

ŚABARA-BHĀṢYA III 4 11 (SŪTRA 30-31) ON THE TAITTIRIYA-SAMHITA II 3 12 1

By

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§ 1.—The *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* (TS) II 3 12 describes several offerings to be made when a horse is given, very likely by the *yajamāna*, the sponsor of the sacrifice, to a priest (1). And to account for them, it supplies us with a mythical story the text of which is as follows:

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| 1. <i>Prajāpatir vāruṇāyāśvam anayat</i> | Prajāpati led the horse to Varuṇa. |
| 2. <i>sá (1) svām devātām ārchat</i> | It went to its own deity. |
| 3. <i>sá (2) páryadāryata</i> | He was afflicted. |
| 4. <i>sá (3) etām vāruṇām cátuṣkapālam apaśyat</i> | He saw this (offering) to Varuṇa on 4 potsherds. |
| 5. <i>tām nīravapat</i> | He offered it. |
| 6. <i>táto vai sá (4) varuṇapāśād amucyata</i> | Then indeed was he set free from Varuṇa's noose. |
| 7. <i>vāruṇo vā etām grhṇāti / yó 'śvam pratigrhṇāti'</i> | Varuṇa seizes him who accepts the horse. |
| 8. <i>yávato 'śvān pratigrhṇāyāt / távato vāruṇān cátuṣkapālān nīrvapet muñcati.²</i> | As many horses he accepts, so many (offerings) to Varuṇa he should offer. |
| 9. <i>vāruṇam eva svena bhagadhé-yenópadhāvati</i> | Verily he has recourse to Varuṇa with his own share. |
| 10. <i>sá evaīnam varuṇapāśān muñcati²</i> | Verily he frees him from Varuṇa's noose. |

A. B. Keith who provides us with the translation here above adds in a note:³ "This is not very clear. Sāyaṇa thinks Prajāpati is the subject of the second clause and that *ārchat* means *ārtam akarot*, and so Eggeling (SBE XLIV, xxiii, xxiv). That is hardly possible but it may be that the subject is the horse and that *ārchat*

* KI. MYLIUS: *Dakṣiṇā, Eine Studie über den altindischen Priesterlohn, Altorientalische For* —

1. P. V. KANE: *History of Dharmaśāstra* II 2 (Poona, 1941), p. 839. schungen (Berlin), VI, 1979, p. 173.
2. Text of the edition A. WEBER, *Indische Studien* XI (reprint Olms, Hildesheim, 1973), pp. 180-81.
3. A. B. KEITH: *The Veda of the Black Yajus school entitled Taittirīya-saṃhitā* (Harvard, Or. Series, vol. 18, reprint Motilal Banarsidass), I, p. 173.

means "afflicted". Probably, however, it means that the horse went back to Prajāpati as its primal deity and that Varuṇa avenged himself by causing Prajāpati to become dropsical (*pāryadīryata*). Hillebrandt (*Mitra und Varuṇa*, p. 64) thinks that Prajāpati appropriates the steed from Varuṇa; but this is impossible syntax (cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, § 131)."

But whereas for Keith the point is: what are the subject and the meaning of *ārchat*? Śabara (Śb) wonders what they are in the case of *pratigrhṇyāt*. For our part, we should like to know besides to whom *sa* refers in clause 10.

§ 2.—The answers given by Sb in his *bhāṣya* to the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* of Jaimini are obviously supplied according to his methodological approach and the apriori principles of his system (§ 7). The *mīmāṃsā* is primarily an investigation into a corpus of vedic utterances⁴ with the aim of grasping the connections (*saṃbandha*) between their words, of setting them up in a hierarchy principal (*pradhāna*)-subsidiary (*guṇa/aṅga*) and pointing out their primary as well as their secondary or implicit meaning (*mukhya artha-lakṣaṇā*). *Mīmāṃsā* is not sheer grammar but rather semantical and philosophical speculation.⁵ Therefore, the discussion of Śb should not be expected to contribute any new or useful element in the grammatical commentary of TS II 3 12. Its value is elsewhere. It is a striking example of how the author tries to fit the commented text in with his preconceived theories.

§ 3.—In his work, Śb is in principle commenting the 2465 *sūtra* composed by Jaimini about the vedic ritual. Rather than explaining these as such, however, Sb is concerned with the series of vedic sentences distributed under each of them. So we come across the clause n°8 of the text just quoted under *sūtra* III 4 30: *acoditam karma bhedāt*, which is translated by G. JHA as follows: "The sacrifice is not prescribed (for the giver), as the action (of giving) is entirely different (from the action of accepting in connection with which the sacrifice is prescribed)."⁶

4. J. F. STALL: *Sanskrit Philosophy of Language* in H. PARRET, *History of linguistic thought and contemporary linguistics* (Berlin, 1976), pp. 112sq.

5. APADEVA: *Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa* (= Apadevi), § 84: *na hi vācyavācakahāvo vyākaraṇasmṛtyadhīnaḥ tasya nyāyasahitānvayavyatirekagamyatvāt*. "For the question of what expresses any meaning to be expressed is not in the province of grammatical science since that is to be determined by consequence or inconsequence according to logic (ed.: transl. F. EDGERTON, New Haven, 1929, pp. 210 and 73).

6. All the *mīmāṃsā*-texts here quoted are picked out of the *Mīmāṃsāsūkṣa* (MK), an impressive set of 7 volumes which collects the most of the literature of this school and is edited by KEVALĀNANDASARASVATĪ, Wai (Satara), 1952-66. The 11th *adhikaraṇa* of the 4th *pāda* of the third *adhyāya* of the *Śābara-bhāṣya*, including the *sūtra* 30, is found in the vol. II, pp. 736ff, column I, lines 26ff. The translation of the *bhāṣya* of S and the *sūtra* of Jaimini is due to G. JHA, 3 vol., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 63/70/73 (reprint Baroda, 1973).

This *sūtra* is put in the mouth of the first of 2 debaters, the *pūrvapakṣin* (PP), who propounds a point of view to be subsequently dismissed.

When the gift of a horse takes place, says the PP, the person who should perform the sacrifice of a cake dedicated to Varuṇa and baked on 4 potsherds is the acceptor, not the donor,⁷ i.e. the person to whom (the horse) is given, not the one who is the cause, namely the one who gives (the animal).⁸

§ 4.—The PP does not check his doctrine on the text of the TS. Let us do it for him. Prajāpati is the donor, Varuṇa the acceptor or donee. Through the *liṅga* or "indicative power,"⁹ the 2 gods act as the models respectively of the human *yajamāna* and priest. But then a problem immediately arises: if the acceptor is the sacrificer as well, it is Varuṇa who is bound, in the myth, to offer for himself. That is hardly possible since a sacrifice requires somebody higher who is the beneficiary of it.¹⁰ Moreover, the clause n°6 stops being meaningful, for Varuṇa can not set free from Varuṇa's noose.

On the contrary, the diptyc (clause n°8)¹¹ is more natural and consistent when the subject of the 2 verbs is the same. It would be indeed rather odd to admit that the subject of *Pratigrahāyāt*, the donee, is different from that of *nīrvapet*; that the priest is not the sacrificer and that this latter (*sa*, clause n° 10) delivers the former (*enam*) from the evil.

§ 5.—The opinion of the PP is set aside by the *sūtra* 31 which makes up the *siddhānta* or the "accepted view". It reads: *sā liṅgād ārtviḥ syāt*, "It (= the sacrifice) should be (performed) by the person employing the priests, as is clearly shown by indicatives."

What is the sense of this rather puzzling formula? We must not forget that the *siddhāntin* (S) is replying here to the PP. For him, the *ārtviḥ*, i.e. the *Yajamāna*,¹² bestows a horse on the priest, probably as the fee (*dakṣiṇā*) of his ritual work. And like his divine

7. MK II 736 I 34-35: *na dānasya kartuḥ iṣṭiḥ codyate, pratigrahakartus tām avagacchāmāḥ* (sandhi of the MK).

8. MK II 736 I 31-33: *athedānīm saṁdihyate: kiṁ pratigrahakartrā kartavyā yasmāi diyate, uta hetukartrā yo dadāti*.

9. Cf. infra note 13.

10. The reason why the gods do not sacrifice is that they do not have anybody above them, cf. M. BIARDEAU, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique* (Paris-La Haye, 1964), p. 87.

11. Diptyc = pattern subordinate clause-main clause both introduced by a correlative. The term is used for example by A. MINARD, *La subordination dans la prose védique* (Paris, 1949) and by J. M. VERPOORTEN, *L'ordre des mots dans l'Aitareya-brāhmaṇa* (Liège-Paris, 1977), 502sq.

12. KUMĀRILA: *Tantravārttika* III 4 11 (31) = MK II 737 II 32-33: *sā khalu iṣṭiḥ ārtviḥ syāt yajamāne syād ity arthaḥ*.

prototype Prajāpati, he has to sacrifice a cake to Varuṇa. To get over his position, Sb provides us with a substantial piece of *mā-māṇsā* exegesis.¹³

First of all, we are reminded that there is a connection between the first words and the next ones. So the anaphoric *sa* requires the context of what precedes it to determine its meaning. Here the four times it occurs, it refers to Prajāpati, but not to Varuṇa; because both pronoun and noun are nominatives, they stand for the same person.¹⁴ Thus, if Prajāpati is the donor and gets free from Varuṇa's noose through his sacrifice, the *yajamāna*, his human counterpart, has to sacrifice too.¹⁵ But problems arise at once.

§ 6.—The first concerns the internal consistency of the diptyc. This cannot be maintained if the subject of *pratigrhṇāyāt* is the priest

13. MK II 737 I 25 sq: *naṣṭā pratigrahakartuḥ, kiṃ tarhi hetukartuḥ syāt, kutah? līṅāt. kiṃ līṅam? pūrvapadānām uttarair padair yathārtham abhisambandhah. Idam śrūyate: "prajāpatir varṇāyāsvam anayāt" iti prajāpatir āsvasya dātā kīrtitah, varuṇah. pratigrahitā "sa svām devatām ārcchat" iti, sa iti sūpekṣam pūrvaprakṛtam vakyaśeṣam apekṣate. sa iti prajāpatim prait nirdīśati iti tena saha ekavākyatām yāti. sāmānādhikarānyāc ca prajāpater eva pratīnirdeśah avakalpyate. na tu varuṇasya vaiyadhikarānyāt. "sa paryadīryata" ity, eṣo 'pi prajāpatim eva pratīnirdīśati pūrvaprakṛtam, tena ca saha ekavākyatām yāti. "saevaitam vāruṇam catuṣkapālam apāśyat" iti prajāpatir eventi. "sa niravapat" iti prajāpatir eveti. "tato vai sa varuṇapāsād amucyata" prajāpatih. "varuṇa vā etaṃ grhṇāti" iti hetvapadeśo 'ym.*
14. G. JHA, I 518: The sacrifice is to be performed, not by the person accepting the gift, but by the person who makes the person accept it. Why? Because this is clearly shown by indications. What is the indicative that shows it? The "indicative" consists in the connection between the words that follow and the words that have gone before. That is to say, there is the text "Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuṇa", where Prajāpati is spoken of as the giver and Varuṇa as the receiver of the horse. Then follows the sentence "He lost the divinity within himself", which needs to be construed with the foregoing sentence, so that the pronoun *sa* ("he") stands for Prajāpati (of the preceding sentence), and the two sentences become syntactically connected. The pronoun "he" is taken as standing for Prajāpati, as it is in the same case as the word *prajāpati*, and it is not taken as standing for Varuṇa, as it is not in the same case as *varuṇāya*. Next follows the sentence "He became torn (afflicted with disease)"; here also the pronoun "he" stands for Prajāpati mentioned before, and the sentence becomes syntactically connected with the first sentence. Next comes the sentence "He perceived the cake baked on four pans dedicated to Varuṇa", where again "he" stands for the same Prajāpati. Then it goes on "He offered it"; again "He" is Prajāpati. Then "Thence he became freed from the clutches of Varuṇa"; here also "he" is Prajāpati. The sentence "Varuṇa seizes him" is the statement of reason.
15. MK II 737 II 4ff: *yasmād eva prajāpatih varuṇāyāsvam dattvā paridīrṇah, tasmāt yo 'svam pratigrhṇāti prayacchati, tam varuṇo grhṇāti: sa paridīryate iti. Tatas tu vāyuṇena pratimuktah, tasmād anyenāpi āsvam prayacchati vāruṇo nirapavyah iti āsvasya dātuh varuṇīṣṭih praśasyate kartavyā anena ākhyātena. tasmād āsvam dattvā varuṇim iṣṭim nirvapet.* JHA, I 519: Because Prajāpati, on giving a horse to Varuṇa, became afflicted with disease, therefore, the person who receives (i.e. gives) a horse is seized by Varuṇa, and becomes afflicted with disease. And because Prajāpati became free by offering the Varuṇa sacrifice, therefore the man who gives a horse should offer the Varuṇa sacrifice. In this manner, the performance of the Varuṇa sacrifice by the giver of a horse becomes commended by the verb "should be performed". From this it follows that when a man gives a horse, he should offer the Varuṇa sacrifice.

and that of *nirvāpet*, the *yajamāna*. And yet this distinction is the only solution in accordance with the myth. If both verbs have the same person as their subject, then agreement with the myth becomes difficult, as, there, the sacrificer is the donor, while, in the diptyc, he would be the acceptor.

Another problem which Sb does not dwell on is the destination of the clause n°10. In the myth, Prajāpati set himself free from the hold of Varuṇa (*amucyata*, clause n°6), but, in the ritual, the verb is active (*muñcati*, clause n°10). Does it mean that the *yajamāna* frees the priest by his offering? That would go in the opposite direction of the whole Vedic thought. But to take *sa* n°5 as applying to Varuṇa^{15a} does not seem much better.

§ 7.—To overcome these difficulties, Sb emphasises a methodological principle and resorts to it in order to invert the meaning of *patigrhṇāyāt*.

The principle, that could be traced back in the thought of the *brāhmaṇa*¹⁶, runs: the beginning and the end must be in concordance, in a ritual sequence as well as in a grammatical one. Thus it must be possible to infer the beginning from the conclusion and the opposite way around. And here, that holds not only inside the diptyc but also between it and the antecedent myth.¹⁷ Sb declares: "(That is) either the opening sentence 'Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuṇa' will, in accordance with what is said in the concluding sentence, have to be taken to mean 'He received the horse from Varuṇa', — or, in accordance with what is said in the opening sentence, the concluding sentence 'He who receives a horse' will have to be taken to mean 'one who gives a horse'."¹⁸

Now which solution has to be admitted after all? Which is the metarule allowing us to choose? This one: "It is what comes first that is to be respected (kept intact), as there is nothing to contradict it (at the time of its appearance), whereas what comes later

15a. Cf. P. E. DUMONT, *L'Āśvamedha* (Louvain-Paris, 1927), introduction, p. xiv.

16. J. M. VERPOORTEN, *Unité et distinction dans les spéculations rituelles védiques*, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* XXI 1 (1977), pp. 62-63. Cf. also JAYANTA, *Nyāyamāñjarī* I 4 = English transl., J. V. BHATTACHARYA (Delhi, 1978), I, p. 8.

17. MK II 737 II 13-14: *tasmāt upakrame vā śabdārthaḥ upasaṃhāravaśeṇa kalpanīyah, upasaṃhāre vā upakramavaśeṇa*.

18. JHA, I 519 = MK II 737 II 14ff: *tartra "prajāpatir varuṇāyāśvam anayat" iti varuṇād āśvaṃ pratyagrṇāt upasaṃhārānurodheṇa (upakramah) kalpyate. yad vā upakramavaśeṇa upasaṃharam "yo 'śvaṃ prati-grhṇāti" iti yo 'śvaṃ prati-grāhayati iti*.

has to be taken in an indirect sense by reason of a contrary idea having already appeared on the scene, — this according to the maxim 'That which comes first is to be accepted, as its injunction comes first, as in ordinary practice' (*Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* XII 2 23).¹⁹

§ 8.—With the help of this principle, Sb decides that *sa* n°1 refers to Prajāpati,²⁰ while Keith would prefer the horse (§1), and proclaims the subject of *pratigrhṇyāt* and *nirvapet* to be the same. Nevertheless, the usual meaning of the first verb prevents a donor to be its subject. On the other hand, it is out of question to take the statement 'Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuṇa' (clause n°1) as signifying that he received it from him.²¹

To remove the dilemma, Sb does not hesitate to understand *pratigrhṇyāt* of clause n°8 as if it had the causative form *pratigrāhayet* "to make the acceptance possible = to give."²² On the other hand, he keeps silent about a similar modification for *pratigrhṇāti* of the clause n°7. However that may be, how can this meaning be conveyed?

We must confess that the response of Sb on this point is rather clumsy and cumbersome. "A man — he says — by whom an act is carried out, either directly or indirectly, can be called the 'doer' of that act".²³ Under these conditions, the giver who calls forth the acceptance, cooperates in it and could be said to *accept* as well. So the donor turns into the donee.²⁴

Let us go further with this reasoning: if it is so, the reverse is equally true, and the person who accepts will be in a way a giver. Even if the text of Sb is not very explicit, it allows the conclusion that *pratigrhṇyāt* actually means *dadyāt*, and that its subject, the *yajamāna*, is offering the cake. Thus the terms of the diptyc match with those of the myth. But have we the right to make the text consistent by such a juggler trick?

19. JHA I 519 = MK loc. cit. 17ff: tatra "mukhyaṃ vā pūrvacodanāl lokavat" iti prathamam anugrahitavyaṃ virodhābhāvāt. paścāttamaṃ tu virodhāt lakṣanayā kalpanīyam.

20. Cf. supra notes 13-14.

21. MK II 737 II 21-22: api ca "prajāpatir varuṇāśvān anayat" iti varuṇād āśvaṃ pratyagrṇād iti bahu asamañjasaṃ kalpayitavyam.

22. MK 737 II 22-24: pratigrhṇāti ity eṣa śabdah pratigrāhayati ity etam artham śakenoti yathā kayā cic chaiktyā vaktum. The device of giving an expression its contrary meaning is found again in Sbbh IV 4 11 (34) where a blind man is spoken of as "having excellent eyes" = MK II 1027 I 20-23.

23. MK, 11.24-26: yo hi tad ācarati yena ca kriyā prañāḍyāpi sidhyati, sa tasyāḥ kriyāyāḥ kartā śakyate vaditum.

24. MK, 11.28-31: evam ihāpi sa pratigrahasamartham ācarati yo dadāti. tasmāt dadat pratigrhṇāti iti śakyate vaditum. tasmāt adhyavadhāryam idam avakṛptam: dadat pratigrhṇātity ucyate, tasya ca vāruniṣṭiḥ iti.

§ 9. — Conclusion. If we go back to the question raised in § 1, we can observe that Sb, by the voice of the S

- proclaims Prajāpati to be the subject of *ārchat* (§ 5), while Keith would select the word "horse",
- is worried neither with regard to the meaning of this verb nor the connection of clause n°10 with the previous ones,
- is eager to defend the consistency of the text by ensuring the same subject for the verbs of the diptych while, at the same time, according this latter with the myth. This result is achieved by altering the meaning of *pratigrhāyāt* in a way that is hardly possible.

Of course, *TS* II.3.12.1 is rather obscure by reason of the ambiguity of the pronouns and shortcomings of expression (for example, there is no sentence referring to the gift on the human level), but the *mīmāṃsā* thinker goes too far in his desire to bend the words into the framework of his system.


A VERY INTERESTING RĀMĀYAṆA PANEL AT NIDIKONDA

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Nidikonda is a small village situated nearly 26 miles away south-west of Hanumakonda in the Janagaon taluk of Warangal District, Andhra Pradesh. The panel which is the subject-matter of our discussion here, is carved on one of the *Chajja* slabs of a Śaiva temple at Nidikonda. The temple is a *trikūṭālaya* on plan and is in a very much battered state. The portico and the *sabhāmandapa* are in a heap of ruins.

The right portion of the panel is occupied by three male figures. They are in standing posture. The figure on the extreme right is having a monkey face. His head is adorned with *Kirīṭamukūṭa*. His left hand is loosely hanging down and holding an indistinct object. Wings are shown on either side of his shoulders. The second figure which is carved immediately left to the above one is also standing and holding a bow in his left hand which is resting on his left shoulder. The figure on the left extreme is in vigorous action as is evident from his posture. He is pressing with his left foot the tail of the serpent which is lying straight on the ground. His right hand is slightly raised above and holding an arrow whilst the left one a bow. The left one is unfortunately broken, but the bow and that portion of the hand holding it are fortunately retained. The



Rāmāyaṇa Panel, Nidikonda, Warangal District (Andhra Pradesh).