

Political Representatives in Quebec and Wallonia.
Distinct Opportunity Structures, Similar Political Classes?

1. Introduction

Who are the Quebecer and Walloon representatives? How are they recruited? And, why do they decide to enter politics? In Western advanced democracies, where parliaments are at the centre of political life, studying representatives have always fascinated political scientists. The road to parliaments – at both the federal and subnational levels – remains indeed largely a perquisite for ambitious politicians and (almost) all elites at top political positions were once in Parliament (Patzelt, 1999, p. 239). In the literature on legislative recruitment, and drawing on the distinction made by Moncrief (1999, p. 175)¹, the core questions of interest are threefold: ‘*who* goes to parliament?’, ‘*how* are they recruited there?’ and ‘*why* did they enter politics?’.

Since there are only a limited number of offices in representative democracy, the question of ‘*who*’ should represent has produced a vast debate in the literature. It is doubtless that “opportunities to serve in legislatures are quite unevenly distributed in all societies” (Matthews, 1984, p. 548). Following Pitkin (1967)’s seminal concept of “descriptive representation”, a large strand of the literature investigates the sociological background of MPs. Do MPs represent the people? In the sense, do they ‘mirror’ the people? In the wake of Rokkan’s tradition of analysis of the historical process of democratization and professionalization, this field is particularly prolific in comparative research regarding MPs’ age, occupation and education (see Best, 2007; Best & Cotta, 2000; Cotta & Best, 2007). In the meantime, many research inquiries the representation of so-called disadvantaged groups, especially minorities and the question of gender: “should blacks represent blacks and women represent women?” asked Mansbridge (1999).

A second considerable area of research concerns the process of selection of representatives. The critical question is ‘*how*’ do individuals enter Parliament? Most of the work is thus dedicated to candidates’ election and selection. The influence of legal systems and electoral systems – e.g. what is the impact of the Belgian opened PR list systems and the Canadian FPTP system? – has been particularly explored. Moreover, a special attention is given to the role of ‘gatekeepers’ and mainly political parties where they have strong roles in candidate selection such as in Belgium and Canada. Although political parties have increasingly democratized and opened the process of candidates selection (Bille, 2001), candidate selection remains largely the “secret garden of politics” (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988) that requires to be investigated.

The third line of research investigates circulation of politicians through analysis of candidates’ motivation and ambition. What does explain the longevity of some careers while several politicians leave the assembly shortly after a single mandate? Canada exposes for instance an unusually high turnover regarding other established democracies (Matland & Studlar, 2004, p. 91). In the Belgian and Canadian federal systems, MPs circulation encompasses furthermore a multi-level perspective. In terms of political careers, the Canadian

¹ This threefold distinction is not the only one. For instance, Norris (1997) presents the phase of recruitment as a model of “supply” of motivated candidates and “demands”.

and Quebecker political arenas are almost hermetic to each other whilst Belgium presents a great deal of career integration between the federal and regional levels.

Among these three lines of research, the first question of ‘descriptive representation’ is already and extensively discussed in the literature. To the question, ‘what do look like typical MPs?’, Dandoy, De Decker, and Pilet (2007, p. 14) established the ‘identikit’ of the Francophone MPs at the House of Commons after the 2007 Belgian federal elections. The typical representative is a male (64.5 per cent), aged between 45 and 54 years old (43.5 per cent), who hold a university diploma (86.9 per cent) and whom profession is politics (82.3 per cent). In other words, mature educated male with long-term careers are overrepresented in Parliament. This is of course not any Walloon specificity and a very similar situation is observed in Quebec. In these two political systems, this MPs’ profile is even stable over the period covered, except on two aspects². Firstly, there is a gentle « rejuvenation » process observable in Quebec (Paquin, 2010; Pelletier, 1991, 1999) and Wallonia (Devos, Reynaert, Valcke, & Van Liefferinge, 2012). Secondly, and more notoriously, women are not anymore the “big losers in legislative recruitment” (Matthews, 1984, p. 551), especially in Belgium. A series of electoral laws eventually turned the country, that was hitherto a “laggard” compared to other European democracies, into a genuine “leader” (Meier, 2012) through the introduction of gender quotas in 1994 and 2002 for regional, federal, and European elections. At the same moment, commissions established in Quebec to revise the electoral law also explicitly integrated in its conclusions the preoccupation of an enhanced representation of women in Parliaments (Tremblay, 2010a). Even though no specific regulation has been passed by the National Assembly, Quebec’s preoccupation on women underrepresentation is reflected in the effective greater presence of women compared to other Canadian provinces (Tremblay, 2010b). Readers interested in descriptive representation would find the detailed information in the references mentioned and in the extensive literature dedicated to MPs’ sociological background. On the contrary, the latter two questions – ‘how’ and ‘why’ are candidates entered Parliaments? – have been little explored in Canada and Belgium.

Based on an original dataset, this chapter analyses thus more extensively federal and regional Quebecker and Walloon careers since the 1990s. More specifically, it presents and explains MPs’ circulation in the two federations, with a specific focus on career maintenance (‘horizontal’ circulation) and career advancement (‘vertical’ circulation between levels). From the viewpoint of theory of representative democracy, political philosophers generally assume that a comprehensive understating of representatives ‘matters’, while for political scientists, MPs also ‘matter’ because their careers shed light on decision-making but also on the polity itself (Hibbing, 1999). In this chapter, critical information of representatives’ careers is used in order to (better) understand political class in Quebec and Wallonia. Although they are not the only member of the political class, representatives constitute its “nucleus part” (Borchert & Golsch, 1995, quoted in Stolz, 2003, p.226). After having reviewed the two concepts of career maintenance (2.1) and career advancement (2.2), it can be concluded that Quebec and Wallonia share important elements in terms of political class(es), despite the very dissimilar Canadian and Belgian opportunity structures.

² Although there are slight political party variances.

2. Quebecker and Walloon Political Class(es) in the Belgian and Canadians Opportunity Structures

The concept of political class is based on Weber (1946)'s seminal discussion of politicians who live 'off politics' and those who live 'for politics'. In this respect, the concept of political class results from the historical process of democratization and professionalization of politics. The latter created, for professionalised politicians, a "collective interest in a reliable income from politics and in a reasonable chance for career maintenance and advancement" (Borchert, 2003, p. 3)³. In a nutshell, "career politicians" who have long-term political positions differ from "citizens politicians" that experience mere short political office until they return to 'civil life' (Stolz, 2001). Importantly, this collective interest (money and long-term job) transgresses party lines: politicians form a class in itself (structural dimension). Political class is though not limited to this collective interest, i.e. the structural dimension is a necessary but not a sufficient condition; it furthermore encompasses a cognitive and habitual dimension: "one may characterize those who live off politics as a 'class in itself' (structural dimension). Once their class consciousness (cognitive dimension) arises and they begin to act collectively according to their common interest, they develop into a 'class for itself' (habitual dimension) (Stolz, 2001, p. 83). A final conceptual element is that political class includes 'backbenchers' and 'staff' (Von Beyme, 1996) – e.g. the very well-known members of cabinet in Belgium (Dewachter, 2001, p. 293).

This chapter is restricted to the analysis of the members of Parliaments and governments on the structural dimension, *career maintenance* and *career advancement*, in order to assess the political class(es) in Quebec and Wallonia⁴. The information gathered embody all the 613 individual Quebecker careers (since 1994) and 419 Walloon careers (since 1991). Those 1032 units collected forms hence a comprehensive data for the period covered, i.e. this is not a sample. Political paths under examination are directly elected offices. It thus excludes nominated senators in Canada and focuses only on the House of Commons (Table X). For each legislature, the exact number of Member of the National Assembly (MNAs) as well as the Member of the Federal Parliaments (MFPs, i.e. only the Canadian House of Commons) is given. Consequently, the number of by-elections can be estimated since it often exceeds the number of seats in the assembly (mentioned into brackets).

Table X. Quebecker political careers at the provincial and federal levels since 1994

National Assembly (125 seats)		Canadian House of Commons (75 seats)	
1994-1998	136 MNAs	1994-1997	80 MFPs
1998-2003	136 MNAs	1997-2001	79 MFPs
2003-2007	133 MNAs	2001-2004	81 MFPs
2007-2008	130 MNAs	2004-2006	75 MFPs
2008-2012	131 MNAs	2006-2008	79 MFPs
2012- ...	125 MNAs	2008-2011	77 MFPs
-	-	2011- ...	75 MFPs

³ See the former German version in co-author with Golsch (Borchert & Golsch, 1995: 612).

⁴ Considering the hitherto incomplete and restricted data on the latter members,

Note: Data gathered until September 2012; *Source:* author's own compilation of Parliaments reports.

Table X. Walloon Political Careers since 1991

Walloon parliament (75 seats)		Federal Parliament (variables seats)		European Parliament (variables seats)	
-	-	1991-1995	142 MFPs (68 S/74 CH)	-	-
1995-1999	89 MFPs	1995-1999	75 MFPs (19 S/56 CH)	1994-1999	10 MEPs
1999-2004	98 MFPs	1999-2003	74 MFPs (12 S/62 CH)	1999-2004	14 MEPs
2004-2009	92 MFPs	2003-2007	92 MFPs (14 S/72 CH)	2004-2009	11 MEPs
2009-2014	89 MFPs	2007-2010	90 MFPs (16 S/74 CH)	2009-2014	9 MEPs
-	-	2010-...	71 MFPs (13 S/58 CH)	-	-

Note: Data gathered until June 2012; *Source:* author's own compilation of Parliaments reports. Walloon local offices completed with biographical encyclopaedia of Walloon Parliamentarians (Delforge, 2010).

For Walloon careers (table X), there are two more specific precisions to underline. One the one hand, it concerns Walloon careers only that has to be distinguished from the Francophone politicians who constitutes a larger group (Walloon and Brussels careers). One the other hand, it includes Walloon candidates who hold an office in the European Parliament. A final methodological consideration that does not appear on the table is that governmental appointments, even those without any former parliamentary experience, are counted.

2.1 Career Maintenance: Renewal of Political Personnel in Parliaments

As states Borchert (2011, p. 120), “the attempt to safeguard one’s career against any outside forces that may endanger it is a natural trait of any profession, as the literature on the sociology of professions has amply demonstrated. You must have a reasonable chance of staying on. Otherwise the investment that is linked with switching from whatever you did before to politics is not justifiable”. As any other professions, turnover is probably the most common indicator used to measure career maintenance⁵.

A typical definition is “the aggregate level of exit, from one general election to the next, of elected candidates in the popularly elected lower house of the legislature in a bicameral system or the sole chamber in a unicameral one”. The reality of elite circulation is however very distorted in such narrow definition (Vanlangenakker & Maddens, 2011)⁶. Firstly, by measuring turnover sequentially (from one election to the next), it prevents the measurement of changes between two elections. While changes are minor incidences in Canada, they occur very often during legislatures in Belgium. Secondly, the focus on winning candidates instead of candidates who effectively hold an office is an additional source of bias.

⁵ There are though distinct ways to operationalize turnover as well as present results. Depending on what is under investigation, some wants to know the number of people who leave an organisation while other looks at the number of individuals who integrate it Those views are often – albeit not always – the inversed mirror of the other. More problematic is the distinct ways to operationalize the turnover (see for instance Somit, Wildenmann, Boll, & Rommele, 1994).

⁶ Most research acknowledges those current problems without proposing any other measurement either due to explicit path dependency (maintaining comparison with former research) or implicit lack of time and resources to adjust the data.

In Belgium, where constitutional system prohibits the accumulation of parliamentary and executive offices, data collection is strongly affected after government formation. In most research, it is nonetheless the members of government who hardly sit a couple of days in Parliament who are considered; in practice, successors from a list of substitutes eventually hold the office for the entire legislature.

In order to avoid these pitfalls, the measure used in this chapter is the ratio of newly elected MPs only (i.e. MPs with former parliamentary experience are excluded). It is counted at the beginning of the session (although just after government formation) and at the end of the session (in order to observe changes). Table X presents the overall ratios of newly elected MPs for each Parliament for the period covered. A first striking observation is the great variation of primo Quebecers MPs represented in the House of Commons: although the mean (38.8) is similar to all the other Parliaments, the 26.71 standard deviation indicates huge fluctuations. In fact, the higher percentage of primo MPs is 80.0 in 1994 whereas the smaller value observed is 13.3 per cent in 2001. Interestingly, the values are not that important for the National Assembly. At the beginning of the session, the ratio is very similar to the observations in the Walloon Parliament and the Belgian federal parliament (mean ranges from 36.3 to 38.8) associated with a small standard deviations (2.8 to 8.31).

Table X. Proportion of Newly Elected Members of Parliament since 1992 (Wallonia) and since 1994 (Quebec)

Beginning of the session	Min	Max	Mean	sd	n elect.
NAQ	27.2	44.0	36.3	6.5	6
WP	33.3	40.0	36.0	2.8	4
HC	13.3	80.0	38.8	26.7	7
FP	21.0	39.3	28.2	8.3	6
End of the session	Min	Max	Mean	sd	n elect.
NAQ	27.2	49.6	38.8	7.6	6
WP	36.0	45.3	40.3	3.8	4
HC	14.7	80.0	41.1	25.0	7
FP	27.4	52.6	35.0	8.4	5

Source: Author's own calculations; *Key:* NAQ= National assembly of Quebec; WP= Walloon Parliament; HC= Canadian House of Commons; FP=Belgian Federal Parliament.

A second salient observation is the substantial difference in the percentage of primo elected MPs in Wallonia between elections. Compared to the beginning of the legislature, the average number of newly elected Walloon federal representatives is almost 6.8 per cent higher (from 28.2 to 35.0) than at the end of the legislature. While it is less pronounced at the Walloon Parliament, there is still a 5.1 difference. Not only does this demonstrate the importance of measuring incumbency at the beginning and at the end of the session, but it also already reveals the importance of changes during the session in Wallonia. As described in the next section, inter-territory movements are one of the major causes of those changes.

The puzzling high renewal of Canadian political personnel – mainly at the federal level but also at the provincial level – has always fascinated political scientists (Atkinson & Docherty, 1992; Kerby & Blidook, 2011; Moncrief, 1994, 1998). On the contrary, Belgium usually experiences averaged turnover in comparative research (e.g. Matland & Studlar, 2004,

p. 93) and there was thus little specific interest for that question (but see recently Vanlangenakker & Maddens, 2011). The first intuitive explanation for turnover is electoral results, i.e. ‘involuntary’ departure. In free and fair elections, the bigger the electoral volatility, the larger the likelihood of high turnover (Rosenthal, 1974, p. 613). The Pedersen index that ranges from 0 to 100, is a good proxy to measure the extent of electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1979)⁷. In order to assess its impact on turnover, the index is here calculated on seats transfers instead of votes transfers. The 0-value in the index means no net seat swing among parties while 100 indicates a complete reallocation of seats between two elections. In Wallonia, the average seat volatility index is of 13.5 (Federal Parliament) and 11.2 (Walloon Parliament). The latter two are largely influenced by the Greens’ dramatic electoral defeat at the 2003 federal elections and at the 2004 regional elections. Although the volatility index is higher at the provincial elections in Quebec (average index of 22.4), it almost triples for the House of Commons (average index of 32.4).

The critical swing of seats following the 1993 federal elections (index scores is 82.4), which resulted in the election of a massive cohort of Bloc Québécois (BQ) in the House of Commons while the Conservatives were decimated, is not an exception but a general trend of federal elections in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada. Since 1994, each election witnesses large swings of seats between the BQ and the Liberal party of Quebec (LPQ) while the astonishing success of the New Democratic Party (NPD) in 2011 only confirms the extreme high seats volatility (index equals 77.3). In fact, compared to other democracies using the FPTP system (such as the US and the UK), there are hardly a few safe seats. The electoral volatility is however not the mere factor explicating high turnover in Canada. In their comparative study, Matland and Studlar (2004, p. 105) demonstrate indeed that this country remains an “outlier” for which specific factors have to be found to elucidate the Canadian’s exceptionality. Amateurism of the Canadian House of Commons is often mentioned (Atkinson & Docherty, 1992). The problem with such explanation is that turnover is both an independent and dependent variable (higher turnover prevents professionalized assembly while amateurism caused high turnover).


‘Voluntary’ turnover appears therefore to be a complementary explanation. And, according to Kerby and Blidook (2011, p. 636)’s recent findings, Quebecker MPs in the House of Commons are indeed more likely to voluntary exist compared to MPs from other provinces. Despite recent positive evolutions (Blidook, 2010), the poor incentives of the assembly along with party discipline that severely constraints MPs’ freedom of speech and legislative behaviour usually explain frustration, disillusion, and disengagement (especially for those who are ultimately never called into Cabinet). Overall, “[u]nlike Jimmy Stewart in Washington, the majority of the men and women who go to Ottawa end up accepting a limited policy role” (Docherty, 1997). In this regard, Wallonia and Belgium in general has received little attention on voluntary turnover (but see Vanlangenakker & Maddens, 2011). It is not very surprising since the Belgian political system is often labelled as a “partitocracy” that reserves a predominant role to political parties for all delegation of power (De Winter, Della

⁷ The index measures the “net change within the electoral part y system resulting from individual vote transfers”. It divides by two the sum of absolute values of the differences in seats or votes shares from all the parties between two elections. Source: Own calculations.

Porta, & Deschouwer, 1996). The consequence was thus little scientific interest on the legislative class (De Winter & Brans, 2003: 43).

The measurement of turnover gives interesting clues but remains nevertheless a mere proxy of career maintenance and, therefore, of political class. The problem lies also in the interpretation: high turnover does not systematically go with high professionalization, and reversibly (Hibbing, 1991, p. 22). On the top of this, turnover is only an aggregate measure per legislature at a specific moment in time; it does not encompass the individual maintenance in diachronic perspective (i.e. length of careers). In this respect, it is worth standing down at a micro level and measuring career maintenance at an individual level (Figure X presents the frequency of number offices hold per individuals). In the average, Quebecer and Walloon politicians have very similar parliamentary experience (2.55 and 2.85 offices) in the average. Furthermore, in terms of statistical distribution, 81.6 per cent of the Quebecers had four parliamentary offices while they are 75.1 per cent in Wallonia.

Figure X. Frequency of the number of offices hold
(From 1 to 12 offices, in percentage of MPs)



Source: Own calculation.

The number of offices hold is yet affected by the cycle and rhythm of elections. The Walloon Parliament has a fixed five-year legislature without possibility of dissolution while the Federal Parliament has a maximum of four-year legislature, but with possibility of anticipated elections (except for the 2010 federal elections, all legislatures had a four-year term)⁸. On the contrary, the House of Commons and the National Assembly of Quebec present a max length of five years with possible anticipated elections. The Canada Elections Act, 56.1, amended in 2007 however disposes of a fixed term for the federal Parliament after 19 October 2009 (Fabre, 2010, p. 184). Due to regular anticipated elections, the average length of legislature is thus of 2.92 years at Ottawa since 1994 (3.06 since 1979) and of 3.35 in Quebec (3.63 since 1970). Simple descriptions of frequency still miss to provide critical information on whether it concerns MPs at the federal and subnational levels, or even those

⁸ Legally speaking, all legislatures since 1992 were anticipated by declaration of revision of the Constitution. In fact, this declaration was however passed at the very end of the legislature.

who hold an office in both assemblies. To this end, the next section embodies individual analysis of career advancement in a multi-level perspective.

2.2. Career Advancement: Political Circulation in Mutli-Level Systems


The gargantuan American literature dominated studies on political careers whereas it was little explored in other Western democracies (Patzelt, 1999). Recently, Docherty (2011, p. 186) rightly stated that “there has been little analytical work on the Canadian political career”. And, arguably, even less on Quebecker political careers *per se*. Since the end of the 1990s, Walloon political careers have though received a greater attention (Fiers. 2001; Pilet. Fiers. & Steyvers. 2007; Vanlangenakker. Maddens. & Put. 2010). More generally, the recent process of regionalisation and federalisation in Western Europe has renewed the interest for political careers, not only for newly regionalised unitary states but also for established federations (Stolz, 2003).

Recent research has notably challenged the ‘classic springboard’ model. Initially conceptualized by Schlesinger (1966) in the US, this model assumes that ambitious candidates progress from the local to the state level and eventually to the national level (box 1 on figure X). On the contrary, in newly regionalised and federalized Western democracies, with strong demands from regionalist and nationalist parties to reorganize the territorial structure of the state, one can assume that “regionalism matters for professional careers” (Stolz, 2011, p. 224). In this respect, careers might follow the exact reversed path – “inverse springboard” – toward the subnational assemblies that have the most attractive offices (Box 4). In the models 1 and 4, the ratio of “centripetal movements” towards the national level and the fraction of “centrifugal movements” to the subnational are the indicators used and all political careers go to a mere direction, either the national or the subnational political arena.

An intermediary situation is that both the national and subnational parliaments expose coveted positions (Box 2). In this context, distinct ambitious candidates seek different position: there are the nationally-oriented and the regionally-oriented politicians. In the two cases, there are distinct “alternative careers” that present low centrifugal and low centripetal transfers. Advancement prerequisites “a hierarchical layering of positions” (Borchert & Stolz. 2011) but in the fourth model, and contrary to the first three career patterns, the national and subnational levels are very connected. Careers are integrated with a high ratio of movements towards the national and towards the subnational level (Box 3).

Figure X. Stolz’s Matrix of Career Patterns in Multi-Level Systems

	High centripetal ratios	Low centripetal ratios
Low centrifugal ratios	(1) Classic springboard	(2) Alternative Careers



Source: Stolz (2003, 2010)

2.2.1. Integrated careers

Fiers (2001)'s concept of level-hopping movements, is a good indicator to integrated careers. Contrary to other concepts examining vertical circulation, e.g. "stepping stone" towards national Parliament, this definition includes movements between institutions and to any directions. Affined by Vanlangenakker, Maddens, and Put (2010), level-hoppers are defined as politicians who "resign an office on one level to take up one upon the other level". For instance, MPs that resigns at one level to become either members of parliament or member of government at another level are considered to provoke inter-territory movements. In Canadian words, level-hoppers are those who 'cross the floor'.

In this respect, Wallonia and Quebec strongly diverge in terms of magnitude of level-hopping movements (table X). Overall, 78 transfers are observed in Wallonia since 1995: 31 are centripetal movements (from regional to federal) whilst 47 are centrifugal movements (from federal towards regional). On the contrary, hardly six Quebecker politicians resigned to cross the floor. However, once past parliamentary experiences are complementary taken into considerations, there are 14 former MNAQs who entered the House of Commons and 7 former federal parliamentarians became MNAs. Likewise in many other Canadian provinces, it confirms that "career mobility from provincial to national office is the exception rather than the rule" (Barrie & Gibbins, 1989, p. 138). For the sake of clarity, European careers are not illustrated on table X but there are 13 level-hopping movements from and towards the European Parliament.

Besides, table X underlines the amount of level-hoppers excluding the 'peculiarity' of the 1995 Walloon Parliament which represents the first direct election of regional MPs⁹. At that moment, 50 national MPs 'left' to the Walloon Parliament. Actually, there were 54 when four MPs with a former national experience are also counted. The six remaining level-hopping movements (out of the 60 indicated in table X) are transfers during the 1995-1999 legislature.

Table X. Level-hopping Movements in Wallonia and Quebec

Elections	Federal	Wallonia	Elections	Federal	Quebec
1995-1999 F	9	←	1994-1997 F	3	←
1995-1999 W		→ 60	1994-1998 Q		→ 1
1999-2003 F	2	←	1997-2000 F	2	←
1999-2004 W		→ 16	1998-2003 Q		→ 2

⁹ Contrary to the established Canadian federation, the Belgian federation is indeed very young and regional Parliament were not composed of directly elected MPs before 1995; national MPs hold instead a seat in regional assemblies between 1970 and 1995. The large amount of level-hoppers in 1995 was furthermore enhanced by the reduction of federal offices by two for the 1995 elections (for more details see Dodeigne, 2012).

2003-2007 F	10	←		2001-2004 F	3	←	
2004-2009 W		→	23	2003-2007 Q		→	2
2007-2010 F	10	←		2004-2008 FF	5	←	
2009-2014 W		→	2	2007-2008 Q		→	1
2010-... F		←		2008-2011 F	1	←	
Total	31		101	2012-... Q		→	1
Total but 1995 F	31		47	Total	14		7

Although level-hopping movements are very limited in Quebec, they are all caused by distinct individuals while in Wallonia, the 78 level-hopping movements are the result of solely 50 individuals. Actually, 18 individuals caused 59.7 per cent of these movements. In other words, although level-hopping movements are much more frequent in Wallonia, the number of level-hoppers involved is slightly similar to Quebec. In percentage, Quebecers politicians with a multi-level experience represent 4.3 per cent of all the careers examined while they account for 19.6 per cent of all the Walloon careers. Yet, it drops to 6.4 once the analysis is limited to the 18 politicians who caused most of it. The latter are indeed ‘major’ figures of Walloon politics and, except two parliamentarians with level-hopping experiences, they are all federal and regional members of governments. Hence, Walloon parties select federal MPs to become Members of the regional governments (and reversibly, regional MPs are called into the federal government).

Precisely, one of the major factors explaining the distinguished degree of level-hopping in the two federations is the party system. With the shock of the 1993 federal elections, “[n]ational parties, national politics, and national electoral competition no longer existed in a Canada that was deeply divided and regionally fragmented” (Carty, Cross, & Young, 2000). In Belgium too, former national parties disaggregated at the end of the 1960/70s and political parties are now divided along the community line. Consequently, Wallonia has a regionalized party system and regional parties only (Brack & Pilet, 2010). The peculiarity being that the (same) four main political parties – the Socialists (PS), the Liberals (MR), the Christian Democrats (cdH) and the Greens (Ecolo) – present list of candidates at the regional and federal elections (the same is perfectly true in Flanders). While there are also different political landscapes across Canada, there is an additional division within Quebec: distinct parties present compete at the provincial and the federal elections. On the one hand, the provincial arena has the Parti Québécois (PQ), the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP), the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) that merged with the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ). On the other hand, the federal level has the Liberal party (LP), the Bloc Québécois (BQ), the refunded Progressive Conservative Party (PC), and the New Democratic Party (NDP).

In terms of level-hopping movements, it is thus clearly ‘easier’ for candidates to move between levels in Wallonia within the same party. In Quebec, where parties do not match between the federal and provincial levels, it is on the contrary ‘harder’ to cross the floor. Even the Liberals that presents candidates at Ottawa and Quebec has a loose integrated structure, or even a confederal structure (Detterbeck, 2011, p. 259), with the PLQ enjoying a great autonomy. Actually, it is still correct to assert that “no other provincial party system in Canada is as distinct from the federal system as Québec’s” (Rayside, 1978, p. 500). For

Docherty (2011), the aftermath of 1993 elections has even produced the rise of “free agents”. In other words, once politicians cross the floor, they switch parties. Out of the 21 Quebecers level-hoppers mentioned in table X, nine joined in fact another party in doing so.

Depending on the electoral strategy, Walloon political parties draw, therefore, candidates from a parliament, and sometimes extensively, to set up their lists of candidates at another level. The 2014 (scheduled) electoral rules will probably affect electoral strategy and reduce the possibility of level-hopping movements. The governmental agreement of December 2011 stipulates that candidates automatically resign from their current offices if they are elected at another level. This regulation will be closer to the Canadian electoral rules which provide that federal candidates must resign before they run for provincial elections (Docherty, 2011, p. 192) .

In conclusion, Wallonia and Quebec have, therefore, rather limited integrated careers in terms of individuals involved but also in terms of percentage. The latter findings question therefore existing research that labels Wallonia – and Flanders – as a good example of the integrated pattern (Vanlangenakker et al., 2010). Level-hopping movements should however not be overlooked but all individual careers should be categorised (Dodeigne, 2012). Overall, even in Wallonia, 80.4 per cent of all the political careers remain to be classified. It is indeed highly plausible to observe, in addition to the integrated careers patterns, politicians with other kind of careers (e.g. federal and/or provincial and regional careers). In other words, a region, a province or even a country might present distinct political classes considering other careers pattern. Let us first examine alternative careers.

2.2.3 Alternative careers

Politicians who never experienced multi-level experience and remains solely at the federal level or the subnational level are considered as having alternative federal pattern and alternative subnational pattern (Dodeigne, 2012). This categorization requires however to consider the length of careers. Federal MPs with one-year parliamentary experience hardly present the characteristic of federal alternative careers; they fall even less into the category of a federal political class. In this respect, a minimum of two mandates is used to distinguish individuals with discrete careers (“citizens politicians”) and professionalized politicians (“careers politicians”). In addition to the number of successful elections (or successions), the effective length of careers is controlled. This control variable is indispensable for Wallonia as frequent changes occur during sessions as mentioned before.

Table X gives the proportion of political careers according to three distinct patterns: *integrated* careers already described; *alternative* careers that gather politicians who experienced at least two entire legislatures in the federal or subnational parliaments; and finally, the *discrete* careers pattern represent individuals who completed less than two legislatures (discussed latter in the chapter)¹⁰. Once again, for the sake of clarity, the three European alternative careers are taken into consideration but not presented in table X.

¹⁰ Current MPs that do not already fall into one of the pattern cannot be categorized and only future elections will determine their career (e.g. current careers will turn alternative if MPs successfully run for another office or integrated if they move to another level or discrete if they stop politics at this stage).

At first glance, it remarkable to notice how the dual Canadian party system might reinforce the creation of differentiated political classes. While Quebecers parties expose blank cases, Walloon parties present percentages for all their cases.

Table X. Political Careers Patterns in Wallonia and Quebec (1992-2012)
(In percentage)

	Integrated Career	Alternative Federal	Alternative Subnational	Discrete Careers	n	Current/ Others
Wallonia	cdH	23.2	23.2	19.6	33.9	56 24
	Ecolo	8.9	11.1	8.9	71.1	45 20
	MR	18.2	27.3	19.5	35.1	77 26
	PS	26.1	28.3	20.7	25.0	92 67
	Others	-	-	10.0	90.0	10 2
	All (percentage)	19.6	23.2	17.9	39.3	280 139
Averaged length (years)		13.5	13.4	12.0	3.6	- -
Quebec	PL/PLQ	3.9	19.7	45.5	30.9	178 22
	PQ	4.1	-	68.6	27.3	121 33
	ADQ/CAQ	-	-	17.0	83.0	47 14
	QS	-	-	-	-	0 2
	P.C.	14.3	71.4	-	14.3	14 -
	NPD	100	-	-	-	1 58
	BQ	5.4	62.5	-	32.1	112 1
	Indep.	-	10.0	60.0	30.0	10 -
All (in percentage)		4.3	24.0	36.9	34.8	483 130
Averaged length (years)		13.4	10.8	12.0	3.1	- -

Source: author's own calculations. *Note:* in case of party changes, counts are for politicians' last affiliation.

Quebecker federal political class is hence principally constituted of B.Q.-MPs (n=70 MPs) and PL-MPs (n=35) and complemented more marginally by P.C.-MPs (n=10) who have, in the average, a political experience of 10.8 years in Parliament. In this respect, the proportion of alternative federal careers is almost perfectly identical in Quebec (24. per cent) and in Wallonia (23.2 per cent). In the latter region, the two biggest parties, the PS (n=26) and the MR (n=21), form the major part of this federal political class while cdH (n=13) and Ecolo (n=5) have a smaller class. Yet, in relative proportion, all parties have similar proportion (around 25 percent). The mere exception is Ecolo with only 11.1 percent of alternative federal MPs but the very high proportion of discrete careers explains why the parties have consequently relative lower fractions in other careers patterns. In terms of length of career, it is also very comparable to Quebec with Walloon MPs having in the average 3.37 mandates and 13 years of parliamentary experience.

The proportion of alternative subnational careers varies on the contrary greatly across the two cases: the percentage of Quebecker provincial careers (36.9 per cent) is twice the size of Walloon regional careers (17.9 per cent). However, the average experience in the Walloon Parliament and the National Assembly matches perfectly between the two cases (12 years). Considering that the Walloon Parliament is a very young institution and that the integrated pattern is relative high, it is not that surprising to observe such difference with Quebec; the latter having a secular provincial assembly. The fact that all Walloon parties have almost the exact proportion of MPs in this category (around 20 per cent, except again the notorious case

of Ecolo) validates the possibility that there is a general ongoing trend toward the formation of a regional political class, complementary to the integrated and federal political classes. Finally, in Quebec, the greater proportion of alternative provincial careers demonstrates how the National Assembly seems an attractive institution to pursue a political career, at least for the PQ and PLQ. Interestingly, the absence of P.C. alternative provincial careers indicates its structural difficulties to obtain a regular provincial representation in the National Assembly despite its state-wide electoral ambition.

2.2.4. Discrete Careers

A striking observation in table X is the large proportion of discrete careers in the two democracies. It forms the most important pattern in Wallonia (39.3 per cent) and in the second biggest group in Quebec (34.8 per cent). This pattern is however not present in equal proportion across parties. In the two democracies under examination, a “third” (Lipset, 1990) or “protest” party, that directly challenged the established parties on the federal and/or subnational arena, presents indeed disproportionate fractions of discrete careers: 71.1 per cent of the greens careers (Ecolo) in Wallonia and 83.0 per cent of the ADQ/CAQ in Quebec. In the two cases, ephemeral electoral successes explain it.

At the 1999 “monster” elections (Fitzmaurice, 2004), joint federal and regional (but also European) elections, Ecolo achieved exceptional electoral results regarding their past experience but also compared to European Green parties (Delwit & Pilet, 2005). After their participation in the regional and federal governments (Buelens & Deschouwer, 2002)¹¹, the green (Bélanger, 2009)s’ electoral results dramatically collapse. Electoral volatility associated with Greens’ internal party rules preventing career maintenance (Bouhon, Reuchamps, & Dodeigne, 2012) are the two major reasons for Ecolo’s unbalanced proportion towards discrete patterns. Similarly, the unique 2007 electoral success of the ADQ (41 seats) permitted the party to be officially recognized by the federal government while it became the official opposition in the National Assembly. The success was so destabilizing for the other two traditional parties, that for the first time since 1879, a minority government lead by the Liberal Charest was formed in Quebec (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2007). The Next provincial election was however terribly delusive and the ADQ come back to its ‘classical’ electoral results (7 seats) in 2009 (Bélanger, 2009) .

Nevertheless, discrete careers do not always reflect amateur politicians, especially in Wallonia. If discrete politicians are certainly not careers politicians oriented toward the federal and the Walloon Parliaments, most of them are nevertheless professional of politics. Following Jones (2002)’s formulation, they are “amateurs legislators” but “professional politicians”. And in this case, they are part of the municipal political class. A large proportion of MPs with a discrete profile has indeed a local executive office – with often strong grassroots – *prior* to their election in the Walloon and federal Parliaments (table X). A local position they held *during* their parliamentary mandate (simultaneity of offices) while most of them return to these municipal offices *after* their Parliamentary experience.

¹¹ They were however not part of the coalition in the Brussels-Capital Region.

Table 5. MPs-Discreet profile' Executive Local Offices

Municip. Pop.	N	Municip. Pop	n
<10.000	10	>30.000	6
10.000-15.000	6	>50.000	1
15.000-20.000	7	>75.000	1
20.000-25.000	6	>100.000	1
25.000-30.000	1	175.000-200.000	2

Source: author's own calculations.

Once we exclude the Greens discrete careers (largely caused by the electoral volatility while this party prohibits the accumulation of an executive local office with a parliamentary position), 54.96 per cent of the MPs with discrete careers effectively return to an executive local office after their Parliamentary experience. And, executive local offices provide a relatively well-professionalised status in terms of income, local popularity, and personal as well as political rewards (60.9 per cent of them have a position in the local executive cabinet in municipalities bigger than 15.000 inhabitants).

Conclusion

This chapter sought to offer a portrait of MPs' careers since 1992 and 1994. Ultimately, what can be drawn from those findings? Once Quebecker and Walloon political careers are compared, there is a first striking difference: while a significant portion of the Walloon politicians go and come between the regional and the federal parliaments, MPs hardly cross the floor in Quebec. And when they switch levels, almost half of them changed party. On the contrary, level-hopping movements in Wallonia are observed exclusively within party: they are caused by and for the party's strategy. In this respect, Quebec is a "small world" (Hepburn, 2010) with strongly divided federal and provincial political landscapes while Wallonia has an interconnected political life between levels of government.

Nonetheless, once individuals are more scrupulously analyzed, it appears that the two political systems share more than they differ from each other. Firstly, once politicians who caused level-hopping movements are counted rather than the overall number of movements, the integrated careers pattern has to be put into perspective. If the integrated politicians still represent an important fraction of all Walloon political careers, they are largely limited to a particular class of politicians: the member of governments. Secondly, and more importantly in terms of comparison, Quebec and Wallonia present nearly equal amount of alternative federal careers while they also share a very comparable percentage of discrete careers. Finally, Quebecker provincial careers are twice the size of Walloon regional careers. Yet, compared to the secular National Assembly, it is important to underline that a significant fraction of alternative regional careers emerged hardly 15 years after its first direct election.

In conclusion, if careers maintenance and careers advancement are core concept of political class, it can be concluded that more than a third of all parliamentarians – those with a short legislative experience – are not part of the political class. The particularity of Wallonia is however that most of the politicians with discrete careers form a 'municipal' political class. A second Walloon particularity is the existence of an integrated political class but mainly for

the top political positions, i.e. the governmental positions. A third and final important lesson is the existence of two other major political classes: based on their career maintenance (between 10 and 14 years), there are clearly a federal and a subnational political class in the two democracies. It is not a very surprising for Quebec, especially in view of the low ratio of level-hopping movements. In the literature, it is however much less common to reach such conclusion for Wallonia since the high visibility of the integrated political class tends to hide the federal and regional political classes.

Career maintenance and advancement are necessary but not sufficient conditions. It remains to assess whether or not politicians with careers patterns also embody the ‘cognitive’ and ‘habitual’ dimensions. This was thus only a methodological prelude for further comparative research on political class.

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