

**European Union Public Diplomacy through the EEAS: the cases of Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico**

Public diplomacy is a promising activity for international political actors to promote a positive image abroad. It also provides opportunities for dialogue, understanding and mutual benefit when communicating and addressing challenges. Within the European Union (EU), the Lisbon Treaty and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have given a new strength to foreign policy. The EEAS, launched in December 2010, is the EU's main institution for public diplomacy. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are relevant Latin American partners for the EU because of their size, population and political and economic potency in the region. This paper aims to answer the following questions: What is the context of EU relations with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico during the period of study (2011-2013)? What have been the EU's foreign policy and strategies towards these countries? How have public diplomacy and the work of the EEAS in these countries supported the objectives and strategies? This research includes information gained through the consultation of publications, official documents and interviews with personnel from the EEAS, both in Brussels and in the EU delegations in Latin America.

Tags: European Union; Public Diplomacy; Argentina; Brazil; Mexico

Introduction

This research starts from the hypothesis that public diplomacy works as a tool that helps the EU strengthen its soft power. Therefore, it is important to identify how the EU has developed its public diplomacy in Latin America, and specifically in three particularly relevant countries, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The three years under study (2011-2013) coincide with the start of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the supranational and official EU diplomatic service.

With the objective of contributing to the analysis of the EU's international action from the perspective of public diplomacy, three research questions will be answered here: What is the context of EU relations with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico during the period of study (2011-2013)? What have been the EU's foreign policy objectives and strategies towards these

countries? How have public diplomacy and the work of the EEAS in these countries supported the objectives and strategies?

First of all, a theoretical framework is developed on the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, and on their application in the case of the EU. In order to answer the first and second questions, a contextual framework is developed regarding the EU's relations with the three countries under study. Finally, the third question is answered by identifying the public diplomacy actions that have been developed by the EU and the role played by the EEAS in implementing these.

1. Theoretical framework: public diplomacy, soft power and the European Union

1.1. Public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is a diplomatic and international political communication activity aimed at foreign publics and seeking to create a positive image and/or political influence, contributing to the achievement of foreign policy goals.

In its traditional form, public diplomacy includes publicly known diplomatic activity and actions specifically aimed at foreign publics (through media and cultural diplomacy). The states are the actors and foreign citizens are the recipients (although in the case of cultural diplomacy, foreign citizens also have a role as collaborators). In a context of globalization, information revolution and the growing influence of civil society in international relations, public diplomacy has gradually evolved into a “new public diplomacy”¹, which takes a more “social” approach.

The “new public diplomacy” provides a more complex and broad view of the activity (place branding and niche diplomacy are incorporated) and of the actors who are able to undertake public diplomacy strategies (the approach goes beyond the traditional state-centric view and considers the possibility that supranational, sub-state and even nongovernmental actors undertake independent public diplomacy strategies). Dialogue and actions that promote relationships for mutual understanding and benefit are highly relevant. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) contribute to dialogue, to the visibility of the different public diplomacy actions and to civil society empowerment. A greater involvement of global

¹ In practice, both views coexist, and the inclination for one or the other (or for both of them), depends on the objectives and resources available.

civil society is sought in order to construct a collaborative and network public diplomacy in which public diplomacy professionals act as networkers, building and managing relations between government and civil society actors². Civil society empowerment is also an objective, with the aim of creating a sense of ownership and responsibility for the economy and institutions, and of contributing to the establishment of a cohesive society and of a stable political and economic situation³. An example of this can be seen in the creation and promotion of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and of institutional and regulatory protection for them. SMEs play an important role in civil society empowerment, since unlike big multinational corporations, they promote a feeling of ownership of the economy and its institutions in the broader society⁴. Lastly, and in consonance with a global context where the division between foreign and domestic policy is becoming increasingly diluted, the “new public diplomacy” stands for *intermestic*⁵ strategies linking public diplomacy with its domestic dimension (public affairs or domestic public diplomacy)

Activities, whether in the traditional or “new public diplomacy” variety, can be classified⁶ into four types⁷: media diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, niche diplomacy and place branding. Each of these will be discussed in turn below.

² Cfr. FITZPATRICK, K. “Advancing the New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective”. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 2, 2007, 187-211.

³ Cfr. RIORDAN, S. “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?”, in MELISSEN, J. *The New Public Diplomacy...*

⁴ Cfr. RIORDAN, S. “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?”, in MELISSEN, J. *The New Public Diplomacy...*

⁵ Cfr. DUKE, S. “The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy”. Discussion Papers in Public Diplomacy, nº 127. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2013.

⁶ There are other classifications that are compatible with the one chosen here. Nicholas J. Cull highlights five areas of activity in traditional public diplomacy: listening (including media monitoring and opinion polls); advocacy (defense of policies and ideas); cultural diplomacy; exchange and international broadcasting (institutional media). Rhonda Zaharna distinguishes two main areas of activity: information transfer and relationship building. Mark Leonard notes three dimensions according to the short, medium and long term: news management-advocacy, strategic communication-branding and relationship building-engagement.

Cfr. CULL, N.J. “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 2008, 31-54; ZAHARNA, R.S. “Mapping Out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives: Information and Relational Communication Frameworks”, in SNOW, N. & TAYLOR, P. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. London: Routledge, 2008; LEONARD, M. *Public Diplomacy*. London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002.

⁷ The classification adopted here is based on the contributions of Javier Noya, and aims to contribute to the development of a “map” of the different public diplomacy actions. The classification does not, however, imply that the four types of public diplomacy are mutually exclusive.

Cfr. NOYA, J. *Diplomacia pública para el siglo XXI: la gestión de la imagen exterior y la opinión pública internacional*. Barcelona: Ariel, 2007.

·Media diplomacy

Citizens' perceptions on other countries are largely created through the media⁸. So, political discourse and the media (whether institutional or not) have represented essential elements for public diplomacy, from its very beginnings. Media diplomacy refers to information and strategic communication actions that work in the short term. These actions are mainly carried out by political leaders and their representatives, and by diplomats and embassy press officers.

Nowadays, information overload is causing attention scarcity. Therefore, it is important to give visibility to a political message and to achieve media coverage, or even to be able to generate opinion or debate in the foreign media. Media diplomacy includes, on the one hand, unilateral actions⁹: publicly known diplomatic activity such as speeches or statements, articles published in institutional or foreign media, press releases, brochures and newsletters, management of mailing lists, websites and social media. On the other hand, there are media diplomacy actions that imply more interactivity: seminars, media events, press conferences and appearances in the media to explain and defend policies and ideas (advocacy).

Theories and strategies linked to political communication studies (agenda-setting, framing, strategic narrative, storytelling, media management, etc.) are especially relevant for the practice and study of media diplomacy, since they have much to say regarding the construction and influence of discourse in the perception of political issues.

·Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy includes the implementation of exchanges, actions and events related to education, research and culture (languages, literature, cinema, music, art). The purpose of this type of action is to promote dialogue, knowledge and mutual benefit, building positive and lasting relationships between citizens of different origins (people-to-people contacts), as well as between institutions and foreign citizens. This approach therefore works in the long term.

·Niche diplomacy

The term is based on the language and logic of business and marketing. Evans identified niche diplomacy with specialization, and explained that it consisted of “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field”¹⁰.

⁸ Through both traditional (radio, press, television) and non-traditional (Internet, social media) forms of media.

⁹ In theory, ICTs enable more interactivity in this type of action.

¹⁰EVANS, G.; GRANT, B. *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991, p. 323.

The definition is clearly related to the concept of “market niche”, which refers to a sector of the market whose needs are not fully covered by the existing products and services. Small firms often adopt “market niche” strategies: their limited resources prevent them from covering a wide market, so they must specialize in products targeting specific customers with specific characteristics. Niche diplomacy has been associated with small and medium-sized powers that exert their influence by identifying themselves with specific principles, as well as by concentrating their limited resources on solving specific problems¹¹. This view is, however, quite reductionist, since great powers can also practice niche diplomacy¹², diversifying their sources of political influence.

Conducting a niche diplomacy strategy involves specializing in functional and/or geographical areas. Functional specialization is undertaken by selecting issues or problems to address. Geographical specialization is undertaken by addressing geographical areas and/or specific segments of the population. Niche diplomacy works in the medium and long term.

Place branding

The development of place branding intensified in the 1990s, within a context of global economic competition. Governments, large companies and chambers of commerce became more aware of the importance of cultivating their brands and of the relevance of the image (national, regional, local) with which they are associated. Therefore, comprehensive strategies of presentation and the selling of an attractive and specific image have been developed at an international level, whether for a country (nation branding), a region (region branding) or a city (city branding). Advertising and marketing techniques are incorporated into place branding in order to create and promote “brands” that take into account multiple historical, political, economic or cultural aspects related to the perception of the place on the international stage¹³. The aim is to help to improve the economy, the business, foreign trade and tourism. Place branding actions, linked to image and attraction, works in the medium and long term.

¹¹ Cfr. COOPER, A.F. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War*. Nueva York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.

¹² Cfr. HENRICKSON, A.K. “Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global ‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway”, in MELISSEN, J. *The New Public Diplomacy...*

¹³ Cfr. ANHOLT, S. *Brand New Justice: The Upside of Global Branding*. New York: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2003; FITZPATRICK, Kathy R. “Advancing the New Public Diplomacy...”

1.2. EU's soft power resources

According to Nye, public diplomacy works as an effective tool to mobilize soft power resources. Soft power is a type of power based on the capacity for attraction, influence and persuasion that occurs indirectly when resources such as culture, principles, foreign policy strategies and institutions are correctly mobilized. Soft power is different from hard power, which is based on the capacity for coercion and involves mobilizing resources such as economic wealth, military force or natural assets. Smart power occurs when the hard and soft power resources available are combined in the best possible way¹⁴.

The international power of the EU is associated with persuasion and cooperation, rather than the resort to coercion or unilateralism¹⁵. The EU is, therefore, an actor associated more with soft power than with hard power: in fact, the normative power attributed to the EU would be confirmation of the great soft power capacity it possesses. The concept of the EU as a normative power refers to its power to transform societies abroad by disseminating its principles and practices, considered to be of universal application. Viewing the EU as a normative power attributes to it the capacity to determine what represents “normal” behavior on the international scene¹⁶. Given its combination of soft and hard power resources, the EU is also associated with a specific type of international power that could be equated with smart power, i.e. civil power. The concept of the EU as a civil power highlights the prevalence of civil action and the use of economic instruments rather than of security and defense policy¹⁷. Viewing the EU as a civil power overcomes the possibly idealistic and Eurocentric connotations of the initial concept of normative power. From a civil power perspective, EU foreign policy can be seen to include a coercive dimension, since it resorts to forms of pressure such as political, economic and normative conditionality, and even to sanctions (mainly economic) and to military means (mainly in humanitarian and peace missions, which retain a significant civil dimension)¹⁸.

¹⁴ Joseph Nye has developed his theory about power in international relations (and its link with public diplomacy) through several books and articles. This research gives a brief summary of the main ideas involved.

See: NYE, J. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011; “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 1, 2008, 94-109; *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004; *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1991.

¹⁵ Cfr. LA PORTE, T. “The Power of the European Union in Global Governance: A Proposal for a New Public Diplomacy”, *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2011.

¹⁶ Cfr. MANNERS, I. “The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics”, *DIIS Brief*. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009; MANNERS, I. “The Normative Power of the European Union in a Globalized World”, in LAÏDI, Z. *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social References*. New York: Routledge, 2008.

¹⁷ Cfr. SMITH, K.E. *The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe*. London: Palgrave, 2004.

¹⁸ Cfr. TELÒ, M. *The European Union and Global Governance*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

According to the concept of civil power, the EU's normative power would not only include the "soft" dimension of the dissemination of principles and practices. It would also include a "hard" dimension represented mainly by the "policy of conditionality" and norms to whose compliance it conditions (in theory) diplomatic relations, development cooperation or commercial exchanges ("democratic clauses" and phytosanitary norms for the trade of agricultural products may be cited as examples). In its mobilizing of resources (culture, principles, foreign policy strategies, institutions), EU public diplomacy contributes to the exercise of soft power, and to some extent, to its normative and civil power.

·European culture and identity

The motto of the EU, "united in diversity", reflects how Europeans have come together to work for peace and prosperity, being at the same time enriched by their different languages, cultures and traditions¹⁹. This motto represents the "brand" under which the EU presents itself to the world: as an internally diverse political entity consisting of different states working together for the common good²⁰. The various cultures existing within the EU constitute an essential element of European identity and a source of attraction abroad. The European identity is a complementary identity that provides a common link to the sum of the various national identities.

The EU also presents itself as a model of regional integration, since its own experience demonstrates the contribution of its regional model to peace, political stability, economic prosperity and social welfare. The pluralism and contradictions arising from diversity can be seen as an inconvenience, but also as an asset: the way in which the EU gets to manage pluralism and to advance toward a greater integration constitutes a practice that could be exported to other regional groupings²¹. In addition, regional integration is presented as desirable in order to create synergies and for the EU to have a stronger voice in global governance. For all these reasons, the EU promotes regional integration and interregional relations throughout the rest of the world.

¹⁹Cfr. EUROPA.EU. "EU Symbols". http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/index_en.htm

²⁰ Cfr. RASMUSSEN, S.B. "The Messages and Practices of the European Union's Public Diplomacy", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 5, 2010, 263-287.

²¹ Cfr. AGORA FORUM. "The European Union External Action Service in Times of Crisis and Change: Public Diplomacy and Discourse", European Policy Brief, 2013; LA PORTE, T. "The Power of the European Union..."

·EU principles

Article 10A of the Lisbon Treaty mentions the principles that have inspired the creation, development and enlargement of the EU, and the values the EU seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

·EU foreign policy strategies

Article 10A of the Lisbon Treaty also mentions the fundamental aims that guide the EU's international action, and which derive from its own identity, principles and political practices. In summary, these aims are: to defend peace, to support sustainable development as a means to eradicate poverty, to promote the removal of barriers to international trade, to provide humanitarian aid and to promote an international system based on multilateralism.

·EU institutions: the EEAS and public diplomacy

The EU's international action has two distinct axes linked with the notions of *high politics* and *low politics*²². The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), is linked to *high politics*. It covers the most "politicized" dimension of the EU's international action. The CFSP is managed through the intergovernmental method, involving the European Council, the Council of Foreign Ministers and the European Parliament. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS has also had responsibilities placed upon it. On the other hand, there is the EU's common external action, which is more functional and linked to *low politics*. This consists of three main areas: relations and representation of the Union in third countries and international organizations; common trade policy; cooperation with third countries (development cooperation, and economic, financial and technical cooperation with industrialized countries) and humanitarian aid (to victims of disasters and of natural or man-made crises). The EU's external action is managed through the community method (Member States have transferred some of their competences to the EU). The European Commission has traditionally been in charge of the EU's external action, mainly through the so-called "RELEX family", which included: the extinct Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX)²³, DG Enlargement, DG Trade, DG Development,

²²Regarding *high politics* and *low politics*, see: Jackson, R. H. & Sørensen, G. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

²³ DG RELEX managed and coordinated the European Commission's Delegations, in charge of promoting a unified image and the EU's interests abroad.

EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO)²⁴ and the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

The Lisbon Treaty²⁵ establishes a single legal personality for the EU²⁶ and adds important new features to its international action, especially relating to horizontal coordination (between EU institutions and policies)²⁷ and to the link between *high politics* and *low politics*. The main new features, also relevant for the development of public diplomacy, are the creation of the following: the post of a fixed and full time President of the European Council (which, in line with the Lisbon Treaty, has become an institution); the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP); and the EEAS.

The role of the former rotating presidency of the European Council²⁸ is now assumed by a fixed and full time President. From January 1, 2010, the President of the European Council has been the Belgian Christian-Democrat Herman Van Rompuy. By eliminating the previous rotating presidency, which tended to introduce new priorities in foreign relations according to the short-term interests of the Member State in post, the EU has created greater continuity in its diplomatic representation, policy priorities and message²⁹.

The post of HR/VP has been held, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, by Catherine Ashton. She leads the EEAS, and her post establishes a link between the two axes of the EU's international action: the CFSP and the EU's external action. In the first case, Ashton takes part

²⁴ Since January 2011, DG Development and AIDCO have been merged into DG Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid (DG DEVCO).

²⁵ See: OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EU. "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007", (2007/C 306/01). <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN>

²⁶ In this way, the EU strengthens its negotiation power and becomes a more efficient actor, capable of expressing itself with clarity on the international stage.

Cfr. EUROPA.EU. "Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century".

http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm

²⁷ The Lisbon Treaty also alludes to the need for vertical coherence (between the EU and the Member States).

²⁸ The European Council determines the general direction and priorities of the EU. It does not exert legislative functions. It is composed of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. The HR/VP takes part in its work. The European Council should not be confused with the Council of the European Union, which brings together Ministers from the Member States in order to adopt legislation and coordinate policies. Unlike the European Council, the Council of the European Union still has a six-month rotating presidency.

Cfr. EUROPA.EU. "The European Council: An Official Institution of the EU", <http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-institution?lang=en>; "Council of the European Union", http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu/index_en.htm.

²⁹ Cfr. RASMUSSEN, S.B. "El Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior: un reto comunicativo para la diplomacia pública de la Unión Europea", *Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto*, 44, 2011, 147-166; DUKE, S. "The European External Action Service..."

in the European Council (as HR) and in the Council of the European Union (as President of the Foreign Affairs Council). In the second case, she is Vice-President of the European Commission (with authority to coordinate the work of the other Commissioners) and is responsible for the EU's external action. Ashton's multidimensional post was created precisely to increase the weight, coherence and visibility of the EU's international action³⁰.

Since December 1, 2010, the EEAS has been the official EU diplomatic service. It includes both the headquarters in Brussels and the EU Delegations (which replace the delegations of the European Commission, representing the EU as a whole and not only the Commission) in third countries and international organizations (such as the UN and the WTO). Employees of the EEAS come from the Commission (mainly from the Foreign Service of the extinct DG RELEX, from DG Development and DG Trade), from the General Secretariat of the European Council and from the diplomatic corps of the Member States³¹. The EEAS is an autonomous institution within the EU. It has its own budget and has absorbed the competences of the extinct DG RELEX. The institution works closely with DGs that were previously members of the "RELEX family", with the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI)³² and with other DGs with an external dimension of action (such as DG Education and Culture).

The EEAS is the main EU institution in charge of public diplomacy, at the communication and coordination level. The EEAS headquarters in Brussels is in charge of strategic planning and horizontal coordination. The EU Delegations are in charge of public diplomacy abroad. They collaborate in the implementation and promotion of public diplomacy strategies and actions designed by the EEAS and the Commission. They also have a specific budget for their own actions: cultural diplomacy (celebration of Europe Day and other relevant dates, events, etc.) and media diplomacy (preparation and promotion of visits, events and actions aimed at opinion multipliers). In addition, they prepare political reports, monitor local media and development programmes and identify the most relevant audiences with a view to promoting

³⁰ Cfr. EUROPA.EU. "Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century".

http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm

³¹ Cfr. DUKE, S. "The European External Action Service..."

³² The FPI is a new service established following the Lisbon Treaty. It comes under the authority of HR/VP Ashton and works closely with the EEAS (it is co-located with the EEAS in its Brussels headquarters) and with the EU Delegations. The FPI is tasked with implementing foreign policy actions in four main areas: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), Electoral Observation Missions (EOMs) and the Instrument of Cooperation with Industrialized Countries (ICI).

Cfr. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. "Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)-About Us".

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/about/index_en.htm

dialogue, collaboration and mutual understanding. In many of their activities, the Delegations collaborate and coordinate with the embassies of Member States.

It is worth noting that, on the rare occasions that the EEAS mentions the term “public diplomacy”, this refers mainly to media diplomacy actions, revealing a rather instrumental view of the activity. For example, the definition of the *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations* states that public diplomacy includes elements such as “advocacy”, “public persuasion” and “basic information provision”, with the ultimate objective of “enhancing the public perception/awareness of a world stage actor”³³. In a similar way, on the EEAS website, and referring to the public diplomacy that is part of the Industrialized Countries Instrument, the aim of public diplomacy is described as being to “enhance the visibility of the EU as a whole, promote a better understanding of the EU's actions and positions and exert a positive influence on how the EU is perceived in partner countries”³⁴. However, in practice, public diplomacy is present in many of the EU's actions where nongovernmental agents have a key role as recipients or collaborators: from the traditional informative and educative exchange activities to the more innovative network strategies for the implementation of development cooperation.

2. EU relations with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico

The EU and Latin America have maintained official biregional political relations since 1999, when the first EU-Latin America/Caribbean (LAC) Summit took place. The EU is the second trade partner of the region and the most important foreign investor, besides being, together with its Member States, an important donor of official development aid³⁵.

During the period 2011-2013, the biregional EU-Latin America strategic association was guided by the Action Plans established in the sixth EU-LAC Summit (Madrid, 16/19 May 2010) and in the first EU-CELAC Summit/seventh EU-LAC Summit (in Santiago, Chile, 26/27 January 2013). In both summits, joint declarations highlighted the common values and global challenges of the two parties, and the need to strengthen the biregional association and to promote innovation, technology and investments for sustainable development. The Action Plan

³³ EEAS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION DIVISION & DEVCO COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPARENCY UNIT. “Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations”. Ref. Ares (2013)32604 - 11/01/2013, p.3.

³⁴ Cfr. EEAS. “Public Diplomacy”. http://eeas.europa.eu/ici/publicdiplomacy/index_en.htm

³⁵ Cfr. EEAS. “EU-Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century”, 2012. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/lac/docs/2012_eu-celac_leaflet_en.pdf

2010-2012 proposed a work programme that includes dialogue, cooperation activities and expected results in six domains: science, research, innovation and technology; sustainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity and energy; regional integration and interconnectivity to promote social inclusion and cohesion; migration; education and employment to promote social inclusion and cohesion; and the world drug problem³⁶. The Action Plan 2013-2015 adds two more domains: gender, and investments and entrepreneurship for sustainable development³⁷.

In Latin America, Mercosur is probably the sub-regional block of greatest importance for the EU, since it absorbs the majority of European exports and private investments. For Mercosur, the EU is its primary economic and trade partner. Relations between the EU and Mercosur began with the Interinstitutional Agreement of 1992 and the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement of 1995 (in force since 1999)³⁸. Negotiations for an Interregional Association Agreement were suspended in 2004 due to disagreements regarding the commercial chapter. The EU was reluctant to liberalize the agricultural sector, where Mercosur has comparative advantages, and wanted to maintain subsidies for the production and export of agricultural goods. Mercosur, for its part, was resistant to the liberalization of investments, services and public markets demanded by the EU³⁹. Negotiations were restarted in 2010, on the occasion of the fourth EU-Mercosur Summit (held in parallel with the sixth EU-LAC Summit)⁴⁰. From that point onwards, nine negotiation rounds in the meetings of the Biregional Negotiations Committee have led to advancement in the political and cooperation chapters, as well as in the normative part of the commercial chapter. In January 2013, a ministerial EU-Mercosur meeting took place (in parallel with the first EU-CELAC Summit). The meeting included a review of the advances achieved to date, and the end of 2013 was established as the

³⁶ Cfr. COUNCIL OF THE EU. "Towards a new stage in the bi-regional partnership: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion", Madrid Action Plan 2010-2012, EU-LAC Summit, Madrid, 18/05/2010.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114535.pdf

³⁷ Cfr. COUNCIL OF THE EU. "EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015", Santiago, Chile, 27/01/2013.

http://www.eas.europa.eu/la/summits/docs/2013_santiago_summit_eu-celac_action_plan_en.pdf

³⁸ EU's Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreements are based on three pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and mutual trade liberalization. They include a "democratic clause" (concerning the respect of common values) and an "evolutive clause" (on the possibility of completing and increasing the level of cooperation). The aim is to help regional integration and, in a second phase, negotiating Interregional Association Agreements that imply also the establishment of a free trade area.

Cfr. SANTANDER, S. "La légitimation de l'Union européenne par l'exportation de son modèle d'intégration et de gouvernance régionale: Le cas du marché commun du sud", *Etudes Internationales*, XXXII, 1, mars 2001, 51-76.

³⁹ Cfr. SANTANDER, S. "Les enjeux du sommet de Madrid", *Revue Nouvelle*, 4, 2010, 11-14.

⁴⁰ Cfr. COUNCIL OF THE EU. "IV EU-Mercosur Summit, Joint Communiqué, Madrid, 17/05/2010.

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-10-129_en.htm

deadline to prepare the conditions for the exchange of market access offers⁴¹. However, at the end of 2013, the signing of an Interregional Association Agreement was still being hampered by disagreement over the commercial chapter, in Mercosur mainly by Brazil and Argentina⁴².

According to Santander, after twenty years of collaboration with the EU, Mercosur has not evolved sufficiently in the consolidation of its regional integration: it has not finalized its free trade area or its customs union, it has not created a collective negotiation body and it has not adopted common legislation in areas subject to negotiations (services, investments, governmental purchases)⁴³. As in the rest of Latin America, the regionalism of Mercosur is more intergovernmental than supranational, and this complicates the existence of strong common institutions, of a common identity and of a sufficient level of social support, leaving regionalism at the mercy of the Member States⁴⁴. Brazil, interested in strengthening its role in South American regional power, defends integration within Mercosur and the negotiations for an Interregional Association Agreement. But at the same time, Brazil protects its developmentalist economic model, which aims to reduce national vulnerability and to maintain autonomy in the formulation of industrial and financial policies⁴⁵. Brazil is therefore resisting a greater degree of supranationality to the extent that it may be limiting its ability to react when faced with external economic crashes. The establishment of the South American Community of Nations in 2004, which became the Union of South American Nations (USAN) in 2008, has been understood as a Brazilian commitment to “enlarging” instead of “furthering” Mercosur. USAN is a weakly institutionalized project, focusing on favoring South American physical integration and framing the liberalization of commercial exchanges and interregional investments⁴⁶. In the case of Argentina, the country’s relations with Mercosur (as with the rest of its foreign policy) are more contextual and are exposed to the pressures of other sectors of

⁴¹ Cfr. TRADE COMMISSION. “Mercosur-EU Ministerial Meeting”, Joint Communiqué, Santiago, Chile, 26/01/2013.

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/january/tradoc_150458.pdf

⁴² Interview with Adrianus Koetsenruijter, Head of the Division for Mercosur countries, EEAS, Brussels, 27 May 2014.

⁴³ Cfr. SANTANDER, S. “L’Atlantique Sud dans l’agenda extérieur de l’UE. Le cas des relations avec le Brésil”, en BRUNELLE, D. *Communautés Atlantiques: asymétries et convergences*. Montréal: Éditions IEIM, 2012.

⁴⁴ Cfr. SANAHUJA, J.A. “L’UE et l’intégration régionale en Amérique Latine. La nécessité d’adopter une nouvelle stratégie”, in SANTANDER, S. (Ed.). *Le partenariat stratégique Union Européenne-Amérique Latine dans un monde en mutation: quelles évolutions et perspectives?*, Revue n°2/2007. Bruxelles: Centre d’Etude des Relations entre l’Union Européenne et l’Amérique Latine.

⁴⁵ Cfr. TURCOTTE, S.F. “Le Brésil de Lula et l’Amérique du Sud: L’impossible construction d’un status de puissance régionale”, in SANTANDER, S. (Ed.). *Le partenariat stratégique Union Européenne-Amérique Latine...*

⁴⁶ Cfr. TURCOTTE, S.F. “Le Brésil de Lula et l’Amérique du Sud: L’impossible construction d’un status de puissance régionale”, in SANTANDER, S. (Ed.). *Le partenariat stratégique Union Européenne-Amérique Latine...*

politics⁴⁷. With the presidencies of Menem (1989-1999), Mercosur was conceived as a commercial instrument destined to be integrated later into the United States' project Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). It was not until the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) that the Argentinean stance changed in a substantial way, giving more relevance to the furthering of Mercosur and to its relations with South America and the world⁴⁸. With the entry of Venezuela into Mercosur (2006), Argentina hoped to benefit from petrodollars, from the country's strategic energetic contribution and from a reduction in the asymmetry in favor of Brazil, evident since the beginnings of Mercosur. However, some elements of Venezuelan politics (anticapitalist discourse, antidemocratic behaviors and military ambitions) turned out to be damaging for Mercosur's external trade policy, resulting in greater collaboration between Brazil and Argentina⁴⁹.

Beyond the difficulties encountered in exporting its model of regional integration and securing association agreements, the EU is aware of the progressive evolution of international relations towards a multipolar and interdependent world, where emerging powers are gaining weight. Therefore, although the EU has not abandoned its commitment to integration and interregional relations, it has, since 2003, begun to establish Strategic Partnerships with countries considered as political and economic powers⁵⁰. The EU Commission's 2005 report, "A stronger partnership between the EU and Latin America", which highlights the economic expansion of the Asian powers and the weight of Brazil and Mexico in the whole of Latin America, is framed in this context⁵¹. Introduced in 2009, the strategy "The EU and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership" stands for promoting regional integration as well as for strengthening bilateral relations with individual countries in a way that complements biregional relations.

⁴⁷ Cfr. RUIZ, J. "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela", *Foro Internacional*, 50, 1, 2010, 35-62.

⁴⁸ Cfr. BERNAL-MEZA, R. "Argentina y Brasil en la Política internacional: regionalismo y Mercosur (estrategias, cooperación y factores de tensión)". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 51, 2, 2008, 154-178.

⁴⁹ Cfr. TURCOTTE, S. "Le Brésil de Lula et l'Amérique du Sud: L'impossible construction d'un statut de puissance régionale", in SANTANDER, S. (Ed.). *Le partenariat stratégique UE-Amérique Latine...*

⁵⁰ Since 2003, the EU has established Strategic Partnerships with ten countries: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States.

See: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE. "EU Strategic Partnerships with Third Countries", 02/10/2012.

<http://epthinktank.eu/2012/10/02/eu-strategic-partnerships-with-third-countries/>

⁵¹ Cfr. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. "A stronger partnership between the EU and Latin America", Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2005), 636 final, Brussels, 08/12/2005.

http://eeas.europa.eu/la/docs/com05_636_en.pdf

In 2007, the EU signed a Strategic Partnership agreement with Brazil⁵²; the first such agreement with a Latin American country. The EU has defended the agreement, describing Brazil as “a key interlocutor”, “a champion of the developing world in the UN and the WTO” and “a natural leader in South America and a key player in Latin America”⁵³. The Strategic Partnership does not imply that the EU has abandoned negotiations for an Interregional Association Agreement with Mercosur, but rather that it is choosing to act in a pragmatic way, seeking to further bilateral relations with a country of weight like Brazil⁵⁴: in fact, the EU considers that its relationship with Brazil could act as an incentive for strengthening the EU-Mercosur process⁵⁵. Through its agreement with Brazil, the EU is also seeking to institutionalize a regular bilateral dialogue regarding global, regional and bilateral issues of common strategic interest with a country of important political and economic weight on the international stage. Both the EU and Brazil perceive the Strategic Partnership as a support to their own international recognition and visibility, and as a tool to diversify their international relationships and to gain economic benefits⁵⁶.

Within the framework of the Strategic Partnership, the V and VI EU-Brazil summits were held in 2011 and 2013⁵⁷. In both summits, the two parties reaffirmed their aim to position themselves jointly regarding global, biregional and bilateral issues, as well as regarding the main international forums⁵⁸. During the period of study, bilateral relations between the EU and Brazil were guided by the first and second Joint Action Plan (2009-2011 and 2012-2014). In the first of these plans, five axes of action were specified: promoting peace and comprehensive security through an effective multilateral system; enhancing the economic, social and environmental partnership to promote sustainable development; promoting regional cooperation; promoting science, technology and innovation; promoting people-to-people exchanges. These axes were

⁵² Prior to the signing of this agreement, bilateral relations had been guided by the CEE-Brazil Framework Cooperation Agreement (1992) and by the Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (2004).

⁵³ Cfr. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. “Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2007) 281 final, Brussels, 30/05/2007, p.2. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0281&from=EN>

⁵⁴ Interview with Adrianus Koetsenruijter...

⁵⁵ SANTANDER, S. & PONJAERT, F. “The EU and its far-abroad: interregional relations with other continents”, in TELÒ, M. *The EU and global governance*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

⁵⁶ Cfr. SANTANDER, S. “L’Atlantique Sud dans l’agenda extérieur de l’UE...”

⁵⁷ The EU-Brazil annual summits, established with the Strategic Partnership, are complemented by ministerial meetings, joint committees and sectorial bilateral dialogues (on education and culture, scientific cooperation, agriculture, energy, information society, etc.). With the aim of including civil society in the dialogue, EU-Brazil business summits and roundtables between the economic and social committees of both parts have been held.

⁵⁸ Cfr. COUNCIL OF THE EU. “V European Union-Brazil Summit”, Joint Statement, Brussels, 04/10/2011; “VI Brazil-EU Summit”, Joint Statement, Brasilia, 24/01/2013.

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-348_en.htm?locale=en;

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/documents/eu_brazil/declaration_summit_january2013_en.pdf

also maintained in the second Joint Action Plan⁵⁹.

EU-Argentina bilateral relations date back to the Framework Agreement for Trade and Economic Cooperation (1990), which covered commercial relations, dialogues on sectorial policies and bilateral cooperation. The Joint Work Programme of 2010 made further progress on bilateral dialogue and multilateral cooperation, on the promotion of sustainable development, and on the exchange between people and cultures and support for regional integration⁶⁰. The EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership (2007) caused mistrust in Argentina, which demanded to receive the same status⁶¹. Argentina was afraid both of Brazil's hegemonic ambitions in the region and of an enhanced Brazilian bilateral relationship with the EU, which could damage Mercosur's unity in international relations. In recent years, Argentina has shown a reduced interest in Mercosur and has augmented its protectionist measures, complicating Mercosur's economic and trade relations with the EU. In this regard, it suffices to remember the YPF issue in 2012, which "froze" bilateral relations for one year⁶². Also in 2012, the Argentinean government deployed a diplomatic campaign for the thirtieth anniversary of the Malvinas War: another conflictive issue for bilateral relations, since the Lisbon Treaty recognizes the Malvinas as British territory. Nevertheless, the EU-Argentina convergence at the cultural level is noteworthy. Also in terms of human rights policies (of special interest for Argentina in light of the impunity of the crimes committed by the country's military dictatorship) and in terms of social issues, where both sides have shown themselves to be progressive (for example, regarding the LGBT collective). While not at the level of Brazil or Mexico in macroeconomic terms or in terms of influence in the global forums, Argentina presents a higher human development index⁶³, and fewer security and extreme and structural poverty problems. This makes Argentina closer to the EU in terms of social cohesion.

⁵⁹ Cfr. COUNCIL OF THE EU. "Brazil-European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan", 2nd Brazil-European Union Summit, Río de Janeiro, 22/12/2008; "V European Union-Brazil Summit Joint Statement", 04/10/2011.

<http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/2008-12-22-final-declaration-2nd-eu-brazil-summit-en.pdf>;
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-348_en.htm?locale=en

⁶⁰ Cfr. EEAS. "Programa de trabajo conjunto Argentina-Unión Europea, 2010-2013", 28/09/2010.

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/argentina/documents/eu_argentina/programa_de_trabajo_es.pdf

⁶¹ Interview with Neal Mac Call, Desk Officer for Argentina, EEAS, Brussels, 18/06/2014.

⁶² Interview with Neal Mac Call...

⁶³ In 2012, Argentina occupies position 45 in the UN Human Development Index, being part of the "very high human development" group of countries. Mexico (in position 61) and Brazil (in position 85) are in the "high human development" group of countries.

Cfr. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. "The Rise of the South: Human Progress in Diverse World", Human Development Report 2013, pp. 143-147.

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf

In 2008, the EU signed another Strategic Partnership agreement with a Latin American country: this time with Mexico⁶⁴, the second largest Latin American power. As in the case of Brazil, here the aim of the EU was to reconcile its position on the international stage and to reinforce bilateral relations. In the case of Mexico, these relations exist within the framework of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement (in force since 2000). The Global Agreement is based on three pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and an economic association that includes the creation of a free trade area⁶⁵. The development of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Mexico is supported by a Joint Executive Plan (2010)⁶⁶, which highlights three axes of action: multilateral issues (its fourteen points include action on the international financial crisis, the reform of the United Nations, and organized crime and security), regional issues (biregional dialogue and triangular cooperation) and bilateral issues (its eleven points include action on economic and trade relations, environment and sustainable development, education and culture, science, technology and innovation, and social cohesion). The VI EU-Mexico Summit (2012)⁶⁷ took place during the period 2011-2013. In this summit, the issues mentioned were addressed and the validity of the 2010 Joint Executive Plan was extended⁶⁸.

Mexico's distinctive feature over the last decades has been its lack of belonging to any Latin American regional block, belonging instead to the economic block created in 1994 by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), together with the United States and Canada. This circumstance has determined Mexico's foreign policy at a regional and global level, with Mexico presenting itself as a "bridge" between North America and Latin America. However, Mexico's asymmetric economic integration with the United States and its tradition of non-intervention at the international level previously prevented it from developing all its potential

⁶⁴ Cfr. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. "Towards an EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership", Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2008) 447 final, Brussels, 15/07/2008.

http://eeas.europa.eu/mexico/docs/com08_447_en.pdf

⁶⁵ Cfr. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. "Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part", 28/10/2010.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f95ad1a3-795e-4fb0-84e1-28351b99415c.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF

⁶⁶ Cfr. COUNCIL OF THE EU. "Mexico-EU Strategic Partnership. Joint Executive Plan", Comillas, Spain, 16/05/2010.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114467.pdf

⁶⁷ Besides EU-Mexico summits (biennials), other mechanisms of institutional dialogue are: the Joint Council (biennial); the Joint Committee (annual); the Forum of Dialogue with Civil Society (biennial); the Mixed Parliamentary Commission (biannual). There are also various sectorial dialogues, for example: Education and Culture, Science and Technology, Social Cohesion, Environment and Climate Change, Public Security and Procurator of Justice or Human Rights.

⁶⁸ Cfr. COUNCIL OF THE EU. "VI Mexico-EU Summit", Joint Statement, Los Cabos (Mexico), 17/06/2012.

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-12-272_en.htm

as an emerging power⁶⁹. This situation has changed in recent years, however, since Mexico has signed many bilateral trade agreements and has exerted an increasing role in international forums, in addition to being part of a Latin American trade block, the Pacific Alliance (created in 2011 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru). Without concerns linked to regional integration or trade negotiations (as is the case for Brazil and Argentina), and with a notable agreement on the area of climate and the environment, the most sensitive issues in EU-Mexico relations relate to human rights⁷⁰ and social cohesion: these issues are emphasized at the political dialogue and cooperation level, but progress in these areas depends fundamentally on the Mexican political will.

3. EU public diplomacy through the EEAS: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico

The EU's soft power resources are employed in its relations with Latin America, Mercosur and the three countries that form the object of this study, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. These soft power resources consist of the EU's own culture and identity (unity in diversity, regionalism), its principles (democracy, respect for human rights, etc.), its institutions (EEAS, DG DEVCO), and its practices exported in foreign policy strategies (pacifism, sustainable development, free trade, multilateralism). Traditional diplomacy mobilizes soft power resources through summits and regular political dialogues. But public diplomacy also has an important role in mobilizing soft power resources, both in its more instrumental dimension (publicly known diplomacy-political discourse, information and strategic communication activities) and in its more discursive dimension (dialogue and the promotion of mutual understanding, the creation of networks and lasting relationships, civil society empowerment).

The main public diplomacy actions carried out in support of EU's international action are identified and discussed below⁷¹:

·Media diplomacy

At the central level, there are global institutional media, such as *EuroNews*, the EU's channel on *YouTube* (*EUTube*) and the multidimensional and multilingual websites of the EU and

⁶⁹ Cfr. ARÈS, M. "Mexique: transcender l'hégémonie Américaine", in SANTANDER, S. (Ed.). *L'émergence de nouvelles puissances: vers un système multipolaire?*. Paris: Ellipses, 2009, 171-204.

⁷⁰ The problem of impunity, violence in general and against human rights defenders and journalists in particular (Mexico is one of the most dangerous countries in which to practice this profession) is especially worrisome.

Interview with Philipp Oliver Gross, International Relations Officer for Mexico, EEAS, Brussels, 18/06/2014.

⁷¹ The analysis included reference to the websites of the EEAS and of the EU Delegations in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico; the EU's development cooperation strategy documents for Latin America, Mercosur and the three individual countries; and interviews with desk and development cooperation officers in the EEAS and DG DEVCO. Interviews with the EU Delegations will take place in summer 2014.

EEAS. In the EEAS, the Division of Strategic Communication (Spokespersons' Service) offers support services to the HR/VP and to those in EEAS senior posts, and it produces content for the media and the general public. For example, it distributes to the Delegations abroad "news flashes", containing daily *lines to take* on the most relevant issues, background information and press material. It also provides event alerts, produces weekly digital newsletters summarizing the main events occurring in EU foreign policy and provides the Delegations with direct access to the daily briefing in Brussels (by phone or via *streaming*)⁷². Thus, the daily "tools" of this service are: *lines to take*, material and events for the press, audiovisual material, the EEAS website, social media, statements, speeches and interviews.

In addition, the Division of Strategic Communication coordinates the messages of the EEAS, the DGs (both DG Communication, in charge of the EU's internal communication, and DGs with dimensions of external action, such as DG Trade and DG DEVCO) and the Delegations. In 2011, the Division of Strategic Communication created the External Relations Information Committee (ERIC), which brings together representatives from the Commission's Communication Units in order to coordinate information and communication activities between the units and with the Delegations. And in 2012, in coordination with the DEVCO Communication and Transparency Unit, the Division produced the *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organizations*⁷³.

At the local level, the EU Delegations develop multiple media diplomacy actions with the aim of increasing visibility and of promoting the EU and its policies. The Delegations manage their own website, social media and newsletter. They also write articles, give interviews in the local media, prepare and promote visits (both inside the country and from EU senior post-holders) and meet with and address opinion multipliers (public institutions, businesses associations, academia, civil society, the media, the general public). In addition, they collaborate in the organization of trips to Brussels for local journalists, aimed at contributing to the understanding of the EU and to the development of precise information about it. Strategies are currently being implemented, aimed at achieving a better coordination at the local level between the Delegations and Member States' media diplomacy⁷⁴. Regarding development cooperation, the Delegations give visibility to calls for proposals and tenders, to the implementation of projects

⁷² Cfr. DUKE S. "The European External Action Service..."

⁷³ See: EEAS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION DIVISION & DEVCO COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPARENCY UNIT. "Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations..."

⁷⁴ Interview with Ignacio Sobrino-Castello, Desk Officer for Brazil, SEAE, Brussels, 18/06/2014.

(the level of organization of visits with journalists to places where projects financed by the EU are being developed is remarkable) and of their results. The EU involves civil society in managing the communications aspect of the projects: the message regarding a project must be coherent with that of the EU, giving information regarding funds received and including the EU logos. The effort to inform and give visibility to development cooperation is patent in the websites of DG DEVCO, of the EU Delegations and of those responsible for each project⁷⁵.

Political discourse (at the central or local level, proactive or reactive) and its repercussions in the media is of great importance for media diplomacy, since its aim is not just to inform, but also to persuade. Discourse arising from political meetings and from visits by relevant EU post-holders is the most likely to receive coverage and to generate reactions from the local media. The same can be said of discourse that alludes specifically to joint challenges and to the EU's relations with Latin America, Mercosur and the countries forming the object of this study. For the period 2011-2013, some relevant examples of political discourse were found at: the G-20 Summit held in Mexico and the Rio+20 Summit held in Brazil (2012); the EU-CELAC Summit (2013); Mercosur's negotiation rounds and the EU-Mercosur Ministerial Meeting (2013); the EU-Brazil summits (2011, 2013) and the EU-Mexico Summit (2012). Other examples can be seen in HR/VP Ashton's official trip to Brazil and Mexico (2012) and the visits of other EU senior post-holders, such as the Vice-President of the European Commission (Antonio Tajani), the President of the European Parliament (Martin Schulz), and the officer in charge of EU relations with Mercosur countries (Adrianus Koetsenruijter). Trips made by different Commissioners (for Education, Trade, Climate Change and the Environment), especially to Brazil in the months before the Rio+20 Summit, are also noteworthy. In the case of Argentina, statements made by important EU post-holders referring to the expropriation of YPF are also quite relevant, since this issue generated considerable media repercussions.

Political meetings and communicative activities developed by the EU Delegations are also subject to receiving media coverage (including seminars, conferences, interviews and articles for the local media)⁷⁶. Visits made by officials from the EU Delegations to the different states

⁷⁵ It would be interesting to ascertain the level of visibility these projects have in the local media.

⁷⁶ The second part of my post-doctoral research project is focused on media diplomacy and, in particular, on the analysis of EU political discourse and how it is received in the Argentinean, Brazilian and Mexican media. In order to carry out this analysis, there will be an empirical application of political communication theories such as agenda-setting or framing.

and provinces (often joint visits, with representatives from the Member State embassies) receive special coverage in the local media⁷⁷.

Cultural diplomacy

EU cultural diplomacy in the three countries under study is developed at the regional, sub-regional and bilateral level, according to the priorities and programmes of development cooperation determined in the “Strategy Papers” (for Latin America as a whole and for each of the individual countries) and through activities implemented directly by the EU Delegations.

At the regional level, the second priority of the Regional Strategy Paper for Latin America for the period 2011-2013 was focused on “human resources and mutual understanding between the EU and Latin America; Higher Education”. This priority has been materialized in the Erasmus Mundus and ALFA III programmes. Erasmus Mundus is a worldwide programme created in 2004. It involves the creation of joint masters and doctoral programmes with third countries, the granting of exchange scholarships and the undertaking of activities to increase the attractiveness of European higher education. The ALFA III programme (Latin America Latina-Academic Formation) promotes both higher education in Latin America and regional integration in this field.

At the bilateral level, the EU-Brazil Joint Action Plans (for the periods 2009-2011 and 2012-2014) include as their fourth and fifth axes “promoting science, technology and innovation” and “promoting people-to-people exchanges”. In addition, Brazil’s Country Strategy Paper 2011-2013 includes as its first priority “enhancing bilateral relations”, through supporting sectorial dialogues but also through a “higher education programme” and through a “European Studies Institute”. In this sense, in addition to the Erasmus Mundus programme it is important to highlight Brazil’s participation in the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (FP7), as well as the establishment of the Institute for Brazil-Europe (IBE). This initiative, in which 28 Brazilian and European universities are taking part, aims to promote training and research in areas where the European experience can provide added value and contribute to meeting Brazil’s development challenges⁷⁸.

⁷⁷ Interview with Ignacio Sobrino-Castello...

⁷⁸ Cfr. Institute for Brazil Europe-IBE, <http://www.ibe.usp.br/index.php/en/the-institute>

In the case of Argentina, two of the three main priorities of the Country Strategy Paper are related to cultural diplomacy: “education” and the “strengthening of bilateral relations and mutual understanding”. In the case of “education”, the aim is to strengthen educational inclusion and work-related skills, with a view to enhancing social inclusion. The “Middle Education and Vocational Training Programme for Young People” was set up in order to work towards achieving this aim. The programme supports governmental policies designed to promote the inclusion of vulnerable young people in the secondary education system, providing technical assistance, equipment and training. As far as the “strengthening of bilateral relations and mutual understanding” is concerned, there is a “Higher Education Programme for Argentina”, aimed at facilitating access to European Higher Education for Argentine postgraduate students and university professionals. Argentina also participates in the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7).

The EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership includes a Joint Executive Plan, which has established, among its bilateral issues, support for the sectors of “education and culture” and “science, technology and innovation”. Mexico’s Country Strategy Paper also includes “education and culture” as one of its three key sectors: the EU and Mexico are committed to an increase in educative and cultural exchange, including the creation of a “Special Fund for Culture, Information Dissemination and Visibility” for cultural projects and events. The activity of the Science and Technology Cooperation Fund EU-Mexico (FONCICYT) should also be noted. This fund was created in 2007 to promote joint scientific and technological research, as well as Mexico’s involvement in the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7).

In addition to actively collaborating in the dissemination, implementation and supervision of regional programmes, EU Delegations organize their own cultural diplomacy activities. For example, for Europe Day on May 9, the Delegations of the three countries under study organize a range of activities: interviews, conferences and colloquiums in universities (Argentina); a concert with groups from different European countries to celebrate cultural diversity (Mexico); the celebration of European Week (Brazil). In European Week, and in collaboration with EUNIC Brazil⁷⁹, the Member States’ Official Cultural Institutes and embassies, the EU

⁷⁹ The EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), created in 2006, constitutes an excellent example of cultural cooperation and network action between Member States. Composed of national Official Cultural Institutes, which act with a certain degree of autonomy, EUNIC’s aim is to promote European principles and to contribute to cultural diversity both inside and outside the EU. In order to do this, EUNIC has focused on generating synergies through the implementation of joint projects and activities.

Delegation organizes many activities in Brasilia and other cities: a European cinema festival, a festival of European gastronomy, a European bazaar, concerts, conferences, and cultural and sports activities. The World and European Day against the Death Penalty takes place on October 10. The EU emphasizes that it is the only region in the world where this punishment is not applied. To celebrate this day, the EU Delegations publish articles in the local press, show films and organize presentations. The Europosgrados Fair takes place annually, in order to make public the European universities' options for high-level academic specialization (masters, doctoral and post-doctoral programmes, research stays), as well as to promote cooperation agreements between universities. Another common activity is the organization of competitions about the EU: for example, monographs and degree theses, journalistic pieces, videos. The prizes are varied: trips to Brussels to meet the European institutions, computers, IPADs, and IPODs. Lastly, EU Delegations also organize, in collaboration with Member States' Official Cultural Institutes, European Cinema exhibitions (especially well established in Argentina).

During the period of study, from 2011-2013, there were also actions to celebrate the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU (on December 10, 2012). In Argentina, the EU Head of Delegation published an article in several media outlets and organized, together with the Italian embassy, a social and academic event. In Brazil, a European Concert for Peace took place. In Mexico, the EU Head of Delegation and the Member State ambassadors gave a press conference and gave a toast.

At an individual level, the “European Languages Week” in Brazil commemorated Europe’s linguistic richness and promoted multilingualism, offering demonstration classes and original versions of films in the different Official Cultural Institutes. Other events involving participation of the Brazilian Delegation were the inauguration of EURAXESS Links Brazil⁸⁰ and the Brazilian National Week of Science and Technology.

The EU Delegation in Argentina has participated in many academic events. The Head of Delegation inaugurated the European Union Chair in the University of Business and Social Sciences (UCES) and in the National University of La Plata, as well as the Jean Monnet Chair

Cfr. FISHER, A. “Network Perspective on Public Diplomacy: EUNIC”, in DAVIS CROSS, M.K. & MELISSEN, J. *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

⁸⁰ Euraxess Links is an information and networking tool for European researchers and researchers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), North America, Brazil, China, India and Japan.

See: <http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/index.cfm/links/eurRes/brazil>

in the Faculty of Law at the University of Buenos Aires. These chairs have the common aim of encouraging teaching and research regarding European integration and other topics related to the EU. The Head of Delegation has also participated in seminars and in the graduation ceremony of the Masters in Human Rights and Democratization programme (taught at the National University San Martín and co-financed by the EU). In addition, the EU Delegation supports and collaborates with the European Club of Buenos Aires, composed of different Member State clubs and associations.

In 2011, the EU Delegation in Mexico organized the intercultural programme “Let’s explore Europe” (“Vamos a explorar Europa”), aimed at youngsters aged between 15 and 18 from public schools in the Federal District. Various activities were organized over a period of one week: conferences on topics such as climate change and education, informative workshops and roundtables on topics relating to the EU, games, sports activities and competitions. The objective was to increase the students’ knowledge about the EU and to create links with schools and teachers. But this Delegation’s activity is remarkable mainly due to its intense level of cultural activity. In the context of the International Book Fair (Feria Internacional del Libro-FIL), held annually in Guadalajara, and in collaboration with other Member States and with the own FIL, the EU Delegation organized the Festival of European Letters. The aim was to promote a literary exchange between EU countries and Mexico, as well as to offer Mexican readers an overview of European contemporary literature. To this end, the festival brought together European writers, who gave talks and shared their experiences with the audience around specific topics and from a literary point of view. Together with the Mexican National Centre of Arts (CENART) and with the Member State embassies, the EU Delegation organizes Eurojazz, a 17-years-old festival where different European music groups play and which is highly successful in terms of attendance. In 2012 and 2013, the first calls were launched for the “Programme in Support of the Performing Arts EU-Mexico”. In these calls, the EU Delegation and the Mexican National Council for Culture and Arts (CONACULTA) appealed to soloists and artistic groups from Mexico and from the EU to undertake a series of presentations, tours and seasons. The programme offers financial support for aerial and ground transportation, production costs, and lighting and sound technicians.

The programmes and activities described are coherent with the most relevant characteristics of cultural diplomacy: developing actions linked to education and culture in order to promote values, dialogue, mutual understanding and the establishment of enduring relations. The

importance given to higher education and to scientific and technological cooperation should be noted, as well as the promotion of regional identity and integration at the cultural and educative level (especially within Mercosur). The collaboration of EU Delegations with Member State embassies, Cultural Institutes and EUNIC constitutes a good example of vertical coordination and contributes to the promotion of the image of a Europe “united in diversity”.

Niche diplomacy

In accordance with Henrickson⁸¹, this research considers that great powers may practice niche diplomacy in order to diversify their sources of political influence. The EU diversifies its political influence specifically through development cooperation, addressing multiple functional and geographical areas. Therefore, it could be said that, through development cooperation, the EU exerts diverse niche diplomacy strategies. At the central level, the EEAS collaborates with DG DEVCO in the preparation of development programmes, and at the local level, the EU Delegations have an important role in the promotion and monitoring of calls and projects, in addition to participating in them in some cases (in workshops, seminars, etc.). Development cooperation includes activities that can be characterized as cultural diplomacy (such as the Erasmus Mundus programme) or media diplomacy (actions to inform and give visibility to projects, including meetings and visits with journalists to the places where the projects are being developed)⁸².

The three countries forming the object of study have all benefited (at regional, sub-regional and bilateral level) from the EU’s global thematic programmes⁸³ and from development cooperation programmes from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), whose ultimate aim is to contribute to poverty reduction. The programmes were devised for the period 2007-2013, but Mid Term Reviews later established the priorities for the period 2011-2013.

The first priority of development cooperation for Latin America is to provide support for

⁸¹ Cfr. HENRICKSON, A.K. “Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena...”

⁸² As previously mentioned, the classification of public diplomacy activities into four types does not imply that these types are mutually exclusive.

⁸³ The EU’s thematic programmes have a global reach and address universal challenges. For the period 2007-2013, five programmes were established: investing in people (good health for all, education skills and knowledge, gender equality, culture, employment and social cohesion, youth and children); environment and sustainable management of natural resources, including water and energy; non-state actors and local authorities in development; food security; migration and asylum.

Cfr. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. “Partners in Development. European Union-Latin America Development Cooperation Guide. Update 2010”.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/178a_latinam_dev_coop_guide_2010_en.pdf

regional integration, social and territorial cohesion. The three countries under study are currently participating in projects and initiatives that started in 2007: “AI-Invest IV” (to promote the internationalization of SMEs); “@lis II” (Alliance for the Information Society, to reduce the digital divide); “Urb-AI III” (for the exchange of practices between local collectives from Europe and Latin America regarding urban local development issues) and “Eurosocial II” (to support public policies intended to improve social cohesion). The three countries are also participating in projects initiated throughout 2010: “Copolad” (for EU-Latin America cooperation in drugs policies); “Euroclima” (for the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change); “Ralcea” (Latin American Network of Knowledge Centres in the Water Sector, to promote policies based on scientific-technical knowledge in the water sector); “Laif” (Latin American Investment Facility, a financial mechanism that combines subsidies and loans with the aim of promoting infrastructure investments that contribute to sustainable development).

The second priority of development cooperation is focused on human resources and mutual understanding between the EU and Latin America, as well as on the promotion of higher education. The three countries under study participate in the Erasmus Mundus and Alfa programmes, already described in the cultural diplomacy section.

In the case of Mercosur, the EU’s cooperation programme aims to support the process of regional integration and the development of its internal market, with a view to promoting interregional relations and the implementation of a future Interregional Association Agreement. For the period 2011-2013, the first priority of the EU’s cooperation programme was support for the development of biotechnology in Mercosur (especially regarding agricultural production)⁸⁴. The aim was to contribute to Mercosur’s development and its economic and scientific integration, as well as to international competitiveness for its products and SMEs. This priority was materialized in the “Biotech” programme, a regional platform co-financed by the EU and Mercosur that brings together the private, public and academic sectors in order to promote research and development in biotechnologies within Mercosur.

The second priority of the EU’s cooperation programme is to support the deepening of Mercosur and implementation of the future Interregional Association Agreement. Specifically, the aim is to promote economic integration and sustainable development within Mercosur,

⁸⁴ For the period 2007-2013, support for Mercosur’s institutionalization (Parliament, Secretary and Permanent Review Court) had been established as the first priority of the EU’s cooperation programme. Mercosur’s authorities rejected this priority and its budget was diverted to cooperation in biotechnologies. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that Mercosur prefers an intergovernmental regionalism to a supranational one.

improving regional coordination in quality, food safety and environmental norms related to farming production, and making SMEs more conscious of the importance of the application of these norms for its international competitiveness. The aim is also to improve EU-Mercosur trade relations, where agricultural products are an important aspect. This priority is mainly materialized in the second phase of the project “Econormas Mercosur” and of the programme “Cooperation for the coordination of norms and veterinary and phytosanitary processes, food safety and differentiated farming production”. The aim of the second phase of “Econormas Mercosur” is to contribute to the establishment of a phytosanitary pattern in Mercosur⁸⁵, with special emphasis on agriculture (this involves addressing aspects such as control institutions, product registration, inspection and certification of exported and imported products, etc). The programme “Cooperation for the coordination of norms...” aims to improve consumer protection through the development of food safety activities.

The cooperation between the EU and Brazil has, as its first priority, the increase and deepening of bilateral relations. This can be seen in the third phase of the “EU-Brazil Sector Dialogues Support Facility”, designed to support the exchange of technical knowledge between interest groups involved in the multiple sectorial dialogues established by the Strategic Partnership. This support consists of firstly, the development of studies for a better understanding of mutual policies and secondly, consultancy and logistics services for strategic planning, technical missions, events organization and publications⁸⁶. Evidence of the first priority can also be seen in the second phase of the EU-Brazil cooperation and academic mobility programme, aimed at promoting links and mutual understanding, as well as at improving the working perspectives of young Brazilians (these projects have already been described in the cultural diplomacy section).

The second priority of EU-Brazil cooperation is the promotion of the environmental dimension of sustainable development. The specific aim here is to contribute to the protection of Brazilian forests and to combat poverty in the most fragile biomes, supporting the Brazilian government efforts in this respect. Two projects approved for the period 2007-2011 were started in 2011: the “Municipal Pact for the Reduction of Deforestation in São Felix do Xingu” and “Conservation Units of the *Terra do Meio*”⁸⁷.

⁸⁵ The first phase of “Econormas Mercosur” was aimed at commercial integration and environmental protection in Mercosur.

⁸⁶ Cfr. Diálogos Sectoriais União Europeia-Brasil.

<http://sectordialogues.org/en/pagina-estatica/project/presentation>

⁸⁷ The first of these projects aims to provide the town with tools for environmental and territorial management for the control of deforestation. The second project aims to consolidate the conservation units (CU) of *Terra do Meio*,

EU-Argentinean cooperation has three priorities: i) the reinforcement of education, ii) the improvement of economic competitiveness and iii) the reinforcement of bilateral relations and of mutual understanding (projects relating to the first and part of the third priority are described in the cultural diplomacy section). In order to improve economic competitiveness, a programme of support for SMEs is being implemented. This programme seeks to do the following: to reinforce the institutional framework and the state's capacity to promote innovation and to facilitate technology transfer; to promote regional policies that strengthen the role of SMEs in productive sectors where Argentina has advantages in terms of availability of natural resources; and to support local actors in SME creation, development and consolidation. The aim of the "Programme of Support for Policy Dialogue" is to reinforce bilateral relations and mutual understanding between the EU and Argentina. This programme involves the implementation of joint activities with the Argentinean authorities, enabling the transference of know-how, the exchange of good practices and the deepening of bilateral relations in jointly identified priority sectors.

EU-Mexico cooperation, co-financed fifty-fifty, is focused on supporting political dialogue and developing projects in three areas. The first area aims to promote social cohesion (through a reduction in structural poverty, inequality and social exclusion). The plan is to support sectorial political dialogues and pilot projects aimed at promoting administrative and legislative change, as well as institutional reinforcement in areas linked to social cohesion (social policy, human rights, migration, security, gender, environment). In this respect, the creation of the EU-Mexico Social Cohesion Laboratory is noteworthy: its objectives are to create consciousness, to promote social cohesion public policies and to improve access to and the quality of basic public services. Some of the instruments employed for these purposes are: specialist reports, citizen participation, workshops, events, and thematic platforms. The second area of interest is sustainable development and competitiveness. This is mainly focused on support for Mexican SMEs and on the collaboration with European SMEs in areas such as: innovation, technology transfer, promotion of clean technologies and of the adoption of environmental criteria, and the development of export capacity and trade facilitation. In this sense, the EU-Mexico Programme of Competitiveness and Innovation (PROCEI) is noteworthy. The third area of interest is education and culture (projects within this area have already been described in the cultural diplomacy section).

with a view to achieving three results: the creation or reinforcement of CU management councils; CU territorial demarcation; local population involvement in CU management and sustainable use of natural resources.

The priorities and cooperation projects described reveal functional and geographical areas of interest for the EU in its relations with Latin America, Mercosur, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. One of the key issues (functional specialization) is regional integration. Indeed, regional integration has traditionally been a key aspect of the EU's strategy in Latin America, with a view to exporting its own model of political, economic and social integration, increasing its reputation as an international actor and securing association agreements⁸⁸. The development cooperation projects that promote regional integration in Latin America and Mercosur can be considered as a tool of the EU's normative power: they allow the EU to transmit its own model, its knowledge and experience, export practices and norms. Besides regionalism, other key issues for the EU's strategy for development cooperation are sustainable development and educative and scientific exchange. In the case of sustainable development, special attention is paid to social cohesion, environmental care, and SMEs as the driving force for economic development and civil society empowerment. In the case of educative and scientific exchange, the aim is to promote mutual understanding and benefits. The population sectors that form the target of development cooperation (geographical specialization) are the groups with the greatest potential to contribute to present and future development, as well as those groups that are the most vulnerable and/or at risk of social exclusion: SMEs, students, academics, scientists, youngsters from disadvantaged socioeconomic contexts, indigenous people.

During the period 2014-2020, the EU's strategy for development cooperation will undergo significant changes. According to the "Agenda for Change", sub-regional blocks (such as Mercosur) and countries that have progressed in the development of their economies (including Brazil, Argentina and Mexico) will stop receiving bilateral aid from the EU, although they will continue to benefit from thematic and regional programmes⁸⁹. In these countries, the Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with Third Countries (PI) will promote the external dimension of the EU's internal policies and the joint management of global challenges. In addition, both Brazil and Mexico, which have their own international development cooperation agencies⁹⁰, have a special interest in South-South and triangular cooperation. It should be noted that the Brazilian interest in the so-called PALOP countries (Portuguese-Speaking African

⁸⁸ Cfr. SANTANDER, S. "EU-LA Relations: from Interregionalism to Bilateralism?", Panel on Theoretical Implications of the New Regional, Interregional and Extra-Regional Relations of Latin America. LASA Congress of Toronto, Canada, 2008.

⁸⁹ Cfr. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. "EU development policy: Commission to increase aid impact, concentrating on fewer sectors, focusing on countries most in need", Press Release, Brussels, 13/10/2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1184_en.htm?locale=en

⁹⁰ See: Agência Brasileira de Coperação (ABC) <http://www.abc.gov.br> and Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Amexcid) <http://amexcid.gob.mx/>

Countries) and the Mexican interest in Central American countries (noteworthy in this respect is the Mesoamerican Project, previously the Puebla-Panama Plan, which promotes the comprehensive development of the southern Mexican states and of nine Mesoamerican countries).

·Place branding

In principle, the EU does not carry out place branding strategies, but it does benefit from those employed by individual Member States. However, there is an EU initiative that could be called place branding. It is a pilot project, initiated in 2011, for the promotion of tourism between the EU and South America (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) in the low season. The project includes promotional campaigns at the European level that complement those of the Member States, and involves the collaboration of governments, airlines and tourism operators⁹¹.

·The EU and the “new public diplomacy”

EU public diplomacy has the characteristics associated with “new public diplomacy” (but media diplomacy actions, more associated with traditional public diplomacy, are still relevant):

*The EU itself is not a traditional public diplomacy actor (State), and it bases a good part of its soft and normative power on development cooperation (classified in this study as niche diplomacy, a less traditional type of public diplomacy than media and cultural diplomacy).

*The increase in political and sectorial dialogue made by the EU is obvious in the case of Brazil and Mexico, given the Strategic Partnership (and in the case of Argentina there is also an intention to increase political dialogue, as shown in the EU-Argentina Work Programme 2010-2013 and in the development cooperation programme). There is also an increased dialogue at the level of civil society: business summits, civil society forums and roundtables all constitute good examples, together with the multiple cooperation and cultural activities that involve civil society from both sides. In addition, civil society is being consulted in the design and review of EU development cooperation programmes. Finally, the objectives of promoting educative and scientific exchange activities include relationship building for mutual knowledge and understanding (which necessarily involves dialogue).

⁹¹ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. “50,000 tourists to promote low season travel in the EU and South America”, Press Release, 01/06/2011.
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-669_en.htm?locale=en

*Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are a constant within EU public diplomacy, whether to provide greater visibility and interactivity to the different actions (political discourse, cultural events, calls and functioning of development cooperation projects, etc.) or as an end in themselves (for example, the aim of the regional development cooperation project @lis II is to provide technological training in ICTs and to reduce the digital divide).

*The involvement of civil society in constructing a collaborative and network public diplomacy (*network perspective*) and civil society empowerment are clearly identifiable aspects of “new public diplomacy” within the EU’s approach. The best example can be found in development cooperation, due to the relevance given to SMEs as a driving force for development and empowerment and due to the way European and foreign civil society is involved. The most usual way of proceeding in development cooperation is by financing projects designed, implemented and communicated by civil society (this approach has been called “public diplomacy by proxy”⁹²). This way of proceeding contributes to civil society empowerment, necessary for political, economic and social stability.

*The concept of *intermestic* strategy has two dimensions in the case of EU public diplomacy: to link foreign and domestic public diplomacy⁹³ and to achieve a certain vertical coherence (with Member States’ public diplomacy), projecting an image of “unity in diversity”. As seen in this paper, the EU has mechanisms for message coordination in media diplomacy (both horizontally and vertically), and establishes collaborations with the Member States in cultural diplomacy events. In the case of development cooperation, the aim is to coordinate the programmes of the EU and the Member States. At the central level this can be dealt with in different meetings at the European Council (Heads of Government, Ministers, Committee of Permanent Representatives in the EU-COREPER, working groups) and in consultation with the European Parliament. But the greatest degree of vertical coordination in development cooperation happens on the ground, although the fact that the development aid provided by the EU and the Member States’ has different programming cycles complicates the implementation of projects and the creation of synergies⁹⁴.

⁹² Cfr. RASMUSSEN, S.B. “The Messages and Practices...”

⁹³ Internal or “domestic” public diplomacy (from the EU to the Member States) is not an object of study in this research.

⁹⁴ Interview with Teresa Barba, coordinator of development cooperation for Brazil and Central America, DG DEVCO, European Commission, Brussels, 27/05/2014.

For the next few years, and with the aim of improving the impact and effectiveness of development cooperation, the EU has either started or agreed joint programming exercises in the field, led by the EU Delegations and by the

Conclusions

This research has generated some conclusions on EU public diplomacy in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, and on the role the EEAS plays in this:

*In the EU's relations with Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, framed also in its relations with Mercosur and Latin America, the importance of soft power resources (which, to a certain degree, are also normative and civil power resources) can be noted: the EU's diverse and regional identity, its principles and the political practices that it attempts to export through foreign policy strategies.

*Public diplomacy supports EU's objectives and strategies in international relations. It works as a tool to mobilize EU's soft power resources, including the main public diplomacy institutions: EEAS and DG DEVCO. Three EU public diplomacy axes of action have been identified in this research: media diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and niche diplomacy (development cooperation).

*The EEAS concept of public diplomacy points to information and communication activities typical of media diplomacy. The form of public diplomacy employed by the EEAS is, therefore, a more reduced version than the one described in the academic field, especially in relation to the more social concept of "new public diplomacy". But the difference exists only at the conceptual level: in practice, as this research has confirmed, the EU is developing both "traditional" public diplomacy and "new public diplomacy" actions.

*The Lisbon Treaty incorporates innovations (the EEAS, the post of HR/VP and of President of the European Council), whose aim is to achieve a better coordination of the EU's international action, mainly between institutions and policies (horizontal coordination). The Lisbon Treaty also stands for coherence between the international action of the EU and Member States' (vertical coordination).

*In terms of public diplomacy the EEAS has, both at the central and at the local level, a particularly important role to play, mainly regarding media diplomacy and horizontal coordination. The Spokespersons' Service supports the HR/VP and other senior posts, and

Member State embassies, in more than 40 countries. See: EUROPEAN COMMISSION. "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises". Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 11/12/2013, p.11.

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf

several initiatives (daily *lines to take*, creation of the External Relations Information Committee, and of the *Handbook of Information and Communication for EU Delegations*, etc.) aim to achieve unity and to coordinate the EEAS message with that of the DGs and the EU Delegations.

*At the local level, the EU Delegations, Member State embassies and Official Cultural Institutes cooperate in the organization of multiple cultural diplomacy activities, in visits to places where cooperation projects are being developed and in development projects (in workshops and seminars). Vertical coordination is, therefore, especially observable in the field.

*From the perspective of this research, the role of DG DEVCO is also of great relevance for public diplomacy, since it is the main body responsible for development cooperation (niche diplomacy). Horizontal coordination between DG DEVCO and the EEAS is strong at the central and local levels, in both communicative and operative aspects. For vertical coordination of development cooperation programmes, there are mechanisms at the central level (meetings at the European Council, consultations with the European Parliament), but the greatest level of collaboration takes place in the field (with difficulties, given the different programming cycles of the EU and the Member States).

*For the future, it remains to be seen how development cooperation, the most “social” part of EU public diplomacy, will be affected by the changes that it will experience (the end of bilateral cooperation, the Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with Third Countries (PI), triangular cooperation with Brazil and México, joint programming exercises, etc.).