

Mīmāṃsā- and Vedānta-sentences in Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā* (Chapter 2)

J. M. VERPOORTEN

§ 1 Padmapāda lived in the 9th century (*floruit* ca. 820), was a disciple of Śaṅkara, and wrote a treatise divided into five chapters (*Pañca-pādikā*) where he comments on the *bhāṣya* of his master on the first four aphorisms of the *Brahmasūtra*.

The edition of the *Pañcapādikā* used here, by S. Śrīrāma Śāstrī and S. R. Krishnamurthi Śāstrī (1958), contains several commentaries of which the *Vivarana* of Prakāśātman is a well-known one. In chapter 2, there is a debate between a M(īmāṃsaka) and a V(edāntin), about whether a later (*uttara*) Mīmāṃsā should be added to the former (*pūrva*) Mīmāṃsā in order to scrutinize the Upaniṣadic sentences and make out their meaning. This discussion is not easy to follow because the arguments – some of them very short – succeed each other without any indication that the speaker has changed. The nature of the problems and the style of the exchanges are such that, at first glance, some views seem interchangeable. Although the issues in the debate are few and constantly repeated, it is difficult to point out at which stage we are in the dialectical development and what is precisely the approach of each opponent.

An English translation of the *Pañcapādikā*, accompanied by rich and illuminating notes, has been produced by D. Venkata-

ramiah.¹ There the M debater is called *anārambhavādin*, 'the one who does not admit [a new] inquiry', and his opponent, the V, is called *ārambhavādin*, 'the one who admits [a new] inquiry'.

A. DELIBERATIONS CONCERNING THE UPANIṢADIC SENTENCES

§ 2 Chapter 2 abruptly opens with an objection of the M: "Sorry (*nanu*) but the inquiry into *brahman* is complete"² with what Jaimini has said in his collection of *sūtras* beginning with the words. "Then, therefore, comes the inquiry into dharma",³ and ending with the appendix entitled *Samkarṣakāṇḍa*.⁴ Thus no additional uncertainty (*abhyadhikāsūnkū*) remains about the essence of *dharma*.

But some (*ke cit*, p. 180/6) authorities are prepared to undertake (*ā-√rabh*)⁵ a separate (*prthag*, p. 181/7) investigation. Śabara indeed defines *dharma* exclusively as *codanū* 'mandate'. Now, in the Upaniṣads, there are important statements that are not mandatory, e.g. ChU 6.2.1: 'In the beginning, my dear, there was being alone.'⁶

§ 3 There are also mandatory sentences like

- BĀU 2.4.5: *ūtmū vā are draṣṭavyah*
- ChU 8.1.1: *tasmin yad antas tad anveṣṭavyam, tad vūva vijijñāsitavyam*.⁷

¹ Venkataramiah 1948. I thank Dr. A. Pelissero, Turin, to have provided me with photocopies of the pages of the Madras edition here used.

² P. 180/2: *siddhā-eva nanu brahmajijñāsā*.

³ *atha-ato dharmajijñāsā*. Cf. below § 14. Concerning this *sūtra* and its commentary cf. Verpoorten 1986.

⁴ On this addendum to the MS, cf. Verpoorten 1987: 6-7. *Samkarṣa*[*kāṇḍa*] still occurs in chapter 2, pp. 184/5, 187/8.

⁵ In our text, the forms of this verb and the noun *ārambha* refer to the new treatise, the one dealing with the Vedānta.

⁶ *sad eva somya-idam agra ūsīt*, quoted on p. 181/1. On p. 188/5 and 193/2, we find a second non-mandatory phrase, viz. BĀU 4.5.7: *idam sarvaṃ yad ayam ūtmū* 'What all this (= the universe) is, that is *ātman*', cf. below § 7.

In them however the injunctive suffix (*krtya* or *tavya-pratyaya*)⁸ bears on the object (*karman*) and not on the action (*kriyā*). It is *karmābhidhāyin*⁹, which is, in the eyes of the M, an undesirable situation.

Another moot point is that *ātman-brahman* is, by essence, beyond the range of acts, even the one of knowing. It cannot be brought about nor modified, nor attained,¹⁰ nor sacralized, because it is eternal (p. 182/1-2).

In the sentence BĀU 1.4.8: *ātmānam upāsīta* 'One should revere the Self', to consider *ātmānam* as a genuine accusative and therefore to qualify it as 'the most desirable [thing]' (*īpsitatama*), sounds freakish in the ear of the M.

In order to address and settle these difficulties, a new inquiry and a new method are necessary under the name of *śūrīrakārambha* (p. 187/11), that is Vedānta.

§ 4 The answer of the M (p. 182) and the reaction of the V.

The M argues that the Upaniṣadic statements must be integrated into the *dharma*-science or Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. After all, what is the difference between *ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ* coming from an Upaniṣad, and *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*¹¹ which is sheer Mīmāṃsā? And, as far as *ātmānam upāsīta* is concerned, we should appeal to the Mīmāṃsā rule called *saktunūyā*¹² that allows us to consider the accusative as

⁷ 'Mark well, it is the Self that should be seen' (Zaehner 1966: 46). 'What is within that is what [you] should seek: that is what [you] should really want to understand' (Zaehner 1966: 122).

⁸ *Krtya* is the technical name of the injunctive suffix used by Pāṇini, e.g. 3.3.171. *Tavya* is a common injunctive ending. In this context *pratyaya* means 'suffix' and not 'knowledge'.

⁹ The word occurs on p. 183/6 and contrasts with *bhāvābhidhāyin*, p. 181/4-5.

¹⁰ These three options are familiar in Indian grammar. Cf. Bhartrhari, *Vākya-padīya* 3.7, *kārikā* 45 (or Rau 2002: 301).

¹¹ 'One should engage into the study [of the Veda].' The text known as *adhyayana-vidhi* shows up in *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 11.5.6.3. In chapter 2, we meet it on pp. 185/7, 191/5 (*svādhyāyakāla*), 195/7, 210/2 (*svādhyāyādhyayana-vidhi*), 204/5, 206/5 (*adhyayana*) and 208-209 (*vedādhyayana*).

a hidden instrumental. Thereby *ātmanam* – actually *ātmanū* – loses the first place in the sentence and hands it over to the verb. As an instrumental, *ātman(ū)* becomes a simple means of gaining heaven and not the main purpose, prior to the act.

But, according to the V, even this solution is unsatisfactory and the above-mentioned phrases must be accounted for by a new method, because they are not ritual prescriptions (*vidhis*)¹³. Thus we should undertake a new treatise, the *Brahmasūtra*.

§ 5 After a remark on the ritual bath at the completion of study (*snāna*),¹⁴ which should be delayed if a Upaniṣadic teaching is delivered, Padmapāda turns to the agent who is the beneficiary of the mandatory act, namely the *adhikārin*.

In common parlance, we hear orders such as

– *kaṭas tvayā kartavyaḥ* ‘The mat must be made by you’

– *grāmas tvayā gantavyaḥ* ‘The village has to be reached by you’, where a commander or *niyoktar* is supposed to be present. And if a sentence contains an act to be done and a material, it is to be completed by the supposition of such a person in order to be purposeful (*prayojana*)¹⁵.

The V replies that this view is wrong. We clearly perceive that the injunction “The Self should be seen” aims at destroying ne-science conducive to *saṃsāra*.¹⁶ Such a purpose is valid by itself without the mention of any instigator to whom the benefit accrues.

¹² MS 2.1.11-12 (analysing TS 3.3.8.4): *saktūn pradāvyē juhuyūt* ‘He should offer grits in the forest fire.’

¹³ It is the opinion of the V. If he held the Upaniṣadic sentences as genuine *vidhis* similar to the ritual ones, he would play the game of the M.

¹⁴ Pp. 183/5, 203/1, 209/1.

¹⁵ P. 183/7-9: *na niyokṛtvam nirūkartum śakyate ... dravyaparatve prayojanābhāvād ānarthakyam niyogasya*. This passage echoes the grammatical ideas of Kumārila; cf. Joshi 1993: 34-36.

¹⁶ Pp. 183-184: *avidyocchedasya-upalabhyamānatvūt. avidyā ca saṃsāra-hetubhūtā*.

§ 6 Other (*apare*) authorities have a different approach: if somebody thinks that the elucidation of the Veda ends with the Saṃkarsakāṇḍa (see § 2) – i.e., is confined to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā – and that no new treatise of Vedānta¹⁷ is to be undertaken, we must draw his attention to the fact that the knowledge of *ātman*, that is of reality (*tattvābodha*, p.185/1), is a *kārya*, 'ought to be done'. And this duty or *niyoga* is to be performed by a qualified person (*adhikārin*).

The last three Sanskrit words are met again after an intricate confrontation between M and V concerning the nature of *ātma-viṣaya* (pp. 186-187). Each of the opponents expounds his view of the content of the word. For the M, *ātman* is the individual ego (*ahaṃpratyaya*)¹⁸; for the V it is the cosmic entity the cognition of which brings the *saṃsāra* to an end.¹⁹

The new development about *kārya*, *niyoga* and *adhikārin* within the Vedānta is called 'another doctrine' (*matāntaram*) (p. 187/7) or *sūrīrakārambha* (p. 187/11). And it is immediately refuted (*pratyukta*, p. 187/12) by the M on the two contrary grounds: either *brahman-ātman* is *siddha*, that is 'already there' and known by everybody, or it is *asiddha* 'not there', 'inexistent', and thereby unknowable. In both cases, the fresh inquiry contemplated by the V is useless.²⁰

§ 7 The V sets forth his stance: the Veda is no doubt an object of duty, but not exclusively in the ritual sphere (p. 188/1; cf. below fn. 57). Another object of duty (*kāryaviṣaya*) is knowing the essence

¹⁷ Chapter 2 ignores the words *pūrva-* and *uttara-mīmāṃsā*. Incidentally (pp. 183/4, 187/9), it employs the term *vedānta*. On these questions of terminology, see Bronkhorst in this volume.

¹⁸ Cf. p. 200/4: *ataḥ ahaṃpratyayāvaseya eva-ūtmā. na tasya śabdāvaseyam atīndriyaṃ rūpāntaram asti.*

¹⁹ Cf. fn. 15 and p. 186/6-8 where the M refutes the Vedantic conception of *ātman* as impossible by saying: *yat punar ātmajñānād avidyocchedaḥ, tad-ucchedāt saṃsāranivṛttiḥ phalam ity upanyastaṃ tad'asat.*

²⁰ P. 187/11-12: *brahmāvagamasya siddhatve 'siddhatve ca kāryatvūsaṃbhavena pratyuktaṃ.*

of reality (*vastutattva*) as revealed by BĀU 4.5.7: *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā* 'What all this (= the universe / what ever exists / the supreme all) is, that is *ātman*'.²¹

At this point, a difficulty arises: if there is identity between *ātman* and the universe, etc., the former is at least partly *acetana* 'insentient', and that jeopardizes the existence of a knower, and, consequently, of his object of knowledge: the Vedic Revelation (*śabda*).

The answer of the V is as follows: *ātman* does not have the form of the [supreme] All (*sarvarūpatū*), but this latter has the essence of *ātman* (*ātmasvabhūvatū*).²² The M then points out that in such a view, *ātman* does not require the presence of a *vidhi*, because it is obvious, known by itself without extra help.²³

§ 8 The parallel of TS 2.6.8.5.

The V wishes to turn the BĀU passage into a *vidhi*²⁴ in the same way as the M claims that the sentence *tasmāt pūṣū prapīṣṭa-bhūgaḥ*²⁵ is injunctive although we hardly ever see a form like *yaṣṭavya* 'must be honoured (with ...)' inside this statement.²⁶ Thus the V proposes to introduce the mandatory form *jñātavya* 'must be known' in BĀU 4.5.7.²⁷ If, indeed, we did not do so, the Upani-

²¹ In the opinion of the M, these words are not a *prayogavacana*, a 'rule of performance', pp. 191/6-7, 197/5, 198/4.

²² Cf. p. 199/7-8: *sarvasya ātmasvabhūvatū sidhyati*. That presumably involves that the [supreme] All has no independent existence.

²³ P. 189/3-4: *pratīte 'rthe śabdaṃ kalpayatū kiṃ kṛtaṃ syūt ? Śabda(m) is probably a synonym of vidhi, which the next phrase suggests by using vidhiṃ kalpayitvā*.

²⁴ P. 189/1: *evaṃ tarhi kalpyatūṃ vidhiḥ*.

²⁵ 'Therefore Pūṣan [is endowed] with a portion of kneaded flour.' The next phrase in the TS is *adantako hi* 'for he is toothless'.

²⁶ By adding the verbal form, the M assumes the right of transforming the assertion of the TS into an injunction. Nowhere else, e.g. in Śbh 3.3.46 that examines the same text, we discover the word *yaṣṭavya*. It is assumed by Venkatarāmiāh (1948: 151, n. 20) to account for the expression *aśrūyamānavidhi* 'an unexpressed *vidhi*', p. 189/6.

śadic sentence would be truncated²⁸ without support (*nirūlambana*, p. 189/11). On the other hand, *jñātavya* gives to the statement the strength of an experience (*anubhava*) or an evidence (*akṣakaraṇā/kāra/bhāva*).²⁹

§ 9 Is it right to complete BĀU 4.5.7 with the injunctive form *jñātavya*?

The V emphasizes that *ātman* under the aspect of the universe is not recognized as a conscious enjoyer except in a mandatory (*niyoga*) frame.³⁰ In other words, to link *ātman* and *idaṃ sarvaṃ* is hardly possible without a mandatory verb.

As far as the M is concerned, he says that the *niyoga*, instead of being required by *ātman*, requires (*ā-√kṣip*) it, because, deprived of a personal agent (*puruṣa*, i.e. *ātman*), it would be neither perceptible (*anupalabdha*) nor effective.

Moreover, for making a *niyoga-vidhi* perceptible, a *dhātu* or 'verbal root' is necessary. Which one?³¹ *Kartavya* is excluded as unfit because, even resting on this form, BĀU 4.5.7 fails to eradicate the unconscious nature of [at least a part of] the universe (*idaṃ sarvaṃ*).³²

Thus the command "Be the universe / whatever exists made (= turned) into *ātman*" cannot be performed by lack of a suitable procedure (*itikartavyatā*).³³ *Jñātavya* is also objectionable and the

²⁷ P. 190; the form *kartavya* is also proposed as the mandatory verb to be supplemented.

²⁸ P. 194/6: *avāntaravākya*. In such a phrase, there is no connection with *pramāṇatva*.

²⁹ This idea is defended by the V on p. 195/3, 6 and p.196/1; cf. fn. 43.

³⁰ P.190/1: *nanv atra-apy ātmapadaṃ cetanasya bhoktur vācakam*.

³¹ Venkataramiah (1948: 153, n. 25) points out that the answer to this question is "no one", since neither *kartavya* nor *jñātavya* are suitable.

³² P.190/7-8: *yadi tāvat kartavyam iti, tatra-anūtmavabhūvatū na nivṛtī prapañcasya*; cf. § 7.

³³ An illustration is given: it is not because you model the offerings of dough (*piṣṭapiṇḍa*) into lion shapes that their nature of dough disappears. Cf. Śbh 8.3.24 cited and commented in Verpoorten 2001: 84.

translation 'Be whatever exists / the universe known as *ātman*' must be rejected because a [concrete?] object as *idaṃ sarvaṃ* cannot be transformed by cognition into a different entity (*ātman*).³⁴

§ 10 The V desperately tries to bolster the proposed *jñātavya* against the thorough criticism of the M. According to the M, however, a statement affirming (*vidhāyaka*) such and such a content cannot make it mandatory at the same time.³⁵

The V argues that something can subserve two goals simultaneously³⁶ and, therefore, that a *śabda* – viz., an Upaniṣadic 'great utterance' (*mahāvākya*) – asserts its own meaning and the obligation of knowing (*pratyaya*) it as well (p. 182/6-7).³⁷

For the M, this thesis is *anirūpita* 'doubtful'. BĀU 4.5.7 actually conveys a message that cannot be demonstrated from elsewhere (*anyato 'siddhatva*, p. 193/4). So it has no right of obtaining the status of 'object of injunction' (*vidher viśaya*, p.193/4). Conversely, if it should become a mandate, it would be unable to have its content known³⁸. So the conclusion is that both aspects cannot coexist in the same sentence for fear of disjunction.³⁹

§ 11 The V then raises a question familiar to anyone acquainted with the Mīmāṃsā: if a *vidhi* is limited to one command, where and what are the details (*guṇakarma*, p. 193/7) of the performance? To

³⁴ P.191/1-2: *na hi vastu vastvantarātmanū jñātuṃ śakyate*.

³⁵ This point is seemingly the main topic of the obscure pages 191-193 and particularly on p. 192/1-3.

³⁶ I skip over the comparison between the *mantras* and the Upaniṣadic sentences developed from p. 191/6 onwards. The example of a double goal object is given in fn. 45.

³⁷ Here *pratyaya*, as the compound *saṃpratyaya*, means 'knowledge' and not 'suffix' like above in fn. 8.

³⁸ P.193/4-5: *atha vidher viśayo na prameyam avagamayitum alam*.

³⁹ P.193/5-6: *na ca yugapad ubhayaṃ sambhavati vairūpyaprasaṅgāt*. It is obvious that *vairūpya* (mentioned again on p. 194/5) is the Vedantic synonym of *vākyabheda* 'split in the sentence', usual with Śābara; cf. Verpoorten 1987, § 22.

make them available, it is easier to postulate that the sentence might provide us with more than one enjoined thing.

This time, the M is in trouble, as proven by his lengthy and embarrassed answer. He tries to get out of this fix by laying down a difference between the ritual sphere and the one of his opponent.⁴⁰ In the first case, the object (*karman*) of the act, e.g., the rice to be sprinkled and purified, is something *siddha* 'already present'; in the second, *brahman-ātman* is something *asiddha* (p. 193/8–194) 'not present', 'unable to be the target of an act', and thus outside the scope of the *kūrya* or duty.⁴¹

The V proceeds to say again that BĀU 4.5.7, as a meaningful explanation, contains in itself the injunctive power of having its message known.⁴² So, this latter should be prescribed in order to be intelligible and valid, somewhat like, according Anselmus of Canterbury, God must exist in order to be perfect.

For the M, on the contrary, the message in question remains illusory because it is beyond the scope of perception.⁴³ And even if it were not illusory, it could be grasped through the *svādhyāya-vidhī* (p. 185/7), at the exclusion of any other prescription. Furthermore, nowhere in the (ritual) Veda is a means of experiencing *ātman*⁴⁴ provided, and, if it was, it would make it useless to complete BĀU 4.5.7 with the imperative participle *jñātavya*.

⁴⁰ The Vedantic sphere is denoted by the words *yatra-tatra* 'where/when ... there'. The couple *iha punaḥ* indicates that the M comes back to his own doctrine and stresses the difference with his opponent. Cf. pp. 194/10, 196/8, 199/3-4 (cf. below fn. 49) etc.

⁴¹ In an other respect, *brahman-ātman* is *siddha* 'accomplished' and not *sādhyā* 'to be carried out' with the help of a rite since it is eternal. See fn. 42.

⁴² P. 184/7: *arthavādapadānām iva ... kaṃ cid artham avabodhya vidhisa-bandham anubhavet*. The M calls BĀU 4.5.7 an 'association of words' (*padasamanvaya*, pp. 193/2-3, 194/10), which is informative and not injunctive, because it describes something *siddha*, i.e. *ātman*.

⁴³ As explained by Venkataramiah (1948: 160, n. 41). In the text (p. 195/3-4), perception is called *sākṣāt-karaṇa/bhāva* or *anubhava*. Cf. § 8.

⁴⁴ According to the M, this means might be called *abhyāsa* 'training, practice', synonym of *upāsana* (p.186/3). BĀU 1.4.8 uses the verb *upāsīta*; cf. above § 3.

§ 12 As far as the other argument is concerned, viz., the possibility for an entity of fulfilling two missions, the M opines that it should be denied as well.⁴⁵ Therefore, a *vidhi* that apparently conveys two commands,⁴⁶ e.g., several deeds and their succession, actually prescribes the former one only. That does not mean that the 'succession' (*krama*) itself does not exist but it pertains to the sphere of the 'remembrance' (*smṛti*) and is to be ascertained by *arthūpatti*.⁴⁷ And once again the M concludes that it is a mistake to say that the Veda is able to reveal the essence of reality since its unique object is *kārya* or 'duty'.⁴⁸

§ 13 Differences between BĀU 4.5.7 as a piece of verbal knowledge and perception.

a. In case (*tatra*) of perception – so the M says – the eye is an independent means of knowledge in reference to each object. But when the *tūtparya* or 'intention' of an Upaniṣadic sentence is object of cognition (*prameyatū*), it is not understood word by word.⁴⁹

b. The V wishes the verbal cognition (*abhidhānika pratyaya*) to be an object of command (*vidhiviṣaya*), but the M notices that enjoined knowledge (*pratipattividhi*) does not necessarily lead to a link with the object (*vāstavaṃ saṃsargam*, p.199/6-7, 10). This

⁴⁵ The example already adduced (p. 192/4) was the one of the irrigating canal which is helpful for the crops as well as for quenching one's thirst. Cf. Śbh 3.1, *sūtra* 12; transl. Jha 1933, I: 351. This example is here dismissed as unfit (p. 187/3: *apeśala*).

⁴⁶ Likely reference to AB 2.4: *samidho yajati / tanūnapūtaṃ y° / iḍo y° / barhir y° / svāhākāraṃ y°*. 'He offers (to) the fire-sticks, (to) Tanūnapāt, (to) the oblation, (to) the sacrificial grass, (to/with) the cry of "hail".'

⁴⁷ Suggestion of Venkataramiah 1948: 164, confirmed by the occurrence of the word *arthāt*, p.199/7.

⁴⁸ P. 198/8-9: *tasmād asad etat: kuryaviṣayo 'pi vedo vastutattvam avagamayati*.

⁴⁹ P. 199/3-5: *tatra yad yad avabodhayati cakṣuḥ tatra svatantram eva pramāṇam. Iha punaḥ yatra tūtparyaṃ tasya [mahāvākyaṣya] prameyatū, na yad yat pratiyate tasya tasya*. A literal translation provides an unsatisfactory meaning, because the parallelism is defective.

paradoxical reasoning seems to be meant to disconnect cognition and injunction, whereas the V seeks to connect them tightly.

The M reminds us that *ātman* is just the individual ego, knowledgeable without a revelation (*śabda*). Granted that *ātman* is such, no obstacle prevents you from meditating on its Upaniṣadic qualifications, namely *brahman*, *antaryāmin* and so on.⁵⁰ If all that occurs in the frame of the Mīmāṃsā, what room is left for a further investigation called Vedānta?⁵¹

B. DELIBERATIONS CONCERNING THE FIRST TWO SŪTRAS OF JAIMINI

§ 14 Why did Jaimini use the word *dharma* in MS 1.1.1?

The V tries to show that his view is already the one of Jaimini, and accordingly he quotes the initial *sūtra* of the MS.⁵² He emphasizes the wide range of meanings included in the word *dharma* mentioned here, ranging from a Vedic ceremony (like the *agnihotra*) to the adoration in a Buddhist temple (*caityavandana*).⁵³ Jaimini, of course, chooses the former meaning as the topic of his *sūtra* (p. 203/2), the *Mīmāṃsā*, but the ritual *dharma* – the V says – does not include the whole object of the Veda (*sarvavedārtha*). There is another topic dealing with what has ‘an accomplished form’ (*siddharūpa*, p. 203/3) and escapes the injunctive power of the *adhyayanavidhi* (p. 204/4-5).

And when Jaimini uses *dharma*, instead of *vedārtha*, in MS 1.1.1, he strives to bring to the reader’s mind the presence of this unsaid possibility: investigating into the essence of reality.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ E.g. BĀU 2.5.9, 3.7.3; ChU 6.8.7 (*tat tvam asi*), cited on p. 200.

⁵¹ P.201/3: *kim aparam avaśiṣṭaṃ yataḥ brahmajijñāsūrambhaṃ prayuñjīta?*

⁵² The text of MS 1.1.1 is given in fn. 3 and fn. 15. It is mentioned in the text on pp. 201/5, 202/8, 204/7.

⁵³ P. 202. The same problem is resumed on p. 211, in a less clear context, cf. below § 16.

⁵⁴ P. 205/3-4: *kaś cid asya (= vedasya) bhūgaḥ kāryatūsūnye vastutattve vartate.*

Dharma is as important for what it suggests as for what it states. On the other hand, it contains a much stronger incentive force than the weak *vedārtha* (p. 204).⁵⁵

§ 15 Why did Jaimini use the word *codanā* in MS 1.1.2?

The M seeks to reaffirm the priority of the *kārya* with the help of the word *codanā* present in MS 1.1.2, without explicitly quoting it at this stage.⁵⁶ According to him, *dharma* is nothing but *codanā* ‘impulsion / mandate to act ritually’ (p. 206/1-5).

The V retorts in a rather tortuous way and comes out with the idea that Jaimini chose *codanā* to denote what this word does not say as much as to denote what it says. Through *codanā*, it is pointed out that the injunctive part of the Veda is not tantamount to the whole of it.⁵⁷ We may have to understand that the other part deserves an investigation even if the Sūtrakāra himself is not concerned with it.⁵⁸ Despite the texts adduced by the M as proofs of the mandatory nature of the Veda,⁵⁹ the V does not declare himself defeated and appeals to the *bhūṣya* on MS 1.1.1 where Śabara proclaims:

We will transgress this mandate (the one of holding the Veda as purely injunctive). If we do not transgress it, we will be rendering the Veda meaningless when it is fraught with meaning ...” (p. 209/1-2).⁶⁰

⁵⁵ P. 204/6-8: *jijñāsām arhati-iti vadituṃ dharmagrahaṇaṃ yuktaṃ. “atha-ato dharmajijñāsā”, na “vedārthajijñāsā-iti” yato na vedārthatayā jñāne pravṛttiḥ.*

⁵⁶ On p. 205/1 he speaks of ‘the second *sūtra*’ (*dvitīyaṃ sūtraṃ*) but quotes the text *codanūlakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmah* for the first time on p. 212/4.

⁵⁷ Pp. 207/6–208/1: (*yena*) *vedārthamātrasya dharmatvaṃ mā bhūd iti codanā-iti avocat* ‘(The Sūtrakāra, p. 207/4) said *codanā* [after thinking]: “be [the ritual] dharma not the unique [object] of the Veda.” Cf. also p. 188/1: *satyaṃ kāryaviśayo vedah, na tu tāvanmūtre* ‘It is true that the Veda has duty as its object, but not merely that.’

⁵⁸ P. 208/1-2: *tad evaṃ sūtrakāra eva svaśūstraviśayātiriktaṃ vedabhāgam avicūritam asūsucat.*

⁵⁹ P. 208/3-4, citing Śbh *ad* MS 1.1.1 (= Frauwallner 1968: 12/12-13); MS 1.1.25 (= Clooney 1990: 90); MS 1.2.1 (see below fn. 61) (= Clooney 1990: 103); see also Taber in this volume.

Such a declaration shows that Śabara extends the 'sense of the Veda' (*vedārtha*) beyond the scope of *kārya* (p. 209/8-9).

C. CLOSING DELIBERATIONS AND CONCLUSION

§ 16 The last 28 Sanskrit lines of chapter 2 are very difficult.⁶¹ First of all, the view of *ke cid*⁶² is presented. They seem to think that a new *sūtra* should not be undertaken to lay down the priority of *dharma* as ritual action over *dharma* as veneration in a Buddhist temple (see § 14), but to settle discrepancies within the orthodoxy concerning the import of this word.

Eventually (p. 215), the chapter ends with the expected restatement that *dharma* has been deliberately mentioned in MS 1.1.2, instead of *vedārtha*, to keep an opportunity available for starting a further inquiry, namely Vedānta.

The content of chapter 2 can be summarized in the form of several contrasts:

- The contrast between (1) Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā according to which everything has been said by Jaimini, etc. about *Veda-dharma* so that no new research is needed, and (2) Uttara-Mīmāṃsā which is prepared to further look into the Upaniṣads for the essence of reality (*vastu-tattva* = *ātman-brahman*).
- The contrast between (1) the ritual injunctions and (2) the Upaniṣadic statements and the difference between (1) the Upaniṣadic statements and (2) *mantras* and *arthavādas*. *Mantras* and *arthavādas* are subordinate to *vidhis* and draw their sense from

⁶⁰ *atikramiṣyāma imam āmnūyam, anatikrāmanto vedam arthavantaṃ santam anarthakaṃ kalpayema* (text in Frauwallner 1968: 12/11-13). The rest of the sentence rather helps the cause of the M.

⁶¹ They are preceded by a discussion on MS 1.2.1: *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyaṃ atadarthānām* (p. 209/9) 'Action is the purport of scripture. Thus, whatever does not refer to action is purposeless' (transl. by Taber in this volume), a *sūtra* which could be a major obstacle on the path towards a non-ritual *mīmāṃsā*.

⁶² According to Venkataramiah (1948: 175), resuming an indication of the *Vivarāṇa* (p. 211/10), these "some" are the Prābhākaras.

them. *Mahāvākyas* are significant by themselves and thus independent.

- The contrast between (1) *ātman* regarded as the individual ego in the Mīmāṃsā but (2) as a universal and supreme entity by the Vedānta.

If one tries to join both aspects of each contrast in one whole, he gets into trouble, especially if he strives to build a sentence which would be both denotative and injunctive. That would result into *vākyabheda* or 'split in the sentence' (see § 10).

Finally, Padmapāda explains the first two *sūtras* of Jaimini in a way of his own. He argues that the Sūtrakāra uses *dharma* in MS 1.1.1 and *codanā* in MS 1.1.2 in order to show the limits of his own task: the study of the mandatory part of the Veda. Implicitly he invites others to explore areas he could not or would not investigate himself. So he tacitly acknowledges the legitimacy of the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā.

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- BĀU *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad*. See Zaehner 1966; Senart 1934.
- ChU *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*. See Zaehner 1966; Senart 1930.
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M = Mīmāṃsaka

MS *Mīmāṃsū-sūtra* of Jaimini. See Abhyankar & Joshi 1929-34; Jha 1933; Frauwallner 1968.

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Śbh *Śābara-bhāṣya*. See Abhyankar & Joshi 1929-34; Jha 1933.

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TS *Taittirīyasamhitā*. See Keith 1914.

V = Vedāntin

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