Some Aspects of Ātman
According to Prabhākara and Śālikanātha

JEAN-MARIE VERPOORTEN

1. Historical and philological context.

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are both thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, one of the six ‘views’ (darśana) well-known in Indian philosophy. In his Bṛhatī (Bṛ), Prabhākara (seventh century CE) has developed an original approach of the problems dealt with by his school. Śālikanātha, his disciple and commentator (750–820 CE), has, in turn, explained the Bṛhatī in his Rju-vimala-paṇcikā (Rju).

Both Prabhākara and Śālikanātha have composed lengthy explanations of the commentary (Bhāṣya) on the fifth of the 2,745 sūtras of Jaimini, written by their predecessors: Śabaravāmin (Ś Bh) and a mysterious Vṛtti-kāra (‘Glossator’), whom Ś Bh widely quotes.

The detailed explanation of the fifth sūtra of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā-sūtra (MS) by Ś Bh and the ‘Glossator’ is divided into 10 sections. The last one, called Ātma-vāda (MŚV 5.17), is devoted to the ātman or ‘soul/self’, and is followed by chapters setting forth grammatical and exegetical questions like the validity of the Veda etc.

The Sanskrit text of the Bṛhatī and Rju-vimala-paṇcikā on the Ātma-vāda has been edited by S.K. Ramanatha Śastri (Bṛ₂ / Rju₂), accompanied by the Ātma-vāda of Ś Bh. There is also another edition of the Bṛhatī and Rju-vimala-paṇcikā by A. Chinnavaswami Sastri (Bṛ₁ / Rju₁), partially reproduced by Kevalānanda Sarasvatī in his Mīmāṃsā-kośa (MK, II: pp. 900–907). As far as the Bhāṣya of Śabara (Ś Bh) is concerned, the text can be read elsewhere also, either in the aforesaid Mīmāṃsā-kośa (MK, II: pp. 897–899 with the first lines in III: p. 1710a.27–30) or in the Mīmāṃsā-darśana (MS) published by Kāśinātha Vāsudevaśāstri Abhyankara and Gaṇeśaśāstri Arbādāsa Josi (MS, I: pp. 72–86).

In the English translation of Gangānātha Jhā (Ś Bh₃), the passage studied below is found in Vol. I, pp. 26–31, 52–60, and the German translation is published (with the critical edition of the text) by E. Frauwallner (Ś Bh₄). The references to page and lines are to the Madras edition (Bṛ₂), which has been used for Bṛhatī and Rju-vimala-paṇcikā.¹ For the Bṛhatī, the references to Mīmāṃsā-

¹ I want to express my gratitude to Professor K. Yoshimizu, Sendai University, Japan, who kindly supplied me with photocopies of the text.
kośa have been added (page, column a or b and lines). The beginning of the Śābara-bhāṣya edited and translated by Frauwallner is cited as ŚBh₁, page and lines with mention of MS, volume, page and lines.

The following pages examine only the first part of the lengthy commentary² of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, in which they seek to show that ātman is different from other components of the human being, such as breath, pleasure etc. Therein they define the self as kārtr̥-bhokt̥, possibly under the influence of the Śāṅkhyā doctrine.

2. The question of the existence of ātman: the starting point of the debate.

There is a Vedic sentence which triggers the discussions of the Ātma-vāda, namely Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra 31 2 21: ‘The [deceased] institutor of the sacrifice instantly proceeds to the heavenly world, furnished with [his] sacrificial utensils.’³ According to ŚBh, this phrase is a crux in that it contradicts what the eyes can see: actually, the late sacrificer does not proceed to heaven since his corpse surrounded by sacred objects is burning on the pyre. Now, if we do not want to acknowledge that the Veda is lying to us, we must presume that something else is going to heaven and discover what it is, which clues are available to trace this invisible ‘[wholly] other’⁴ and which inferential marks should be used in the inference (anumāna) establishing its existence.

3. In the subsequent discussion, the Vedic sentence is no longer the focus; nevertheless, it is not totally forgotten. For instance, it occurs as a reminder by the end of the first part of the Prabhākara’s commentary where it is qualified by artha-vāda or ‘explanatory phrase’.⁵

² It expands on pp. 207–256 and contains 276 Sanskrit lines for the Br and approximately 385 lines for the Rju stricto sensu, viz. without the long and numerous quotes of the Br.

³ Translated by SLAJE (2006:145). The text is found in ŚBh₁, p. 50.1–2 (sa eṣa yajñāyuḍhi yajamāṇo 'ṛjasā svargam lokam yāti. In section 5 (Citra-vāda) of the ŚBh on 1.1.5, a disputant, already citing this sentence, emphasises the conflict arising thereby between the perception and the statement of the Revelation (ŚBh₁, p. 34.6: dṛṣṭa-viruddham api bhavati kiṃcid vaidikam vacanam = MS, I: p. 49.1–3 where vaidikam is omitted). We find hints at this very sentence in Kumārila, MŚV Ātma-vāda 74:

> yajamāṇatvam apy ātman sakriyātvaṁ prapadyate /
> na parispanda eva ekaḥ kriyā naḥ kṣaṇa-bhojavit// —
> —‘On account of its active character, the soul comes to be the performer of sacrifices: We do not hold “motion” to be the only form of action, as held by the Vaiśeṣikas’ (tr. MŚV₂, p. 395),

and in Śālikanātha, PrP, p. 329.11–12: kartā bhoktā ca yajña-āyuḍhi-vākyenaśiptaḥ samarthayitavya iti upayuktah prayatbhiñā-ūpanyāśāḥ.—‘Since it is necessary to consider that doer and enjoyer are implied in the sentence “equipped with the arms of the sacrifice”, mention can be made of the recognition’.

⁴ ŚBh₁, p. 50.5 = MS, I: p. 72.4: āha: ko “sāv anya”.—‘(An opponent) asks: “Who is this «other»?”.’ Throughout the text, the word anya is a way of talking of the self.

⁵ Br₂, p. 239.10 = MK, p. 905b.11–12: tasmād yathārtho 'yam artha-vādaḥ: “sa eṣa yajñāyuḍhi yajamāṇa iti”. Rju₂ glosses yathārtha (‘correct’) by nāyathārtha (‘not incor-
Some Aspects of átman

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha prefer to devote themselves to an analysis of the human entity in order to discover:

—what this mysterious ‘other’ (anāya) is which is different from body, breath, inner states (sc. feelings, such pleasure etc.) and which might be called átman, or ‘self’,

—whether not only breath and feelings but also desire (icchā) and recollection (smṛti) can serve as inferential marks fit to aver (by anumāna) the existence of átman.

4. The components of the human being which are not conducive to átman.

In Śabara’s work, an opponent states: ‘We perceive it (átman) with the help of breath (prāṇa).’6 Both Prabhākara and Śālikanātha wonder whether prāṇa can lead us to átman or whether it merely remains a material element, a product of the body, without link with the mysterious ‘other one’.

The question remains unsettled because the nature of prāṇa is uncertain.

Prāṇa is not a quality of the body7 and is not tightly associated with it because it is not coeval with it (ayāvad-śarīra-bhūta).8 Whereas the body is still present, ‘intact’, ‘not destroyed’9 (even though it is now a corpse), breath has already vanished. Consequently, ‘the prāṇas cannot be material qualities since they do not last as long as their abode and are not seen in [material objects,] e.g. a jug.’10 Further in the Brhatā, the non-coevality of the prāṇa is put aside by a disputant (unexpectedly a Mīmāṁsaka, Prabhākara himself) who prefers to talk of (a)calanātmatkavā ‘(im)mobility’ (cf. n. 89).

Despite having a degree of independence from the body, breath cannot be the logical mark of the presence of átman. On this point, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are opposed to the Vaiśeṣikas11 who claim that sukha (pleasure) and prāṇa (breath), being bereft of material support, are rightly named ‘properties of átman’.12

---

6 ŚBhI, p. 50.5–6: nanu prāṇādibhir enam upalabhāmahe = MS, I: p. 72.4; where nanu is omitted. Enam = asāv anyo, i.e. ‘that other one’ of n. 4, finally identified with átman.
7 MŚV Átma-vāda 97: tasmān na deha-dharmatvam prāṇāder.
8 Cf. ŚBhI, p. 59.9 = MS, I: p. 73.4 (ayāvad-charīra-bhāvita); BṛI, p. 217.8 and 12 = MK, p. 902a.20, 25 and 27 (ayāvad-bhūta-bhāvita/tā).
9 Drēha, avināṣṭa as said in MŚV Átma-vāda 94, 96.
11 Ṛju2, p. 218.15.
5. In the subsequent passage (Br / Rju, p. 217–218), both authors constantly mix up the accounts on prāṇa and on sukha. Although breath and pleasure are outside the material range, it would be preposterous to look upon them as ātma-guṇa, or the ‘qualities of ātman’. To declare that the non-coevality of breath–body is not established—in other words, to opt for a tight relationship of both of them—would be tantamount to applying the idea of ātman to that which is material (bhūta) and, thus not ātman.\(^{13}\) That would deny the latter’s own existence, confining what is ‘other’ (anīya/ vyatirikta), i.e. what is beyond the visible, to prāṇa alone and ultimately dismissing as false the aforesaid Vedic sentence (§ 2).

6. The inner states/feelings (sukha, ‘pleasure’ etc.) and their inferential mark (cesṭā, ‘the movements of the body’), i.e. the inference of the self on the basis of bodily movements (cesṭā-anumāna).

Of course, these states should not be seen as material features (bhūta-dharma),\(^{14}\) for they are, unlike e.g. colour, imperceptible to anybody else except to their enjoyer.\(^{15}\) Thus, with other people, they are reached by anumāna (inference).

On the other hand, they should not be regarded as qualities (guṇa) of the self, despite the claim of the Vaiśeṣikas,\(^{16}\) because their inferential mark is a ‘material change’: bhūta-vikāra-hetutva, the first two elements of the compound being a synonym of cesṭā.

It would thus be erroneous to infer the presence of ātman from the movements of the body (cesṭā), for these movements only reveal the essence of the states that bring them about. If sukha etc. inferentially led us to ātman through cesṭā, the self would lose its immaterial essence.\(^{17}\)

Earlier in the text of the Rju-vimala-paṇcikā, a proponent stated that ‘the existence of ātman is indeed demonstrated everywhere by the experience of pleasure [which is never without motion]’. But an opponent put that statement aside by pointing out: ‘There is no proof that this [existence/experience] is presently accompanied by a motion.’\(^{18}\)

---


\(^{14}\) Br, p. 211.4 = MK, p. 901b.18: mā bhuvan bhūta-dharmāḥ sukhādayaḥ, glossed by Rju₂, p. 211.14: kiṁ ca sukhādayas ca na bhūta-dharmāḥ śakyante vaktum.

\(^{15}\) Rju₂, p. 211.17: na ca sukhādayaḥ parāṇāriya-grāhyāḥ. tasmād na bhūta-dharmāḥ.

\(^{16}\) Are they Vaiśeṣikas those who think that the sukha etc. are material qualities in Rju₂, p. 219.18.

\(^{17}\) Rju₂, p. 246.23–24: ātmano ’py anātmata prasaỵate. Cf. n. 13 for a similar expression. To use material marks like prāṇa in order to infer the self could turn this latter into a ‘material aggregate’ (bhūta-saṃgha), Rju₂, p. 217.16.

\(^{18}\) Rju₂, p. 236.9 ff. (cited in MK II: p. 904b.30–34): sattā tāvad ātmanāḥ sarvatra sukhādalamabhena siddhā. sēdāniṁ gamana-pūrvikā iti nāsti pramāṇam. The point of these cumbersome passages (Br₂, 235.10–12, 236/4–5 and Rju₂, 235.23–25, 236/9–11) is to show how ātman, by itself ubiquitous (sarva-gata) and therefore inactive and motionless (niṣkriya; cf. also infra §§ 18 and 20), can receive an amount of change from its objects.
Seemingly, the Mīmāṃsakas accept as valid an anumāna which is based on the bodily movements (ceṣṭā)—a frown or a smiling face—and reveals the states of pleasure etc., but they do not go to the extent of saying that that anumāna bears out the presence of ātman.

7. As seen just above, Śabara and his disciples are prepared to dismiss the logical marks such as prāṇa and sukha as incapable of making one infer the self. They prefer to confine this power to the Vedic Revelation alone. Putting one’s trust in prāṇa etc. as a path to ātman leads us astray by inducing us to think that ‘on account of them, the notion of ātman is in force for what is not ātman.’ However the Vaiśeṣika thinkers are guilty of this fallacy and they teach it to their students.

8. Are desire (iccā) and recollection (smṛti) conducive to an invisible ātman?

This question is dealt with from p. 215.14 (Prabhākara) and 216.16 f. (Śālikanātha) onwards.

In this intricate issue, the Buddhist and the three Mīmāṃsakas (Śabaravāmin, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha) agree on just one fact: desire and recollection are existing elements. However the Buddhist wants to confine human nature to the act of ‘knowing’ (jñāṇī) its ideas (buddhi) and their reciprocal causality (paraspara-kāraṇata), and he gives desire and recollection a minimal importance. Therefore he points out that iccā and smṛti bear only on the perceived objects and not on the so far unperceived ones, like the sweet fruits said

(sukha etc.), and how these latter, although or rather because they are not ubiquitous but localised in time and space (prādeśika), are the means of revealing it.

19 Bhū-rahaṅga, Br., p. 247.9 = MK, p. 906b.3; prahṛṣṭa-vadanatva, MŚV Ātma-vāda 99.


21 Rju, p. 216.25–217.14–15: asyārthaḥ: yady ete hetavo na niśkriyatan tadā śisyaṁ eṣva api vaiśeṣikādi-dārsana-śravaṇa-vipralabdha-buddhīnāṁ samicīnaṁ ātma-hetu-abhīmaṇāṁ syāt.—‘The meaning is as follows: if these [logical] grounds were not dismissed, there would be, for the students of these [topics] whose minds are deceived by hearing the Vaiśeṣika doctrines, the misconception that these grounds (sukha, prāṇa) are right [to infer] the Self. Incidentally, Śālikanātha and Prabhākara come to target more personally some philosophical adversaries: Prabhākara (Rju, p. 247.8 = MK, p. 906b.2) calls his opponent anupāsita-guru, ‘a badly educated doctor’, and some scholars believe that this word refers to Kumārila.

22 ŚBh, p. 52.17 (= MS, I: p. 76.6): icchayā ātmanam upalabhāmahe; p. 54.17 (= MS, I: p. 78.6): smṛtir api cchāvat.

23 Cf. also MŚV Ātma-vāda 103.

24 Rju, p. 216.15–16: buddhy-ādibhyo ‘nyasyānapalabdheḥ paraspara-kāraṇataya cōpapattier jñāṇī.—‘Due to the non-perception of another [entity] apart from the ideas and due to the possibility [for these latter to exist] under the form of a reciprocal causality, he knows’.
to grow north of Mount Meru\textsuperscript{25} or, implicitly, a whimsical entity as ātman. With respect to desire and recollection, one should not ask who is their owner, since, like the sun and moon, they are things without ‘possessor’ (tadvān).\textsuperscript{26}

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha argue that, on the contrary, desire and recollection are perceptible and consequently non-implausible;\textsuperscript{27} they cannot be looked upon as negligible data. The Buddhist seems to endorse this approach when he states in an awkward phrase that ‘one could not say that recollection etc. are impossible when/ if the ‘other’, the ‘dissimilar’ (visabhāga), is invisible’.\textsuperscript{28} However he draws from there the following consequence: icchā and smṛti exist without being related to an imperceptible ātman. The self is not their support and thus does not deserve any attention or refutation.\textsuperscript{29}

9. From p. 219–220 onwards, both Mīmāṁsakas proceed to ascertain their own positions against the Buddhists.\textsuperscript{30} Prabhākara tauntingly portrays them as kecit prajñābhimānāḥ, or ‘some people who overrate their intelligence/discrimination’,\textsuperscript{31} who dare, as Śālikanātha explains, to remove the relation of ‘the supported and the support’ (āśrayāśrayitā)\textsuperscript{32} and to impede the inference of an invisible support (ātman) from the visibly supported (sukha etc.).

\textsuperscript{25} ŚBh₁, p. 52.17–19: upalabdhā–pūrve ky abhiprete bhavatācā, nānapalabdhā–pūrve, yathā merum uttareṇa yāny asmaj–jātiyair anupalabdhā–pūrvāni svādāni vrksa–phalāni na tāni praty asaṃkām icchā bhavati.—Desire appears when the desired object is one that has been perceived before [and not one not perceived before]; for instance we have no desire for those sweet fruits that grow to the north of the Meru mountains and which have never before been tested by people like us’. Frawullner points out (ŚBh₁, p. 52, no. 18), among the variae lectiones, the omission of the phrase ‘nānapalabdhāpurve’ in three mss, what is evidenced in MS, I: p. 76.6–7, where the group is absent, and in ŚBh₂, p. 27, where it is not translated by G. Jha.

\textsuperscript{26} ŚBh₁, p. 50.18–19; p. 52.1 = MS, I: p. 74.6–8.

\textsuperscript{27} Bṛ₂, p. 222.8 = MK, p. 903a.5–6: dṛṣṭe ky anupapattir nāsti; Rju₂, p. 223.14: yat tu khalu dṛṣṭam, tatrānapapannaṁ nāsti.

\textsuperscript{28} Bṛ₂, p. 215.14–15 = MK, p. 902a.9–10: na ky dṛṣṭe 'nyasmin visabhāge smṛty-ādayo nāpapadyanta iti śakyate vaktum. Visabhāga, which occurs e.g. in Abhidharma-kośa 3.43 (tr. AK, III: p. 77, 196 ff.), possibly means that ātman is outside the cognitive series and not of the same nature as desire and recollection. Thus the self is not revealed by them and therefore non-cognisable.

\textsuperscript{29} Rju₂, p. 216.21–22: yadi prāṇādyān ātmanam avagāmayītum īṣate, tatas tebhya 'py ātma-pratāpit arṣu; atha na, tadā anadāra eva yuktah, kim-arthaṁ esāṁ nirākaraṇam.—If breath etc. are able to let know the self, let the knowledge of ātman be [produced] by them as well; but if not, then [to pay] no heed to them (prāṇa etc.) is right. What is the need to refute them?


\textsuperscript{31} Bṛ₂, p. 219.11–220.5 = MK, p. 902b.9.

\textsuperscript{32} Bṛ₂, p. 220.5 = MK, p. 902b.10; Rju₂, p. 220.12 seems to gloss this term by the Vaiśeṣika notion of samavāyi-kāraṇa (‘inherent/necessary causality’) in the sentence kṣaṇikatvāt padārthānāṁ samavāyi-kāraṇāṁ na bhavati.—In view of the momentariness of [all] things, there is no necessary causality [between them]’.
Throughout both commentaries, the Buddhist pushes forward the view that it is useless to search for an invisible entity beyond and behind the sensorial data (skandha). Thus anumana (inference), passing from the visible towards the invisible, is of no avail when perception has already taken place.  

In other words, when perception takes place, anumana becomes useless. On the other hand, when perception is lacking, e.g. in the case of an invisible object, anumana cannot work either.  

10. On the contrary, Prabhakara and Sālikanātha defend the anumana which the Buddhist undermines so strongly that he could be regarded as a sheer materialist. The Mīmāṃsakas envisage the perceptive cognition (pratyakṣa-(vijñāna) as unsatisfactory in so far as it is momentary (kṣanika) and thus unable to prompt the ‘epistemological jump’ from the visible to the invisible. Accordingly, Prabhakara and Sālikanātha use the expression ‘perception with recognition’ (saprtyabhijñām pratyakṣam) to define their approach.

11. The crucial proof of the existence of the soul, or ātman, is obviously the process of recognition (pratyabhijñā) on which Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas so radically disagree.

According to the latter, the notion of aham ‘I’ is necessarily linked with the recognition, because the recognizer is nobody else but the ‘ego’.  

As Śabaravāmin says, aham denotes what is apart from—i.e. beyond—cognitions. This statement is better understood in contrast, viz. if we remember that the aforesaid pronoun can also metaphorically denote a material element, e.g. in the phrase ‘I am going’, where aham takes the place of ‘my body’.

---

33 This is what Prabhakara qualifies as ‘a piece of recklessness’ (sāhasam), Bf2, p. 225.10–11 = MK, p. 903a.28–29: pruyākṣa-dṛṣṭe ‘rthe ‘numānam na saṃbhavatīti sāhasam idam.

34 Bf2, p. 226.9 = MK p. 903b.4–5: upaladoḥ cet svayam, kim anumānena.—If [ātman] is perceived by itself, what is the point of an inference? Noteworthy is the fact that these words bear upon the important issue (not dealt with in these pages) whether the perception of one’s own ātman can allow one to infer the existence of someone else’s self.


36 Rju2, p. 234.23 glossing Bf2, p. 235.7 = MK, p. 904b.23, where both words are attributed to the bhāṣya-kāraḥ, i.e. Śabaravāmin, who however does not use them, at least in his Ātma-vāda. They are also present in Rju2, pp. 234.22–23 and 235.15–16.

37 Ś Bh1, p. 56.3–4 = MS, I: p. 79.5: tasmāt tad-vyātirikto ‘nyo ‘sti yatrayām aham-śabadh.—Hence it follows that there is something apart from the [cognitions], and it is to this something that the term ‘I’ is applied’ (tr. Ś Bh2, I: p. 28); p. 56.21 = MS, I: p. 80.13–14, the Buddhist demands that the ‘other’, i.e. the ‘knower’, be shown to him (āha: yadi vijnānād anyad asti vijnāt... tan nidarśyatām); vide infra n. 96.

38 The phrase aham gacchāmi is mentioned in Ś Bh1, p. 56.6 = MS, I: p. 79.7, and commented by Prabhakara and Sālikanātha, Bf2, p. 230.5 and 14 = MK, p. 904a.1 ff. The complex relationship between ātman (‘soul/self’) and aham (‘I’) is scrutinised by M. HULIN (1978) and (2008: e.g. 98).
Further in the text, towards the end of the first part of his commentary, Prabhākara points out that ‘the concept of aham is the support (ālambana) of ātman, provided this concept [of aham] is devoid of any notion of “this” (asaṁbhinnēdaṁ-prataya), viz. of any thing of objective essence.’

For his part, Kumārila points out that aham must exclusively refer to the cogniser and its reference to a feature or an act concerning the body can safely be taken as a misconception (bhrānti).

12. The nature of the recognition as set forth by our authors can be more easily realised with the help of some quotations of ŚBh which describe the phenomenon and the conclusions that might be drawn from it.

A (1) The first extract describes the standard recognition, the one caused by recollection, i.e. linked with the past: ‘It is only when a person has seen a thing on one day that he has the notion (remembrance/recollection) on the next day in the form “I have seen it”, and this notion of recognition appears only in his own one’s self and not elsewhere...’

Hence it follows that there is something apart from both cognitions and it is to this “something” that the term “I” is applied.

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha cite words and excerpts from this passage more than once, when they thoroughly deal with the aham-ātman relationship.

A (2) Elsewhere, we meet with a shortened picture of the same event: ‘It was we who saw this thing on one day, and it is we who remember it today ... It is “we” that existed yesterday, and it is the same “we” that exists today.’

---

39 Bṛ2, p. 239.1–2 = MK p. 905b.1–2 (where ātmana is omitted): tasmād asaṁbhinnēdaṁ-prataya evāham-prataya ātmana ālambanam. Ṛjū, p. 239.14 glosses asaṁbhīma by amiśrikata (‘not mixed’) and ālambana by vyavasthitau kārāya (‘cause of distinction’). The compound asaṁbhinnēdaṁ-pratayaḥ-āhāṁ-prataya-vasayatva (‘the fact of being the discriminated object of the notions of “this” and “I”’ occurs already in Ṛjū, p. 231.17–18.

40 MSV Āṭma-vāda 125–27.

41 ŚBh1, p. 56.1 ff. = MS, I: p. 79.3 ff.: anyeduyur dṛṣṭe ‘paryadyur “aham idam adarśam” iti bhavati pratayaḥ. <pratyag-ātmani caitad bhavati, na paratra> ... tasmād tad-vyatirikto ‘nyo ‘sti yatrayam aham śabdāḥ. The words pratya.9 ... paratra are the approximate quotation of VS (vide infra n. 42). It is quoted in Bṛ2, p. 231.4–5 = MK, p. 904a.7 ff. and Ṛjū, p. 230.21–22.

42 The words in the guillemets « ... » in n. 41 are a quotation lato sensu of VS 3.2.14: aham iti pratyag-ātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvāṃ arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ.—Because the [intuition] “I” exists in one’s own self, and because it does not exist elsewhere, it apprehends something else [than the body]. English translation: RADIHKRISHNAN–MOORE (1960: 392); French translation and text: BLARDEAU (1968: 116). See also NOZAWA (1991: 35) and PREISENDANZ (1994: 228–29).

43 Tr. ŚBh3, I: p. 28 (modified).

44 Bṛ2 and Ṛjū, p. 231.14 and 18, p. 236.5 ff., 237.8 and 238.13.

45 ŚBh1, p. 56.9–11 = MS, I: p. 80.2–3 (tr. ŚBh3, I: p. 29). A shorter phrasing of the same statement occurs in Bṛ2, p. 232.6 = MK, p. 904a.18–19 (and Ṛjū, p. 232.13): na ca—anyā upalabdhiḥ kyāḥ, adya cānyāḥ—ity etātātā nairātmyam.—‘It is not as far as [we say] “other [was] the perceiver yesterday, other is he today”’ that there is non-existence of the self’.
B (1) The third example describes recognition as related to desire, i.e. to something rather linked with the future. It, too, occurs in the Śābhara-bhāṣya: ‘For instance, we find that when on one day a man has left an action half-done, he tries to make up for it on the next day, and from this action it is inferred that the person regards himself as enduring (lasting) in relationship to things that are evanescent [or, on the basis of evanescent activities one comes to cognise the enduring self].’

B (2) In the MŚv, Ātma-vāda 135, a somewhat similar example is given: ‘In a case where only a half of a certain scripture etc. has been learnt, if one were not to have any idea that ‘I have learnt this much’, then (when taking up the study of the work after some time), he would have to learn from the beginning again.’

It is clear to anyone that a number of human behaviours require, at least in the view of non-Buddhist thinkers, an underlying entity is in charge of recollection and desire. It is justified to call this entity atman, or ‘self/soul’.

13. At this point, Prabhakara makes several remarks with respect to the stock formula of the recognition aham idam adarsain (‘I have seen it’), remarks which his disciple Śālikanātha does not let go unnoticed.

The former says: ‘It is not intended here to dismiss the concept of momentariness. What then? The intention is to ascertain the existence of atman as apart from the intellect, sensory organs and body.’ The latter takes up almost the same words but twice mentions the aham-pratyaya (‘notion of “I”’) to identify this atman which escapes any additional description.

It is with such a view that Śālikanātha and Prabhakara confront the Buddhist opponent who, twice in the Śābara-bhāṣya, challenges them as follows: ‘Leaving cognition aside (apāśya) ... please point out the cogniser with the words: “Here it is, such it is”.’ This sentence is the one of a man who sees no need

---


47 MŚv₁, Ātma-vāda 125–27:
śāstrādāv ardha-vijñāte yady ’ham jñātavān iti / nāvagacchet tataḥ sarvāḥ pravartetādītāḥ punaḥ //
Tr. MŚv₂, p. 406.


50 ŚBh₁, p. 56.21–22; 60.5 (partially) = MS, I: p. 80.13–14, 84.5 commented upon by B₂, p. 240.5–6, 250.4 = MK, p. 905b.13–14, 906b.25 and Rju₂, p. 240.15–16. Tr. ŚBh₃, I: p. 29.
of a support (ātman) for a quality like cognition etc.\textsuperscript{51} Ātman is therefore useless; it can be replaced by the quality itself: cognition or a cognitive series (samātāna). The Buddhist thus asks his opponent Mīmāṃsaka to show the ‘cogniser’, personally convinced that it is impossible to do so.\textsuperscript{52}

The Mīmāṃsaka skilfully answers that it is hardly possible to trace a sheer cogniser devoid of any cognition. With the words of the Śābara-bhāṣya Śālikanātha demonstrates this: ‘Thus, if we leave cognition aside, we cannot indicate anything at all’,\textsuperscript{53} especially no cogniser.

By and large, the second section of Prabhākara’s and Śālikanātha’s explanation of the Ātma-vāda (vide infra § 22) is devoted to this question and contains statements, such as ‘outside knowledge, no knower is there’, ‘when cognition is not apprehended, there is no apprehension of ātman’,\textsuperscript{54} and also ‘without apprehending cognition, no knowable [object] can be apprehended.’\textsuperscript{55}

14. In addition to the Buddhists (vide supra § 9), other disputants (apare), i.e. the followers of the Sāmkhya school, are brought to the foreground under the name of brahma-vid.\textsuperscript{56} Their influence on our two authors is perceptible, if only slightly. Significant is the presence in the Rju-vimala-pañcikā of two stanzas of the Sāmkhya-kārikā: 3 and 57.\textsuperscript{57} More expressions, e.g. kārya-

\textsuperscript{51} BIARDEAU (1968: 111): ‘L’adversaire proteste que tout cela (that is body, cognition etc.—J.-M.V.) ne requiert aucun substrat permanent; son argument essentiel—et qui le restera jusqu’au bout—est qu’on ne peut voir ce substrat en lui-même. On le décrit toujours comme ce qui possède tel ou tel attribut (guna) mais on ne propose jamais d’écartier le voile de cet attribut pour le montrer lui-même. Pourquoi alors ne pas reconnaître qu’il se réduit à l’attribut’.

\textsuperscript{52} HULIN (2008: 95).

\textsuperscript{53} Tr. ŚBBb, p. 30 of ŚBbh, p. 60.10–11 = MS, I: p. 85.1–2: tasmān na vijnānaṃ pratyākhyāya kasyacid rupaṁ nidarśayitām sākyam, cited by Bṛ, p. 229.14–15. In Śbh, p.60.5, Śābara uses apāśya as a synonym of pratyākhyāya.

\textsuperscript{54} Rju, p. 228.15 and 17: vijñāṇāgraḥane saty ātmano grahaṇāṃ nāsti; vijñāṇāgraḥane yaddātmano ‘grahaṇam...

\textsuperscript{55} Rju, p. 229.11: vijñānam agrhītvā vijñeyam nāvā grahitum śakyate.

\textsuperscript{56} Bṛ, p. 220.8, 20 = MK, p. 902b.14 glossed by Śālikanātha, p. 220.21–22, as eṣā hi sānkhyaśānaṃ prakriyā—‘for it is a designation of the Sāmkhyas’. Cf. Bṛ, p. 230.6 = MK, p. 904a.2. In Bṛ, p. 230.9, the opponents of the brahma-vid are given the name of the ātma-vid (most probably the Naiyāyikas rather than the Vedāntins). The term brahma-vid still occurs in Bṛ, p. 239.8 = MK, p. 905b.8. In Rju, p. 209.20, the Vaiśeṣikas are called padārtha-vid.

\textsuperscript{57} The Sānkhya-Kārikā is a collection dated of fourth–fifth century CE according to PELESSERO (2007: 327). SK 3 (p. 221.14–15) reads as follows: ‘Primal Nature (prakṛti) is not an evolute; the seven, beginning with the Great one (mahat, i.e. the intellect) are both evolvents and evolutes; the sixteen (i.e. the five organs of sense, the five of action, the mind, and the five gross elements) are only evolutes; the spirit is neither evolvent nor evolute.’ SK 57 (p. 222.16–17): As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the spirit’ [tr. RADHAKRISHNAN–MOORE(1960: 427 and 443)].
karaṇa (‘the body and its organs’),\(^{58}\) pariṇati (‘transformation’, a synonym of pariṇāma)\(^{59}\), kaivalya (‘absolute independence’)\(^{60}\) and so on are likely to stem from Śāṅkhyā sources. But one of the most interesting terms is undoubtedly bhokṛ (‘experiencing person’, ‘enjoyer’), i.e. subject of perceptive and retuitive experiences.

15. The ātman as bhokṛ (‘enjoyer’).

The term bhokṛ is predominantly met with from p. 232 onwards in the Madras edition of the Bṛhatī (Br\(t\))\(^{61}\).

The notion of the ‘enjoyer’ has priority over that of the ‘doer’ in the demonstration of the ātman by Prabhākara and Śālikanātha. In other words, their argumentation, undertaken along the Mīmāṁsā lines, stresses the importance of the self as ritual agent, but still more as ritual beneficiary (bhokṛ) of the sacrifice. Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are looking for an evidence to substantiate their views, namely that a sacrificer performs his long and weary ritual task in the hope of earning a benefit from it at the end, namely to become the bhokṛ of heaven (svarga). Now, this is impossible if he is nothing but a body which will burn on a pyre and if, accordingly, someone else might go to heaven because the acting person is not the enjoying one.

The well-known stanza\(^{62}\)—Śāṅkhyā-kārikā 17—provides support to their position. The crucial passage therein is puruṣo ‘sti bhokṛ-bhāvāt—‘...because there must be someone to experience, the spirit must be there...’\(^{63}\) This conception of the soul/self (ātman), here called ‘spirit’ (puruṣa), as the ‘experiencing person’ is accepted by the Brahminical systems: ātman enjoys either objects of one’s senses and pleasure or the good and bad results of retuitive action. The Buddhists, on the contrary, dismiss the notion of bhokṛ (bhokṛ-grāha) along with that of ‘soul/self’ (ātman) and speak instead of āyatana (the ‘base [of cognition]’).\(^{64}\)

16. In the system of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, the ‘condition of bhokṛ’ (bhokṛtva) is primarily required to support the thesis of the existence of the ātman and to protect the necessary identity of the doer of the sacrifice and the enjoyer thereof, jeopardised by the tenet of universal momentariness.

---

\(^{58}\) Br\(t\), p. 238.8 = MK, p. 905a.32: idān-pratyaya-grāhyāṁ kārya-karaṇam. The dvandva-compound kārya-karaṇa (‘body and sense organs’) is glossed in Br\(t\), p. 238.23 as follows: ‘body’ = jīvya (‘the knowable’) and ‘sense organs’ = jñāna (‘cognitive instruments’).

\(^{59}\) Br\(t\), p. 234.6 = MK, p. 904b.16.

\(^{60}\) Rju\(i\), p. 239.26.

\(^{61}\) It seems to be unknown to ŚBh. No reference to it is found in the MK.

\(^{62}\) Also alluded to in MŚV Ātma-vāda 114.

\(^{63}\) SK 17:

\[ saṁghāta-parārthatvatvātri-guṇādi-viparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt / puruṣo ‘sti bhokṛ-bhāvāt kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteh //
\]

Tr. RADHAKRISHNAN–MOORE (1960: 431).

\(^{64}\) See e.g. Sthiramati’s Paśca-skandhaka-vibhāṣā cited in KRAMER (2008: 154, n.17).
Prabhākara makes the following statement: ‘Even if the existence [of the ātman] is established, its nature as ātman is totally (eva) lost in case of momentariness.’ And Śālikanātha explains: ‘The nature of ātman is the nature as an experiencing subject, and precisely that nature as an experiencing subject in case of a momentary entity is forsaken.’

Prabhākara previously stated that the recognitive event (of the identity between performer and enjoier of the sacrifice) was not designed to put momentariness aside but to assert the existence of a self/soul (ātman) as distinct from the mind, sensory organs and body. A similar statement is found in the Śloka-vārttika: ‘Thus then, we would have a rejection of the theory of the non-existence of the soul, by means of the aforesaid recognition (of the soul) experienced by all persons.’

Thus, when Prabhākara proclaims that the momentariness of the skandhas, i.e. the constituent parts of the human being, is caused by the absence of a bhokṛ, his opponent confronts him by asking whether one is bound to accept this teaching like ‘an order of the king’, that is unconditionally and blindly. Prabhākara answers that his view is to be accepted not as an order of the king, but as an order of reason.

Such a statement sounds like a reverse of the position of the Buddhist who points out that the bhokṛ cannot exist because everything is and must be momentary.

17. Both Mīmāṁsakas have grounds of their own to emphasise the importance of the enjoying function of the self and thus look for arguments to support their position in the Sāṅkhya system as well. They might have reckoned in the first place Sāṅkhya-kārikā 19 and 20. Stanza 19 describes ātman, called here puruṣa, as ‘having the qualities of witness and onlooker but without that of agent’ (sāksitvam puruṣasya ... draṣṭṛtvam akartṛ-bhāvaś ca) and stanza 20 adds ‘although [only] the strands (guṇa) are agents, the [puruṣa] indifferent (udāśina) is, in similar manner, as if an agent (kartā iva).’

Is it under the influence of the Sāṅkhya that Prabhākara and Śālikanātha are inclined to underrate the kartṛ side of the ātman.

18. Bhokṛ and kartṛ (‘active agent’) in the Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya.

A further testimony of the priority granted by the Sāṅkhya to the bhokṛ over the kartṛ is that of the Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya. This important but
late Sāṃkhya treatise written by Vijñānabhiṣkṣu (1550–1600) on the hardly more ancient Sāṃkhya-sūtra is of course not a source for Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, who lived more than seven centuries earlier. However it seems to be close to the positions of both Mīmāṃsakas in a number of cases.

In the very beginning of his work, Vijñānabhiṣkṣu already points out the difference between Sāṃkhya and Nyāya the adepts of which—here named ‘logicians’ (tārīkā)—champion the ātman as a kartṛ.\(^{72}\)

Kapila’s Sāṃkhya-sūtra 1.143 contains a wording of SK 17.\(^{73}\) Later on, Vijñānabhiṣkṣu, commenting on SS 1.143, states that bhokṛtvā (= bhokṛt-bhāva) cannot belong to the (human) body, but to the puruṣa, and that bhoga is made up of thought (cit, cf. also SS 1.104). According to the Sāṃkhya doctor, the puruṣa, synonym of the ātman of Mīmāṃsā, primarily possesses bhokṛtva. Being motionless and actionless by nature, the puruṣa will be bhokṛ (‘the subject of experience (e.g. of pleasure etc.) and retribution’)\(^{74}\) and draṣṭṛ (‘the onlooker’)\(^{75}\) rather than kartṛ (‘active agent’). The bhokṛ is operating by (immateral) contact with the enties on which it exerts its control (adhīṣṭhāna), like a suzerain who is the beneficiary of the activities performed by those who abide by his orders.\(^{76}\) For instance, the bhokṛ manages to keep the body from putting the help of the breath but the merit thereof accrues, not to the latter, but to the enyjoer himself.\(^{77}\)

In fact, bhoga (‘enjoyment’) accrues to bhokṛ (‘the enyjoer’), provided the enyjoer possesses a material abode, which is the body, or bhogāyatana (‘place of enjoyment’).\(^{78}\) But to locate enjoyment within the mere body would be a misconception like the converse fallacy which refers the pronoun ‘I’ in the statement ‘I am bright (of skin)’ to the ātman instead of to the body.\(^{79}\)

\(^{72}\) Cf. GARBE (1943: 2.5 = introduction to SS 1.1), where the Tārīkā is qualified as kartṛtvābhīmāṇīn ‘who overrates the function of agent’; (1943: 65.6–7 ad SS 1.146), where the Tārīkā’s take the kartṛ function of the ātman for granted.

\(^{73}\) This sūtra contains just the word bhokṛt-bhāva (cf. GARBE (1943 : 63)), which is no doubt borrowed from SK 17 cited supra § 15. Cf. RAJU (1994: 143).

\(^{74}\) SPRBH ad SS 1.75 and 106 = GARBE (1943: 39.12–13 and 51.35–37). Puruṣa has a synonym in the word punān (see n. 75): ‘male [principle]’, i.e. ‘spirit’ as opposed to ‘nature’.

\(^{75}\) SS 1.139: śarīrādī-yyatiriktāḥ punān; SPRBH ad loc.: tato (= śarīra) ‘tiriktaḥ punān bhokṛtāt arthaḥ, bhokṛtvam ca draṣṭṛtvam iti = GARBE (1943: 62.30–32).

\(^{76}\) SPRBH ad SS 1.142 = GARBE (1943: 63.20–22). On the comparison of the bhokṛ (‘suzerain’) and the prāṇa (‘servants’) cf. e.g. SS 5.115: bhṛtya-dvārā svāmī-adhīṣṭhitih… = GARBE (1943: 142.35).

\(^{77}\) SPRBH ad SS 5.114 and 6.60: prāṇa-yyāpāra-abhāve śukra-śoṇitayoh pūtī-bhāva-prasaṅgāt and bhokṛt-anadīṣṭhitasya śukrādeh pūtī-bhāva-prasaṅgāt = = GARBE (1943: 142.29 and 160.27).

\(^{78}\) SS 5.114: bhokṭur adhīṣṭhānāt bhogāyatana-nirmanam, anyathā pūtī-bhāva-prasaṅgāt = GARBE (1943: 142.28–29).

\(^{79}\) SPRBH ad SS 5.64 loke hi śarīra-śarīrinor bhogya-bhoktroś cāvivekena-abheedo vyavaharīyate “aham gauro”, “mamām bhadrasena” ity-ādiḥ—‘For in the world no dis-
cases we come across a wrong view of reality. Thus the bhogāyatana is the place of the bhoga the owner of which is actually the self.

19. Ātman and aham-kāra (‘the “I”-consciousness’) according to the Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya.

A survey of early Sāṁkhya documents shows that ātman gives birth to aham-kāra and that the one and unique act carried out by this unchangeable entity is to be aware of itself as aham. However, this ‘utterance of “I”’ (aham-kāra) has wide-ranging consequences.\(^80\) Replacing its own source, aham-kāra becomes henceforth an agent,\(^81\) not only in the individual range but even in the case of the creation and dissolution of the world.\(^82\)

In principle, the agent benefits from the fruit of his own act,\(^83\) but that does not hold true for the ātman/puruṣa that enjoys it without being its active cause, its agent.\(^84\) And when agency is assigned to the puruṣa, it is due to a wrong transfer from the buddhi.\(^85\) The genuine agent is aham-kāra\(^86\) which is said to be independent from anything else, to be deprived of a creator, and to be ‘caused by [the power of] time alone’.\(^87\)

20. The position of Prabhakara and Śālikanātha concerning ātman as bhoktṛ.

As far as Mīmāṁsā is the philosophy of the ritual action, it cannot but deny a conception of the self as an omnipresent and everlasting entity which would be, accordingly, unable to act because it is unable to move and to change.

In several places in the Brhadī and the Rju-vimala-pañcikā, one or more opponents put forward suspicions and criticisms against the Mīmāṁsā approach

tinction is expressed between the body and its owner since no separation [is done] between what is enjoyed and the enjoyer as in the statements: “I am of bright skin”; “I am (stricto sensu my self is) Bhadrasena”. = GARBE (1943: 130. 33–35); cf. § 11.


\(^81\) SS 6.54: aham-kāraḥ kartā, na puruṣaḥ. = GARBE (1943: 159.23).

\(^82\) SpBrh ad SS 6.64: idāniḥ mahad-aham-kārayor eva tad-itaram jagad kāryam and aham-kāra-rūpo yaḥ kartā, tad-adhināva kārya-siddhiḥ sṛṣṭi-samhāra-nilpattir bhavati. = GARBE (1943:162.3 and 8). But according to SpBrh ad SS 2.1: pradhānasya jugat-kartrtvam. = GARBE (1943: 74.29), the role of agent of creation is ascribed to the pradhāna or ‘primordial matter’; see van Buitenen (1957: 19): ‘the self-formulated being is the cosmos’.


\(^85\) SpBrh ad SS 1.164: puruṣasya yat kartṛtvam, tad buddhi-uparāgāt; buddhes ca ya cintā, sā puruṣa-sāṁvidhyāt (‘The agent quality of the puruṣa [arises] from the tinge of the buddhi and the thought [pertaining] to the buddhi [arises] from the proximity of the puruṣa’). = GARBE (1943: 74.2–3). Buddhi et mahad (‘understanding’ derives its active power out of its source, the pradhāna, cf. BALLANTYNE (1865: 63).

\(^86\) SS 6.54 aham-kāraḥ kartā, na puruṣaḥ. = GARBE (1943: 159.23).

\(^87\) SpBrh ad SS 6.65 = GARBE (1943: 162.18, 21–22 kāla-mātra-nimitta).
to the ātman as kartṛ by pointing out that the self is by nature inert (niṣkriya). 88 Furthermore, the ātman cannot be an agent on account of its immobility that results itself from its omnipresence (sarva-gatatva). In its turn, sarva-gatatva results from the universal experience of sukha (‘well-being, pleasure’). 89

21. The aforesaid views seem to be those of opponents, but Prabhākara cannot endorse them on account of his allegiance to the main and obvious tenet of the Mīmāṁsa, that is that the mandatory operations of the Vedic ritual must be performed by a self provided with an amount of activity.

When Prabhākara returns to the first description by Śabarasmāṁin of the recognition event, 90 he argues that it contributes to the demonstration of the ‘enjoying nature’ of the ātman. If indeed somebody else, he adds, were the bhokṛ of the sacrifice instead ātman/aham, i.e. the person who has performed it, that would mean the ruin of bhokṛtvā, 91 since the fruit would not accrue to its expected beneficiary: the doer.

That the term ātman is a synonym of bhokṛ is ultimately repeated by Prabhākara 92 as follows: ‘We answer on this point: “It is said that the nature of ātman (āmatā) is [synonymous to] enjoying (bhokṛtvā)”’, and Śālikanātha glosses this last word by anushtubvatayā iti yāvat (‘in other words, [it is the synonym of] experiencing’). 93

For his part, Śālikanātha seeks to affirm his stance in face of the Sāmkhya, and, in an eager argument, he reaffirms up to five times, that ātman is nothing else than the condition of acting and experiencing together. These are the relevant sentences:

88 Bhṛ, p. 221.7-8 = MK, p. 902b.21-22: tasmāt siḍḍha ātmā kartṛ-bhūtaḥ, nanu asau niṣkriya ity uktam (MK: abhyupagatam)—‘Therefore, the self is proved to be an agent. [Objection:] It is stated that it is inert/inactive’.

89 Bhṛ, p. 235.10-12 = MK, p. 904b.27-29: yuktam bhokṛtvā-evaatmā iti. kartṛtvopanyāsas tu virudhyate, niṣkriyātvaḥ ātmanaḥ. sarvagatatvāc ca. niṣkriyātwaṁ pratipannam ca sarva-gatatvam, sarvatra sukhopalambhat—‘To say that the self is sheer enjoyment is correct. The mention of its agency is contradictory because of its inactivity and its omnipresence. The inactivity and omnipresence [of ātman] occur because the experience of pleasure [exists] everywhere (‘’). Bhṛ, p. 238.6 = MK, p. 905a.28-29., ātman is again qualified as ‘immovable by nature’ (acalanātmatatvat).

90 Vide supra § 12.

91 Vide supra § 16; Bhṛ, p. 237.3-4 = MK, p. 905a.13-15 (glossed Rju, p. 237.18-19): yadi paro ‘py ahaṁ-pratayā-vaṣayatāṁ āpadyeta, tadā bhokṛtvā-hānam [ in MK 6-hānam is replaced by 6-jñānam] prāṇaṁtvā. bhokṛtā cātmēty uktam: ‘If somebody else became the object of the notion of ‘I’, the notion of bhokṛ would go to ruin and it has been said that the self [has] the quality of bhokṛ’.

92 Bhṛ, p. 248.10-249.14 (it is a passage which does not appear in the Bhṛ and consequently not in MK, II: p. 906b either): atra brumah: uktam eva bhokṛtvāhy āmatatā iti.
22. In the second part of the commentary,\textsuperscript{94} the topic is different. Prabhākara and Śālikanātha no longer look for a definition of the self; they encounter the Buddhist challenge, as stated in the Bhāṣya of Śabaravāmin: 'If there is something apart from cognition, viz. a cogniser, [then] leaving aside the cognition, please point out the cogniser.'\textsuperscript{96} Here the echoes of the Sāṁkhya thought are weaker and, therefore, we limit ourselves to a cursory survey of the most significant doctrinal features exposed from here on up to the end the Ātma-vāda.

The first development is based on BĀU 4.3.6 which reads as follows: 'When the [Vedic] speech is silent, what light does the person possess?'\textsuperscript{97} In answer, Śabaravāmin points out that, in this case, the auto-luminosity (svayam-jyotiṣṭva) of the ātman takes the place of the Veda.\textsuperscript{98}

Thereupon another question arises: when the Śruti avers that ātman is non-perceptible (agrhya) (BĀU 3.9.26), does that mean that it is such for anyone including the owner of the self or is it such only for the other persons (para)?\textsuperscript{99} In other words, is the ātman’s invisibility complete and necessary or is it contingent (āpeksika), viz. just limited to somebody else?\textsuperscript{100}

The fact that the self might escape the notice of somebody else does not prevent it from being grasped by its owner. But when it is indispensable to say something about it, one should have recourse to an apophatic method by defining it as ‘not that, not that’ like in the Brhad-āranyakopaniṣad.\textsuperscript{101}

Then our Mīmāṁsakas examine cesṭā-anumāṇa,\textsuperscript{102} which enables one to discover, not the ātman, but only the inner states, such as sukha, traced by


\textsuperscript{96} ŚBṛ₁, p. 56.21–22 = MS, I: p. 80.13–14: yadi vijñānād anyad asti vijñātṛ, vijñānam apāsya tan nidāsya evam (tr. ŚBṛ₃, I: p. 29 slightly modified). Vide supra n.37 and § 13, n. 50.

\textsuperscript{97} śaṁyāṁ vaci kiṁ-jyotir evāyaṁ puruṣah?, quoted in ŚBṛ₁, p. 58.8 = MS, I: p. 82.7.

\textsuperscript{98} ŚBṛ₁, p. 58.11 = MS, I: p. 82.9 mentioned by Bṛṛ₂, p. 245.11 = MK, p. 906a.25, where Śabara quotes BĀU 4.3.9 as well: ātṛyaṁ puruṣah svayam jyotir bhavati.—’Then is this “person” light by his own light?’ Tr. ZAEHNER (1972: 66).

\textsuperscript{99} ŚBṛ₁, p. 58.9–10 = MS, I: p. 82.7–8 commented upon by Bṛṛ₂, p. 245.12–246.6 ff. = MK, p. 906a.26 ff.

\textsuperscript{100} Bṛṛ₂, p. 245.8 = MK, p. 906a.21: asyāgraḥaṇa-śrutir āpeksī. —’The mention of the [ātman by BĀU 3.9.26 and 4.3.9] as “non-perceptible” is contingent/occasional’.

\textsuperscript{101} BĀU 3.9.26: sa esa nēti nēti ātmēti, is quoted in ŚBṛ₁, p. 58.14 = MS, I: p. 83.1 and is commented upon by Bṛṛ₂, p. 246.9 ff. = MK, p. 906a.31 ff.

\textsuperscript{102} Cf. supra § 6.
physical motions. Afterwards they question what help the upamā/ upamāna,\textsuperscript{103} or ‘comparision-identification’, may supply to discover ātman, and address a final theme.\textsuperscript{104} the refutation of the Buddhist who is urging that there is nothing to grasp apart from cognition, neither an ātman that would be its support nor an entity extra animam that would be its object.\textsuperscript{105}

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha answer that cognition contains an objective datum and not only a subjective one.\textsuperscript{106} Moreover, ātman is part of all cognitions\textsuperscript{107} and supplies each one (including an anumāna) with a quality of perceptive evidence (sāksāt-kāra).\textsuperscript{108}

Prabhākara and Śālikanātha conclude with three exegetical remarks. The baffling statement of Yājñavalkya in the Brhad-āranyakopanisād: ‘After death, there is no consciousness’,\textsuperscript{109} must be read in its context, namely at the light of the subsequent teaching of the seer: ‘The Self is wholly indestructible; of its very nature (dharma) it cannot be annihilated’.\textsuperscript{110} Yet with the modern reader, uncertainty remains. Does the first assertion mean that consciousness leaves the dead body? However, that would sound like a trivial assertion.

\textsuperscript{103}ŚBh, p. 58.25-60.1 = MS I: p. 83.10–11, p. 84.1: upamānāc cōpadīṣyate “yādṛśaṁ bhavāṁ svayam ātmaṁ paśyati, anenōpamānenaṇvagaccha «aham api tādyām eva paśyāmi»”  iti. Tr. ŚBh, p. 30: ‘By upamāna (ātman–self) is pointed out in the words: ‘Just as you perceive your own self, so, on the same upamāna, [please] understand that I also perceive the self in the same manner’, commented upon in Bṛ, p. 249, 14 ff. = MK, p. 906b.22 ff.: upamānāpi atra kathoḥpṛṇayatā eva upanyastā.—‘Upamā for its part is here mentioned in the function of means of naming’. Rju, p. 249.23–250.9 seems to criticise Śabara when he (i.e. Śālikanātha) says: bhāṣye kathoḥpṛṇayatenaṇpamābhimātā.—‘In the Bhāṣya, the upamā is wrongly considered as a means of naming’.

\textsuperscript{104}Bṛ, p. 251.10 ff. = MK, p. 907a.2 ff.

\textsuperscript{105}Bṛ, p. 251.9–10 = MK, p. 907a.3–4: vijñāna-viviktasya tu grahaṇāṁ na prāṇnoti vyāpytrāvagamāt...—‘the grasping [of what is] apart from cognition is not in force because the comprehension is operated [by cognition alone]’; Rju, p. 252.13–14: tatas cārtā-at-sūnyatā jñānānāṁ prāṇoti.—‘Therefore, the absence of an object is in force for the cognitions’.

\textsuperscript{106}Rju, p. 252.17–18: grāhyākāraṁ vijñānam, na grāhakākāram ity uktam śūnyavāda-nirākaraṇe.—‘In the refutation of the doctrine of voidness, it is said that cognition is an aspect of the knowable [and] not an aspect of the knower’. The Śūnyavādin thinks the other way around: the knowledge rests upon the grāhaka (‘knowing subject’) and not on an external—grāhya or bāhyārtha (Rju, p. 252.14)—object, or an ‘outside object’.

\textsuperscript{107}Bṛ, p. 253.10–11 = MK, p. 907a.30–31: tasmād sarvā-vijñāna-jñeyatāmanah sthitā bhavati.—‘Therefore, the knowable nature of all cognitions is lying in the self’.

\textsuperscript{108}Rju, p. 253.22–23: sāksāt-kārenā pratibhāsāmā añvatabātmano ‘numānādīśv api pratyaśātāvā.—‘Since the self is manifesting itself with evidence, there is actually (eva?) perception inside inference and so on’.

\textsuperscript{109}BĀU 4.5.13: na prayāya saṁjñāṣṭi. Tr. ZAEHNER (1972: 75).

\textsuperscript{110}BĀU 4.5.14: avināṣi vā are ‘yam atma anucchiti-dharmā. Tr. ZAEHNER (1972: 75).
The Vedic passage which triggered the debate (vide supra § 2) is classified as an explanatory passage (arthā-vāda) and not as a mandatory one (vidhi), so that it can be interpreted in a metaphoric way.

Finally Prabhākara rounds off his explanation of the Ātma-vāda by quoting the Bhagavad-gītā: ‘Let not “the wise man” split the mind (buddhi) of witless men attached to work’, suggesting to the reader that he knows, more than anyone, the limits of his hermeneutical labour.

23. General conclusion.

The explanations by Prabhākara and Śālikanātha of the Ātma-vāda section of Śābara-bhāṣya 1.1.5 show up as a lengthy and rambling text in which the main issue—the existence of a self/soul—is entangled in a variety of side problems and stock discussions (e.g. the relative value of perception and inference). Nonetheless, the portions analysed above allow us to pick out two basic problems: (1) Which human components are inferential marks purported to reveal the presence of the self; (2) Why it is important to regard the self as a bhoktṛ, an ‘enjoyer’ of the sacrificial outcome and not only as a kartaḥ, a ‘performer’ of rites.

(1) Which human components are inferential marks of the self (§§ 4–5)? These are:

—neither breath (prāṇa). Admittedly prāṇa is something apart from the body since it does not last as long as the body (ayāvad-bhūta-bhāvitva, ‘non-coevality’; § 4) and is already gone whereas the body is still intact in front of our eyes. But that does not mean that prāṇa is a clue to trace the existence of the ātman, because the jump from the perceptible breath to the invisible anya, ‘the [wholly] other’, i.e. the self, is logically not sound.\(^\text{113}\)

---

\(^{111}\) Cf. supra § 3 and n. 5. The fact that we face an artha-vāda and not a vidhi allows for a metaphoric explanation Āpastamba-śrāuta-sūtra 31.2.21 (already cited in n. 3): sa eṣa yajñāyuddhi yajamānāh...—‘This sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial utensils...’ actually means ‘this sacrificer whose body [is equipped]...’ (vasyātac charitram...), see Bṛ and Rju², p. 207.11–12 and 22–24.


\(^{113}\) The Vaiṣeṣika inference (anumāna) is mentioned in VS 3.2.4 and is made up of a list of 12 ‘inferential marks’ (liṅga) of the existence of an ātman. These liṅgas are inbreathing (prāṇa) and outbreathing (apāṇa), motions of the shutting (nimesa) and opening (unmesa) of eyes, life (jīvāna), movement of the mind (mano-gati), alterations of the other senses (indriyāntara-vikāra), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveśa) and volition (pratyatma). Such a mechanistic conception is dismissed by Rju², p. 219.19 as follows: prāṇādibhir anātman ātma-buddhir bhavati.—‘By [using the words] prāṇa and so on, the notion of self is [transferred towards] what is not the self’. Cf. somewhat further p. 220.17–18: evam tāvat abhyupagamyāpi prāṇādi-sukhānāṁ abhūta-dharmatvaṁ nātma-sādhatvatvam ity upasāmyam.—‘So even if breathing etc. and pleasure etc. are obviously of immaterial nature, they are not means to demonstrate the [existence of] ātman. Such is the conclusion’. The issue is dealt with by Rju², pp. 210–211 = MK, p. 901a and b, with a quotation of VS 3.1.4–5–6. In a different context, the ‘otherness’ (ananya) is defined
—nor inner states/feelings (sukhādi, 'pleasure etc.'). Albeit looking immaterial, sukhādi must not be regarded as leading towards the self, for fear of making the latter as transitory as themselves. To claim the contrary is nothing else than to call that which is material (anātman) ‘ātman’ (cf. n. 20).

The situation is different for desire (icchā) and recollection (smṛti) because they are factors of recognition. According to Mīmāṁsā, pratyabhijñā is a decisive proof of the presence of ātman, for, without the self, there would be no connection between the past and the present (recollection) or between the present and the future (desire). And that would mean the victory of the Buddhist theory of momentariness. For the Buddhist indeed—at least such as he is depicted by his opponent, the Mīmāṁsaka—no one would remember today the experience of yesterday; nobody would wish to take up a task at the point he had let it the day before. So nobody performing a sacrifice could hope to benefit from its result, in the future or even after his death.

In order to ward off these disastrous consequences, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha put forward that the human self is together the doer (kartṛ) of the sacrifice and the enjoyer (bhokṭṛ) of it.

(2) The self as bhokṭṛ.

How can one demonstrate that the man, especially one who seeks heaven and sacrifices in order to get there, will manage to enjoy it? Prabhākara and Śālikanātha sought elements of the answer in the Śāmkhya doctrine the adherents of which they call brahma-vid (§ 14). In the well-known collection of the Śāmkhya-kārikā, it is said that the puruṣa—the Śāmkhya equivalent of the ātman of Mīmāṁsā—exists to benefit the acts performed on the material factors, providing them with meaning and goal. Such an approach might have prompted the interest of both Prabhākara and Śālikanātha and induced them to apply the idea in the domain of the sacrifice.

A late treatise of Śāmkhya, the Śāmkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, in which Vijñānabhiṣṣu comments upon the Śāmkhya-sūtra, points out that the self as kartṛ is championed by the ‘logicians’ (tārkika). True to the teachings of the Śāmkhya, Vijñānabhiṣṣu prefers to ascribe the function of kartṛ to the aham-kāra or ‘I’-consciousness,114 and to reserve the role of bhokṭṛ to the puruṣa-ātman (§ 19).

Whereas Prabhākara seems prone to rally the Śāmkhya tradition on this point, but without crossing the line, his disciple Śālikanātha makes a choice, in keeping with his usual behaviour (e.g. in the Prakaraṇa-paṇcikā): he reconciles both contrasting points of view and vindicates that ātman is kartṛ and bhokṭṛ together (§ 21).

---

as ‘complete disconnection’ (atyantāsaṁbandhata) by Rju, p. 219.18. Thus we could say that it is impossible to cross from the visible towards what is ‘other’: the invisible.

114 The aham-kāra and its function within cognition are repeatedly mentioned in the Br and Rju, but have not been explored in depth in this contribution.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


ESNOUL 1964 = See: SK.


SPrBh = Vijñānabhikṣu: Śāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya. See: GARBE (1943).


