INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE REVIEW

crime  2  Piracy Worldwide
        by Eric Ellen

criminology  7  
Crime Prevention in Belgium
        by Georges Kellens

feature  16  Schengen Co-operation (part II)
        by Serge A. Bonnefoi

action/organization  26  FinCEN
        by Brian M. Bruh and David E. Nowak

forensic science  35  Plastic fracture
        by G.J. Srinivasan, P. Satyanarayana and P. Chandrak Sekharan

39  News and Notes
40  Books
Crime prevention in Belgium
Towards “integrated prevention”

by Georges KELLENS

Tragic events can provide the opportunity for an overall rethink of crime prevention. Recent history in Belgium has led to crime prevention being recentred at local level for that is where it can be deployed most effectively.

In this article on “new trends in crime prevention in Belgium”, I shall discuss certain recent events that led us to define major reorientations, some of which have not yet been fully achieved let alone evaluated. This pragmatic approach aims to do away with the usual preliminary general account of theoretical research on the subject of prevention: I do not wish to add yet another broad-scope study to the eight-thousand-odd documents collected in the computerized data bank of the Head of Crime Prevention in the Netherlands (1).

Three serious cases

Three episodes of collective crime have marked criminological thinking in Belgium in recent years. Directly or indirectly, all three resulted in the establishment of Parliamentary Commissions of Enquiry (Heysel, Weapons, Banditism and Terrorism), which is unusual in Belgium. All three posed or still pose tricky, or indeed distressing, problems for the entire criminal law system.

The Heysel affair remains engraved in everyone’s memory. On 29th May 1985, a massacre took place in full view of the whole world at a European Cup football match. United Kingdom nationals who had taken part in the murderous crowd movement were handed over to the Belgian courts. The trial expressed the incompatibility of two judicial traditions and justice systems (2). It gave rise to a prison mutiny provoked by the preferential treatment of the English prisoners. It allowed the development of a dangerous hypothesis, that of a “Hooligans International”. It damaged the reputation of the forces of law and order, and ended in a verdict determining the liability of the Belgian State, the Belgian Football Union, and the European Football Union, as well as the liability of supporters who had inflicted injuries “by pushing back human beings without their consent” (3).

The CCC (Cellules communistes combattantes — Combattant Communist Cells) affair falls into the traditional category of small groups convinced of the need to resort to terror to make people aware of their protests. For a time, fanciful international hypotheses of links with Action Directe Française (French Direct Action) were put forward, but the law ended up faced with two sub-groups which adopted different defence techniques, one using procedure, and the other refusing to participate in the trial in any way and indeed resorting to hunger strikes. This affair represents another phenomenon against which the State generally feels disarmed: a few fanatics who operate outside all known channels and who, without any particular skills, manage to terrorize and kill. At the end of proceedings open to criticism, the sentences were heavy although not so heavy as to create martyrs (4).

The Walloon-Brabant Killers affair is more mysterious and will undoubtedly remain obscure. While the CCC attacked SHAPE supplies, large banks, and symbols of law and order, the masked Walloon-Brabant gunmen attacked hypermarkets at closing time for the cash takings, insanely killing any human target.
their own countries of residence but would go to another country of the region, undertake all the necessary planning to set the wheels of crime in motion, and then return home.

It was as if they had a double identity, being law-abiding pillars of commerce in their own country and reserving their criminal activities for another jurisdiction. It is for this reason, as well as the well-known “wall of silence” which exists, that these crimes are difficult to combat.

**Specific difficulties**

The fight against piracy, in any of its multitude of forms, is always going to be difficult. In general, two of the normal preventive factors to landside crime do not exist at sea. These are the normal prevention measures which people can operate for themselves and the possibility that some measure of response or assistance is not too far away.

This is not true of the sea.

A ship has a very large perimeter — with some of the largest there is about one kilometre of perimeter - and some of the modern vessels have small crews. This will mean that, when set alongside all their other duties, there is scant manpower reserve to maintain the standard of alertness and look-out which is necessary to avoid being boarded in high-risk areas. This is made worse by the understandable attitude of some mariners who look on the ship as their homes and as a place to be lived in and not defended as if it were a fortress.

The lack of immediate effective response to a cry for help in many areas is a matter of some concern which again has its cause in several factors.

On the high seas, there is the thorny problem of jurisdiction. In international law, although the pirate is said to be the “enemy of all mankind” and there is, therefore, universal jurisdiction, when it comes down to practical operation, the vessels of some governments are strictly prohibited from “interfering”. This is an understandable approach on behalf of governments which would not wish to be inadvertently caught up in any situation which has political overtones. Response from commercial vessels is, by the nature of what they do and where they are, not a viable option and they are generally not capable of offering any practical assistance. The days of coming alongside with grappling hooks and swinging on to the deck from the yards is purely for the story-books.

The last factor, and one which causes strong feelings, is the inability or lack of will on the part of some littoral states to do anything about the attacks which occur in their waters or are obviously committed by criminals based in their country.

In some cases, there is an obvious lack of resources to give law enforcement agencies the capability which is part of the underlying cause of the problem in the first place. Sometimes we see that a country does not wish to “lose face” in the eyes of the international community by acknowledging a problem and in other cases one can never be quite certain if the authorities in a country wish to do anything about the problem.

At the end of the day, it is the seafarer who is the victim; he is the one who suffers under attack; he is the one who can be so traumatized that he never goes to sea again; he can be the one who is injured; he can be the one that dies.

That last fact alone should be sufficient for the countries who know that they are havens for the pirates to grasp the nettle and put the firmest possible measures into force to rid the seas of this scourge.
in their way, for relatively small sums. "The underworld won’t tarnish its reputation so badly for six million Belgian francs" (say US$ 175,000), Franz Reyniers, Chief Commissioner of the Brussels Criminal Police Department told the Parliamentary Commission on Banditism and Terrorism (5). The trial remained focused on a few drop-outs, former policemen and bankrupt garage-owners, on the fringe of the Fourth World (underworld). The Assize Court trial of some of them ended in the acquittal of the defendants, to the credit of the judges but to the discredit of the various police forces and magistrates involved in the investigation. The main hypothesis, also evoked in the Parliamentary Enquiry on Arms Dealing triggered off by the murder of an engineer from a large arms factory, was that the crimes were organized by extreme right-wing groups using terrorist tactics to achieve a hardening of the government regime. Serious questions continue to hang over this affair (6).

Small extreme left-wing groups, shadowy extreme right-wing groups, a hypothetical "Hooligans International", and questions about the underworld — all these make it clear that the crime prevention and law enforcement machinery in Belgium needed re-examining.

**The repercussions of the Heysel affair**

Without the links being explicit, it is clear that the Heysel affair hastened the introduction of national crime prevention structures in Belgium and led to the adoption of a certain number of positions.

The Royal Decree of 8th August 1985 (7) created a national High Council for Crime Prevention and Provincial Commissions for Crime Prevention in each of the nine provinces. These institutions, which come within the direct remit of the Interior Minister and his responsibility for "general policing of the Kingdom", basically apply a policing policy which has been put to the test since the early 1980's. In fact, the National Gendarmerie, and to a lesser extent certain local authority police forces, had already set up sections promoting "technical" or "police" prevention in the sense that they encourage citizens to take a certain number of precautions against everyday crime such as burglary, theft of and from cars, and vandalism. Above all this policy was concerned with target hardening (making target access more difficult), despite the risk of causing a shift of criminal activity towards other less well-protected citizens, neighbourhoods or districts. It was a matter of reminding the citizen that he must contribute to his own security, and that policing is a limited public resource, the use of which must be justified by priorities.

The Decree implicitly called into question life-styles which entailed increased risks of victimization. The eight principles drawn up by Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, from the empirical distribution of criminal victimization observed in the United States, are well known (8). In terms of advice, these assertions are closely akin to the traditional recommendations parents make to their children: work hard, return home on time, keep good company because rotten apples infect others, do not over-indulge, avoid strong drink except at home, and lead a well-ordered life.

From praise for a well-ordered life, we can easily move on to the demand for a normal life, outside of which aggression is normal. Moreover, the population groups designated as most vulnerable — women for example, or the elderly — already anticipate this requirement: generally speaking, they observe a self-imposed curfew, and in terms of victimization, this characteristic is reflected in the statistics which show that those segments of the population which are most afraid of becoming victims in fact have the least reason to be fearful. The danger of deriving a policy from these propositions is to consider that any person who deviates from the norms of a well-ordered life takes a risk, and has only himself to blame if dire consequences ensue.

Solidarity would have its limits. Protection would only be justified for good citizens able to prove a normal life-style. The gloomy prophecies which George Orwell made in his novel 1984 are fulfilled in this vision of a uniform world, where every person and everything is in its place, where everyone should be observable at all times because he should have nothing to reproach himself with, where at all times everyone would be fit for duty and could be called to action instantly for public service.

In 1988, when the High Council was set up, I wondered if it came within the remit of a structure of this kind to form the compliant citizen, the citizen with irrefutable behaviour (9).

Furthermore, I referred to other research, on the subject of burglary for example, taking the viewpoint of a potential offender and weighing up the effectiveness of impediments to criminal projects. Some of the burglars interviewed stated that they attached great importance to neighbours, and that the effectiveness of a neighbour is all the greater if he has a certain field of vision — a reply which corresponds to certain concerns of Oscar Newman about "defendable spaces". Whether or not prevention is conceivable at a
community level is a tricky question. Neighbourhood solidarity can be effective in certain areas but may suit others less. Solutions must be modified to suit requirements, always taking account of the costs of deterrent operations. The shift of criminal phenomena caused by these operations may give rise to some ethical misgivings. But above all, prevention programmes must not distort the quality of life of the inhabitants in a disproportionate way compared with the harm which we wish to avoid: specific examples are reported of people choosing to retain an essential element of their daily environment even if it presents drawbacks as regards security (10). I wondered if the High Council and Provincial Commissions would have to interfere in these very personal choices, even if the locals wanted to run the risk of becoming victims of certain phenomena rather than ruin their environment. Is it within their remit to encourage — according to the expression of Pierre Lascoumes — “pénalocentrisme” (pénalocentrism), that is, to place great emphasis in everyday life on consideration of the risk of penal incidents. As Professor Anthony E. Bottoms put it so well, “At the end of the day, some things are more important than crime prevention” (11).

Like the inhabitants of the Third World, some people will be “prepared to put up with a probable increase in crime as a by-product of what they perceive to be the necessary economic expansion and modernization of their countries” (12). In the same way, at local level, we have been able to observe the lamentable effects of prevention projects: “as a result of [a high-technology crime prevention] initiative, old age pensioners were trapped inside a fortress of heavy doors and electronic card-key devices which they found difficult to understand and to operate, while neighbours were no longer able to keep a friendly eye on them (13).”

A third point, which I observed during the setting-up of the High Council, was that the definition of criminality does not fall within the scope of the Interior Minister. The High Council and the Provincial Commissions have to manage the prevention of a phenomenon called “criminality” but this phenomenon is not behavioural. It is juridical. There is no behaviour which is criminal by nature, there is only behaviour which is defined by the law as criminal. Quite a number of actions which cause serious consequences for other people, slip through the net of the criminal law. Conversely, within the enormous range of behaviour formally covered by criminal law — some of which will emerge in the attributions of the police or the courts — confrontations can often be analysed as conflicts to be resolved, rather than as incidents to be punished (14). This is what is at stake in what has been called the “abolitionist movement”, which has so shaken up the ideas of criminologists and the “guardians of law and order” in recent years.

Modern juridical anthropology allows us to study the mechanisms of social control of traditional societies in much more balanced terms than in the past, whether or not these societies include a State structure. In reality, these societies have been able to devise “juridical mechanisms to resolve conflicts which, while not without defects, nonetheless constitute innovations just as worthy of esteem as many of the discoveries of modern societies. (Confinement in prison became general in the nineteenth century, spectacular physical punishments in public disappeared with the French Revolution. Prison appears more humane: expectations are rather of re-education than of punishment. While undoubtedly better than torture by the wheel, experience has shown the very limited character of its curative virtues). In assimilating revenge and violence, the State gives the impression that abolition of the former is the best defence against the latter. If that were true, violence would diminish as State control and centralization increase. Ethnographic data leave much room for doubt. Trends in revenge and violence are not necessarily determined by the presence or absence of the State” (15).

Nonetheless, in the sphere of intervention defined for the High Council, its task was proposed in very wide terms. The Council was required to study, evaluate, and analyse; to gather information and make enquiries; to define and establish foundations for the multi-disciplinary planning of a national policy; to develop and stimulate national programmes; to ensure collaboration with Provincial Commissions for Crime Prevention and if necessary to stimulate and coordinate provincial and local efforts; to contribute to integrating crime prevention in the training of district police officers and of gendarmes. The wording was rich, stimulating and dynamic, and allowed the flexible development of new ground in which little pioneering work had been done, in symbiosis and synergy with what already existed or which might exist. The vocabulary was not competitive but co-operative and innovative. As time went by the terrain was defined and made fertile within the bounds of the experience and competence demonstrated by the Council.

The only problem was that of the political will. In fact, experience showed that the Provincial Commissions, with their absurdly low budgets, generally remained inactive (16).
Apart from a certain number of opinions which were interesting but not widely adopted by the authorities, in practice the High Council could only subsidize one initiative directly linked to the Heysel affair, that of fan-coaching.

"Fan-coaching" consists of research and action intended to prevent vandalism and violent behaviour in football stadia. Rather than centering security at sports events on the maintenance of law and order by the police or gendarmerie alone and the sanctioning of excesses by the judiciary, the public authorities have placed their confidence in teams of criminologists, psychologists and educationalists to lead group activities, and individual escorts intended to encourage the social integration of youngsters likely to become involved in violence or vandalism. A team from the Catholic University of Leuven was encouraged to take responsibility for the "Siders" of Antwerp Football Club, and a team from the University of Liège took charge of the "Hell Side" members of the Standard Football Club (17). A first approach consists of "flexible" escorting of these supporters at the time of matches: the educationalists have a communication function between the youngsters and the forces of law and order. The organization of sports activities (football, rafting, bungy jumping — from great heights on elastic ropes, etc.) or "family" activities (Christmas suppers, barbecues, etc.), help in job-hunting and help to find more stable social situations: these are some of the methods used in "fan-coaching" projects.

Fan-coaching has certain similarities to a surgical operation intended to "cut-out" violence. As the psychologist Manuel Cameron explains, "These youngsters place great importance on their identity as supporters. They don't go around with the main aim of smashing things or harming people, even if there is sometimes premeditation or an intention of violence". For example, this is the case in "risky" matches where the probability of clashes between rival sides is high. The most vicious supporters are those most exposed to what Professor Walgrave calls "group vulnerability" (18). Most of these youngsters are in conflict with society and find it difficult to live in the community. Belonging to a prestigious group is a social plus-value which reinforces their identity. They prefer to be someone, even with negative implications, rather than having no identity. But the Hell Side is not a structured horde in which racist or fascist ideologies develop, and the youngsters are neither brutes nor murderers. The Hell Side is not Attila and the Huns. As a person in charge of the forces of law and order declared, "The Sides attack their counterparts. Their second favourite target is the police. The spectators are not in danger. You never see the seated enclosures mobbed or the referee attacked. We mainly deplore the vandalism phenomena".

Nevertheless, in February 1992 Liège Magistrates' Court, in sentencing three Standard hooligans for acts of violence, defined the Hell Side as a "criminal conspiracy". A "Sider" should know that there are rules of conduct to be respected. But repression does not help to slow down the phenomenon. It only shifts the emphasis and further marginalizes these youngsters, some of whom are undergoing a re-socialization course. Collaboration with police and judiciary circles must develop further to eliminate the problem, which is not limited to one specific locality: above all, hooliganism is a symptom of the socio-economic unrest which our society is experiencing.
The “Face-Lift” of crime prevention institutions

In 1991 the High Council for Crime Prevention changed its appearance very rapidly. At the press conference at which the Minister explained his initiative, it was explained that the composition of the High Council had broadly reflected earlier concepts of crime prevention which had been perceived as a task inherent to police departments. The police were responsible for combating opportunities to commit criminal acts. This required their presence in high crime risk localities and the provision of advice on self-protection to citizens. With the exception of certain university professors, therefore, the High Council had been solely composed of representatives of the police or of departments directly concerned by the problem of crime prevention, such as the General Police of the Kingdom or the Public Prosecutor’s Department.

After a certain time, the Minister went on to say, that approach had clearly become too limited to guarantee lasting results. Other countries’ experience also showed that a crime prevention policy based solely on reducing opportunities for committing criminal acts was too limited. It had become necessary to consider the causes of crime. The complexity of this task implied calling on departments and authorities which did not necessarily have crime problems as their priority objective, but which had an undeniable impact on such problems because of their spheres of responsibility which might include combating social exclusion, immigration problems, national and regional development, etc.

Consequently, the Minister announced “a fresh start!”, he explained that the initial composition of the High Council was not suited to the multidisciplinary membership required by an integrated approach to crime prevention. That is why the provisions of the Royal Decree of 8th August 1985 on the composition of the High Council had been modified by the Royal Decree of 31st January 1991 which stated that the High Council would be composed of representatives of: national, community or regional ministries which could make an important contribution to crime prevention; the Gendarmerie and district police forces; the Union of Belgian Cities and Districts; research and training institutes active in crime prevention.

On the other hand, the insurance sector — present on the previous version of the Council — was no longer represented. Representatives of other interested parties could be invited as individual members.

At the national level, in addition to the Interior Ministry which naturally has competence in the field of crime prevention and within which, at the General Directorate of the General Policing of the Kingdom a department has specific responsibility for crime prevention, the Ministries of Justice (judiciary policy) and of Communications (security of airways and public transport) are represented. At the community level, members represent the Departments of Education, Public Health (Flemish Community) and Child Welfare (French Community). A member of the Department of Social Affairs of the German-speaking Community was also appointed. Two members of social welfare groups (Victim Aid and Drug Prevention) were appointed. Two mayors as well as a youth judge and the Deputy Royal Commissioner for Immigrants are also members of the High Council. Finally, the police and the Gendarmerie which still have important crime prevention missions to fulfil, remain represented.

Security arrangements impose strict segregation of rival supporters inside the ground. The infrastructure provides for barriers and fences so that spectators can be separated according to which team they support. These passive security measures are backed up by the physical presence of police officers in riot gear. Left: the Hannover stadium during a match between Germany and Belgium in May 1991.
The slogan given by the Minister at his presentation was: “A High Council to support local integrated prevention”. He explained that the wide-ranging membership should guarantee that the High Council could handle any crime problems and could study them from every angle in order to find solutions. Crime prevention would be more likely to succeed if the techniques of “situational” prevention (i.e. reducing the opportunities of committing criminal acts and increasing the risk of getting caught) were combined in a global strategy with social prevention techniques based on the causes of crime.

Crime prevention, he considered, must essentially take place locally. Only at local level can all the subtleties of criminal phenomena be assessed and local situations and structures can be fully considered when implementing prevention initiatives. That is why it is very important that the Union of Belgian Cities and Districts be represented by two mayors on the High Council.

While the provincial level is no longer considered as an extension of central power, the policy of the Interior Minister thus presently consists, in the main, of supporting, co-ordinating and stimulating local initiatives. As was done under the previous policy, documents and brochures giving prevention advice are distributed with the aid of the districts: they deal with drug abuse prevention and the protection of vehicles. Brochures on shop theft, the security of vulnerable people, and house protection are planned. Specialized courses for police personnel and other crime prevention professionals have been organized.

But above all, since the beginning of 1991, 27 “integrated district prevention” pilot-projects have been backed by the Interior Minister. Out of some 600 districts invited, within too tight a deadline, to present projects conforming to a proposed pattern, 70 replied and 27 were accepted. These 27 communes thus obtained the help of two or three (according to the size of the cities) prevention workers, with a somewhat precarious status, for the development and implementation of their projects. These projects, mainly centred on drug problems, youth crime, leisure crime, or crime in socially deprived areas, are supported by the General Police of the Kingdom. Half of them also benefit from the scientific support of four university teams, but in rather ambiguous conditions: in fact, their job is defined not only as an auxiliary task, but also as one of evaluation. A first objective, which must be completed by early 1993, is to develop manuals for district authorities wishing to instil prevention in their urban community, to create the synergies necessary to fight against deterioration in the social climate of the cities or, in the more positive terms used by François Mitterand, to contribute to the creation of a “city civilization” still in its infancy. The wager of the present Minister is that the district as such, that is the political level closest to the citizen, will generously look after the interests of everyone while putting in the middle distance an illusory and ephemeral authority: how do you achieve a broad, collective and enduring mobilization, respectful of everyone, and get district entities to accept the “central interest for the local” (Chevalier’s expression), to stomach bread kneaded with national leaven?

In the Minister’s view, the role of the High Council must be set in the same context. Its essential task is not to develop national initiatives for crime prevention. On the contrary, through the competence and versatility of its members, the High Council must give opinions to the Interior Minister to support his prevention policy. Here also the role of support for local authorities is essential. To that end, the attributions of the High Council have been redefined by the Royal Decree of 31st January 1991, so that it may issue opinions to the Interior Minister on the most diverse subjects related to crime prevention.

The project of a Model Regulation for the Creation of District Councils for Crime Prevention is a first example of the manner in which the High Council can be active in developing instruments which may contribute to a district policy of crime prevention. At the local level, it is
important that all departments and authorities with an interest in crime should contribute to the district policy on the subject. The district authorities responsible for the development and implementation of a security policy within their district can, by the creation of a District Council, call upon the competence of departments in very different sectors, such as police and security, city planning, social affairs, education, youth and leisure, victim assistance, etc.

The "Model Regulation creating a District Consultative Council on Prevention" has been discussed by the High Council and distributed to all provincial governors, and for information to the mayors.

In the covering letter attached to the "Model Regulation" dated 30th January 1992, the Minister refers to Recommendation R (87) 19 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe relating to the organization of crime prevention, and the Royal Decree of 1985 (modified in 1991) which provides for the possibility of organizing meetings with a view to the development, promotion or co-ordination of preventive measures and local actions.

"It is important that the driving force of crime prevention initiatives be located at local level. An international consensus exists on this point. To be really effective, the actions must be integrally adapted to all the specific circumstances in which certain criminal offences take place. To conduct such preventive activities, taking complete account of this specificity, can obviously only be done at the local level".

"Having regard to the multiplicity of causes which are at the root of crime, a district approach to this problem must necessarily be integrated and multidisciplinary. Security is thus certainly not the exclusive business of the police department. To be able to deal with all aspects of this problem, an appeal must be made at local level to collaborators from very varied sectors such as the police and security, city development planning, social affairs, education, and youth and leisure. However, it is a fact that little progress has been made in the local fight against crime because all these participants act separately, seldom co-ordinating their activities and then only to some degree.

"The advantage of this prevention council is that it will establish a dialogue. By integrating representatives of the population (for example, youth associations, parents’ associations, etc.) in a consultative commission which reports directly to the district authority, greater participation of the public in district policy is ensured. This not only reinforces district democracy, but also offers a greater guarantee that the developed policy benefits from the approval of the public concerned, such that the execution of these measures will be more effective".

Moreover, the opinions and proposals issued by the prevention council to assist the district authority, will also enable the mayor to be better briefed for a dialogue with the judicial authorities, within the framework of what is known as five-way discussions. These five-ways discussions are provided for in the draft law on the police function, and include, at the judiciary district level, discussions between the mayor, the Public Prosecutor and the officers in charge of the Gendarmerie, the district police and the criminal investigation police attached to the Public Prosecutor’s department, with a view to promoting both optimum co-ordination of the functions of the administrative and criminal police and collaboration between the police departments".

Thus, the key-words are currently “integrated prevention” and “five-way discussions”. Prevention should be integrated, not only in the sense of combining the two main approaches which are usually distinguished (situational crime prevention following the Anglo-Dutch model and social crime prevention following the French model) but also in the sense of implying concerted action by the various participants in prevention, if possible with the determination and teleological tone that authors like Touraine give to this concept of “participant” (19). Besides, the five-way discussion is a variant of the traditional Dutch driehoeksoverleg (three-way discussion).

The Repercussions of the Walloon Brabant Killers Affair

The projects which we have just described fall within the objectives of the Council of Europe and, at world level, are part of the main theme of the International Conference on Security, Drugs and Urban Crime Prevention, held in Montreal in 1989 and in Paris in 1991. Among the export opinions expressed in preparation for the Paris Conference, that of Professor Jean-Paul Brodeur, Director of the Montreal International Comparative Criminology Centre, is particularly worthy of note. "It is often said of generals that they plan their next campaign as if they were fighting the previous war. As far as we are concerned, we have been astonished by the conservative nature of the themes chosen by the Paris Conference (drugs, youngsters, recidivism, community mobilization, and the media). This set of themes seems to us to be based on relatively idyllic premises, according to which the problems of the future will be more determined by individual behaviour resulting from petty and average crime than by group movements leading to violent confrontations which endanger public order. It is possible that this optimism is well-founded in
countries where ethnic conflicts have subsided and where the nature of the immigration policies is unlikely to rekindle them. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Canada (20)

In the same way, with regard to the German situation, the Gewaltkommission (Violence Commission) appointed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany envisaged, besides violence in the family and at school, violence in stadia, streets and public places, and politically motivated violence (21).

In Belgium, the mysterious Walloon Brabant affairs gave rise to a deep awareness of the problem, from which the population, the criminal system and the authorities have not yet completely recovered. Following the report by Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry on Banditism and Terrorism, the Government developed a "programme for the maintenance of order, citizens’ security and repression of criminal offences", read to the Chamber on 5th June 1990, and it devoted a major part of the Government agreement of 9th March 1992 to "an urgent programme on social problems", which certainly refers to a supportive society, a more elaborate environment policy, better immigration control and more fairness through better administration of justice, but first and foremost to a determination to "guarantee the safety of the citizen".

In Belgium, we were not used to such priority for criminological problems. Aurea mediocritas (the golden mean), as Horace said: happy the times when our studies on the feeling of insecurity (22) seemed to be a luxury and also revealed little concern and a low level of involvement on the part of the public. The Belgian Minister of Justice has since accepted that Belgium should participate in the "International Crime Survey" directed by Jan van Dijk, Pat Mayhew and Martin Killias (23), and references to surveys are increasing in public speeches. In some ways, criminologists are not very pleased when their subject tops the list of public anxieties: the United States seemed so far away.

The "urgent programme" of 1990 (24) provided for a whole series of reorganizations, involving the re-establishment of a series of democratic controls restoring the effectiveness of Parliamentary oversight on criminal policy as a whole. The Gendarmerie must be demilitarized, crime control centralized, and proceedings must be more respectful of democratic liberties.

This programme was confirmed in 1991 (25) when it was stated that the Government "intends to react rapidly to citizens’ everyday problems which daily are becoming more acute in our society".

The restoration of normal life in the great urban entities implies, according to the Government programme, "the pursuit and reinforcement of preventive action against petty crime".

Districts must respect the minimum obligations regarding security, in terms of police contribution and organization of police "rapid response" services, set by the national authority and taking account of local specifics. The reduction of the administrative tasks of the various police departments, as well as cooperation between district police forces and co-ordination between police departments, are assured".

"Moreover, the State will conclude "security agreements" allowing a better response to local needs, with priority for the large urban entities, which will include precise commitments by the security participants as well as by the State, in particular as regards finance. The districts concerned will be encouraged to set up a District Prevention and Security Commission based on a partnership of all local participants responsible for security. The Regions which participate in the financing will be associated with the development of these contracts".

"In view of its specific situation as a large urban entity and as an international capital, we shall ensure the reinforcement of cooperation and co-ordination between district police departments of the Brussels-Capital Region, in consultation with regional and local authorities, and with due respect for district autonomy".

Following the declarations of intent regarding the re-evaluation of the status and profession of police officers and the modernization of the departments, the Government will ensure "alternative punishments (work in the general interest)" "rapid verdicts on petty crime", reinforcement of help to victims, acceleration of the indemnity procedure for victims of violence, the organization of a system of penal arbitration for minor criminal offences, and sustained attention in the "struggle against drugs" and road safety.

It is true that these declarations are worded in relatively vague and reassuring political language but, beyond the words, they mark a determination to achieve a new transparency and new partnerships which give a new look to prevention in Belgium.

Belgium in the Concert of Nations

It has often been said, particularly about the Netherlands (26), that States do not exist in isolation, and that their policies are more and more interdependent. It is at international level in particular that catastrophic choices of criminal policy with regard to
drugs have been made since the beginning of the century. The cereal for prevention is also the major international trends which can cover very diverse realities. It is not only geographically that Belgium is situated between France, the Netherlands and England: as regards prevention it is adopting an intermediate model between the policies of its neighbours. Or, more exactly, one should speak of the regions of Belgium. The world is becoming more and more regional, with the advantages and dangers of this new geopolitical order. Prudently, in its 1992 agreement, the Government contended that “for reasons of budgetary constraints, it will fix priorities and will pursue collaboration with the various levels of authority (districts, provinces, communities, regions) with due respect for the present division of authorities”. In reality, that is only one aspect of a universal phenomenon Philippe Robert described as a complex dialogue between all sorts of levels of authority and, more and more, between federated States and local entities, under the protection of broader political alliances. Belgium and its regions are consequently situated in the wake of what Brown calls the “insecure societies”, and which, eventually is the common lot of mankind.

The photographic material was kindly supplied by Mr. Manuel Comerson, assistant lecturer at the University of Liège, who is directing the “fan-coaching” project launched within the context of the Liège crime prevention programme.

NOTES


(4) See S. Moureaux : Le procès des CCC est terminé, l’affaire CCC commence [The CCC trial is over, the CCC affair begins]. Journal des Procès [Trial Journal], 138 (16th November 1988), pp. 8-10.


(10) G. Kellens: Qu’a-tu fait de ton frère ? [What have you done with your brother ?]. Etudes de criminologie spéciale [Studies in special criminology]. Brussels: Mardaga, 1986, p. 96, and references quoted.


(12) Ibid.


(20) J.P. Brodeur : Bilan des connaissances au Canada [Appraisal of knowledge in Canada], in Ph. Robert (ed.): Les politiques de prévention de la délinquance à l’aune de la recherche (op. cit.).


(25) Documents parlementaires [Parliamentary Documents] 290 (91/92), Chamber 224 (91/92), Senate
