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THE 24TH CHAPTER OF THE TATTVASAMGRAHA: REFUTATION OF THE MĪMĀMSĀ DOCTRINE OF VEDĀPAURUṢĒYATVA

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§ 1. The 24th chapter of the *Tattvasamgraha* (TS) of Śāntara-
kṣita (Ś) (725-83 C.E.) is called *Śrutiparikṣā* 'Inquiry into the
Revealed Word', and contains 725 *kārikās*, that is approximately
one-fifth of the total amount of stanzas of the work. It goes
without saying that it has been commented by the pupil of Ś,
Kamalaśīla (740-95 C.E.).¹

The *Śrutiparikṣā* is a lengthy piece of controversy confronting
—a Buddhist who rejects the eternality of the Veda as well as
of its components from the sound up to the sentence,
and

—his opponent, actually a Mīmāṃsaka of the Kumārila's
persuasion, who regards upon the Veda as eternal and, there-
fore, entirely reliable and authoritative. It is indeed faultless
and unerring because it has no origin at all—neither divine
nor human. It is *apauruṣeya* (*k.* 2794 or 95) or *narākṛta*
(*k.* 2085/86).²

The chapter is divided into unequal sections:

—*kk.* 2084-2350, the *prima facie* view where the *kārikās* are
mostly taken over from the *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV) of Kumārila
(7th c. C.E.).³

—*kk.* 2351-2809, the *siddhānta* or final view of Ś who seeks to
prove the absence of the above qualities in the Veda.

The dialectical structure of the text, however, is such that
neither of both parts is a plain account of a viewpoint, but rather
an intermingling of statements and answers. So the greatest at-
tention is required from the reader if he wants to trace at which
point in the debate he is.

§2. From *k.* 2084 up to 2131, Ś lets the Mīmāṃsaka speak and expound a series of ideas significant for him. Among them, two remarks of dialectical import must be emphasized:

- the first one is made in *k.* 2096. The Mīmāṃsaka points out that the refutation of the view of the opponent (a *tārkika*, a 'logician') is tantamount to the demonstration of his own.
- the second belongs to the *P.* introducing *kk.* 2110 (=ŚV *Codanāsūtra* 93). ff.: the Buddhist is invited to join the discussion even though he disagrees with its starting point.

Out of the 47 *kārikās* of that section, a number stem from the ŚV, even though they are sometimes quoted with slight modifications (see below ft. 15). These are

- kk.* 2110-11 = ŚV, *Codanāsūtra* 92-3: it is not allowed to deny the validity of the Veda by reason of sheer malice (*dveṣamātra*). By lack of acquaintance with the Veda,⁴ the Buddhist is disqualified to condemn it.
- kk.* 2118-19 = ŚV, *Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa* (Śn) 414-15 deal with the Recognition of the universal.⁵
- kk.* 2121c/d-2125a/b = ŚV, Śn 418-19, 420, 416, summarize the reasons of admitting the eternality of the word.
- k.* 2130 = ŚV, Śn 422c/d-423a/b: the universality of the word does not annul the diversity of the things (f.e. the jar).⁶

§3. From *k.* 2132 onwards, a *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) starts. It is made up of *kārikās* also coming from the ŚV, but rearranged by Ś and ascribed by him to the Mīmāṃsaka who seeks to demonstrate that

- the various elements composing the Veda are eternal,
- the diversity-transiency therein is a false impression due to the presence of manifesting agents,

The summary of this long extract is as follows:

A. *kk.* 2131-39 = ŚV, Śn 359-66: the word never perishes, cannot be destroyed. Refutation, *k.* 2742 and below § 10A.

B. *kk.* 2140-54 = ŚV, *Sphoṭavāda* 22, 32, 34, 28, 38, 39, 40-44, 50-51: the letters are everlasting and there is no diversity in them. Refutation below, § 10B.

C. *kk.* 2155-68 = ŚV, Śn 52-66 raise the problem of an all-pervading sound, of an *ākāśa* without parts etc. Refutation § 10F.

D. *kk.* 2169-72 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 42-45: the *dhvanis* ('articulations', Jhā) are the manifesters of the eternal *śabda* through the moulding (*saṁskāra* 'embellishment', Jhā) of the ether (*ākāśa*) or space (*dik*, *kk.* 2197-203) enclosed in the ear-cavity.⁷ Refutation § 10D.

E. *kk.* 2173-81 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 119-30: the Buddhist is wrong to rule out any contact between ear and sound, when explaining the hearing process. Refutation § 10E.

F. *kk.* 2182-96 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 66-73, 76-83: the ubiquitous (*vyāpīn*, *k.* 2184) auditory organ (*śrotra*) can be particularized by the *dhvanisaṁskṛti* so that the *śabda* is just heard by such or such man and nobody else.

G. *kk.* 2203-207 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 154-5, 183-87, 126-28, 122: the ear-cavity consists of space (*dik*); the differentiating agent allowing somebody to hear in his own way is the *dhvani*.⁸ Refutation § 10F.

H. *kk.* 2210-13, 2209, 2214-24, 2225-28 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 172-76, 178-91, 197-201: albeit all-pervading, the sound is not perceived everywhere⁹; the necessary diversity is brought about by the manifesting (*vyañjaka*) *dhvani*; the *śabda* remains one (*na bhidyate*, *k.* 2226), even if it comes up in a diversity of places (*deśataḥ*, *k.* 2227) or times (*kālabhedena*, *ibid.*).¹⁰

I. *kk.* 2229-32 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 217-21: the *dhvani* is bearing sound qualities; length and shortness of the *varṇa*'s (phonemes) rest on the articulation.

J. *kk.* 2233-50 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 241-52, 256-63: the connection word-meaning is eternal.¹¹ Refutation, § 10G.

K. *kk.* 2252-55, 2256-73 = *ŚV*, *Saṁbandhākṣepaparihāra* 12-4, 21-42: there are objections undermining the theory of the eternality of word,¹² but there are counterarguments too avering this eternality versus the Buddhist doctrine of the word convention resulting in its impermanency. Refutation § 10G.

L. *kk.* 2278-301 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 278-305: the *varṇa*'s ('letters', Jhā, phonemes) and their order are without beginning; that order has a usage eternality (*vyavahārāt nityatā*, *k.* 2287).¹³ Refutation, § 10B.

M. *kk.* 2303-15 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 313-27: the Buddhist thesis 'Word is non-eternal' (*śabdānityatā*, *k.* 2303) must be criticized.

N. *kk.* 2316-20, 2321-31a/b = *ŚV*, *Śn* 343-48, 22-32: are also disputable the reasons adduced by the Buddhist in favour of the non-eternality of word, namely

- because it is perceptible by the sense-organs,
- because it is invariably concomitant with effort.

Consequently, the subtle or uncaused destruction is refuted and a clear pronouncement is made in favour of

O. *kk.* 2331-34 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 350c/d-53: the dual nature (*śabalā-kāra*) of the beings.¹⁴ Refutation, *k.* 2750.

P. *kk.* 2335-38, 2340c/d-42, 2346, 2347-8 = *ŚV*, *Vākyaḍhikaraṇa*, I, 108-10, 365-67; *Sambandhākṣepavāda* 2; *Codanāsūtra* 184-5: the Buddhist negation of the eternality of the sentence must be rebutted. Refutation § 10I.

From *k.* 2337 onwards, the word Veda again occurs and the *kārikās* gradually cease being borrowed from Kumārila.¹⁵

§ 4. Now, some aspects of the concept of Vedic eternality must be stressed. *Nityatā* is conceived as

- a subjective consciousness stated in the words: 'I am uttering words that have been used by other persons' (*k.* 2290 = *ŚV*, *Śn* 293). These persons form the longstanding beginningless line of teachers and pupils.

K. 2678 may be held on as the refutation of the above opinion that is said to proceed from an illusion, viz. the recognition of the similarity (*tulyapratyavamarśa*)

- an absence of remembrance in reference to its author (*P.* on 2342).
- an absence of beginning and end (*k.* 2104).¹⁶ This fact needs no proof because it has the nature of an absolute negation (*niṣedhamātra*, *kk.* 2430ff. and *P.*).¹⁷ The negation of the two ends of the Veda amounts to claim its eternality (*k.* 2103). The Buddhist rejects this idea in *kk.* 2429-34.

Lastly, another way of paraphrasing the concept of eternality is to name it 'absence of personal origin', *apauruṣeyatva/tā* (*kk.* 2096, 2420, 2802 f.i.).^{17a}

§ 5. Yet the eternality of the Veda is not sought for itself, but as the soundest basis of its reliability or authority. As a matter of fact, the assessment of these qualities is at the heart of the debate between Mimāṃsaka and Buddhist.¹⁸ In order to undermine the Vedic authority, the Buddhist claims the Veda to

be a compilation (*saṅghāta*), a human production (*pauruṣeya*), like any book of stories (*kathāvat*, *kk.* 2137, 2420). It is unreliable because it does not proceed from an authoritative person (*āpta puruṣa*, *k.* 2337).¹⁹ It has indeed an author, even if his name remains unknown (*k.* 2412).

Paradoxically, the main argument of the Mimāṃsaka to bolster the validity of the Veda, the lack of an author, is, according to the Buddhist, the clearest proof of its deficiency (*P.* on *kk.* 2353 ff.), since the Veda has no doubt an author, and, furthermore, an author whose reliability is uncertain (see also below, § 9).

Now why is the Veda deprived of eternity? Because it presents itself in a sequential form (*vyāñjanakrama*, *k.* 2420), like dramas and stories. Now in what is eternal, there is no sequence since it is unable to be manifested (*k.* 2421). Regarding eternal things—the *P.* says—there is nothing that a manifestor can do (on *k.* 2494) and all the words are synchronous (*samakālatva*, *P.* on 2421, 2761-65). On the other hand, if the Veda were extant all the time, the cognitions it yields should be present for ever and arise simultaneously (*kk.* 2358-59).²⁰

§ 6. The Buddhist adds further reasons in order to confirm the non-eternality and the non-validity of the Scripture.

—When the Vedic sentence is heard for the first time, it does not reveal its meaning to a man who does not know the conventions (*k.* 2373+*P.*). So it is unable to express that meaning by itself, and, accordingly, is not valid (*kk.* 2393-98).

As a matter of fact, the comprehension of the Veda is not supplied by its sentences themselves, but through the explanations of the human commentators (*kk.* 2355-56+*P.* = *Jhā*, p. 1104), acting as lamps (*puruṣaiḥ dipabhūtaiḥ*, *k.* 2365, *P.* on *k.* 2772). Let us mention among them Manu and Vyāsa (*k.* 2380). Therefore, the Veda is made efficient (*prasakta*) through the help of personalities (*narāśrayāt*) and, thus, is their work (*pauruṣeya*, *k.* 2364).

—On the other hand, if the Veda is ill-explained, it ceases being the light of the man (*k.* 2374), and that is bound to be so because not a single member of the traditional line of pupils and teachers is capable of perceiving supersensuous things (*k.* 2378 : *yasmād eko 'pi tanmadhye naivātīndriyadrñ mataḥ*). This

spiritual lineage, even beginningless, is just a line of blind persons (*andhaparāṃparā*).

—The *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda, if there is any, could not prevent it from being unreliable and a source of illusions, since a forest-fire, though of non-personal origin, can have a blue lotus perceived as red (*k.* 2402). This is what is realized by all men of keen intellectual vision (*sūkṣmadhīrk*, *k.* 2410).

§7. There is also a complete opposition between the Mīmāṃsaka and the Buddhist over the way of interpreting such stock phrases of the Mīmāṃsā²¹ as

—*Svargakāmo 'gniṣṭomena yajeta* quoted in the *P.* on *kk.* 208 and 2784.

—*Agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* quoted in the *P.* on *kk.* 2335-37.

—*Svargakāmo yajeta* quoted in the *Śābara-bhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* I 1 2, referred to in the *P.* on *kk.* 2345-49 and 2386

The gist of those injunctions is embodied in the *k.* 2386, put into the mouth of the Mīmāṃsaka who is reaffirming his stand 'The cognition that arises in regard to heaven and to such things from the Vedic sentences speaking of the Agnihotra etc. is found to be free from doubt and uncertainty'.²²

They are also hinted at in the *P.* on *kk.* 2388-89, in order this time, to be fought:

'The notion that the intelligent man has of Agnihotra leading to Heaven is just as uncertain as that of Agnihotra not leading to Heaven.'²³

So the Mīmāṃsaka holds that the Vedic message is as true as a direct perception (*P.* on *kk.* 2355). It does not depend on a convention, for the latter is holding good for the words related to perceptible things and not to the ones beyond the reach of the senses (*P.* on *kk.* 2338-39).

Eventually, the view of the Buddhist comes out of his demerit (*adharmaja*), as he hates the Veda like an owl hostile to the light (*k.* 2350).

§8. But such a taunting declaration is not confined to the Mīmāṃsaka side. The validity of the *Śruti*—the Buddhist says—is emphasized on account of the false pride of the twice-born (*dvijātīnām mithyāmānavijrmbhitam k.* 2351) As a matter of fact there is no proof of the Vedic phrase being reliable, because in

reference to the supersensuous knowledges, any assertion is acceptable (*tulyabalābala*, k. 2443). 'There can be no certainty regarding their existence or non-existence' (*nātindriye yujyete sadasattāviniścayau*, k. 2389).

§9. The Mimāṃsaka said that the Veda was without author because there is perception of none (k. 2087: *kartā tāvad adṛṣṭaḥ*). From k. 2412 onwards, the Buddhist undertakes to counter that argument. He declares that a lot of works were brought about by men who fell into oblivion. Likewise, the author of the Veda is not amenable to the 'non-apprehension' (*abhāva*), the means of knowledge that witnesses to the total absence of something.

On the contrary, the Veda, being expressive of clear meanings, requires an author (k. 2413). And precisely, the perception is said to reveal who he is, who are the creators (*kartāraḥ*) of the Veda (k. 2417). These are the readers (*adhyetāraḥ*, k. 2417)²⁴ or the speakers (*vaktṛ*, k. 2799). The Veda is—so to say—the outcome of their action. When not read, indeed, it is without any manifestor (*vyāñjaka*, k. 2417). The cognition of the Veda amounts to its interpretation by man (*vyākhyānāt puruṣāśrayāt* k. 2772) or to its remembrance. And the 'remember' is the creator (P. on k. 2790-91: *karotiḥ smaraṇārthaḥ kiṃ na vyākhyāyate*).

The practitioners, though, have their intelligence dulled by the constant contemplation of the Veda, and, prompted by false attachment, have failed to detect the sources of error therein (k. 2445: *mithyānurāgasamjātavedādhyayanajaḍikṛtaiḥ mithyātvahetur ajñātaḥ*). They are misled by faith (*śraddhayā*), even in regard to things that are open to doubt (k. 2773).

In reference to the Veda's eternity, we may use a conclusion concerning an other question²⁵ and running thus: 'All this assumption by the Vedic scholar is absolutely baseless; it is not agreeable to the learned (*viduṣāṃ prītaye na*) and shines only among Vedic scholars (*śrotṛiya*)' (k. 2536). How could any intelligent person (*prekṣāvanta*, P. on k. 2774) undertake any activity on the authority of such a scripture, 'the exact form or subject-matter of which is like dense darkness (*tamobhūta*) and for which only dull-witted persons (*manda*) can have an attachment' (k. 2806)?

On the contrary, the wise followers of the Buddha have recourse to their scriptures in full accordance with reason and not by hearsay (*P.* on *k.* 2773: *tatra nyāyam eva anupālayantaḥ saugatāḥ sudhiyaḥ pravartante na pravādamātreṇa*).

§ 10. Against Kumārila's claim of the eternity of each Vedic constituent (see above § 3), Ś argues that

A. *Gotva*, viz. the name *go* 'cow' envisaged as a universal and here exemplifying any word whatsoever, cannot be considered as eternal (*gotvaṃ nityam apāstam*, *k.* 2471) (Refutation of § 3A). It is 'through illusion that people come to treat and speak of the word cow (f. i.) as one only, regarding all as the same', whereas it applies to a variety of objects (*k.* 2614).

B. it is not possible to posit the oneness of the letters (*k.* 2482), and thus their eternity is not real. Each occurring of a letter is a separate phenomenon and not one of the successive manifestations of the same substrate (*kk.* 2483-84) (Refutation of § 3B). The letters pronounced by each man must be regarded as distinct (*k.* 2680). They are not eternal (*k.* 2734), for, only in this case, they are expressive (*sārthaka*), endowed with distinct meanings (*pravibhaktārtha*) and particular order of sequence (*viśiṣṭākrama*, *k.* 2781).

C. there is no eternal order of sequence for the letters and their articulations, both of which are deprived of any universal (*kk.* 2675 ff., refutation of § 3L).²⁶

D. if the *śabda* is capable of being apprehended, that must happen without restriction nor instrument (*kk.* 2497-98), viz. without manifestor nor manifestation taking place. On the other hand, the Buddhist argues that, if things are eternal as urged by the Mīmāṃsaka, they cannot be manifested,²⁷ for manifestation means some kind of sequential appearance, what is precluded for eternal things. Refutation of § 3D.

Accordingly, it is futile to assume tools of manifestation such as the *dhvani* 'articulation' or the *saṃs-kṛti/kāra* 'embellishment' (*kk.* 2506-08).²⁸ Refutation of § 3H.

E. the word-sound, appearing at sundry places, must be diverse (*k.* 2604); it is not grasped by a contact with the ear (*kk.* 2518ff.). Refutation of § 3E, H etc.

F. the auditory organ is neither part of *ākāśa* nor of *dik*

(k. 2560). *Ākāśa*, on the other hand, is undefinable and vague (k. 2607). Refutation of § 3D, G.

G. an eternal connection between word and meaning is a groundless assumption (*nityaśabdārthasambandhakalpanā vo nirarthakā*, k. 2659), and the opportunity of error (*mithyātva-sambhava*) is never missing (k. 2657). Refutation of § 3J, K, M etc.

This connection, far from being eternal, is a pure convention (*samketa/samaya*) between the speakers (k. 2620). The words, indeed, are unable, according to the Buddhist, to reflect and reach the realities. They are meant to point out the presence (in the speaker) of the desire to speak (k. 2618). They do not bring about the cognition of things directly, because there is no invariable concomitance between them and the external objects. On the contrary, they contain a certain amount of whim.²⁹ The convention constituting the relationship does not rest on the factors word and meaning only; man must also be taken into account. Therefore, terms like *yāga* or *svarga*, so significant for the Mīmāṃsaka, are created by the whim of man just as other technical terms (*vrddhi* and so on, k. 2767). If the word were eternal, it could not be expressive (k. 2735: *nityā satī na vāg yuktā dyotakā*), because it would not have any connection with an order of sequence (*anupūrvyāyogena*) or a production in succession.

H. it is useless to define the connection (*sambandha*) word-meaning as an eternal potency (*śakti*) of producing the cognition of the meaning (*arthabodhajanana*, k. 2643). Such a view entails a great deal of difficulties and is conflicting with that of language as a convention (kk. 2640-51). The latter gives us the opportunity of explaining as well why a corrupt form (*gāvi* instead of *go*) is also conveying a sense (kk. 2667-69).

I. the sentence is not eternal either (kk. 2760, 2766). Refutation of § 3P. The joining of the letters in a phrase like *svargakāmo gniṣṭomena yajeta* is not beyond the human capacities (P. on k. 2784).

§11. Besides these reasons disproving the eternity of the Veda, there are some clues pointing out that it is a human work.

- A. It speaks of wrongful sexual acts (*kk.* 2786ff.).
- B. The alleged unique power of its incantations can be found elsewhere also (*ibid.*).
- C. It cannot avoid the *kṣaṇabhaṅga* or 'Continual decay' of everything (*kk.* 2670-72, 2814-16).
- D. If it is put among the non-personal productions, it cannot be true (*tataś ca apauruṣeyeṣu satyāśā tyajyatām iyam, k.* 2794). And the *P.* reads: the *apauruṣeyatva* is not a proof of truth (*apauruṣeyatvaṃ satyārthaṃ na siddhyet*). On the other hand, this *apauruṣeyatva* remains uncertain (*amiścita, k.* 2802).
- E. Even if there is no desire of altering the Vedic text, this risk cannot be definitely excluded (*k.* 2674: *anyatheccchāpravṛttau tu nāśaṅkā vinivartate*).

§ 12. Conclusion. The great gap between Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka lies in their different approach to the supersensuous realities as evoked in the language. The former is inclined to deny them any existence since anything told in reference to them is uncertain (§ 8). The latter is willing to put his full trust in them because they cannot be sublated by anything (§ 7). Out of both debaters, the Buddhist, as an agnostic, would probably endorse the Wittgensteinian command: 'What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence'.³⁰

From an other point of view, the Buddhist is hampered by a conspicuous shortcoming: the absence in his ontological framework of the notion of potency, nay the denial of it. Hence he would not easily agree with Aristotle when this latter says: it is absurd to contend that a builder who does not build now is absolutely unable to build.³¹ § is rather inclined to declare: the Veda is not a means of knowledge since it does not supply any knowledge by itself and at the very outset.³³

At a still deeper level, such a conviction is linked with the tenet of the universal momentariness. Granted that each entity is either totally in actuality or completely destroyed, with no possible middle term,³³ every Mīmāṃsaka attempt at reconciling unity and diversity, eternity and temporality with the help of notions like potency or manifestation fails. So, 'When the perpetual Flux has been established, the Veda, as something eternal by itself, becomes clearly discarded' (*k.* 2803).

NOTES

1. In his *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, quoted below by the letter *P.* before the number of the *kārikā*. The *TS* and *TSP* have been published in a handy way by Dvarikadas Shastri, 2 vol., Varanasi, 1981-2, Bauddha Bharati Series 1-2, and translated by G. Jhā, 1st ed. Baroda, G.O.S. 83, 1939; reprint, 2 vol., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1986.
2. The lower figure is that of Shastri; the higher is that of Jhā. Below, the numbering of Shastri is kept and the quotations are made according to the Jhā's translation which is quite satisfactory. For *apauruṣeya*, see below fn. 17a.
3. On *K* in general and the *ŚV* in particular, see J.M. Verpoorten, *Mīmāṃsā Literature*, pp. 22-28 (Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1987, History of Indian Literature, vol. VI.5).
4. In a hostile debate like this one—the *Caraka-saṁhitā* says—it is right to consider the demerits of the opponent, e.g. his lack of proficiency, cf. E. Solomon, *Indian Dialectics*, I, p. 75 (Ahmedabad, Sheth Bholabhai... Research Ser. 70, 74, 1976-78).
5. Let us notice that *k.* 2119c is actually *Śn* 383c rather than 415c.
6. These *kārikā*'s are not traced back to the *ŚV* by Jhā who starts pointing out the borrowings only from 2131 onwards. Let us add a few *śloka*s of *K.* occurring in the *P.* on *TS* 2084 (= *ŚV*, *Codanāsūtra* 13, 14, 191, 200), 2140 (= *ŚV*, *Śn* 422-3) etc.
7. = *ŚV*, *Śn* 150-55. Cf. K.K. Dixit, *Slokavārtika. A Study*, pp. 22ff, Ahmedabad, LS. Ser. 92, 1983; F.X. D'sa, *Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śabara and Kumārila*, pp. 225ff., Vienna, Publ. of the De Nobili Research Library VII, 1980. The doctrine of the temporal and limited manifestation of an eternal word-sound is the means used by the *Mīmāṃsaka* in order to ward off the Buddhist emphasis on the immediate destruction of everything.
8. E. Abegg, *Die Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes bei Kumārila*, Antidoron f.J. Wackernagel, p. 262, Göttingen 1923. For a definition of *dhvani*, see fn. 13.
9. D'sa, p. 127; Dixit, p. 23.
10. D'sa, pp. 117-18.
11. *K.* 2251 is a personal conclusion of Ś; *k.* 2305: a non-eternal word (*pratijñā*) cannot express its meaning.
12. The Buddhist view summarized in these *kk.* and enclosed in the *Pūrvapakṣa* held by the *Mīmāṃsaka* runs thus: the relationship word-meaning originates in a convention (*samaya*), cf. Dixit, pp. 19ff.
13. D'sa, p. 121; p. 119: a *varṇa* is nothing but *śabda* itself perceived through a particular perspective called *dhvani*. The difference in the *varṇa*s is merely an indication of the observer's perspective; p. 120: *dhvani*=limited means of access to *śabda*.
14. *K.* 2333c/d: *śabalākāram ekaṁ hi vastu prāk pratipādītam*. Those *pāda*s are not found in the *ŚV*.
15. Further in the text, we still come across *kk.* 2776-78=*ŚV*, *Saṁbandh-ākṣepaparihāra* 136-39a/b and 2792=*ŚV*, *Codanāsūtra* 144. The variant