

Some Aspects of *Ātman* According to Prabhākara and Śālikanātha

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1. Historical and philological context.

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are both thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, one of the six 'views' (*darśana*) well-known in Indian philosophy. In his *Bṛhatī* (Br), Prabhākara (seventh century CE) has developed an original approach of the problems dealt with by his school. Śālikanātha, his disciple and commentator (750–820 CE), has, in turn, explained the *Bṛhatī* in his *Ṛju-vimāla-pañcikā* (Rju).

Both Prabhākara and Śālikanātha have composed lengthy explanations of the commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on the fifth of the 2,745 *sūtras* of Jaimini, written by their predecessors: Śabarasvāmin (ŚBh) and a mysterious Vṛtti-kāra ('Glossator'), whom ŚBh widely quotes.

The detailed explanation of the fifth *sūtra* of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (MS) by ŚBh and the 'Glossator' is divided into 10 sections. The last one, called *Ātma-vāda* (MŚV 5.17), is devoted to the *ātman* or 'soul/self', and is followed by chapters setting forth grammatical and exegetical questions like the validity of the *Veda* etc.

The Sanskrit text of the *Bṛhatī* and *Ṛju-vimāla-pañcikā* on the *Ātma-vāda* has been edited by S.K. Ramanatha Śāstrī (Br₂ / Rju₂), accompanied by the *Ātma-vāda* of ŚBh. There is also another edition of the *Bṛhatī* and *Ṛju-vimāla-pañcikā* by A. Chinnaswami Sastri (Br₁/Rju₁), partially reproduced by Kevalānanda Sarasvatī in his *Mīmāṃsā-kośa* (MK, II: pp. 900–907). As far as the *Bhāṣya* of Śabara (ŚBh) is concerned, the text can be read elsewhere also, either in the aforesaid *Mīmāṃsā-kośa* (MK, II: pp. 897–899 with the first lines in III: p. 1710a.27–30) or in the *Mīmāṃsā-darśana* (MS) published by Kāśīnātha Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankara and Gaṇeśaśāstrī Āmbādāsa Jośī (MS, I: pp. 72–86).

In the English translation of Gangānātha Jhā (ŚBh₃), the passage studied below is found in Vol. I, pp. 26–31, 52–60, and the German translation is published (with the critical edition of the text) by E. Frauwallner (ŚBh₁). The references to page and lines are to the Madras edition (Br₂), which has been used for *Bṛhatī* and *Ṛju-vimāla-pañcikā*.¹ For the *Bṛhatī*, the references to *Mīmāṃsā-*

¹ I want to express my gratitude to Professor K. Yoshimizu, Sendai University, Japan, who kindly supplied me with photocopies of the text.

kośa have been added (page, column a or b and lines). The beginning of the *Śābara-bhāṣya* edited and translated by Frauwallner is cited as ŚBh₁, page and lines with mention of MS, volume, page and lines.

The following pages examine only the first part of the lengthy commentary² of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, in which they seek to show that *ātman* is different from other components of the human being, such as breath, pleasure etc. Therein they define the self as *kartṛ–bhokṛ*, possibly under the influence of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

2. The question of the existence of *ātman*: the starting point of the debate.

There is a Vedic sentence which triggers the discussions of the *Ātma-vāda*, namely *Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra* 31 2 21: ‘The [deceased] institutor of the sacrifice instantly proceeds to the heavenly world, furnished with [his] sacrificial utensils.’³ According to ŚBh, this phrase is a crux in that it contradicts what the eyes can see: actually, the late sacrificer does not proceed to heaven since his corpse surrounded by sacred objects is burning on the pyre. Now, if we do not want to acknowledge that the *Veda* is lying to us, we must presume that something else is going to heaven and discover what it is, which clues are available to trace this invisible ‘[wholly] other’⁴ and which inferential marks should be used in the inference (*anumāna*) establishing its existence.

3. In the subsequent discussion, the Vedic sentence is no longer the focus; nevertheless, it is not totally forgotten. For instance, it occurs as a reminder by the end of the first part of the Prabhākara’s commentary where it is qualified by *artha-vāda* or ‘explanatory phrase’.⁵

² It expands on pp. 207–256 and contains 276 Sanskrit lines for the Bṛ and approximately 385 lines for the R̥ju *stricto sensu*, viz. without the long and numerous quotes of the Bṛ.

³ Translated by SLAJE (2006:145). The text is found in ŚBh₁, p. 50.1–2 (*sa eṣa yajñāyudhī yajamāno ’ñjasā svargaṃ lokam yāti*. In section 5 (*Citra-vāda*) of the ŚBh on 1.1.5, a disputant, already citing this sentence, emphasises the conflict arising thereby between the perception and the statement of the Revelation (ŚBh₁, p. 34.6: *dṛṣṭa-viruddham api bhavati kimcid vaidikaṃ vacanam* = MS, I: p. 49.1–3 where *vaidikam* is omitted). We find hints at this very sentence in Kumārila, MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 74:

*yajamānatvam apy ātmā sakriyatvāt prapadyate /
na parispanda eva ekaḥ kriyā naḥ kaṇa-bjōivat // —*

—‘On account of its active character, the soul comes to be the performer of sacrifices: We do not hold “motion” to be the only form of action, as held by the Vaiśeṣikas’ (tr. MŚV₂, p. 395),

and in Śālikanātha, PrP, p. 329.11–12: *kartā bhoktā ca yajña-āyudhi-vākyenākṣiptaḥ samarthayitavya ity upayuktaḥ pratyabhijñā-upanyāsaḥ*.—‘Since it is necessary to consider that doer and enjoyer are implied in the sentence “equipped with the arms of the sacrifice”, mention can be made of the recognition’.

⁴ ŚBh₁, p. 50.5 = MS, I: p. 72.4: *āha: ko “sāv anyo”*.—‘(An opponent) asks: “Who is this «other»?”. Throughout the text, the word *anya* is a way of talking of the self.

⁵ Bṛ₂, p. 239.10 = MK, p. 905b.11–12: *tasmād yathārtho ’yam artha-vādaḥ: “sa eṣa yajñāyudhī yajamāna iti”*. R̥ju₂ glosses *yathārtha* (‘correct’) by *nāyathārtha* (‘not incor-

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha prefer to devote themselves to an analysis of the human entity in order to discover:

- what this mysterious ‘other’ (*anya*) is which is different from body, breath, inner states (*sc.* feelings, such pleasure etc.) and which might be called *ātman*, or ‘self’,
- whether not only breath and feelings but also desire (*icchā*) and recollection (*smṛti*) can serve as inferential marks fit to aver (by *anumāna*) the existence of *ātman*.

4. The components of the human being which are not conducive to *ātman*.

In Śabara’s work, an opponent states: ‘We perceive it (*ātman*) with the help of breath (*prāṇa*).’⁶ Both Prabhākara and Śālikanātha wonder whether *prāṇa* can lead us to *ātman* or whether it merely remains a material element, a product of the body, without link with the mysterious ‘other one’.

The question remains unsettled because the nature of *prāṇa* is uncertain.

Prāṇa is not a quality of the body⁷ and is not tightly associated with it because it is not coeval with it (*ayāvad-śarīra-bhūta*).⁸ Whereas the body is still present, ‘intact’, ‘not destroyed’⁹ (even though it is now a corpse), breath has already vanished. Consequently, ‘the *prāṇas* cannot be material qualities since they do not last as long as their abode and are not seen in [material objects,] e.g. a jug.’¹⁰ Further in the *Bṛhatī*, the non-coequality of the *prāṇa* is put aside by a disputant (unexpectedly a Mīmāṃsaka, Prabhākara himself) who prefers to talk of (*a*)*calanātmakatva* ‘(im)mobility’ (cf. n. 89).

Despite having a degree of independence from the body, breath cannot be the logical mark of the presence of *ātman*. On this point, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are opposed to the Vaiśeṣikas¹¹ who claim that *sukha* (pleasure) and *prāṇa* (breath), being bereft of material support, are rightly named ‘properties of *ātman*’.¹²

rect’). The semantic status of the *iti*-quote is uncertain: mandatory (*vidhi*) or explanatory (*artha-vāda*). The answer differs according to the authors. This aspect is not dealt with here in detail. *Vide infra* n. 111.

⁶ ŚBh₁, p. 50.5–6: *nanu prāṇādibhir enam upalabhāmahe* = MS, I: p. 72.4; where *nanu* is omitted. *Enam* = *asāv anyo*, i.e. ‘that other one’ of n. 4, finally identified with *ātman*.

⁷ MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 97: *tasmān na deha-dharmatvaṃ prāṇāder*.

⁸ Cf. ŚBh₁, p. 50.9 = MS, I: p. 73.4 (*ayāvac-charīra-bhāvitva*); Bṛ₂, p. 217.8 and 12 = MK, p. 902a.20, 25 and 27 (*ayāvad-bhūta-bhāvitva/tā*).

⁹ *Dṛḍha, avinaṣṭa* as said in MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 94, 96.

¹⁰ Bṛ₂, p. 217.8–9: *bhūta-guṇā hy amī (=prāṇa) na bhavanti ayāvad-bhūta-bhāvitvād ghaṭādiṣv adarśanāt*. The last two words are not found in MK, p. 902a.20. They look like an explanation inspired by the debate around VS 3.2.4–6: VS₁, p. 173–174, tr. VS₂ (1868: 389–390), cf. n. 113.

¹¹ Rju₂, p. 218.15.

¹² Bṛ₂, p. 217.10–11 = MK, p. 902a.22–23: *ātma-guṇā hy ete ity yuktam evōktam*; Rju₂, p. 218.15: *nirasta-bhūtāśraya-bhāvāḥ samyag eva ātma-guṇatayā uktāḥ*.

5. In the subsequent passage (Bṛ / Ṛju, p. 217–218), both authors constantly mix up the accounts on *prāṇa* and on *sukha*. Although breath and pleasure are outside the material range, it would be preposterous to look upon them as *ātma-guṇa*, or the ‘qualities of *ātman*’. To declare that the non-coequality of breath–body is not established—in other words, to opt for a tight relationship of both of them—would be tantamount to applying the idea of *ātman* to that which is material (*bhūta*) and, thus not *ātman*.¹³ That would deny the latter’s own existence, confining what is ‘other’ (*anya/vyatirikta*), i.e. what is beyond the visible, to *prāṇa* alone and ultimately dismissing as false the aforesaid Vedic sentence (§ 2).

6. The inner states/feelings (*sukha*, ‘pleasure’ etc.) and their inferential mark (*ceṣṭā*, ‘the movements of the body’), i.e. the inference of the self on the basis of bodily movements (*ceṣṭā-anumāna*).

Of course, these states should not be seen as material features (*bhūta-dharma*),¹⁴ for they are, unlike e.g. colour, imperceptible to anybody else except to their enjoyer.¹⁵ Thus, with other people, they are reached by *anumāna* (inference).

On the other hand, they should not be regarded as qualities (*guṇa*) of the self, despite the claim of the Vaiśeṣikas,¹⁶ because their inferential mark is a ‘material change’: *bhūta-vikāra-hetutva*, the first two elements of the compound being a synonym of *ceṣṭā*.

It would thus be erroneous to infer the presence of *ātman* from the movements of the body (*ceṣṭā*), for these movements only reveal the essence of the states that bring them about. If *sukha* etc. inferentially led us to *ātman* through *ceṣṭā*, the self would lose its immaterial essence.¹⁷

Earlier in the text of the *Ṛju-vimala-pañcikā*, a proponent stated that ‘the existence of *ātman* is indeed demonstrated everywhere by the experience of pleasure [which is never without motion]’. But an opponent put that statement aside by pointing out: ‘There is no proof that this [existence/ experience] is presently accompanied by a motion.’¹⁸

¹³ Bṛ₂, p. 218.9–10 = MK, p. 902a.30: *tasmād ayāvād-bhūta-bhāvitvam asiddham. Sēyam anātmany ātma-buddhiḥ.*

¹⁴ Bṛ₂, p. 211.4 = MK, p. 901b.18: *mā bhuvan bhūta-dharmāḥ sukhādayaḥ*, glossed by Ṛju₂, p. 211.14: *kiṃ ca sukhādayaś ca na bhūta-dharmāḥ śakyante vaktum.*

¹⁵ Ṛju₂, p. 211.17: *na ca sukhādayaḥ parēndriya-grāhyāḥ. tasmād na bhūta-dharmāḥ.*

¹⁶ Are they Vaiśeṣikas those who think that the *sukha* etc are material qualities in Ṛju₂, p. 219.18.

¹⁷ Ṛju₂, p. 246.23–24: *ātmano ‘py anātmatā prasajyate*. Cf. n. 13 for a similar expression. To use material marks like *prāṇa* in order to infer the self could turn this latter into a ‘material aggregate’ (*bhūta-saṅghaṭa*), Ṛju₂, p. 217.16.

¹⁸ Ṛju₂, p. 236.9 ff. (cited in MK II: p. 904b.30–34): *sattā tāvad ātmanaḥ sarvatra sukhōpalambhena siddhā. sēdānīm gamana-pūrvikā iti nāsti pramāṇam*. The point of these cumbersome passages (Bṛ₂, 235.10–12, 236/4–5 and Ṛju₂, 235.23–25, 236/9–11) is to show how *ātman*, by itself ubiquitous (*sarva-gata*) and therefore inactive and motionless (*niṣkriya*; cf. also *infra* §§ 18 and 20), can receive an amount of change from its objects

Seemingly, the Mīmāṃsakas accept as valid an *anumāna* which is based on the bodily movements (*ceṣṭā*)—a frown or a smiling face¹⁹—and reveals the states of pleasure etc., but they do not go to the extent of saying that that *anumāna* bears out the presence of *ātman*.

7. As seen just above, Śābara and his disciples are prepared to dismiss the logical marks such as *prāṇa* and *sukha* as incapable of making one infer the self. They prefer to confine this power to the Vedic Revelation alone. Putting one's trust in *prāṇa* etc. as a path to *ātman* leads us astray by inducing us to think that 'on account of them, the notion of *ātman* is in force for what is not *ātman*.'²⁰ However the Vaiśeṣika thinkers are guilty of this fallacy and they teach it to their students.²¹

8. Are desire (*icchā*) and recollection (*smṛti*) conducive to an invisible *ātman*?²²

This question is dealt with from p. 215.14 (Prabhākara) and 216.16 f. (Śālikanātha) onwards.²³

In this intricate issue, the Buddhist and the three Mīmāṃsakas (Śābarasvāmin, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha) agree on just one fact: desire and recollection are existing elements. However the Buddhist wants to confine human nature to the act of 'knowing' (*jānāti*), its ideas (*buddhi*) and their reciprocal causality (*paraspara-kāraṇatā*),²⁴ and he gives desire and recollection a minimal importance. Therefore he points out that *icchā* and *smṛti* bear only on the perceived objects and not on the so far unperceived ones, like the sweet fruits said

(*sukha* etc.), and how these latter, although or rather because they are not ubiquitous but localised in time and space (*prādesika*), are the means of revealing it.

¹⁹ *Bhrū-bhaṅga*, Bṛ₂, p. 247.9 = MK, p. 906b.3; *prahṛṣṭa-vadanatva*, MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 99.

²⁰ Bṛ₂, p. 216.9–10 = MK, p. 902a.14: *ebhir anātmanah ātma-buddhiḥ prāpnoti*. For *anātman* (glossed *bhūta*, 'material', in Rju₂, p. 218.20), cf. also Bṛ₂, p. 217.11–12 = MK, p. 902a.23–24; 218.10 = MK, p. 902a.30–31; Rju₂, 219.19 (cf. n. 113); Bṛ₂, p. 224.7–8 = MK, p. 903a.22–23; 230.7 and 9 = MK p. 904a.3–4 and 6–7; 237.8 and 238.13 (MK, p. 905a.22 reads *ātmani* instead of *anātmani*, but p. 238.13, Rju₂ quotes with *anātmani*); Rju₂, p. 246.24 (*anātmatā*); 256.9 = MK, p. 907b.14.

²¹ Rju₂, p. 216.25–217.14–15: *asyārthah: yady ete hetavo na niṣkriyeran tadā śiṣyānām eṣv api vaiśeṣikādi-darśana-śravaṇa-vipralabdha-buddhinām samicīna-ātma-hetv-abhimānaḥ syāt*.—'The meaning is as follows: if these [logical] grounds were not dismissed, there would be, for the students of these [topics] whose minds are deceived by hearing the Vaiśeṣika doctrines, the misconception that these grounds (*sukha*, *prāṇa*) are right [to infer] the Self'. Incidentally, Śālikanātha and Prabhākara come to target more personally some philosophical adversaries: Prabhākara (Rju₂, p. 247.8 = MK, p. 906b.2) calls his opponent *anupāsita-guru*, 'a badly educated doctor', and some scholars believe that this word refers to Kumārila.

²² ŚBh₁, p. 52.17 (= MS, I: p. 76.6): *icchayā ātmānam upalabhāmahe*; p. 54.17 (= MS, I: p. 78.6): *smṛtir apicchāvat*.

²³ Cf. also MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 103.

²⁴ Rju₂, p. 216.15–16: *buddhy-ādibhyo 'nyasyānupalabdheḥ paraspara-kāraṇatayā cōpapatter jānāti*.—'Due to the non-perception of another [entity] apart from the ideas and due to the possibility [for these latter to exist] under the form of a reciprocal causality, he knows'.

to grow north of Mount Meru²⁵ or, implicitly, a whimsical entity as *ātman*. With respect to desire and recollection, one should not ask who is their owner, since, like the sun and moon, they are things without ‘possessor’ (*tadvān*).²⁶

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha argue that, on the contrary, desire and recollection are perceptible and consequently non-implausible;²⁷ they cannot be looked upon as negligible data. The Buddhist seems to endorse this approach when he states in an awkward phrase that ‘one could not say that recollection etc. are impossible when/ if the ‘other’, the ‘dissimilar’ (*visabhāga*), is invisible’.²⁸ However he draws from there the following consequence: *icchā* and *smṛti* exist without being related to an imperceptible *ātman*. The self is not their support and thus does not deserve any attention or refutation.²⁹

9. From p. 219–220 onwards, both Mīmāṃsakas proceed to ascertain their own positions against the Buddhists.³⁰ Prabhākara tauntingly portrays them as *keci prajñābhīmāninaḥ*, or ‘some people who overrate their intelligence/ discernment’,³¹ who dare, as Śālikanātha explains, to remove the relation of ‘the supported and the support’ (*āśrayāśrayitā*)³² and to impede the inference of an invisible support (*ātman*) from the visibly supported (*sukha* etc.).

²⁵ ŚBh₁, p. 52.17–19: *upalabdha-pūrve hy abhiprete bhavaticchā, nānupalabdha-pūrve, yathā merum uttareṇa yāny asmaj-jāṭiyair anupalabdha-pūrvāṇi svādūni vṛkṣa-phalāni na tāni praty asmākam icchā bhavati.*—‘Desire appears when the desired object is one that has been perceived before [and not one not perceived before]; for instance we have no desire for those sweet fruits that grow to the north of the Meru mountains and which have never before been tested by people like us’. Frauwallner points out (Śbh₁, p. 52, no. 18), among the *variae lectiones*, the omission of the phrase ‘*nānupalabdhapūrve*’ in three mss, what is evidenced in MS, I: p. 76.6–7, where the group is absent, and in Śbh₃, p. 27, where it is not translated by G. Jha.

²⁶ ŚBh₁, p. 50.18–19; p. 52.1 = MS, I: p. 74.6–8.

²⁷ Bṛ₂, p. 222.8 = MK, p. 903a.5–6: *dṛṣṭe hy anupapattir nāsti*; Rju₂, p. 223.14: *yat tu khalu dṛṣṭam, tatrānupapannaṃ nāsti.*

²⁸ Bṛ₂, p. 215.14–15 = MK, p. 902a.9–10: *na hy adṛṣṭe ’nyasmin visabhāge smṛty-ādayo nōpapadyanta iti śakyate vaktum. Visabhāga*, which occurs e.g. in *Abhidharma-kośa* 3.43 (tr. AK, III: p. 77, 196 ff.), possibly means that *ātman* is outside the cognitive series and not of the same nature as desire and recollection. Thus the self is not revealed by them and therefore non-cognisable.

²⁹ Rju₂, p. 216.21–22: *yadi prāṇādīny ātmānam avagāmayitum iṣate, tatas tebhyo ’py ātma-pratītir astu; atha na, tadā anadāra eva yuktah, kim-arīham eṣāṃ nirākaraṇam.*—‘If breath etc. are able to let know the self, let the knowledge of *ātman* be [produced] by them as well; but if not, then [to pay] no heed to them (*prāṇa* etc.) is right. What is the need to refute them?’

³⁰ *Bauddha*: Rju₂, p. 220.11, p. 224.12; *vijñāna-vāda*: p. 224.13, p. 229.12; *nairātmya-vādin*: Bṛ₂, p. 235.8 = MK, p. 904b.24.

³¹ Bṛ₂, p. 219.11–220.5 = MK, p. 902b.9.

³² Bṛ₂, p. 220.5 = MK, p. 902b.10; Rju₂, p. 220.12 seems to gloss this term by the Vaiśeṣika notion of *samavāyi-kāraṇa* (‘inherent/necessary causality’) in the sentence *kaṣaṇikatvāt padārthānām samavāyi-kāraṇam na bhavati.*—‘In view of the momentariness of [all] things, there is no necessary causality [between them]’.

Throughout both commentaries, the Buddhist pushes forward the view that it is useless to search for an invisible entity beyond and behind the sensorial data (*skandha*). Thus *anumāna* (inference), passing from the visible towards the invisible, is of no avail when perception has already taken place.³³ In other words, when perception takes place, *anumāna* becomes useless.³⁴ On the other hand, when perception is lacking, e.g. in the case of an invisible object, *anumāna* cannot work either.³⁵

10. On the contrary, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha defend the *anumāna* which the Buddhist undermines so strongly that he could be regarded as a sheer materialist. The Mīmāṃsakas envisage the perceptive cognition (*pratyakṣa-(vi)jñāna*) as unsatisfactory in so far as it is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and thus unable to prompt the 'epistemological jump' from the visible to the invisible. Accordingly, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha use the expression 'perception with recognition' (*sapratyabhijñāṃ pratyakṣam*)³⁶ to define their approach.

11. The crucial proof of the existence of the soul, or *ātman*, is obviously the process of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) on which Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas so radically disagree.

According to the latter, the notion of *aham* 'I' is necessarily linked with the recognition, because the recognizer is nobody else but the 'ego'.

As Śābarasvāmin says, *aham* denotes what is apart from—i.e. beyond—cognitions.³⁷ This statement is better understood in contrast, viz. if we remember that the aforesaid pronoun can also metaphorically denote a material element, e.g. in the phrase 'I am going', where *aham* takes the place of 'my body'.³⁸

³³ This is what Prabhākara qualifies as 'a piece of recklessness' (*sāhasam*), Bṛ₂, p. 225.10–11 = MK, p. 903a.28–29: *pru: yakṣa-dṛṣṭe 'rthe 'numānaṃ na sambhavaṭīti sāhasam idam*.

³⁴ Bṛ₂, p. 226.9 = MK, p. 903b.4–5: *upalabdhaś cet svayam, kim anumānena*.—'If [*ātman*] is perceived by itself, what is the point of an inference?' Noteworthy is the fact that these words bear upon the important issue (not dealt with in these pages) whether the perception of one's own *ātman* can allow one to infer the existence of someone else's self.

³⁵ Bṛ₂, p. 226.8–9 = MK, p. 903b.3–4: *svayam ātmānaṃ pratyakṣeṇānupalabhya nēdam anumānaṃ pravartate*.

³⁶ Rju₂, p. 234.23 glossing Bṛ₂, p. 235.7 = MK, p. 904b.23, where both words are attributed to the *bhāṣya-kāraḥ*, i.e. Śābarasvāmin, who however does not use them, at least in his *Ātma-vāda*. They are also present in Rju₂, pp. 234.22–23 and 235.15–16.

³⁷ ŚBh₁, p. 56.3–4 = MS, I: p. 79.5: *tasmāt tad-vyatirikto 'nyo 'sti yatrāyam aham-śabdah*.—'Hence it follows that there is something apart from the [cognitions], and it is to this something that the term "I" is applied' (tr. ŚBh₃, I: p. 28); p. 56.21 = MS, I: p. 80.13–14, the Buddhist demands that the 'other', i.e. the 'knower', be shown to him (*āha: yadi vijñānād anyad asti vijñātṛ ... tan nidarśyatām*); vide *infra* n. 96.

³⁸ The phrase *aham gacchāmi* is mentioned in ŚBh₁, p. 56.6 = MS, I: p. 79.7, and commented by Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, Bṛ₂, p. 230.5 and 14 = MK, p. 904a.1 ff. The complex relationship between *ātman* ('soul/self') and *aham* ('I') is scrutinised by M. HULIN (1978) and (2008: e.g. 98).

Further in the text, towards the end of the first part of his commentary, Prabhākara points out that ‘the concept of *aham* is the support (*ālambana*) of *ātman*, provided this concept [of *aham*] is devoid of any notion of “this” (*asambhinnēdam-pratyaya*)’, viz. of any thing of objective essence.³⁹

For his part, Kumāriḷa points out that *aham* must exclusively refer to the cogniser and its reference to a feature or an act concerning the body can safely be taken as a misconception (*bhrānti*).⁴⁰

12. The nature of the recognition as set forth by our authors can be more easily realised with the help of some quotations of ŚBh which describe the phenomenon and the conclusions that might be drawn from it.

A (1) The first extract describes the standard recognition, the one caused by recollection, i.e. linked with the past:⁴¹ ‘It is only when a person has seen a thing on one day that he has the notion (remembrance/recollection) on the next day in the form “I have seen it”, and this notion of recognition appears only in his own one’s self and not elsewhere...’.⁴² Hence it follows that there is something apart from both cognitions and it is to this “something” that the term “I” is applied’.⁴³

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha cite words and excerpts from this passage more than once, when they thoroughly deal with the *aham-ātman* relationship.⁴⁴

A (2) Elsewhere, we meet with a shortened picture of the same event: ‘It was we who saw this thing on one day, and it is we who remember it today ... It is “we” that existed yesterday, and it is the same “we” that exists today.’⁴⁵

³⁹ Bṛ₂, p. 239.1–2 = MK p. 905b.1–2 (where *ātmana* is omitted): *tasmād asambhinnēdam-pratyaya evāham-pratyaya ātmana ālambanam*. Rju₂, p. 239.14 glosses *asambhinna* by *amiśṛikata* (‘not mixed’) and *ālambana* by *vyavasthitau kāraṇa* (‘cause of distinction’). The compound *asambhinnēdam-pratyayāham-pratyaya-viṣayatva* (‘the fact of being the discriminated object of the notions of “this” and “I”’) occurs already in Rju₂, p. 231.17–18.

⁴⁰ MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 125–27.

⁴¹ ŚBh₁, p. 56.1 ff. = MS, I: p. 79.3 ff.: *anyedyur dṛṣṭe ’paredyur “aham idam adarśam” iti bhavati pratyayaḥ. «pratyag-ātmani cātad bhavati, na paratra» ... tasmād tad-vyatirikto ’nyo ’sti yatrāyam aham śabdah*. The words *pratyag-° ... paratra* are the approximate quotation of VS (*vide infra* n. 42). It is quoted in Bṛ₂, p. 231.4–5 = MK, p. 904a.7 ff. and Rju₂, p. 230.21–22.

⁴² The words in the guillemets « ... » in n. 41 are a quotation *lato sensu* of VS 3.2.14: *aham iti pratyag-ātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvād arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ*.—‘Because the [intuition] “I” exists in one’s own self, and because it does not exist elsewhere, it apprehends something else [than the body]’. English translation: RADHAKRISHNAN–MOORE (1960: 392); French translation and text: BIARDEAU (1968: 116). See also NOZAWA (1991: 35) and PREISENDANZ (1994: 228–29).

⁴³ Tr. ŚBh₃, I: p. 28 (modified).

⁴⁴ Bṛ₂ and Rju₂, p. 231.14 and 18, p. 236.5 ff., 237.8 and 238.13.

⁴⁵ ŚBh₁, p. 56.9–11 = MS, I: p. 80.2–3 (tr. ŚBh₃, I: p. 29). A shorter phrasing of the same statement occurs in Bṛ₂, p. 232.6 = MK, p. 904a.18–19 (and Rju₂, p. 232.13): *na ca—anya upalābdhā hyaḥ, adya cānyaḥ—ity etāvātā nairātmyam*.—‘It is not as far as [we say] “other [was] the perceiver yesterday, other is he today” that there is non-existence of the self’.

B (1) The third example describes recognition as related to desire, i.e. to something rather linked with the future. It, too, occurs in the *Śābhara-bhāṣya*: 'For instance, we find that when on one day a man has left an action half-done, he tries to make up for it on the next day, and from this action it is inferred that the person regards himself as enduring (lasting) in relationship to things that are evanescent [or, on the basis of evanescent activities one comes to cognise the enduring self].'⁴⁶

B (2) In the MŚV, *Ātma-vāda* 135, a somewhat similar example is given: 'In a case where only a half of a certain scripture etc. has been learnt, if one were not to have any idea that 'I have learnt this much', then (when taking up the study of the work after some time), he would have to learn from the beginning again'.⁴⁷

It is clear to anyone that a number of human behaviours require, at least in the view of non-Buddhist thinkers, an underlying entity is in charge of recollection and desire. It is justified to call this entity *ātman*, or 'self/soul'.

13. At this point, Prabhākara makes several remarks with respect to the stock formula of the recognition *aham idam adarśam* ('I have seen it'), remarks which his disciple Śālikanātha does not let go unnoticed.

The former says: 'It is not intended here to dismiss the concept of momentariness. What then? The intention is to ascertain the existence of *ātman* as apart from the intellect, sensory organs and body.'⁴⁸ The latter takes up almost the same words but twice mentions the *aham-pratyaya* ('notion of "I"') to identify this *ātman* which escapes any additional description.⁴⁹

It is with such a view that Śālikanātha and Prabhākara confront the Buddhist opponent who, twice in the *Śābhara-bhāṣya*, challenges them as follows: 'Leaving cognition aside (*apāśya*) ... please point out the cogniser with the words: "Here it is, such it is".'⁵⁰ This sentence is the one of a man who sees no need

⁴⁶ ŚBh₁, p. 58.22–23 = MS, I: p. 83.8–10: *yadāsau puruṣaḥ pūrvedyuh sāmi-kytānām arthānām prati samādhāne śeṣa-anuṣṭhāne ca yatate. ataḥ pravṛttyāvagamyate: "nūnam asāv anityān nityam avagacchati" iti*; tr. ŚBh₃, I: p. 30.

⁴⁷ MŚV₁, *Ātma-vāda* 125–27:

*śāstrādāv ardha-vijñāte yady 'ham jñātavān iti /
nāvagacchet tataḥ sarvaḥ pravartetāditaḥ punaḥ //*

Tr. MŚV₂, p. 406.

⁴⁸ Bṛ₂, p. 231.7–8 = MK, p. 904a.12–13: *na cātra kṣaṇikatva-nirākaraṇam abhipretam. kiṁ tarhi? buddhīndriya-śarīra-vyatiriktaśātmanāḥ sadbhāva-pratipattir abhipretā*. Somewhat further (Bṛ₂, p. 232.7 = MK, p. 904a.20, repeated in Rju₂, p. 232.17), the second phrase is taken up in Sāṅkhya terms: 'apart from the body and its organs' (*kārya-karaṇa-vyatirikta*).

⁴⁹ Rju₂, p. 231.14, 18. Bṛ₂, p. 232.7 = MK, p. 904a.20 has the compound *aham-pratyaya-grāhya* to qualify *ātman*. According to HULIN (1978: 66): 'L' *ātman* [of Mīmāṃsā] est substrat inerte et muet, simple point de référence de la variété des expériences concrètes ... simple capacité abstraite de connaître, de jouir et d'agir ...'

⁵⁰ ŚBh₁, p. 56.21–22; 60.5 (partially) = MS, I: p. 80.13–14, 84.5 commented upon by Bṛ₂, p. 240.5–6, 250.4 = MK, p. 905b.13–14, 906b.25 and Rju₂, p. 240.15–16. Tr. ŚBh₃, I: p. 29.

of a support (*ātman*) for a quality like cognition etc.⁵¹ *Ātman* is therefore useless; it can be replaced by the quality itself: cognition or a cognitive series (*samtāna*). The Buddhist thus asks his opponent Mīmāṃsaka to show the ‘cogniser’, personally convinced that it is impossible to do so.⁵²

The Mīmāṃsaka skilfully answers that it is hardly possible to trace a sheer cogniser devoid of any cognition. With the words of the *Śābara-bhāṣya* Śālikanātha demonstrates this: ‘Thus, if we leave cognition aside, we cannot indicate anything at all’,⁵³ especially no cogniser.

By and large, the second section of Prabhākara’s and Śālikanātha’s explanation of the *Ātma-vāda* (*vide infra* § 22) is devoted to this question and contains statements, such as ‘outside knowledge, no knower is there’, ‘when cognition is not apprehended, there is no apprehension of *ātman*’,⁵⁴ and also ‘without apprehending cognition, no knowable [object] can be apprehended.’⁵⁵

14. In addition to the Buddhists (*vide supra* § 9), other disputants (*apare*), i.e. the followers of the Sāṃkhya school, are brought to the foreground under the name of *brahma-vid*.⁵⁶ Their influence on our two authors is perceptible, if only slightly. Significant is the presence in the *Ṛju-vimala-pañcikā* of two stanzas of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*: 3 and 57.⁵⁷ More expressions, e.g. *kārya-*

⁵¹ BIARDEAU (1968: 111): ‘L’adversaire proteste que tout cela (that is body, cognition etc.—J.-M.V.) ne requiert aucun substrat permanent; son argument essentiel—et qui le restera jusqu’au bout—est qu’on ne peut voir ce substrat en lui-même. On le décrit toujours comme ce qui possède tel ou tel attribut (*guṇa*) mais on ne propose jamais d’écarter le voile de cet attribut pour le montrer lui-même. Pourquoi alors ne pas reconnaître qu’il se réduit à l’attribut?’

⁵² HULIN (2008: 95).

⁵³ Tr. ŚBh₃, p. 30 of ŚBh₁, p. 60.10–11 = MS, I: p. 85.1–2: *tasmān na vijñānam pratyākhyāya kasyacid rupaṃ nidarśayitum śakyam*, cited by Br₂, p. 229.14–15. In ŚBh₁, p. 60.5, Śābara uses *apāśya* as a synonym of *pratyākhyāya*.

⁵⁴ Ṛju₂, p. 228.15 and 17: *vijñānāgrahaṇe saty ātmano grahaṇam nāsti; vijñānāgrahaṇe yadātmano ’grahaṇam...*

⁵⁵ Ṛju₂, p. 229.11: *vijñānam agrhitvā vijñeyam nāva grahitum śakyate*.

⁵⁶ Br₂, p. 220.8, 20 = MK, p. 902b.14 glossed by Śālikanātha, p. 220.21–22, as *eṣā hi sāmkyānām prakriyā*—‘for it is a designation of the Sāṃkhyas’. Cf. Br₂, p. 230.6 = MK, p. 904a.2. In Br₂, p. 230.9, the opponents of the *brahma-vid* are given the name of the *ātma-vid* (most probably the Naiyāyikas rather than the Vedāntins). The term *brahma-vid* still occurs in Br₂, p. 239.8 = MK, p. 905b.8. In Ṛju₂, p. 209.20, the Vaiśeṣikas are called *padārtha-vid*.

⁵⁷ The *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* is a collection dated of fourth–fifth century CE according to PELISSERO (2007: 327). SK 3 (p. 221.14–15) reads as follows: ‘Primal Nature (*prakṛti*) is not an evolute; the seven, beginning with the Great one (*mahat*, i.e. the intellect) are both evolutes and evolutes; the sixteen (i.e. the five organs of sense, the five of action, the mind, and the five gross elements) are only evolutes; the spirit is neither evolvent nor evolute.’ SK 57 (p. 222.16–17): ‘As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the spirit’ [tr. RADHAKRISHNAN–MOORE(1960: 427 and 443)].

karana ('the body and its organs'),⁵⁸ *pariṇati* ('transformation', a synonym of *pariṇāma*)⁵⁹, *kaivalya* ('absolute independence')⁶⁰ and so on are likely to stem from Sāṃkhya sources. But one of the most interesting terms is undoubtedly *bhokṭṛ* ('experiencing person', 'enjoyer'), i.e. subject of perceptive and retributive experiences.

15. The *ātman* as *bhokṭṛ* ('enjoyer').

The term *bhokṭṛ* is predominantly met with from p. 232 onwards in the Madras edition of the *Bṛhatī* (Bṛ₂).⁶¹

The notion of the 'enjoyer' has priority over that of the 'doer' in the demonstration of the *ātman* by Prabhākara and Śālikanātha. In other words, their argumentation, undertaken along the Mīmāṃsā lines, stresses the importance of the self as ritual agent, but still more as ritual beneficiary (*bhokṭṛ*) of the sacrifice. Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are looking for an evidence to substantiate their views, namely that a sacrificer performs his long and weary ritual task in the hope of earning a benefit from it at the end, namely to become the *bhokṭṛ* of heaven (*svarga*). Now, this is impossible if he is nothing but a body which will burn on a pyre and if, accordingly, someone else might go to heaven because the acting person is not the enjoying one.

The well-known stanza⁶²—*Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 17—provides support to their position. The crucial passage therein is *puruṣo 'sti bhokṭṛ-bhāvāt*—'...because there must be someone to experience, the spirit must be there...'.⁶³ This conception of the soul/self (*ātman*), here called 'spirit' (*puruṣa*), as the 'experiencing person' is accepted by the Brahminical systems: *ātman* enjoys either objects of one's senses and pleasure or the good and bad results of retributive action. The Buddhists, on the contrary, dismiss the notion of *bhokṭṛ* (*bhokṭṛ-grāha*) along with that of 'soul/self' (*ātman*) and speak instead of *āyatana* (the 'base [of cognition]').⁶⁴

16. In the system of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, the 'condition of *bhokṭṛ*' (*bhokṭṛtva*) is primarily required to support the thesis of the existence of the *ātman* and to protect the necessary identity of the doer of the sacrifice and the enjoyer thereof, jeopardised by the tenet of universal momentariness.

⁵⁸ Bṛ₂, p. 238.8 = MK, p. 905a.32: *idaṃ-pratyaya-grāhyaṃ kārya-karaṇam*. The *dvandva*-compound *kārya-karāna* ('body and sense organs') is glossed in Bṛ₂, p. 238.23 as follows: 'body' = *jñeya* ('the knowable') and 'sense organs' = *jñāna* ('cognitive instruments').

⁵⁹ Bṛ₂, p. 234.6 = MK, p. 904b.16.

⁶⁰ Rju₂, p. 239.26.

⁶¹ It seems to be unknown to ŚBh. No reference to it is found in the MK.

⁶² Also alluded to in MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 114.

⁶³ SK 17:

*saṃghāta-parārthatvāt tri-guṇādi-viparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt /
puruṣo 'sti bhokṭṛ-bhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛtteḥ //*

Tr. RADHAKRISHNAN-MOORE (1960: 431).

⁶⁴ See e.g. Sthiramati's *Pañca-skandhaka-vibhāṣā* cited in KRAMER (2008: 154, n.17).

Prabhākara makes the following statement: 'Even if the existence [of the *ātman*] is established, its nature as *ātman* is totally (*eva*) lost in case of momentariness.'⁶⁵ And Śālikanātha explains: 'The nature of *ātman* is the nature as an experiencing subject, and precisely that nature as an experiencing subject in case of a momentary [entity] is forsaken.'⁶⁶

Prabhākara previously stated⁶⁷ that the recognitive event (of the identity between performer and enjoyer of the sacrifice) was not designed to put momentariness aside but to assert the existence of a self/soul (*ātman*) as distinct from the mind, sensory organs and body. A similar statement is found in the *Śloka-vārttika*: 'Thus then, we would have a rejection of the theory of the non-existence of the soul, by means of the aforesaid recognition (of the soul) experienced by all persons.'⁶⁸

Thus, when Prabhākara proclaims that the momentariness of the *skandhas*, i.e. the constituent parts of the human being, is caused by the absence of a *bhokṭṛ*, his opponent confronts him by asking whether one is bound to accept this teaching like 'an order of the king', that is unconditionally and blindly. Prabhākara answers that his view is to be accepted not as an order of the king, but as an order of reason.⁶⁹

Such a statement sounds like a reverse of the position of the Buddhist who points out that the *bhokṭṛ* cannot exist because everything is and must be momentary.

17. Both Mīmāṃsakas have grounds of their own to emphasise the importance of the enjoying function of the self and thus look for arguments to support their position in the Sāṃkhya system as well. They might have reckoned in the first place *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 19 and 20. Stanza 19 describes *ātman*, called here *puruṣa*, as 'having the qualities of witness and onlooker but without that of agent' (*sākṣitvam puruṣasya ... draṣṭṛtvam akartṛ-bhāvaś ca*)⁷⁰ and stanza 20 adds 'although [only] the strands (*guṇa*) are agents, the [*puruṣa*] indifferent (*udāsīna*) is, in similar manner, as if an agent (*kartā iva*).'⁷¹

Is it under the influence of the Sāṃkhya that Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are inclined to underrate the *kartṛ* side of the *ātman*.

18. *Bhokṭṛ* and *kartṛ* ('active agent') in the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*.

A further testimony of the priority granted by the Sāṃkhya to the *bhokṭṛ* over the *kartṛ* is that of the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*. This important but

⁶⁵ B₁₂, p. 232.8–9 = MK, p. 904a.22–23: *sādhite 'py astitve kṣaṇikatvād ātmatāva hīyate*.

⁶⁶ R₁₂, p. 232.19–20: *bhokṭṛtā hy ātmatā. sā bhokṭṛtāva kṣaṇikasya hīyate*.

⁶⁷ B₁₂, p. 231.6–8, cited *supra* n. 48.

⁶⁸ MŚV *Ātma-vāda* 136: *tenāsmāt pratyabhijñānāt sarva-lokāvadhāritān nairātmya-vāda-bādhaḥ syāt*; tr. MŚV₂, p. 406.

⁶⁹ B₁₂, p. 233.7 = MK, p. 904a.33–34: *bhoktur abhāve kṣaṇikatā skandhānām iti kim iyaṃ rājājñā? nēyaṃ rājājñā. nayājñā hy eṣā*.

⁷⁰ SK 19: *sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya... draṣṭṛtvam akartṛ-bhāvaś ca*.

⁷¹ SK 20: *guṇa-kartṛtve ca tathā kartēva bhavaty udāsīnaḥ*. Tr. BRONKHORST (2000: 12–13).

late Sāṃkhya treatise written by Vijñānabhikṣu (1550–1600) on the hardly more ancient *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* is of course not a source for Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, who lived more than seven centuries earlier. However it seems to be close to the positions of both Mīmāṃsakas in a number of cases.

In the very beginning of his work, Vijñānabhikṣu already points out the difference between Sāṃkhya and Nyāya the adepts of which—here named ‘logicians’ (*tārkika*)—champion the *ātman* as a *kartṛ*.⁷²

Kapila’s *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* 1.143 contains a wording of SK 17.⁷³ Later on, Vijñānabhikṣu, commenting on SS 1.143, states that *bhokṛtva* (= *bhokṛt-bhāva*) cannot belong to the (human) body, but to the *puruṣa*, and that *bhoga* is made up of thought (*cit*, cf. also SS 1.104). According to the Sāṃkhya doctor, the *puruṣa*, synonym of the *ātman* of Mīmāṃsā, primarily possesses *bhokṛtva*. Being motionless and actionless by nature, the *puruṣa* will be *bhokṛt* (‘the subject of experience (e.g. of pleasure etc.) and retribution’)⁷⁴ and *draṣṭṛ* (‘the onlooker’)⁷⁵ rather than *kartṛ* (‘active agent’). The *bhokṛt* is operating by (immaterial) contact with the entities on which it exerts its control (*adhiṣṭhāna*), like a suzerain who is the beneficiary of the activities performed by those who abide by his orders.⁷⁶ For instance, the *bhokṛt* manages to keep the body from putrefying with the help of the breath but the merit thereof accrues, not to the latter, but to the enjoyer himself.⁷⁷

In fact, *bhoga* (‘enjoyment’) accrues to *bhokṛt* (‘the enjoyer’), provided the enjoyer possesses a material abode, which is the body, or *bhogāyatana* (‘place of enjoyment’).⁷⁸ But to locate enjoyment within the mere body would be a misconception like the converse fallacy which refers the pronoun ‘I’ in the statement ‘I am bright (of skin)’ to the *ātman* instead of to the body.⁷⁹ In both

⁷² Cf. GARBE (1943: 2.5 = introduction to SS 1.1), where the *Tārkika* is qualified as *kartṛtvābhimānin* ‘who overrates the function of agent’; (1943: 65.6–7 *ad* SS 1.146), where the *Tārkika*’s take the *kartṛ* function of the *ātman* for granted.

⁷³ This *sūtra* contains just the word *bhokṛt-bhāvāt* (cf. GARBE (1943 : 63)), which is no doubt borrowed from SK 17 cited *supra* § 15. Cf. RAJU (1994: 143).

⁷⁴ SPPrBh *ad* SS 1.75 and 106 = GARBE (1943: 39.12–13 and 51.35–37). *Puruṣa* has a synonym in the word *pumān* (see n. 75): ‘male [principle]’, i.e. ‘spirit’ as opposed to ‘nature’.

⁷⁵ SS 1.139: *śarīrādi-vyatiriktaḥ pumān*; SPPrBh *ad loc.*: *tato* (= *śarīra*) *tiriktaḥ pumān bhokṛtēty arthaḥ. bhokṛtvaṃ ca draṣṭṛtvaṃ iti* = GARBE (1943: 62.30–32).

⁷⁶ SPPrBh *ad* SS 1.142 = GARBE (1943: 63.20–22). On the comparison of the *bhokṛt* (‘suzerain’) and the *prāṇa* (‘servants’) cf. e.g. SS 5.115: *bhṛtya-dvārā svāmy-adhiṣṭhitih...* = GARBE (1943: 142.35).

⁷⁷ SPPrBh *ad* SS 5.114 and 6.60: *prāṇa-vyāpāra-abhāve śukra-śoṇitayoḥ pūti-bhāva-prasaṅgāt* and *bhokṛt-anadhiṣṭhitasya śukrādeḥ pūti-bhāva-prasaṅgāt* = GARBE (1943: 142.29 and 160.27).

⁷⁸ SS 5.114: *bhokṛt adhiṣṭhānāt bhogāyatana-nirmāṇam, anyathā pūti-bhāva-prasaṅgāt* = GARBE (1943: 142.28–29).

⁷⁹ SPPrBh *ad* SS 5.64 *loke hi śarīra-śarīriṇor bhogya-bhokṛtoś cāvivekena-abhedo vyavahriyate “ahaṃ gauro”, “mamātmā bhadrasena” ity-ādiḥ*—‘For in the world no dis-

cases we come across a wrong view of reality. Thus the *bhogâyatana* is the place of the *bhoga* the owner of which is actually the self.

19. *Ātman* and *aham-kāra* ('the "I"-consciousness') according to the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*.

A survey of early Sāṃkhya documents shows that *ātman* gives birth to *aham-kāra* and that the one and unique act carried out by this unchangeable entity is to be aware of itself as *aham*. However, this 'utterance of "I"' (*aham-kāra*) has wide-ranging consequences.⁸⁰ Replacing its own source, *aham-kāra* becomes henceforth an agent,⁸¹ not only in the individual range but even in the case of the creation and dissolution of the world.⁸²

In principle, the agent benefits from the fruit of his own act,⁸³ but that does not hold true for the *ātman/puruṣa* that enjoys it without being its active cause, its agent.⁸⁴ And when agency is assigned to the *puruṣa*, it is due to a wrong transfer from the *buddhi*.⁸⁵ The genuine agent is *aham-kāra*⁸⁶ which is said to be independent from anything else, to be deprived of a creator, and to be 'caused by [the power of] time alone'.⁸⁷

20. The position of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha concerning *ātman* as *bhoktṛ*.

As far as Mīmāṃsā is the philosophy of the ritual action, it cannot but deny a conception of the self as an omnipresent and everlasting entity which would be, accordingly, unable to act because it is unable to move and to change.

In several places in the *Bṛhatī* and the *Ṛju-vimala-pañcikā*, one or more opponents put forward suspicions and criticisms against the Mīmāṃsā approach

inction is expressed between the body and its owner since no separation [is done] between what is enjoyed and the enjoyer as in the statements: "I am of bright skin"; "I am (*stricto sensu* my self is) Bhadrāsena". = GARBE (1943: 130. 33-35); cf. § 11.

⁸⁰ Cf. VAN BUTTENEN (1957: 17) (*°-kāra*, like in *om-kāra* etc., means 'cry, uttering, ejaculation'), and BIARDEAU (1965: 65), (1966: 115).

⁸¹ SS 6.54: *aham-kāraḥ kartā, na puruṣaḥ*. = GARBE (1943: 159.23).

⁸² SPṚBh ad SS 6.64: *idānīm mahad-aham-kārayor eva tad-itarāṃ jagad kāryam and aham-kāra-rūpo yaḥ kartā, tad-adhināiva kārya-siddhiḥ sṛṣṭi-samhāra-niṣpattir bhavati*. = GARBE (1943: 162.3 and 8). But according to SPṚBh ad SS 2.1: *pradhānasya jagat-kartṛtvam*. = GARBE (1943: 74.29), the role of agent of creation is ascribed to the *pradhāna* or 'primordial matter'; see VAN BUTTENEN (1957: 19): 'the self-formulated being is the cosmos'.

⁸³ SPṚBh ad SS 1.105: *nanu kartur eva loke kriyā-phala-bhogo dṛṣṭaḥ*. = GARBE (1943: 51.22).

⁸⁴ SPṚBh ad SS 1.105: *buddhi-karma-phalasyāpi vṛtter upabhogas tad-akartur api puruṣasya yuktaḥ*. = GARBE (1943: 51.27 ff.).

⁸⁵ SPṚBh ad SS 1.164: *puruṣasya yat kartṛtvam, tad buddhy-uparāgāt; buddheś ca yā cittā, sā puruṣa-sāmnidhyāt* ('The agent quality of the *puruṣa* [arises] from the tinge of the *buddhi* and the thought [pertaining] to the *buddhi* [arises] from the proximity of the *puruṣa*'). = GARBE (1943: 74.2-3). *Buddhi* or *mahad* ('understanding') derives its active power out of its source, the *pradhāna*, cf. BALLANTYNE (1865: 63).

⁸⁶ SS 6.54 *aham-kāraḥ kartā, na puruṣaḥ*. = GARBE (1943: 159.23).

⁸⁷ SPṚBh ad SS 6.65 = GARBE (1943: 162.18, 21-22 *kāla-mātra-nimitta*).

to the *ātman* as *kartṛ* by pointing out that the self is by nature inert (*niṣkriya*).⁸⁸ Furthermore, the *ātman* cannot be an agent on account of its immobility that results itself from its omnipresence (*sarva-gatatva*). In its turn, *sarva-gatatva* results from the universal experience of *sukha* ('well-being, pleasure').⁸⁹

21. The aforesaid views seem to be those of opponents, but Prabhākara cannot endorse them on account of his allegiance to the main and obvious tenet of the Mīmāṃsā, that is that the mandatory operations of the Vedic ritual must be performed by a self provided with an amount of activity.

When Prabhākara returns to the first description by Śābarasvāmin of the recognition event,⁹⁰ he argues that it contributes to the demonstration of the 'enjoying nature' of the *ātman*. If indeed somebody else, he adds, were the *bhokṛ* of the sacrifice instead *ātman/aham*, i.e. the person who has performed it, that would mean the ruin of *bhokṛtva*,⁹¹ since the fruit would not accrue to its expected beneficiary: the doer.

That the term *ātman* is a synonym of *bhokṛ* is ultimately repeated by Prabhākara⁹² as follows: 'We answer on this point: "It is said that the nature of *ātman* (*ātmatā*) is [synonymous to] enjoying (*bhokṛtayā*)"', and Śālikanātha glosses this last word by *anubhavitatayā iti yāvāt* ('in other words, [it is the synonym of] experiencing').⁹³

For his part, Śālikanātha seeks to affirm his stance in face of the Sāṃkhya, and, in an eager argument, he reaffirms up to five times, that *ātman* is nothing else than the condition of acting and experiencing together. These are the relevant sentences:

⁸⁸ Bṛ₂, p. 221.7–8 = MK, p. 902b.21–22: *tasmāt siddha ātmā kartṛ-bhūtaḥ. nanu asau niṣkriya ity uktam* (MK: *abhyupagatam*)—'Therefore, the self is proved to be an agent. [Objection:] It is stated that it is inert/inactive'.

⁸⁹ Bṛ₂, p. 235.10–12 = MK, p. 904b.27–29: *yuktam bhokṛtayā-ēvātmā iti. kartṛtvōpanyāsa tu virudhyate, niṣkriyatvād ātmanaḥ.sarvagatatvāc ca. niṣkriyatvaṃ pratipannaṃ ca sarva-gatatvam, sarvatra sukhōpalambhāt*—'To say that the self is sheer enjoyment is correct. The mention of its agency is contradictory because of its inactivity and its omnipresence. The inactivity and omnipresence [of *ātman*] occur because the experience of pleasure [exists] everywhere ('). Bṛ₂, p. 238.6 = MK, p. 905a.28–29., *ātman* is again qualified as 'immovable by nature' (*acalanātmakatva*).

⁹⁰ *Vide supra* § 12.

⁹¹ *Vide supra* § 16; Bṛ₂, p. 237.3–4 = MK, p. 905a.13–15 (glossed *Rju*, p. 237.18–19): *yadi paro 'py ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣayatām āpadyeta, tadā bhokṛtva-hānam* [in MK °-*hānam* is replaced by °-*jñānam*] *prāpnoti. bhokṛtā cātmēty uktam*: 'If somebody else became the object of the notion of 'I', the notion of *bhokṛ* would go to ruin and it has been said that the self [has] the quality of *bhokṛ*'.

⁹² Bṛ₂, p. 248.10–249.14 (it is a passage which does not appear in the Bṛ₁ and consequently not in MK, II: p. 906b either): *atra brumaḥ: uktam eva bhokṛtayā hy ātmatā iti*.

⁹³ *Rju*₂, p. 249.20–21.

1. 'Since agency and enjoyment are, by reasoning, co-ordinated within the self ...';
- 2–3. 'The self is nothing else than agency and enjoyment';
4. 'The meaning of the word "self" is based on agency and enjoyment';
5. 'Since the self is known as agency and enjoyment by nature ...'.⁹⁴

22. In the second part of the commentary,⁹⁵ the topic is different. Prabhākara and Śālikanātha no longer look for a definition of the self; they encounter the Buddhist challenge, as stated in the *Bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmin: 'If there is something apart from cognition, viz. a cogniser, [then] leaving aside the cognition, please point out the cogniser.'⁹⁶ Here the echoes of the Sāṃkhya thought are weaker and, therefore, we limit ourselves to a cursory survey of the most significant doctrinal features exposed from here on up to the end the *Ātma-vāda*.

The first development is based on BĀU₁ 4.3.6 which reads as follows: 'When the [Vedic] speech is silent, what light does the person possess?'⁹⁷ In answer, Śabarasvāmin points out that, in this case, the auto-luminosity (*svayam-jyotiṣṭva*) of the *ātman* takes the place of the *Veda*.⁹⁸

Thereupon another question arises: when the Śruti avers that *ātman* is non-perceptible (*agrhya*) (BĀU₁ 3.9.26), does that mean that it is such for anyone including the owner of the self or is it such only for the other persons (*para*)?⁹⁹ In other words, is the *ātman*'s invisibility complete and necessary or is it contingent (*āpekṣika*), viz. just limited to somebody else?¹⁰⁰

The fact that the self might escape the notice of somebody else does not prevent it from being grasped by its owner. But when it is indispensable to say something about it, one should have recourse to an apophatic method by defining it as 'not that, not that' like in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyakôpaniṣad*.¹⁰¹

Then our Mīmāṃsakas examine *ceṣṭā-anumāna*,¹⁰² which enables one to discover, not the *ātman*, but only the inner states, such as *sukha*, traced by

⁹⁴ Rju₂, p. 236.18: *yasmād ātmanaḥ kartṛtvam bhokṛtvam ca yuktyā saṅgachante*; Rju₂, p. 236.19–20: *kartṛtva-bhokṛtve evātmā*; Rju₂, p. 236.19: *kartṛtva-bhokṛtva-nibandhanā ātma-śabda-vācyatā*; Rju₂, p. 236.20–21: *yasmāt kartṛtva-bhokṛtva-svarupa ātmā siddhaḥ*.

⁹⁵ Bṛ₂/Rju₂, p. 240–256 = MK, p. 905b.13–p.907b.20.

⁹⁶ ŚBh₁, p. 56.21–22 = MS, I: p. 80.13–14: *yadi vijñānād anyad asti vijñātṛ, vijñānam apāsyā tan nidarśyatām* (tr. ŚBh₃, I: p. 29 slightly modified). *Vide supra* n.37 and § 13, n. 50.

⁹⁷ *śāntāyām vāci kim-jyotir evāyam puruṣaḥ?*, quoted in ŚBh₁, p. 58.8 = MS, I: p. 82.7.

⁹⁸ ŚBh₁, p. 58.11 = MS, I: p. 82.9 mentioned by Bṛ₂, p. 245.11 = MK, p. 906a.25, where Śabara quotes BĀU₁ 4.3.9 as well: *atrāyam puruṣaḥ svayam jyotir bhavati*.—'Then is this "person" light by his own light?' Tr. ZAEHNER (1972: 66).

⁹⁹ ŚBh₁, p. 58.9–10 = MS, I: p. 82.7–8 commented upon by Bṛ₂, p. 245.12–246.6 ff. = MK, p. 906a.26 ff.

¹⁰⁰ Bṛ₂, p. 245.8 = MK, p. 906a.21: *asyāgrahaṇa-śrutir āpekṣikī*.—'The mention of the [*ātman*] by BĀU 3.9.26 and 4.3.9] as "non-perceptible" is contingent/occasional'.

¹⁰¹ BĀU₁ 3.9.26: *sa eṣa nēti nēti ātmēti*, is quoted in ŚBh₁, p. 58.14 = MS, I: p. 83.1 and is commented upon by Bṛ₂, p. 246.9 ff. = MK, p. 906a.31 ff.

¹⁰² Cf. *supra* § 6.

physical motions. Afterwards they question what help the *upamā/upamāna*,¹⁰³ or 'comparison-identification', may supply to discover *ātman*, and address a final theme:¹⁰⁴ the refutation of the Buddhist who is urging that there is nothing to grasp apart from cognition, neither an *ātman* that would be its support nor an entity *extra animam* that would be its object.¹⁰⁵

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha answer that cognition contains an objective datum and not only a subjective one.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, *ātman* is part of all cognitions¹⁰⁷ and supplies each one (including an *anumāna*) with a quality of perceptive evidence (*sākṣāt-kāra*).¹⁰⁸

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha conclude with three exegetical remarks. The baffling statement of Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhad-āranyakōpaniṣad*: 'After death, there is no consciousness',¹⁰⁹ must be read in its context, namely at the light of the subsequent teaching of the seer: 'The Self is wholly indestructible; of its very nature (*dharma*) it cannot be annihilated'.¹¹⁰ Yet with the modern reader, uncertainty remains. Does the first assertion mean that consciousness leaves the dead body? However, that would sound like a trivial assertion.

¹⁰³ ŚBh₁, p. 58.25–60.1 = MS I: p. 83.10–11, p. 84.1: *upamānāc cōpadiśyate "yādṛśam bhavān svayam ātmānam paśyati, anenōpamānenāvagacha «aham api tādṛśam eva paśyāmi»" iti*. Tr. ŚBh₃, p. 30: 'By *upamāna* (*ātman*-self) is pointed out in the words: 'Just as you perceive your own self, so, on the same *upamāna*, [please] understand that I also perceive the self in the same manner', commented upon in Bṛ₂, p. 249, 14 ff. = MK, p. 906b.22 ff.: *upamānāpi atra kathanōpeyatayā eva upanyastā*.—'Upamā for its part is here mentioned in the function of means of naming'. Rju₂, p. 249.23–250.9 seems to criticise Śābara when he (i.e. Śālikanātha) says: *bhāṣye kathanōpāyatvenōpamābhimatā*.—'In the Bhāṣya, the *upamā* is wrongly considered as a means of naming'.

¹⁰⁴ Bṛ₂, p. 251.10 ff. = MK, p. 907a.2 ff.

¹⁰⁵ Bṛ₂, p. 251.9–10 = MK, p. 907a.3–4: *viññāna-viviktasya tu grahaṇam na prāpnoti vyāpṛtāvagamāt*...—'the grasping [of what is] apart from cognition is not in force because the comprehension is operated [by cognition alone]'; Rju₂, p. 252.13–14: *tataś cārtha-sūnyatā jñānānam prāpnoti*.—'Therefore, the absence of an object is in force for the cognitions'.

¹⁰⁶ Rju₂, p. 252.17–18: *grāhyākāram viññānam, na grāhakākāram ity uktam sūnya-vādanirākaraṇe*.—'In the refutation of the doctrine of voidness, it is said that cognition is an aspect of the knowable [and] not an aspect of the knower'. The Sūnyavādin thinks the other way around: the knowledge rests upon the *grāhaka* ('knowing subject') and not on an external—*grāhya* or *bāhyārtha* (Rju₂, p. 252.14)—object, or an 'outside object'.

¹⁰⁷ Bṛ₂, p. 253.10–11 = MK, p. 907a.30–31: *tasmād sarva-viññāna-jñeyatātmanah sthitā bhavati*.—'Therefore, the knowable nature of all cognitions is lying in the self'.

¹⁰⁸ Rju₂, p. 253.22–23: *sākṣāt-kāreṇa pratibhāsamānatvād ātmano 'numānādiṣv api pratyakṣatāva*.—'Since the self is manifesting itself with evidence, there is actually (*eva*?) perception inside inference and so on'.

¹⁰⁹ BĀU₁ 4.5.13: *na pretya samjñāsti*. Tr. ZAEHNER (1972: 75).

¹¹⁰ BĀU 4.5.14: *avināśi vā are 'yam ātmā anucchitti-dharmā*. Tr. ZAEHNER (1972: 75).

The Vedic passage which triggered the debate (*vide supra* § 2) is classified as an explanatory passage (*artha-vāda*) and not as a mandatory one (*vidhi*),¹¹¹ so that it can be interpreted in a metaphoric way.

Finally Prabhākara rounds off his explanation of the *Ātma-vāda* by quoting the *Bhagavad-gītā*: 'Let not "the wise man" split the mind (*buddhi*) of witless men attached to work',¹¹² suggesting to the reader that he knows, more than anyone, the limits of his hermeneutical labour.

23. General conclusion.

The explanations by Prabhākara and Śālikanātha of the *Ātma-vāda* section of *Śābara-bhāṣya* 1.1.5 show up as a lengthy and rambling text in which the main issue—the existence of a self/soul—is entangled in a variety of side problems and stock discussions (e.g. the relative value of perception and inference). Nonetheless, the portions analysed above allow us to pick out two basic problems: (1) Which human components are inferential marks purported to reveal the presence of the self; (2) Why it is important to regard the self as a *bhokṭṛ*, an 'enjoyer' of the sacrificial outcome and not only as a *kartṛ*, a 'performer' of rites.

(1) Which human components are inferential marks of the self (§§ 4–5)? These are:

—neither breath (*prāṇa*). Admittedly *prāṇa* is something apart from the body since it does not last as long as the body (*ayāvad-bhūta-bhāvitva*, 'non-coevality'; § 4) and is already gone whereas the body is still intact in front of our eyes. But that does not mean that *prāṇa* is a clue to trace the existence of the *ātman*, because the jump from the perceptible breath to the invisible *anya*, 'the [wholly] other', i.e. the self, is logically not sound.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Cf. *supra* § 3 and n. 5. The fact that we face an *artha-vāda* and not a *vidhi* allows for a metaphoric explanation *Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra* 31.2.21 (already cited in n. 3): *sa eṣa yajñāyuddhī yajamānah...*—'This sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial utensils...' actually means 'this sacrificer whose body [is equipped]...' (*yasyāitac charīram...*), see Br₂ and Rju₂, p. 207.11–12 and 22–24.

¹¹² BhG 3.26a: *na buddhi-bhedam janayed ajñānām karma-saṅginām*. Tr. ZAEHNER (1972: 264).

¹¹³ The Vaiśeṣika inference (*anumāna*) is mentioned in VS 3.2.4 and is made up of a list of 12 'inferential marks' (*liṅga*) of the existence of an *ātman*. These *liṅgas* are inbreathing (*prāṇa*) and outbreathing (*apāna*), motions of the shutting (*nimeṣa*) and opening (*unmeṣa*) of eyes, life (*jīvana*), movement of the mind (*mano-gati*), alterations of the other senses (*indriyāntara-vikāra*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and volition (*prayatna*). Such a mechanistic conception is dismissed by Rju₂, p. 219.19 as follows: *prāṇādibhir anātmāny ātma-buddhir bhavati*.—'By [using the words] *prāṇa* and so on, the notion of self is [transferred towards] what is not the self'. Cf. somewhat further p. 220.17–18: *evam tāvat abhyupagamyāpi prāṇādi-sukhādīnām abhūta-dharmatvaṃ nātma-sādhakatvam ity upasamhṛtam*.—'So even if breathing etc. and pleasure etc. are obviously of immaterial nature, they are not means to demonstrate the [existence of] *ātman*. Such is the conclusion'. The issue is dealt with by Rju₂, pp. 210–211 = MK, p. 901a and b, with a quotation of VS 3.1.4–5–6. In a different context, the 'otherness' (*anyatā*) is defined

—nor inner states/feelings (*sukhâdi*, 'pleasure etc.'). Albeit looking immaterial, *sukhâdi* must not be regarded as leading towards the self, for fear of making the latter as transitory as themselves. To claim the contrary is nothing else than to call that which is material (*anātman*) 'ātman' (cf. n. 20).

The situation is different for desire (*icchā*) and recollection (*smṛti*) because they are factors of recognition. According to Mīmāṃsā, *pratyabhijñā* is a decisive proof of the presence of *ātman*, for, without the self, there would be no connection between the past and the present (recollection) or between the present and the future (desire). And that would mean the victory of the Buddhist theory of momentariness. For the Buddhist indeed—at least such as he is depicted by his opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka—no one would remember today the experience of yesterday; nobody would wish to take up a task at the point he had let it the day before. So nobody performing a sacrifice could hope to benefit from its result, in the future or even after his death.

In order to ward off these disastrous consequences, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha put forward that the human self is together the doer (*kartṛ*) of the sacrifice and the enjoyer (*bhokṛ*) of it.

(2) The self as *bhokṛ*.

How can one demonstrate that the man, especially one who seeks heaven and sacrifices in order to get there, will manage to enjoy it? Prabhākara and Śālikanātha sought elements of the answer in the Sāṃkhya doctrine the adherents of which they call *brahma-vid* (§ 14). In the well-known collection of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, it is said that the *puruṣa*—the Sāṃkhya equivalent of the *ātman* of Mīmāṃsā—exists to benefit the acts performed on the material factors, providing them with meaning and goal. Such an approach might have prompted the interest of both Prabhākara and Śālikanātha and induced them to apply the idea in the domain of the sacrifice.

A late treatise of Sāṃkhya, the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, in which Vijñānabhikṣu comments upon the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, points out that the self as *kartṛ* is championed by the 'logicians' (*tārṅika*). True to the teachings of the Sāṃkhya, Vijñānabhikṣu prefers to ascribe the function of *kartṛ* to the *aham-kāra* or 'I'-consciousness¹¹⁴ and to reserve the role of *bhokṛ* to the *puruṣa-ātman* (§ 19).

Whereas Prabhākara seems prone to rally the Sāṃkhya tradition on this point, but without crossing the line, his disciple Śālikanātha makes a choice, in keeping with his usual behaviour (e.g. in the *Prakarāṇa-pañcikā*): he reconciles both contrasting points of view and vindicates that *ātman* is *kartṛ* and *bhokṛ* together (§ 21).

as 'complete disconnection' (*atyantāsambandhatā*) by Ṛju₂, p. 219.18. Thus we could say that it is impossible to cross from the visible towards what is 'other': the invisible.

¹¹⁴ The *aham-kāra* and its function within cognition are repeatedly mentioned in the Bṛ and Ṛju, but have not been explored in depth in this contribution.

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