§ 1.—The Taittiriya-samhita (TS) II 3 12 describes several offerings to be made when a horse is given, very likely by the yajamāna, the sponsor of the sacrifice, to a priest (1). And to account for them, it supplies us with a mythical story the text of which is as follows:

1. Prajāpatir vārunāyāsvam anayat  
2. sā (1) svām devātāṁ ārchat  
3. sā (2) pāryādāryata  
4. sā (3) etāṁ vārunām cātuskapālaṁ apāsyat  
5. tāṁ nāravapat  
6. tāto vai sā (4) varuṇapāśāṁ amucyata  
7. vāruno vā etāṁ grhyatī / yō ‘svām prati-grhyatī’  
8. yāvatō ‘śvān prati-grhyatā / tāvato vārunān cātuskapālaṁ niṟvatet municatī  
9. vārunām eva evaḥ bhagadhēyenopadāvati  
10. sā evaṁ vārunapāśāṁ municati2

Prajāpati led the horse to Varuṇa. It went to its own deity. He was afflicted. He saw this (offering) to Varuṇa on 4 potsherds. He offered it. Then indeed was he set free from Varuṇa’s noose. Varuṇa seizes him who accepts the horse. As many horses he accepts, so many (offerings) to Varuṇa he should offer. Verily he has recourse to Varuṇa with his own share. Verily he frees him from Varuṇa’s noose.

A. B. Keith who provides us with the translation here above adds in a note:3 “This is not very clear. Sāyaṇa thinks Prajāpati is the subject of the second clause and that ārchat means ārtam aka-rot, and so Eggeling (SBE XLIV, xxiii, xxiv). That is hardly possible but it may be that the subject is the horse and that ārchat

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* K. MYLIUS: Dakṣinā, Eine Studie über den altindischen Priestersohn, Alterorientalische For —
means "afflicted". Probably, however, and that the horse went back to Prajāpati as its primal deity, and that Varuṇa avenged himself by causing Prajāpati to become dropsical (páryadírya). Hillebrandt (Mitra und Varuṇa, p. 64) thinks that Prajāpati appropriates the steed from Varuṇa; but this is impossible syntax (cf. Speijer, Sanskrit Syntax, § 131)."

But whereas for Keith the point is: what are the subject and the meaning of árchat? Sābara (śb) wonders what they are in the case of pratigṛhṇyāt. For our part, we should like to know besides to whom sa refers in clause 10.

§ 2.—The answers given by Sb in his bhāṣya to the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra of Jaimini are obviously supplied according to his methodological approach and the apriori principles of his system (§ 7). The mīmāṁsā is primarily an investigation into a corpus of vedaic utterances with the aim of grasping the connections (samāṅbhandha) between their words, of setting them up in a hierarchy principal (pradhāna)-subsidiary (gūṇa/aṅga) and pointing out their primary as well as their secondary or implicit meaning (mukhyā artha-lakṣanā). Mīmāṁsā is not sheer grammar but rather semantical and philosophical speculation. Therefore, the discussion of Sb should not be expected to contribute any new or useful element in the grammatical commentary of TS II 3 12. Its value is elsewhere. It is a striking example of how the author tries to fit the commented text in with his preconceived theories.

§ 3.—In his work, Sb is in principle commenting the 2465 sūtra composed by Jaimini about the vedaic ritual. Rather than explaining these as such, however, Sb is concerned with the series of vedaic sentences distributed under each of them. So we come across the clause n°8 of the text just quoted under sūtra III 4 30: acoditam karma bhedat, which is translated by G. JHA as follows: "The sacrifice is not prescribed (for the giver), as the action (of giving) is entirely different (from the action of accepting in connection with which the sacrifice is prescribed)."

5. APADEVA: Mīmāṁsā Nyāya Prakāsa (= Āpadevi), § 84: na hi vācyavācakābhāva vyākaraṇāṃśūtādhiḥ tasya nyāyasthitāvayyatvikramamanyayatvāt "For the question of what meaning any meaning to be expressed is not in the province of grammatical science since that is to be determined by consequence or inconsequence according to logic (ed.: transl. F. EDGERTON, New Haven, 1929, pp. 210 and 73)."
6. All the mīmāṁsāśāstra texts here quoted are picked out of the Mīmāṁsāśāstra (MK), an impressive set of 7 volumes which collects the most of the literature of this school and is edited by KEVALĀNANDASARASVATI, Rai (Satarā), 1923-66. The 11th adhikaraṇa of the 4th pāda of the third adhyāya of the Śābara-bhāṣya, including the sūtra 30, is found in the vol. II, pp. 738ff, column I, lines 26ff. The translation of the bhāṣya of S and the sūtra of Jaimini is due to G. JHA, 3 vol., Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 63/70/73 (reprint Baroda, 1973).
This sūtra is put in the mouth of the first of 2 debaters, the pūrvapakṣin (PP), who propounds a point of view to be subsequently dismissed.

When the gift of a horse takes place, says the PP, the person who should perform the sacrifice of a cake dedicated to Varuṇa and baked on 4 potsherds is the acceptor, not the donor,7 i.e. the person to whom (the horse) is given, not the one who is the cause, namely the one who gives (the animal).8

§ 4.—The PP does not check his doctrine on the text of the TS. Let us do it for him. Prajāpati is the donor, Varuṇa the acceptor or donee. Through the liṅga or “indicative power,”6 the 2 gods act as the models respectively of the human yajamāna and priest. But then a problem immediately arises: if the acceptor is the sacrificer as well, it is Varuṇa who is bound, in the myth, to offer for himself. That is hardly possible since a sacrifice requires somebody higher who is the beneficiary of it.10 Moreover, the clause n°6 stops being meaningful, for Varuṇa can not set free from Varuṇa’s nose.

On the contrary, the diptyc (clause n°8)11 is more natural and consistent when the subject of the 2 verbs is the same. It would be indeed rather odd to admit that the subject of Pratiyāhyāyaṭ, the donee, is different from that of nīrvapet; that the priest is not the sacrificer and that this latter (sa, clause n° 10) delivers the former (enam) from the evil.

§ 5.—The opinion of the PP is set aside by the sūtra 31 which makes up the siddhānta or the “accepted view”. It reads: sa liṅgād ārtvija syāt, “It (= the sacrifice) should be (performed) by the person employing the priests, as is clearly shown by indicatives.”

What is the sense of this rather puzzling formula? We must not forget that the siddhāntin (S) is replying here to the PP. For him, the ārtvija, i.e. the Yajamāna,12 bestows a horse on the priest, probably as the fee (dakṣiṇā) of his ritual work. And like his divine

7. MK II 736 I 34-35: na dānasya kartuḥ itiḥ codagate, pratigrahakartus tām avagucchāmaḥ (sandhi of the MK).
8. MK II 736 I 31-33: athedānim samastihyate: kim pratigrahakaritrā kartavyā yasmāl dygate, uṣa hetukaritrā yo daśāti.
10. The reason why the gods do not sacrifice is that they do not have anybody above them, cf. M. BIARDEAU, Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique (Paris-La Haye, 1984), p. 87.
11. Diptyc = pattern subordinate clause-main clause both introduced by a correlative. The term is used for example by A. MINARD, La subordination dans la prose védique (Paris, 1949) and by J. M. VERPOORTEN, L'ordre des mots dans l'Aitareya-brāhmaṇa (Liège-Paris, 1977), 502sq.
12. KUMARILĀ: Tanaśvārtikā III 4 11 (31) = MK II 737 II 32-33: sa khalu itiḥ ārtvija syāt “yajamāne syād iti arthah.”
prototype Prajāpati, he has to sacrifice a cake to Varuṇa. To get over his position, Sb provides us with a substantial piece of māmokṣa exegesis.¹³

First of all, we are reminded that there is a connection between the first words and the next ones. So the anaphoric sa requires the context of what precedes it to determine its meaning. Here the four times it occurs, it refers to Prajāpati, but not to Varuṇa; because both pronoun and noun are nominatives, they stand for the same person.¹⁴ Thus, if Prajāpati is the donor and gets free from Varuṇa’s nose through his sacrifice, the yejamaṇa, his human counterpart, has to sacrifice too.¹⁵ But problems arise at once.

§ 6.—The first concerns the internal consistency of the diptyc. This cannot be maintained if the subject of pratigṛhyāyat is the priest


14. G. JHA, I 518: The sacrifice is to be performed, not by the person accepting the gift, but by the person who makes the person accept it. Why? Because this is clearly shown by indications. What is the indicative that shows it? The “indicative” consists in the connection between the words that follow and the words that have gone before. That is to say, there is the text “Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuṇa”, where Prajāpati is spoken of as the giver and Varuṇa as the receiver of the horse. Then follows the sentence “He lost the divinity within himself”, which needs to be construed with the foregoing sentence, so that the pronoun sa (“he”) stands for Prajāpati (of the preceding sentence), and the two sentences become syntactically connected. The pronoun “he” is taken as standing for Prajāpati, as it is in the same case as the word praṃjāpati, and it is not taken as standing for Varuṇa, as it is not in the same case as varunāya. Next follows the sentence “He became torn (afflicted with disease)”; here also the pronoun “he” stands for Prajāpati mentioned before, and the sentence becomes syntactically connected with the first sentence. Next comes the sentence “He perceived the cake baked on four pans dedicated to Varuṇa”, where again “he” stands for the same Prajāpati. Then it goes on “He offered it”; again “he” is Prajāpati. Then “Hence he became freed from the clutches of Varuṇa”; here also “he” is Prajāpati. The sentence “Varuṇa seized him” is the statement of reason.

15. MK II 737 II 44: yasmād eva praṃjāpatī varunāyāvan datāva paridiśyata, tasmāt yo āvam pratigṛhyādi "pracyacchati, taṃ varunā gṛhyātā sa pariḥdyate iti. Tukta tu adyaṃna pratimuktaḥ, tasmād anjaneyā āśvasa pracyacchata varuṇaṁ niṣṭapatavyāḥ iti āvasya dātuḥ varunāṣṭi pracyasate kartavya anena dhiṣṭānaḥ. Tasmād āvam datāva varunām iṣṭaṃ nivāpyate. JHA, I 519: Because Prajāpati, on giving a horse to Varuṇa, became afflicted with disease, therefore, the person who receives (i.e. gives) a horse is seized by Varuṇa, and becomes afflicted with disease. And because Prajāpati became free by offering the Varuṇa sacrifice, therefore the man who gives a horse should offer the Varuṇa sacrifice. In this manner, the performance of the Varuṇa sacrifice by the giver of a horse becomes commended by the verb “should be performed”. From this it follows that when a man gives a horse, he should offer the Varuṇa sacrifice.
and that of nirvapet, the yaجامāṇa. And yet this distinction is the only solution in accordance with the myth. If both verbs have the same person as their subject, then agreement with the myth becomes difficult, as, there, the sacrificer is the donor, while, in the diptyc, he would be the acceptor.

Another problem which Sb does not dwell on is the destination of the clause n°10. In the myth, Prajāpati set himself free from the hold of Varuṇa (amucyata, clause n°6), but, in the ritual, the verb is active (muñceti, clause n°10). Does it mean that the yajamāṇa frees the priest by his offering? That would go in the opposite direction of the whole Vedic thought. But to take sa n°5 as applying to Varuṇa¹⁵a does not seem much better.

§ 7.—To overcome these difficulties, Sb emphasises a methodological principle and resorts to it in order to invert the meaning of patigṛhaṇāyāt.

The principle, that could be traced back in the thought of the brāhmaṇa¹⁶, runs: the beginning and the end must be in concordance, in a ritual sequence as well as in a grammatical one. Thus it must be possible to infer the beginning from the conclusion and the opposite way around. And here, that holds not only inside the diptyc but also between it and the antecedent myth.¹⁷ Sb declares: "(That is) either the opening sentence ‘Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuṇa’, will, in accordance with what is said in the concluding sentence, have to be taken to mean ‘He received the horse from Varuṇa’, — or, in accordance with what is said in the opening sentence, the concluding sentence ‘He who receives a horse’ will have to be taken to mean ‘one who gives a horse’."¹⁸

Now which solution has to be admitted after all? Which is the metarule allowing us to choose? This one: “It is what comes first that is to be respected (kept intact), as there is nothing to contradict it (at the time of its appearance), whereas what comes later

¹⁷. MK II 737 II 13-14: tasmāt upakrame va śabdārthah upasamihāravaśena kalpaśyaḥ, upasamihāre va upakramavaiṣṇava.
¹⁸. JHA, I 519 = MK II 737 II 14ff. tantra “prajāpitar varvacyāvam anayati” iti varvānād āsvam pratiyogṛhaṃ upasamihāravaṇudhena (upakramaḥ) kalpyate, yad vā upakramavaiṣṇava upasamihāvaḥ “yo śvam pratiyogṛhaṃ” iti yo śvam pratiyogṛhayati iti.
has to be taken in an indirect sense by reason of a contrary idea having already appeared on the scene, — this according to the maxim
‘That which comes first is to be accepted, as its injunction comes first, as in ordinary practice’ (Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad I 2 23).”

§ 8.—With the help of this principle, Sb decides that sa n°1 refers to Prajāpati,20 while Keith would prefer the horse (§1), and
proclaims the subject of pratiṣṭhāyat and nīruṣepet to be the same. Nevertheless, the usual meaning of the first verb prevents a donor
to be its subject. On the other hand, it is out of question to take the statement ‘Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuṇa’ (clause n°1) as
signifying that he received it from him.21

To remove the dilemma, Sb does not hesitate to understand pratiṣṭhāyat of clause n°8 as if it had the causative form pratiṣṭhāhayet “to make the acceptance possible = to give.”22 On the other hand, he keeps silent about a similar modification for pratiṣṭhātāti of the clause n°7. However that may be, how can this meaning be conveyed?

We must confess that the response of Sb on this point is rather clumsy and cumbersome. “A man — he says — by whom an act
is carried out, either directly or indirectly, can be called the ‘doer’ of that act.”23 Under these conditions, the giver who calls forth
the acceptance, cooperates in it and could be said to accept as well. So the donor turns into the done.24

Let us go further with this reasoning: if it is so, the reverse is
equally true, and the person who accepts will be in a way a giver. Even if the text of Sb is not very explicit, it allows the conclusion
that pratiṣṭhāyat actually means dasyāt, and that its subject, the
yajamāna, is offering the cake. Thus the terms of the ditye match
with those of the myth. But have we the right to make the text
consistent by such a juggler trick?

19. JHA I 519 = MK loc. cit. 17ff: trata “mukhyāṃ vā pūrasadanāl lokavat” iti
prathamam anugrahitavyam virodhābhavat, pācāttamaṁ tu virodhāt lakṣaṇayā
dalpaniṣayam.
21. MK II 737 II 21-22: api ca “prajāpatir varuṇāyaśvam anayat” iti varuṇād aśvaṃ
pratyagṛhyād iti bahu asamāṃśaṃ kalpaigṛhyayam.
22. MK 737 II 22-24: pratiṣṭhātāti ity esa śabdāḥ pratiṣṭhāyati ity etam arthaṃ
śaknoṭi yathā kāya cīc chaktyā vaktum. The device of giving an expression its
country meaning is found again in Sbbk IV 4 11 (34) where a blind man is
spoken of as “having excellent eyes” = MK II 1027 I 20-23.
23. MK, 11.24-26: yo hi tad ācarati yena ca kriyā pradāyopī sidhyati, sa tasyāḥ
kṛityāḥ kartā śakyate vādūtum.
24. MK, 11.29-31: evam ihāpi sa pratigrahasamartham ācarati yo dadi, tasmāt
dadat pratiṣṭhātāti iti śakyate vādūtum. tasmāt adhyavadhāryam idam avakāptam:
dadat pratiṣṭhātātya ucyate, tasya ca varuṇaḥśiṣṭḥ iti.
§ 9. — Conclusion. If we go back to the question raised in § 1, we can observe that Sb, by the voice of the S

— proclaims Prajāpati to be the subject of ārchat (§ 5), while Keith would select the word “horse”,

— is worried neither with regard to the meaning of this verb nor the connection of clause n°10 with the previous ones,

— is eager to defend the consistency of the text by ensuring the same subject for the verbs of the diptych while, at the same time, according this latter with the myth. This result is achieved by altering the meaning of pratigrhaśyāt in a way that is hardly possible.

Of course, TS II.3.12.1 is rather obscure by reason of the ambiguity of the pronouns and shortcomings of expression (for example, there is no sentence referring to the gift on the human level), but the māmāṣa thinker goes too far in his desire to bend the words into the framework of his system.
A VERY INTERESTING RĀMĀYĀNA PANEL AT NIDIKONDA

By
Y. GOPAL REDDY

Nidikonda is a small village situated nearly 26 miles away south-west of Hanumakonda in the Janagaon taluk of Warangal District, Andhra Pradesh. The panel which is the subject-matter of our discussion here, is carved on one of the Chajja slabs of a Saiva temple at Nidikonda. The temple is a trikūṭālaya on plan and is in a very much battered state. The portico and the sabhāmandapa are in a heap of ruins.

The right portion of the panel is occupied by three male figures. They are in standing posture. The figure on the extreme right is having a monkey face. His head is adorned with Kirīṭamukuta. His left hand is loosely hanging down and holding an indistinct object. Wings are shown on either side of his shoulders. The second figure which is carved immediately left to the above one is also standing and holding a bow in his left hand which is resting on his left shoulder. The figure on the left extreme is in vigorous action as is evident from his posture. He is pressing with his left foot the tail of the serpent which is lying straight on the ground. His right hand is slightly raised above and holding an arrow whilst the left one a bow. The left one is unfortunately broken, but the bow and that portion of the hand holding it are fortunately retained. The

Rāmāyana Panel, Nidikonda, Warangal District (Andhra Pradesh).