two privatives.

Two schemes deserve special attention. In the Śabara-bhāṣya, the na+etāvatā group is meant to formulate a subtle play of ideas by means of several negations (§ 14).

In the Nyāya-vārttika and almost only there, the double na comes to the fore, particularly in sentences linked by na hi (§§ 28ff.).

Everywhere, we shall be careful to distinguish between the genuine double negation that is enclosed in one sentence and bears on a unique verb, and the bogus double negation where each of them has a separate field of action (e.g. § 31).